Strange War So, having declared war on the Reich, England and France did nothing. The French command even specifically forbade shelling German positions, so that some corporal would not foolishly believe that a war was going on. By September 27, the English had crossed the English Channel: 152

The "strange war" is a concept floated by the American press. It soon caught on on both sides of the Atlantic and firmly established itself as the name of the period of the war from the fall of Poland in September 1939 until the beginning of the offensive of German troops in the West in the spring of the following year.

Those who used this concept meant that there was no war as such, since no big battles took place between the Franco-English and German troops. In fact, it was a period of active behind-the-scenes activities of the parties. In the middle of this period, a strange incident occurred to a German staff officer, which so frightened Hitler that in the course of the following weeks the German plan of war was completely changed. The old plan would not have had the success that the Germans had with the new one.

But the world did not know all this. The battlefields remained calm and people thought that Mars had gone into hibernation.

Popular explanations for this outwardly stable state have varied. According to one of them, England and France, despite the declaration of war on the side of Poland, did not take their obligations seriously and only waited for the moment to start negotiations with Germany. No less popular was the opinion that England and France were cunning. There were many reports in the American press that the Allied High Command had deliberately adopted a finely crafted defensive strategy and were preparing a trap for the Germans.

Both explanations are far from the truth. During the autumn and winter, instead of concentrating on preparing an effective defense against a possible offensive by the Nazi troops, the Allied governments and the high command discussed in detail offensive plans against Germany and its flanks, although in reality they did not have the opportunity to carry out these plans with their own forces and means. .

After the fall of France, the Germans seized the documents of the French High Command and partially published them. It was sensational stuff. Documents testified that during the winter the allied command was considering plans for a variety of offensive operations: plan to strike Germany through Norway, Sweden and Finland; a plan to strike the Ruhr through Belgium; a plan to attack Germany through Greece and the Balkans; strike plan for oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus in order to cut off Germany from sources of oil supply. It was a conglomeration of the vain imaginations of the allied leaders, who remained in a world of illusion until they were brought to their senses by Hitler's offensive.

Hitler, being a man who was always ahead of the curve in his judgments, began to consider offensive actions in the West even before the end of the Polish campaign and even earlier, before his public speaking with a proposal to convene a general peace conference. He had already begun to realize that any such proposal was unlikely to be well received by the Western allies. However, until the October 6 speech, Hitler did not tell anyone except those closest to him about his intention. Even the General Staff found out about this only at the moment when Hitler's proposal to convene a general peace conference was publicly rejected.

Three days later, Hitler set out his considerations in a rather lengthy directive to the command of the ground forces. His main arguments were that offensive operations in the West were the only possible course for Germany. The directive was a most striking document. Here Hitler comes to the conclusion that a prolonged war with France and England will exhaust Germany's resources and put her in danger of a mortal blow from Russia. He believed that France must be forced into peace by offensive actions against her; as soon as France was out of the game, England would accept his terms.

Hitler believed that Germany at the moment had the forces and means necessary to defeat France. Most importantly, Germany had superiority in new weapons. He said:

“Tank troops and aviation have now reached such heights (not only as an offensive, but also as a defensive weapon) that no other weapon can compare with them. The strategic potential of these forces is ensured by their organization and a clear command and control system in combat. There are no such forces in any other country.”

Recognizing the superiority of France in weapons of the old type, especially in heavy artillery, Hitler, however, argued that in "maneuver warfare, these weapons do not have any significant value at all." And since Germany was superior in having new weapons, the superiority of France in the number of trained soldiers could not be taken into account.

Further, Hitler argued that one could not wait and hope until France was tired of the war, since "the development of the military power of England will introduce a new military element, which will be of the highest importance for France, both psychologically and materially," as it will strengthen her defenses.

“First of all, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from eliminating the weakness in weapons, and especially in anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, because this can create a balance of power. In this respect, every month that has passed represents an unfavorable waste of time for the offensive power of Germany.

Hitler was worried that "the will of the German soldiers to fight" would weaken as soon as the invigorating effect of the easy conquest of Poland wore off. “The soldier's self-respect was as great as the respect he demands from others at the present time. However, six months of protracted warfare and effective enemy propaganda can dispel these important qualities.

Hitler believed that the strike should be struck as quickly as possible so as not to lose time: "In the present situation, time can be considered an ally of the Western powers rather than ours." His memorandum ended with the conclusion: "The blow must be struck this autumn at all costs."

Hitler planned to include Belgium in the strike zone: firstly, in order to gain space for maneuver and bypass the French Maginot Line, and secondly, in order to prevent the danger of Anglo-French troops entering Belgium and deploying their forces on the border near the Ruhr, " in close proximity to the heart of our military industry." (According to the French archives, it was this course of action that the commander-in-chief of the French army, Gamelin, defended.)

Hitler's statement of his intentions was a complete surprise to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff, Halder.

Like many higher German generals, they did not share Hitler's belief in the ability of the new weapon to overcome the superiority of opponents in trained manpower. Using the usual columns of figures reflecting the number of divisions, they argued that the German army did not have enough strength to defeat the Allies. In their opinion, the 98 divisions that Germany managed to mobilize were inferior to the enemy forces, especially since 36 of these divisions were poorly armed and insufficiently trained. In addition, realizing that the war would escalate into a new world war, they feared fatal consequences for Germany.

Brauchitsch and Halder were so disturbed by all this that they were ready to resort to emergency measures. Just as during the Munich crisis, a year ago, they began to consider actions aimed at overthrowing Hitler. The idea was to transport selected units from the front to Berlin. However, the commander of the reserve army, General Fromm, refused to cooperate with them, and his help was very important. Fromm argued that the troops would not obey the order to march against Hitler, because many ordinary soldiers trusted the Fuhrer. Perhaps Fromm's judgment about the reaction of the troops was correct. This is also confirmed by many officers who had contact with the troops and did not know what was being discussed in the higher headquarters.

