Plan of attack on the USSR in 1940. From Marx to Paulus. Creation of a shock group. Impact forces, army groups, other groupings
On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the war plan against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a quick, blitzkrieg war, as a result of which the German troops were planned to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and later to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is "the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to an end to Soviet resistance."
According to this plan, two strikes were envisaged - north and south of Polissya. The northern blow was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these strikes, a "private operation to seize the Baku region" was planned. The implementation of the plan was given from 9 to 17 weeks.
Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the supreme command under the leadership of General Paulus. This test revealed a serious drawback of the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main grouping towards Moscow. The headquarters of the supreme command decided to revise the plan.
In connection with Keitel's report about the poor engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi command on August 9, 1940 issued an order called "Aufbau Ost". It outlined measures for the preparation of a theater of military operations against the USSR, the repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order stating: “I order to increase the number of occupation troops in the east during the following weeks. For security reasons, the impression should not be created in Russia that Germany is preparing for an offensive in an easterly direction.
On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military conference, Halder's report was heard on the Otto plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groups of the Red Army before the capture of Moscow by developing an offensive against Kyiv and Leningrad. In this form, the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler declared: “It is to be expected that the Russian army at the first blow German troops will suffer an even greater defeat than the army of France in 1940. Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.
The participants in the meeting had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be completed quickly; CPOK~ weeks was also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler's General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: was provided only for every fifth soldier. German generals later tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the troops of the winter campaign to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame for this. He writes: "I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that only Hitler is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the autumn of 1941."4
Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and the generals, when he, with his characteristic self-confidence, said in a circle of close associates: “I will not make such a mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter."
The next day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive for war against the USSR on the basis of the decisions taken at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont submitted directive No. 21 to yodel, who made several corrections, and on December 17 it was handed over to Hitler for his signature. The next day, the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.
At a meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, the war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell into disfavor forever.
The fascist German generals worked out and put into effect a plan of war against the USSR, which corresponded to the most predatory desires of the imperialists. The military leaders of Germany unanimously spoke in favor of the implementation of this plan. Only after the defeat of Germany in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders for self-rehabilitation put forward a false version that they objected to an attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition he received, nevertheless unleashed a war in the East. Thus, for example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder tried to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted. With a firm hand, he took the helm and led Germany to the rocks of complete defeat. In reality, not only the "Fuhrer", but the entire German generals believed in the "blitzkrieg", in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.
Directive No. 21 stated: “The German armed forces must be prepared to win by fleeting victory even before the end of the war with England. military operation Soviet Russia ”- the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows:“ The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with a deep advance of tank units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the expanses of Russian territory should be prevented ... The ultimate goal of the operation is to isolate itself from Asian Russia common line Arkhangelsk - Volga.
On January 31, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces issued a "Directive on the Concentration of Troops", which set out the general plan of the command, determined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the deployment of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the "first intention" of the German army, set before it the task of "splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the disunited groups of enemy troops.
Thus, two main directions for the offensive of the German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. To the north of Polissya, the main blow was delivered by two army groups: "Center" and "North". Their task was defined as follows: “To the north of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having introduced powerful tank formations into battle, she makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys, together with the Finnish army and the German troops thrown up for this from Norway, completely deprives the enemy of the last defensive possibilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured for the implementation of subsequent tasks in cooperation with the German troops advancing in southern Russia.
In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of the Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north is no longer possible and the question of an immediate strike on Moscow may arise.
To the south of Polesye, it was planned to launch an offensive by the forces of Army Group South. Its task was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Rutsdstedt, using a swift blow from powerful tank formations from the Lublin region, cuts off Soviet troops stationed in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the region of Kyiv and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver for solving subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or performing new tasks in southern Russia.
The most important strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of Soviet Union, and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction expected to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donets Basin. In terms of great importance was attached to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the plan of the German command, should have brought Germany a decisive political, military and economic success. The Hitlerite command believed that his plan of war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.
In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to play a war game in order to check the expected course of battles and obtain material for the detailed development of an operational plan.
In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of hostilities against the USSR was postponed for 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order stating: “The time for the start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the High Command of the German Armed Forces made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941 An intensified transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.
Even before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, Stalin began to prepare the Red Army to conquer Europe.
Stalin was preparing not for a defensive, but for an offensive aggressive war. On February 14, 1938, Stalin wrote in the Pravda newspaper: "The final victory of socialism in the sense of a complete guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations is possible only on an international scale." In the Directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army of May 15, 1941, it was written: “Leninism teaches that the country of socialism, using the favorable international situation, must and will be obliged to take the initiative in offensive military operations against the capitalist encirclement in order to expand the front of socialism” .
On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations for attacking Finland. Of the 40 member states of the League of Nations, 28 states voted in favor of the draft resolution of the Assembly, 9 abstained, 3 were absent, including the USSR. The Council of the League of Nations got acquainted with the resolution adopted by the Assembly and passed a resolution on the exclusion of the Soviet Union from this international organization.
Stalin's operational plans for preparing an attack on Germany have not yet been declassified, but are partially set out in a memorandum to Stalin from the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army "On the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West and in the East", compiled no later than August 16, 1940 of the year. These plans of the Soviet General Staff were declassified and published only in the first half of the 1990s.
In mid-May 1941, the next version of the "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan" appeared - the fifth (since August 1940) version of the war plan against Germany. On the map attached to the text document, the hand of the First Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff - Vasilevsky clearly marked the date “15.5.41″
Hitler's plans to attack the USSR were outlined in the Barbarossa plan, signed on December 18, 1940. Hitler began to develop this plan shortly after the surrender of France on July 1, 1940.
