From the very beginning of the Second World War, tanks became the main strike force of the ground forces of literally all the warring parties. The first, on the basis of advanced tactics, the tanks were effectively used by the Germans, in a fantastically short time "kneeling" Western Europe and nearly defeating the Soviet Union.

From the moment he came to power, Adolf Hitler was obsessed with the idea of ​​revising the decisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Realizing that neither England nor France would agree to this by peaceful means, Germany immediately began preparations for war. In a very short time, the Germans managed to create a fairly powerful military industry capable of producing almost all types of weapons for the Luftwaffe Air Force, Kriegsmarine navy and ground forces of the Wehrmacht.

The reform of the army was carried out at a very rapid pace in all areas, so that far from all the Germans were able to immediately achieve qualitative changes for the better. But if we talk about tanks, then here almost everything was done at once tests, adoption, elimination of shortcomings, development of instructions for use, exercises, organization of repair work, and so on. What took England and France two decades, and without much success, Germany took only 5 years it was during this period that combat-ready tank forces were created using advanced tactics. Similar rates were demonstrated only in the USSR, but little was known about this in Europe.

In the late 1930s, Germany's strategic doctrine was the theory of "blitzkrieg" blitzkrieg. The war was supposed to be waged at an exceptionally high pace and victoriously ended in the shortest possible time. The point, of course, was not that the German strategists were “lazy” to fight for a long time, but that Germany had neither the strength nor the means to conduct a long, at times positional military campaign. The then state of the German economy did not allow providing the army with the necessary amount of weapons, ammunition and equipment for a long time, at least more than 6 months. So the blitzkrieg strategy was as attractive as it was dangerous.

According to this doctrine, the decisive role was assigned to tank forces and aviation, which were used in close cooperation with each other. The tank units were to cut the enemy army into several units isolated from one another, which were then supposed to be destroyed by aviation, artillery and motorized infantry. The tanks had to conquer all the important control centers of the enemy side as quickly as possible, preventing serious resistance from arising.

The theory was really impressive, but the failure of the first strike, inflicted by all available forces, programmed the transition to a protracted war unacceptable for Germany. The element of adventurism contained in the Blitzkrieg greatly embarrassed the German Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General von Fritsch. Hitler, on the other hand, was infuriated by the warnings of these honored military leaders, who enjoyed great authority among the troops.

Back in 1937, von Fritsch, at one of the meetings with the Führer, expressed his disagreement with his plans to conquer "living space", and von Blomberg presented the Führer with a report in early 1938, stating that "Germany is not threatened by an attack from anyone sides." Many generals and officers of the Wehrmacht listened to the opinion of the highest military leaders.

Unwilling to tolerate "opposition in his ranks", Hitler solved this problem very "gracefully". Baron von Fritsch was accused of homosexuality, which was considered a criminal offense in Germany, and removed from office. The accusation was completely untrue, especially since the witness who gave false testimony against the colonel-general was executed very quickly, but the deed was done. The officers' court of honor acquitted von Fritsch for lack of evidence of guilt, but Hitler, of course, did not want to reinstate him in his position, giving him command of the 12th artillery regiment, which was another humiliation for such a military man. high rank. Commanding this regiment, Colonel-General von Fritsch died in September 1939 near Warsaw. According to eyewitnesses, the baron himself was looking for death on the front line and, when a fragment broke his femoral artery, he forbade bandaging the wound and bled to death.

With regard to von Blomberg, an even more sophisticated method was chosen - he, a 60-year-old father of already grown children, was "accidentally" introduced to a very beautiful and seductive girl of 24 years old. The Field Marshal fell in love with her and, as an "honest man", married her. Moreover, Hitler fully approved the marriage and even, together with Goering, was a witness at the solemn ceremony. True, immediately after the wedding it turned out that the newlywed was in the recent past a prostitute involved in several thefts. As a result of the ensuing scandal, von Blomberg was forced to resign and emigrate.

So on February 4, 1938, Adolf Hitler took over as Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces. Now no one "got under the feet" of the Fuhrer, obsessed with his aggressive plans. The German generals, judging by the memoirs of the military leaders, were wounded and shocked by the events that had taken place, but did not dare to protest. No one even resigned - did not consider it possible to use this classic way of expressing their categorical disagreement with the higher authorities by the officers of all armies. Thus, the top German leadership firmly linked their collective fate with the personal fate of Adolf Hitler. However, despite the absence of open discontent on the part of the generals, the Fuhrer never changed his suspicious attitude towards them, which he retained both in times of great victories and in times of severe defeats. However, defeat was still far away, while the Wehrmacht, led by the Fuhrer, went from victory to victory. At first, these victories were bloodless: thus, without a single shot, the Anschluss was carried out - the annexation of Austria. And it was in this "connection" campaign that the Fuhrer wished to see the German armored forces. General Guderian led the 2nd Panzer Division on a 700-kilometer march. To the surprise of the "father of German tanks", the campaign was quite successful on such a long journey, only 30% of combat vehicles broke down, most of which, however, managed to "stand up" for the parade held on March 15 in Vienna.

