German soldiers on a tractor Sd.Kfz. 10/4 during the battles for Voronezh

On the morning of June 28, 1942, after artillery and aviation preparation, units of the Weichs Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front.

In accordance with the general plan of the fascist German command, the goal of the main operation, which was planned to be carried out in the southwestern strategic direction in the summer of 1942, was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern Fronts, to capture the Stalingrad region and enter the Caucasus. On June 28, the troops of the Weichs group struck in the Voronezh direction and, breaking through the defenses at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front, on the very first day advanced to a depth of 8-12 kilometers.

The correlation of forces in the zone of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts is characterized by the following indicators. Soviet troops numbered 655 thousand people, 744 tanks, 14,196 guns and mortars, 1012 aircraft. The German troops of their allies had a numerical strength - 900 thousand people, 1263 tanks, 17,035 guns and mortars, 1640 combat aircraft. Thus, the overall ratio was in favor of the enemy, despite the fact that the enemy was superior to our troops in maneuverability.

To organize the first major counterattack of new tank formations, the Stavka sent its representative - A. M. Vasilevsky. As is usually the case when organizing counterattacks of formations hastily transferred to the breakthrough area, the corps entered the battle one by one. The 4th Panzer Corps entered the battle on June 30th, while the 17th and 24th Panzer Corps did so only on July 2nd. The presence of Richthofen's elite German aviation in the air and, as indicated above, the Germans' 1.5-fold superiority in the number of personnel and military equipment of all kinds also did not create objective prerequisites for a successful counteroffensive. It should also be noted that the artillery-weak 17th Corps of N. V. Feklenko was forced to attack the elite "Great Germany", whose StuG III self-propelled guns could shoot Soviet tanks with impunity from their long 75-mm cannons. Assessing the events near Voronezh at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, one must remember that it was here that the full-scale debut of the new German armored vehicles took place.

Soviet soldiers surrender to the crew of a German self-propelled gun

The command of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts failed to correctly assess the current situation, did not take into account the instructions of the Headquarters to strengthen the defense in the Voronezh direction, did not take more decisive measures to establish control and to concentrate forces and means in dangerous areas in order to create a more favorable balance for themselves forces in the areas of enemy strikes. The defense of the 40th Army, which became the site of the main attack of the enemy, was the most poorly prepared in terms of engineering, and the operational density of troops was only one division per 17 km of the front. The troops of the 21st and 28th armies, which had suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were not reinforced, and the defense lines they hastily occupied were poorly prepared. The command of the South-Western and Southern Fronts also failed to organize a systematic withdrawal of troops along the lines and ensure a solid defense of the Rostov fortified area. The departure took place in extremely difficult conditions. The army commanders and their headquarters lost contact with the troops entrusted to them for several days. As a result of the overestimation of the reliability of wire communications and the underestimation of radio communications, firm and continuous command and control of troops was not ensured. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses during the defensive battles.

Victory Square in Voronezh

If you have photographs of Operation Blau, please post them in the comments of this post.

Source of information about the photo.

Fedor von Bock
Side forces to the beginning of the operation:
74 divisions
6 tank corps
37 brigades
6 ur
1.3 million people

entered during the operation:
4 tank corps
20 divisions

to the beginning of the operation:
68 German divisions (including 9 armored and 7 motorized) in the GA "YUG".

2nd Hungarian Army: 9 light, 1 tank, 3 security divisions.
Italian corps and Romanian units.
Total 68 German divisions and 26 Allied divisions
About 1.3 million in the ground forces.
1,495 tanks

Losses 568,347 people, of which 370,522 were killed and missing; 488.6 thousand pieces shooter weapons; 2,436 tanks and self-propelled guns; 1,371 guns and mortars; 783 combat aircraft July: 70.6 thousand
(in GA "A" and "B")

German Allied losses are unknown.

The Great Patriotic War

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Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operation- a major battle between the USSR and the countries of the Nazi bloc in the southern direction of the Great Patriotic War in June-July 1942. On the German side - part of the operation "Blau".

Defensive operation of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts in the Voronezh direction (June 28 - July 6, 1942)

Operation progress

The enemy delivered the main blow to the left-flank 15th Rifle Division of the 13th Army, the 121st and 160th Rifle Divisions of the 40th Army. Here, on a front of 45 km, in the first echelon of the enemy, two tank, three infantry and two motorized divisions advanced, moving shoulder to shoulder with the XXIV motorized and XXXXVIII tank corps. Air support for the advancing was provided by Wolfram von Richthoffen's VIII Air Corps, the most powerful and most experienced in dealing with ground forces. As a result of a tense battle, the XXXXVIII Corps managed to break through the Soviet defenses at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies, advance 8-15 km to the east, and by the end of June 28 reach the Gremyachaya line, r. Tim.

Refugees leaving on a dirt road near Voronezh, June 1942.

Reserves were immediately sent to the revealed direction of the main attack. On June 28, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to strengthen the Bryansk Front. The 4th and 24th Tank Corps from the Southwestern Front and the 17th Tank Corps from the Headquarters reserve were sent to the latter. In the Voronezh region, four fighter and three assault aviation regiments were transferred to reinforce the front. The struggle began in new conditions, it was necessary to test a new tool - tank corps - in the first battles.

The commander of the Bryansk Front decided to delay the enemy's offensive at the turn of the river. Kshen and for this purpose gave instructions on the transfer to the breakthrough site of the 16th Panzer Corps. At the same time, he ordered the concentration of the 17th tank corps of N.V. Feklenko in the Kastornoye area, and the 4th tank corps of V.A. Mishulin and the 24th tank corps of V.M. counterattacks in the northwestern and northern directions. The 115th and 116th tank brigades were transferred from the front reserve to reinforce the 40th Army.

However, as is always the case in "blitzkriegs", one of the first victims was control points. During June 29, the left-flank formations of the 13th Army, waging stubborn battles, held back the enemy advance on the line railway Livny, Marmyzhi, and the troops of the right flank of the 40th Army - on the Kshen River. In the Rakov area, the 24th Panzer Division of Geim's corps managed to break through the second line of defense of the 40th Army and develop an offensive in the direction of Gorshechny. The appearance of a small group of tanks in the area of ​​​​the command post of the 40th Army in the Gorshechny area disorganized command and control. The army commander, Lieutenant-General M.A. Parsegov and his headquarters, having abandoned some of the documents, including those of an operational nature, moved to the area southeast of Kastornoye and finally lost control of the military operations of the troops. Apparently, M.A. Parsegov's nerves simply could not stand it: in September 1941, he was one of the direct participants in the battles near Kiev, which ended in a huge "boiler". One way or another, General Parsegov was soon removed from command of the 40th Army and sent to the Far East.

