Operation "Blau" (Documentary film "Battle of Stalingrad"). Beginning of Operation Blau German Maps of Operation Blau 1942

Operation Blue

On June 1, 1942, a meeting was held in Poltava, attended by Adolf Hitler. The Fuhrer hardly mentioned Stalingrad, then it was just a city on the map for him. Hitler singled out the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus as a special task.

“If we do not capture Maykop and Grozny,” he said, “I will have to stop the war” “Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles”, S. Mitcham, Rusich, Smolensk, 1999, p.135. Operation Blau was to begin with the capture of Voronezh. Then it was planned to encircle the Soviet troops west of the Don, after which the 6th Army, developing the offensive against Stalingrad, ensured the security of the northeastern flank. It was assumed that the Caucasus was occupied by the 1st Panzer Army of Kleist and the 17th Army. The 11th army, after the capture of Sevastopol, was to go north.

Meanwhile, an event occurred that could undermine the success of the operation. On June 19, Major Reichel, officer of the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, flew out of the unit in a Fieseler-Storch light aircraft. In violation of all the rules, he took with him plans for the upcoming offensive. This plane was shot down, and the documents fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers. Here is how an eyewitness describes this event: “... one major with a briefcase jumped out of the Storch and, firing back, rushed to the forest. He was slapped. In his portfolio were the operational plans of the German command regarding the operation "Blau" "Barbarossa", V. Pikul, Military publications, Moscow, 1991, p.50. When Hitler found out about this, he was furious.

Ironically, Stalin, who was informed about the documents, did not believe them. He insisted that the Germans would strike the main blow at Moscow. Having learned that the commander of the Bryansk Front, General Golikov, in whose sector the main actions were to unfold, considers the documents authentic, Stalin ordered him to draw up a plan for a preventive offensive in order to liberate Orel.

But their advance was not calm. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command came to the conclusion that Voronezh should be defended to the end.

On July 3, 1942, Adolf Hitler again arrived in Poltava for consultations with Field Marshal von Bock. At the end of the meeting, Hitler made a fatal decision - he ordered von Bock to continue the offensive on Voronezh, leaving one tank corps there, and sent all the other tank formations south to Goth.

By this time, Timoshenko began to conduct a more flexible defense, avoiding encirclement. From Voronezh, the Red Army began to pay more attention to the defense of cities. On July 12, 1942, the Stalingrad Front was organized by a special directive of the Stavka. The 10th NKVD Rifle Division was quickly transferred from the Urals and Siberia. All the flying units of the NKVD, police battalions, two training tank battalions and railway troops came under its control.

40th Panzer Corps, which immediately slowed down the attack on Stalingrad. Moreover, the Fuhrer divided Army Group South into Group A - the attack on the Caucasus, and Group B - the attack on Stalingrad. Bock was dismissed, accused of failures near Voronezh.

On July 23, 1942, Hitler issued Directive No. 45, effectively canceling the entire operation "Blau". The 6th Army was to capture Stalingrad, and after its capture, send all motorized units to the south and develop an offensive along the Volga to Astrakhan and further, up to the Caspian Sea. Army Group A, under the command of Field Marshal List, was to occupy the eastern coast of the Black Sea and capture the Caucasus. Upon receiving this order, List suggested that Hitler had some kind of supernova intelligence.

At the same time, Manstein's 11th Army was heading to the Leningrad region, and the SS Panzer Divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Grossdeutschland" were sent to France. Instead of the departed units, the command put the armies of the allies - the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians.

German tank and motorized divisions continued to move towards the Volga, and Stalingrad was already waiting for them ahead ...

#war #voronezh #history

Operation "Blau" was supposed to begin with the capture of Voronezh by the army group "Weichs". Then it was planned to encircle the Soviet troops west of the Don, after which the 6th Army, developing an offensive against Stalingrad, ensured the security of the northeastern flank. The Caucasus was supposed to be occupied by the 1st Panzer and 17th armies.

To carry out the operation, a number of organizational measures had to be carried out. Since there were not enough forces and there were no reserves, in order to provide Operation Blau with people and equipment, the German command had to reduce 69 (out of 77) infantry divisions of the Army Groups North and Center. They left two battalions per regiment (there are six in total in the division). Armored vehicles were not supplied to the tank divisions that did not participate in the offensive in the south; the existing tanks of the division were to equip only one battalion and wait for receipts. The motorized infantry divisions did not receive their tanks either. All tanks and assault guns of new modifications were sent only to the southern sector of the front.

However, it was not possible to fully equip the divisions intended for the offensive. There were also no reserves of manpower and equipment to replenish the troops during the offensive. The troops had to rely only on the available forces.

Table Distribution of Wehrmacht and Allied forces on the Eastern Front by June 28, 1942.

army group

Infantry divisions

Mountain and light infantry divisions

Motorized infantry and mobile divisions

Allied cavalry divisions

Panzer divisions

Security divisions

Total divisions

Allies

German

Allies

German

Allies

German

Allies

German

Allies

Finland

German

On the section from Belev to the upper reaches of the Seim River on a section of 350 km, there were troops of the Bryansk Front under the command of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov. The front included:

3rd Army under the command of General P.P. Korzun, consisting of the 60th, 137th, 240th, 269th, 283rd, 287th rifle divisions, 104th, 134th rifle and 79th, 150th tank brigades.

48th Army under the command of Major General P.A. Khalyuzin, consisting of the 6th Guards, 8th, 211th, 280th Rifle and 55th Cavalry Divisions, 118th, 122nd Rifle and 80th, 202nd tank brigades.

The 13th Army under the command of General N.P. Pukhov, consisting of the 15th, 132nd, 143rd, 148th, 307th rifle divisions, the 109th rifle and 129th tank brigades.

40th Army under the command of Lieutenant General M.A. Parsegov, consisting of the 6th, 45th, 62nd, 121st, 160th, 212th rifle divisions, 111th, 119th and the 141st rifle, 14th, 170th tank brigades.

The 1st (1st guards, 49th, 89th tank, 1st motorized rifle brigades), 16th, (107th, 109th, 164th tank, 15th motorized rifle brigade) tank, 7th (11th, 17th, 83rd cavalry divisions), 8th cavalry corps (21st, 112th cavalry divisions), 1st guards, 284th rifle and the 2nd Fighter Division, 106th, 135th Rifle, 118th, 157th, 20th Tank Brigades.

2nd Air Army consisting of the 205th, 207th, 266th Fighter, 225th, 227th, 267th Assault, 208th Night Bomber, 223rd Bomber Air Divisions.

In the front line were the reserves of the Headquarters:

The 5th tank army under the command of General A.I. Lizyukov, consisting of the 2nd (26th, 27th, 148th tank, 2nd motorized rifle brigades) and 11th (53rd, I, 160th tank, 12th motorized rifle brigades) tank corps and 17th (66th, 67th, 174th tank, 31st motorized rifle brigades) tank corps.

The troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew to the Oskol River and were on the 300-kilometer line from the headwaters of the Seim to the Red Liman.

The front included:

21st Army consisting of the 76th, 124th, 226th, 227th, 293rd, 297th, 301st, 343rd Rifle Divisions and the 8th NKVD Rifle Division, 13th tank corps (85th, 167th tank, 20th motorized rifle brigades), 10th tank brigade.

28th Army as part of the 13th and 15th Guards, 38th, 169th, 175th Rifle Divisions, 23rd Tank Corps (6th Guards, 114th Tank, 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade ), 65th, 90th and 91st tank brigades.

38th Army consisting of the 162nd, 199th, 242nd, 277th, 278th, 304th rifle divisions, 22nd tank corps (3rd, 13th, 36th tank brigades), 133rd, 156th, 159th, 168th tank, 22nd motorized rifle brigades.

9th Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Lopatin, as part of the 51st, 81st, 106th, 140th, 255th, 296th, 318th and 333rd rifle divisions, 5th cavalry corps (30th, 34th I and the 60th cavalry divisions), 18th, 19th fighter and 12th tank brigades, 71st, 132nd separate tank battalions.

The 57th Army had only 5 engineer battalions under its command.

The 8th Air Army included the 206th, 220th, 235th, 268th, 269th fighter, 226th, 228th assault, 221st, 270th bomber, 271st, 272 th night bomber air divisions.

The 9th Guards, 103rd, 244th, 300th Rifle and 1st Fighter Divisions, 3rd Guards Cavalry (5th and 6th, 32nd Cavalry Divisions), 4 th (45th, 47th, 102nd tank, 4th motorized rifle brigades), 14th (138th, 139th tank brigades) and 24th (4th guards, 54th , 130th tank, 24th motorized rifle brigade) tank corps, 11th, 13th, 15th fighter, 57th, 58th, 84th, 88th, 158th tank, 21 -I motorized rifle brigades, 52nd, 53rd, 74th, 117th and 118th URs (total 32 machine gun and artillery battalions).

The southern front under the command of Lieutenant General R. Ya. Malinovsky was located at the turn of Krasny Liman, 30 km west of Voroshilovsk, 20 km east of Taganrog.

The front included:

The 37th Army, which included the 102nd, 218th, 230th, 275th, 295th rifle divisions, and the 121st tank brigade.

12th Army, consisting of the 4th, 74th, 176th, 261st, 349th rifle divisions.

18th Army consisting of the 216th, 353rd, 383rd, 395th Rifle Divisions, 64th Tank Brigade.

56th Army, which included the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps (2nd Guards Rifle Division, 68th, 76th, 81st Marine Rifle Brigades), 30th, 31st, 339th rifle divisions, the 16th rifle and 63rd tank brigades, the 70th and 158th UR, defended Rostov.

The 4th Air Army included the 216th, 217th Fighter, 230th Assault, 219th Bomber, and 218th Night Bomber Divisions.

The 24th Army was in reserve, consisting of the 73rd, 228th, 335th, 341st rifle divisions.

In frontal subordination - the 347th rifle division, the 5th guards, 15th, 140th tank brigades, the 62nd, 75th separate tank battalions.

