Polish cavalry attacks German tanks. So the Polish cavalry defeated Hitler's tanks. Polish artists are stronger than Goethe's Faust

The mythologists of the Great Patriotic War and World War II generally gave birth to a fairy tale that the cavalry in this war was a relic of the past and was preserved in the Red Army only thanks to the cavalry marshals - Budyonny, Voroshilov, and Stalin, who allegedly did not understand the role of mechanization in the army and overestimated the role of the cavalry divisions.

But the opinion about the overestimation of the role of the cavalry in the Red Army is not true. Before the war, the number of cavalry was constantly falling. According to the report of the People's Commissar of Defense to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the fall of 1937, the long-term plan for the development of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army for 1938-1942 spoke of the reduction and disbandment of a significant part of the cavalry. As a result, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates in 1938, 4 corps directorates and 13 divisions remained. Some cavalry units were reorganized into mechanized ones; so, the 4th cavalry corps, management and the 34th cavalry division became the basis of the 8th mechanized corps of D. I. Ryabtsev (before that the commander of the cavalry corps).

The theory of combat use of cavalry in the USSR

The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was created by quite sensible people; So, in 1922, the work “Cavalry: Cavalry Essays” was published, which belonged to Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov - a colonel, a cavalryman of the tsarist army, who headed the General Staff in the USSR. He published in the Union the first study on the tactics of the cavalry, it caused a wide discussion of the red commanders. In his work, Shaposhnikov reduced equestrian combat to exceptions, and combined combat should become the norm - a maneuver by horsemen, and the actual combat on foot. The organization was supposed to become closer to the infantry, the weapons were strengthened, becoming similar to the infantry - rifles with a bayonet, revolvers, grenades, carbines, the number of machine guns was increased, artillery units were strengthened (the cavalry should have howitzers and anti-aircraft guns), armored vehicles were attached, including tanks. The cavalry was supposed to be supported by aviation from the air.

Marshal Budyonny was not a "narrow-minded" cavalryman, but quite sensibly argued that the role of the cavalry would increase in the event of a mobile war, this is its scope. That is why it was necessary to maintain a powerful cavalry in the Red Army.

The combat charter of the cavalry attributed the offensive in the cavalry formation only in the case of a "favorable situation", that is, if there is shelter from enemy fire, it is weak or there is no enemy fire. The horse actually became a vehicle, while the cavalry fought on foot.

The field manual of 1939 noted that the cavalry units should be used in conjunction with tank units, motorized infantry, and aviation; in the development of breakthroughs, in raids behind enemy lines, in the pursuit of the enemy. Cavalrymen, dismounted, could hold the terrain, but it was assigned at the first opportunity to replace them, saving them for maneuver.


Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich

Combat use of cavalry

Horses were used for movement, before the battle they were taken away by horse breeders (several people in each squadron), cavalrymen fought like ordinary infantry. Attacking enemy positions in cavalry formation, with increased firepower, was suicide, and senseless, our commanders did not suffer from such nonsense. The famous carts also remained, but before the battle the machine gun was removed, the horses were taken away with the cart. Horse attack and cutting the enemy with a saber became an exception. Many fighters never went on horseback during the war and did not hack anyone.

In fact, the caval units became a kind of motorized infantry, only on horseback. This had its advantages, the cavalry passed where armored vehicles could not pass, cars - in forests, mountainous terrain. Soviet cavalrymen attacking the positions of the Wehrmacht with sabers unsheathed is a myth.



Horse guards of General Oslikovsky at the review, 1944

The myth of the Polish cavalry attacking the tanks of the Wehrmacht

The myth was created by Guderian in his memoirs: “The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the constructive data and methods of action of our tankers, attacked them cold and suffered monstrous losses.” Apparently, this plot fit well into the idea of ​​the racial superiority of the "Nordic race" over the "subhuman" Slavs, who were smart enough to attack tanks on horseback.

His message was then creatively developed in fiction, Pikul, for example, in his book "The Square of the Fallen Fighters".

In reality, the Polish cavalry, like the Soviet one, had instructions that the cavalry marches on horseback, and the battle is on foot. Naturally, there could be an exception if you are chasing a demoralized enemy or taking him by surprise.

The 18th Pomeranian Lancers took part in the battle near Kroyants. On August 22, 1939, he received an order to mobilize, on the 25th it was completed. The regiment consisted of more than 800 people, two 37-mm anti-tank guns, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 heavy machine guns, 18 light machine guns, 2 motorcycles, 2 radio stations. Then it was reinforced with a battery with 4 75-mm cannons and two heavy machine guns.

On September 1, the regiment met the enemy on the border and fought a defensive battle in the first half of the day, in the afternoon the regiment received an order to launch a counterattack and, taking advantage of the enemy’s hitch, withdraw. For the counterattack, two squadrons and two platoons were allocated, they were brought into a mobile detachment, he was given the task of reaching the rear of the German infantry by seven in the evening and attacking it, and then retreating behind the front line.

During a roundabout maneuver, the reconnaissance of the Poles discovered a battalion of German infantry, which was on a halt 300-400 meters from the edge of the forest. The Polish commanders decided to attack in cavalry formation, using the effect of surprise. The attack was led by the commander of the regiment, Colonel Mastalezh, at the signal of the trumpet, the Poles attacked. The Germans did not expect a blow and were taken by surprise, and ran, the Poles began to cut them down. But the Poles did not notice the armored vehicles hidden in the forest, now they took them by surprise. They left the forest and opened fire from machine guns (that is, there were no tanks), they were supported by one gun, the Poles were defeated. They retreated with 26 dead, including a colonel, and about 50 wounded.

Most of the losses of the 18th regiment on September 1 suffered in a defensive battle - up to 60% of the composition, two anti-tank guns, several machine guns. The image invented by Guderian and developed by other authors has nothing to do with reality. The 18th Pomeranian Lancers (or rather, part of it) attacked the gaping German infantry, not tanks, and was attacked by German armored vehicles when chopping down the Germans. But, having suffered losses, the cavalry retreated and was not completely destroyed.

Sources:
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, 1999.
Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M., 2004.
Soviet cavalry. Military - ist. essay / A. Ya. Soshnikov, P. N. Dmitriev, A. S. Arutyunov et al. M., 1984.
Tyulenev I. V. Soviet cavalry in the battles for the Motherland. M., 1957.