The bulk of the troops and the German people were drugged by Goebbels' propaganda that Hitler wanted peace and the Allies were determined to destroy Germany. Unfortunately, allied statesmen and the press provided Goebbels with much propaganda material, which he cleverly used to mask Germany's plans of conquest.

And although the first military conspiracy against the Fuhrer failed, Hitler was not able to carry out offensive operations in the fall, as he had hoped. However, this turned out to be beneficial for him, and for the whole world, including the German people, grief.

The start of the offensive was tentatively scheduled for 12 November. On November 5, Brauchitsch again tried to dissuade Hitler from invading France, putting forward many arguments against it. Hitler ignored his arguments and strictly ordered the offensive to begin no later than November 12th. However, on November 7, the order was canceled: meteorologists predicted bad weather. The start of the offensive was delayed for another three days, and then postponed again and again.

Although the bad weather that had set in was the obvious reason for delaying the start of the offensive, Hitler was beside himself with the fact that he had to give in, and did not want to believe that everything was due to the weather alone. On November 23, he called the top military leaders to a meeting. Deciding to dispel their doubts about the need for offensive action, Hitler expressed concern about the threat from Russia, and also emphasized the fact that the Western allies were ignoring his peace proposals and building up their weapons. "Time works for the enemy ... Our Achilles' heel is the Ruhr ... If England and France break through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we will be in the greatest danger."

Then Hitler rebuked the generals for cowardice and cowardice and announced that he suspected them of trying to sabotage his plans. He recalled that since the occupation of the Rhineland, they were against his every step, and yet every time his actions were crowned with success. Hitler declared that he expected them to unconditionally follow his ideas. Brauchitsch tried to point out the peculiarities of the new venture and the even greater risks involved, but only brought a severe reprimand on his head. That same evening, Hitler had a personal conversation with Brauchitsch and gave him a thrashing. Brauchitsch submitted a letter of resignation, but Hitler did not accept the general's resignation and ordered him to obey.

Nevertheless, the weather proved to be a better saboteur than the generals, and caused new delays until the first half of December. Then they had to wait until the New Year and allow the generals a Christmas holiday. However, even after Christmas the weather did not improve, and on January 10, Hitler scheduled the attack for January 17.

But on the very day that Hitler made this decision, a very mysterious "incident" occurred. This story was mentioned in numerous versions, but it was most briefly stated by the commander-in-chief of the airborne troops of Germany, General Student:

“On January 10, a major, appointed by me as a communications officer in the 2nd Air Fleet, flew from Munster to Bonn with the task of clarifying some insignificant details of the plan from the fleet command. With him he had a complete operational plan for the offensive in the West.

Due to frosty weather and strong winds over the frozen, snow-covered Rhine, the plane lost its course and flew into Belgian territory, where it had to make an emergency landing. The major failed to burn an important document, therefore, the general content of the German plan for offensive operations in the West became the property of the Belgians. The German air attache in The Hague reported that on the same evening the King of Belgium had a long telephone conversation with the Queen of Holland.

Of course, the Germans at that time did not know exactly what happened to the documents, but they naturally feared the worst and had to reckon with it.

It was interesting to observe the reaction to this incident among the top German leaders. Göring was furious. Hitler wanted to strike immediately, he decided to completely cancel the original plan and instead adopted the Manstein plan.

General Warlimont, who held an important position on the headquarters of the Supreme Command, recalled that on January 16 Hitler decided to change his plan mainly because of the aircraft incident. This turned out to be very unfortunate for the Allies, despite the fact that they had another four months to prepare, as the Germans postponed offensive operations for an indefinite time (the plan was completely revised and prepared only on May 10). When Hitler embarked on a new plan, the Allies immediately lost their balance. The French army quickly capitulated, and the British barely managed to escape by sea from Dunkirk.

Naturally, the question arises whether the forced landing of the aircraft with a communications officer was an accident. One would expect that after the war one of the German generals involved would be only too happy to present himself in a favorable light to those who captured him, claiming that it was he who organized the warning of the Allies. However, no one has ever done this, and it would seem that one can believe that the accident with the plane was accidental. But we know that the head of the German secret service, Admiral Canaris, who was later executed, took many secret steps to prevent Hitler from carrying out his plans, and that just before the spring offensive against Norway, Holland and Belgium, warnings were sent to these countries. We also know that Canaris acted very covertly and skillfully covered his tracks. That is why the fateful incident of January 10 is still a mystery.

The history of the origin of the new plan does not cause so much doubt. It is connected with another strange episode, although of a different nature.

According to the old plan developed by the General Staff under the leadership of Halder, the main direction of the offensive, as in 1914, was to pass through central Belgium: Army Group B under the command of Bock struck, and Army Group A under the command of Rundstedt carried out the offensive in the subsidiary direction through the hilly and wooded Ardennes. All Panzer divisions were attached to Bock, as the Ardennes were considered by the General Staff to be unsuitable for tank advances.

Manstein was the chief of staff of the Rundstedt Army Group. Friends considered him the most capable strategist among the young generals. Manstein noted that the intent of the original plan was too obvious and largely repeated the Schlieffen plan (1914), which means that the allied high command could be ready for it. Another drawback of the original plan, according to Manstein, was that German troops one would have to face the English army, which would certainly prove to be a more difficult opponent than the French. Moreover, this plan did not promise decisive results. Here is what Manstein wrote: “Perhaps we could have defeated the Allied forces in Belgium, we could have captured the coast of the English Channel. But it was also possible that our advance would finally stop at the Somme. Then there would have been exactly the same situation as in 1914 ... And there would have been no chance of achieving peace.