On June 22, 1941, hundreds of thousands of officers and commanders of the Red Army did not have maps for the defense of the territory of the USSR. 550 million copies of maps of the territory not of the USSR, but of Germany, Poland, Romania were printed ... In December 1939, the Chief of the General Staff Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, on the working map of Mark Karpovich Kudryavtsev, who for many years headed the topographic service, marked with a blue pencil the lines on which he was supposed to reserve topographic maps. And the lines were:
- In the depths of our troops, these were Murmansk, Petrozavodsk, Leningrad, Minsk, Kyiv, Moldova.
- And to the west it was Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest.
The USSR was preparing for a victorious offensive right up to Berlin ... East of Minsk and Kyiv, there were no maps in the fighting units of the army. Minsk was taken by the Germans on the 7th day of the war. Further, the Red Army retreated "blindly". In sufficient quantities, maps appeared only near Moscow.
Historian M. Meltyukhov pointed out that the plan for the war with Germany was approved on October 14, 1940, and its further clarification in the documents dated March 11 and May 15, 1941, essentially did not change anything. “The most important thing,” he stressed, “both in Germany and in the USSR, these plans did not remain on paper, but began to be implemented. A comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties for the war is another direction for further research on the eve of the war. But even on the basis of the materials known today, it can be argued that this process went on in parallel and from the beginning of 1941 entered the final stage both in Germany and in the USSR, which, by the way, once again confirms the inevitability of the outbreak of war precisely in 1941, who no matter who initiated it."
In history Patriotic War There is one little known detail.
The fact is that the Barbarosa operational plan was by no means the first operational plan developed for an attack on the USSR, and the attack itself was planned in the fall of 1940.
Hitler believed that the British would quickly conclude a truce (or peace), he would turn to the USSR and quickly end the war in the east.
But England persisted and the plan eventually fell through. That's what it was.
INTENTION
On July 21, Hitler categorically stated: “The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive.
Followed by the German ground forces, Brauchitsch was ordered to prepare a plan of war against the USSR, given that the attack would be undertaken 4-6 weeks after the end of the concentration of troops.
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It was at this meeting on a national scale that the decision to attack the Soviet country was approved.
For the first time, the question of a war with the USSR was put on the basis of operational calculations.
Here is the commander-in-chief of 0 divisions.
Herman Goth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during the attack on the USSR, notes in his memoirs “Tank Operations” that on July 29, 1940, the chief of staff of the 18th Army (this post was previously held by Lieutenant General Marx, the author of the very first plan attack on the USSR) was called to Berlin, "where he was given the task of developing a plan of operation against Russia."
Goth wrote:
“At this time, Hitler, who was about to launch an offensive against Russia in the autumn (autumn of 1940), was informed that the concentration and deployment of troops along the eastern border would take from four to six weeks ...
On July 31, Hitler made his intentions more specific and stated that he would most willingly launch an offensive against Russia this year.
But this cannot be done, since hostilities will take over the winter, and a pause is dangerous; the operation makes sense only if we defeat Russian state with one blow"
Herman Goth
About the same General Tippelskirch:
“The beginning of military preparations can be traced back to the summer of 1940. At the end of July, before the order was given for an air attack on England, Jodl informed one of his closest collaborators that Hitler had decided to prepare for war against the Soviet Union.
This war had to start under all circumstances, and then it would be better to fight it within the framework of a war already being waged; in any case, it is necessary to prepare for it.
Initially, even the possibility of starting new war still coming autumn (i.e., in 1940). However, this would have to face insurmountable difficulties associated with strategic concentration, and such an idea had to be abandoned soon ”
Only time constraints - the Germans did not have time to make a strategic concentration for aggression against the USSR - kept them from attacking the Soviet Union in 1940.
Simply put, the decision to attack the USSR was made in the summer of 1940. Everything else was technical developments.
CREATING A STRIKING GROUP
In the summer and autumn of 1940, the high command of the German Wehrmacht began to intensively transfer to Poland, closer to the Soviet borders; their troops. Against the USSR, Hitler planned to throw 120 divisions, leaving 60 divisions in the West, in France and Belgium, as well as in Norway.
To this end, the railway network in Poland was improved, old tracks were repaired and new tracks were laid, communication lines were established.
Immediately after the defeat of France, three Nazi armies of the von Bock group - 4, 12 and 18 - numbering up to 30 divisions were sent to the East, to the Poznan region.
Of the 24 formations that were part of the 16th and 9th armies of group "A", intended to attack England according to the "Sea Lion" plan, 17 were transferred to the East
The headquarters of the 18th Army was deployed in Poland, uniting all German troops in the East. Only during the period from July 16 to August 14, more than 20 Nazi divisions were redeployed, making marches along a mysterious curve.
They went from Central France to the English Channel and the Pas de Calais, and then through Belgium and Holland to Germany and on to Poland, to the borders of the Soviet Union. However, everything will become extremely clear if we consider that the Nazi command, which carried out these mysterious marches, pursued a single goal: to cover Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.
According to German data, by September 20, 1940, about 30 divisions were transferred from France to the borders of the USSR, to East Prussia, Poland, Upper Silesia
To wage war against the USSR, the German command formed new infantry, tank, motorized divisions.
Since for Germany since the autumn of 1940 decisive task preparations for a war against the Soviet Union began, on October 12, 1940, an order was given to stop all preparations for the Sea Lion plan until the spring of 1941.
Tank, mechanized and infantry divisions, including the division of selected thugs "Dead Head", as well as Himmler's terrorist apparatus, which were intended for landing in England, were loaded into wagons at the end of the summer and autumn of 1940 and moved to the borders of the Soviet Union.