Guderian's old detractor, Colonel General von Bock, hastened to attack the "young" armored forces, blaming them for their general technical unreliability and inability to make long marches. Fedor von Bock was not alone in his criticism, but the Fuhrer, as well as Guderian, was not impressed.

In 1938, the basis of the German armored forces were Pz. I and Pz. II (short for PanzerKampfwagen armored fighting vehicle). Pz. Model I of 1935 weighed about 6 tons, had a maximum armor of 13 mm, was armed with two 7.92 mm machine guns, engine power was 100 hp, maximum speed 40 km / h, cruising range 140 km, the crew consisted from two people.

This tank, which was more like a tankette with a rotating turret, was the "first sign" of German tank building and by 1938 had already become obsolete. The crew was uncomfortable in it, the technical reliability of the tank was not too high, and the absence of at least some kind of gun did not leave the Pz. I have no chance of surviving any cannon tank of any enemy. Civil War in Spain, where the Germans helped the Francoists, showed this perfectly. Fight Soviet T-26 and BT-5 Pz. There were two ways I could hide or "run away". Pz. II of the 1937 model was more powerful weighed about 9 tons, maximum armor 15 mm, power reserve 200 km, maximum speed 40 km / h, crew 3 people and, most importantly, had armament from a 20-mm automatic cannon and 7.92 mm machine gun.

The presence of a gun significantly increased the combat capabilities of the tank, but still Guderian understood that the Pz. I and Pz. II, which are essentially training vehicles, do not provide a qualitative superiority over the tanks that were in service with developed European countries. Therefore, the general made every effort to increase the production of Pz. III and Pz. IV.

Pz. III of the 1938 model had the following data: weight about 17 tons, maximum armor 30 mm, power reserve 165 km, engine power 250 hp, maximum speed 35 km / h, armament one 37 mm gun and three 7.92 mm machine guns, the crew was 5 people. Pz. IV of the 1938 model weighed almost 19 tons, maximum armor 30 mm, engine power 300 hp, maximum speed 40 km / h, armament one 75 mm short-barreled cannon and one 7.92 mm machine gun. The crew consisted of 5 people. This medium tank was intended to support other German tanks with lighter weapons. Despite the solid caliber, the Pz. IV had a low initial speed projectile (380 m / s) and was intended primarily to destroy enemy manpower with high-explosive fragmentation projectiles of high power. German tankers called her "cigarette butt". Nothing better than Pz. IV Germans at that time did not have. Pz production. III and Pz. IV unfolded extremely slowly, however, the tanks themselves were quite difficult to manufacture. The release of each of these types in 1938 did not exceed a few dozen units.

The situation with the rearmament of the German armored forces was difficult, but the coming year of 1939 brought Guderian considerable relief. In March, the Fuhrer ordered the occupation of the Czech Republic and annex it to the Reich as a protectorate, which was immediately done. Slovakia formally retained its independence, but was completely controlled by Germany. The Germans got a well-developed Czech industry, capable of producing many types of weapons.

To his great delight, Guderian discovered that two types of Czech tanks, called by the Germans Pz. 35 and Pz. 38, are very successful, surpassing the Pz. I and Pz. II, and even comparable to Pz. III. Both tanks were well armored, heavily armed with a 37 mm cannon and two 7.92 mm machine guns each, and reached speeds of up to 40 km/h. The Germans got almost 300 Pz. 35 and only 20 Pz. 38, but most importantly, the production of these tanks was not only perfectly established at the Skoda and ČKD factories, but could also be significantly increased.

In the autumn of 1938, tensions between Germany and Czechoslovakia began to grow rapidly - the Germans wanted to annex the Sudetenland, inhabited mainly by ethnic Germans, while the Czechs refused. Hitler was ready to fight with Czechoslovakia, but England and France decided to "appease" the Fuhrer, "allowing" him to occupy the Sudetenland as a result of the "Munich agreement". The Czechs did not resist, realizing that they could not count on the British and French, and they themselves could not stand against the Wehrmacht. In September, after the annexation of the Sudetenland, the Fuhrer dismissed the last of the "dinosaurs" of the Reichswehr, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General von Beck, replacing him with the more "obedient" General Halder.

Von Beck objected to Hitler's foreign policy, saying that this course would inevitably lead to an early and large-scale war with England and France, for which Germany was completely unprepared. Apparently, Hitler was in a good mood at the time, so this case was limited to a simple resignation without any "dirty" accusations.

In the meantime, Heinz Guderian was appointed to the post of commander of the armored forces and was given the rank of general of the tank forces. Guderian had ample opportunity to build the tank units entrusted to him in accordance with his advanced views, and he set to work with all his indomitable energy. To the best of his ability, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, and his generals interfered in this. Von Brauchitsch still did not consider large tank formations as an offensive means of an operational nature, but believed that tanks should be attached to the infantry. In addition, many believed that Guderian was "offending" the cavalry, from whose ranks many German military leaders. And in this situation, Guderian was greatly helped by the direct support of his actions by Hitler.