Thinking about this problem, Manstein came to the conclusion that it would be more expedient to launch the main attack in the Ardennes, where the enemy would be taken by surprise. However, before Manstein had to resolve one serious issue, about which in November 1939 he consulted with Guderian.

Here is how Guderian wrote about it:

“Manstein asked me if it was possible for tanks to advance through the Ardennes in the direction of Sedan. He explained his plan to break through the fortifications of the Maginot Line at Sedan. In his opinion, this way it was possible to avoid repeating the Schlieffen plan, which was known to the enemy. The area was familiar to me since the First World War, and, having studied the map, I agreed with Manstein's conclusions. He then convinced General Rundstedt that he was right and sent a memo to the headquarters of the ground forces to Brauchitsch and Halder. The latter did not agree with Manstein, but Halder nevertheless reported to Hitler about this version of the plan.

After a conversation with him in mid-December, Manstein's idea drew the attention of Hitler's headquarters and Warlimont. He told General Jodl about it, who reported it to the Fuhrer. Hitler seriously thought about a new plan only after the incident with the aircraft on 10 January. However, another month passed before Hitler spoke out in favor of this plan.

The final decision was made under the following circumstances. Brauchitsch and Halder did not like that Manstein insisted on his "brilliant" idea and thus opposed their plan. They managed to remove him from his post and send him to command an infantry corps, where he did not have the opportunity to push his ideas. However, shortly after Manstein was transferred to a new duty station, Hitler called him. Manstein had the opportunity to personally explain his plan to the Fuhrer. This meeting was arranged at the initiative of Hitler's envoy, General Schmundt, an ardent admirer of Manstein.

After this meeting, Hitler "persuaded" Brauchitsch and Halder. They had to succumb to the pressure of the Fuhrer and develop a plan in accordance with the ideas of Manstein. Halder set to work reluctantly, but he was a capable officer, and the detailed draft plan he presented was a model of strategic planning.

It is noteworthy that Hitler, having become infected with some new idea, immediately began to think that he was its author. As a result, Manstein's merit was reduced to the fact that he agreed with the Fuhrer: "Of all the generals with whom I spoke about the new plan in the West, Manstein was the only one who understood me."

If we analyze the course of events after the May offensive, it becomes clear that the old plan would almost certainly not have led to the fall of France. This plan, apparently, would only allow the Germans to push the allied armies to the French border, since in the main direction the Germans would stumble upon well-equipped Anglo-French forces and they would have to fight their way through territory saturated with obstacles - rivers, canals and large cities. The Ardennes might seem like an even more difficult destination. But if the Germans had managed to break through this mountainous and wooded area in southern Belgium before the French high command realized the danger, they would have opened up the vast plains of France with excellent conditions for a tank attack.

If the old plan had been adopted and if it had reached a dead end (it was possible), the war as a whole would have developed quite differently. And although it is unlikely that France and England would have been able to defeat Germany at all, certain obstacles to the German offensive would have given these countries time gain in order to increase the production of weapons, especially tanks and aircraft, and thus establish a balance of power in this new weapons. Hitler's assurances of an imminent victory would have failed, and this would have undermined faith in him in the troops and people. Thus, stagnation in the West would help the strong anti-Hitler group in Germany gain more support and implement plans to overthrow Hitler, and this would already be a prerequisite for peace. And no matter how events would unfold if it were stopped German offensive perhaps Europe would have escaped the destruction and disaster that fell upon her head as a result of the chain of events that followed the defeat of France.

Thus, Hitler only benefited from the incident with the plane, since it entailed a change in the plan of offensive operations, and the Allies suffered. The strangest thing about this whole story is that the Allies did not benefit from the unexpected warning. After all, from documents that did not have time to burn German officer, copies were made, which the Belgians immediately handed over to the French and British governments. However, the military advisers of these governments tended to view the captured documents as disinformation. This point of view was hardly justified, for it would be rather foolish to try to mislead the Allies in this way, as this would only alert the Belgians and force them to work more closely with the French and British. The Belgians could very well decide to open the border and let in the Franco-British armies to strengthen the defense.

Stranger still, the Allied High Command made no changes to its own plans and took no precautions in case the German High Command changed its main line of advance.

In mid-November, the Allied Supreme Council approved Plan D developed by Gamelin. It was a risky variant of the previously approved plan, and therefore the British command at first doubted its expediency. According to Plan D, as soon as Hitler launched the offensive, the Allied armies would strike with their left wing in Belgium and then move south. This was to the advantage of Hitler, since it was in full accordance with his new plan: the farther the left wing of the allied forces advanced into central Belgium, the easier it would be for the German tank formations to overcome the Ardennes, get out allied forces to the rear and cut them off from the rest of the forces.

The outcome became even more obvious, as the Allied High Command sent most of its mobile forces to enter Belgium and left only a few second-rate divisions to cover the flank at the exits from the "impenetrable Ardennes". In addition, the defensive positions occupied by these divisions were especially weak between the tip of the Maginot Line and the fortified positions occupied by the British.

Churchill, referring in his memoirs to the anxiety that the British staffs experienced throughout the autumn about the situation in this area, wrote: “The Minister of Defense Hore Belisha raised this issue several times in the War Cabinet ... However, the War Cabinet and our military leaders, of course, refrained from criticizing those whose armies were 10 times stronger than ours.” When Khor-Belisha resigned from his post in early January after a bitter controversy aroused by his critical speeches, the issue hardly came up again. In England and France there was a dangerous and unjustified self-confidence. On January 27, Churchill declared that "Hitler missed his best opportunity." This reassuring statement made headlines the next day. And at this time, Hitler had a new plan.