On the eastern coast of the Azov and Black Seas were the troops of the North Caucasian Front, which included 3 armies 15 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions, 11 rifle, 1 motorized rifle and 3 tank brigades, 5 air divisions.

Despite the fact that since May 24 the troops of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts went over to the defensive, they continued to prepare for the offensive. The troops of the Bryansk Front continued to prepare an offensive operation to defeat the Oryol group, and then the Kursk group German troops. The Southwestern Front was preparing a new offensive operation in the Volchansk direction. The troops did not prepare defensive lines, reserves were not created in the depths of the defense, the troops of the fronts were located in one echelon.

against three Soviet fronts the main forces of the Army Group "South" were operating.

In the Voronezh direction, the Weichs army group operated as part of the 2nd and 4th German tank and 2nd Hungarian armies, under the command of Colonel General Weichs. The group consisted of 14 infantry, 4 tank and 3 motorized infantry divisions.

The main blow was dealt by the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Colonel-General Goth, at the junction of the 40th and 13th armies, where the German command concentrated three tank divisions against three Soviet rifle divisions (11th, 9th , 24th), motorized infantry ("Gross Germany") and two infantry (387th, 385th) divisions.

In the center of the German front was the 6th Army under the command of General of the Panzer Troops Paulus. The army consisted of 17 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorized infantry divisions. The main forces of the army, the 8th army (305th, 376th, 389th infantry divisions) and the 40th motorized (3rd and 23rd tank and 29th motorized infantry divisions) corps were concentrated on a 15-kilometer sector on the left flank of the 21st Army.

Against the 37th Army of the Southern Front, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army of Colonel General Kleist were concentrated, 3 tank (14th, 16th, 22nd), 1 motorized infantry (60th), 2 infantry (295th I, 76th), 1 mountain infantry (1st) division.

The 17th Army, which was on the left flank under the command of Colonel General Ruoff, was supposed to strike in the Voroshilovograd direction with the forces of the 49th and 52nd army corps (3 infantry and mountain infantry divisions) and in the Rostov direction with the forces of the 57th motorized corps ( 13th Panzer Division and SS Viking Division).

German troops were concentrated in separate strike groups in narrow areas, thanks to which it was possible to create an overwhelming advantage in the directions of the main attack over the Soviet troops stretched in a line.

Air support was to be carried out by the main forces of the 4th Air Fleet $ / In addition to the 8th Air Corps located in the Crimea. $ under the command of Colonel General Richthofen, as part of the 3rd and 52nd Fighter Squadrons, 1st and 2nd 1st squadron of heavy fighters, 1st squadron of attack aircraft, 2nd squadron of dive bombers, 27th, 55th and 76th bomber squadrons, a total of 701 serviceable aircraft.

On June 28, 1942, the troops of the 2nd and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht launched an offensive in the Voronezh direction, at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies.

The defense of the Soviet troops was broken through to a depth of 10-12 km, mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough, in two days the 24th Panzer Division and the Great Germany motorized infantry division advanced 35 km, and reached the line railway Castor oil - Stary Oskol. A group of tanks went to the command post of the 40th Army. Part of the headquarters moved to Kastornoye, command of the troops of the 40th Army was lost. To the north, in the direction of Livny, the 55th Army Corps of the 2nd Army advanced.

By decision of the Stavka, the 4th and 24th tank corps were advanced from the Southwestern Front to the Stary Oskol region, and the 17th tank corps was advanced to the Kastornoye region. 4 fighter and 3 assault air regiments were additionally transferred to the 2nd Air Army of the Bryansk Front.

On June 29, on the Kishen River in the Volovo area, the 16th Panzer Corps collided with advanced German units, hull losses up to 15% of combat vehicles, German losses of 18 tanks. Attempts the next day to attack the German troops who crossed the Kishen River came to nothing.

The 1st and 16th tank corps were supposed to strike at the German troops from the Livny area, from the Gorshechnoye area the 4th, 24th and 17th, which were combined into an operational group under the command of the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, General - Lieutenant Ya.N. Fedorenko. The actions of the ground forces were to be supported by the entire aviation of the Bryansk Front.

Tank battles in the interfluve of Kshen and Olym, where the 1st and 16th tank corps operated, continued until July 7, but they failed to complete the task of defeating the German group. There was no aviation and artillery support for the tank units, there was no coordination of the actions of the corps, the troops were brought into battle at different times, and reconnaissance was poorly organized. Tanks operated in small groups, strike big amount tanks failed. The corps suffered heavy losses (by July 3, only 50 tanks remained in the 16th tank corps).

On June 30, the 4th Panzer Corps, having gone on the offensive from the Stary Oskol region, reached Gorshechnoye by the end of the day, but the blow was not supported and did not receive development.

The 17th Panzer Corps, which had reached the Kastornoye area by June 30, collided with units of the "Grossdeutschland" division and, after a battle in which it suffered heavy losses, withdrew. On July 1, German units occupied Kulevka, cutting the 17th Corps into two parts, part of the forces, together with the 102nd Tank Brigade of the 4th Corps, were surrounded (only on July 3 the remnants of the brigades broke through to their own). The direction to Voronezh turned out to be open. On the same day, the Headquarters ordered the arrest of the commander of the 17th tank corps, Major General N.V. Feklenko $ / He remained at large and soon assumed the post of head of the Stalingrad armored training center. On July 2, German units crushed the troops of the 17th Corps (38 tanks remained - 10 KV, 11 T-34, 17 T-60) and broke through to the Don near Verkhne-Turovo. The remnants of the 17th corps withdrew beyond the Don (in the following days, the corps, which suffered losses, received 44 T-34 tanks).

The 24th Panzer Corps entered the battle on July 2 with the advanced units of the 48th Motorized Corps (before that, the corps, receiving conflicting orders, made long marches, which led to significant wear and tear of equipment). Bearing losses, the corps retreated to the Don. On July 6, the corps went to the Uryv area (15 KV, 30 T-34, 22 T-60, 17 M3l remained serviceable), where they took up defense. The corps fought in this area until the end of July (42 serviceable tanks remained on July 25 - 7 T-34, 31 T-60 and 3 M3l)

In the very first days of the German offensive, the Soviet command tried to launch counterattacks with significant tank forces. There was a significant superiority in forces, due to the tank corps prepared for the offensive in the Oryol direction, but nevertheless, it was not possible to stop the German mobile formations. Soviet tank corps were brought into battle not coordinated and not simultaneously. The command did not have a stable connection with the corps, the fragmentary information received was contradictory, and there was usually no information about the enemy. Instead of creating a powerful strike force and destroying the 48th German motorized corps with one blow, all tank units were brought into battle as they arrived, as a result of which it was not possible to create superiority in forces.

The Germans continued to use the old tactics that brought them success throughout the war. When Soviet tanks appeared, German tankers tried not to engage in battle, anti-tank artillery units moved forward and aviation was called. As a result, Soviet tanks attacking head-on (the Soviet troops failed to maneuver on the battlefield) suffered significant losses. A significant advantage of the Germans was in well-organized reconnaissance, primarily aviation, which always allowed them to have time to take up defense in a tank-dangerous direction. The same reconnaissance was the weak point of the Soviet troops, so the tank units fell into ambushes and encirclement. Even if aerial reconnaissance was carried out, its results could rarely be used due to poor communications, and more often its complete absence.

During the fighting, clashes of new German tanks with the Soviet T-34s, which showed the superiority of the former. However, despite this, the German tankers still tried not to engage in tank duels, leaving anti-tank artillery and aviation to deal with Soviet tanks.

On June 30, the 6th Army also went on the offensive from the Volchansk region to Ostrogozh. The defense at the junction of the 21st and 28th Soviet armies was broken through. The 40th motorized corps, introduced into the breach, began an offensive in the general direction of Stary Oskol. On the left flank of the German troops, at the junction of the Southwestern and Bryansk fronts, in the direction of Stary Oskol, the troops of the 2nd Hungarian Army launched an offensive.

For several days, the troops of the 21st and 28th armies with the forces of the 13th and 23rd tank corps, the 65th and 90th tank brigades tried to eliminate the breakthrough, but to no avail. The 13th tank corps (by June 30 had 180 tanks) suffered heavy losses already on the first day of fighting, the corps commander, Major General P.E. Shurov, was mortally wounded, the commanders of the 20th motorized rifle and 85th tank brigades were killed. The 21st and 28th armies withdrew to the line of Slonovka, Staroivanovka, but failed to hold the defense. An attempt to stop the German troops with a blow from the 23rd Panzer Corps failed. Due to the poor organization of the offensive and the lack of air and artillery support, the corps suffered heavy losses.

On July 3, troops of the 8th Army Corps met with Hungarian units in the Stary Oskol area. Part of the troops of the 21st and 40th armies fell into the encirclement, the control of which by that time had been completely lost. The commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General M.A. Parsegov, was removed from his post, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov was appointed in his place. On the same day, the 23rd Panzer Division of the 40th Corps crossed the Oskol River and launched an attack on Korotoyak.

On the Voronezh direction, German troops tried to take Kastornoye that day, but the 284th Rifle Division and the 111th and 119th Rifle Brigades held the line. However, the 11th Panzer Division from the north, and the 9th from the south bypassed Kastornoe.

To reinforce the troops of the Bryansk Front, the Headquarters decided to push the 3rd, 5th and 6th reserve armies (22 rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade) to the Don. Only the formed 5th Tank Army under the command of Major General A.I. Lizyukov was transferred to the Yelets area.

The 1st Fighter Aviation Army of the Headquarters reserve under the command of General E.M. Beletsky (231 serviceable aircraft) was redeployed to the same area. Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, was sent to the Bryansk Front.

The commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant-General F.I. Golikov, at the direction of the Headquarters, arrived in the Voronezh region to personally lead the fighting. At the same time, no instructions were left for the 5th Panzer Army and no decision was made on its further actions.

