Mannerheim line brick. Mannerheim line. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line. Common features of Finnish bunkers

The Mannerheim Line is a chain of military fortifications between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, consisting of interconnected fortified concrete structures - bunkers, which were part of the strongholds. Around them, mines and rows of barbed wire became impregnable barriers. In total, there were about 280 firing points on the Mannerheim line, extending 135 km wide and 90 km deep. The fortifications appeared in the 1920s on the initiative of the Finnish command to protect against Russian attacks. Supervised the creation of the fortification Oscar Enkel. Gradually, the structures were strengthened, and the quality of materials improved, thereby modernizing the line of defense.

During the Russian-Finnish war in 1939, the attacks of the Soviet troops of the fortified area ended in defeat. Combined with the rugged surroundings and the difficult terrain of the Karelian Isthmus, powerful defensive structures became impregnable. The line was named after the commander of the Finnish troops Karl Mannerheim. It was only two months later that the defenses were broken through, and this was the turning point of the Winter War. Immediately after that, the defensive line was undermined by sappers. Only engineering structures and many military facilities, remnants of shells, mines in a huge concentration remained in place, which turned the area into an open-air museum.

How to get there

On foot:
1. By train to Leipyasuo station, and from there along the forest path to the grader. Then turn left and go to height 65.5.
From the station Leipyasuo about 10 km.
2. By train to Kirillovskoye station, then by road to the tank range. At the training ground, go along the "Tank Director" to a height of 65.5.
From Kirillovsky to the training ground along an asphalt road - 10 km (you can catch a ride), along the "Tank Director" to a height of 65.5 - 4 km.
In total - 14 km.
3. By train to the Gavrilovo station, then along the road to the grader, then turn left and up to a height of 65.5.
Approximately - 12 km.

By car:

On the "Scandinavia" to Gavrilovo, then go to the grader and drive up to a height of 65.5.
From the interchange with the Ring Road to the height of 65.5 - about 100 km.

February 15, 1940 Soviet troops finally broke through the "Mannerheim Line"- a powerful complex of Finnish defensive structures, which was considered impregnable. This was the turning point in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and in military history as such. Today we will recall what this legendary Finnish defensive line was like and tell you about the six most interesting facts associated with the "Mannerheim Line" - the history of its construction and operation.

Mannerheim line or Enkel line?

The name of Mannerheim, the Finnish commander in chief, and then the President of Finland, was given to the line of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus only at the end of 1939, when a group of foreign journalists visited its construction site. The journalists returned home and wrote a series of reports about what they saw, in which they mentioned the term that later became official.

In Finland itself, this defense complex was for a long time called the "Enkel line" in honor of the chief of the General Staff of the young republic, who paid great attention to the construction of defensive structures on the southern borders of his homeland in the early 20s of the 20th century. Construction of the line began in 1920 and was suspended in 1924 when Enkel resigned from his post.

It was resumed only in 1932, when the legendary military leader Carl Gustav Mannerheim, who had become the head of the State Defense Committee the year before, rode with an inspection along the Enkel Line and gave the order to complete it, strengthen and modernize it.

What is the Mannerheim line?

This is really where you should have started. The "Mannerheim Line" is a giant defensive line built by the Finns in 1920-1939 near the border with Soviet Russia. It was created to stop the advance of the Red Army inland. And the fact that this will begin one day, in Helsinki, no doubt.

The line was created taking into account the landscape of the Karelian Isthmus and in the west rested on the Gulf of Finland, and in the east - in Ladoga. The complex of structures consisted of six lines of defense, of which the second, main, in fact, was the "Mannerheim Line".

It consisted of 22 nodes of resistance and separate strongholds. The landscape features made it possible to hold the defense on this line with small forces, while inflicting significant damage to the advancing enemy. And 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles, 330 kilometers of barbed wire, mines, gouges, ditches, pillboxes and bunkers did not contribute to the rapid breakthrough of this line.

The pillboxes and bunkers themselves were skillfully hidden from the eyes of the attackers, the relief made it possible to hide them, disguising them as hills with trees and other natural elements. During the Winter War, there was a rumor among Soviet soldiers that the Finnish bunkers were covered with rubber, which is why the shells that hit them bounce off - they could not explain the “survivability” of the enemy firing points otherwise.

Was the line really impregnable?