In the meantime, in two days of the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army, G. Goth managed to break through the defenses of the troops of the Bryansk Front at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies on a 40-kilometer front and advance to a depth of 35-40 km. This breakthrough complicated the situation on the left wing of the Bryansk Front, but did not yet pose a particular threat, since four tank corps advanced into the areas of Volov, Kastorny and Stary Oskol. However, the concentration of the 4th and 24th corps was slow, and the rear of the 17th tank corps, transported by rail, fell behind and units were left without fuel.

The commander of the Bryansk Front, F.I. Golikov, in the conditions of a deep breakthrough of the enemy in the Voronezh direction, decided to withdraw the troops of the 40th Army to the line of the river. Kshen, Bystrets, Arkhangelsk. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, represented by I.V. Stalin, did not agree with this decision of the commander of the Bryansk Front. Golikov was told that "a simple withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army to an unprepared line would be dangerous and could turn into a flight." In addition, the front commander was pointed out to the mistakes in his actions:

The worst and most unacceptable thing in your work is the lack of communication with Parsegov's army and the tank corps of Mishulin and Bogdanov. As long as you neglect radio communication, you will have no connection and your entire front will be an unorganized rabble.

To organize the first major counterattack of new tank formations, the Stavka sent its representative - A. M. Vasilevsky. In order to defeat the units of the XXXXVIII tank corps of Heim, who broke through in the direction of Gorshechnoye, a special task force was created under the leadership of the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko. The group included the 4th, 24th and 17th tank corps. The task of the group was to deliver counterattacks by the 24th and 4th tank corps from the Stary Oskol region to the north, and by the 17th tank corps from the Kastornoye region to the south. At the same time, by decision of the front commander, counterattacks were being prepared by the 1st Panzer Corps M.E. Katukov from the Livny region to the south along the Livny, Marmyzha railway and the 16th tank corps of M.I. Pavelkin from the Volovo region to the south along the eastern bank of the river. Kshen.

As is usually the case when organizing counterattacks of formations hastily transferred to the area of ​​a breakthrough, the corps entered the battle non-simultaneously. So, for example, the 4th Panzer Corps entered the battle on June 30, and the 17th and 24th Panzer Corps only on July 2. At the same time, contrary to the traditionally cited dialogue of I.V. Stalin and F.I. Golikov, regarding the balance of forces on the Bryansk Front, 1000 tanks of the Bryansk Front against 500 tanks, the Germans had a slightly more complicated situation. The presence of Richthoffen's aviation in the air did not favor an objective assessment of the forces of the enemy that had broken through to the approaches to Voronezh. In reality, against the 4th, 16th, 17th and 24th tank corps, the Germans had three tank (9th, 11th and 24th) and three motorized ("Great Germany", 16th and 3rd) divisions . That is, against four (albeit five with the corps of M.E. Katukov, who fought with the infantry of the LV corps) Soviet independent tank formations, the enemy could put up almost one and a half times more divisions - six. Let's not forget that the Soviet tank corps, in its own way organizational structure then it only roughly corresponded to a tank division. At the same time, N.V. Feklenko’s 17th Corps, which was weak in terms of artillery, was forced to attack the elite “Great Germany”, whose StuGIII self-propelled guns could shoot his tanks with impunity from their long 75-mm cannons. Assessing the events near Voronezh at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, one must remember that it was here that the full-scale debut of the new German armored vehicles took place.

The appearance of new equipment was noted by the commanders of our tank formations. In particular, the commander of the 18th tank corps, I.P. Korchagin, wrote in a report on the results of the July and August battles:

In the battles near Voronezh, the enemy most effectively used mobile anti-tank defense, using for this purpose self-propelled armored vehicles armed with 75-mm guns firing Molotov cocktails. This blank pierces the armor of all brands of our vehicles. The enemy uses mobile guns not only on the defensive, but also on the offensive, accompanying infantry and tanks with them.

On the morning of July 3, the enemy continued to develop the offensive. The army group "Weikhs" delivered the main blow from the Kastornoye, Gorshechnoye region to Voronezh, pushing part of its forces to the line of Livny, Terbuny. The German 6th Army XXXX with a motorized corps developed an offensive from the area of ​​Novy Oskol and Volokonovka in a northeasterly direction.

The left-flank XXIX Army Corps of the 6th German Army moved with its main forces from Skorodnoye to Stary Oskol, in the area of ​​​​which on July 3 it connected with units of the 2nd Hungarian Army, closing the encirclement around six divisions of the left flank of the 40th Army and the right flank of the 21st th army.

The troops of the 40th and 21st armies, which were surrounded, were forced to break through in separate subunits and units in an unorganized manner, with poor ammunition supply, in the absence of a unified command of the encircled troops, and with unsatisfactory leadership of the operation by the army commanders.

Already on July 4, fighting began on the outskirts of Voronezh, and the next day the 24th Panzer Division of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps of the army of G. Goth, having crossed the river. Don, broke into the western part of Voronezh. North of the 24th division crossed the Don and formed two bridgeheads "Great Germany". The breakthrough into the depths of the defense was so swift that the right bank of Voronezh was already captured on July 7, 1942, the task of the first phase of the operation was completed by the Germans. Already on July 5, Weikhs was ordered to release the mobile formations of the 4th Panzer Army in the Voronezh region and move them south.

But before the steam roller of the 4th Panzer Army of G. Goth, according to the “Blau” plan, went south along the left bank of the Don, a counterattack of the Soviet 5th Panzer Army took place. The 5th Panzer Army advancing to the Voronezh region was one of two formations (3rd and 5th) with this name, which were formed according to the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of May 25, 1942. Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko was appointed commander of the 3rd Tank Army, Major General A. I. Lizyukov was appointed commander of the 5th Tank Army. Soviet tank troops were then still in the stage of copying the decisions of the enemy. Therefore, in terms of its organizational structure, the tank army roughly corresponded to the German motorized corps. As we know, the motorized corps included tank, motorized divisions, diluted with several infantry divisions. The first two Soviet tank armies were built on the same principle, and this structure was maintained until 1943. The 5th Tank Army included the 2nd and 11th Tank Corps, the 19th Separate Tank Brigade (this armored "core" of tank armies will remain until the end of the war), the 340th Rifle Division, one regiment of 76-mm RGK SPM guns, guards mortar regiment of RS M-8 and M-13 installations. Differences from the motorized hull are visible to the naked eye. The German corps includes heavy artillery from 10 cm cannons to 210 mm mortars. In the Soviet tank army, it was replaced by universal guns and rocket artillery with much more modest capabilities.

On the night of July 3, formations of the 5th Panzer Army completed their concentration south of Yelets. On the night of July 4, its commander A.I. Lizyukov received a directive from Moscow obliging “to intercept the communications of the enemy tank group that had broken through to the Don River to Voronezh; actions on the rear of this group to disrupt its crossing over the Don.

