1943 in history. The Great Patriotic War. The turning point (1943). Declaration of the United Nations

network mini-encyclopedia of a patriot of Russia

Developed by the editors of the publication "Science. Society. Defense" in order to consecrate the events of 1943 during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, information support for the preparation and holding of other patriotic events related to the 75th anniversary of the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad, the Battle of Kursk, air battles in the Kuban, the battle for the Dnieper, the end of the battle for the Caucasus, the founding of the Suvorov military and Nakhimov naval schools, the Tehran Conference, the establishment of the European Advisory Commission, other events of the Great Patriotic and World War II.

By the second half of November 1942, the situation in the USSR remained difficult. The enemy stood at Voronezh, Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus, captured the most important economic regions of the country, was located 150-200 km from Moscow, blockaded Leningrad. length front reached 6200 km. The second front was not opened, which allowed the German command to transfer about 80 divisions to the East during the summer and autumn of 1942.

As a result, the Soviet troops were opposed by 258 divisions and 16 brigades (over 6.2 million people, about 52 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3.5 thousand combat aircraft and up to 200 warships ). Soviet active army and navy counted approx. 6 million people, 78 thousand guns and mortars, 7 thousand tanks, more than 3.2 thousand combat aircraft; fleets - 440 thousand people, St. 300 warships and 757 aircraft. In the Baltic and Black Sea theaters of war Soviet fleets outnumbered the enemy, but the latter had a great advantage in basing and air supremacy. In the Barents and Norwegian Seas, the German fleet had a significant overall superiority.

The main tasks that faced the Soviet Union in the second period of the war (November 19, 1942 - the end of 1943) were: seizing the strategic initiative and creating a turning point in the war, liberating Soviet territory, political struggle for the opening of a second front, activation of anti-fascist forces worldwide. This period included winter campaign 1942/43, summer-autumn campaign 1943 and operational-strategic pause (1.4 - 30.6.1943).

By the autumn of 1942, due to the growth of technical equipment Red Army and fleet, on the basis of a generalization of the experience of the war, their organization was also improved. A single staff of a rifle division was established, and the formation of tank and mechanized corps and tank armies of mixed composition began according to the new staff. Artillery divisions were created RVGK, guards heavy mortar divisions, anti-aircraft artillery divisions. The formation of air armies was completed. IN Navy increased the number of aircraft, torpedo boats, patrol ships, means of coastal defense and air defense. Improved structure Air Defense Forces of the country. The task of creating strategic reserves was successfully solved. undergone a radical reorganization engineering troops And Signal Corps. New guidelines were put into effect.

One of the historical stages on the way to victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany appeared Battle of Stalingrad 1942–43, the victory in which marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The strategic initiative passed to the Soviet Armed Forces. This victory was of great international significance: thanks to it, the struggle of the peoples of Europe against the invaders intensified, Turkey and Japan abandoned their original intention to oppose the USSR, and the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.

In January 1943, the Red Army went on the offensive in the North Caucasus and advanced 500-600 km, liberating most of this region (see. Battle for the Caucasus 1942–43). In January-February, having defeated the Italian-German-Hungarian grouping on the Upper Don, the formations of Soviet troops pursued the retreating enemy in the Donbass. At the same time, their communications turned out to be excessively stretched, they broke away from the supply bases, which was not taken into account in the Voronezh-Kharkov direction, where the Red Army offensive was developing in order to reach the Dnieper. As a result, having gained superiority in forces and undertaking successive counteroffensives in these directions, the enemy again captured Kharkov and Belgorod.

At the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops stopped the enemy. With approach reserves The stakes of the front stabilized, forming the southern face of the Kursk salient. By February 1943, part of the troops that had taken part in the liquidation of the enemy group near Stalingrad had arrived in the area northwest of Kursk. In the second half of March, an offensive began in the direction of Bryansk, covering the right flank of the central German grouping. As a result, the northern face of the Kursk Bulge was formed. Active military operations were also carried out in other directions. In the period from 12 to 18 January was carried out breaking the blockade of Leningrad. The enemy was forced to leave the Demyansky bridgehead and the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. In February - March 1943, the Krasnodar operation was carried out.

To make up for losses, the command Wehrmacht transferred to the East St. 34 divisions, part of the aviation, a significant amount of weapons and military equipment. Active actions of the Soviet Armed Forces made it easier for the Anglo-American troops to advance in North Africa, landing on Sicily and southern Italy.

The operational-strategic pause that came in the spring of 1943 was used by the Soviet command to prepare for the struggle to hold the initiative and complete the radical turning point in the war.

The army received more and more military equipment and weapons. By July 1943, compared with April, the number of guns and mortars increased by almost 23 thousand, tanks and self-propelled guns - by more than 5 thousand, combat aircraft - by more than 4.3 thousand.

The reorganization of the army continued. Rifle troops were transferred to a corps organization, tank armies were created, consisting only of tank and mechanized corps. In the artillery of the RVGK, breakthrough artillery corps and destroyer anti-tank artillery brigades were formed. By the end of 1943, 12 RVGK aviation corps and 15 separate air divisions were additionally created. By summer, there were 8 combined arms, 3 tank and 1 air armies in the strategic reserve. At the same time, formations were created on the territory of the USSR from representatives of the peoples of European countries (see. Foreign military formations).

The enemy by this time still possessed great power. Germany and its allies conducted a total mobilization, sharply increased the output of military products. The vast majority of human and material resources were directed to Soviet-German front. However, the balance of power was already in favor of the USSR.

The German command, seeking to seize the strategic initiative again, decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. It intended to defeat the Soviet troops here, and then, developing success in the northeast direction, to go deep in the rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow.