Guderian developed the charter of the armored forces, which formulated the basic principles for the training of tank crews. Tankers had to be able to: flawlessly manage the tank both day and night, quickly and accurately open fire, take care of the tank and weapons, and, perhaps most importantly, maintain the “spirit of tank brotherhood”. Guderian rigorously introduced the principle of "one for all and all for one" into the minds of every German tanker and was quite successful in this. Perhaps only German submariners differed in the same “special fighting spirit” as that of the tankers.

The "Father of Tanks" understood that he would never have very many tanks and tankers, so the emphasis in training and combat units was placed on the most thorough training of crews. Tank drivers were especially selected in the first place. If the instructors did not see progress in the cadet after the very first practical training, then he was immediately transferred to loaders or radio gunners. The crew was trained to move in mixed columns along with artillery, engineering and reconnaissance units of the tank division. Such columns were sent on multi-kilometer trips for 23 days along special routes.

The observance by the cadets of the accuracy of the given course was monitored by specially assigned navigators from the Kriegsmarine. Gunners and loaders of tank guns in endless training sought to meet strict standards each of their operations was regulated by seconds. The Luftwaffe instructors trained the gunners separately for maximum accuracy, while sparing no ammunition, so their training mainly consisted of practical exercises. The driver was obliged to be well versed in the engine of the tank and in general in the arrangement of numerous mechanisms. The cadets devoted all their free time from classes to caring for the tank. In addition to combat training, future tankers were intensively engaged in physical activity, often running crosses, which increased overall endurance.

At the end of their studies, the worst cadets were ruthlessly eliminated. Such training principles were preserved in tank training units until the very end of the Second World War. It is thanks to all its components that the German tankers showed themselves so well both in offensive and defensive operations on all fronts.

To conquer France, the Germans concentrated 2,500 tanks, but it was not the total number of vehicles that was important, but the fact that among them there were 329 Pz. III and 280 Pz. IV, which became the main striking force of the Wehrmacht. They were opposed by 3,000 Allied tanks, of which 1,500 were French S-35 SOMUA and B1 medium tanks. The rest of the mass was made up of French medium tanks Renault D1 and D2, light Renault R-35 and Hotchkiss. In addition, 400 English, Belgian and Dutch tanks came out against the Germans.

The French medium tanks were heavily armored (up to 60mm) and heavily armed with a 47mm cannon and machine guns. Their main and decisive drawback was the low speed of 1520 km/h. Not a single German tank could penetrate their thick armor, but they simply “driving around” them, giving the right to destroy them to dive bombers and artillery. Designed for a positional, "slow" war, French tanks in the conditions of a new, maneuverable war, where the situation changed hourly, could not have time to go anywhere.

In the summer of 1939, Hitler turned his eyes to Poland, wanting to take back the lands that had previously belonged to Germany. This was the official point of view, so to speak, for external use, but in fact the Fuhrer, who called Poland in the circle of close associates "ugly and unnatural public education”, wanted to annex the entire territory of the eastern neighbor to the Reich.

But here the interests of Germany collided with the interests of the USSR, which had its own views on a number of Polish regions. Then Hitler preferred to negotiate with Stalin, which he quickly succeeded in doing. The parties divided not only Poland, but also spheres of influence in Europe. The position of France and England, which gave Poland an official guarantee of maintaining its independence, did not bother Hitler. He was sure that everything, as before, would be limited to a demonstration of external discontent, and nothing more. Although it turned out that even conciliation in politics has its limits, and as soon as Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, England and France declared war on the Third Reich, which immediately took on a strange character on their part. The French themselves called this period from the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1940 the "strange war."

I must say that no one in Europe expected such a quick and complete military defeat of Poland. The Poles had 50 infantry divisions, 1 motorized brigade, 9 cavalry brigades and 900 tanks and tankettes. With such forces it was possible to resist much longer than one month, but in practice it turned out that the Polish army was the army of "yesterday". A significant part of its weapons belonged to the period of the First World War, anti-tank artillery and automatic weapons were completely lacking, tanks and aircraft developed in the early 30s were obsolete. The Polish commanders were captivated by the tactical "positional" views of the last world war. The task of the Germans was greatly facilitated by the extremely unsuccessful strategic deployment of the Polish army, which tried to cover the entire front from Lithuania to the Carpathians for 1,500 km. There were absolutely not enough troops for this, so that all the available forces of the Poles were scattered over a large area and isolated from each other. The Germans, placing 5 tank and 6 motorized divisions, supported by 48 infantry divisions, and having complete air superiority, "dealt with" the Polish army "like a textbook."

The Poles fought valiantly, but it was the valor of the doomed. Many Germans remember the attack of the Polish cavalry brigade "Pomorska" on German tanks. One of the German veterans who commanded the Pz. II in the Polish campaign, he recalled this attack like this: “I still have a chill running through my skin at the mere memory of an unexpected attack by the Polish cavalry! I can see in front of me an endless chain of horsemen galloping at us with naked sabers. Poor fellows! They were sure that the Germans had all plywood equipment and they could easily deal with it with their sabers!

Unlike the cavalrymen, the Polish tankers managed to deliver some troubles to the German "colleagues" the best polish tank The 7TP was well (up to 40 mm) armored and armed with a fast-firing Swedish 37 mm Bofors cannon. This tank was structurally a well-known and slightly modified British export Vickers 6-ton tank.