As is usually the case with hastily organized counterattacks, the army of A.I. Lizyukova entered the battle in parts. On July 6, the 7th Tank Corps went into battle first, then the 11th Tank Corps (July 8) and, finally, the 2nd Tank Corps (July 10). The corps entered the battle, not being able to conduct reconnaissance, to fully concentrate. Located in the offensive zone of the army of A.I. The Lizyukov River Dry Vereika did not live up to its name and met the advancing tanks with a swampy floodplain.

However, it should be noted that the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army was based on the initially incorrect assumption that the advancing German tank corps would move further through the Don and Voronezh to the east. They had no such task. Accordingly, instead of the forward movement characteristic of an offensive, they stopped in front of the Don on the bridgehead near Voronezh and took up defensive positions. More than a hundred tanks of the 11th Panzer Division armed with 60-caliber 50-mm guns were a serious enemy for the advancing Soviet tank brigades and tank corps.

That the army of A.I. Lizyukova could do in this situation, this is to delay the change of tank formations to infantry as much as possible. She accomplished this task. On July 10, Halder makes the following entry in his diary:

The northern sector of the Weichs front is again under enemy attack. The change of the 9th and 11th Panzer divisions is difficult.

In order to liberate the 4th Panzer Army, the German command was forced to send the XXIX Army Corps of the 6th Army to Voronezh, weakening the offensive capabilities of the F. Paulus army against the troops of the Southwestern Front. The change of constantly attacked divisions really took place with great difficulties. In particular, the 11th Panzer Division was replaced by the 340th Infantry Division, which had not been in combat before, the child of the German "permanent mobilization".

Operation results

The battle near Voronezh ended, leaving the fields filled with smoking skeletons of tanks. The German tank formations leaving for Stalingrad gave the Soviet tank troops a kind of “kiss of death”, as if hinting that the summer campaign does not promise to be easy. The battles near Voronezh moved into a positional phase. On July 15, by the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 5th tank army was disbanded, and A.I. Lizyukov, according to the same directive, was proposed "to appoint the commander of one of the tank corps." On July 25, 1942, the commander of the 5th Tank Army, A. I. Lizyukov, himself got into the tank and led the unit on the attack, intending to make a hole in the enemy’s defenses near the village of Sukhaya Vereika and withdraw a unit belonging to his army from the encirclement. A. I. Lizyukov’s CV was hit, and the commander of one of the first Soviet tank armies died.

For the convenience of command and control of the troops operating in the Voronezh direction, by the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on July 7, the Voronezh Front was formed, which included the 60th (former 3rd reserve army), 40th and 6th (former 6th reserve army) army, 17th, 18th and 24th tank corps. A lieutenant general was appointed commander of the front, and corps commissar I.Z. was appointed a member of the Military Council. Susaykov, chief of staff - Major General M.I. Kazakov. F.I. Golikov was demoted and became deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. The task of covering the directions to Tambov and Borisoglebsk was assigned to the newly created front. The responsibility of the troops of the Bryansk Front, which consisted of the 3rd, 48th, 13th and 5th tank armies, remained the task of covering the southern approaches to Moscow. Lieutenant General K.K., who had recovered from his wound in March 1942, was appointed commander of this front in mid-July. Rokossovsky, a member of the Military Council - Regimental Commissar S.I. Shalin, chief of staff - Major General M.S. Malinin. The battles near Voronezh were rich in personnel changes. For failures in organizing a counterattack by the forces of the 23rd Panzer Corps, the commander of the 28th Army, D.I. Ryabyshev was removed from his post, and his place was taken by the commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps V.D. Kryuchenko.

Important organizational changes also took place in the leadership of the German troops on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. As previously planned, on July 7, 1942, Army Group South was divided into Army Groups A and B. Army Group B, which included the 4th Panzer (Goth), 6th (Paulus) and 2nd (Weichs) armies, the 8th Italian Army (Gariboldi) and the 2nd Hungarian Army (Jany), headed by Fedor von Bock. For Army Group A, from the spring of 1942, a headquarters was being prepared under the command of Marshal Wilhelm List. The 1st Panzer Army (Kleist) and the Ruof Army Group (17th Army and 3rd Romanian Army) were subordinated to Army Group A.

Defensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts in the big bend of the Don and in the Donbass (July 7-24, 1942)

As early as July 6, the Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Southern Fronts to the east and gain a foothold at the line: Novaya Kalitva, Chuprinin, Novaya Astrakhan, Popasnaya. This instruction from the Headquarters was connected with the deep coverage of the right wing of the Southwestern Front by enemy troops, as well as the concentration of a strong enemy grouping in the Donbass against the right wing of the Southern Front. The withdrawal of our troops to the indicated line began on the night of July 7. At the same time, the Supreme High Command began to concentrate fresh forces in order to strengthen the defense on the outskirts of Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

On the left bank of the middle reaches of the Don from Pavlovsk to Veshenskaya, the 63rd Army (the former 5th Reserve Army) was deployed. In addition to the 7th reserve army formed there, the 1st reserve army was transferred to the Stalingrad region from the Stalinogorsk region. The commander of the North Caucasian Front was ordered to deploy the 51st Army along the southern bank of the Don from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Azov and prepare this line for defense.

Operation progress

File:Voroneg-Voroshilovgrad.jpg

The German command continued the implementation of the plan described in OKW Directive No. 41 and launched an offensive to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Southwestern Front. The fulfillment of this task by the enemy was carried out by delivering two strikes: one from the area south of Voronezh by the forces of the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies of Army Group "B" and the other from the area of ​​Slavyansk, Artemovsk by the forces of the 1st Tank Army of Army Group "A" in general direction to Millerovo.

Despite the order received to withdraw troops and the delay of G. Hoth's tank army by counterattacks near Voronezh, the troops of the South-Western Front failed to completely avoid the blow of the "steam roller" rushing south of the German offensive. If the army of G. Goth was delayed, then the XXXX tank corps (in the summer of 1942, the mass renaming of the German motorized corps into tank ones began) of the 6th Army of F. Paulus was not shackled by anyone. At that time, the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized, 100th Jaeger and 336th Infantry Divisions were part of the XXXXX Panzer Corps of General of Panzer Troops Geyer von Schweppenburg. It was the XXXX Corps that attacked the right wing of the Southwestern Front, which went over to the defensive on the southern bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River in the area from Novaya Kalitva to Chuprinin. The 9th Guards, 199th and 304th Rifle Divisions, which retreated to this line, did not have time to organize a solid defense and were simply swept away by the German offensive.