On July 4, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky arrived in the Yelets area, who gave the order to start the offensive of the 5th Panzer Army no later than July 5, without waiting for full concentration. The 7th Panzer Corps, transferred from Kalinin, was included in the army. The air group of Major General Vorozheikin was supposed to cover the troops of the 5th Tank Army.

On July 4, the advanced units of the 24th Panzer Division reached Voronezh. The defense of the city was carried out by the troops of the 75th UR (6 machine gun-artillery battalions), the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk air defense district (3rd air defense division, 746 anti-aircraft artillery regiment and 101st air defense fighter air division, 78 guns of 76-85 mm caliber, 64 guns 37-25 mm, up to 60 fighters) and parts of the NKVD. By July 4, units of the 18th Tank Corps (110th, 180th and 181st Tank, 18th Motorized Rifle Brigades) began to arrive under the command of Major General I.D. Chernyakhovsky.

On July 6, units of the 24th Panzer and 3rd Motorized Infantry Divisions occupied most of Voronezh. Hitler ordered not to occupy Voronezh with mobile formations, replacing them with infantry, and to turn the main forces of the 4th Panzer Army to the south, where the 40th Corps of the 6th Army reached the line of the Tikhaya Sosna River. On July 7, the 24th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division near Voronezh were relieved by infantry units and turned south.

On July 6, units of the 7th Panzer Corps of the 5th Panzer Army entered the battle with the German 11th Panzer Division. The next day, units of the 11th Panzer Corps approached and threw back the German units to the line of Perekopovka, Ozerki, Kamenka. By July 8, units of the 7th and 11th tank corps reached the Dry Vereika River. Further progress was stopped. Parts of the corps suffered huge losses from German aviation; Soviet aviation did not provide cover. The troops of the 5th Panzer Army fought until July 18, when the remnants of the army were withdrawn to the rear. As a result of the hasty introduction of the army into battle in parts, it was again not possible to create superiority in forces over the 11th and 9th German tank divisions, with which the army was fighting. The lack of air cover led to huge losses precisely from air strikes. However, two German tank divisions, constrained by battles with the 5th Panzer Army, were unable to take part in operations to encircle the troops of the Southwestern Front, which greatly violated the plans of the German command.

On July 7, the Voronezh Front was created as part of the 60th, 40th and 6th armies, the 2nd air army, the 4th, 17th, 18th and 24th tank corps. Lieutenant-General F.I. Golikov was appointed commander of the front. (Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front). The front was supposed to clear the eastern bank of the Don and take up a strong defense on this bank.

On the same day, units of the German 3rd Motorized Infantry Division captured crossings across the Don in the Podkletnaya area. The 110th and 180th tank brigades of the 18th tank corps were cut off (the bridges in Voronezh were blown up), having lost all the tanks, by July 9 the remnants of the brigades broke out of the encirclement. On July 10, the corps was withdrawn for resupplying.

On July 14, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front, and Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front.

During the offensive from June 28 to July 7, German troops managed to break through the defenses of the Red Army on a front of about 300 km and advance to a depth of 150-170 km, reaching the Don and deeply enveloping the troops of the Southwestern Front from the north.

The German command decided on July 7 to launch Operation Clausewitz: a strike from the north from the Ostrozhsk area by the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies $ / It is worth noting that some of the units of these armies were already advancing in the indicated direction $, and from the Artemovsk - 1st Panzer Army in general in the direction of Kantemirovka, in order to cover the South-Western Front.

On July 3, the command of the Southwestern Front, in order to prevent a German offensive behind the front from the north, decided to advance the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to the line of Alekseevka, Ostrogozhsk.

To create a defensive line on the Tikhaya Pine River, the 22nd Tank Corps, the 333rd Rifle and 1st Fighter Divisions, the 13th and 156th Tank Brigades were advanced from the 38th Army, from the 28th Army 199 -I rifle division, from the reserve of the front of the 52nd, 53rd and 117th URs. But before these troops could advance to the indicated lines, on July 6, the 17th Army and 40th Tank Corps of the 6th Army crossed the river.

Parts of the 28th Army, by that time, had retreated across the Chernaya Kalitva River. On July 7, troops of the 38th Army began to withdraw to the rear defensive line of the Nagolnaya - Rovenki - Kuryachevka - Belokurakino front. The indicated line was located 35-40 km east of the river. Oskol was occupied by units of the 118th UR.

On July 7, the 8th Army and 40th Motorized Corps occupied the city of Rossosh. The next morning they took over locality Olkhovatka and captured bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River. This created a threat to the rear of the left wing of the Southwestern Front. The 28th Army and the group of troops that retreated there under the command of Major General of Tank Forces E. G. Pushkin did not manage to organize defenses on the southern bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River and were forced to continue their retreat in a southeasterly direction. On July 7, the commander of the 28th Army gave the order to the 23rd Tank Corps to capture Rossosh. Fulfilling the order, the corps lost all remaining tanks and most of the personnel, but the command of the 28th Army, having no information, continued "to fight for Rossosh, with the forces of the 23rd Tank Corps." $ / According to many researchers, the leadership of 28 th Army (D.I. Ryabyshev and N.K. Popel), to put it mildly, are not among the most talented Soviet military leaders. It is not known how much the circumstances and actions of even higher authorities are to blame here, but it is worth recognizing that all operations carried out under the leadership of D.I. Ryabyshev ended in failure. $ On July 8, D.I. Ryabyshev was removed from command of the army. $ / N.K. Popel was also removed from his post. $, Major General V.D. Kryuchenkon took over the 28th Army. As a result of the withdrawal of the troops of the 28th Army, the gap between it and the 38th, which took up defensive positions at the Nagolnaya - Belokurakino line, increased. However, no order was given for the withdrawal of the 38th Army. Only on July 10 was it decided to withdraw the 38th army to the Pervomaisky - Novo-Streltsovka line. On July 12, communication between the front headquarters and the 38th Army was lost.

On July 8, the 17th Army (49th and 52nd Army Corps) launched an offensive from the Stalino-Artemovsk region in the direction of Voroshilovograd. The 1st Panzer Army (3rd and 14th Corps) from the area north of Lisichansk struck at the junction of the Southwestern and Southern fronts and, having broken through the defenses, began an attack on Starobelsk - Kantemirovka ..

The 40th Corps of the 6th Army, having launched an offensive in a southerly direction, by July 10 reached the Kantemirovka area. To the left of it, with difficulty (due to lack of fuel), units of the 24th Panzer Division and the "Grossdeutschland" division of the 4th Panzer Army advanced.

On July 9, the division of Army Group South was documented. The composition of Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal von Bock included the 2nd and 6th German, 2nd Hungarian, 8th Italian and the 3rd Romanian armies, which were in the process of formation. Army Group "A" under the command of Field Marshal List included the 1st and 4th tank and 17th armies.

The Soviet troops retreated, the troops did not have enough fuel and ammunition, command and control of the troops was constantly lost. Commander of the Southwestern Front Marshal Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, having left on July 6 for an auxiliary command post in Gorokhovka, while his entire headquarters left for Kalach, was left without communication, command and control at the front level was disrupted, Moscow did not know what was happening. Only on July 9 Tymoshenko arrived in Kalach.

The exit of German troops to the rear areas of the front forced aviation to relocate to distant airfields, as a result, the troops were left completely without air support, which even in best time did not stand up to criticism. The command tried to transfer the 57th Army to the Kantemirovka region, but this army did not have troops at its disposal, and the formations transferred to it did not have time to reach the indicated areas. After it became clear that the headquarters of the Southwestern Front had already completely lost control of the troops, the front headquarters was transferred to Stalingrad to receive new troops there, and on July 12 it was renamed Stalingrad. All armies (except the 21st) were transferred to the Southern Front.

On July 11, units of the 40th and 8th Army Corps of the 6th Army crossed the Novaya Kalitva River and reached the Bokovskaya-Degtevo line. By July 15, the troops of the 40th corps, now subordinate to the command of the 4th tank army, and the 16th tank and 60th motorized infantry divisions of the 24th corps of this army reached Millerov, Morozovsk, covering the 38th and 9th Soviet armies from the rear, at the same time, the 3rd and 14th Corps of the 1st Tank Army reached the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky area. To the east, the "Grossdeutschland" division, the 29th motorized infantry and the 24th tank did not meet the resistance of the Soviet troops (they simply were not there) rushed north to the Don.

On July 15, Hitler, dissatisfied with the actions of Field Marshal von Bock (in his opinion, he spent too much energy in the Voronezh region, and thereby diverted forces from the encirclement of Soviet troops in the south), appointed Colonel General Weichs as commander of Army Group B.

On July 16, by order of the Headquarters, the troops of the Southern Front began to withdraw beyond the Don. From July 12, the 28th, 38th and 9th armies of the Southwestern Front were subordinated to the front command, however, it was not possible to establish contact with the 28th and 38th armies (and the command of the armies had no connection with the troops ).

On July 17, troops of the 17th Army occupied Voroshilovograd, units of the 29th Motorized Infantry Division and the Great Germany Division of the 4th Panzer Army reached the Don east of the Donets mouth, but they failed to capture the bridgeheads.

At this time, the troops of the 6th German Army continued their offensive in the Stalingrad direction with the forces of three army corps (the 29th Army Corps was transferred near Voronezh). On July 17, the advanced units of the Germans reached the Chir River, where, in the areas of Pronin, Chernyshevsky, Chernyshkovsky and Tormosin, they collided with advanced detachments with advanced units of the 192nd, 33rd Guards, 147th, 196th Rifle Divisions, the newly created Stalingrad Front ..

As mentioned above, on July 12, the Stavka decided to create a new front in the Stalingrad direction. On the basis of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created, and Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko was appointed commander. The front was supposed to include the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from the Stavka reserve $ / The 7th reserve army was formed in the Stalingrad area, the 1st began to be transferred as early as July 6th. $, the 21st and 8th air armies of the Southwestern Front, and then the 28th, 37th and 57th armies that retreated into its lane. The front was supposed to take a line along the Don River from Pavlovsk to Kletskaya and further along the line Kletskaya - Surovikino - Suvorovsky - Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya.