... In the early morning of November 19, 1941, realizing that they were going to certain death, the cavalrymen of the squadron released their war horses. And soon dozens of German tanks appeared on the horizon. From our side, from hastily equipped shelters, they were opposed by 45 Kuban Cossacks. Probably, looking through the viewing slots, the Germans thought: “Strange people: we will soon hold a parade on Red Square, and these Russians are going hand-to-hand against tanks.”

And the Cossacks really staged hand-to-hand combat with iron cars, throwing grenades and Molotov cocktails at them. At the village of Fedyukovo, which the Wehrmacht troops intended to slip through in a matter of minutes, the Germans lingered for a day. A squadron of Cossacks bit into the frozen soil to death, becoming an insurmountable barrier for almost a day. This happened a few days after the feat of the Panfilovites.

Family photo of Nikolai Bogdashko on the eve of the war: he is with his wife, parents and two children. Photo from personal archive Filipp Bogdashko's family

But if every schoolchild heard about the heroism of 28 fighters near the village of Dubosekovo, the feat of the Cossack squadron became known recently. Among those cavalrymen was a Cossack Nikolay Bogdashko from the Kuban village of Peredovaya. “Before the war, my father worked on a collective farm,” says AiF. son of a Cossack Philip Bogdashko. - He went to the front at the end of June 1941. As a skilled rider, he got into the cavalry. Their units became part of the cavalry group of the famous Dovator».

Ataman of the "Wild Cossacks"

Dovator is known for daring sorties behind enemy lines. In September 1941, in a report of the Soviet Information Bureau, it was reported that his group, being behind enemy lines for two weeks, managed to destroy 3,000 fascist soldiers, 19 officers, 150 vehicles, 9 tanks. Attacking the villages where the Nazis quartered at night, the Cossacks threw grenades at houses with sleeping Germans. They destroyed equipment, setting up ambushes on the roads. The Hitlerite command distributed a leaflet, which spoke of a 100,000-strong army of "wild Cossacks" raging in forests and villages, about their "ataman" Dovator: a reward was set for his capture - 50,000 Reichsmarks. The cavalrymen tore this leaflet from the headquarters of the German unit and handed it over to Dovator. He laughed: there were 50 times fewer Cossacks. And in one of the letters found from the murdered German, which he did not have time to send home, it was said: “One memory of the Cossack attack plunges me into horror and makes me tremble. At night, the Cossacks come to me in hallucinations! .. We are afraid of the Cossacks as punishment from the Almighty.

For successful raids behind enemy lines in September 1941, Dovator was awarded the rank of major general. “He took care of the Cossacks. I tried in vain not to risk their lives, - says Philip Bogdashko. - It is clear that in November 1941 the cavalry was put up against tanks not from a good life. But already in the evening, Dovator, wanting to save the remnants of the squadron, sent a messenger with an order to retreat. The contact was killed. They sent a second one and they killed him. The son of the regiment volunteered to deliver the order - 14-year-old Sasha Kopylov. At the scene of the battle, the teenager counted more than 20 wrecked tanks and did not see a single surviving Cossack. He returned and reported: the entire squadron was killed. All this Kopylov himself told in 2008 to the Kuban Cossack Bulletin. However, the report of the death of the entire squadron was hasty. And I was able to prove it.

Life after death

My father had a difficult fate, - continues Philip Nikolayevich. - Before the war, in 1932-1933. he buried two small children. At that time there was a terrible famine in the Kuban. Miraculously survived two other children, my older brothers. Well, my sister and I were born only because dad returned from the war.

This is surprising, but on the night of June 21-22, 1941, my grandmother Maria Semyonovna had a dream: as if Mitriy (my father’s older brother) and Nikolka (my father) suddenly left for firewood, and by the evening the smaller one returned alone, but so saddened. .. And in the afternoon, a rider galloped to the board of the brigade: the war with the Germans had begun! Mitriy went to the front the next morning, and his father a week later. Mitriy soon died, and Batya met the victorious salute in Germany. He died in 1985. Journalists never wrote about him. And suddenly, in 2007, almost a quarter of a century after his death, I open a newspaper and read: they say, the 4th squadron of the 37th Armavir cavalry regiment of the 50th Kuban cavalry division repeated the feat of the Panfilovites. And then the names and surnames, including my father - Nikolai Bogdashko. I started my investigation. I had to write to the then President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev - it turns out that not all archives are required to answer to a private person, even taking into account the fact that I myself am a military man - a captain of the 1st rank. Finally, I received copies of archival materials, among which were statements of monetary allowance. Father and after his "death" received according to the statements of 60 rubles. per month for shag, etc. Having shoveled a lot of archival documents, I found that in addition to my father, five more Cossacks survived to the Victory! Later, cadets from the Moscow Cossack cadet corps them. M. Sholokhov arranged a meeting for me with the daughter of General Dovator Rita Lvovna. Dovator himself died heroically near Moscow in December 1941.

And here sit the young, with burning eyes: tell us about the hero-father. And I have a lump in my throat. What to tell? I remember how in childhood my father took me to work - he sheared sheep on the collective farm, and I crushed this wool in huge bales of human height. How he was a deputy of the village council, how he worked at a sawmill for the last 20 years - he sawed logs into boards. He didn’t complain about anything, except for the children who died. He treated bread with care, did not like to leave home. I would give a lot now to ask him about that battle, so that he would tell why he has the Order of the Red Star and the medals For Courage and For Military Merit.

Pupils of the Moscow Cossack Cadet Corps. M. Sholokhov at the Poklonny Cross in honor of the Cossacks of the 4th squadron. Photo from the personal archive of Philip Bogdashko's family

I read the dry lines of award sheets. But I really want details, and for some reason I didn’t have time to ask before. I am grateful to the Kuban Cossack community and the Kuban community of Moscow - they put a Poklonny cross in memory of the Cossack heroes at the battle site near the village of Fedyukovo. I am grateful to the cadets that on the anniversary, November 19, on a cold day, they came to the memorial and laid flowers. The guys did it at the call of the heart. Now, more than a quarter of a century after my father's death, it's like I'm rediscovering him."

... December 5-6, 1941, our troops near Moscow launched a counteroffensive, driving the enemy away from the capital. General Keitel, who signed the Act on the unconditional surrender of Germany on the night of May 8-9, 1945, later admitted: “The day of December 6, 1941 is one of the most turning points in brief history Third Reich. On this day, the myth of the invincibility of the German army was shattered.