Having information about the impending attack of the enemy, VGK rate in April adopted a preliminary, and in June the final decision on the transition to a deliberate defense on the Kursk salient (see. Battle of Kursk 1943). It was planned to break the enemy tank groups, and then go to counteroffensive and crush him. Further, a general offensive was planned in the western and southwestern strategic directions. From April to June 1943, active military operations were not conducted by ground troops on the Soviet-German front. However, major air battles unfolded on the southern sector of the front (see Fig. Air battles in the Kuban 1943). In May-June there were air operations with the aim of defeating German aviation in the central and southwestern directions, in which the enemy suffered significant losses. As a result, at the beginning of the summer of 1943, objective prerequisites were created for gaining strategic air supremacy.

The main hostilities on the Kursk Bulge began with the enemy offensive on July 5. Stubbornly defending, the Soviet troops stopped the enemy strike groups and on July 12-15 launched a counteroffensive in the Oryol, and on August 3 in the Belgorod-Kharkov directions. As a result, the enemy was thrown back to the west by 140–150 km. Germany's last attempt to seize the strategic initiative in the war against the Soviet Union failed. This victory was of great military and political significance. If Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war, the Battle of Kursk was its further development, marked the final collapse of the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet command retained the strategic initiative and did not let it go until the end of the war.

As a result of the Battle of Kursk, Russian military art was enriched with the experience of organizing a deliberate defense, as well as conducting a major counter-offensive with its advance preparation. As a result of the heavy losses suffered by the fascist German bloc, especially in aviation and tanks, the situation in all other theaters of the Second World War also changed dramatically. Favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and its withdrawal from the war.

After the defeat in the Battle of Kursk, the fascist leadership tried to give the war protracted, positional forms. An important role in this was assigned to the boundary along the river. Dnieper, where it was supposed to create an insurmountable defense. Battle for the Dnieper 1943 began in August and consisted of several operations united by the general idea of ​​the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the end of September, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper on the front from Dnepropetrovsk to Zaporozhye. The offensive was successfully developing in the Gomel, Chernigov, Kiev and Poltava-Kremenchug directions, where from September 21 to 30, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper at a front of 700 km and forced it on the move. In October, the main actions were transferred to the right bank of the Dnieper. On November 6, Soviet troops liberated Kyiv, advanced westward up to 150 km, then repulsed the enemy counteroffensive in the area of ​​Korosten, Zhytomyr and Fastov. On the right bank of the Dnieper, a strategic foothold of St. 500 km along the front. Advancing in the Kirovograd and Kryvyi Rih directions and in Northern Tavria, Soviet troops liquidated the enemy's Zaporozhye bridgehead, liberated Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and blocked his grouping in the Crimea. An attempt by the Nazis to stabilize the front at the turn of the Dnieper failed.

Soviet troops also successfully advanced in other directions: in October they liberated the Taman Peninsula, reached the Kerch Strait and seized a bridgehead northeast of the city of Kerch; in the western strategic direction (see Smolensk operation 1943) Soviet troops advanced 200-250 km, liberated Smolensk, part of the Kalinin region. and launched the fight for the liberation eastern regions Belarus.

In the second period of the war, the Red Army advanced 500-1300 km during the offensive, crossed the Dnieper, liberated about half of the territory of the USSR occupied by the enemy, defeating 218 divisions. At the same time, the Soviet Armed Forces lost approx. 8.5 million people (Irretrievable losses amounted to approx. 2.5 million, sanitary - approx. 6 million). Losses of military equipment amounted to: approx. 830 thousand units small arms, St. 16 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 20 thousand guns and mortars, 4720 combat aircraft. The struggle in the enemy's rear acquired a huge scope: 24 underground regional, 222 district, county, district, city committees of the party operated, under the leadership of which, by the end of 1943, approx. 250 thousand partisans and underground workers; created partisan territories and districts (cf. Partisan movement; Underground).

The victories of the Red Army demonstrated the increased military and economic capabilities of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Germany began to feel a shortage of human and material resources. The fundamental turning point achieved by the USSR in the economic confrontation became the material basis for the radical turning point in the course of hostilities. Economy). The successes of the Soviet Armed Forces and the country's national economy were largely due to the selfless work of the Soviet people, the active work of government authorities, parties, work public organizations, trade unions, Komsomol.

The inevitability of collapse fascist bloc became more and more obvious. In September 1943, Italy capitulated, and many of Germany's remaining allies were looking for a way out of the war. The neutral countries (Turkey, Portugal, Sweden) were finally convinced that they should not bind their fate with Germany. Received further development resistance movement. In Germany, disbelief in the victory of the Reich grew, and the anti-fascist struggle expanded. The actions of the allies of the USSR on other fronts of World War II intensified. At the same time, the absence of a second front in Europe continued to affect the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet foreign policy in the second period of the war was aimed at solving important international problems. At the Moscow Conference in October 1943, a Declaration of four states (USSR, USA, England and China) on the issue of universal security was developed, the determination was proclaimed to wage war until the unconditional surrender of the countries of the fascist-militarist bloc, to continue after the war joint actions to maintain world peace and to establish an international organization for this purpose.

An important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations was Tehran Conference 1943. During its implementation, an agreement was reached with our main allies the US and the UK to open second front in May 1944, the USSR declared its readiness to fulfill its allied obligations and enter the war with Japan after the defeat of Germany.

Anti-Hitler coalition increased from 26 to 33 states.

Despite major military successes and changes in the general strategic situation on the Soviet-German front in the second period of the war, the enemy was still strong. A significant part of the territory of the USSR remained under occupation.

Military operations in the western and northwestern directions in February - March 1943

In late January - early February 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to use the favorable strategic situation in the south to expand the front of the offensive. According to the plan of the Headquarters, it was planned to carry out two major operations simultaneously: one against Army Group Center, the other against Army Group North.

Achieving the strategic goal in the western direction was supposed to be carried out by conducting a series of successive operations: first, concentric strikes by the troops of the Bryansk and left wing Western fronts defeat the Oryol grouping of the enemy (2nd German Panzer Army), and then, with the arrival of the armies of the Central Front, develop an offensive in the general direction of Smolensk, go to the rear of the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy and, in cooperation with the Kalinin and Western fronts, surround and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. On February 6, 1943, the front commanders received directives to prepare for the offensive.