By July 19, the troops of the Southern Front withdrew to the Sinegorsky, Zverevo, Dyakovo line, the sector in the Novoshakhtinsky area remained uncovered.

On July 20, the 3rd Motorized Corps of the 1st Tank Army, having crossed the Seversky Donets, struck in the direction of Novocherkassk, broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops, and on July 21 went to Rostov.

On the same day, the troops of the 57th Corps of the 17th Army (13th Panzer Division and the SS Viking Division) from the area north of Taganrog launched an attack on Rostov. On July 23, Rostov was abandoned by Soviet troops, the 56th army defending the city retreated beyond the Don. By the evening of July 25, the troops of the Southern Front occupied the line from the mouth of the Manycharsky Canal to Azov, on the left bank of the Don.

Thus, by mid-July, German troops broke through the front in a section of about 500 km, the depth of the breakthrough reached 150-400 km. According to German data, 88,689 prisoners were captured in the area west of the Don, 1,007 tanks and 1,688 guns were captured or destroyed. According to Soviet data, during June 28 - July 24, the troops of the Bryansk, Voronezh, South-Western, Southern Fronts and the Azov military flotilla lost 568,347 people killed and wounded, 2,436 tanks, 13,716 guns, 783 aircraft.

At the same time, it was not possible to completely encircle the troops of the Southern and Southwestern fronts, since a significant part of the Soviet troops managed to break out of the encirclement.

However, in general, the implementation of the plans of the German command could be considered successful. The Soviet Southwestern Front ceased to exist, and the road was opened (as it seemed to the German command) to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

However, the German command once again considered that the Red Army had suffered irreparable losses and would not be able to quickly rectify the situation. And once again they made a mistake - the resources of the Soviet Union were not exhausted. The remnants of formations and units were hastily restored, received marching reinforcements and equipment, and reserve armies were pulled together. New fronts were deployed - Voronezh and Stalingrad, the North Caucasian Front was deployed behind the Southern Front. Before the troops of the German groups "A" and "B" were Soviet troops no less numerous than at the beginning of operations "Blau".

On July 28, 1942, an order was issued People's Commissar Defense of the USSR No. 227. Although after the issuance of this order, the Soviet troops continued to retreat, in any case, the stability of the Red Army in defense increased. It should be noted that the barrier units in the Red Army existed even before that, they did not appear at all in July. And machine guns for "support" behind the attacking and defending units were placed a long time ago, and the fighters and commanders who left their positions were shot on the spot. Since July 1942, barrage detachments were introduced into all formations operating at the front.

The main shortcoming of the Red Army, which once again led it to huge losses, was, first of all, the unwillingness and inability of the leadership at all levels to defend themselves. If the German units, when Soviet tanks appeared, immediately took up defensive positions, pushing anti-tank weapons forward, and in all operational pauses built a strong defense, which the Soviet troops, as a rule, could not break through, then the Red Army recognized only the offensive. Although during this period a significant number of units intended for defense were created in the structure of the troops: machine-gun battalions of rifle formations, field URs, anti-tank units and formations, engineering formations, which should have made it possible to create defense very quickly, this did not change the picture . As in 1941, the Soviet command recognized only the offensive. And in the worst form, without any hint of maneuver, a frontal attack on a entrenched enemy, most often without the organization of artillery and air support.

All this was superimposed on the very poor training of personnel, both fighters and commanders at all levels. Conscientious commanders, for the most part, were able to raise fighters to attack, complex maneuvers and other fundamentals of tactics, if they were known and were not completely forgotten, they did not meet. The Germans are so accustomed to the monotonous tactics of the Red Army (with a shout of "hurrah", infantry and tanks attack machine guns and cannons head-on) that when Soviet commanders used at least some maneuver on the battlefield (there were such commanders), the results were achieved surprisingly easily, the Germans were often simply lost in surprise.

However, one can also understand the commanders, for some kind of maneuvers on the battlefield, trained personnel are needed. The rank and file, as a rule, did not know how to do a lot of things, for example, often the soldiers did not know how to shoot (even in the guards units, although this is not surprising - the same replenishment went to the guards divisions as to the ordinary ones). Many historians believe that this was due to the short time frame for the formation of compounds. But far from always, divisions and brigades were formed in a very short time, it was more an exception than a rule, and besides, there were spare parts, where, in fact, they had to learn a lot. However, the training of Soviet soldiers was most often at the lowest level. This is confirmed by many documents and memoirs of the participants. The quality of training of ordinary soldiers in the Soviet army can be judged by those who happened to serve in it (there was no difference between the 30s, 40s or 70s). The training of personnel was divided into three main components: combat, political and actual combat. The main attention has always been paid to drill training - firstly, it was the easiest way for the authorities to check this part of the training, and secondly, for commanders of all levels it was the most convenient form - you don’t have to go far, know, develop a commanding voice. Political preparation consisted in the reading by political workers of certain texts prepared by the relevant bodies, while the rest of the personnel had to listen. Although officially this part of the training was the main one, in reality it was in second place, after the drill. And, finally, combat training usually took the last place: it was too difficult and tiring, and even more important, the results can really be verified only in a combat situation. Of course, there have always been exceptions.

And more about aviation. German aviation in this, as in all previous operations, attacked the Soviet rear, supported its troops on the battlefield, destroying Soviet tanks and infantry. German fighters covered their bombers from the attacks of Soviet fighters, covered their troops from the attacks of Soviet attack aircraft and bombers. The losses of Soviet troops from German air strikes were very significant, there are many cases when Soviet attacks were stopped by the strike of only one dive bombers.

Soviet aviation did, in general, everything the same. Bombers attacked German rear lines, attack aircraft attacked columns of German infantry and equipment. The fighters were actively fighting for air supremacy, inflicting very significant losses on German aviation. But it turns out that the Soviet aviation waged its own special war, actually separate from the actions of the ground forces. Despite the great activity of Soviet aviation, multiplied by its strength, the infantry constantly did not have air cover, the attacks of Soviet tanks did not receive air support, and there was no coordination in actions between ground forces and aviation. The most characteristic example is the actions of the 5th tank army in the Voronezh region, when the 1st fighter army under the command of General E.M. Beletsky was allocated to cover it. With 231 aircraft, the army conducted 104 air battles in seven days, shooting down 91 German aircraft (the data is somewhat overestimated, the Germans did not suffer such losses these days) and losing 116. But at the same time, the 5th Panzer Army was mercilessly beaten by German bombers, having no air cover. According to the memoirs, there were no Soviet planes in the sky at all. But in addition to the 1st Fighter Army, which had more fighters than in the entire German 4th Air Fleet, the Bryansk Front also had its own 2nd Air Army, all of whose forces were thrown into the Voronezh direction.

Air reconnaissance also acted inefficiently, the information received from it came too late.

In addition to the fact that Soviet aircraft in 1942 were inferior in their main characteristics to German ones, Soviet fighters had practically no radio stations: even receiving radios were rare, and there were only a few transceivers in units. In this regard, it was impossible to establish interaction even in the air, but there was nothing to think about interaction with ground units. To this must be added the worst preparation Soviet pilots compared with German (as well as Italian and Hungarian). As a result, in these and subsequent operations, the Soviet troops received practically no real support from aviation. With rare exceptions.

Fedor von Bock
Side forces to the beginning of the operation:
74 divisions
6 tank corps
37 brigades
6 ur
1.3 million people

entered during the operation:
4 tank corps
20 divisions

to the beginning of the operation:
68 German divisions (including 9 armored and 7 motorized) in the GA "YUG".

2nd Hungarian Army: 9 light, 1 tank, 3 security divisions.
Italian corps and Romanian units.
Total 68 German divisions and 26 Allied divisions
About 1.3 million in the ground forces.
1,495 tanks

Losses 568,347 people, of which 370,522 were killed and missing; 488.6 thousand pieces shooter weapons; 2,436 tanks and self-propelled guns; 1,371 guns and mortars; 783 combat aircraft July: 70.6 thousand
(in GA "A" and "B")

German Allied losses are unknown.

The Great Patriotic War
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Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operation- a major battle between the USSR and the countries of the Nazi bloc in the southern direction of the Great Patriotic War in June-July 1942. On the German side - part of the operation "Blau".

Defensive operation of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts in the Voronezh direction (June 28 - July 6, 1942)

Operation progress

The enemy delivered the main blow to the left-flank 15th Rifle Division of the 13th Army, the 121st and 160th Rifle Divisions of the 40th Army. Here, on a front of 45 km, in the first echelon of the enemy, two tank, three infantry and two motorized divisions advanced, moving shoulder to shoulder with the XXIV motorized and XXXXVIII tank corps. Air support for the advancing was provided by Wolfram von Richthoffen's VIII Air Corps, the most powerful and most experienced in dealing with ground forces. As a result of a tense battle, the XXXXVIII Corps managed to break through the Soviet defenses at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies, advance 8-15 km to the east, and by the end of June 28 reach the Gremyachaya line, r. Tim.

Refugees leaving on a dirt road near Voronezh, June 1942.

Reserves were immediately sent to the revealed direction of the main attack. On June 28, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to strengthen the Bryansk Front. The 4th and 24th Tank Corps from the Southwestern Front and the 17th Tank Corps from the Headquarters reserve were sent to the latter. In the Voronezh region, four fighter and three assault aviation regiments were transferred to reinforce the front. The struggle began in new conditions, it was necessary to test a new tool - tank corps - in the first battles.

The commander of the Bryansk Front decided to delay the enemy's offensive at the turn of the river. Kshen and for this purpose gave instructions on the transfer to the breakthrough site of the 16th Panzer Corps. At the same time, he ordered the concentration of the 17th tank corps of N.V. Feklenko in the Kastornoye area, and the 4th tank corps of V.A. Mishulin and the 24th tank corps of V.M. counterattacks in the northwestern and northern directions. The 115th and 116th tank brigades were transferred from the front reserve to reinforce the 40th Army.