Preparations for the attack on the USSR were carried out with German punctuality. Operational-strategic plans were developed very carefully and comprehensively. Tens of thousands of pages were written, thousands of maps and diagrams were drawn. The most experienced field marshals, generals, and officers of the General Staff methodically developed an aggressive plan for a treacherous attack on a socialist state that was engaged in peaceful, creative work.
The slowness and thoughtfulness of this preparation testify to the fact that fascist Germany was not afraid of an attack from the USSR, and the legends of German politicians, generals, "historians" about Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR are simply falsification and lies.
After a meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, on August 1, 1940, E. Marx presented Halder with the first version of the plan for the war against the USSR. It was based on the idea of "blitzkrieg". Marx proposed the formation of two shock groups, which were to advance to the line Rostov-on-Don - Gorky - Arkhangelsk, and further to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow, which would lead, Marx pointed out, to the "termination of Soviet resistance"
Only 9-17 weeks were allotted for the implementation of the plan to defeat the USSR.
After Keitel's report about the insufficient engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, Jodl on August 9 gave the top secret order "Aufbau ost". It outlined the following preparatory measures: repair and construction of railways and highways, barracks, hospitals, airfields, training grounds, warehouses, communication lines; provided for the formation and combat training of new formations
By the end of August 1940, a preliminary version of the war plan was drawn up. Nazi Germany against the USSR, which received the code name of the plan "Barbarossa
Marx's plan was discussed at operational meetings with the participation of Hitler, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Halder and other generals. was put forward and new version- invasion of the USSR by forces of 130-140 divisions; the final development of it was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Paulus. The purpose of the invasion was to encircle and defeat the Soviet units in the western part of the USSR, access to the line Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk
Paulus considered it necessary to create three army groups: "North" - to attack Leningrad, "Center" - to Minsk - Smolensk, "South" - in order to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv. Started in August 1940, the development of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa", according to General Paulus, ended with two war games.
In late November and early December 1940, these large operational games were held at the General Staff of the Ground Forces in Zossen under the leadership of Paulus.
They were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and specially invited senior staff officers from the OKH.
Field Marshal Paulus at the Nuremberg Tribunal testified
“The result of the games, taken as the basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line - the distant target of the OKW - should have led to complete defeat Soviet state what, in fact, the OKW sought in its aggression and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country ”
At the end of the military games, in December, a secret meeting was held with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, who used the theoretical results of the games with the involvement of individual headquarters of army groups and armies responsible for unleashing aggression against the USSR.
It discussed issues that were not resolved during the military games.
At the end of the meeting, Colonel Kindel, Head of the Vostok Department of Foreign Armies, delivered a special report. He gave detailed economic and geographical characteristic the Soviet Union, as well as the Red Army, although he really could not appreciate its true strength.
Paulus testified:
“The speaker’s conclusions are a noteworthy adversary that there was no information about special military preparations and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed”
As Tippelskirch notes, this was essentially the first step towards the strategic deployment of the German armed forces against the Soviet Union. In July, the direct development of plans for an attack on the USSR begins.
Interesting is the following remark by Tippelskirch, referring to the beginning of the development of the German plans for the eastern campaign:
“The hitherto known grouping of enemy forces, as well as general considerations independent of this, made it possible to assume that the Russians would withdraw no further than the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, because with a further retreat they would no longer be able to protect their industrial regions.
Based on this, it was planned to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous front of defense to the west of these rivers with tank wedges.
Those. the information about the Soviet group that the Germans had at the time they began to develop plans for a war against the USSR did not at all cause them fears that they might be subjected to a military strike from the east.
On the contrary, they assume that the Russians will retreat, and are thinking about how to prevent the Red Army from retreating too far - to defeat it in border battles. General Marks
The same is said in the very first draft of the Ost operation plan, developed by the chief of staff of the 18th Army, Major General Marx, who, according to Hoth, enjoyed "special authority" with Hitler.
MARX PLAN
On August 5, 1940, General Marx presented his project. Now this document was declassified in the 90s by the international fund "Democracy", "Documents", v. 1, pp. 232-233;
In the very first lines it stated:
"The goal of the campaign is to defeat the Russian armed forces and make Russia unable to act as an enemy to Germany in the foreseeable future." And not a word about the fact that there is a threat of a Soviet attack and that the campaign is designed to prevent it. Vice versa! The document says in black and white: "The Russians will not do us a favor by attacking us."
But the Russians will not render such a service, it’s not scary - the Germans will attack themselves.
How will the enemy (i.e. Soviet troops) behave in response to the German attack? General Marx stated his considerations: “We must count on the fact that the Russian ground forces will resort to defense, while only aviation and naval forces, namely the submarine fleet.
Therefore, the conduct of war by Soviet Russia will consist in the fact that she will join the blockade (of Germany).
To this end, a Russian invasion of Romania is likely to take oil from us. Therefore, one should count on at least strong Russian air raids on the Romanian oil regions.
On the other hand, the Russian will not be able, as in 1812, to evade any decision on the battlefield. The modern armed forces, numbering 100 divisions, cannot give up the sources of their strength. It should be assumed that the Russian ground forces will take up a defensive position to fight in order to protect Great Russia and Eastern Ukraine.
After the frank indication of General Marx that “the Russians will not render us a service by their attack on us” (i.e., the Germans initially proceeded from the fact that they would be the aggressors, and the Soviet Union was assigned the role of a victim of aggression), it is quite obvious: any forecasts of German strategists about the possible actions of the Red Army - these are reflections on the response, defensive actions on the Soviet side.
General Marks
And, of course, quite legal and natural for a country that has been attacked by an aggressor.