Curtis "Hawk" H.75C1 of CG II/5

"Strange", "sitting" war - this is the name given to the fighting on the Western Front in the period from the declaration of war by France and Great Britain on Germany (September 3, 1939) until the start of the German Blitzkrieg (May 10, 1940). While the Polish army, bleeding, tried to hold back the advance of the Wehrmacht units, the Western allies deployed their armies without undue haste, by no means seeking to start active hostilities against Germany. All aviation activity on the German-French border, now a front, was reduced to reconnaissance flights. Both sides cautiously "probed" the enemy's defenses, sending single reconnaissance aircraft under the cover of several fighters. The first skirmish between the aircraft of the French Air Force (Armay de l'Her) and the Luftwaffe, with this method of action, had to wait several days. On the evening of September 8, five "Curtiss" from the GC II / 5 group, accompanying the scout, were intercepted by four from the 1./JG 53 detachment.

From the first call, the Germans managed to shoot down the plane of Sergeant Francois Dietrich, but in the ensuing "dog dump" the French tried to take revenge. According to the results of the battle, two victories were recorded on their account: one was shared by ajudan chief Robert Krushan and sergeant chief Antoine Casenob, and the second with the same Krushan was shared by ajudan Pierre Ville. In fact, all German aircraft returned to base, although one was forced to land "on its belly" due to damage. It was piloted by none other than Werner Mölders himself.

The next fight had to wait almost two weeks - what can you do, "sitting" war! Its participants were "old acquaintances" - the pilots of the GC II / 5 and I / JG 53 groups, and the events unfolded according to the previous scenario: six H.75C1s accompanied a scout in the Apach-Budingen area, four Messerschmitts rose to intercept. led by the same Mölders. The role of a kind of bait was played, diverting the attention of the Curtiss pilots. Skillfully taking advantage of this, Mölders set fire to one H.75C1 in the first run. Sergeant Roger Keguinier, who piloted it, managed to escape with a parachute. Mölders' partners damaged another enemy vehicle that made an emergency landing. Sergeant Andre Legrand managed to save the French from a “dry defeat”. Skillfully using the good maneuverability of his "Curtiss", he managed to go into the tail of one of the "Messers", knocking him down. This was the first confirmed victory for French fighters in World War II.

In the third decade of September, the intensity of the air battles increased significantly - the Luftwaffe, having successfully dealt with the Polish aviation, were able to increase their presence in the West and act more actively and confidently, which caused a corresponding response from Armet de l'Ere. On September 24, already in the morning, fleeting air battles broke out over various sectors of the front, ending, however, to no avail. Around 15:00, two hawks (six aircraft) from the GC II / 4 group flew out to be escorted from GR II / 52, which had the task of surveying the Eppenbrumm-Hornbach sector. They were intercepted by a dozen Bf 109Es from the I/ZG 52 group. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, the French resolutely entered the battle. Sergeant Antoine de la Chapelle was forced to leave with a parachute the padded "Curtiss", having managed to damage one "Messerschmitt" before that. Two more Bf 109Es were shot down by Ajudans Darden and Camille Plubo (the latter had 14 confirmed and 4 probable air victories by the time of surrender). In total, in that battle, the French, at the cost of losing one of their cars, chalked up four downed enemy ones. True, German sources confirm the loss of only two of their Messerschmitts, but given the numerical superiority of the enemy, the result of the battle for the French was quite favorable.

The next day, the intensity of the air battles did not decrease. In one of the episodes, around noon, the Curtiss from GC II / 4, led by the commander of the 4th squadron, Captain Pierre Claude, converged in the air with a large group of Messerschmitts from JG 51 and JG 53. Six H.75C1 arrived in time to help their comrades from GC I/4. One of the pilots of the 1st squadron, ajudan chief Pierre Very, shot down two Bf 109s at once, which became the first victories of the GC I / 4. But when leaving the battle, Captain Claude's plane was shot down. The pilot jumped out with a parachute, but the infantrymen found his lifeless body on the ground, riddled with bullets - probably the Messerschmitt pilots fired at the pilot descending by parachute. Claude's colleagues, feeling their own guilt in what happened - after all, they failed to cover the commander - rushed into battle. Retaliation was achieved on 27 September, when So-Lieutenant Georges Baptizet, Ajudan Georges Tessero and Sergeant de la Chapelle shot down three Bf 109Ds from JGr. 153 (two victories confirmed).

On September 30, it was the turn of the 5th squadron. Nine Curtiss (six from GC I/5 and three from GC II/5) encountered 15 Bf 109Es from Group II/JG 53 while patrolling over the front line. , as they say, did not hit the face in the dirt, knocking down five Messerschmitts. Two victories were recorded at the expense of Lieutenant Robber Juve (GC II / 5) and Ajudan Pierre Zhenty (GC I / 5), another “Messer” was shot down by Sergeant-Chief Francois Lachot (GC II / 5). However, the French also suffered heavy losses - three pilots were shot down and killed (So-Lieutenant Yves Le Restief, Sergeants Jacques Lepro and Jean Magnier).

In total, during the first month of the war, the French lost ten fighters in air battles - six H.75С1 and four (the first Moran was shot down on September 21). The proportion of losses clearly reflects the proportion of aircraft of various types in combat work: the groups of the 4th and 5th squadrons, armed with "curtiss", carried the brunt of the fighting on their shoulders, and the "morans" were, so to speak, "on dancers". Twin-engine "potezes" were not actively used at the front, but the outdated types of fighters, the French command, did not at all seek to expose the "Messerschmitts" to the blows, with which they had no chance to withstand battles.