However, as is always the case in "blitzkriegs", one of the first victims was control points. During June 29, the left-flank formations of the 13th Army, waging stubborn battles, held back the enemy advance on the Livny, Marmyzha railway lines, and the troops of the right flank of the 40th Army on the Kshen River. In the Rakov area, the 24th Panzer Division of Geim's corps managed to break through the second line of defense of the 40th Army and develop an offensive in the direction of Gorshechny. The appearance of a small group of tanks in the area of the command post of the 40th Army in the Gorshechny area disorganized command and control. The commander of the army, Lieutenant General M.A. Parsegov and his headquarters, having abandoned some of the documents, including those of an operational nature, moved to the area southeast of Kastornoye and finally lost control of the military operations of the troops. Apparently, M.A. Parsegov's nerves simply could not stand it: in September 1941, he was one of the direct participants in the battles near Kiev, which ended in a huge "boiler". One way or another, General Parsegov was soon removed from command of the 40th Army and sent to the Far East.

In the meantime, in two days of the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army, G. Goth managed to break through the defenses of the troops of the Bryansk Front at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies on a 40-kilometer front and advance to a depth of 35-40 km. This breakthrough complicated the situation on the left wing of the Bryansk Front, but did not yet pose a particular threat, since four tank corps advanced into the areas of Volov, Kastorny and Stary Oskol. However, the concentration of the 4th and 24th corps was slow, and the rear of the 17th tank corps, transported by rail, fell behind and units were left without fuel.

The commander of the Bryansk Front, F.I. Golikov, in the conditions of a deep breakthrough of the enemy in the Voronezh direction, decided to withdraw the troops of the 40th Army to the line of the river. Kshen, Bystrets, Arkhangelsk. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, represented by I.V. Stalin, did not agree with this decision of the commander of the Bryansk Front. Golikov was told that "a simple withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army to an unprepared line would be dangerous and could turn into a flight." In addition, the front commander was pointed out to the mistakes in his actions:

The worst and most impermissible thing in your work is the lack of communication with Parsegov's army and the tank corps of Mishulin and Bogdanov. As long as you neglect radio communication, you will have no connection and your entire front will be an unorganized rabble.

To organize the first major counterattack of new tank formations, the Stavka sent its representative - A. M. Vasilevsky. In order to defeat the units of the XXXXVIII tank corps of Heim, who broke through in the direction of Gorshechnoye, a special task force was created under the leadership of the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko. The group included the 4th, 24th and 17th tank corps. The task of the group was to deliver counterattacks by the 24th and 4th tank corps from the Stary Oskol region to the north, and by the 17th tank corps from the Kastornoye region to the south. At the same time, by decision of the front commander, counterattacks were being prepared by the 1st Panzer Corps M.E. Katukov from the Livny region to the south along the Livny, Marmyzha railway and the 16th tank corps of M.I. Pavelkin from the Volovo region to the south along the eastern bank of the river. Kshen.

As is usually the case when organizing counterattacks of formations hastily transferred to the area of a breakthrough, the corps entered the battle non-simultaneously. So, for example, the 4th Panzer Corps entered the battle on June 30, and the 17th and 24th Panzer Corps only on July 2. At the same time, contrary to the traditionally cited dialogue of I.V. Stalin and F.I. Golikov, regarding the balance of forces on the Bryansk Front, 1000 tanks of the Bryansk Front against 500 tanks, the Germans had a slightly more complicated situation. The presence of Richthoffen's aviation in the air did not favor an objective assessment of the forces of the enemy that had broken through to the approaches to Voronezh. In reality, against the 4th, 16th, 17th and 24th tank corps, the Germans had three tank (9th, 11th and 24th) and three motorized ("Great Germany", 16th and 3rd) divisions . That is, against four (albeit five with the corps of M.E. Katukov, who fought with the infantry of the LV corps) Soviet independent tank formations, the enemy could put up almost one and a half times more divisions - six. Let's not forget that the Soviet tank corps, in its own way organizational structure then it only roughly corresponded to a tank division. At the same time, N.V. Feklenko’s 17th Corps, which was weak in terms of artillery, was forced to attack the elite “Great Germany”, whose StuGIII self-propelled guns could shoot his tanks with impunity from their long 75-mm cannons. Assessing the events near Voronezh at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, one must remember that it was here that the full-scale debut of the new German armored vehicles took place.

The appearance of new equipment was noted by the commanders of our tank formations. In particular, the commander of the 18th tank corps, I.P. Korchagin, wrote in a report on the results of the July and August battles:

In the battles near Voronezh, the enemy most effectively used mobile anti-tank defense, using for this purpose self-propelled armored vehicles armed with 75-mm guns firing Molotov cocktails. This blank pierces the armor of all brands of our vehicles. The enemy uses mobile guns not only on the defensive, but also on the offensive, accompanying infantry and tanks with them.

On the morning of July 3, the enemy continued to develop the offensive. The army group "Weikhs" delivered the main blow from the Kastornoye, Gorshechnoye region to Voronezh, pushing part of its forces to the line of Livny, Terbuny. The German 6th Army XXXX with a motorized corps developed an offensive from the area of Novy Oskol and Volokonovka in a northeasterly direction.

The left-flank XXIX Army Corps of the 6th German Army moved with its main forces from Skorodnoye to Stary Oskol, in the area of which on July 3 it connected with units of the 2nd Hungarian Army, closing the encirclement around six divisions of the left flank of the 40th Army and the right flank of the 21st th army.

The troops of the 40th and 21st armies, which were surrounded, were forced to break through in separate subunits and units in an unorganized manner, with a poor supply of ammunition, in the absence of a unified command of the encircled troops, and with unsatisfactory leadership of the operation by the army commanders.

Already on July 4, fighting began on the outskirts of Voronezh, and the next day the 24th Panzer Division of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps of the army of G. Goth, having crossed the river. Don, broke into the western part of Voronezh. North of the 24th division crossed the Don and formed two bridgeheads "Great Germany". The breakthrough into the depths of the defense was so swift that the right bank of Voronezh was already captured on July 7, 1942, the task of the first phase of the operation was completed by the Germans. Already on July 5, Weikhs was ordered to release the mobile formations of the 4th Panzer Army in the Voronezh region and move them south.

But before the steam roller of the 4th Panzer Army of G. Goth, according to the “Blau” plan, went south along the left bank of the Don, a counterattack of the Soviet 5th Panzer Army took place. The 5th Tank Army advancing to the Voronezh region was one of two formations (3rd and 5th) with the same name, which were formed according to the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of May 25, 1942. Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko was appointed commander of the 3rd Tank Army, Major General A. I. Lizyukov was appointed commander of the 5th Tank Army. Soviet tank troops were then still in the stage of copying the decisions of the enemy. Therefore, in terms of its organizational structure, the tank army roughly corresponded to the German motorized corps. As we know, the motorized corps included tank, motorized divisions, diluted with several infantry divisions. The first two Soviet tank armies were built on the same principle, and this structure was maintained until 1943. The 5th Tank Army included the 2nd and 11th Tank Corps, the 19th Separate Tank Brigade (this armored "core" of tank armies will remain until the end of the war), the 340th Rifle Division, one regiment of 76-mm RGK SPM guns, guards mortar regiment of RS M-8 and M-13 installations. Differences from the motorized hull are visible to the naked eye. The German corps includes heavy artillery from 10 cm cannons to 210 mm mortars. In the Soviet tank army, it was replaced by universal guns and rocket artillery with much more modest capabilities.

On the night of July 3, formations of the 5th Panzer Army completed their concentration south of Yelets. On the night of July 4, its commander A.I. Lizyukov received a directive from Moscow obliging “to intercept the communications of the enemy tank group that had broken through to the Don River to Voronezh; actions on the rear of this group to disrupt its crossing over the Don.

As is usually the case with hastily organized counterattacks, the army of A.I. Lizyukova entered the battle in parts. On July 6, the 7th Tank Corps went into battle first, then the 11th Tank Corps (July 8) and, finally, the 2nd Tank Corps (July 10). The corps entered the battle, not being able to conduct reconnaissance, to fully concentrate. Located in the offensive zone of the army of A.I. The Lizyukov River Dry Vereika did not live up to its name and met the advancing tanks with a swampy floodplain.

However, it should be noted that the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army was based on the initially incorrect assumption that the advancing German tank corps would move further through the Don and Voronezh to the east. They had no such task. Accordingly, instead of the forward movement characteristic of an offensive, they stopped in front of the Don on the bridgehead near Voronezh and took up defensive positions. More than a hundred tanks of the 11th Panzer Division armed with 60-caliber 50-mm guns were a serious enemy for the advancing Soviet tank brigades and tank corps.

That the army of A.I. Lizyukova could do in this situation, this is to delay the change of tank formations to infantry as much as possible. She accomplished this task. On July 10, Halder makes the following entry in his diary:

The northern sector of the Weichs front is again under enemy attack. The change of the 9th and 11th Panzer divisions is difficult.

In order to liberate the 4th Panzer Army, the German command was forced to send the XXIX Army Corps of the 6th Army to Voronezh, weakening the offensive capabilities of the F. Paulus army against the troops of the Southwestern Front. The change of constantly attacked divisions really took place with great difficulties. In particular, the 11th Panzer Division was replaced by the 340th Infantry Division, which had not been in combat before, the child of the German "permanent mobilization".

Operation results

The battle near Voronezh ended, leaving the fields filled with smoking skeletons of tanks. The German tank formations leaving for Stalingrad gave the Soviet tank troops a kind of “kiss of death”, as if hinting that the summer campaign does not promise to be easy. The battles near Voronezh moved into a positional phase. On July 15, by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 5th tank army was disbanded, and A.I. Lizyukov, according to the same directive, was proposed "to appoint the commander of one of the tank corps." On July 25, 1942, the commander of the 5th Tank Army, A. I. Lizyukov, himself got into the tank and led the unit on the attack, intending to make a hole in the enemy’s defenses near the village of Sukhaya Vereika and withdraw a unit belonging to his army from the encirclement. A. I. Lizyukov’s CV was hit, and the commander of one of the first Soviet tank armies died.