In the northwestern direction, in order to defeat Army Group North, the Headquarters planned to attract troops from the Leningrad, Volkhov and Northwestern fronts. According to the plan of Operation Polar Star, the main blow was delivered by the troops of the left wing of the North-Western Front in the general direction of Pskov and Narva. At first, it was supposed to cut the so-called Ramushevsky corridor with concentric strikes from the north and south and defeat the enemy's Demyansk grouping. At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were supposed to eliminate the Mginsk ledge. A very responsible task was assigned to a special group of troops of General M.S. Khozin, which included the 1st Tank and 68th Armies, as well as a number of other formations and units. It was supposed to be introduced into a breakthrough in the zone of the 1st shock army with the task of rapidly advancing in a north-western direction and "cutting off the communications of the Leningrad-Volkhov enemy grouping by accessing the Luga, Struga Krasnye, Porkhov, Dno area and preventing enemy units from approaching to help the Demyansk and the Leningrad-Volkhov groupings of the enemy. In the future, this group, reinforced by formations of the North-Western Front, was part of the forces to develop success on Kingisepp and Narva in order to cut off the escape routes of the Nazi troops to Estonia, and with the main forces, in cooperation with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, to surround and destroy the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. enemy groupings. The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts in the northwestern direction was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov.

The offensive actions of the Soviet troops in the western and northwestern directions were not unexpected for the enemy. The operations carried out here in late 1942 - early 1943 fettered significant enemy forces. Even when on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front the fascist German troops were suffering one defeat after another and huge gaps were being formed, the fascist German command did not weaken the groupings near Leningrad and in the direction of Moscow: it was constantly expecting new, more powerful blows here.

By the beginning of February 1943, Army Group North had 46 divisions and an infantry brigade. Almost half of them were used to hold the Mginsk and Demyansk bridgeheads. In the western direction, the Army Group Center was defending, consisting of 77 divisions and a brigade. Of these, more than half were located in the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, which, according to the enemy, was “a pistol aimed at the chest of Moscow,” since this sector of the front was most advanced towards the Soviet capital. In total, therefore, in these areas the enemy command had over 124 formations, or more than half of all forces located on the Soviet-German front. These were the most combat-ready enemy troops.

On most sectors of the front, the enemy had a well-organized, fortified and developed defense in depth, which he prepared for 1-1.5 years. To break through such a defense, great efforts were required by the advancing troops and a good supply of materiel, especially ammunition. Meanwhile, there was still an acute shortage of ammunition in the country, and the Supreme High Command could not give the fronts the required amount of them. So, for example, the security of the Volkhov Front by the beginning of February averaged 1-2 ammunition. The troops of the fronts had to advance in the conditions of a wooded and swampy area, deep snow cover and with a very limited number of roads, which made it extremely difficult to maneuver, transport materiel and evacuation.

Many armies that were part of the fronts of the western and northwestern directions carried out offensive operations for a long time. This reduced their combat capabilities. The fighting was especially protracted in the areas of Mga, Ramushevo, Velikiye Luki, Rzhev, Sychevka and in some other areas. So, the troops of the Kalinin Front carried out the Velikoluksky operation for about two months. It began on November 25, 1942, and the city of Velikiye Luki was liberated from the enemy by the formations of the 3rd shock army of General K.N. could not. Some other armies were in approximately the same position.

The fronts of the western direction were included in the operation at different times. The Bryansk Front was the first to launch the offensive. On February 12, his 13th and 48th armies, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters, resumed their offensive against the right flank of the 2nd tank army, trying to bypass Orel from the southeast and south. However, by this time, the fascist command had withdrawn 7 divisions from the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead and transferred them to the Oryol direction. In particular, 2 tank and 3 infantry divisions deployed south of Orel. Therefore, the Soviet troops met exceptionally stubborn resistance. In two weeks of bloody fighting, they only managed to penetrate the enemy defenses for 10-30 km and reach the Novosil, Maloarkhangelsk, Rozhdestvenskoye line, where the front line stabilized.

On February 22, the 16th Army of the Western Front launched an offensive, attacking Bryansk from the area southwest of Sukhinichi. Having advanced to a depth of 10-13 km, she was no longer able to break the organized enemy defenses and was forced to move on to consolidating the achieved line. The main forces of the Western and Kalinin fronts, however, switched to offensive operations only at the beginning of March, when the enemy, in essence, began a general withdrawal of his troops from the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead.

An important role in the operation against Army Group Center was assigned to the Central Front, which included the 21st and 65th armies of the former Don Front, the 70th and 2nd tank armies from the Stavka reserve. He needed to turn around northwest of Kursk in readiness on February 15 to launch an attack on Sevsk, Unecha. However, by this time the troops of the front had not been able to reach the areas of concentration. The low capacity of the single-track railway in conditions of unprecedented snow drifts led to a disruption in the train schedule. The movement of all modes of transport was paralyzed. Artillery, road units with their equipment, transport units lagged behind the troops. In combat units, there was an acute shortage of food, fodder, fuel, and ammunition. Exhausting marches exhausted the people and the cavalry.

Only on February 25, the troops of the Central Front went on the offensive in the Sevsk direction. By March 6, the 65th and 2nd tank armies broke the enemy’s resistance and wedged into his defenses for 30-60 km, cutting railway Bryansk - Konotop. Only the reinforced 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps broke through into the depths of the enemy defense by 100-120 km and by March 10 reached the Desna River north of Novgorod-Seversky.

Describing the events of those days, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky noted that by this time the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him by the Soviet troops in the Bryansk and Kharkov directions and began to prepare for a counteroffensive. The forces of the front were involved in battles in a very wide zone of operations. The enemy was clearly ahead of the Soviet troops in deployment. There was an acute shortage of material resources and weapons in the troops. .