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 domestic propaganda claimed that the "Mannerheim Line" is one of the greatest defense systems built by Mankind, more impregnable than the legendary French "Maginot Line". That is why her breakthrough was presented as an unprecedented feat of Soviet soldiers. However, the Finnish field marshal himself, as well as most historians, were very skeptical about such statements.

The impregnability of the "Mannerheim Line" is a myth, blown up by the Western press and Soviet propaganda. Our command needed to justify the delays at the front (after all, a quick and victorious war was expected), the Finns raised the morale of the fighters with stories about the wonderful characteristics of the defense system, and the European media needed beautiful stories and hot facts.

In fact, the Mannerheim Line, despite its scale, had many significant shortcomings. Let's start with the fact that at the time of the outbreak of the war, it was not completed, and there was still quite a lot of construction work left. In addition, most of the equipment of this defensive complex in 1939 was noticeably outdated, and there were not so many modern firing points. And there was no talk of a great depth of defense.

Why did Soviet troops storm the Mannerheim Line for more than two months?

The war with Finland was conceived by the Soviet leadership as a quick armed conflict on foreign territory, which in a short time would end with the victory of our army. The fighting began on November 30, and already on December 12, the Red Army reached the front line of the main defense line of the Mannerheim Line. However, here they are stuck for two months.

The reason for this is the lack of accurate data on the structure of the Mannerheim Line, as well as the lack of personal strength and weapons appropriate for the task. At Soviet army there was not enough large-caliber artillery to destroy enemy concrete firing points and military experience in breaking through such barriers. And the command did not always behave competently.

For these and many other reasons, the battles for the "Mannerheim Line" lasted more than two months. And it was possible to break through it only in February 1940. The general offensive began on 11 February. The first breakthrough of the defensive shaft occurred on the 13th, and on the 15th the fall of the "Mannerheim Line" became irreversible - the 7th Army entered the rear of the Finnish troops, which forced them to retreat to a new line of defense. Thus was decided the fate of the Winter War.

The fighting escalated until March 12, after which the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed, which fixed the annexation of Soviet Union a number of Finnish border territories. In particular, the cities of Vyborg and Sortvalla, as well as the Khanka Peninsula in the depths of Finland, where a Soviet naval base was built, became Russian.

What is a "Karelian sculptor"?

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 gave the world several new terms. For example, "Molotov cocktail" and "Karelian sculptor". The last was the Soviet high-powered howitzer of the B-4 caliber, the projectile of which, after hitting the pillboxes and bunkers, turned these structures into a shapeless mess of concrete and reinforcement. These bizarre structures were visible from afar, which earned them the nickname "Karelian monuments". The Finns also called the B-4 howitzer "Stalin's sledgehammer."

What is now in place of the Mannerheim Line?

Immediately after the end of the Winter War, Soviet sappers made great efforts to destroy the remnants of the Mannerheim Line. Most of the firing points were blown up, only those engineering structures that could not be dismantled remained intact.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1941-1944, the Finns who again occupied these territories did not want to restore the Mannerheim Line, considering this case unpromising.

Now, from the once large-scale Finnish defense line, there are only scattered objects scattered throughout the Karelian Isthmus. They are an object of pilgrimage for lovers of military history and a few tourists. No attempts are being made to put this monument in order by the Russian or Finnish authorities. However, powerful reinforced concrete fortifications can stand for centuries even in the open air in harsh northern natural conditions.

In early November, as part of the crew of the test Toyota Venza, I went to St. Petersburg.
The plans were to see the grandiose Grand Layout, as well as to get acquainted with the famous complex of fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.

Leaving St. Petersburg early in the morning, we drove along the bay along a fantastically beautiful road through Zelenogorsk.

Only in 1940 did this territory become a suburb of Leningrad, and before that (from about 1917) it was "near Finland" - the city of Terijoki.
It's very beautiful around. These places have become a kind of St. Petersburg Rublyovka - a very prestigious direction.

While we are driving, I will tell you about the Mannerheim Line. This is more than 130 km complex of defensive structures between the Gulf of Finland and Ladoga, created on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus in 1920-1930.

Unfortunately, before the trip, I had little idea of the scale and location of the nodes of the Mannerheim Line, not to mention the fortified areas. Therefore, this time (and I am sure that I will come here again) we will see only a small part of the Summakyul fortified area (near the village of Kamenka).