In turn, the French fighters announced the destruction of 20 Bf 109s. True, it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of the actions of Arme de l'Ere fighter aircraft by this indicator alone - after all, the main task of the Curtiss and Morans in September 1939 was to cover their own scouts. And they did not cope with this in the best way: 19 of their “wards” were shot down in a month. True, the obsolescence of the French Myuro scouts ANF.113/115/117 played an important role in such high losses.

If in September 1939 air battles on the Western Front still bore some signs of liveliness (although not comparable with later battles during the Blitzkrieg and the Battle of England), then in October an almost complete lull was established. None of the opposing sides was eager to fight, and the opponents, it seemed, with relief and joy, met a sharp deterioration in the weather, which allowed them to leave the planes at the airfields with a clear conscience day after day. The passivity of the French side was aggravated by too significant (according to the command) losses in the previous month. As a result, for the whole of October, the French fighters could boast of only four downed Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft - these victories were equally divided between the Curtiss (in particular, one was shot down on October 31 by Camille Plubeau, already familiar to us) and Morans.

The respite was badly needed by the French in terms of updating the fleet. In the autumn of 1939, it was finally possible to bring to the proper conditions, allowing large batches to be delivered to combat units. 28 MV.151C1 aircraft with wooden propellers were delivered to the fighter pilot training centers in Chartres and Etampes, another 50 aircraft, but with metal propellers, were transferred to air defense squadrons. In particular, at the end of September, such aircraft entered ERC 1/561 and 2/561 (on October 14, these squadrons were brought into the GARC I/561 group). Since September 1939, MB.152С1s were delivered to the GC I / 1 and GC II / 1 groups: the first of them reached the authorized strength of 26 aircraft by November 6, and the second - by November 15. The re-equipment of the third group, flying on the old "devuatins" - GC I / 8 - began only in December. Deliveries of MS.406C1 continued, which made it possible on November 1, 1939 to form the GC I / 9 group in Algiers on these machines (thanks to this, it was possible to transfer the GC I / 6 group to the metropolis, which had already managed to fully master the “morans”).

Sous Lieutenant René Tremolet's hawk after a forced landing in the "9 vs. 27" battle

... On the morning of November 6 at the Tul airfield, where the GC II / 5 group was stationed, high spirits reigned. Firstly, the unit was visited by the commander of the French Air Force, General Villemin, and the fighter aircraft inspector, General d'Harcourt, who presented awards to pilots who had won victories in previous battles. Secondly, the sky finally cleared up, which allowed us to hope for an end to the gray routine and the resumption of combat work. We did not have to wait long - when the aviators were having lunch, an order was received to send a detachment of fighters to escort a reconnaissance aircraft ("poteza" from the GR II / 22 group). Around 14:00, in full view of the generals, nine Hawks went up into the sky. At 14:50 over the Sarre River, the French noticed the first group of Bf 109Ds (these machines belonged to I / ZG 2) - two dozen Messers were at the same echelon as the Curtiss (about 5000 m). Led the group Hannes Gentzen - the best ace of the Luftwaffe Polish campaign. A moment later, seven more Messerschmitts appeared - they were about 500 m higher. Despite the threefold numerical superiority of the enemy, the French pilots bravely rushed into battle. In the ensuing dogfight-style fight, they skillfully used their Hawks' advantage in maneuverability. Lieutenant Pierre Ouz fought Gentzen himself. Although his H.75C1 was damaged, Oase managed to land "on his belly" at his home airfield. Sou-lieutenant René Tremola also had to land with the landing gear retracted. But for these two damaged cars, the Germans had to pay with five downed "Messers" (in particular, two victories were chalked up to sergeants Eduard Sale and Andre Legrand, and one more to graduate student Georges Lefol); in addition, five more victories were credited to the French as probable. As a result, the Teutons had to retreat, and Gentzen was summoned to Berlin that same evening for an explanation. This fight, called "battle 9 against 27", became the most famous episode of the air battles of the period of the "Weird War". It was widely covered in the French press, and its participants became real national heroes. However, in reality there was no reason to rejoice - after all, the Hawks had to fight with the Messerschmitts of an outdated modification, with low-power engines. By the spring of 1940, there were no more Bf 109Ds in combat units, and the Emil - Bf 109E - was a much more dangerous enemy.

The success of November 6 was consolidated the next day, when Eduard Sale intercepted south of Bliskastel from 3. (F) / 22 from a long-range reconnaissance detachment. Despite the intense fire of the gunners, Sale "dead grip" clung to his victim. In the end, the Dornier crashed at Saint-Ingbert, burying the entire crew under its wreckage. Another Do 17P (this one from 1.(F)/22) fell victim to the Curtiss on 8 November. That day, ten aircraft of the GC II / 4 group flew out to escort the reconnaissance Potez. On an intersecting course, they met the Dornier, which was escorted by a pair of Bf 109s. Seeing easy prey, the French attacked it, and after several visits sent the Do 17P to the ground (the crew was able to escape with parachutes). A pair of Messerschmitts retreated. But upon returning to the airfield, the French pilots were not awaited by praise, but by the fury of the group commander, Captain Andre Bornet. After all, having rushed all over the German, the hot Gallic guys did not leave a single fighter to carry out their main task - to cover their scout ... In the end, the destroyed Dornier was recorded at the expense of Camille Plubo, who was the first to open fire. The Morans were less lucky - on November 8, the Messerschmitts shot down a plane from the GC III / 2 that had strayed from the group, Sergeant Barbe piloting it was captured.

The attack of German scouts was far from always a simple "shooting at a moving target" - their gunners tried to "snarl", and sometimes very effectively. On November 10, during the Dornier attack, a Hawk from the GC II / 5 group was shot down. Its pilot, Ajudan Dugojon, escaped with a parachute.