During the war, there were several cases when these tanks knocked out several German Pz. I and Pz. II without prejudice to yourself. The Poles had only 169 such tanks, and their successes were of a private nature, but it became clear to Heinz Guderian that the Pz. I from combat units must be urgently transferred to training ones, since against a more serious enemy than the Polish army, they will only be a burden. It was time to clean up the Pz. II, but Guderian could not afford this, since the release of Pz. III and IV were still moving at a snail's pace.

In general, Guderian praised the “debut” of his tanks in this war: “The Polish campaign was a baptism of fire for my tank formations. I came to the conclusion that they fully justified themselves, and the efforts spent on their creation paid off.

Immediately after the end of the Polish campaign, Hitler ordered an offensive in the West against the French army and the British expeditionary force. Absolutely all the German generals, who held different points of view on subsequent military operations, agreed that it was real madness to attack without a plan and without preparation against a strong enemy on muddy autumn soil, limiting the use of tanks, and in conditions of rain and fog, excluding effective application aviation.

By that time, Hitler was already used to not paying attention to the opinion of the generals, having believed in his own military “genius”, but even he was somewhat embarrassed by the unanimity of the military leaders, many of whom, by the way, could not stand each other. Therefore, he cooled off somewhat and ordered the development of a plan of attack through Northern Belgium and Holland towards the English Channel. And such a plan was developed by the main command of the ground forces in the winter of 1939/40. It was somewhat reminiscent of the "Schlieffen plan" of 1914, in any case, the main offensive was supposed to be launched in the same place where the German army was then advancing. But if Schlieffen planned, having defeated the allies in Belgium, to break through to France and advance in an arc to the Swiss border, then the Fuhrer's plan, drawn up by the staff officers, set somewhat different tasks as the main goal. Namely: the defeat of the French in Belgium and Holland, the capture of a large bridgehead on the English Channel (to threaten England), the construction of new airfields and bases for submarines and the "creation of prerequisites" for further hostilities against the British and French. According to this plan, the German army was drawn into heavy frontal positional battles with the enemy, who was waiting German advance exactly where it should have started. There was no smell of any "blitzkrieg" here.

At this time, the chief of staff of Army Group A of the Wehrmacht, General Erich von Manstein, proposed to his commander, Colonel General von Rundstedt, a plan for a western offensive. According to him, the German army should have delivered the main blow through Luxembourg and Southern Belgium to Sedan, overcoming the Ardennes and the Maginot Line, which was weak in those places, and go behind enemy lines towards the mouth of the Somme River. Army Group "B" was to advance "in the old way" in Northern Belgium and Holland. Thus, the French and British, taken in "pincers", would have to fight with an "inverted front" with an enemy advancing from two sides.

The plan was ideologically different from the plan developed by the high command of the ground forces in a fundamental way Manstein did not propose partial success, but the complete defeat of the enemy. Guderian helped Manstein in developing the plan regarding the use of large tank formations. He assured Manstein that the tanks would be able to overcome the Ardennes and carry out a rapid breakthrough in the future.

Von Rundstedt appreciated the effectiveness and beauty of his chief of staff's operational plan and sent a note to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, with a proposal to discuss a new offensive option. After that, the commander had to send several more such notes, as well as a detailed new Manstein plan, but he did not receive any intelligible answer. Von Brauchitsch and his chief of staff, Halder, did not even want to discuss what they thought was an unrealistic proposal. But for Manstein's luck, his adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel von Tresckow, was friends with Hitler's chief adjutant, Schmundt, and persuaded the latter to show the plan to the Fuhrer. Hitler liked this idea.

Meanwhile, von Brauchitsch removed Manstein, who had bothered him, from his post and appointed him commander of an army corps. On the occasion of the new appointment, Manstein had to introduce himself to Hitler as Supreme Commander, which was done. During the presentation, Manstein told the Fuhrer in the most detailed way all the details of his plan and, as a result, finally convinced him that it was expedient to act in this way.

The headquarters war game ordered by Hitler also showed the full benefits of the Manstein plan. Ironically, the author and developer himself was soon forced to advance in the second echelon, solving by no means the main tasks with his corps, but the authority of Erich von Manstein among the German generals rose to a great height, and Guderian (and not only him) considered him since then "Germany's best operational mind".

Starting its offensive on May 9, 1940, the Wehrmacht quickly achieved decisive successes. A purposeful, sudden strike by large tank forces through Sedan to Amiens with access to the Atlantic coast met only the strongly extended flank of the French, who were advancing to Belgium, where, in their opinion, the main German offensive was to take place. The development of events quickly led to the actual defeat of the unruly Anglo-French troops.

On May 22, Guderian's tanks reached the Atlantic coast and on May 25 captured Boulogne. On the same day, Guderian intended to launch an attack on Dunkirk, where more than 300 thousand soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force had taken refuge, but this was strictly forbidden to him. "Fast Heinz" could only watch as sea vessels of all types and classes evacuate the British from the trap. Permission to advance was received by him only on the evening of May 26, when it was already too late. Subsequently, both Guderian himself and other German generals and military historians repeatedly asked themselves the question: why did Hitler not allow the British army, which was in a hopeless situation, to be captured? Many are inclined to the opinion of Churchill, who believed that in this way Hitler made a broad “gesture of goodwill” towards England, wanting to conclude a truce.