“How could they do this - withstand in the war what is physically impossible to withstand ?!” - now I can already see the burning eyes of the cadets, having come to visit them in the circle of young museum-Vedas. Having learned about the huge circulation of AiF, they asked to publish the names of five more Cossacks who met Victory in defeated Germany. The guys believe that the story of the feat of the squadron will acquire new details.

P. S. Please respond to the relatives of the Red Army soldiers of the 4th squadron Goncharov Stepan Kirillovich, Emelyanov Abram Nikolaevich, Kozyrev Vasily Konstantinovich, Konovalov Efim Mitrofanovich and Chernyshov Ivan Fedorovich at the address "AiF": 107996, Moscow, st. Elektrozavodskaya, 27, building 4, with the note: “70 years of Victory. Cossack squadron.

A special chapter is devoted to the role of the cavalry in our army in wartime and before the war. Those interested in the details will easily find them there. We quote only the conclusion.

“Stories about stupid, backward cavalrymen throwing themselves at tanks with sabers are in best case misleading people who are poorly versed in tactical and operational issues. As a rule, these misconceptions are the result of dishonesty of historians and memoirists. The cavalry was quite an adequate means of conducting maneuverable combat operations in 1939-1945. The Red Army demonstrated this most clearly. The cavalry of the Red Army in the prewar years has undergone a sharp reduction. It was believed that she could not seriously compete with tank and motorized formations on the battlefield. Of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates available by 1938, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained by the beginning of the war. However, the experience of the war showed that with the reduction of the cavalry hastened. The creation of only motorized units and formations was, firstly, unbearable for domestic industry, and secondly, the nature of the terrain in the European part of the USSR in many cases did not favor the use of vehicles. All this led to the revival of large cavalry formations. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of hostilities had changed significantly compared to 1941-1942, 7 cavalry corps successfully operated in the Red Army, 6 of them bore the honorary title of guards. In fact, during its decline, the cavalry returned to the standard of 1938 - 7 departments of cavalry corps. The Wehrmacht cavalry experienced a similar evolution - from one brigade in 1939 to several cavalry divisions in 1945. In 1941-1942. The horsemen played a crucial role in defensive and offensive operations, becoming the indispensable "quasi-motorized infantry" of the Red Army. In fact, before the appearance in the Red Army of large independent mechanized formations and formations, cavalry was the only maneuverable means of the operational level. In 1943-1945, when the mechanisms of tank armies were finally fine-tuned, the cavalry became a subtle tool for solving especially important tasks in offensive operations. Tellingly, the number of cavalry corps was approximately equal to the number of tank armies. There were six tank armies in 1945, and seven cavalry corps. Most of both of them bore the rank of Guards by the end of the war. If the tank armies were the sword of the Red Army, then the cavalry was a sharp and long sword. Typical task of cavalrymen in 1943-1945. there was the formation of an outer front of encirclement, a breakthrough far into the depths of the enemy defenses at a time when the old front was crumbling and a new one had not yet been created. On a good highway, the cavalry certainly lagged behind the motorized infantry. But on dirt roads and in wooded and swampy areas, it could advance at a pace quite comparable to that of motorized infantry. In addition, unlike motorized infantry, the cavalry did not require a constant delivery of many tons of fuel. This allowed the cavalry corps to advance deeper than most of the mechanized formations and ensure a high rate of advance for the armies and fronts as a whole. Cavalry breakthroughs to great depths made it possible to save the forces of infantrymen and tankmen. Only a person who does not have the slightest idea about the tactics of the cavalry and has a vague idea of ​​​​its operational use can assert that the cavalry is a backward branch of the army, only due to the thoughtlessness of the leadership remaining in the Red Army.

It should be added to this that a number of military commanders, like Voroshilov and Budyonny, should not be represented as "anti-motorists". As Pykhalov shows, it is somehow difficult to attribute to this category the same Voroshilov, who in a number of speeches speaks of a future war as a "war of engines".

If the cavalry was already so far behind, then it is reasonable to ask how the enemy was doing with this. The Germans did not experience a shortage of cavalry. In addition to the 3rd and 4th cavalry divisions created at the height of the war, they also had SS divisions (8th Florian Geir and later formed by Maria Theresa and Lützow) and "foreign divisions of the ground forces" (1st and 2nd cavalry), and the Allied cavalry (4 Romanian divisions, Hungarians, Italians, Croats). In addition, in each infantry division there were combat cavalry units, a reconnaissance battalion cavalry squadron. There were 173 horses in it - riding and harnessed to machine-gun carts (a tachanka repeatedly ridiculed by "whistleblowers"). If we count only 118 infantry divisions thrown against the USSR on June 22, 1941, and only their cavalry squadrons, then we get 20,414 cavalry fighters. Three Soviet divisions.

"You can beg for everything! Money, fame, power, but not the Motherland ... Especially one like my Russia"

Polish artists are stronger than Goethe's Faust...

Jerzy Kosak "Battle of Kutno" 1939
The author knew nothing about tanks, a few years later he learned something and rewrote the picture.


Jerzy Kosak "Battle of Kutno" 1943
Not much, however, he learned something.

The irony is that Kosak, being a Pole, repeated Goebbels' nonsense. Under Kutno really Polish cavalrymen with varying success fought with German tanks - but by no means on horseback. The Polish cavalry division had quite serious reinforcements (artillery, armored vehicles).

Both paintings are breathtakingly beautiful. But they have one common drawback. There are not enough NKVD soldiers in the frame, treacherously shooting Polish heroes in the back of the head with German Walthers, I

The cavalry brigades were one of the most mobile branches of the armed forces in the Rzhechi Commonwealth. By the beginning of the Second World War, Poland fielded 30 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry and 2 mechanized brigades against 27 infantry, 6 tank and 8 motorized (including 4 "light") divisions of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, the Polish defensive concept was built precisely on counterattacks, for which it was necessary to have a certain operational mobility.

By 1939, the Polish army had 38 cavalry regiments (26 lancers, 3 light cavalry, 9 cavalry archers), united in 11 brigades. Plus - the cavalry of the Border Protection Corps. In addition, already during the war, the Combined Cavalry Division, the Volkovysk Reserve Cavalry Brigade and the Zaza Cavalry Division were formed.