The fortified area of Summakyulya (Summa-Khotinen) was located in the area of the village of the same name and blocked the Sredne-Vyborg highway. The fortified area included lines of anti-tank obstacles, barbed wire barriers, 18 concrete structures (two of which were not completed), built in two stages - in the early 1920s and in the 1930s. Part of the bunkers of the first period of construction was also reconstructed in the 1930s.

Photo from glebychevo.narod.ru

The first stop is pillbox Sk6. Little is left of it, because it was blown up by the soldiers of the Red Army. Only the cross indicates the place.

The Sk6 bunker was originally built in the 1920s as a frontal machine gun emplacement, and in the 1930s it was rebuilt as a flanking semi-canopy. This flanking bunker is located about 30 meters east of the Srednevyborzhskoye Highway. The explosion that destroyed the bunker was so strong that concrete blocks with reinforcement were scattered within a radius of several tens of meters.

Sk6 - Concrete single-hole machine-gun bunker of frontal fire built in 1920. It was modernized in 1938-1939. by adding a new reinforced concrete semi-caponier, designed for two easel machine guns with intersecting sectors of fire. The bunker was equipped with a ventilation system and a searchlight. In Soviet intelligence, it is listed under No. 36.

On December 24, 1939, the stone lining near the side wall was destroyed by Soviet artillery fire, which was later restored. Periodic shelling on January 13-16, 1940 repeatedly demolished this lining, which was restored at night. On December 31, a heavy projectile hit the corner of the bunker and demolished the slab, but the living compartment was not damaged. On February 9, 1940, a direct hit by two large-caliber shells destroyed the roof and wall of the structure. Completely destroyed by explosion after the end of hostilities.

Memorial plate near the bunker:

Across the road from sk6 is bunker sk5, which I mistakenly took for a slab thrown by the explosion.
Sk5 - Concrete machine-gun bunker with single embrasure frontal fire built in 1920. It was modernized in 1938-1939. by adding a side reinforced concrete caponier with an embrasure for an easel machine gun, an embrasure for a light machine gun, an armored cap and a searchlight. In Soviet intelligence it is listed under No. 31.

On December 19, 1939, Soviet tanks that broke through to the rear shot at the embrasure of the bunker, destroying the machine gun. On December 24 (according to other sources - December 29), as a result of powerful shelling, the old part of the bunker was completely destroyed. The armored cap, which received mechanical damage, was broken on January 22-23 (according to other sources - December 16) by five direct hits of 152-mm shells. At the same time, the front wall and part of the side wing were destroyed. The bunker was cleared of debris, while maintaining combat readiness. On February 9, 1940, the bunker withstood an 8-hour direct fire, but the next day the shells broke through the roof, and the garrison was forced to leave it.

Reinforcement and crumbling concrete stick out all around:

You can see the preserved embrasure:

The rest of the metal box of those years (does anyone know what they were kept?):

For more than half a century since the end of the fighting, a forest has grown here, but just a couple of years ago it burned out, and its remains were cut down.
As a result, now this place looks about the same as during the battles. Only instead of the blood-red autumn ground there should be snow.

The Sk10 bunker belongs to the "Millionnik" bunkers, so named because of the high construction costs - more than 1 million Finnish marks.
Schematically, the DOT looks like this:

Sk10 - Reinforced concrete bunker built in 1937-1939. It had three loopholes for heavy machine guns covering the entrances, and was also equipped with an eclipse gun carriage for an additional heavy machine gun.

The original project of a lifting carriage for an easel machine gun was proposed by the Finnish major (later Colonel) J.K. Fabricius. The machine gun was lowered manually into a special shaft of a concrete structure for shelter from enemy aimed fire. The lowering of the machine gun was carried out without much effort, due to the counterweight; at the right time, it could be raised again by opening the steel cover of the mine, and quickly prepared for firing. The cost of such an installation was much cheaper than a structure, such as an armored turret or an armored turret or an armored dome with a carriage.

At the design stage, the construction of the structure underwent various changes several times. The flank casemates were connected by underground barracks to the central casemate, their frontal walls were made of armor plates. Water supply in the bunker was equipped only in the first days of hostilities. The code name of the bunker is "Kyumppi" - "Chervonets". In Soviet intelligence it is listed under No. 40.