On July 7, at the height of the fighting near Voronezh, the XXXXX tank and VIII army corps of the army of F. Paulus crossed the Chernaya Kalitva River and, developing the offensive to the southeast, reached the Kantemirovka area by the end of July 11. The advanced formations of the 4th German Panzer Army, withdrawn from the battle in the Voronezh region on July 9, advanced along the Don River to the south behind the strike force of the 6th German Army. By the end of July 11, they had reached the Rossosh area. The main forces of the Southwestern Front, engulfed by the enemy from the northeast and east and attacked from the front, were forced to fight hard south and southwest of Kantemirovka, losing contact with the front headquarters.

Due to the fact that the headquarters of the South-Western Front, which was located in the city of Kalache since July 7 (180 km southeast of Voronezh), turned out to be cut off from the bulk of the front’s troops, its 57th, 28th, 38th and 9 1st Army were transferred to the Southern Front. On the Southern Front, R. Ya. Malinovsky has been relatively calm so far. The troops of the right wing and the center of the front in the period from July 7 to 11, under the cover of the rearguards, retreated back to the line running approximately along the meridian of Taganrog. Thus, the front line was straightened and the elbow connection with the neighbor on the right was maintained.

While the Southern Front was retreating, the German command was preparing an operation symmetrical to the daring landing in Kerch and Feodosia in December 1941. On July 11, 1942, Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 43, which ordered the capture of amphibious assault Anapa and Novorossiysk. Black Sea Fleet was supposed to be neutralized with the help of the Luftwaffe. Further along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, the landing troops were to reach the oil fields of Maykop, and along the Black Sea coast - to Tuapse. Five days after the signing of OKW Directive No. 43, Hitler moved to a new headquarters 15 km northeast of Vinnitsa. The camp, equipped there from barracks and blockhouses, received the name "Werwolf" (Werewolf).

Almost a year before the events described, the 6th and 12th armies of I.N. The fate of the 6th and 12th armies then, as we know, was not the best. In the summer of 1942, everything was not so dramatic, but it could not have done without a catastrophe of local significance. In the summer of 1942, the 9th and 38th armies, in a somewhat modernized form, repeated the fate of the 6th and 12th armies in the summer of 1941.

In the same way as in July 1941, in July 1942 between the right flank of the Southern Front and the left flank of the Southwestern Front gaped a gap several tens of kilometers wide. A mass of mobile formations of the enemy immediately rushed into this gap. In order to cut off the escape route to the east for the entire grouping of Soviet troops operating in the Donbass, the efforts of the 1st and 4th German tank armies were combined. On July 13, the tank corps advancing on Millerovo XXXX tank corps was transferred to the 4th tank army of G. Goth from the 6th army of F. Paulus. For the duration of the operation against the Donbass grouping of Soviet troops, both tank armies were transferred to Army Group A.

On June 14, I. V. Stalin addressed S. K. Timoshenko with the following rather harsh words:

The Stavka considers it intolerable and unacceptable that the Military Council of the Front has not been giving information about the fate of the 28th, 38th and 57th armies and the 22nd tank corps for several days now. The Stavka knows from other sources that the headquarters of these armies have retreated beyond the Don, but neither these headquarters nor the Military Council of the front tell the Headquarters where the troops of these armies have gone and what their fate is, whether they continue to fight or are captured. These armies contained, it seems, 14 divisions. The headquarters wants to know where these divisions have gone.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Documents and materials. 1942. S. 208-309.

The following happened with these divisions. While the XXXX Panzer Corps cut off the 9th and 38th armies from the east, the III Panzer Corps of E. von Mackensen of the 1st Panzer Army wedged between the 9th Army of the then Southwestern Front and the 37th Army of the Southern front. On July 15, 1942, the German 14th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Corps established contact with the formations of the XXXX Panzer Corps advancing towards it and an encirclement ring around the troops of the 9th, 38th and part of the forces of the 24th Army in the Millerovo area. However, the distance between the outer and inner fronts of the "cauldron" was relatively small, which allowed the troops of the 9th and 38th armies to break out of the encirclement with varying success.

On July 1, 1942, the 9th Army included 51, , 140, 255, 296, 318th and 333rd rifle divisions, and the 38th Army included 162, , 242, 277, 278th and 304th rifle divisions. As of August 1, 1942, the 9th Army has 51, , 140, 242, 255, 296 and 318 rifle divisions. The 38th Army, reorganized into the 1st Tank Army, includes the 131st and 399th Rifle Divisions. Accordingly, the 162nd, 277th, 278th, and 304th Rifle Divisions disappeared into the “cauldron” near Millerovo.

Formations of the 24th Army of Lieutenant General I.K. Smirnov, who were moving out of the reserve of the Southern Front to the Millerovo area, were forced to immediately engage in battle with units of the XXXX and III tank corps, which formed the outer front of the encirclement in the Millerovo area. Panzer divisions pushed the 24th Army back to the south and southeast. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the Southern Front, R. Ya. Malinovsky, to withdraw the troops of the front beyond the river. Don in its lower reaches. Since the Southern Front, which was now turning not to the west, but to the north, fell into the area of ​​\u200b\u200bresponsibility of S. M. Budyonny, the defense was ordered to be organized in cooperation with the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. R. Ya. Malinovsky was ordered to organize a strong defense along the southern bank of the river. Don from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Bataysk and further along defensive line, prepared on the northern approaches to Rostov. The retreat of the Southern Front beyond the Don began on the night of July 16 in the Razdorskaya-Rostov sector.

While the Southern Front tried to salvage at least part of the search for the detached left wing of the Southwestern Front, the latter was renamed the Stalingrad Front on 12 June. The front included the 21st Army from the old composition of the Southwestern Front, as well as the 63rd (former 5th Reserve Army), 62nd (former 7th Reserve Army) and 64th (former 1st Reserve ) armies. This was a general rule - when it hit the first line, the reserve army received the corresponding number from among the armies that were not occupied by existing, actually or already virtually, armies. The 62nd Army at that time included the 33rd Guards, 192nd, 147th, 184th, 196th and 181st Rifle Divisions. The 63rd - 14th Guards, 153rd, 127th and 203rd Rifle Divisions. The 64th - 131, , , 214th and 112th rifle divisions. The command of the renamed front remained the same, that is, the commander was Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, the member of the Military Council was N.S. Khrushchev, and the chief of staff was Lieutenant General P.I. Bodin. On June 17, the Stalingrad Front, by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170 513, also included armies, of which only headquarters remained - the 28th, 57th and 38th.

The failures that followed one after another near Kharkov and the withdrawal to Stalingrad with the loss of divisions in Millerovo overflowed the patience of the Supreme Commander. By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, S.K. Timoshenko was removed from command of the Stalingrad Front, and Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, who had previously commanded the 21st Army, was appointed in his place.