As already mentioned, by this time the situation in the Donbass and the Kharkov region had deteriorated sharply. Under the blows of the enemy, the Soviet troops were forced to retreat. There was a threat to Kharkov. In this regard, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to strengthen the Voronezh Front in order to prevent the enemy from advancing in the Belgorod direction. To solve the unforeseen tasks that arose, the 21st Army, which arrived near Kursk, was withdrawn from the Central Front, which did not allow it to develop the offensive that had begun. The forward troops of the front, deprived of the support of the second echelons and reserves, under the influence of the enemy by March 20 withdrew to Sevsk, where they entrenched themselves.

While Soviet troops were advancing in the areas south and southwest of Orel and Zhizdra, heavy fighting continued north of Velikiye Luki. In these battles on the day of the 25th anniversary Soviet army committed immortal feat Private Alexander Matrosov. The 2nd Rifle Battalion of the 91st Rifle Brigade had the task of capturing an important stronghold of the enemy defense in the village of Chernushki. During the offensive, the battalion was stopped on the outskirts of the village by fire from a bunker. The area in front of the bunker was clearly visible, and the Nazis shot through it with dense machine-gun fire. A group of submachine gunners sent to undermine the bunker failed to complete the task. Then Private Matrosov crawled to the bunker. Approaching him at twenty meters, he threw grenades into the embrasure one after another, and then fired a long burst from a machine gun. The machine gun is silent. The soldiers went on the attack. But the bunker suddenly came to life, and the lead jet again pressed the attackers to the ground. Then Matrosov rushed forward and closed the embrasure with his body. Soviet soldiers and officers in unison attacked the stronghold and broke into Chernushki.

“The great feat of Comrade Matrosov,” the order said. People's Commissar defense, - should serve as an example of military prowess and heroism for all soldiers of the Red Army. This feat found a wide response in the hearts Soviet soldiers. Alexander Matveevich Matrosov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. His name was given to the 254th Guards Rifle Regiment, where the hero is forever enlisted in the lists of the 1st company.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in February 1943 in the western direction, although it did not achieve significant operational results, forced the enemy to use up all the reserves to hold the occupied lines. In order to strengthen the defenses and strengthen the Oryol grouping, the fascist German command needed significant forces, and there were no free reserves. In this regard, on February 28, it made the final decision to withdraw its troops from the Rzhev-Vyazma salient. The withdrawal began on March 2 and was carried out systematically from line to line under the cover of strong rearguards.

The troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, commanded by Generals M. A. Purkaev and V. D. Sokolovsky, went into pursuit. From the air they were supported by aviation of the 3rd and 1st air armies. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded more energetic actions from the front commanders in order not to push the enemy out, but, widely using a detour maneuver, move mobile detachments to the rear of the enemy and cut off his retreat . However, the spring thaw in the wooded and swampy terrain and the enemy's extensive use of various obstacles sharply reduced the pace of pursuit and hampered the maneuver of mobile detachments. The troops advanced no more than 6-7 km per day, so they could not reach the rear of the enemy. On March 3, Soviet formations liberated Rzhev, and on March 12, Vyazma. On March 22, they went to a prearranged defensive line the enemy northeast of Yartsevo, Spas-Demensk, where, having met strong resistance, they were forced to stop the offensive.

After the withdrawal of enemy troops from the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, the front line moved away from Moscow by another 130-160 km. The reduction of the front in this area made it possible for the Soviet command to withdraw two combined-arms armies and a mechanized corps into the reserve of the Headquarters. The Nazis also managed to release more than 12 divisions and transfer them south of Orel and Bryansk to strengthen the defense in this direction.

At the end of March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to stop the further offensive in the western direction: on its instructions, the fronts went over to the defensive on the lines they occupied.

Simultaneously with the offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction, operations were carried out in the Demyansk region and near Leningrad. By the beginning of the operation, the North-Western Front, which had the task of defeating the enemy's Demyansk grouping, outnumbered the enemy by 1.5-2 times. To develop the offensive in depth, there were tank formations. However, it was extremely difficult to use superiority in weapons and military equipment in the wooded and swampy terrain in the absence of roads. “In the area of ​​the forthcoming actions,” wrote the Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, “there are many swamps, and where there are none, groundwater appeared. It took a lot of work to build roads here... For most of the firing positions, it was necessary to build strong wooden decks so that the guns would not sink into the quagmire when firing. This took a long time." In addition, the troops were insufficiently provided with ammunition and engineering equipment.

The offensive of the troops of the North-Western Front began in different time. The formations of the 11th and 53rd armies went over to active operations on February 15, the rest of the armies at that time were not yet ready for the operation. Although in the first days the strikes of the Soviet troops did not lead to a significant change in the situation, the German fascist command felt a real threat to their grouping. Fearing a new cauldron, on February 19, it began to withdraw troops from the Demyansk ledge (Operation Ziten). At the same time, measures were taken to strengthen the defense of the Ramushevsky corridor.

Soviet intelligence detected the enemy's withdrawal in a timely manner. Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, in a telegram to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, on the night of February 20, indicated: “... There is a danger that he [the enemy] will be able to withdraw his divisions beyond the Lovat River and the Polar Star operation planned by us may be in jeopardy. I consider it absolutely necessary to start the operation of Trofimenko, Korotkov and Khozin three or four days ahead of schedule.

Following instructions Supreme Commander, the 27th Army went on the offensive on February 23, and the 1st Shock Army on February 26. By this time, the enemy had succeeded in reinforcing his groupings in the area of ​​the Ramushevsky corridor and on the Lovat River at the expense of formations that had withdrawn from the Demyansk sack. The withdrawal of the rest of his troops from the Demyansk region continued.