On December 19, 1939, the bunker received five direct hits from heavy shells, which did not cause significant damage to it. He withstood a series of subsequent shelling without needing repairs. The bunker was blown up at the end of hostilities.

The entrance to the western casemate looks like this:

The well in the central casemate of the bunker, it was in it that the carriage moved:

A hole in the wall (apparently from a direct hit):

I did not dare to go down inside, but from archival photographs you can imagine how everything was arranged

Despite the past time, the work of search engines and just diggers, the land around is literally stuffed with traces of battles:

Marking on the sleeve - '39:

Today, anti-tank gouges are an almost forgotten form of fighting enemy tanks. During the Soviet-Finnish war, gouges were a serious obstacle for Soviet tanks.

The main type of anti-tank gouges are reinforced concrete gouges made from high-strength fortified concrete. Ordinary building concrete is not suitable for these purposes, although it is forced to be used. Nadolbs can also be carved from wild stone (granite, basalt). The use of other materials is impractical. Wooden logs made of logs should not be taken seriously as an anti-tank obstacle.

In the absence of special equipment, stone gouges were transported on horse-drawn carts and installed manually. Colossal work.

Stone gouges were not installed anyhow, but according to strict rules:
- The lines of anti-tank gouges must be camouflaged as carefully as the lines of trenches, firing points. The enemy should not know about them until his tanks come across this obstacle. Moreover, he must be placed in such a position that he has no choice but to overcome them.

Barriers must be covered by rifle-machine-gun, mortar fire, the fire of own tanks and guns, and the fire of anti-tank weapons. After all, gouges are not capable of destroying or incapacitating an enemy tank. They can only delay it, stop it, force it to maneuver on the spot, i.e. create favorable conditions for his execution, turn him into a target.

Nadolby with their size and appearance should give the enemy tankers the impression of their surmountability, provoke the tank to move forward across the line.

The first row of gouges must be overcome by the tank when moving forward, but insurmountable when the tank moves in reverse (if he refused to try to overcome the second row). Its height should be somewhat greater than the tank's ground clearance (approximately 8-12 cm), the outer side (facing the enemy) is rather flat (the angle to the horizon is 30-35 degrees), and the opposite side is steep (the angle to the horizon is about 60 degrees).

The second row of gouges should be insurmountable by the tank as it moves forward, but visually (at least when viewed from the first row) should leave the impression of surmountability. Its height should be 15-25 cm more than the height of the gouges of the first row. The shape is identical to the gouge of the first row.

The third and subsequent rows of gouges should represent, as it were, a reserve of the barrier line in case the enemy tanks somehow managed to overcome the second row (by blowing up the gouges, destroying them with artillery fire, etc.). The main requirement for the gouges of the third and subsequent rows is high strength, resistance to explosion. The height is the same as the second row or higher by 25 cm. These gouges should be much wider at the base, the steepness of the edges is about 60-70 degrees.

It is advisable to mine the gaps between the gouges and between the rows with anti-personnel mines, especially the area between the second and third (and subsequent) rows in order to make it difficult or exclude the work of the enemy demolitionists to destroy the gouges. Installation of anti-tank mines is impractical, because. these mines can be quickly removed (or destroyed) by the enemy and used to destroy gouges.

The distance between the gouges in a row must necessarily be about three-quarters of the width of the tank. This is necessary in order for the tank to be tempted to overcome the line by running one caterpillar onto a gouge. With a small distance between the gouges, the tank will simply give up trying to overcome it.

The next and final point of inspection of the Summakyul resistance node was the bunker Sk16.
The battalion command post Sk16 is one of the eighteen concrete objects of the fortified area Summakyulya (Summa-Khotinen). It is located at the side of the Sredne-Vyborgskoye Highway.
The eastern part of the shelter was blown up in 1940, while the roof of the eastern part was turned over by the explosion and overturned on top of the roof of the western part. It had two loopholes for light machine guns that covered the entrances.

In 1941, Soviet builders built a bunker close to the wall of the bunker. After the occupation of this territory by Finnish troops, a small camp of Soviet prisoners of war was located here.

During the war, the bunker was disguised with netting and spruce groves, the Finns had shepherd dogs and some kind of life inside (photo taken on December 14, 1939):

Since, due to its location, the bunker was not damaged during the war, it ceased to exist only in 1940.