Each cavalry brigade of the Polish Army included: 3-4 cavalry regiments, a horse artillery division, an armored division (a squadron of 13 reconnaissance tanks and a squadron of 7 armored cars), a cyclist squadron, a sapper squadron, a communications squadron, an air defense battery, a platoon of motorcyclists and support services. Some brigades also included a rifle battalion - 3 companies of 3 platoons, a company of heavy machine guns, a platoon of 81-mm mortars (2 pcs.). The three-regiment brigade without a rifle battalion (there were six of them) consisted of 5075 people. personnel, with a battalion (one) - 6143. Four-regiment brigades without a battalion (two) - 6116, with a battalion - 7184 people.

In fact, the cavalry brigade was three times smaller than the infantry division. At the same time, the cavalrymen were better than the infantry, armed with machine guns and anti-tank guns. To this must be added high level training, thanks to a longer service life (23 months) and the cultivation of traditions and a sense of elitism, celebrated by the media and artists. In September 1939, about 70 thousand cavalrymen stood up to defend Poland - 8% of all armed forces (the third largest branch of the armed forces after infantry and artillery).

At the disposal of the Polish cavalry brigade of three regiments was (in brackets - for a four-regiment):
* Horses - 5194 (6291)
* Cars - 65 (66)
* Machine guns: manual arr. 1928 - 89 (107), light arr. 1908/15 and arr. 1908/18 - 10 (12), heavy arr. 1930 - 52 (64)
* Grenade launchers arr. 1930 or 1936 - 9 (9)
* Artillery: mortars cal. 81 mm - 2 (2), field gun mod. 1902/26 cal. 75 mm - 12 (16), anti-aircraft gun mod. 1936 cal. 40 mm - 2 (2), anti-tank gun mod. 1936 cal. 37 mm - 14 (18)
* Anti-tank rifles cal. 7.92 mm arr. 1935 - 51-68 (64-78)
* Armored vehicles arr. 1934 or arr. 1929 - 8, reconnaissance tanks TKS or TK-3 - 13

The Polish reconnaissance tank TK-3 (improved modification - TKS) was created on the basis of the British Carden-Loyd Mk VI tankette and appearance very similar to the Soviet tankette T-27 of the 1931 model, also produced under a British license (sold, by the way, to 16 countries of the world).

As in other armies of that time, foot combat for cavalrymen was envisaged as the basic type of action. Horses were supposed to serve only as a vehicle due to the lack of mass production of cars. There were not enough specialists - drivers, technicians, and so on. Especially manifested during the war shortage of gasoline. The commander of the Warsaw Armored Motorized Brigade (a regiment of mounted archers, an infantry regiment, a mechanized artillery battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank battalion, a sapper mechanized battalion, a communications squadron, two separate tank squadrons, an air defense battery), Colonel Stefan Rowiecki bitterly recalled how he had to throw equipment due to lack of gasoline.

The top of the officer corps, and even more so - the Supreme Leader armed forces E. Rydz-Smigly, was confident in the high combat value of the cavalry and did not trust the concept of independent and lightning-fast warfare by tank units. The specter of the “miracle on the Vistula” and the conviction that the next war would be fought in the east continued to stand in the way of a decisive modernization of the Polish army - accordingly, in the conditions of “off-road conditions in the USSR”, the cavalry would have an advantage over armored formations.

The statement "The Polish Army was so scared that they attacked German tanks with cavalry" was created during WWII by German propaganda, which distributed the propaganda film "Kampfgeschwader Lützow" (1941) specially made for this purpose. However, the beauty and senselessness of this action was picked up in Poland. Already in 1959, the film "Lotna" directed by Andrzej Wajda (later received an Oscar for all his work and the French Order of the Legion of Honor) was filmed, showing a Polish cavalry attack on German tank troops that never took place. The Germans, creating this myth of their own about “stupid Poles”, probably wanted, in addition to their technical omnipotence, to emphasize to the Western states that it was not worth fighting for Poland. But the Poles themselves began to cultivate this legend, apparently to emphasize their courage and willingness to sacrifice themselves even in the face of a stronger and better armed enemy.

During the September campaign of 1939, several cavalry attacks of various sizes were launched from the Polish side.

The colored rectangles show the places of deployment of the cavalry brigades at the beginning of the war, the arrows show the paths of movement, the riders show the places of attacks.

The most famous is the so-called battle near Kroyants. The main confusion in the perception of this battle by the world community was introduced by Sir Winston Churchill, who wrote in his famous work “The Second World War”: “12 brigades of the Polish cavalry courageously attacked hordes of tanks and armored vehicles, but could not harm them with their sabers and pikes.” Also, one cannot discount the arrogant phrase in the memoirs of Heinz Guderian “Memoirs of a Soldier”: “The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the constructive data and methods of action of our tanks, attacked them with melee weapons and suffered monstrous losses.”

The main character of the episode mentioned by Guderian was the Polish 18th Pomeranian Lancers Regiment. This regiment was formed on June 25, 1919 in Poznań under the name of the 4th Nadvislansky Lancers, and from February 1920 became the 18th Pomeranian. On August 22, 1939, the regiment received an order to mobilize, which ended less than a week before the war, on August 25. After mobilization, the regiment consisted of 35 officers, more than 800 sub-officers and privates, 850 horses, two 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns (according to the state, there should have been twice as many), twelve 7.92-mm Maroshek anti-tank guns mod. 1935, twelve heavy machine guns and eighteen light machine guns. The novelties of the century of the "war of motors" were 2 motorcycles with sidecars and 2 radio stations. Soon the regiment was reinforced with a battery of the 11th Cavalry Artillery Battalion. The battery consisted of 180 gunners, 248 horses, four 75-mm cannons with 1440 rounds of ammunition and two heavy machine guns.

The regiment of Pomeranian Lancers met the morning of September 1, 1939 at the border and in the first half of the day fought a completely traditional defensive battle. In the afternoon, the cavalry received an order to launch a counterattack and, taking advantage of the enemy's transition to the defense as a result of this strike, retreat back. For the counterattack, a maneuver detachment was allocated (1st and 2nd squadrons and two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons), it was supposed to go to the rear of the German infantry by 19.00, attack it, and then retreat to the line of fortifications in the area the town of Rytel, occupied by the Polish infantry.