In mid-July 1942, the Stalingrad Front received a short respite due to the slowdown in the offensive of the 6th Army of F. Paulus. After the XXXX Panzer Corps was withdrawn from the army and handed over to G. Goth, the Paulus army significantly lost its penetrating power. The German command concentrated its main efforts in the face of the tank armies of E. von Kleist and G. Goth on defeating the armies of the Southern Front that had retreated beyond the Don. In the long term, this did not bode well for the Stalingrad Front - having defeated the units that had retreated beyond the Don, two German tank armies could turn around and deliver a crushing blow in the direction of Stalingrad.

It should be noted that during this period there were no independent tank formations in the Southern Front. The 24th tank corps of V. M. Badanov, which was formed in the spring of 1942 in the zone of the Southern Front, departed near Voronezh and remained there for a long time. Therefore, the command of the Southern Front had only infantry support units and formations.

On the contrary, the German command in this direction gathered almost all the tank formations allocated for the summer offensive, including the 16th motorized division and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" castelled to Rostov.

The command of the Southern Front, having entrusted the defense of the Rostov fortified region to the 56th Army, Major General D.N. Nikishev, the rest of the front forces were withdrawn beyond the river. Don. At the same time, the 37th Army of Major General P. M. Kozlov was ordered to turn around to defend the southern bank of the river from Konstantinovskaya to the mouth of the river. Manych, which reduced the defense sector of the 51st Army. The 12th Army of Major General A. A. Grechko was withdrawn to the area south of Manychskaya, and the 18th Army of Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov was withdrawn to the area of ​​Khomutovskaya and Kagalnitskaya. The front commander ordered to concentrate one rifle division and two rifle brigades from the 56th Army in the front reserve in the Bataysk region.

The weakest was the Rostov sector of the front, which was occupied by the 56th Army. To defend a hundred-kilometer section of the front, the army had five rifle divisions, weakened by previous battles, two rifle brigades and seven machine-gun battalions of the 70th and 158th fortified regions. The situation was worsened by the lack of reliance on large water barriers. As early as July 16, the 22nd Panzer Division of the corps of E. von Mackensen captured a bridgehead near Pereboynoye on the southern bank of the Donets. The departing Soviet troops carefully blew up all the bridges behind them, but the capture of the bridgehead made it possible to build a floating bridge by the forces of pontoon parks. Moreover, there were not enough pontoons for two crossings, and the 14th Panzer Division was forced to stand in the back of the head of the 22nd in line to force the Donets. Despite all the efforts of the armored group of the Southern Front under the command of A. D. Shtevnev and the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General I. T. Zamertsev, it was not possible to eliminate the bridgehead on July 17-19.

The offensive of the 14th and 22nd Panzer Divisions from the bridgehead at Pereboynoye began on 19 July. The attack of the Rostov fortified area began on the morning of July 22, and by the end of the day the tanks of the corps of E. von Mackensen entered the suburbs of Rostov. The next day, the 125th Infantry Division approached the city, and on July 24, the 298th and 73rd Infantry Divisions of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps joined the battle. Already on July 25, Rostov was abandoned by the Soviet troops.

In order to prevent the enemy from forcing the Don south of Rostov, the commander of the Southern Front on July 23 ordered the 18th Army, and then the 12th Army, to turn around and take up defense along the left bank of the river. Don from the mouth of the river. Manych to Azov. But the time had already passed. The enemy preempted the troops of these armies, penetrating Rostov, the 13th Panzer Division broke further south, crossed the river and captured bridgeheads in the Bataysk region.

Operation results

The Soviet troops also failed to hold the line of the river. Don east of the mouth of the river. Manych. The fighting here flared up as early as July 21, where at that time the main forces of the 4th German Panzer Army began to advance. Troops of the 51st Army, Major General N.I. Trufanov, who defended here on a wide front, could not prevent the enemy from forcing the river. By the evening of July 24, units of XXXXVIII and XXXXX tank corps had captured small bridgeheads south of Razdorskaya and Tsimlyanskaya and an extensive bridgehead south of Nikolayevskaya. Here Breit's 3rd Panzer Division advanced south to the river. Sal and even crossed to its southern shore.

By July 25, the 12th and 18th armies deployed on the southern bank of the river. Don. Now on the lower reaches of the Don were deployed in the first echelon four Soviet armies: from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to the German bridgehead south of Nikolaevskaya - the 51st Army, included in the Southern Front; further west to the mouth of the river. Manych - the 37th Army, which included separate formations and units of the 51st Army, cut off from its main forces after the advance of the enemy on the river. Sal. The section of the front from the mouth of the river. Manych to Olginskaya was defended by the 12th army (, 261st and 353rd rifle divisions), and to the left of it to the mouth of the river. Don - 18th Army (, 395th Rifle Divisions). However, the combat effectiveness of these armies, due to their small numbers and weak weapons, was very small. The troops of the 56th and the remnants of the 24th armies continued to withdraw from the northern bank of the river. Don to the south, heading to the rear to tidy up and resupply. The total number of armies of the Southern Front during this period did not exceed 100 thousand people.

The retreat, even if organized, never favored the preservation of artillery and heavy infantry weapons. In addition, in the process of withdrawal, armies crawl out of trenches, dugouts and dugouts and stretch out in long columns along the roads. the best target for air strikes is hard to even imagine. Therefore, of all the armies that took part in the initial phase of the battles for the Caucasus, only the 51st Army had tangible amounts of artillery with a caliber of 122 mm and 152 mm. In addition, due to the limited number of crossings, part of the artillery broke away from their troops. The normal work of the rear in supplying the troops of the Southern Front with ammunition was disrupted.

In such a difficult situation, some relief from the fate of the troops of R.Ya. Malinovsky came from Berlin. On July 23, 1942, OKW Directive No. 45 came into being, which ordered the withdrawal of two mobile formations from Army Group A and transfer them to Army Group B to continue the offensive on Stalingrad. At the same time, Army Group A was withdrawn to the Great Germany reserve. The 11th Army, which, according to OKW Directive No. 43, was supposed to land in Taman and assist the offensive in the Caucasus, was ordered to move near Leningrad along with all heavy artillery.

After receiving OKW Directive No. 45, List and Weichs began to regroup German troops from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad. In the period from July 23 to July 25, the control of the XXIV and XXXXVIII tank corps and two tank divisions, the 23rd and 24th, were transferred from Army Group A to Army Group B. They were soon followed by the 14th and 16th tank, 29th motorized divisions. The 8th Italian Army was also sent to Army Group B from the Donbass. In addition, the XI Army Corps of the 17th Army was withdrawn to the reserve of the main command and also sent in marching order to the Stalingrad direction. The offensive axes of Army Groups "A" and "B" finally diverged. Two almost independent battles began in two operational directions - for Stalingrad Wikipedia Wikipedia Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

Operation Blue

On June 1, 1942, a meeting was held in Poltava, attended by Adolf Hitler. The Fuhrer hardly mentioned Stalingrad, then it was just a city on the map for him. Hitler singled out the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus as a special task.