With the retreat of the enemy troops across the Lovat River, the so-called Demyansk bridgehead, which the enemy held for 17 months, ceased to exist.

For more than a year, the 6th Air Army of the front fought against enemy transport aircraft, which supplied troops in the Demyansk region. During this time, the enemy lost about 265 aircraft . The Hitlerite command was forced to use a significant part of transport aviation near Demyansk to the detriment of providing for its group operating on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front.

At the beginning of March 1943, a thaw set in. The terrain became impassable. Taking into account the unfavorable meteorological conditions, as well as the aggravated situation north of Kharkov, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command recognized it as inappropriate to inflict deep strikes on Pskov and Narva. Therefore, the special group of troops of General M. S. Khozin was disbanded on March 9. The 1st Panzer Army of General M.E. Katukov was urgently transferred to the Kursk region in the Voronezh Front, and the 68th Army of General F.I. Tolbukhin was transferred to the North-Western Front. To mask the operational maneuver of the troops, the Headquarters demanded that the North-Western Front continue the offensive with the task of reaching the Polist River and capturing Staraya Russa. Within 9 days, the Soviet troops, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the densified enemy grouping, managed to advance only 10-15 km. On March 17, the position of the parties finally stabilized on the Redya River.

The offensive of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts in order to eliminate the Mginsky ledge did not receive further development. From February 10 to February 23, Soviet troops managed to wedge only 10-15 km towards Tosno. The enemy advanced operational reserves to the threatened sectors and with artillery fire, counterattacks supported by aviation, stopped the offensive of the fronts. The fighting took on a protracted character. Attempts to continue the offensive in the second half of March were also unsuccessful, because due to a lack of ammunition, it was not possible to achieve fire superiority over the defending enemy.

In the spring of 1943, there was a pause on the vast front stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the Sea of ​​Azov. Fierce fighting continued only near Novorossiysk. The opposing sides were preparing for new operations that unfolded in the summer.

The operations of the Soviet troops in the western and northwestern directions, carried out at the beginning of 1943, are closely connected with the strategic offensive in the south. Although they did not achieve their goals, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to strengthen his groupings on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front at the expense of Army Groups Center and North. This made it much easier for the Soviet army not only to successfully carry out operations near Stalingrad, on the Upper Don, the Kharkov and Donbas directions, but also to repel an enemy counteroffensive attempt. The elimination of bridgeheads in the area of ​​Rzhev and Demyansk practically removed the threat of an enemy offensive in the Moscow direction. Prerequisites were created for the deployment of operations in the Pskov-Vitebsk and Smolensk directions.

The February-March operations basically completed the winter campaign of 1942-1943. on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet Armed Forces, in accordance with military-political goals, successfully solved a number of important strategic objectives. the Soviet people and valiant warriors made a decisive contribution to the creation of a radical change in the course of the entire Second World War in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

During the counteroffensive and the general offensive, Soviet troops inflicted heavy defeats on the strike force of the aggressive bloc - the armed forces Nazi Germany and her allies. From November 1942 to the end of March 1943, they defeated over 100 enemy divisions, or more than 40 percent of all forces operating against the USSR. To restore the strategic front, the fascist German command was forced to transfer to the east from Western Europe and Africa 33 divisions, 3 brigades, part of the aviation and other forces. The total losses of the enemy amounted to 1700 thousand people, more than 3500 tanks, 24 thousand guns and 4300 aircraft. Thanks to this, the solution of tasks by the allies of the Soviet Union in the North African-Mediterranean and European-Atlantic theaters was facilitated.

Victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the winter of 1942-1943. were of great military and political importance. They had a decisive influence on the deterioration of the internal political and international position of fascist Germany and its satellites. The authority of Germany among its allies has declined markedly. A deep crisis was brewing in the camp of the fascist bloc.

During the winter campaign, the Soviet army began a mass expulsion of fascist invaders from Soviet soil. During five months of armed struggle, she threw back the Nazi troops by almost 600-700 km. From the invaders was cleared huge territory with an area of ​​over 480 thousand square meters. km. They lost not only those areas that they captured in the second half of 1942, but also a number of cities and regions occupied in the first year of the war. The North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth Regions, areas west of Moscow and south of Novgorod were almost completely cleared of the aggressor. The expulsion of the invaders from Ukraine began. In the liberated cities and villages, at the call of the Communist Party Soviet people launched extensive restoration work in order to quickly raise the national economy from the ruins and put it at the service of the front.

An important result of the winter offensive was the advance of the Soviet armies to the area west of Kursk and the repulse of enemy attacks on this sector of the front. The Kursk ledge that developed during the battles served as the initial springboard for subsequent operations in the Oryol and Kharkov directions.

The Soviet Supreme High Command skillfully used the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Volga to expand the front of the offensive. The counteroffensive near Stalingrad, which began with the forces of three fronts in a strip of 450 km, developed in January 1943 into an offensive of seven fronts, covering an area of ​​1200 km. In February - March, eleven fronts participated in the operations. Operations were carried out by forces of both one front and several. Their range along the front usually reached 200-650 km and in depth 150-600 km. The duration of the operation ranged from two to three weeks to two or more months. The average rate of progress was 10-25 km per day, and in some cases even higher.

The main content of the final stage of the winter campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces was the offensive of the fronts in the northwestern, western and southwestern directions, as well as the defense near Kharkov and in the Donbass. In the northwestern and western directions, operations were carried out against large groupings, which the fascist German command maintained despite the difficult situation created as a result of the Soviet offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The operations of the Soviet troops in the southwestern direction were carried out in a very difficult situation with an acute shortage of forces and means and a large length of communications, as well as with high enemy activity.

In the course of hostilities, critical situations very often arose that required the use of various forms and methods of struggle. Soviet troops had to break through the defenses, conduct pursuit and oncoming battles. At the final stages of operations, the enemy often forced them to go on the defensive, repel counterattacks, and even retreat.