However, the roundabout maneuver led to unexpected results for both sides. The head outpost of the detachment discovered a battalion of German infantry, which was on a halt 300-400 m from the edge of the forest. The Poles decided to attack the enemy on horseback, using the effect of surprise. According to the old command "szable dlon!" (“sabers out!”) the uhlans quickly and smoothly unsheathed their blades, shining in the red rays of the setting sun. The commander of the 18th regiment, Colonel Mastalezh, participated in the attack. Obeying the signal of the trumpet, the uhlans swiftly rushed at the enemy. The calculation for the suddenness of the attack turned out to be correct: the Germans, who did not expect an attack, rushed in a panic across the field. The cavalry mercilessly cut down the fleeing foot soldiers with their sabers.

The triumph of the cavalry was interrupted by armored vehicles hitherto hidden in the forest. Riding out from behind the trees, they opened machine-gun fire. In addition to armored vehicles, flank fire was also opened by one German gun. Now the Poles were rushing across the field under deadly fire. Having suffered heavy losses, the cavalry retreated behind the nearest wooded ridge. However, the casualties in the cavalry charge were far less than might be imagined from the description of the battle. Three officers (including the commander of the regiment, Colonel Mastalezh) and 23 lancers were killed, one officer and about 50 lancers were seriously wounded.

Most of the losses of the 18th Lancers on September 1, 1939, which amounted to up to 60% of the people, seven machine guns and two anti-tank guns, the regiment suffered in a combined arms defensive battle. Guderian's words do not have this case nothing to do with reality. The Polish cavalrymen did not attack the tanks, but were themselves attacked by armored vehicles in the process of cutting down a gaping battalion. In a similar situation, ordinary infantry or dismounted cavalry would have suffered quite comparable losses, especially since the cavalry could get out of the flank attack much faster than the infantry.

Under the village of Wet The 1st and 3rd squadrons of the 19th Volyn Uhlan Regiment (Ostrog) of the Volyn Cavalry Brigade attacked units of the German 4th Panzer Division standing near the forest, which were just regrouping. Due to the effect of surprise, the enemy did not put up strong resistance and left the position in a panic. Captain Anthony Skiba commanded the attack. The general outline is as follows - Volyn lancers in this area guarded the southern wing of the Lodz army and held back the onslaught of the 16th tank corps of the Wehrmacht on Warsaw. The battle of Mokra lasted all day, the Germans made five attacks. The Polish horse artillery division, with the support of aviation, armored train No. 53 "Brave" and anti-tank guns of the 12th Podolsky Lancers Regiment (Bialokrynitsa), managed to knock out 170 enemy vehicles, including 80 tanks (the 4th German division totaled 324 tanks in total and 101 armored personnel carriers), however, most of them were repaired after a few days. The Volyn brigade lost in the battle 182 people killed, about 300 wounded, about 500 horses, 5 cannons and 4 anti-tank guns. The enemy lost several hundred killed and wounded, about 200 Nazis were captured. 108 officers and fighters of the brigade were awarded the Virtuti Military Order and the Combatant's Cross. The Battle of Mokra proved the effectiveness of using cavalrymen on foot, provided they were supported by aviation and artillery. The brigade held back the onslaught on the capital and made it possible to carry out additional mobilization. 4th tank division The Wehrmacht was unable to continue the offensive for two more days.

In the Krulje forests in the area of ​​​​Yanov and Khinovolga, the Small Patrol of the 11th Legion Lancers Regiment (Tsekhanov) from the Mazovets Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Vladislav Kosakovsky conducted reconnaissance, during which he came across a unit of the German cavalry of the 3rd Army. Kosakovsky recalled: “at the end of our trip, in one clearing we saw a small detachment of German cavalry. They didn't see us, but they were standing in our way. I asked my people - are we attacking? The answer was drawing sabers from their scabbards. Unnoticed, turning in a wide line, we jumped out of the forest at high speed. The surprise was complete, but the Germans met the attack in the face, only our strength was greater. We raced through them. I remember that Corporal Yutskevich stumbled upon the pike of some German. We rushed in our direction, the Germans in theirs. We were all out of our depths with emotion and fear. Next were the positions of our infantry. According to the Polish Wikipedia, the Poles lost 20 people killed, 11 wounded, the Germans - 17 killed, 25 wounded.

Near Brochow part of the 17th Lancers Regiment (Leshno) from the Greater Poland Brigade launched an attack on German positions. It did not come to a battle in the equestrian formation, since the purpose of this offensive in an open field was a psychological effect. The direct attack on the enemy began after dismounting.

Near Hayovka Denbovskaya one platoon of the 4th squadron of the 17th uhlan regiment forced a small German detachment to leave their positions with a cavalry attack.

Under Vulka Venglova a battle took place, in intensity of passions not inferior to the famous battle of Kroyants.

The 14th Yazlovets Lancers Regiment (Lvov) was considered in Poland the cavalry regiment with the longest continuous history (created in February 1918 in the Kuban, took an active part in the battles with the Reds). The regiment as part of the Podolsk brigade was included in the Poznan army. The conditions for this attack were as follows - the regiment had been making its way through enemy positions to the capital for the last three days, but again came across the Germans (the total number is estimated at 2300 soldiers and 37 tanks). The commander of the regiment, Colonel E. Godlevsky, hoping for the effect of surprise, decided to break through with a cavalry attack through the positions of the Nazis resting in Pushcha Kampinoska. The lancers were without heavy weapons, but a small unit of the 9th Little Poland Lancers regiment of the same cavalry brigade (Terebovlya) nailed to them. The attack was led by the commander of the 3rd squadron of the 14th regiment, Lieutenant Marianne Walitsky, who died from wounds after the battle.

At the same time, the lancers did not take into account that German machine guns were installed in the neighboring village of Mościski, and artillery and tanks were hidden behind the houses, which fired at the advancing cavalrymen. The Poles managed to break through the dense artillery-machine-gun-tank fire of the enemy, losing 105 people killed and 100 wounded (20% of the regiment's personnel at that time). A large number were also captured, they were promised release for bravery, but the Nazis did not keep their promise - those who confessed to their participation in the cavalry attack were shot. During the battle, a horse fell under the wounded corporal Felix Mazyarsky, who was holding the banner of the regiment. At the last moment, Corporal Mechislav Cech picked up the banner and joined his own. For this, General Yu. Rummel awarded him his own Order of Virtuti Militari. The entire attack lasted 18 minutes. The Germans lost 52 killed and 70 wounded.