If this was so, then there was no common sense in Hitler's decision, since only the capture of almost all of her combat-ready army could make England more accommodating. Be that as it may, the British did not even say “thank you” to Hitler, and the evacuated soldiers in the near future caused the Germans a lot of problems in North Africa. By mid-June, the large French army, considered by many to be the strongest in Europe, was finally defeated. On June 22, 1940, the French government concluded an armistice with the Germans. Moreover, Hitler forced the French to sign it in the same Compiègne forest and in the same staff car of Marshal Foch, in which in November 1918 the Germans signed their defeat in the First World War.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army had about 23,000 tanks. The German command could not even imagine that the "Soviets" had such a huge tank armada, and the enemy had no more than 10,000 combat-ready vehicles (which was already several times greater than those 3,350 German tanks that were thrown against the USSR).

In fact, by June 1941, there were 12,780 tanks in the five western military districts of the Red Army, of which approximately 10,500 were serviceable. About 1,500 tanks were of new types - T-34 and KV. All Soviet tanks were consolidated into 20 mechanized corps, each of which was supposed to have about 35,000 people, 1,000 tanks, 268 armored vehicles and 358 guns and mortars - that is, two tank and one mechanized division. In fact, practically not a single mechanical corps was completed in the state.

In terms of the number of tanks, the Soviet mechanized corps surpassed any German tank group, of which the Germans had only four: two in Army Group Center and one each in Army Groups North and South. It seemed that the Germans did not have a single chance not only to defeat, but even to survive in battles with 20 giant Soviet mechanized corps. But in practice, everything turned out differently in the German tank forces, the main thing was not the number of vehicles, but management and organization. In a German tank division of the 1941 model, there were 149 or (in three-battalion divisions) 209 tanks, 27 armored vehicles, 192 guns and mortars, 400 armored personnel carriers, 1,500 trucks, 600 cars and 1,300 motorcycles.

Unlike the Soviet mechanized corps, the main striking force of the German tank division was motorized infantry in vehicles. Thanks to her, the Germans could quickly gain a foothold in the occupied territories, while the Soviet mechanized corps, where there were very few infantry, and she moved on foot, could not, even if successful, properly consolidate or organize a reliable defense.

The Soviet command experienced the biggest problems in command and control. The Soviet mechanized corps was essentially a huge and unbalanced formation. Its supply of fuels and lubricants (diesel fuel and gasoline of various grades) and shells (at least six different calibers) was extremely difficult in peacetime, and in conditions of maneuver war it became completely impossible. Almost all gas storages and artillery depots in the border areas were bombed by German aircraft or captured by the Wehrmacht in the first days of the war. Thus, each Soviet tanker could only rely on the fuel and ammunition that were in the tank. When both ended, and another, the tank was undermined or simply rushed.

The T-34 had projectile-proof hull armor due to the large angles of inclination of armor plates 45 mm thick. The frontal armor was inclined from the vertical by 60° and corresponded to 90 mm thick armor set at a right angle. Pz. III and Pz. IVs could hit the T-34 only by hitting the undercarriage or the stern, but for this the German tank had to approach 100150 m, although even this distance did not guarantee success. The long-barreled 76.2 mm T-34 gun hit the armor of the Pz. III and Pz. IV anywhere from a range of 1,500 m.

In the battles for Moscow, acting from ambushes on the advantageous lines of highways and dirt roads, the "thirty-fours" staged real terror among the German tank units, which were already advancing with their last strength. The 4th tank brigade of Colonel M.E. was especially distinguished in such battles. Katukov.

In just one day of fighting, the brigade, which consisted of 49 tanks (20 of which were T-34s), knocked out and destroyed 43 German tanks, 16 of which were on the account of the T-34 commander, Lieutenant D.F. Lavrinenko. His crew in the battles for Moscow achieved fantastic results he managed to knock out and destroy about 50 enemy tanks! A ridiculous death prevented the lieutenant from achieving more - a single random fragment struck him in the heart when he simply stood next to his tank.

From the first day of the war, the command of the fronts almost completely lost control of the troops. Radio stations were sorely lacking, those that were available were used little and inefficiently. In the Red Army, before the war, they were used to keeping communications by wire, which was quickly disabled in combat conditions, and by means of couriers, messengers and other "communication delegates" on cars, motorcycles and horses. In the summer of 1941, all these couriers, as a rule, simply could not find their addressees, and if they did, they passed on already hopelessly outdated orders to them, the implementation of which further complicated the already catastrophic situation. Confusion reigned in everything - the Soviet command lost sight of entire armies, while the German generals and officers literally knew where each German tank or infantry platoon was located, and what combat mission they were performing at that time. Communication with the Germans worked flawlessly.

Having used up the material part in senseless marches, the Soviet tankers, forced to undermine their vehicles, along with the remnants of other troops made their way to the east. In those dark days of 1941, a star rose over the battlefields of the outstanding Soviet T-34 tank.