In the next few days, the weather on the Franco-German front deteriorated again, and combat work aviation resumed only on November 21. That day turned out to be quite eventful. Firstly, Eduard Sale, who became a kind of "expert" in the destruction of the Dornier, shot down another scout of this type. Two of the three Do 17P crew members managed to escape. Secondly, in the afternoon, the “reinforced link” (patrouille lourd - six aircraft) from GC II / 4 left no chance for a pair of Messerschmitts from I / JG 52 that met on its way. One of them, shot down by ajudan Pierre Ville, was piloted by the commander German group Dietrich Graf von Pfeil. The second victory was shared between Jean Casenob and Sergeant Pierre Sallar. Thirdly, on that day, a major air battle took place between the "Curtiss" of the GC II / 5 group and the "Messerschmitts" from III / JG 53, which debuted on the Western Front. In this case, no one managed to succeed, although there were damaged cars on both sides .

On November 22, another Do 17P fell victim to French fighters. This time, four MS.406s from GC II/7 distinguished themselves. The Dornier they shot down fell near Mooz in Germany. Interestingly, three of the four Moran pilots who participated in that battle - Georges Valentin, Gabriel Gauthier and Jacques Lamblin - later became aces (the fourth participant in the battle was Lieutenant Gruelle, who turned out to be less lucky).

The loss of scouts aroused the concern of the Luftwaffe command. In an effort to neutralize the French aviation, the German command ordered to organize the "sweeping" of enemy fighters from the zone of work of their scouts. Already on November 22, the first such operation took place, during which the Messerschmitts from I / JG 2 intercepted the link of the Hawks of the GC II / 4 group. Caught by surprise, the French fighters were unable to offer worthy resistance. One "Curtiss" was shot down, and Pierre Sallar, who piloted it, died (the victory was recorded at the expense of Helmut Wieck). That battle almost became fatal for Casedom, who managed to reach the airfield in Xaffevilliers on a Hawk riddled with bullets. A third French pilot, Camille Plubeaux, was wounded in the leg and face, and his aircraft had to be written off after landing as beyond repair.

On the afternoon of November 22, three groups of "morans" from GC I / 3, II / 6 and III / 7 flew out to escort several scouts operating in the zone of the French 4th Army. Bf 109E from I / JG 51 and I / JG 76 rose to intercept. As a result of the outbreak of maneuverable air battles, two Messerschmitts from I / JG 76 were shot down. Since the battle was fought over French territory, both pilots who jumped out with parachutes hit in captivity. The pilot of the third Bf 109E, who got lost and landed his practically undamaged car on French territory, also became a prisoner. Subsequently, this "Messerschmitt" was carefully studied by the specialists of Arme de l'Ere. Distinguished and deployed on the coast of the Pas de Calais, in Norren Font, group GC I / 4. Two of its pilots, lieutenants Jean-Louis Hirschauer and Andre Weiss, intercepted the He 111 bomber from the headquarters of the KG 4 squadron. In the heat of battle, the French did not stop before invading the airspace of neutral Belgium, finishing off the Heinkel.

The day of November 23 began for French fighters already traditionally - another Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft (from detachment 5. (F) / 122) was shot down. This success was achieved by Ajudan Chief Pierre Le Gloan of GC III/6 flying MS.406 and was the first of his 19 aerial victories. On the same day, one of the few air battles conducted jointly by French and British fighters during the period of the "strange war" took place - although several squadrons of "Hurricanes" were redeployed to France after the entry of Great Britain into the war, coordination between the allies was frankly weak. In this case, too, six "Curtiss" from GC II / 5 tried "without asking" to intervene in the battle, which was fought by a trio of "Hurricanes" of the 1st squadron with the only one from the headquarters link of the KG 53 squadron. The French were so eager to "join" seemingly easy success that one of the Hawks collided with the Hurricane. Fortunately, both cars were able to land safely. The ill-fated "Heinkel" managed to shoot down, and the victory was divided between six pilots at once - three British and three French.

H.75C1 fighters were quite widely used in French aviation as courier machines. On November 23, one of these aircraft was shot down by Bf 110 heavy fighters from the V (Z) / LG 1 instructor group, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mios from the Air Force Headquarters piloting it was killed. By the end of the month, four Morans were also lost: two aircraft from GC III / 6 collided in the air in poor visibility (both pilots died), and two more aircraft from GC II / 7 were shot down, but their pilots escaped. One of them, Lieutenant Henri Grimaud, having been hospitalized due to burns, managed to recover just in time for the German blitzkrieg. Between May 10 and June 15, 1940, he scored five confirmed and three to four probable air victories. Subsequently, he participated in the Resistance and died in 1944, when the Wehrmacht attacked the Maquis bases on the Vercors plateau.

In December 1939, aviation operations on the Western Front were paralyzed by the most severe winter in several previous decades - for the whole month, French fighters chalked up only three air victories, and even those are in doubt. In particular, on December 21, Hawk pilots from GC II / 4 announced the destruction of Bf 109E from group III / JG 53, but this loss is not confirmed according to Luftwaffe documents.