The Italian war correspondent Mario Appelius, who saw the attack, wrote about it: “Suddenly, a heroic detachment of cavalrymen, numbering several hundred horses, galloped out of the thickets. They approached with a developing banner. All German machine guns fell silent, only the guns fired. Their fire created a dense barrier 300 meters from the German positions. The Polish cavalry advanced at full speed, like in medieval paintings! At the head rode the commander with a raised saber. It could be seen how the distance between the group of Polish cavalrymen and the wall of German fire was decreasing. It was crazy to continue this attack towards death. But the Poles broke through. This poetic description of the suicidal attack of mad heroes has circled the world. But the participants in the battle themselves describe it not so romantically. Lieutenant F. Potvorovsky wrote: “Everything happened so quickly that it is difficult to determine the order. The enemy fire is getting closer… More and more horses without riders… From behind a potato patch, a German non-commissioned officer shoots at me from a parabellum, after my shot he falls. To the right, under the trees, a German tank follows us, as if on a walk. My horse fell on its front legs. Managed to pick it up. We were heading towards the forest. There, having already jumped the ditch, the horse fell. A second later he was already sitting on another, there were a lot of them circling the forest. With a group of lancers we make our way from the forest to the highway ... ".

As a result of this breakthrough, the 14th cavalry regiment became the first unit of the Poznan army, which made its way to the surrounded Warsaw, and took an active part in the defense of the capital. After three weeks of fighting, the regiment was left with 14 officers, 29 sub-officers and 388 lancers with 280 horses. In general, the regiment lost 12 officers and about 250 privates in the September campaign. His fighters were awarded 4 gold and 26 silver Virtuti Military Crosses, 47 Fighting Crosses. For the September campaign of 1939, in particular for the battle near Vulka Venglova, the regiment was repeatedly presented for the award of the Virtuti Military Cross (the first one received from the hands of Pilsudski for the Polish-Ukrainian and Soviet-Polish wars). Since this award was not presented twice, the regiment received the right to place the inscription "Distinguished for extraordinary courage in the 1939 campaign in Poland" on the ribbons of the banner.

Cross of the Order of Virtuti Military First Class.

On the same day near Lomyanka reconnaissance of the 6th horse artillery division made its way to Warsaw with a horse attack.

Under Kamenka Strumilova The 3rd squadron of the 1st cavalry division from the formation of Colonel K. Galitsky pierced the encirclement of the 4th light division of the Wehrmacht (later it became the 9th tank division).

Not far from Lublin, units of the Novogrudok Cavalry Brigade attacked German positions on foot near the village of Krasnobrod. The headquarters of the German 8th Infantry Division retreated from the village. In pursuit of him, they rushed in equestrian formation under the command of Lieutenant Tadeusz Gerletsky, lancers of the 1st squadron of the 25th Greater Poland lancers regiment (Pruzhany). The German squadron of the East Prussian heavy cavalry rushed to intercept. The Poles moved forward, putting up peaks. The Germans accepted the challenge. Their commander cut down several lancers and rushed to Gerletsky. Togo was saved by platoon commander Mikolayevsky, who at the last moment hacked German officer. The victory remained in this battle for the lancers, but, pursuing the retreating Prussians, they came under flank fire from enemy machine guns standing on a hill. Many died, including Gerletsky. As a result, only 30 lancers and 25 horses survived from the squadron, who were saved by the composure of Corporal Mikolayevsky, who managed to bring the remnants of the unit to a safe place. However, the Poles managed to capture the village and capture the headquarters of the 8th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. German losses in mounted combat were 47 killed and 30 wounded.

In September 1939, there was also a case of a mounted attack by the Polish cavalry on Soviet troops, namely, on soldiers of the 8th Rifle Corps of the Red Army in the Grubeshov area. In the village of Gusin the Polish infantry unit was surrounded by Soviet units. About 500 cavalrymen from the reserve squadron of the 14th Lancers, the cavalry division of the state police from Warsaw and the divisional cavalry tried to break through to him. They attacked the left wing of the Red Army, who began to retreat with losses. However, Soviet armored vehicles entered the battle, and then the infantry inflicted significant losses on the Poles. The cavalrymen were surrounded and capitulated.

On the Russian site "I remember" you can find the memoirs of the tanker Ivan Vladimirovich Maslov. In 1939 he took part in liberation campaign Red Army in Western Belarus as a senior driver of the 1st company of the 139th separate tank battalion. Here is what he says: “At the end of the summer of 1939, we were transferred to the border with Western Belarus, and soon they gave the go-ahead” - “Forward!”. No special battles took place there, but I had to become a witness and participant in the reflection of the attack of the Polish cavalry on our tank battalion. And this is not a joke. And when the Polish cavalrymen with naked sabers attacked our tanks, we thought, are they, these Polish lancers or hussars, completely crazy? They were quickly suppressed and shot at. The Poles abandoned their horses and weapons, and dispersed - some were captured by us, and some ran to their home, to the west. And then the captured Poles told us that before the attack they were told that the Russians had all the tanks made of plywood and they did not pose any danger ... "

The story is very doubtful - such an attack is not mentioned in Polish sources. Apparently, this is a retelling of the story about the battle near Gusin, which, however, is not located in Belarus ...

The 27th Lancers, on the orders of the commander of the Novogrudok Cavalry Brigade, Vladislav Anders, made two horseback attacks on the German infantry battalion defending village Moranci. The attacks ended in failure, the commanders of the 1st and 2nd squadrons, the commander of a platoon of lancers and a platoon of heavy machine guns, 20 lancers were killed. Another 50 were wounded. After the battle, negotiations took place, after which the Germans retreated from the village. The next day, German infantry attacked the lancers supported by tanks and artillery, scattering the Poles through the surrounding forests. This was the last horse attack of the September campaign...

Worthy of special mention raids of the Polish cavalry on the territory of the Reich undertaken by some units of the Podlasie and Suvalka cavalry brigades.

The first raid has already taken place. September 2 for the purpose of capturing prisoners and reconnaissance. Two squadrons of lancers invaded Germany, had a fight with the forest guards and local self-defense forces and captured in the border village of languages, then retreated to Polish territory.