“If we do not capture Maykop and Grozny,” he said, “I will have to stop the war” “Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles”, S. Mitcham, Rusich, Smolensk, 1999, p.135. Operation Blau was to begin with the capture of Voronezh. Then it was planned to encircle the Soviet troops west of the Don, after which the 6th Army, developing the offensive against Stalingrad, ensured the security of the northeastern flank. It was assumed that the Caucasus was occupied by the 1st Panzer Army of Kleist and the 17th Army. The 11th army, after the capture of Sevastopol, was to go north.

Meanwhile, an event occurred that could undermine the success of the operation. On June 19, Major Reichel, officer of the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, flew out of the unit in a Fieseler-Storch light aircraft. In violation of all the rules, he took with him plans for the upcoming offensive. This plane was shot down, and the documents fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers. Here is how an eyewitness describes this event: “... one major with a briefcase jumped out of the Storch and, firing back, rushed to the forest. He was slapped. In his portfolio were the operational plans of the German command regarding the operation "Blau" "Barbarossa", V. Pikul, Military publications, Moscow, 1991, p.50. When Hitler found out about this, he was furious.

Ironically, Stalin, who was informed about the documents, did not believe them. He insisted that the Germans would strike the main blow at Moscow. Having learned that the commander of the Bryansk Front, General Golikov, in whose sector the main actions were to unfold, considers the documents authentic, Stalin ordered him to draw up a plan for a preventive offensive in order to liberate Orel.

On June 28, 1942, the 2nd Army and the 4th Tank Army launched an offensive in the Voronezh direction, and not at all in the Oryol-Moscow direction, as Stalin assumed. Luftwaffe aircraft dominated the air, and Hoth's tank divisions entered the operational space.

But their advance was not calm. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command came to the conclusion that Voronezh should be defended to the end.

On July 3, 1942, Adolf Hitler again arrived in Poltava for consultations with Field Marshal von Bock. At the end of the meeting, Hitler made a fatal decision - he ordered von Bock to continue the attack on Voronezh, leaving one tank corps there, and sent all the rest of the tank formations south to Goth.

By this time, Timoshenko began to conduct a more flexible defense, avoiding encirclement. From Voronezh, the Red Army began to pay more attention to the defense of cities. On July 12, 1942, the Stalingrad Front was organized by a special directive of the Stavka. The 10th NKVD Rifle Division was quickly transferred from the Urals and Siberia. All the flying units of the NKVD, police battalions, two training tank battalions and railway troops passed into its subordination.

In July, Hitler became again impatient with delays. Tanks stopped - there was not enough fuel. The Fuhrer became even more convinced of the need for the fastest capture of the Caucasus. This set him on a fatal step. The main idea of ​​the operation "Blau" was the offensive of the 6th and 4th tank armies to Stalingrad, and then the offensive to Rostov-on-Don with a general offensive to the Caucasus. Against the advice of Halder, Hitler redirected the 4th Panzer Army to the south and took from the 6th Army

40th Panzer Corps, which immediately slowed down the attack on Stalingrad. Moreover, the Fuhrer divided the Army Group "South" into group "A" - the attack on the Caucasus, and into group "B" - the attack on Stalingrad. Bock was dismissed, accused of failures near Voronezh.

On July 23, 1942, Hitler issued Directive No. 45, effectively canceling the entire operation "Blau". The 6th Army was to capture Stalingrad, and after its capture, send all motorized units to the south and develop an offensive along the Volga to Astrakhan and further, up to the Caspian Sea. Army Group "A" under the command of Field Marshal List was to occupy the eastern coast of the Black Sea and capture the Caucasus. Upon receiving this order, List suggested that Hitler had some kind of supernova intelligence.

At the same time, Manstein's 11th Army was heading to the Leningrad region, and the SS Panzer Divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Grossdeutschland" were sent to France. Instead of the departed units, the command put the armies of the allies - the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians.

German tank and motorized divisions continued to move towards the Volga, and Stalingrad was already waiting for them ahead ...

Operation "Blau" (Documentary film "Battle of Stalingrad").

Operation "Blau" (Documentary film "Battle of Stalingrad").

In the spring of 1942, after the winter counter-offensive of the Red Army, a lull settled on most of the Soviet-German front. The parties were intensively preparing for summer battles. Enterprises of the Soviet military industry, transferred to the east at the end of 1941, under difficult conditions, increased the production of modernized or new types of weapons. Thus, the production of field and anti-tank artillery increased by 2 and 4 times, respectively, machine guns - by 6, tanks - 2.3 times. By May, the Red Army had 5.1 million men, 49,900 guns and mortars, 3,900 tanks, and 2,200 aircraft. Taking into account the sad experience of the beginning of the war and the past battles, the Soviet military leadership began to transform the organizational structure of the troops: tank corps and air armies were formed, the principles of field tactics and combat training at the battalion-regiment-division link were revised, operational management and work of headquarters at all levels were improved.

The defeat suffered by the German army near Moscow in December 1941 created a favorable environment for strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA, but our allies were in no hurry to launch military operations in Europe and preferred to help from across the ocean. German intelligence learned that the second front would not be opened in 1942, and this allowed the Germans to constantly increase the number of divisions by eastern front: in June from 174 to 243, and by November to 266. By the beginning of the summer of 1942, Germany on the eastern front had (together with its allies) 6.2 million people, 57,000 guns and mortars, 3,300 tanks and assault guns, 3,400 aircraft. Mobilizing the economy of the occupied countries, the Germans also increased the production of weapons, but lagged behind in terms of the pace and quantity of production, and in 1942 there was already an advantage in favor of the Soviet rear. The organizational structure of the German mobile troops, the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, was also improved. In tank divisions, obsolete and unsuitable for Russian light tanks were removed from service, and long-barreled guns with a caliber of 50 and 75 mm were installed on medium Pz.III and Pz.IV. An 88-mm anti-aircraft battalion was included in the staff of the "panzer division", and a fourth company was added to the tank battalions. They also made changes to the states of infantry and motorized units. For example, the number of submachine gunners was increased in infantry companies.

Superiority in manpower and means still remained on the side of the German troops. Their tank division, which included two regiments of motorized infantry, tank and artillery regiments and a reconnaissance battalion, consisted of 210 tanks, more than 200 guns and mortars, 50 armored vehicles and was equal in power to the Soviet tank corps. Our rifle armies usually had 4-5 divisions, while in the German army there were 4 corps of 3-4 divisions each. Our army was equal in composition to the German corps, inferior to it in numbers and weapons. In addition, the quality of Soviet weapons was often inferior to German, and new superior models, such as T-34 or KV tanks, were not always used skillfully. In terms of operational and tactical capabilities, the Soviet troops were still inferior to the Wehrmacht. There was a shortage of qualified personnel.