The successful performance of the T-34 was such an unpleasant “surprise” for the Germans that Heinz Guderian was forced to make a gloomy prediction: “Very alarming reports about the quality of Russian tanks The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which has taken place so far, has now been lost and has now passed to the enemy. Thus, the prospects for quick decisive victories disappeared.

"Fast Heinz", as always, was right: despite the fact that the Red Army lost 20,500 tanks in the whole of 1941, the USSR did not even think of capitulating. Despite the colossal, incredible losses in manpower and equipment, in December 1941 the Red Army even managed to go on the counteroffensive and push the Germans away from Moscow.

All this meant that the "blitzkrieg" ended in failure at arm's length from victory. The war was becoming disastrous for Germany, protracted, and the German armored forces in the midst of the war had to rearm T-34 overnight made German tanks obsolete. But this required both time and huge resources, which Germany already lacked. The time of quick and brilliant victories of the Wehrmacht had passed, a merciless total war for survival began.

Maxim Morgunov
To be continued

Home Structure Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Ground Forces Structure Tank

Tank forces

Tank forces- the type of troops and the main striking force of the Ground Forces. They are mainly used in conjunction with motorized rifle troops in the main directions and perform the following main tasks:

. on the defensive - for direct support of motorized rifle troops in repelling an enemy offensive and inflicting counterattacks and counterattacks;

. on the offensive - inflicting powerful cutting blows to a great depth, developing success, defeating the enemy in oncoming battles and battles.

Tank brigades and tank battalions of motorized rifle brigades, which are highly resistant to the damaging factors of nuclear weapons, firepower, high mobility and maneuverability, form the basis of tank troops. They are capable of making fullest use of the results of fire (nuclear) engagement of the enemy and achieving the ultimate goals of combat and operations in a short time.

The combat capabilities of tank formations and subunits allow them to conduct active combat operations day and night, at a considerable distance from other troops, to crush the enemy in head-on battles and battles, to overcome vast zones of radioactive contamination on the move, to force water barriers, and also to quickly create a solid defense and successfully resist the offensive of superior enemy forces.

Further development and enhancement of the combat capabilities of tank troops is carried out mainly by equipping them with more advanced types of tanks, which optimally combine such important combat properties as high firepower, maneuverability and reliable protection. In improving organizational forms, the main efforts are concentrated on giving them a combined-arms character, which to the greatest extent corresponds to the content of modern operations (combat actions).

Tank forces Russian Federation the main strike force of the Ground Forces and a powerful means of armed struggle, designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of military operations. The appearance of tanks is connected with the need to solve the problem of breaking through the positional defense, equipped in engineering terms and saturated with artillery, machine guns and mortars. Tank troops are used primarily in the main axes for inflicting powerful cutting blows on the enemy to great depths. Possessing high mobility, maneuverability, firepower and high resistance to the damaging factors of weapons of mass destruction, they are able to quickly create a solid defense and achieve the set goals of the battle and operation in a short time. The combat capabilities of tank formations, units and subunits allow them to conduct active combat operations day and night, at a significant distance from other troops, to smash enemy groupings in head-on battles and battles, to overcome vast zones of radioactive contamination on the move and force water barriers.

Trends in the development of tank troops included: a constant increase in the firepower and strike force of units, formations and associations; giving, especially to corps and armies, the necessary autonomy in conducting combat operations in isolation from rifle formations; constant striving to provide all organizational forms with high mobility and mobility; providing units, formations and associations with opportunities for successful combat and operations in various terrain conditions; the creation of an easily manageable organization of regiments, brigades, corps and armies.

TANK - combat tracked armored vehicle. It was first used by British troops in 1916 during the 1st World War. Types: light, medium, heavy. The main weapon is a cannon, auxiliary machine guns. The crew is 3-4 people, the caliber of the gun is from 105 to 152 mm, the speed is km / h, the mass is tons. Tank troops consist of tank, motorized rifle (mechanized, motorized infantry), rocket, artillery and other units, units, formations.

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS No. 12/2007, pp. 2-5

Used photos by A. Chiryatnikov,

V. Shcherbakov, as well as services

information and public relations

Ground forces.

The magazine "Technique and Armament" constantly pays great attention to modern armored weapons and equipment. To questions from the editors of the journal regarding current situation Russian tank troops and their weapons kindly agreed to answer the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General of the ArmyA.F. Maslov

- Alexey Fyodorovich! Not for the first time in the media and in special publications the question of the "reducing the role" of tank troops has been raised, that the time when tanks played a decisive role in combat operations is "left behind". How reasonable is it to classify tanks as "endangered brontosaurs"?

Indeed, one can often come across assertions that the "golden time" of the tank forces is over, and that in the foreseeable future their significance will steadily decline. Such views are mainly held by supporters of the so-called "non-contact" wars, who seek to prove that in modern military conflicts, when fire defeat becomes one of the most important operational factors, aviation and precision weapons play an almost decisive role in achieving success. Without belittling their importance, I note that, as experience shows, the effectiveness of the use of aviation is quite high in the fight against an enemy who does not have or has an underdeveloped air defense, when conducting combat operations in open areas and destroying, as a rule, stationary objects. In addition, hostilities usually do not end with one fire defeat. The results of fire engagement must still be used to complete the defeat of the enemy, capture important areas, lines and liberate the territory he has seized.