AT night from 2 to 3 September a night raid took place by the forces of the 10th Lancers Regiment, separate units of the 5th Zasyavsky Lancers and the 9th Mounted Riflemen of the regiments (with the support of a platoon of tankettes and a battery of horse artillery). The Poles ran into strong German resistance, but managed to capture two villages, where they took many prisoners and heavy enemy weapons. In view of the intensifying German artillery fire, it was decided to retreat.

On the evening of September 3 about 100 cavalrymen of the 3rd Mazovian schvolezher regiment made a foot raid on the Prussian village of Tsimokhi, where a company of Wehrmacht sappers was located. Two prisoners, weapons and ammunition were captured, along the way the railway station and the forest guard department were destroyed. The Poles lost one killed and one wounded. At the same time, the Germans claimed that there were no military units in the village, but only a military gendarmerie post, while the Poles fired on and threw grenades at private houses and a customs post, as a result of which 3 civilians were killed.

The last raid took place in night from 3 to 4 September, when one platoon from the 2nd Grochovsky Lancers of the regiment went deep into German territory, led by a border guard guide, but without meeting enemy forces, returned back. According to some sources, seven ulans under the command of Lieutenant Giuskoy attacked a forest guard post 7 km from the border, but, having fallen under heavy return fire, retreated.

Given the positive result in obtaining intelligence during such raids, the command of the Independent Task Force "Narev" decided on more. On September 4, a raid into East Prussia was planned by the concentrated forces of two cavalry brigades. But after receiving an order from the High Command of the Polish Army to retreat, this idea had to be abandoned. The raids on the territory of the Reich were not of strategic importance, but were used for propaganda purposes.

The last cavalry attack on the territory of Poland took place in 1947 in the battle of the 1st Warsaw division of the cavalry of the Polish People's Army with units of the Ukrainian rebel army near the city of Khreshchataya.

What kind of battle is depicted in the above picture is not exactly known. From September 9 to September 18, 1939, a series of battles took place near the city of Kutno, better known as the “battle of the Bzura” (named after the tributary of the Vistula River), which were fought by the Polish armies “Poznan” and “Pomorye” from the 8th and 10th and armies of the Wehrmacht. There is an opinion that this is a highly romanticized version of the battle of the 14th regiment of the Yazlovets Lancers near Vulka Venglova.

An epic painting by a certain Jerzy Kossak "The Battle of Kutno" from 1939 dedicated to the famous myth of the light cavalry attack. (with)

Everything in the "picture" is surprising - from firing a pistol at a triplex, surrendering under the mighty pressure of the German uhlans, and ending with a pike in the forehead of an unknown armored monster (Grotte's tank?), which clearly got out of the cartoons about the "Clone Wars" of the heyday of the Trade Federation. :)

But that's not all: it turns out that in 1943 Kossak redrawn his masterpiece, apparently seeing real tanks several times. What didn't make them more similar: they look like mutated Churchills with turrets from Matildas.

And this is how it really happened:

18th regiment of Pomeranian Lancers and cavalry attack of armored vehicles near Kroyants

September 1, 1939 Nazi Germany attacked Poland, thereby unleashing the Second World War.

The resistance offered by the Poles to the perfidious aggressor, who had a significant superiority in tanks and aircraft, did not last long (from September 1 to October 6, 1939), but this short campaign was marked by many combat episodes glorious for Polish weapons. The latter, of course, include the cavalry attacks of the Polish cavalry, which, against the backdrop of the then "war of the worlds", were perceived as a romantic anachronism and gave rise to the well-known legend of the brave, but reckless lancers who rushed with lances and sabers at German tanks. The creation of this myth was greatly facilitated by fascist propaganda, which wanted to prove the "natural savagery" of the Poles, who tried to fight with such archaic methods against a powerful machine - the creation of the military and technical genius of the German Reich.

The real facts expose the falsity of these claims. Indeed, in 1939, the Polish cavalry made at least six attacks in the cavalry, but only two of them were marked by the presence of German armored vehicles (September 1 near Kroyanty) and tanks (September 19 near Wulka Venglova) on the battlefield, and in both episodes enemy armored vehicles were not the direct target of the attacking lancers.

It should be noted that in the Polish cavalry cavalry charge (szarza) (1) was not then a regulated type of hostilities. According to the "General Instructions for Combat" (Ogolnej instrukcji waiki), published back in 1930, the cavalry was supposed to move on horseback, and fight on foot.

The honor of conducting the first cavalry attack in the history of the Second World War belongs to the 18th regiment of the Primorsky Lancers. (2) . The regiment consisted of 35 officers, more than 800 sub-officers and privates, 850 horses, 2 anti-tank guns of 37 mm caliber (instead of 4 regular ones), 12 anti-tank rifles, 12 machine guns (4 pack and 8 on carts), 18 light machine guns, 2 motorcycles with wheelchairs and 2 radio stations. On August 29, the 2nd battery of the 11th cavalry artillery battalion was attached to the 18th regiment: 180 gunners, 248 horses, 4 light guns (with an ammunition load of 1440 shells) and 2 heavy machine guns.

On August 31, 1939, the Pomeranian Lancers took up a position near the border, along the highway leading from Chojnice to the south. On the morning of September 1, the guard posts of the regiment reported that a strong enemy was moving towards them (infantry and armored cars of the 76th motorized infantry regiment (3) 20th Motorized Infantry Division (4) 19th Panzer Corps under General Guderian). The immediate task of this division was to capture the city of Chojnice, and in the future it was to advance through the Tuchol wasteland and the city of Osh to Grudziadz.

The outposts of the 18th Lancers could not hold back the onslaught of a much stronger enemy and retreated, having lost their commanders, Lieutenants Dembsky and Moskovsky, killed. The Germans rushed to the defensive line of the lancers, in front of which, however, they were delayed by machine gun fire and an anti-tank gun. At 5.45 an enemy plane began circling over the observation post and the position of the 2nd battery of the 11th cavalry artillery battalion. On the orders of Captain Pasturchak, both battery machine guns (under the command of the cadet Karnkovsky) fired at this air target and hit it.

The 76th motorized infantry regiment, supported by armored vehicles, soon resumed its offensive, at the same time threatening to bypass the left flank of the lancers. The latter circumstance forced Colonel Mastalezh around 0800 to begin withdrawing his squadrons to a new line of defense in the Pavlovo-Ratslavka area.