Unfortunately, that's all we saw that day. This is catastrophically small and I am sure that I will return to the Mannerheim Line again.

Point coordinates:
Bunker Sk5 - 60.505278, 29.016111
Bunker Sk6 - 60.505278, 29.016944
Finnish mass grave - 60.508056, 29.021944
Hopper Sk10 - 60.505556, 29.033056
Bunker Sk16 - 60.512214, 29.009698

Mannerheim line(Fin. Mannerheim-linja) - a complex of defensive structures between the Gulf of Finland and Ladoga, created in 1920-1930 on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus to deter a possible offensive strike from the USSR 132-135 km long. This line became the site of the most significant fighting in the "Winter War" of 1940 and received great fame in the international press. Three lines of defense were planned between Vyborg and the border with the USSR. The one closest to the border was called “main”, then there was “intermediate”, near Vyborg “rear”. The most powerful node of the main line was located in the Summakyl area, the place of the greatest threat of a breakthrough. During the Winter War, the Finnish and Western press named the complex of the main defensive line after the commander-in-chief, Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the defense complex were created.

The defenses of the Mannerheim Line were greatly exaggerated by propaganda on both sides.

Geographical characteristics of the area

As follows from the geological map of the Karelian Isthmus, the main line of defense in its most critical western section ran approximately along the border of the discordant location of geological morphostructures: to the northwest, these were rapakivi granites and gneisses, to the southeast, clays with sandstone interlayers, which was typical for preglacial times. After the end of the epochs of glaciation, all this was buried under a layer of moraine deposits brought by repeatedly retreating glaciers. A hilly-hollow kame relief, characteristic of this area, was formed, composed of glacial sandy deposits.

The basis of the defense was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of medium and small lakes and rivers. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. Rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere in the forests. With the rational placement of nodes of resistance and the firing positions of each of them, the terrain made it possible to organize an effective defense with relatively small forces. This was noted by Mannerheim during his inspection of the then-existing "Enckel Line" in 1931. At the same time, he noted its significant drawback, which consisted in the absence of a rocky foundation, which significantly increased the cost of building modern pillboxes, requiring the creation of a concrete "cushion" under them, which prevented the structure from sinking into the ground. It was decided to take the existing facilities of the Enckel Line as a basis and seek funds for their modernization and the construction of modern pillboxes.

Name

The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish war in December 1939, when the Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in the autumn, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work on the complex. At that time much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Akseli Galen-Kallela, Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the journalists, in a conversation called the complex of defensive structures the "Mannerheim Line". With the outbreak of the Winter War, this name appeared in newspaper articles, whose journalists inspected the buildings in the fall of 1939.

History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after the independence of Finland in 1918. Construction continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.

The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.

Work on the defense plan was continued by German Colonel Baron von Brandenstein (O. von Brandenstein). The plan was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and it all came down to the work of the Finnish training sapper battalion:

On the main defensive strip, 18 defense units of various degrees of power were built. The system of fortifications also included a rear defensive line that covered the approaches to Vyborg. It included 10 defense nodes:

"R" - Rempetti [now Key]
"Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct]
"Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinsky]
"Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe]
"Le" - Leviainen [non-existent]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo]
"Y.-Sa" - Julia-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo]
"Ly" - Luyukulya [now Ozernoe]

The knot of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and 1.5-2 kilometers in depth. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mostly machine-gun and much less often artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.

Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which connected the structures of the node, and, if necessary, could be turned into trenches. There were no trenches between nodes of resistance. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one to three shooters. There were also rifle cells covered with armored shields with visors. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire.

The flanks of the line rested against the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim Line" are divided into buildings of the first (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

The pillboxes of the first generation were small, one-story, for one or three machine guns, they did not have shelters for the garrison and internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coverage - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures, some of which were removed from the fortifications of the "Ino" fort. The concrete structures of the Enckel Line were built with little or no steel reinforcement.

Some second-generation pillboxes were dubbed by the Finnish press as "million" or millionaire pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded one million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such bunkers were built. The initiator of their construction was Karl Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, who obtained additional appropriations from the country's parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified were the defense units that were part of the system (which, at the cost of extremely large losses of the attackers, broke through the main line of fortifications - Summa-Khotinen) Sj4 "Poppius" pillboxes, which had embrasures of flanking fire in the western casemate and Sj5 "Millionaire ”, with loopholes for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers fired machine guns at the flank of the entire hollow, covering each other's front. The bunkers of flanking fire were called the Le Bourget casemate, after the name of the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some pillboxes in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into casemates for flanking fire, while the frontal embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made it difficult to detect them, in addition, it was almost impossible to break through the casemate with artillery from the front.