For the convenience of command and control of the troops operating in the Voronezh direction, by the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on July 7, the Voronezh Front was formed, which included the 60th (former 3rd reserve army), 40th and 6th (former 6th reserve army) army, 17th, 18th and 24th tank corps. A lieutenant general was appointed commander of the front, and corps commissar I.Z. was appointed a member of the Military Council. Susaykov, chief of staff - Major General M.I. Kazakov. F.I. Golikov was demoted and became deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. The task of covering the directions to Tambov and Borisoglebsk was assigned to the newly created front. The responsibility of the troops of the Bryansk Front, which consisted of the 3rd, 48th, 13th and 5th tank armies, remained the task of covering the southern approaches to Moscow. Lieutenant General K.K., who had recovered from his wound in March 1942, was appointed commander of this front in mid-July. Rokossovsky, a member of the Military Council - Regimental Commissar S.I. Shalin, chief of staff - Major General M.S. Malinin. The battles near Voronezh were rich in personnel changes. For failures in organizing a counterattack by the forces of the 23rd Panzer Corps, the commander of the 28th Army, D.I. Ryabyshev was removed from his post, and his place was taken by the commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps V.D. Kryuchenko.

Important organizational changes also took place in the leadership of the German troops on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. As previously planned, on July 7, 1942, Army Group South was divided into Army Groups A and B. Army Group B, which included the 4th Panzer (Goth), 6th (Paulus) and 2nd (Weichs) armies, the 8th Italian Army (Gariboldi) and the 2nd Hungarian Army (Jany), headed by Fedor von Bock. For Army Group A, from the spring of 1942, a headquarters was being prepared under the command of Marshal Wilhelm List. The 1st Panzer Army (Kleist) and the Ruof Army Group (17th Army and 3rd Romanian Army) were subordinated to Army Group A.

Defensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts in the big bend of the Don and in the Donbass (July 7-24, 1942)

As early as July 6, the Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Southern Fronts to the east and gain a foothold at the line: Novaya Kalitva, Chuprinin, Novaya Astrakhan, Popasnaya. This instruction from the Headquarters was connected with the deep coverage of the right wing of the Southwestern Front by enemy troops, as well as the concentration of a strong enemy grouping in the Donbass against the right wing of the Southern Front. The withdrawal of our troops to the indicated line began on the night of July 7. At the same time, the Supreme High Command began to concentrate fresh forces in order to strengthen the defense on the outskirts of Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

On the left bank of the middle reaches of the Don from Pavlovsk to Veshenskaya, the 63rd Army (the former 5th Reserve Army) was deployed. In addition to the 7th reserve army formed there, the 1st reserve army was transferred to the Stalingrad region from the Stalinogorsk region. The commander of the North Caucasian Front was ordered to deploy the 51st Army along the southern bank of the Don from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Azov and prepare this line for defense.

Operation progress

File:Voroneg-Voroshilovgrad.jpg

The German command continued the implementation of the plan described in OKW Directive No. 41 and launched an offensive to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Southwestern Front. The fulfillment of this task by the enemy was carried out by delivering two strikes: one from the area south of Voronezh by the forces of the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies of Army Group "B" and the other from the area of Slavyansk, Artemovsk by the forces of the 1st Tank Army of Army Group "A" in general direction to Millerovo.

Despite the order received to withdraw troops and the delay of G. Hoth's tank army by counterattacks near Voronezh, the troops of the South-Western Front failed to completely avoid the blow of the "steam roller" rushing south of the German offensive. If the army of G. Goth was delayed, then the XXXX tank corps (in the summer of 1942, the mass renaming of the German motorized corps into tank ones began) of the 6th Army of F. Paulus was not shackled by anyone. At that time, the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized, 100th Jaeger and 336th Infantry Divisions were part of the XXXXX Panzer Corps of General of Panzer Troops Geyer von Schweppenburg. It was the XXXX Corps that fell on the right wing of the Southwestern Front, which went over to the defensive on the southern bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River in the area from Novaya Kalitva to Chuprinin. The 9th Guards, 199th and 304th Rifle Divisions, which retreated to this line, did not have time to organize a solid defense and were simply swept away by the German offensive.

On July 7, at the height of the fighting near Voronezh, the XXXXX tank and VIII army corps of the army of F. Paulus crossed the Chernaya Kalitva River and, developing the offensive to the southeast, reached the Kantemirovka area by the end of July 11. The advanced formations of the 4th German Panzer Army, withdrawn from the battle in the Voronezh region on July 9, advanced along the Don River to the south beyond strike force 6th German army. By the end of July 11, they had reached the Rossosh region. The main forces of the Southwestern Front, engulfed by the enemy from the northeast and east and attacked from the front, were forced to fight hard south and southwest of Kantemirovka, losing contact with the front headquarters.

Due to the fact that the headquarters of the South-Western Front, which was located in the city of Kalache since July 7 (180 km southeast of Voronezh), turned out to be cut off from the bulk of the front’s troops, its 57th, 28th, 38th and 9 1st Army were transferred to the Southern Front. On the Southern Front, R. Ya. Malinovsky has been relatively calm so far. The troops of the right wing and the center of the front in the period from July 7 to 11, under the cover of the rearguards, retreated back to the line running approximately along the meridian of Taganrog. Thus, the front line was straightened and the elbow connection with the neighbor on the right was maintained.

While the Southern Front was retreating, the German command was preparing an operation symmetrical to the daring landing in Kerch and Feodosia in December 1941. On July 11, 1942, Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 43, which ordered the capture of amphibious assault Anapa and Novorossiysk. Black Sea Fleet was supposed to be neutralized with the help of the Luftwaffe. Further along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, the landing troops were to reach the oil fields of Maykop, and along the Black Sea coast - to Tuapse. Five days after the signing of OKW Directive No. 43, Hitler moved to a new headquarters 15 km northeast of Vinnitsa. The camp, equipped there from barracks and blockhouses, received the name "Werwolf" (Werewolf).

Almost a year before the events described, the 6th and 12th armies of I.N. The fate of the 6th and 12th armies then, as we know, was not the best. In the summer of 1942, everything was not so dramatic, but it could not have done without a catastrophe of local significance. In the summer of 1942, the 9th and 38th armies, in a somewhat modernized form, repeated the fate of the 6th and 12th armies in the summer of 1941.

In the same way as in July 1941, in July 1942 between the right flank of the Southern Front and the left flank of the Southwestern Front gaped a gap several tens of kilometers wide. A mass of mobile formations of the enemy immediately rushed into this gap. In order to cut off the escape route to the east for the entire grouping of Soviet troops operating in the Donbass, the efforts of the 1st and 4th German tank armies were combined. On July 13, the tank corps advancing on Millerovo XXXX tank corps was transferred to the 4th tank army of G. Goth from the 6th army of F. Paulus. For the duration of the operation against the Donbass grouping of Soviet troops, both tank armies were transferred to Army Group A.

On June 14, I. V. Stalin addressed S. K. Timoshenko with the following rather harsh words:

The Stavka considers it intolerable and unacceptable that the Military Council of the Front has not been giving information about the fate of the 28th, 38th and 57th armies and the 22nd tank corps for several days now. The Stavka knows from other sources that the headquarters of these armies have retreated beyond the Don, but neither these headquarters nor the Military Council of the front tell the Headquarters where the troops of these armies have gone and what their fate is, whether they continue to fight or are captured. These armies contained, it seems, 14 divisions. The headquarters wants to know where these divisions have gone.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Documents and materials. 1942. S. 208-309.

The following happened with these divisions. While the XXXX Panzer Corps cut off the 9th and 38th armies from the east, the III Panzer Corps of E. von Mackensen of the 1st Panzer Army wedged between the 9th Army of the then Southwestern Front and the 37th Army of the Southern front. On July 15, 1942, the German 14th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Corps established contact with the formations of the XXXX Panzer Corps advancing towards it and an encirclement ring around the troops of the 9th, 38th and part of the forces of the 24th Army in the Millerovo area. However, the distance between the outer and inner fronts of the "cauldron" was relatively small, which allowed the troops of the 9th and 38th armies to break out of the encirclement with varying success.

On July 1, 1942, the 9th Army included 51, , 140, 255, 296, 318th and 333rd rifle divisions, and the 38th Army included 162, , 242, 277, 278th and 304th rifle divisions. As of August 1, 1942, the 9th Army has 51, , 140, 242, 255, 296 and 318 rifle divisions. The 38th Army, reorganized into the 1st Tank Army, includes the 131st and 399th Rifle Divisions. Accordingly, the 162nd, 277th, 278th, and 304th Rifle Divisions disappeared into the “cauldron” near Millerovo.

Formations of the 24th Army of Lieutenant General I.K. Smirnov, who were moving out of the reserve of the Southern Front to the Millerovo area, were forced to immediately engage in battle with units of the XXXX and III tank corps, which formed the outer front of the encirclement in the Millerovo area. Panzer divisions pushed the 24th Army back to the south and southeast. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the Southern Front, R. Ya. Malinovsky, to withdraw the troops of the front beyond the river. Don in its lower reaches. Since the Southern Front, which was now turning not to the west, but to the north, fell into the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility of S. M. Budyonny, the defense was ordered to be organized in cooperation with the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. R. Ya. Malinovsky was ordered to organize a strong defense along the southern bank of the river. Don from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Bataysk and further along defensive line, prepared on the northern approaches to Rostov. The retreat of the Southern Front beyond the Don began on the night of July 16 in the Razdorskaya-Rostov section.