In the new year, the weather conditions improved, and this immediately affected aviation activity. On January 2, 1940, in a battle of a dozen H.75s from the GC II / 5 group with Messerschmitts from I / JG 53, one Bf 109E was shot down. The next day, Moran pilots from GC II/7 distinguished themselves by shooting down one old Bf 109D without loss on their part. Over the next week, the weather again chained the planes to the ground. Combat sorties resumed on January 10, when six "hawks" of the GC II / 5 group went to escort reconnaissance aircraft. The French were intercepted by several Messerschmitts from I/JG 2. Despite the surprise factor, the Germans failed to succeed and turned themselves from hunters into game: one Bf 109 was shot down by Sergeant Andre Legrand, and the victory over the second was divided between Captain Gerard Portalier and Lieutenant Pierre Villasec. On January 11, French fighters again distinguished themselves by shooting down a Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft from 2. (F) / 22 over Verdun. The victory went to two pilots of the GC I / 5 - Lieutenant Edmond Marine-le-Mesle and Sous-Lieutenant Jean-Marie Rey. Due to the damage received, the enemy car landed on forced French territory, and its crew was captured. An hour later, Captain Jean-Marie Accart and Sergeant Gerard Muselli attacked another Dornier, but this time the German was more fortunate and was able to return safely to base.

On January 13, 1940, Captain Bernard Barbier and Sergeant Georges Lemar of CG I/4 shot down another Dornier. This time the prey of the French was a very rare aircraft modification - Do 17S-0, built in the amount of only three copies. The aircraft, belonging to the 1st detachment of the long-range reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command (1. (F) / ObdL), tried to escape to neutral Belgium, but, taking advantage of the speed advantage of their cars, the Curtiss pilots knocked out the Dornier, and its pilot there was nothing left but to land the car with the landing gear retracted on the beach at Calais. The crew was taken prisoner, not having managed to destroy either the aircraft itself or at least the maps, codes and other secret documents that were on board.

In the next few weeks, the weather worsened again, and until the end of January, the French fighters were able to increase their combat score by only one victory - Lieutenant Gruelle from GC II / 7 managed to shoot down Bf 109E from 2./JG 54 in his Moran. In February and In March, the weather was no better, and, taking advantage of this, the French command began to send fighter groups to rest. First of all, this concerned the units armed with the Curtiss. GC II / 4 was taken to Marignane at the end of February and returned to the front only at the beginning of April. In early March, the GC II / 5 was taken to Cannes.

In February 1940, the French Air Force reorganized its front-line aviation, forming four zones of air operations - ZOA (Zone d'Operations Aeriennes): Northern (ZOA Nord or ZOAN), which included the Pas de Calais coast and the border with Belgium; East (ZOA Est or ZOE) - the border with Luxembourg and Germany to the south of Strasbourg; South (ZOA Sud or ZOAS) - the border with Germany and Switzerland to about the river. Rhone; Alps (ZOA des Alpes or ZOAA) - the border with Switzerland and Italy, as well as the Mediterranean coast to the line west of the Rhone. The combat units of the "first line" were stationed here, and those that were at the stage of formation or rearmament were located in the interior of the country and in North Africa.

The main load at the front now fell on the shoulders of groups of "morans". Throughout March, they managed to achieve a single victory, shooting down the pilots of the GC III / 6 and GC II / 7 reconnaissance Do 17 with the combined efforts. At the same time, the losses were very noticeable - both due to accidents and in battles. In particular, on the last day of March 1940, four MS.406s from the GC III/7 group became victims of the Messerschmitts from II / JG 53 over Saargemünd, three more Morans were damaged in the same battle. It is worth noting that On March 21, the only aerial victory of R.631 for the entire period of the "Strange War" was won: over Cray, a pair of Potezes from ECN 1/13 (pilots Boursin and Post) shot down Do 17.

The improvement in the weather in early April immediately led to the intensification of air battles. The day of April 1, according to the "good tradition", began with the destruction of another Do 17 reconnaissance aircraft - an aircraft from Detachment 4. (F) / 11 was shot down near Sedan by a pair of Morans from GC II / 2. On the same day, a major battle took place, in which the German group II / JG 52 made its debut on the Western Front - eight of its Messerschmitts grappled with a dozen MS.406s from GC I / 2. The fleeting "dog dump" did not determine the winner - the opponents in full force returned to their bases. In the afternoon, a pair of GC II / 2 pilots announced the destruction of the He-111 bomber. But the Curtiss had no luck on the first day of April. The five vehicles from GC I/5 were unable to deal with the furiously fighting back from 3.(F)/ObdL. The German car intercepted from Longwy was able to safely leave for its territory, and its gunners damaged one Hawk.

On April 2, Moran pilots again distinguished themselves - this time from GC II / 3 - who shot down two enemy aircraft (Bf 110 and Do 215). The French also suffered losses that day - one MS.406 from GC I / 2 crashed during an emergency landing, burying the pilot under its wreckage. And on April 4 came the stunning news of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway. For the next few days, a lull reigned in the air on the German-French front - the Luftwaffe concentrated forces for Operation Weserübung, well, but there was no particular desire for action from the French before. On the morning of April 7, German reconnaissance flights resumed. Several MS.406 units from GC III/6 and III/2 tried to intercept a high-altitude Do 17. But the Morans, having only a slight speed advantage over the Dorniers, could not harm him. Also in the morning, a battle took place over Strasbourg, in which a dozen MS.406s from GC I / 2 and six Messerschmitts from I / JG 54 participated. leave the falling car, but died due to the fact that the parachute caught on the tail of his aircraft. The GC III / 3 group also suffered losses, having lost Captain Andre Richard in the battle with the Messers from II / JG 53, who was trying to land the damaged Moran in the field.

It was hot on April 7 and in the sky over Champagne. Here the "first violin" was played by the "Curtisses". Six aircraft from GC I / 5 fought several Bf 110Cs from I / ZG 2 (it was this group that participated from the German side in the battle "9 vs. "zersterers"). Two Messerschmitts were shot down (the victories were chalked up to the newly appointed commander of the 2nd squadron, Lieutenant Michel Dorance and Lieutenant Francois Varnier). However, when the Hoki were already returning home, Ajudan chief Andre Salman died. According to his wingman, Sergeant Edward Preux, Salmand's Curtiss suddenly went into a steep dive from high altitude and crashed into the ground. The cause of Salman's death was probably a loss of consciousness due to a malfunction of the oxygen equipment. Previously, GC I / 5 has already lost one pilot under similar circumstances - on January 2, Vladimir Vasek, one of the Czechoslovak pilots who were accepted into the French Air Force after the occupation of their native country, crashed.