The experience of local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades just shows that the ground forces have not lost their importance at all, and tanks retain the leading role in the combined arms formations, both as a means of maneuver following the fire engagement of the enemy, and as the main combat weapon in close combat. . This is also confirmed by the trend towards an increase in their proportion in the composition of combined arms groupings of troops. So, if in the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 only about 2600 tanks were used, in 1973 - about 5300, then in the armed conflict between Iraq and the multinational forces in 1990-1991. - already over 9000. And in 2003, the Americans had to wage another war against Iraq, where, despite the widespread use of high-precision long-range weapons, the main role was assigned to ground groups, a significant part of which were armored forces, which included about 5000 tanks.

Today at Russian Army, despite a significant reduction, the tank forces still play an important role in solving the tasks facing the Ground Forces.

As before, the fundamental principle of the use of tanks in modern warfare remains their massive use to solve the main tasks by concentrating on the main directions both in the offensive and in defense.

At the same time, tank units and subunits are used both in isolated directions and in separate areas according to the focal principle. This gives the actions of divisions, brigades and especially battalions, and sometimes even tank companies, an autonomous character in the absence of fire communication with neighbors. In this case, tanks are used independently or as means of direct support for infantry as part of battalion (company) tactical groups. Under such conditions, the need for direct support of tanks by combat helicopters, attack aircraft, artillery, as well as air defense cover, sharply increases. But this, like the widespread use of high-precision weapons, by no means diminishes the role of tank troops. The use by the opposing sides of high-precision weapons and other latest means of armed struggle contributes to an increase in the transience of combat and sharply increases the importance of preempting the enemy. Typical in the conduct of hostilities will be a quick and frequent transition from one type of action to another. And in this regard, the role of tank troops, which combine high mobility, maneuverability and firepower, in order to achieve success in a modern combined-arms operation (combat) is only increasing.

Views on the use of tank units and subunits are periodically updated. Moreover, we take into account not only foreign, but, above all, our own experience.

Thus, in the course of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus region, combat operations, as a rule, were conducted in the absence of a clearly defined front. Bandit formations widely used ambushes, night and surprise strikes in small groups, and cities and towns turned into strongholds saturated with anti-tank weapons. Unfortunately, in the first Chechen campaign, individual commanders often did not fully take into account the specific conditions of the situation. Due to the lack of the necessary experience in the use of tank units in mountainous wooded areas and settlements, weak interaction with supporting units, tankers suffered serious losses.

Taking into account all these factors and the experience gained ensured the successful solution of tasks in the course of the further conduct of the counter-terrorist operation.

And yet, the use of tank troops in the counter-terrorist operation is a private, and not a characteristic task for them. The main purpose of tank units and subunits is to conduct combat operations in local and regional (large-scale) wars. In my opinion, there are no special grounds for asserting that the importance of deep combined-arms operations and the importance of such a strike force as tank troops in them has decreased.

- Could you briefly describe the current fleet of armored combat vehicles?

Today, a fairly wide range of models of military vehicles is still in service: T-62, T-64, T-72, T-80, T-90 and their modifications.

The staffing of tank units and formations of constant readiness is 100%. Unfortunately, the share of modern models in formations and units is not yet high, and the problem of equipping units of the Ground Forces with constant combat readiness with modern tanks is a top priority for us. Of course, we would like the troops to receive as many modern and effective weapons as possible, including tanks. But taking into account the financial capabilities of the state, one has to be content with what is received annually within the framework of the state defense order.

The T-90 tank, which is a further development of both the T-72B and T-80 tanks, can currently be considered the main battle tank of the Russian Armed Forces. The T-90 is equipped with the Shtora electronic suppression system, a modern fire control system, the Arena complex for protection against modern anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank grenades.

At the same time, I would like to emphasize that our industry has created a sufficient scientific and technical reserve, which makes it possible to comprehensively solve the problems of increasing combat and specifications BTVT by their modernization. The most expedient should be considered the modernization of the T-72, T-80, T-90 tanks in the direction of a comprehensive increase in firepower, security, and mobility.

What does the modern Russian tank fleet look like against the background of the main battle tanks of the armed forces of the most developed foreign countries?

Of course, each combat vehicle has its own advantages and disadvantages over its “competitors” (and the competition in tank building took place both in Soviet time, as well as now). However, in comparison with the serial tanks of leading foreign countries, Russian tanks not only are not inferior, but even surpass them in some characteristics. It is characteristic that in the modern arms market, domestic tanks are in deserved demand and respect. The positive qualities of our tanks are their low silhouette, good mobility, reliability, the presence of sufficiently effective guided weapons and an automatic (mechanism) loader. At the same time, it should be noted that foreign tanks since the 1980s. are equipped with thermal imaging observation and aiming devices, and our vehicles are not yet equipped with them in sufficient quantities. Currently, the best foreign tanks include the American Abrame, the French Leclerc, the English Challenger-2, and the German Leopard-2A5 / A6. The Russian T-90 tank is roughly on par with them.