This is to the fact that Rezun quite often exaggerates the topic of the “Soviet threat to the Romanian oil fields” - they say, poor and unfortunate Hitler, who depended on fuel supplies from Romania, was afraid that the USSR would cut these supplies.
But we see - from the reflections of the German strategists themselves, under what circumstances could something like this happen - "a Russian invasion of Romania in order to take oil from us (Germans.)" - only in the case (and under the condition) of a German attack on the USSR.
The fact that the Germans were not at all afraid of any strike from the USSR - even a preemptive one (!), Even in a situation where Germany's aggressive intentions were unraveled in Moscow, is also evidenced by the indisputable fact that the German troops concentrating near the Soviet border were not even put tasks in case the Red Army strikes first.
German strategists, in principle, did not consider such an option and completely ruled it out!
And this despite the fact that the concentration of Soviet troops, the Germans noted and perceived this fact as a response, defensive nature, measures of the USSR.
For example, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, on March 27, 1941, writes in his diary:
“A meeting was held at the headquarters of the OKW on the issue of speaking out against Russia ... No decision was made on issuing the necessary instructions in case of an unexpected Russian offensive on the border in the sector of the army group.
Although such a development of events seems unlikely, we must be prepared for any surprises, since any attempt to attack in the direction of the German border threatens the huge stocks of ammunition, food and weapons concentrated there, intended to support our planned operation.
As you can see, von Bock, although he considers any unexpected offensive by the Red Army "unlikely", would still consider it necessary to play it safe - one must, they say, be prepared "for any surprises."
Which, in general, is logical. But even for reinsurance purposes, the OKW does not give any appropriate (to cover the border in case of a Soviet attack) instructions to the German troops - get ready calmly for the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, do not be distracted by "unlikely" scenarios (and the OKW, apparently, had reason consider the Soviet offensive completely unbelievable), do not bother your head with unnecessary problems.
So all rezunism can be sent to a landfill ...
DEVELOPMENT OF OKW
All Soviet border districts (in the west of the country) received orders from their command to provide cover for the border in the event of a German attack; German army groups did not set similar tasks.
As they say, feel the difference! So the Germans were "afraid" of the Soviet attack.
The most curious document Strategic development of the operational department of the OKW for the preparation and conduct of a campaign against the USSR.
The head of the operations department of the OKW was Alfred Jodl, who was also Hitler's chief military adviser on operational-strategic issues.
The document is dated September 15, 1940.
Among the goals of the campaign against the USSR, we again do not find even a hint of the "threat of a Soviet invasion" that should have been averted. In general, not a single word that the Soviet Union is plotting something against Germany.
“The goal of the campaign against Soviet Russia,” the document said, “is: by swift action, destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space, and then, cutting off the western part of Russia from the seas, break through to such a boundary, which, on the one hand, would secure the most important regions of Russia for us, and on the other hand, could serve as a convenient barrier from its Asian part.
This strategic development of the operational department of the OKW was accompanied by a map that schematically showed "the grouping of forces of the Russian ground forces according to the data at the end of August 1940."
Perhaps in the grouping of Soviet troops "at the end of August 1940" was something threatening for Germany?
No. The Soviet grouping - at the moment when the Germans were no longer even making a decision (this happened back in July 1940), but were developing their plans for the upcoming attack on the USSR - did not represent any threats to Germany.
What worries German military strategists?
And they are worried that in the USSR they can unravel the aggressive German plans and regroup their forces in such a way that it will not be possible to realize the above plan: "to destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space." This alone worries the Germans.
The document of Jodl's department (later hanged by the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal) stated:
“It should, however, be taken into account that it is in Russia that it is difficult to obtain more or less reliable information about our future enemy. Even less reliable will be this data on the distribution of Russian forces by the time our aggressive intentions are discovered on the other side of the border. On the this moment the distribution of Russian forces may still bear traces of previous events in Finland, the limitrophes and Bessarabia.
As you can see, in their documents for internal use, the Germans already in 1940 did not hesitate to call themselves aggressors.
So, in the operational department of the OKW, it was assumed that the "aggressive intentions" of the Germans would be noticed in the USSR. And these are quite reasonable assumptions: to completely hide the preparations for an event of such gigantic proportions as an attack on the Soviet Union is a matter of science fiction.
At the very least, one must be prepared for the fact that aggressive German plans will be revealed in the USSR. And for this case, Jodl's department compiled 3 options for possible actions of the USSR:
"I. The Russians will want to pre-empt us and, to this end, will deliver a preemptive strike against the German troops that are beginning to concentrate near the border.
II. The Russian armies will take upon themselves the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).
III. The Russians use a method that has already justified itself in 1812, i.e. they will retreat into the depths of their space in order to impose on the advancing armies the difficulties of extended communications and the difficulties of supply associated with them, and then, only in the further course of the campaign, will they launch a counterattack.
And then the views of the German strategists were expressed on each of options response actions of the USSR.
THREE OPTIONS
These three options are worth talking about, they are very important.
“Option I. It seems incredible that the Russians would decide on an offensive on a large scale, for example, an invasion of East Prussia and the northern part of the General Government, until the bulk of the German army was shackled for a long time by hostilities on another front.
Apparently, neither the command nor the troops will be able to do this. Smaller operations are more likely. They can be directed either against Finland or against Romania ... "
Those. in Germany, not only were they not afraid of a Soviet attack, but it seemed “incredible” to the Germans that the Soviet Union would decide on a preemptive strike even when it realized that it was facing German aggression.
And this forecast of the operational department of the OKW came true. When the Soviet military begins to assert the opinion that Germany is systematically concentrating its forces against the USSR, they will have the idea of delivering a preventive (preemptive) strike.
But what did the Germans consider more probable?