While the Southern Front tried to salvage at least part of the search for the detached left wing of the Southwestern Front, the latter was renamed the Stalingrad Front on 12 June. The front included the 21st Army from the old composition of the Southwestern Front, as well as the 63rd (former 5th Reserve Army), 62nd (former 7th Reserve Army) and 64th (former 1st Reserve ) armies. This was a general rule - when it hit the first line, the reserve army received the corresponding number from among the armies that were not occupied by existing, actually or already virtually, armies. The 62nd Army at that time included the 33rd Guards, 192nd, 147th, 184th, 196th and 181st Rifle Divisions. The 63rd - 14th Guards, 153rd, 127th and 203rd Rifle Divisions. The 64th - 131, , , 214th and 112th rifle divisions. The command of the renamed front remained the same, that is, the commander was Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, the member of the Military Council was N.S. Khrushchev, and the chief of staff was Lieutenant General P.I. Bodin. On June 17, the Stalingrad Front, by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170 513, also included armies, of which only headquarters remained - the 28th, 57th and 38th.

The failures that followed one after another near Kharkov and the withdrawal to Stalingrad with the loss of divisions in Millerovo overflowed the patience of the Supreme Commander. By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, S.K. Timoshenko was removed from command of the Stalingrad Front, and Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, who had previously commanded the 21st Army, was appointed in his place.

In mid-July 1942, the Stalingrad Front received a short respite due to the slowdown in the offensive of the 6th Army of F. Paulus. After the XXXX Panzer Corps was withdrawn from the army and handed over to G. Goth, the Paulus army significantly lost its penetrating power. The German command concentrated its main efforts in the face of the tank armies of E. von Kleist and G. Goth on defeating the armies of the Southern Front that had retreated beyond the Don. In the long term, this did not bode well for the Stalingrad Front - having defeated the units that had retreated beyond the Don, two German tank armies could turn around and deliver a crushing blow in the direction of Stalingrad.

It should be noted that during this period there were no independent tank formations in the Southern Front. The 24th tank corps of V. M. Badanov, which was formed in the spring of 1942 in the zone of the Southern Front, departed near Voronezh and remained there for a long time. Therefore, the command of the Southern Front had only infantry support units and formations.

On the contrary, the German command in this direction gathered almost all the tank formations allocated for the summer offensive, including the 16th motorized division and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" castelled to Rostov.

The command of the Southern Front, having entrusted the defense of the Rostov fortified region to the 56th Army, Major General D.N. Nikishev, the rest of the front forces were withdrawn beyond the river. Don. At the same time, the 37th Army of Major General P. M. Kozlov was ordered to turn around to defend the southern bank of the river from Konstantinovskaya to the mouth of the river. Manych, which reduced the defense sector of the 51st Army. The 12th Army of Major General A. A. Grechko was withdrawn to the area south of Manychskaya, and the 18th Army of Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov was withdrawn to the area of Khomutovskaya and Kagalnitskaya. The front commander ordered to concentrate one rifle division and two rifle brigades from the 56th Army in the front reserve in the Bataysk region.

The weakest was the Rostov sector of the front, which was occupied by the 56th Army. To defend a hundred-kilometer section of the front, the army had five rifle divisions, weakened by previous battles, two rifle brigades and seven machine-gun battalions of the 70th and 158th fortified regions. The situation was worsened by the lack of reliance on large water barriers. As early as July 16, the 22nd Panzer Division of the corps of E. von Mackensen captured a bridgehead near Pereboynoye on the southern bank of the Donets. The departing Soviet troops carefully blew up all the bridges behind them, but the capture of the bridgehead made it possible to build a floating bridge by the forces of pontoon parks. Moreover, there were not enough pontoons for two crossings, and the 14th Panzer Division was forced to stand in the back of the head of the 22nd in line to force the Donets. Despite all the efforts of the armored group of the Southern Front under the command of A. D. Shtevnev and the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General I. T. Zamertsev, it was not possible to eliminate the bridgehead on July 17-19.

The offensive of the 14th and 22nd Panzer Divisions from the bridgehead at Pereboynoye began on 19 July. The attack of the Rostov fortified area began on the morning of July 22, and by the end of the day the tanks of the corps of E. von Mackensen entered the suburbs of Rostov. The next day, the 125th Infantry Division approached the city, and on July 24, the 298th and 73rd Infantry Divisions of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps joined the battle. Already on July 25, Rostov was abandoned by the Soviet troops.

In order to prevent the enemy from forcing the Don south of Rostov, the commander of the Southern Front on July 23 ordered the 18th Army, and then the 12th Army, to turn around and take up defense along the left bank of the river. Don from the mouth of the river. Manych to Azov. But the time had already passed. The enemy preempted the troops of these armies, penetrating Rostov, the 13th Panzer Division broke further south, crossed the river and captured bridgeheads in the Bataysk region.

Operation results

The Soviet troops also failed to hold the line of the river. Don east of the mouth of the river. Manych. The fighting here flared up as early as July 21, where at that time the main forces of the 4th German Panzer Army began to advance. Troops of the 51st Army, Major General N.I. Trufanov, who defended here on a wide front, could not prevent the enemy from forcing the river. By the evening of July 24, units of XXXXVIII and XXXXX tank corps had captured small bridgeheads south of Razdorskaya and Tsimlyanskaya and an extensive bridgehead south of Nikolayevskaya. Here Breit's 3rd Panzer Division advanced south to the river. Sal and even crossed to its southern shore.

By July 25, the 12th and 18th armies deployed on the southern bank of the river. Don. Now, on the lower reaches of the Don, four Soviet armies were deployed in the first echelon: from the Upper Kurmoyarskaya to the German bridgehead south of Nikolaevskaya - the 51st Army, included in the Southern Front; further west to the mouth of the river. Manych - the 37th Army, which included separate formations and units of the 51st Army, cut off from its main forces after the advance of the enemy on the river. Sal. The section of the front from the mouth of the river. Manych to Olginskaya was defended by the 12th army (, 261st and 353rd rifle divisions), and to the left of it to the mouth of the river. Don - 18th Army (, 395th Rifle Divisions). However, the combat effectiveness of these armies, due to their small numbers and weak weapons, was very small. The troops of the 56th and the remnants of the 24th armies continued to withdraw from the northern bank of the river. Don to the south, heading to the rear to tidy up and resupply. The total number of armies of the Southern Front during this period did not exceed 100 thousand people.

The retreat, even if organized, never favored the preservation of artillery and heavy infantry weapons. In addition, in the process of withdrawal, armies crawl out of trenches, dugouts and dugouts and stretch out in long columns along the roads. the best target for air strikes is hard to even imagine. Therefore, of all the armies that took part in the initial phase of the battles for the Caucasus, only the 51st Army had tangible amounts of artillery with a caliber of 122 mm and 152 mm. In addition, due to the limited number of crossings, part of the artillery broke away from their troops. The normal work of the rear in supplying the troops of the Southern Front with ammunition was disrupted.

In such a difficult situation, some relief from the fate of the troops of R.Ya. Malinovsky came from Berlin. On July 23, 1942, OKW Directive No. 45 came into being, which ordered the withdrawal of two mobile formations from Army Group A and transfer them to Army Group B to continue the offensive on Stalingrad. At the same time, Army Group A was withdrawn to the Great Germany reserve. The 11th Army, which, according to OKW Directive No. 43, was supposed to land in Taman and assist the offensive in the Caucasus, was ordered to move near Leningrad along with all heavy artillery.

After receiving OKW Directive No. 45, List and Weichs began the regrouping of German troops from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad. In the period from July 23 to July 25, the control of the XXIV and XXXXVIII tank corps and two tank divisions, the 23rd and 24th, were transferred from Army Group A to Army Group B. They were soon followed by the 14th and 16th tank, 29th motorized divisions. The 8th Italian Army was also sent to Army Group B from the Donbass. In addition, the XI Army Corps of the 17th Army was withdrawn to the reserve of the main command and also sent in marching order to the Stalingrad direction. The offensive axes of Army Groups "A" and "B" finally diverged. Two almost independent battles began in two operational directions - for Stalingrad Wikipedia Wikipedia Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

(German "Blau") - a plan for the summer-autumn campaign of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in 1942. The main idea of the operation was the offensive of the 6th and 4th tank armies to Stalingrad, and then the offensive to Rostov-on-Don with a general offensive to the Caucasus. It was replaced on June 30, 1942 by the Braunschweig plan.

History

In contrast to the situation near Moscow in early 1942, the campaign of the Wehrmacht army in 1942 on the southern wing of the Eastern Front against the USSR was more successful. Here it was decided to launch the largest offensive of 1942. On April 5, signed by Hitler, Directive No. 41 was issued with the title “Operation Blau” (German: Blau) on the goals of the German army during the second campaign in the East. According to the directive, the general plan of the campaign was to concentrate the main forces for the main operation on the southern sector of the front in order to destroy the grouping of Soviet troops west of the Don, and then capture oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian Range. The infantry divisions of the 6th Army were given the task of blocking Stalingrad and covering the left flank of the 1st Tank Army going to the Caucasus.

The implementation of the Blue plan was entrusted to Army Groups A and B. They included five fully equipped German armies numbering over 900,000 people and having 17,000 guns, 1,200 tanks, and also supporting 1,640 aircraft of the 4th Luftwaffe Air Fleet. The southern Army Group A under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List included the 17th field and 1st tank armies. In the northern army group B under the command of Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock - the 4th tank, 2nd and 6th field armies.

Part of the tasks set by the plan turned out to be possible for successful implementation due to the unsuccessful offensive of the Soviet troops near Kharkov in May 1942, as a result of which a significant part of the Soviet Southern Front was surrounded and practically destroyed, and it became possible for the Germans to advance in the southern sector of the front to Voronezh and Rostov -on-Don with subsequent access to the Volga and advance to the Caucasus.

On June 30, 1942, the German command adopted the Braunschweig plan, in accordance with which the task was to deliver a new strike, not provided for by the Blau plan, through the Western Caucasus and further along the Black Sea coast to the Batumi region. After Rostov-on-Don was taken by the German army, Hitler considered the result of the Blau plan achieved and on July 23, 1942 issued a new directive No. 45 on the continuation of Operation Braunschweig.