The decisive, skillful actions of the Soviet troops to encircle and eliminate enemy groupings near Stalingrad and on the Upper Don forced the enemy to react sharply to the position of their flank groupings. This, in particular, is evidenced by the hasty withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Army from the North Caucasus, as well as the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "North" from the Rzhev-Vyazma and Demyansk ledges.

The breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses was carried out mainly in the northwestern and western directions, where the enemy had large groupings of troops occupying heavily fortified and deeply echeloned positions. On these axes, Soviet troops usually failed to create gaps in the enemy's fortified front and develop an offensive in depth. This was largely due to the weakness of the strike groups and the lack of materiel, in particular ammunition.

The persecution of the Soviet troops was carried out in conditions of both forced and deliberate withdrawal of the enemy. The lack of tank and mechanized troops, as well as their weak staffing, led to the fact that the shock groups of the fronts could not cut the retreat routes of enemy formations and smash them in parts. The pace of pursuit during a deliberate withdrawal of the enemy did not exceed 6-8 km, and during a forced withdrawal - 15-25 km per day.

During fierce battles in early 1943, the enemy tried to seize the initiative. When retreating, he managed to create strong groupings by reducing the front line and transferring additional reserves and launching counterattacks on Soviet troops, as was the case in the Donbass and near Kharkov. The failures of the Soviet troops in these areas were largely due to an overestimation of their capabilities and an underestimation of the enemy's forces at the end of the campaign.

The decline in allied activity in February-March 1943 also had a negative impact on the outcome of the final operations of the Soviet army.

The enemy counteroffensive in the areas of Donbass and Kharkov extremely complicated the situation of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts. The difficulties of conducting defensive battles were exacerbated by an inaccurate assessment of the intentions of the enemy. Only by bringing strategic reserves into battle was it possible to stabilize the front on the Seversky Donets and in the Belgorod region. All attempts by the Nazis to seize the strategic initiative failed.

During the winter of 1942-1943. Soviet troops in the difficult situation of long, exhausting battles, sometimes with an acute shortage of material resources, showed a high offensive impulse, stamina and stubbornness in defense, and an unprecedented will to win. The experience of the strategic offensive at the stage of the war under consideration subsequently served as the basis for the implementation by the Soviet Armed Forces of new offensive campaigns of even greater scope.

February 1, 1943. 590th day of the war

After several days of fighting, tankers and infantrymen of the 3rd Tank Army (P. S. Rybalko) of the Voronezh Front (F. I. Golikov) managed to break the enemy’s resistance, and on the night of February 9-10, the cities of Pechenegy and Chuguev in the eastern and southeastern approaches to Kharkov. The Seversky Donets was forced, and only a couple of tens of kilometers remained in a straight line to Kharkov. The 69th Army captured Volchansk, advanced to the Northern Donets, crossed it on the ice, and by the end of February 10, they approached the inner defensive bypass of Kharkov

Demyansk operation. (see map Demyansk operation (61 KB)) Demyansk began offensive troops of the North-Western Front (S. K. Timoshenko) in order to eliminate the Demyansk bridgehead, on which the main forces of the 16th German army were concentrated - a total of 12 divisions. The 11th and 53rd armies went on the offensive. The enemy figured out the plan of the front command and, fearing the "cauldron", accelerated the withdrawal of its troops from the Demyansk region, while building up the forces defending the "Ramushev corridor". The main attack groups of the Northwestern Front - the 27th and 1st shock armies, which were supposed to cut the "Ramushev corridor" with counter strikes - did not have time to prepare for the offensive. The 27th Army was able to start the task instead of the 19th only on February 23, and the 1st Shock Army only on February 26th.

Kharkov offensive operation. On February 15, Soviet troops made their way to Kharkov simultaneously from three sides: from the west, north and southeast. The first to break into the city on the morning of February 15 was the 340th Rifle Division of Major General S.S. Martirosyan of the 40th Army (K.S. Moskalenko) of the Voronezh Front (F.I. Golikov). Its regiments captured the South Station, penetrated the city center, cleared Dzerzhinsky and Tevelev Squares, as well as the building that once housed the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR. Above him is a group of submachine gunners of the 1142nd rifle regiment hoisted a red banner. At 11.00, the regiments of the 183rd Infantry Division of General Kostitsyn broke through the defenses of the "Great Germany" units in the Dergachi area and reached the northern part of the city. By 5 pm on February 15, the troops of the 40th Army cleared the southwestern, western and northwestern parts of the city from the enemy. From the east and southeast, units of the 62nd Guards Rifle and 160th Rifle Divisions of the 3rd Tank Army (P.S. Rybalko) of the Voronezh Front (F.I. Golikov) entered Kharkov. At 14.00, despite Hitler's order to hold the city, units of the "Great Germany" began to withdraw to the area of ​​​​the city of Lyubotin to the west of Kharkov. The group commander, Lanz, who belonged to the mountain rifle troops, was replaced a few days later by General of the Panzer Troops Kempf.

Voroshilovgrad operation. The Voroshilovgrad operation ended: the enemy troops were driven back 120-150 km, the northern part of the Donbass was liberated, the troops of the Southwestern Front failed to complete the task of encircling and defeating the 1st German tank army and completely liberating the Donbass.

Army Group Center. On February 27, the German command ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the 9th Army, the main forces of the 4th Army and the 3rd Tank Army from the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. The troops are sent to reinforce the groupings near Orel and Kharkov.

Soviet Information Bureau. During February 27, our troops fought offensive battles in the same directions.

February 28, 1943. 617th day of the war

Demyansk operation. The Demyansk offensive operation of the troops of the North-Western Front (S.K. Timoshenko) was completed. Pursuing the retreating enemy, the formations of the North-Western Front reached the Lovat River by February 28, thereby eliminating the Demyansk bridgehead, which the enemy held for almost a year and a half. However, the North-Western Front failed to fully fulfill the plan of the Headquarters. The changed situation on this sector of the front, as well as the beginning of the spring thaw, forced the Soviet command to abandon the planned deep strike of the mobile group in the north-western direction in the rear of the 18th German army.