The most pronounced trend in the development of armored vehicles can be considered a steady increase in the firepower of tanks, and the most dynamic improvement was primarily in their weapons system.

No armor protection gives a combat vehicle absolute security. To survive in combat, you must first find the target and hit it. Today, tanks have the ability to fire effectively both from a standstill and on the move. And thermal imaging sights (sight channels) allow you to search for targets in difficult weather conditions, not only during the day, but also at night. Significantly (more than 3 times) the armor penetration of shells also increased, complexes for remote detonation of high-explosive fragmentation (shrapnel) shells and tank missile flight control appeared.

The main weapons of modern tanks are high-ballistic guns of medium (120-125 mm) caliber, mainly with a smooth-walled barrel. Domestic tank guns, created on the basis of the concept of "least mass", are the lightest. The survivability of their trunks is from 400 to 700 shots. And the best performance is for barrels with an internal protective chrome coating of the channel.

As auxiliary weapons, tank protection and crew weapons are used. As for additional weapons, it provides self-defense against air targets, as well as the defeat of manpower and lightly armored targets. On modern tanks, autonomous 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on the tower are used for this. There are also guided missile systems that hit armored targets with high accuracy at ranges up to 5000 m.

It's important to say this, too. The search for targets, the accuracy of fire and the speed of weapons depend on the fire control system (FCS). Modern control systems of domestic and foreign tanks are built on the principles of automating the processes of searching for targets and preparing for firing. As part of domestic control systems, for example, gunner's day sighting systems with independent stabilization of the line of sight are used. Domestic SLAs are also equipped with tank missile flight control equipment (it is not available on foreign ones). And the systems for stabilizing and guiding weapons have an electro-hydraulic drive in the plane of the vertical nave
denia (on foreign - electromechanical).

Let's take a look at the ammo. It includes armor-piercing (kinetic, high-explosive, and cumulative action) and high-explosive fragmentation (shrapnel) shells. But Russian tanks also have guided missiles. Foreign ones use multi-purpose shots (M830 in the USA, DM 12 in Germany) with cumulative fragmentation projectiles. The main difference between domestic shots and foreign shots is separate loading, which makes it possible to store them in automata and loaders located in the tank hull.

The use of automatic machines and loading mechanisms provides tanks high level technical rate of fire, independent of physical abilities loader, and allows you to reduce the number of crew to three people. So modern tanks are no longer "steel brontosaurs", but highly mobile armored systems saturated with modern electronics and weapons.

At the same time, it should be noted that the main emphasis is not only on improving the tactical and technical characteristics of the tanks themselves, but also on finding alternative solutions to improve the effectiveness of the use of tank units in battle. Of particular note is one of such urgent decisions as the inclusion in the state of tank units of a tank support combat vehicle (BMPT), which is currently being tested. In terms of firepower, the BMPT surpasses the BMP by 25-30%, and in terms of security it is not inferior to tanks. The appearance of this machine will significantly change the views on the forms and methods of using tank units and will increase their combat effectiveness by about a third. In particular, India, Germany, Israel, France, and the United States show great interest in the BMPT. There are no analogues of such a machine in the world yet.

In addition to the main combat, there are also "light" tanks. In our country, this class was represented for several decades by the PT-76 amphibious tanks that are already going down in history. Is there a replacement for them?

PT-76s were in service, as a rule, in the reconnaissance units of the Ground Forces. They, in general, were also equipped with units and subunits of the Marine Corps. To date, the PT-76 has been discontinued, although it played a certain role in shaping views on the conduct of landing operations and the development of armored vehicles. It is being replaced by the Sprut anti-tank self-propelled system, recently put into service. It is equipped with a 125 mm tank gun and is capable of delivering effective fire both on the move and afloat. That is, in addition to high mobility, buoyancy and air transportability, we are also talking about a qualitative increase in firepower.

What is the situation in tank formations and units with combat training of personnel, does the state of their combat training differ from the state of affairs in all the Ground Forces?

Of course, in the combat training of tank formations, units and subunits, problems can be traced that are also characteristic of other branches of the Ground Forces. But the peculiarities of the use of tank troops, namely the cohesion factor of tank crews, the understanding that the survivability, power of a tank and its weapons directly depend on the training and ability of the crew to act in a coordinated manner in any combat situation, have always distinguished the special and technical training of tankers. The question of complete interchangeability is also very relevant for tankers. After all, the tank remains a combat unit, even if only one of the crew members is physically capable of performing functional duties.

It should be borne in mind that the combat training of tankers is much more expensive than, for example, that of motorized riflemen, and therefore more attention is paid to training on tank firing camps with firing substitutes for regular shots and the use of simulators for training tank commanders, drivers, gunners -operators individually, and crews as a whole. Designed in last years new high-quality training facilities and range equipment meet modern requirements, have been mastered by industry and will be supplied to the troops in sufficient quantities. This will significantly increase the level of training of tankers while significantly reducing the material and financial costs of training.

The material was prepared with the assistance of the information and public relations service of the Ground Forces.

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