The Germans thought it most likely that the USSR would act according to option "II", i.e. when the Red Army will take "on itself the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border." Those. stubborn defense will hold the new border (with the annexed Baltic States, Western Belarus and Ukraine, Bessarabia). "
This decision, the OKW document said, “appears to be the most probable, since it cannot be assumed that such a strong military power as Russia will cede its richest, including the recently conquered areas, without a fight.”
And in the discussion about this option, it was said:
“If the Russians stop at option II, then the disposition of their forces will, apparently, have a certain resemblance to the present. At the same time, even larger forces are likely to be concentrated on the territory of Russian Poland, and the main reserves will remain in the Moscow region, which is already due to at least the structure of the Russian railway network.
“For us, such a decision, in which the enemy will take up battle with large forces at an early stage, would be favorable because, after defeats in border battles Russian command is unlikely to be able to ensure an organized withdrawal of the entire army, ”the German strategists added.
In this document, which is by no means Soviet propagandists and not by Soviet historians, but by the Germans themselves - there is also a direct answer to Rezunov's numerous "perplexities" about "why such high concentration Soviet troops on the border?
The Germans perfectly understood why and why.
Because (I answer with the words of the German strategists) “the Russian armies will take the blow of the German armed forces, turning around near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).”
The Germans quite well calculated the train of thought of the Soviet military-political leadership. And they planned their attack based on this forecast, which turned out to be accurate (according to the second option for the possible actions of the Red Army, which seemed to them "the most likely").
Finally, option III - if the Red Army will act on the model of the Russian army of 1812 - was characterized by the Germans as extremely unfavorable for them (which is understandable: it meant a protracted war). But at the same time, how unlikely.
The OKW noted:
“If the Russians build their war plan in advance on first accepting the attack of the German troops with small forces, and concentrating their main grouping in the deep rear, then the boundary of the latter’s location north of the Pripyat marshes can most likely be a powerful water barrier formed by the Dvina rivers ( Daugava) and Dnieper. This barrier has a gap only about 70 m wide - in the area south of Vitebsk. Such an unfavorable decision for us should also be taken into account as a possible one. On the other hand, it is absolutely unbelievable that, south of the Pripyat swamps, the Russians will leave the regions of Ukraine, almost indispensable for them, without a fight.
So, we emphasize once again: neither at the moment when the Germans made the decision to attack the USSR, nor when planning for a future aggressive war against the Soviet Union was already in full swing in Germany, such a motive as protection from Soviet aggression was completely absent.
Completely absent and all.
July 31, 1940 Franz Halder again takes notes on the results of the next meeting with Hitler, who has already decided how to "force England to go to peace" (as Hitler put it at the aforementioned meeting in the Berghof on July 13, 1940) - defeat Russia and establish complete German hegemony in Europe.
“England's hope is Russia and America,” Hitler explained to his military leaders.
But, he added, if hope in Russia falls away, then the British will not have to hope in America either - "for the fall of Russia will in an unpleasant way increase the importance of Japan in East Asia, Russia is the East Asian sword of England and America against Japan." Hitler loved these analogies with the "sword".
Russia, Hitler stressed, is the factor on which England puts the most. However, if Russia is defeated, then "England's last hope will fade." And then the prospects are much more tempting: "Then Germany will become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans." Well, stubborn England will have to put up with it.
Hence the conclusion:
“Russia must be finished off,” and “the sooner Russia is defeated, the better.” Hitler also sets a target date: spring 1941
DECISION IS MADE
On October 15, 1940, Franz Halder records in a military diary Hitler's thoughts expressed during a meeting in Brenner, a high-mountainous place on the Austro-Italian border, after the Anschluss of Austria - German-Italian.
In Brenner, Hitler often held business meetings (for example, with Mussolini) and conferences.
This meeting took place two weeks after the signing of the Berlin Pact (also known as the 1940 Three Power Pact, or the Tripartite Pact).
"On September 27, 1940, in Berlin, Germany, Italy and Japan signed an agreement for a period of 10 years, containing obligations regarding mutual assistance between these powers, in addition, zones of influence between the Axis countries were delimited when establishing a" new order "in the world. Germany and Italy were intended leading role in Europe and Japan in Asia.
The Fuhrer expresses confidence that the war is "won", and bringing it to complete victory is "only a matter of time." The reason for England's resilience, says Hitler, is a double hope: on the USA and the USSR. But America, he says, by the fact of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact "has been given a warning," the United States is confronted "with the prospect of waging a war on two fronts." Accordingly, American aid to England will be limited.
The hope of England in the Soviet Union, continues Hitler, is also not justified. At the same time, he notes, “it is unbelievable that Russia itself would start a conflict with us.”
Which, however, does not stop the Fuhrer from developing plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.
On December 5, 1940, Halder writes:
“Notes on a meeting with Hitler on December 5, 1940… If England is forced to sue for peace, she will try to use Russia as a ‘sword’ on the Continent…
The question of hegemony in Europe will be decided in the struggle against Russia.
Again, no "Soviet threat". The USSR is seen as a factor that (according to Hitler) will play a role in making peace with England.
If the USSR is present as a player on the continent, peace with England will be less profitable.
If the USSR is taken out of the game, England will have no choice but to recognize German hegemony in Europe.
December 13, 1940 - a meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies.
“In the morning,” writes Halder, “discussion under the leadership of Paulus of the problems of the operation in the East.”
Thus, the plan of war against the Soviet Union is being discussed at full speed. Perhaps the exacerbation of the military-political situation on the Soviet-German border, the growing threat from the east, obliges us to do so?
Not at all. Even vice versa.
Halder writes:
"Military-political situation: Our assessments are based on the statements of the Fuhrer." What are these ratings? For example: “Russia, on which they pin (meaning in London.) hopes that it will not tolerate the sole domination of Germany on the continent.