Kharkov offensive operation. The 15th tank corps of the 3rd tank army (P.S. Rybalko), together with the 219th rifle division of the Sokolov group, captured the Leninsky Zavod, Shlyakhovaya. By the evening of February 28, Soviet troops liberated Kegichevka and took up all-round defense in it.

From 22.00 on February 28, the 3rd Panzer Army was transferred to the Southwestern Front. By the end of February 28, the 3rd Panzer Army received the task of part of the forces to go on the defensive, and strike group army, under the leadership of the commander of the 12th tank corps Zinkovich, from the morning of March 2, go on the offensive from the Kegichevka area in the direction of Mironovka and Lozovenka.

Army Group South. Manstein: “After, as a result of this victory between the Donets and the Dnieper, the initiative was again in our hands, the group, in accordance with the order given back on February 28, launched an attack on the enemy’s Voronezh Front, that is, on his troops located in the Kharkov region. We intended to strike at the southern flank of the enemy in order to push him from the south, or - if possible - later to strike him in the rear from the east. Our goal was not the capture of Kharkov, but the defeat and, if possible, the destruction of the enemy units stationed there.

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The year 1943 was marked by a number of events that left a noticeable mark on the history of the Soviet Union. visual arts. Contents 1 Events 2 Born 3 Died ... Wikipedia

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1941 - 1942 1943 1944 - 1945 See also: Other events in 1943 In 1943 there were various scientific and technological events, some of which are presented below. Contents 1 Events ... Wikipedia

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1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 See also: Other events in 1943 The history of rail transport in 1943 The history of public transport in 1943 This article lists the main events in the history of subways ... Wikipedia

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Books

• Diary of a Diplomat. London. 1934-1943. Book 2. Part 2. June 22, 1941-1943, Maisky I.M. as…
• Board game "The Great Patriotic War. The Kursk Bulge, 1943" (6233) , . The Battle of Kursk, which lasted almost two months - from July 5 to August 23, 1943 - was one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. Seeking to turn the tide of the war...

November 1, 1943. 863rd day of the war

November 2, 1943. 864th day of the war

November 3, 1943. 865th day of the war

The Kyiv offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began, which lasted until November 13, 1943 (see map - Kyiv offensive and defensive operations of 1943 (112 KB)).

On the morning of November 3, the 38th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive against Kyiv from the Lyutezh bridgehead. The Soviet units broke through the first position of the enemy's defense and slowly continued to move forward. fighting were carried out mainly in the forests, which stretch for many kilometers near Kyiv. The enemy offered strong resistance. Already on the first day of the offensive, he brought his 20th motorized division into battle against parts of the 38th Army.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, giving great importance launched an offensive from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead, on the evening of November 3 ordered the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front “not to delay the operation launched on the right wing of the front, since every extra day only gives the enemy an advantage, allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads, then how our roads destroyed by the enemy make it difficult and restrict maneuver. The headquarters demanded that Kiev be captured no later than November 5-6. The directive stated that the Kyiv bridgehead was the most important and most advantageous bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River, which was of exceptional importance for the expulsion of the Germans from the Right-Bank Ukraine.

November 4, 1943. 866th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On the morning of November 4, the fighting took on an exceptionally tense character. The second echelon and army reserves were brought into the battle. The 1st Czechoslovak separate brigade, commanded by Colonel Ludwik Svoboda, entered the struggle for the liberation of Kyiv. However, the advancing troops could not achieve decisive success. On this day, the weather worsened, drizzling rain began to fall. Poor visibility made it difficult to fire artillery and completely ruled out the use of aviation. The roads became almost impassable. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy defenses, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front was forced on November 4 to bring the 3rd Guards Tank Army into battle. In the middle of the day, its tank corps overtook the infantry and advanced 8 kilometers deep. Breaking the resistance of the Nazi troops, they continued their movement after dark. The tanks went on the attack with headlights on, sirens blaring, heavy cannon and machine gun fire. The night tank attack had a stunning effect on the enemy.

November 5, 1943. 867th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. By the morning of November 5, the 3rd Guards Tank Army of P. S. Rybalko had deeply bypassed the enemy troops defending Kyiv from the west and entered the Svyatoshino region, cutting off the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway. On the same day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of V.K. Baranov was introduced into the battle. At the same time, units of the 38th Army, advancing 25 kilometers by the end of November 5, started a battle on the outskirts of Kyiv. The German command, fearing the encirclement of its troops in Kyiv, began their withdrawal from the Ukrainian capital. At the same time, it began to transfer forces to Kyiv from the region of Veliky Bukrin.

November 6, 1943. 868th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. Throughout the night of November 6, street fighting went on in Kyiv. At midnight, units of the 51st Rifle Corps of the 38th Army broke through into the city center, onto Kirov Street. By 4 o'clock in the morning on November 6, the troops of the 38th Army completely liquidated the enemy's resistance in Kyiv. On the evening of November 6, Moscow saluted the Soviet troops who had liberated the capital of Soviet Ukraine.

November 7, 1943. 869th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On November 7, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army liberated Fastov, a large railway junction that connected the enemy grouping, defending southwest of Kyiv, with troops operating in the Krivoy Rog and Kirovograd region.

November 8, 1943. 870th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On November 8, strong counterattacks of German troops began on the front from Fastov to the Dnieper. The enemy sought to capture Fastov again and at the same time break through along the right bank of the Dnieper, reach the Kyiv area and behind the lines of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The fighting was exceptionally stubborn. Separate settlements several times passed from hand to hand.

November 9, 1943. 871st day of the war

November 10, 1943. 872nd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation of the troops of the Belorussian Front began, which lasted until November 30, 1943 (see map - Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation (35 KB)) .