"Million" bunkers were reinforced concrete structures in the form of combat casemates buried in the ground for flanking or frontal fire, connected by an underground shelter-barracks. The number of embrasures could reach up to 4-6, of which in rare cases (4% of the total number of bunkers) one or two were gun-mounted, mainly of flanking action. The usual weapons of the bunkers equipped with artillery were Russian 76-mm cannons of the 1900 model of the year on casemate machines Durlyakhov and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model of the year on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

Back on December 17, when the troops came under fire from the Sj4 and Sj5 pillboxes, Meretskov doubted the existence of long-term fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus at all, since he did not have reliable data on their discovery.

Engineering barriers

The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. Additionally, slingshots were installed, which were somewhat different from Soviet slingshots or Bruno's spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were supplemented by anti-tank ones.

In order to save money, the gouges were made of low-quality concrete, which easily crumbled under the fire of the guns of the T-28 and T-28M tanks, which were widely used in the Winter War, with a caliber of 76.2 mm. They were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with barbed wire, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned simultaneously into anti-personnel ones. The most powerful obstacles were at a height of 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen, at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhbolotny and Sumy nodes of resistance. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To undermine the gouge, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three to four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front line of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and bunkers was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually on the outskirts locality and were built of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. Such houses, if necessary, turned into defensive fortifications.

Finnish sappers managed to build about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of barbed wire along the main defense line.

During the war, the line held the offensive of the Red Army for about two months. On the part of the USSR, on the entire Soviet-Finnish front from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Ocean, initially (on November 30, 1939) participated: 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 armies, 2900 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 24 divisions with a total number of 425,000 people .

In total, for the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, 40 rifle divisions, 11 motorized rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 2 cavalry divisions, 2 motorized cavalry divisions, 1 reserve rifle brigade, 1 motorized rifle and machine gun brigade took part in the war from the USSR brigade, 1 brigade of reserve troops, 8 tank brigades, 3 airborne brigades, and 4 rifle divisions of the Finnish People's Army. Total - 67 settlement divisions.

In December 1939, five Soviet rifle divisions of the 7th Army were sent to three Finnish divisions in permanent fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Later, the ratio became 6:9, but this is still far from the normal ratio between the defender and the attacker in the direction of the main attack, 1:3.

From the Finnish side on the Karelian Isthmus there were 6 infantry divisions (4th, 5th, 11th infantry division of the II army corps, 8th and 10th infantry division of the III army corps, 6th infantry division in reserve), 4 infantry brigades , one cavalry brigade and 10 battalions (individual, chasseurs, mobile, coastal defense). A total of 80 settlement battalions. FROM Soviet side 9 rifle divisions (24, 90, 138, 49, 150, 142, 43, 70, 100th rifle divisions), 1 rifle and machine-gun brigade (as part of the 10th tank corps) and 6 tank brigades advanced on the Karelian Isthmus. A total of 84 calculated rifle battalions. The number of Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus was 130 thousand people, 360 guns and mortars and 25 tanks. The Soviet command had a manpower in the amount of 400,000 people (introduced into fighting in parts - at the beginning there were 169 thousand), 1500 guns, 1000 tanks and 700 aircraft

There were 150 machine-gun bunkers on the Mannerheim line (of which 13 were two-machine-gun and 7 were three-machine-gun, the rest had one machine gun), 8 artillery bunkers, 9 command bunkers and 41 shelters (shelter). Basically, terrain features were used for defense. The amount of concrete spent on the entire 135 km line (14,520 cubic meters) is less than was spent on the building of the Finnish National Opera in Helsinki.

The Finnish patriotic song Mannerheimin linjalla (“On the Mannerheim Line”, composer Matti Jurva, lyrics by Tatu Pekkarinen) was dedicated to the actions of Finnish soldiers on the Mannerheim Line.