When planning military operations for the summer of 1942, there was no unity of opinion in the top Soviet leadership. JV Stalin assumed that the Germans would be able to conduct major offensive operations in two strategic directions, most likely in Moscow and in the south - and he was very afraid for Moscow, since the enemy held more than 70 divisions here. Therefore, Stalin believed, the Soviet troops, who did not yet have the strength for a major offensive, should limit themselves to strategic defense, but simultaneously carry out five to six private operations: in the Crimea, in the Lvov-Kursk and Smolensk directions, as well as in the regions of Kharkov, Demyansk and Leningrad . The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, sharing Stalin's opinion in principle, proposed limiting himself to only tough defense. Fearing an attack on Moscow from the west and bypassing it from the south of Orel-Tula and Kursk-Voronezh, Shaposhnikov proposed concentrating the main reserves of the Headquarters in the center and partly in the Bryansk Front. Army General G.K. Zhukov, agreeing with Stalin’s operational forecasts and Shaposhnikov’s opinion, also proposed limiting himself to defense, but believed that one offensive front-line operation still needed to be carried out - to defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, which would force the Germans to abandon large offensives. In the south, Zhukov hoped to meet the Germans with air strikes, powerful artillery fire, wear him down with a stubborn defense, and then go on the offensive. Marshal S. K. Timoshenko believed that it was necessary to deliver a strong preemptive strike by the forces of the South-Western (SWF) and Southern Fronts (Southern Front) in the direction of Kharkov and further to the Dnieper line, which would frustrate the enemy’s plans on the entire southern wing. Stalingrad, as a rear city, was not even mentioned in all these plans.

In March, a GKO meeting was held, at which the complex and controversial issue of strategic planning for 1942 was once again discussed. The arguments and objections of Shaposhnikov and Zhukov were dismissed by Stalin, who stated:

We can't just sit back and wait for the Germans to strike first! We must ourselves launch a number of preemptive strikes on a broad front and test the readiness of the enemy. Zhukov proposes to launch an offensive in the western direction, and defend in the rest. I think it's a half measure.

Thus, the decision was made: "strategic defense with several major offensives." The duality of this decision inevitably predetermined the dispersion of forces and reserves. Soviet intelligence was unable to timely reveal the intentions and concentration of the main enemy groupings. The headquarters assumed that the enemy would try to break through around Moscow from the southeast through the Bryansk Front, therefore, to the detriment of the south, it strengthened the flank of the central direction, especially the Oryol-Tula one. It was here that large forces were sent. In June, the Bryansk Front received only in its reserve 5 tank corps, 4 tank brigades, 4 divisions, 2 cavalry corps, several artillery regiments. The first formed Soviet 5th tank army was also located here. Due to an incorrect assessment of the situation, the reserves and forces of the parry were at the decisive moment far away from the main attack of the enemy.

In the German top leadership, the idea and plan for the summer campaign also became the subject of discussion. Field Marshal Rundtstedt, mindful of the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow, advocated the transition to strategic defense, up to the withdrawal and consolidation on the Soviet-Polish border. Chief of the General Staff F. Halder - for the resumption of the offensive against Moscow, but on condition that the Russians will be the first to show the initiative. The chief of operations, Heusinger, strongly advocated a broad offensive. Keitel and Jodl shared Hitler's position, knowing that even after the collapse of the blitzkrieg in 1941, he did not abandon the main goal - the crushing of the USSR as a state. And for this it was necessary not only to defeat the Soviet armies, but also to undermine their economic basis. Therefore, limited options, such as "fixing east of the Dnieper" or "holding the manganese mines near Nikopol", etc., developed under the painful impression of the Moscow defeats, were rejected. Hitler outlined the new plan and plan of the top German leadership in Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942: “the main task is to achieve a breakthrough on the southern flank to the Caucasus on the southern flank ... Therefore, all available forces must be concentrated for carrying out an operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy on this side of the Don, in order to then capture the oil regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge ... "The Directive also mentioned Stalingrad, but only as the final point of an auxiliary covering strike:" try to reach Stalingrad or, according to at least expose it to heavy weapons so that it loses its importance as a center of military industry and a communications center.

The German plan for the 1942 summer campaign of the year provided for four consecutive “stepwise” operations (Scheme 1):

Breakthrough of the 2nd field and 4th tank armies to Voronezh and the capture of the city.

The encirclement of the Russians at Korotoyak and Ostashkov and Voronezh by turning the 4th Tank Army and at the same time the breakthrough of the 6th Field Army to the Don.

The blow of the 6th field army from Voronezh to the south to Stalingrad and the creation of a defense line along the banks of the Don. At the same time, from the south, through the mouth of the Don, a breakthrough by the forces of the 1st Panzer Army to Stalingrad and the encirclement of the remnants of Russian troops in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. After intercepting the Volga line from Stalingrad to Astrakhan, having covered ourselves with defenses from the north, turning all available forces to the Caucasus and attacking Mozdok - Grozny, and further to Baku.

For the implementation of the plan, 900 thousand people, 1200 tanks, over 17 thousand guns and mortars, 1700 aircraft, i.e., were allocated. more than one third of the forces and means. For the purposes of operational leadership, Army Group South was divided into two commands: Group A (17th and 11th field, 1st Tank Armies - Field Marshal V. List) and Group B (4th tank, 2nd and 6th German field and 2nd Hungarian armies - Field Marshal F. von Bock, then Weichs).

The plan was based on the idea of ​​a "blitzkrieg" characteristic of the German military doctrine, only modernized to the size of one "all-destroying" lightning campaign. Compared with 1941, the campaign plan was limited to the scale of only the southern wing of the eastern front, since Germany was no longer able to conduct an offensive in all directions in 1942.

According to the plan of the German strategists, the capture of the Caucasus and the most important economic regions of Ukraine, the Don, Kuban, as well as the interception of the Volga communications cut off the entire densely populated industrial south and put the Red Army and all of Russia in a hopeless situation. In addition, according to a more distant plan, the successful implementation of this plan subsequently allowed German groups to easily move north, up the Volga to Saratov, Kuibyshev (Samara) and beyond, and create conditions for an attack on Moscow from the Kursk-Orel region with a simultaneous strike on it from the west (scheme 2). Thus, the main military and political goals of the war were achieved.