January 1942 turned out to be extremely difficult for the German armies along the entire Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht retreated all winter - a swift retreat near Moscow, the failure of the connection with the Finns in the North with the subsequent capture of Leningrad, a difficult encirclement near Demyansk, the evacuation of Rostov-on-Don. Manstein's 11th Army in the Crimea failed to take Sevastopol. Moreover, in December 1941, the troops of the Red Army drove the Germans out of the Kerch Peninsula with an unexpected blow. Hitler had a fit of rage, after which he gave the order to execute the corps commander Count von Sponeck. In this situation, a new major offensive of the Red Army began - the attack on Kharkov.

The main blow was to be taken by the 6th Army under the command of the new commander Paulus. First of all, he moved the headquarters to Kharkov - where the Russians were rushing. According to the plan adopted by Tymoshenko's headquarters, the Russian units were going to break into the Donbass and create a huge "cauldron" in the Kharkov region. But the Red Army was able to break through the defenses only in the south. The offensive developed successfully, the Soviet troops went deep into the location of the German troops, but after two months of fierce fighting, having exhausted all human and material resources, Timoshenko gave the order to go on the defensive.

The 6th Army held out, but Paulus himself had a hard time. Field Marshal von Bock did not hide his displeasure at the slow reaction of the new commander. Chief of Staff Ferdinand Heim lost his place, Arthur Schmidt was appointed in his place.

On March 28, General Halder went to Rosterburg to present to Hitler plans for the conquest of the Caucasus and southern Russia as far as the Volga. At that time, Timoshenko's project to resume the attack on Kharkov was being studied at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

On April 5, the Führer Headquarters issued an order for the upcoming summer campaign, which was to ensure the final victory in the East. Army Group "North" during the operation " Northern Lights"was called upon to successfully complete the siege of Leningrad and connect with the Finns. And the main blow during Operation Siegfried" (later renamed Operation Blau) was supposed to strike in southern Russia.

Already on May 10, Paulus presented von Bock with a plan of operation code-named Friedrich, which provided for the elimination of the Barven salient that arose during the January offensive of the Red Army. The fears of some German generals were confirmed - having concentrated 640,000 people, 1,200 tanks and about 1,000 aircraft, Timoshenko on May 12, 6 days before the start of Operation Friedrich, launched an offensive around Volchansk and from the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barvensky ledge in order to surround Kharkov. At first, the matter seemed harmless, but by the evening, Soviet tanks had broken through the defenses of Gates' VIII Corps, and individual tank formations of the Red Army were only 15-20 kilometers from Kharkov.

Hurricane fire fell on the positions of the 6th Army. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses. 16 battalions were destroyed, but Paulus continued to hesitate. At Bock's urging, Halder convinced Hitler that Kleist's 1st Panzer Army could launch a counterattack against the advancing troops from the south. The Luftwaffe was ordered to do everything to slow down the advance of the Soviet tanks.

At dawn on 17 May, Kleist's 1st Panzer Army struck from the south. By noon, the tank divisions had advanced 10-15 kilometers. Already in the evening Timoshenko asked the Headquarters for reinforcements. Reserves were allocated, but they could only arrive in a few days. Until that time, the General Staff proposed to strike at the advancing tank army with the forces of two tank corps and one rifle division. Only on May 19 did Tymoshenko receive permission from the Headquarters to go on the defensive, but it was too late. At this time, the 6th army of Paulus went on the offensive in a young direction. As a result, about a quarter of a million soldiers and officers of the Red Army were surrounded. The fights were particularly brutal. For almost a week, the soldiers of the Red Army fought desperately, trying to break through to their own. Only one Red Army soldier out of ten managed to escape. The 6th and 57th armies that fell into the "Barven mousetrap" suffered huge losses. Tens of thousands of soldiers, 2,000 guns and many tanks were taken prisoner. German losses amounted to 20,000 people.

On June 1, a meeting was held in Poltava, which was attended by Hitler. The Fuhrer hardly mentioned Stalingrad, then it was just a city on the map for him. Hitler singled out the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus as a special task. "If we don't capture Maykop and Grozny," he declared, "I'll have to stop the war." Operation Blau was to begin with the capture of Voronezh. Then it was planned to encircle the Soviet troops west of the Don, after which the 6th Army, developing the offensive against Stalingrad, ensured the security of the northeastern flank. It was assumed that the Caucasus was occupied by the 1st Panzer Army of Kleist and the 17th Army. The 11th Army, after the capture of Sevastopol, was to go north.

On June 10, at two in the morning, several companies of the 297th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Pfeffer crossed by boat to the right bank of the Donets and, having captured the bridgehead, immediately began to build a pontoon bridge 20 meters long. By the evening of the next day, the first tanks of Major General Latmann's 14th Panzer Division crossed over it. The next day, the bridge to the north along the river was captured.

Meanwhile, an event occurred that could undermine the success of the operation. On June 19, Major Reichel, an officer in the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, took off in a light aircraft for units. In violation of all the rules, he took with him plans for the upcoming offensive. The plane was shot down, and the documents fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers. Hitler was furious. Ironically, Stalin, who was informed about the documents, did not believe them. He insisted that the Germans would strike the main blow at Moscow. Having learned that the commander of the Bryansk Front, General Golikov, in whose sector the main actions were to unfold, considers the documents authentic, Stalin ordered him to draw up a plan for a preventive offensive in order to liberate Orel.

On June 28, 1942, the 2nd Army and the 4th Tank Army launched an offensive in the Voronezh direction, and not at all in the Oryol-Moscow direction, as Stalin assumed. Luftwaffe aircraft dominated the air, and Hoth's tank divisions entered the operational space. Now Stalin gave permission to send several tank brigades to Golikov. "Focke-Wulf-189" from the close reconnaissance squadron discovered the concentration of equipment, and on July 4, Richthofen's 8th Air Corps dealt a powerful blow to them.

On June 30, the 6th Army also went on the offensive. The 2nd Hungarian Army moved on the left flank, and the 1st Panzer Army covered the right flank. By mid-July, all the fears of the staff officers dissipated - the 4th Panzer Army broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops. But their advance was not calm. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command came to the conclusion that Voronezh should be defended to the end.

The battle for Voronezh was the baptism of fire for the 24th Panzer Division, which a year ago was the only cavalry division. With the SS division "Grossdeutschland" and the 16th motorized on the flanks, the 24th Panzer Division advanced directly on Voronezh. Her "Panzergrenadiers" on July 3 reached the Don and captured a bridgehead on the opposite bank.

On July 3, Hitler again arrived in Poltava for a consultation with Field Marshal von Bock. At the end of the meeting, Hitler made a fatal decision - he ordered Bock to continue the attack on Voronezh, leaving one tank corps there, and sending all the other tank formations south to Goth.

By this time, Timoshenko began to conduct a more flexible defense, avoiding encirclement. From Voronezh, the Red Army began to pay more attention to the defense of cities. On July 12, the Stalingrad Front was specially organized by the directive of the Stavka. The 10th NKVD Rifle Division was quickly transferred from the Urals and from Siberia. All the flying units of the NKVD, police battalions, two training tank battalions and railway troops passed into its subordination.

In July, Hitler became again impatient with delays. Tanks stopped - there was not enough fuel. The Fuhrer became even more convinced of the need for the fastest capture of the Caucasus. This set him on a fatal step. The main idea of the operation "Blau" was the attack of the 6th and 4th tank armies on Stalingrad, and then the attack on Rostov-on-Don with a general attack on the Caucasus. Against the advice of Halder, Hitler redirected the 4th Panzer Army to the south and took the 40th Panzer Corps from the 6th Army, which immediately slowed down the advance on Stalingrad. Moreover, the Fuhrer divided the Army Group "South" into group "A" - the attack on the Caucasus, and into group "B" - the attack on Stalingrad. Bock was dismissed, accused of failures near Voronezh.

Already on July 18, the 40th Panzer Corps reached the lower reaches of the Don, capturing the city of Morozovsk, an important railway junction. During the three days of the offensive, the Wehrmacht traveled at least two hundred kilometers. On July 19, Stalin ordered the Stalingrad Defense Committee to prepare the city for defense. Headquarters feared that Rostov-on-Don would not last long. Troops of the 17th German Army were aiming at the city from the south, the 1st Panzer Army was advancing from the north, and units of the 4th Panzer Army were preparing to cross the Don in order to bypass the city from the east. July 23, when the 13th and 22nd Panzer divisions, with the support of the grenadiers of the SS Viking division, reached the bridges across the Don, fierce battles began for Rostov-on-Don. The Soviet soldiers fought with great courage, the NKVD units fought especially stubbornly. By the end of the next day, the Germans had practically captured the city and began a "cleansing" operation.

On July 16, Hitler arrived at his new headquarters located in Vinnitsa, a small Ukrainian town. The rate was called "Werwolf". The headquarters consisted of several large and very comfortable log buildings erected to the north of the city. To ensure food rates, the German company Zeidenspiner planted a huge vegetable garden near the city.

The Fuhrer's stay in Vinnitsa in the second half of July coincided with a period of extreme heat. The temperature reached plus 40. Hitler did not tolerate the heat well, and the impatience with which he waited for the capture of Rostov only worsened his mood. In the end, he convinced himself so much that the Red Army was on the verge of final defeat that on July 23 he issued Directive No. 45, which actually crossed out the entire operation "Blau". Hitler ignored strategic rationalism, and now set new, more ambitious tasks for his officers. Thus, the 6th Army was to capture Stalingrad, and after its capture, send all motorized units to the south and develop an offensive along the Volga to Astrakhan and further, up to the Caspian Sea. Army Group "A" under the command of Field Marshal List was to occupy the eastern coast of the Black Sea and capture the Caucasus. Upon receiving this order, List suggested that Hitler had some kind of supernova intelligence. At the same time, Manstein's 11th Army was heading to the Leningrad region, and the SS Panzer Divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Grossdeutschland" were sent to France. Instead of the departed units, the command put the armies of the allies - the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians.

German tank and motorized divisions continued to move towards the Volga, and Stalingrad was already waiting for them ahead.