The day ended on April 7 with another air victory - MS.406 from GC I / 6 and GC II / 7 were shot down. This machine, equipped with special equipment, carried out radio reconnaissance of the front line.

After the outbreak of dogfights on April 7 in the sky above Western Front calm again, caused by worsening weather. From time to time it was interspersed with single combat episodes. So, on April 11, a pair of Hawks, piloted by Lieutenant Hubert Buatele and Sergeant Maurice Tallen, tried to intercept a Do 17 reconnaissance aircraft from 4. (F) / 22, but they were able to finish it off only thanks to the help of the three Morans who arrived in time. And on April 20, the first victory was achieved by the new MB.152 - the aircraft of the GC II / 9 group, piloted by Ajudan Amorua, intercepted a reconnaissance aircraft flying at high altitude. Amorua was credited with the victory, although in fact the enemy vehicle - a brand new one from squad 4.(F) / 121 - received only damage.

On April 20, several more air battles took place. In the skirmish between MS.406 from GC II/7 and Messerschmitts from 2./JG 54, Pierre Bullot won his first victory - the Bf 109E of Lieutenant Helmut Hoch exploded in the air from the fire of his cannon. On the northern sector of the front, several "morans" from GC II / 3 pinched a single Henkel He-111 from the KG 54 squadron into the "pincers", finishing it off at Maastricht over neutral Holland. The victory was shared among all the pilots who participated in the battle. Among them was the future ace Martin Louis, who opened his battle account in this way. But the Curtiss were less lucky on April 20 - in a battle with the Messerschmitts from III / JG 53, the H.75 of the GC II / 4 group was shot down, and its pilot was injured.

On 21 April, So-Lieutenant François Warnier and Sergeant Maurice Tallen of GC I/5 attacked a Do 17, damaging it, but the scout was able to escape into neutral Belgian airspace. Nevertheless, both pilots were credited with the victory. The next day, three other pilots of the same group showed more perseverance - Sous-Lieutenant Marcel Rouquette, Ajudan Louis Bouvard and Sergeant-Chief Francois Morel. Having met a Do 17 reconnaissance aircraft from the 3.(F)/11 detachment in the air, they pursued it, deepening 20 km into Belgian airspace and finally finished off the Dornier. This episode was the last aerial victory of the GC I / 5, won before the start of the German Blitzkrieg, but the losses continued: on April 24, the ajudan chief Michel Empri was killed. In total, over the last ten days of May, French fighter units lost four vehicles - one each H.75, Moran-Saulnier MS.406, Bloch MB.152 and. The last car belonged to the GC I / 3 group, re-equipped with "morans" and the only unit with new "devuatins" that reached combat readiness before the start of the German blitzkrieg. All losses were caused by non-combat reasons and all, alas, were accompanied by the death of pilots.

The plane shot down on 22 April by GC I/5 pilots was not the only French aerial victory scored in the last days of April. On April 23, 13 Hawks from GC II / 5 intercepted a Do-17 reconnaissance aircraft from detachment 1. (H) / 13, following a strong escort of a dozen Messerschmitts of I / JG 52 group. ”, the other five cars attacked the scout. However, it was not possible to shoot down the Dornier - due to lack of fuel, the French had to withdraw from the battle. But the part of the patrol that fought the Bf 109 turned out to be more successful: So-Lieutenant Jan Klan shot down one "Messer" (this was the first victory for Czech pilots won on "hawks"), another enemy vehicle was damaged. And all the Curtiss returned safely to the Tul airfield.

During the first nine days of May, a lull reigned in the air over the Western Front - the Luftwaffe was gathering strength before the decisive blow, which was supposed to put an end to the fate of France and the Benelux countries. During these days, the fighters of Arme de l'Ere could not increase their combat score by a single victory, and they did not suffer combat losses. True, two "hawks" from the GC II / 5 were still lost when the planes of Edouard Sale and the ajudan chief Jean Dugojon collided in the air. Fortunately, both pilots managed to escape with parachutes.

In total, during the period of the “Strange War”, French fighters completed 10,119 sorties, of which about half fell on the MS.406. It is characteristic that more than a quarter of sorties (2600) were carried out in September 1939. In October there were 1400 sorties, and then combat activity decreased significantly, and only in April 1940 there was a revival - 1826 sorties.

Fighter pilots chalked up 81 reliable and several dozen more "probable" victories. In this regard, it was not the mass “morans” (they accounted for 32 reliable and 16 probable victories), but the “Curtisses”, whose pilots achieved 42 reliable and 22 probable victories, who showed themselves better. Air battles revealed significant shortcomings of the most common French fighters MS.406: insufficient speed (far from being fully compensated by good maneuverability), lack of armor protection, insufficient quality of the cockpit glazing (which often burst during sharp maneuvers), slow operation of the cannon air trigger (from pressing the trigger to the first shot took about 0.2 seconds - a lot for a fleeting air battle).

During the "Strange War", the official combat losses of the "morans" amounted to 13 aircraft (and 9 dead pilots). But out of 33 non-combat losses in frontline a significant part was probably due to damage received in battle. The losses of the 4th and 5th squadrons armed with "hawks" (combat and non-combat) amounted to 28 aircraft and 13 pilots.

According to materials: Kharuk A.I. French fighters of the Second World War - M .: Yauza: EKSMO: 2013. - 112 p: ill.