The main calculation was made on the use of tank and motorized groups with strong air cover. For the operations, the flat southern Russian steppes near the Don and the Volga were deliberately chosen, as convenient as possible for the use of tanks and motorized units and having almost no natural boundaries for organizing anti-tank defense. It is likely that this plan was based on one of the options for an attack on the USSR, developed back in July 1940. At that time, the chief of staff of the 18th Army major general Erich Marx, based on the Naguderian concept of a deep tank breakthrough, proposed creating one powerful strike group against the southern flank of the western border of the USSR, which was supposed to break through Ukraine to the Donbass (the bend of the Don), and from there, turning sharply to the north, strike through the Orel-Voronezh regions on Moscow, and along the Volga - to Gorky. Marx's version was rejected. He preferred the option of General Paulus, known as the "Barbarossa" plan. But, acting in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the Germans in 1941 did not achieve their main goals. Perhaps that is why the ideas of E. Marx were again in demand by the summer of 1942, especially since the German troops had already captured the whole of Ukraine and were stationed 50 km from the mouth of the Don.

Paying tribute to the German General Staff officers, we note that the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 was seriously thought out and had an effective calculation. And yet, the seal of duality lay on it from the very beginning. German strategists tried to combine economic and far-reaching military goals. The capture of the Caucasus and the lower reaches of the Volga to Astrakhan, initially laid the foundation for the inevitable division of the offensive into two sharply divergent directions. At the same time, the Germans clearly overestimated their strength and underestimated the capabilities of the enemy.

What happened next is beautifully reflected in documentary series "The Great War" - "Battle of Stalingrad"

At the beginning of 1942, Berlin was planning another major offensive in Russia - Operation Blau. Its main goal was the Caucasian oil, and then the oil fields of Iran and Iraq, from where it was supposed to open the way to India. Economic experts told Hitler that Germany could not continue the war without access to Russian oil, and the Fuhrer was in full agreement with them. At the same time, he wanted to strike at the heart of the Russian war economy. Deprived of the oil needed for the army and agriculture, Russia will not be able to survive the war. Hitler believed that Soviet Union spends his last human reserves on protecting oil fields, after which victory will go to him. Germany created a special brigade for the technical maintenance of oil fields, the number of which amounted to 15 thousand people. Its task is the restoration and operation of the Russian oil industry. The only thing left for Germany to do on the way to Russian oil was to seize it.
By the end of July 1942, when Rostov was taken and the route for oil supplies from the Caucasus was blocked, it seemed that the German armies were on the right track. On August 9, they reached Maykop, the westernmost of the Caucasian oil centers, small in terms of reserves, the productivity of which, even under normal conditions, did not exceed a tenth of the Baku fields. In addition, before the retreat from Maikop, the Russians so thoroughly destroyed the oil fields with all supplies and equipment, down to small devices, that by January 1943 the Germans were able to somehow produce no more than 70 barrels a day there.
Nevertheless, the Germans continued to advance, now thousands of miles from their homeland and from supply centers. In mid-August, German mountain infantry units planted a flag with a swastika on top of Mount Elbrus, the highest point in the Caucasus and all of Europe. But the German war machine stalled, never reaching its goals. Her armies were blocked in the mountain passes, and their advance stopped due to lack of fuel. To fight the war in Russia, the German forces needed huge supplies of oil, but they were far ahead of their supply lines and lost the advantage of speed and surprise. The bitter irony was that the Germans, approaching oil, experienced an increasing lack of it.
They seized the Russian fuel reserves, just as they had seized the French, but this time it did not help them. Russian tanks used diesel fuel, which was not suitable for German ones. Sometimes the German tank divisions in the Caucasus had to stand idle for several days waiting for fuel supplies. The trucks carrying the fuel also failed to keep up, because they, in turn, were also running out of fuel. Finally in despair

The Germans tried to use camels to transport fuel. By November 1942, the last attempts of the Germans to break through the mountain passes to Grozny and Baku were finally repulsed.
The city of Stalingrad, located north of the Caucasus, was not the main target in the German offensive. But from the very beginning, the name of the city, symbolic for both sides, determined its fate. It became the scene of a titanic decisive battle in the winter of 1942-1943. Again and again the Germans were plagued by supply disruptions, including fuel shortages. General Heinz Guderian, a legendary tank commander, wrote to his wife from the Stalingrad front: "The piercing cold, the lack of shelters, uniforms, heavy losses in people and equipment, the terrible situation with fuel supplies, all this makes the performance of the duties of a commander into torment."
More than a year later, a turning point in the course of the war finally came, and the Germans were forced to go on the defensive. During a late-night telephone conversation with Hitler, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein begged the Fuhrer to reassign the German troops in the Caucasus to him and transfer them to help the 6th Army, bogged down near Stalingrad. "It's a matter of capturing Baku, field marshal," the dictator answered. "If we don't get Baku oil, the war is lost."
Hitler then moved on to talk about the importance of oil for warfare. He repeated himself over and over again, but he could not stop. "If I can't provide you with more fuel for your operations, Field Marshal, there's nothing you can do."
Manstein tried to stop the flow of eloquence, tried to prove that troops were needed to solve urgent problems. strategic objective- rescue of the 6th army. Hitler didn't listen. Instead, he went on to explain how the German armies would meet in the Middle East: "Then we will jointly attack India, where we will secure our final victory over England. Good night, heil, field marshal!" - "Heil, mein Fuhrer!" was all Manstein could say.
Despite Hitler's enthusiasm, in January 1943 the German soldiers were ordered to retreat. But it was no longer possible to help the 6th Army. Surrounded by Soviet troops, she fell into a trap and could not escape from the encirclement. The tanks had only enough fuel for twenty miles, and to break through it was necessary to cover a distance of thirty miles. So in late January - early February 1943, surrounded by German troops, exhausted and exhausted, frozen, hungry, having lost most of their vehicles - capitul and roval and.
Stalingrad was Germany's first major defeat in Europe, and it sent Hitler into a state of uncontrollable rage. The Fuhrer's soldiers were supposed to die, but not to surrender. And they were no longer on the offensive. The blitzkrieg phase is over. From now until the end of the war, the decisive factor will not be lightning offensives, but human and economic resources - including fuel. On the eastern front, despite occasional defeats, the Soviets would push inexorably forward, pushing the Germans out of the occupied territory and moving inexorably closer to their ultimate goal, Berlin.

More on the topic OPERATION "BLOW":

1. ACCOUNTING OF CASH OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND OPERATIONS ON CURRENCY ACCOUNT
2. CHAPTER 5. Audit of operations with cash and securities. Checking the correctness of settlement and credit operations
3. Current foreign exchange transactions and foreign exchange transactions related to the movement of capital.
4. 15.1.8. Features of determining the tax base, calculating and paying tax on income from transactions with securities and transactions with financial instruments of futures transactions, the underlying asset for which are securities