So far, no result in this sense." Those. there are no threats to Germany from the USSR. However…
However, "Russia is a complicating factor." What is this factor "difficulty"? All the same: “The solution to the question of hegemony in Europe rests on the struggle against Russia”
Those. the presence of Russia in itself (regardless of its intentions) is a problem and an "embarrassing factor". And that's enough.
Therefore, although Hitler “still” has no reason to fear from the East, after 5 days he signs the well-known directive No. 21, the Barbarossa plan (Weisung Nr.21. Fall Barbarossa).
January 8 - 9, 1941 in the Berghof, Hitler holds a big meeting with the commander in chief ground forces in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW, the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Chief Quartermaster (i.e. the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff), the Chief of the Operations Department of the High Command of the Naval Forces and the Chief of the General Staff military air forces.
January 16, 1941 Halder writes in his diary:
“About the Führer's report 8-9.1 at the Berghof ... Separate points: The purpose of England in the war? England aspires to dominance on the Continent. Consequently, she will try to defeat us on the continent. So I [Hitler] must be so strong on the continent that this goal can never be achieved. England's Hope: America and Russia...
We will not be able to finally defeat England only by landing troops (aviation, navy). Therefore, in 1941, we must strengthen our positions on the continent to such an extent that in the future we will be able to wage war with England (and America) ...
Russia:
Stalin is smart and cunning. He will increase his demands all the time. From the point of view of Russian ideology, the victory of Germany is unacceptable. Therefore, the solution is to defeat Russia as soon as possible. In two years England will have 40 divisions. This may encourage Russia to move closer to it.”
And again we do not see such a motive as the "threat of a Soviet attack." Hitler does not like that the "smart and cunning" Stalin is trying to use the circumstances prevailing at that time in the interests of the USSR.
But more remarkable is Hitler's indication of the date when, in his opinion, an Anglo-Soviet alliance dangerous for Germany could take shape: "in two years." It is not difficult to calculate when this (and at that time purely hypothetical) situation could have developed: at the beginning of 1943.
Those. Hitler actually admitted that before 1943 there was no threat from the east.
CONCLUSION
The German command developed a plan and strategy for an attack on the USSR in the summer of 1940 and at the same time began to create a strike group of troops on the border with the USSR.
The Germans were not at all afraid of the USSR, they were only concerned with the question of how the USSR would respond to the attack.
They themselves made a decision long before the aggression itself ..
In principle, that there would be a march to the East, it was clear from the very beginning, Hitler was “programmed” for it. The question was different - when? On July 22, 1940, F. Halder received a task from the commander of the ground forces to think about various options for an operation against Russia. Initially, the plan was developed by General E. Marx, he enjoyed the Fuhrer's special confidence, he proceeded from the general input received from Halder. On July 31, 1940, at a meeting with the generals of the Wehrmacht, Hitler announced the general strategy of the operation: two main attacks, the first - in the southern strategic direction - to Kyiv and Odessa, the second - in the northern strategic direction - through the Baltic states, to Moscow; in the future, a two-sided strike, from the north and south; later, an operation to seize the Caucasus, the oil fields of Baku.
On August 5, General E. Marx prepared the initial plan, "Plan Fritz". According to him, the main blow was from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow. The main strike force, Army Group North, was to include 3 armies, a total of 68 divisions (of which 15 were armored and 2 were motorized). It was supposed to defeat the Red Army in the western direction, capture the northern part of European Russia and Moscow, then help the southern group in the capture of Ukraine. The second blow was inflicted on Ukraine, Army Group "South" consisting of 2 armies, a total of 35 divisions (including 5 tank and 6 motorized). Army Group "South" was supposed to defeat the troops of the Red Army in the south-western direction, capture Kyiv and cross the Dnieper in the middle reaches. Both groups were supposed to reach the line: Arkhangelsk-Gorky-Rostov-on-Don. There were 44 divisions in the reserve, they were supposed to be concentrated in the offensive zone of the main strike force - "North". The main idea was in the "blitzkrieg", they planned to defeat the USSR in 9 weeks (!) Under a favorable scenario and in the case of the most unfavorable scenario in 17 weeks.
Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939
Weak points of E. Marx's plan: underestimation of the military power of the Red Army and the USSR as a whole; reassessment of their capabilities, i.e., the Wehrmacht; tolerances in a number of enemy response actions, thus, the ability of the military-political leadership in organizing defense, counterattacks, excessive hopes for the collapse of the state and political system, the state economy in the rejection of the western regions were underestimated. Opportunities to restore the economy and the army after the first defeats were excluded. The USSR was confused with Russia in 1918, when, during the collapse of the front, small German detachments on the railways were able to capture huge territories. A scenario was not developed in case the blitzkrieg escalated into a protracted war. In a word, the plan suffered from adventurism bordering on suicide. These mistakes were not eliminated later.
Thus, German intelligence failed to correctly assess the defense capability of the USSR, its military, economic, moral, political, and spiritual potentials. Gross mistakes were made in assessing the size of the Red Army, its mobilization potential, the quantitative and qualitative parameters of our Air Force and armored forces. So, according to the intelligence of the Reich, in the USSR, the annual production of aircraft in 1941 amounted to 3500-4000 aircraft, in reality, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army Air Force received 17,745 aircraft, of which 3,719 were new designs.
The top military leaders of the Reich were also captivated by the illusions of the "blitzkrieg", so, on August 17, 1940, at a meeting at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Keitel called "it is a crime to try to create at the present time such production capacities that will have an effect only after 1941. You can invest only in such enterprises that are necessary to achieve the goal and will give the appropriate effect.
Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939
Further development
Further development of the plan was entrusted to General F. Paulus, who received the post of Assistant Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. In addition, Hitler involved in the work of the generals, who were to become the chiefs of staff of the army groups. They had to independently investigate the problem. By September 17, this work was completed and Paulus could generalize the results. On October 29, he submitted a memorandum: "On the main idea of the operation against Russia." It emphasized that it was necessary to achieve the surprise of the strike, and for this, develop and implement measures to misinform the enemy. The need was pointed out to prevent the retreat of the Soviet border forces, to surround and destroy them in the border zone.
At the same time, the war plan was being developed at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the supreme command. At the direction of Jodl, Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg dealt with them. By September 15, he presented his war plan, many of his ideas were included in the final war plan: to destroy the main forces of the Red Army by lightning actions, preventing them from retreating to the east, to cut off western Russia from the seas - the Baltic and Black, to gain a foothold on such a line that would allow them to capture the most important regions of the European part of Russia, while becoming a barrier against its Asian part. Three army groups already appear in this development: "North", "Center" and "South". Moreover, Army Group Center received most of the motorized and tank forces, beat on Moscow, through Minsk and Smolensk. With the delay of the "North" group, which hit in the direction of Leningrad, the troops of the "Center", after the capture of Smolensk, were supposed to throw part of their forces in the northern direction. Army Group "South" was supposed to defeat the enemy troops, surrounding them, seize Ukraine, force the Dnieper, on its northern flank come into contact with the southern flank of the "Center" group. Finland and Romania were drawn into the war: the Finnish-German separate task force was to advance on Leningrad, part of the forces on Murmansk. The final frontier of the advance of the Wehrmacht. The fate of the Union was to be determined, whether there would be an internal catastrophe in it. Also, as in the Paulus plan, much attention was paid to the surprise factor of the strike.
Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus (1890-1957).
Meeting of the General Staff (1940). Participants of the meeting at the table with a map (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder.
Plan "Otto"
In the future, the development was continued, the plan was refined, on November 19, the plan, code-named "Otto", was considered by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces Brauchitsch. It was approved without significant comments. On December 5, 1940, the plan was presented to A. Hitler, the ultimate goal of the offensive of the three army groups was Arkhangelsk and Volga. Hitler approved it. From November 29 to December 7, 1940, according to the plan, a war game was held.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, the plan received the symbolic name "Barbarossa". Emperor Frederick the Redbeard was the initiator of a series of campaigns to the East. For the sake of secrecy, the plan was made only in 9 copies. For secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland were to receive specific tasks only before the start of the war. Preparations for the war were to be completed by May 15, 1941.
Walter von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941
The essence of the plan "Barbarossa"
The idea of "blitzkrieg" and surprise strike. The final goal for the Wehrmacht: the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.
The maximum concentration of forces of the ground forces and the air force. The destruction of the troops of the Red Army as a result of bold, deep and fast actions of tank "wedges". The Luftwaffe had to eliminate the possibility of effective actions of the Soviet Air Force at the very beginning of the operation.
The Navy performed auxiliary tasks: supporting the Wehrmacht from the sea; stopping the breakthrough of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea; protection of its coast; to tie down the Soviet naval forces with their actions, ensuring navigation in the Baltic and supplying the northern flank of the Wehrmacht by sea.
Strike in three strategic directions: northern - Baltic-Leningrad, central - Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow, southern - Kyiv-Volga. The main blow was in the central direction.
In addition to Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, there were other documents: directives and orders on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, camouflage, disinformation, preparation of a theater of operations, etc. So, on January 31, 1941, a directive was issued OKH (General Staff of the Ground Forces) on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, on February 15, 1941, an order was issued by the Chief of Staff of the High Command on camouflage.
A. Hitler personally had a great influence on the plan, it was he who approved the offensive by 3 army groups in order to capture the economically important regions of the USSR, insisted on special attention - to the zone of the Baltic and Black Seas, inclusion in the operational planning of the Urals and the Caucasus. He paid much attention to the southern strategic direction - the grain of Ukraine, the Donbass, the most important strategic importance of the Volga, the oil of the Caucasus.
Impact forces, army groups, other groupings
To beat were singled out huge forces: 190 divisions, of which 153 German (including 33 tank and motorized), 37 infantry divisions of Finland, Romania, Hungary, two-thirds of the Reich Air Force, naval forces, air forces and naval forces of Germany's allies. Berlin left only 24 divisions in the reserve of the high command. And even then, in the west and southeast, there remained divisions with limited strike capabilities, intended for protection and security. The only mobile reserve was two armored brigades in France armed with captured .
Army Group Center - commanded by F. Bock, it dealt the main blow - included two field armies - the 9th and 4th, two tank groups - the 3rd and 2nd, a total of 50 divisions and 2 brigades supported 2nd air. She was supposed to make a deep breakthrough south and north of Minsk with flank attacks (2 tank groups), encircle a large grouping of Soviet forces between Bialystok and Minsk. After the destruction of the encircled Soviet forces and reaching the Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk line, two scenarios were considered: the first, if Army Group North could not defeat the forces opposing it, send tank groups against them, and the field armies should continue to move to Moscow; second, if everything is going well with the Sever group, attack Moscow with all its might.
Fedor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940
Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal Leeb, it included the 16th and 18th field armies, 4 tank groups, a total of 29 divisions, with the support of the 1st air fleet. She was supposed to defeat the forces opposing her, capture the Baltic ports, Leningrad, bases Baltic Fleet. Then, together with the Finnish army and the German units transferred from Norway, they will break the resistance of the Soviet forces in the north of European Russia.
Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940
Army Group "South", which hit south of the Pripyat swamps, was commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundstedt. It included: the 6th, 17th, 11th field armies, the 1st tank group, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, the Hungarian mobile corps, with the support of the 4th Reich air fleet and the Romanian Air Force and Hungary. In total - 57 divisions and 13 brigades, of which 13 are Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades. Rundstedt was supposed to lead an offensive against Kyiv, defeat the Red Army in Galicia, in western Ukraine, capture the crossings across the Dnieper, creating the prerequisites for further offensive operations. To do this, the 1st Panzer Group, in cooperation with units of the 17th and 6th armies, was supposed to break through the defenses in the area between Rava Russa and Kovel, going through Berdichev and Zhitomir, to reach the Dnieper in the Kyiv region and to the south. Then strike along the Dnieper in a southeasterly direction to cut off the Red Army forces operating in Western Ukraine and destroy them. At this time, the 11th Army was supposed to give the Soviet leadership the appearance of the main blow from the territory of Romania, pinning down the forces of the Red Army and preventing them from leaving the Dniester.
The Romanian armies (plan "Munich") were also to tie down the Soviet troops, break through the defenses in the sector of Tsutsora, New Bedrazh.
Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939
The German army "Norway" and two Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway, in total 21 divisions and 3 brigades, with the support of the 5th Reich Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force. The Finnish units were to pin down the Red Army in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. When Army Group North entered the line of the Luga River, the Finns had to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and between the Onega and Ladoga lakes, in order to join the Germans on the Svir River and the Leningrad region, they had to take part in the capture of the second capital of the Union , the city should (or rather, this territory, the city planned to destroy, and the population "utilize") to go to Finland. The German army "Norway", with the help of two reinforced corps, was to launch an offensive against Murmansk and Kandalaksha. After the fall of Kandalaksha and access to the White Sea, the southern corps was to advance north, along railway and, together with the northern corps, capture Murmansk, Polyarnoye, destroying Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.
Discussion of the situation and issuance of orders in one of German units just before the attack on 06/22/1941
The overall plan for Barbarossa, like the early designs, was adventurous and based on a few "ifs". If the USSR is a “colossus with feet of clay”, if the Wehrmacht can do everything correctly and on time, if it is possible to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the border “boilers”, if the industry, the economy of the USSR will not be able to function normally after the loss of the western regions, especially Ukraine. The economy, the army, the allies were not prepared for a possible protracted war. Did not have strategic plan in case the blitzkrieg fails. In the end, when the blitzkrieg failed, we had to improvise.
Plan of the attack of the German Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union, June 1941
Sources:
The suddenness of the attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
The criminal goals of Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. Documents and materials. M., 1987.
http://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/History/Article/Pl_Barb.php
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000019/index.shtml
http://katynbooks.narod.ru/foreign/dashichev-01.htm
http://protown.ru/information/hide/4979.html
http://www.warmech.ru/1941war/razrabotka_barbarossa.html
http://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/germanyvsussr/5.htm?print=Y
But still, the main topics for discussion were precisely the invasion of Russia. In early August, Major General Erich Marx issued a report detailing the plan for the invasion of the USSR in May 1940. It was in August 1940 that the development of the Barbarossa plan was launched.
Adolf Hitler on August 1, 1940 signed another directive on the war against England at sea and in the air. If Vyacheslav Molotov, having become acquainted with this directive, he would have understood that the German indecision to wage a merciless war against England was subject to too great conditions. The Führer ordered only to intensify the air war against Great Britain, without using all the air resources.
The issue of equipping 180 divisions of the Wehrmacht with the latest tanks was resolved more quickly. The Germans had high hopes for the production capacities of the conquered Bohemia and Moravia. The Czechs never let the Germans down and always produced excellent and high-quality military equipment.
Adolf Hitler in the Reich Chancellery with representatives of the generals after he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal for the victory over France, September 1940. From left to right: Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group A von Rundtstedt, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group V von Bock, Reichsmarschall Göring, Hitler, Commander-in-Chief Ground Forces von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C Ritter von Leeb, Commander of the 12th Army General List, Commander of the 4th Army von Kluge, Commander of the 1st Army General Witzleben, Commander of the 6th Army General von Reichenau.
Goering in early August 1940 ordered his Air Force to start fighting over the south coast of England. The German Luftwaffe tried to involve all the available British air reserves in the battle. After that, the Germans planned to destroy all the industrial facilities of Great Britain through air strikes by bombers. The British understood the intention of the Germans and fully prepared to repel the blow. Marshal Hugh Dowding prudently relocated seven fighter squadrons to the north of the island of Great Britain, where they would play an important role in the battle for England.
During August, the Germans bombarded British ports, industrial plants and several bombs fell on residential areas of cities. In response, the RAF launched a retaliatory air strike on Berlin. Hitler was furious with such an act of the British. After that, he ordered to stop bombing British airfields and start massively bombing London. At this point, the big mistake of Hitler and Goering occurred. After all, the position of the British Air Force was critical, and it was precisely the respite that the Germans gave to the British that played a decisive role in the battle for England. The British held on to the edge of the abyss. At the end of August 1940, cultural centers, gathering places and historical centers of London were bombed in order to intimidate the population.
In parallel with the belief that the German landing on the coast of Great Britain is only a tactical threat and not a direct reality, the thought began to creep into the minds of the German commanders-in-chief that the German Luftwaffe could not surpass the Royal Air Force of England.
The air attack on Great Britain began on August 10, 1940. The Germans bombed ports, cities, airfields. The German fighters had one big minus - their flight range was 95 minutes. Very often it happened that the escort fighters left their bombers and returned back to the base right during the battle. Due to this minus, the losses of the bombers grew every year, and the German aces could not fully show their skills.