In order to avoid the encirclement of other retreating units of the Polish army, the commander of the defense area, Colonel Mayevsky, after conferring with General Gzhmot-Skotnitsky, ordered Colonel Mastalezh with part of the 18th Lancers, who had broken away from the enemy, to launch a counterattack on the German infantry near the village of Kroyanty.

Having assessed the situation, the commander of the Pomeranian Lancers ordered the cavalry maneuver detachment led by Major Maletsky (1st and 2nd squadrons and two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons) through the villages of Krushki, Kroyanty and Pavlova to go to the rear of the German army by 19.00 infantry, attack it, and then retreat to Granovo and further to the line of fortifications in the area of ​​​​the town of Rytel, occupied by the Polish infantry.

Having learned about this disposition and the order of Colonel Mastalezh, Lieutenant Tsydzik (communication officer of General Gzhmot-Skotnitsky) doubted the expediency of such a decision. "Wouldn't it be better, Pan Colonel, to advance on foot?" he asked with concern. The blood of the old soldier surged in Mastalege's veins. "Don't teach me, sir lieutenant, how to carry out impossible orders," he said with irritation in his voice. “That's right,” Tsydzik replied, but nevertheless contacted the head of the Chersk cover group by phone and informed him of Mastalezh's intentions.

After passing about 10 km, Major Maletsky's division ended up in a forest near the village of Krushki, northeast of Kroyant. The time appointed for the start of the attack was approaching (19.00), and there were still about 7 km to the Pavlov’s starting area, when the detachment’s head outpost discovered a battalion of German infantry bivouacking 300-400 m from the forest edge. Major Maletsky decided to attack this enemy in cavalry formation, using the effect of surprise. He built his division in two echelons: in front of the 1st squadron, and behind it at a distance of 200 m the 2nd squadron. The number of both squadrons was then about 200 horsemen. (5) . Lancers, dressed in field uniforms, were armed with sabers and cavalry carbines. (6) . On their heads they had French-style helmets (Adrian's models).

According to the old command "szable dion!" (sabers out!) The uhlans quickly and smoothly unsheathed their blades, shining in the red rays of the setting sun. At that moment, when the squadrons famously turned around at the edge of the forest, Colonel Mastalege appeared on their flank with his headquarters. Having caught up with Maletsky's division, the regimental commander wanted to personally take part in the cavalry attack. Obeying the signal of the trumpet, the lancers swiftly rushed at the enemy, stunned by such an unexpected attack. The German battalion, which did not take proper precautions, was taken by surprise and scattered across the field in a panic.

The cavalry, overtaking the fleeing, mercilessly chopped them with sabers. However, this triumph of the cavalry did not last long. Carried away by their brilliant attack, the Poles did not notice several enemy armored vehicles hidden in the forest. Driving out from behind the trees, these armored vehicles opened frequent machine-gun fire into the flank of the galloping squadrons. The German cannon, hidden in the thicket, also began firing at the lancers. Dozens of horses and people fell from enemy bullets and shells...

Having suffered heavy losses, the division of Major Maletsky retreated behind the nearest wooded ridge, where he took cover from enemy fire. In addition to Colonel Mastalezh, two officers were killed (the commander of the 1st squadron, captain Shveshchak and the 2nd adjutant, lieutenant of the reserve Miletsky) and 23 uhlans. Lieutenant Anthony Unrug and about 50 uhlans were seriously wounded. Only half of the horsemen participating in the attack gathered in the forest near the Chojnice-Rytel highway. The command over the regiment instead of the killed Colonel Mastalezh was taken by Major Maletsky.

The battle of September 1, 1939 cost the Pomeranian lancers dearly, losing up to 60% of their men and horses, 7 machine guns, 2 anti-tank guns and a radio station. However, these sacrifices were not in vain. Thanks to the selfless actions of the regiment, including a dashing attack near Kroyants, an attempt by the enemy, who had a large advantage in manpower and equipment, to cut off the retreat path for the infantry of the Polish detachment "Chojnice" was thwarted (the last night gathered behind Brda and again organized a defense line there) .

Returning to the horse attack near Kroyants, one should cite the lines of memoirs dedicated to it by the “father of German tank power” Guderian. “The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the design data and methods of operation of our tanks,” wrote the famous Wehrmacht general, “attacked them with melee weapons and suffered monstrous losses,” the facts already known to the reader of this article expose the falsity of this quote, which turned 3 incomplete Polish squadrons into a whole brigade, German armored cars into tanks, and 26 killed and 50 wounded lancers into "monstrous losses." The maneuverable, well-trained, and excellently manned cavalry of the 2nd Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth repeatedly refuted such slander on the battlefield. In the tragic days of September 1939, she adequately resisted a strong enemy and often defeated him, fighting both on foot and on horseback, both in defense and in the offensive.

(1) - The word "szarza" in Polish denotes exclusively horse attack, in other cases the term "atak" is used.

(2) - The last cavalry attack of the Second World War was also made by the Poles: on March 1, 1945, two squadrons of lancers of the Polish Army (from the 2nd and 3rd lancers regiments of the 1st Warsaw Cavalry Brigade) under the command of Major V. Bogdanovich were captured in equestrian system, the town of Schönfeld (Boruisk) is one of the German strongholds of the Pomeranian Wall. Interestingly, this brilliant attack was carried out in the same area as the first.

(3) - The 76th Motorized Infantry Regiment (commander - Colonel Reinhardt) consisted of three battalions. Each battalion had four companies (three rifle and one machine gun), 27 light and 14 heavy machine guns, 9 light and 6 medium

mortars.

(4) - 20th motorized infantry (Hamburg) division (commander - Lieutenant General M.Victorin) included: 69th, 76th, 90th motorized infantry and 56th artillery regiments, 20th observation (LIR), 20th anti-tank destroyer, 20th reconnaissance battalion, 20th pioneer battalion and 20th communications battalion. (5) - On the morning of September 1, 1939, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the Pomeranian Lancers (together with two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons) numbered 256 people in the ranks, but from the start of hostilities until 17.30 they lost about 20% of its personnel. (6) - The regiment left its peaks in the depot, retaining only a few pieces in service (as squadron badges).

mob_info