Before the Belorussian Front acted German troops army group "Center" (4th, 9th and 2nd armies), seeking to prevent the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall. The 11th army of I. I. Fedyuninsky, together with the troops of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, continuously attacked the enemy north of Gomel, riveting his attention to this area. And the main blow by the Soviet troops was prepared from the Loev bridgehead. Frontal reserves were transferred to the Loevsky bridgehead - the 1st Don Guards Tank Corps of M.F. Panov, the 9th Tank Corps of B.S. Bakharov, the cavalry corps of V.V. Kryukov and M.P. Konstantinov, the artillery corps of the breakthrough N V. Ignatova. The 48th Army continued to cross its main forces to the western bank of the Dnieper, improving the starting position for an attack on Rechitsa. On November 10, Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the enemy defenses on the very first day.

November 11, 1943. 873rd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. On the second day of the operation, tank and cavalry corps entered the gap. They rapidly moved forward, destroying the enemy units that tried to resist. The troops of the 48th Army successfully operated along the western bank of the Dnieper to Rechitsa.

November 12, 1943. 874th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. The Soviet troops, repelling the enemy's counterattacks, firmly held Fastov in their hands and at the same time continued to develop the offensive in a westerly direction. On November 12, the regional center of Ukraine, Zhitomir, was liberated. Our units went to the front Chernobyl - Malin - Zhytomyr - Fastov - Tripoli.

November 13, 1943. 875th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. The Kyiv offensive operation, which took place from November 3 to November 13, 1943, ended. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the course of a swift offensive liberated the capital of Ukraine - Kyiv and formed a strategic bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, which played an important role in further operations to liberate Right-Bank Ukraine.

The duration of the operation was 11 days. The width of the combat front is 320-500 km. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops is 150 km. The average daily advance rate is 12-14 km. The number of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the operation was 671,000 people. Human losses in the operation: irretrievable - 6491 people (1.0%), sanitary - 24078 people, total - 30569 people, average daily - 2779 people.

November 14, 1943. 876th day of the war

November 15, 1943. 877th day of the war

November 16, 1943. 878th day of the war

November 17, 1943. 879th day of the war

November 18, 1943. 880th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. On the night of November 18, the 65th army of P.I. Batov cut the Gomel-Kalinkovichi railway. P. I. Batov turned two rifle divisions and two tank brigades of Panov's corps, which had escaped forward, to the rear of the Germans defending in Rechitsa. As a result of this strike, on November 18, the city was liberated.

Developing success, the 48th Army crossed the Berezina with part of its forces at its confluence with the Dnieper and entrenched itself on the bridgehead south of Zhlobin. Pursuing the enemy, the troops of the 61st Army of P. A. Belov were approaching Mozyr. The enemy defense was broken through by the troops of the left wing of the Belorussian Front over a distance of 120 kilometers.

November 19, 1943. 881st day of the war

November 20, 1943. 882nd day of the war

November 21, 1943. 883rd day of the war

November 22, 1943. 884th day of the war

November 23, 1943. 885th day of the war

November 24, 1943. 886th day of the war

November 25, 1943. 887th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The troops of the right wing of the Belorussian Front reached the Dnieper near Novy Bykhov. By the evening of November 25, Soviet troops approached Gomel from three sides and started fighting on the streets of the city. The fighting continued all night.

Troops of the 48th Army crossed the river. Berezina and captured a bridgehead on its western bank. At night, enemy troops began to withdraw from the interfluve of the Sozh and Dnieper rivers.

November 26, 1943. 888th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The attack grouping of the Belorussian Front entered the deep rear of the enemy troops defending in the Gomel region, the successful actions of Gorbatov's 3rd Army, which delivered a sudden blow from the right in the direction of Bykhov, and strong pressure on the enemy in the center by units of the 63rd and 11th armies forced Gomel grouping of the enemy to a hasty retreat. November 26 Gomel was completely liberated from the enemy. On the same day in the evening, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted the valiant troops who liberated Gomel.

November 27, 1943. 889th day of the war

November 28, 1943. 890th day of the war

From November 28 to December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA, Great Britain was held.

November 29, 1943. 891st day of the war

November 30, 1943. 892nd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The Gomel-Rechitsa operation, which took place from November 10 to 30, 1943, ended. The troops of the Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses and advanced, with the support of the partisans, to a depth of 130 km, reached the line west of the south of Novy Bykhov, Potapovka, Gamza, Prudok, south of Yelsk, created a threat to the southern flank of Army Group Center.

The duration of the operation was 21 days. The number of troops of the Belorussian Front at the beginning of the operation was 761,300 people. Human losses in the operation: irretrievable - 21650 people (2.8%), sanitary - 66556 people, total - 88206 people, average daily - 4200 people.

Sovinformburo. During November 30, between the SOZH and DNEPR rivers, northwest of GOMEL, our troops, overcoming enemy resistance and counterattacks, occupied several settlements; among them are REUT, DORKI, ROZOV, KIDNEYS, MIKHALEVKA, TALES.

Between the rivers DNEPR and BEREZINA, south of Zhlobin, our troops occupied several settlements with battles.

In the region of the lower reaches of the PRIPYAT river, our troops fought forward and occupied settlements Zamostye, Lozki, Kryshichi, Yurevichi, Ridge, Guta, Zarakitnoye, Knurovka.

By order of the Supreme High Command, our troops left the city of KOROSTEN and occupied more advantageous lines for defense.

In the Cherkasy region, our troops fought to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper and improved their positions.

Southwest of KREMENCHUG, as a result of stubborn battles, our troops captured the heavily fortified enemy strongholds of TABURISCHE, ZAKHARIEVKA, RAZOROPOL, YANOV, BOLSHAYA MAKARIKHA.

In the bend of the DNEPR, southwest of DNEPROPETROVSK, our troops, repulsing the enemy counterattacks, improved their positions.

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