Training troops to break through the Mannerheim Line

By the beginning of the war and during its course, the engineering intelligence of the 7th Army had not been formalized organizationally. The engineering troops did not have special reconnaissance groups or units. According to the wartime states, intelligence squads were provided as part of the control platoons of engineer battalions, but they were not ready to perform the complex and diverse tasks of special engineering intelligence. Therefore, the engineering troops did not have specific data on the nature of the engineering preparation of the Finnish troops for the war. The description of the fortified area on the Karelian Isthmus was given in general strokes, the drawings of reinforced concrete points in the majority turned out to be incorrect, and the designs of anti-tank mines were a surprise. There was not enough information about the types of anti-tank barriers.

A frontal strike carried out from the move did not give a result. It was not even possible to establish the location of the enemy's defense points. Together with poor preparation offensive operation, the lack of forces and means came to an understanding of the impossibility of mastering the main line of defense on the move. It became clear that to overcome the Mannerheim Line, a completely different procedure and thorough special training were required.

To practice actions on the ground, the captured Finnish training ground in Bobochino (Kamenka) was adapted. Boss engineering troops 7th Army A.F. Khrenov developed a draft instruction for breaking through the defense line. The front commander approved it, making several additions and clarifications.

The instruction provided for a thorough artillery preparation, conducted not by area, but by specific targets. It was forbidden to throw infantry into the offensive before the pillboxes on the front line of the enemy’s defense were destroyed. To block and destroy pillboxes, it was prescribed to create assault groups at the rate of three per rifle battalion. The group included one rifle and one machine-gun platoon, two or three tanks, one or two 45-mm guns, from a squad to a platoon of sappers, and two or three chemists. Sappers were to have 150-200 kg of explosives for each pillbox, as well as mine detectors, wire shears, and fascines to overcome ditches by tanks. In addition to the assault groups, more obstacle and recovery groups were created.

A.F. Khrenov was entrusted with organizing the classes and monitoring their progress. Studies and training were conducted during the day and, most importantly, at night. The lesson began with an imitation of artillery preparation. Then, under the cover of shooters and machine gunners, sappers with mine detectors moved forward. On their way there were "mines" that had to be discovered and neutralized in order to open the way for infantry and tanks. After that, the sappers cut the barbed wire and undermined the gouges.

Then infantry and tanks moved forward, artillery was brought to direct fire. It was assumed that the pillbox was not yet suppressed, but its combat power was weakened. The actions of the infantry, artillerymen and tankers were supposed to make it easier for the sappers to complete the main task: to go to the rear of the pillbox with the necessary amount of explosive and blow up the structure. Thus, the assault group fulfilled its purpose, and the entire battalion went on the attack. Battalion after battalion, regiment after regiment passed through the training ground. Not a single one of the units that had to operate on any of the sectors of the 110-kilometer front passed it. It took about a month to complete the instructions.

In addition, manuals, memos, instructions on engineering were developed and sent to the troops. They helped the personnel of the engineering troops to better study the engineering weapons of the Finns, various kinds of obstacles, master the new engineering weapons of the Red Army and learn how to use them. effective application. The measures taken made it possible to meet the needs of the engineering troops of the front with trained command personnel and Red Army personnel.

Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line

On February 11, 1940, at 9:40 am, salvos of artillery preparation that lasted for more than two hours announced the start of the general offensive of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus. Artillery fire was long and devastating. In the 7th Army, guns fired for 2 hours and 20 minutes, in the 13th - 3 hours. Shortly before the end of the fire, the infantry and tanks moved forward and at exactly 12 noon went on the offensive. The 7th Army hit the Mannerheim Line west of Lake Muolaanyarvi. The right flank of the army rushed to Vyborg through Kamarya, the left - to Makslahti. Following the barrage of artillery explosions, units of the 245th regiment of the 123rd rifle division, along the trenches-saps, came close to the line of gouges, and, together with two tank battalions, captured the eastern slopes of height 65.5 (Fortified area Sj Summa- Lyakhde) and the Molotok grove.

In close combat, the resistance of the strongholds of the Sumy defense center was broken. Building on success, 245th rifle regiment launched an offensive in the direction of the Figurnaya grove. By the end of the day, the 123rd division, having destroyed 8 reinforced concrete bunkers and about 20 bunkers, advanced one and a half kilometers deep into the Finnish defense. Units of the 24th Infantry Division in the Vaixiane area reached the edge of the Redkaya grove and in hand-to-hand combat captured a key position - the height dominating the grove.

February 12-13 passed in stubborn counterattacks of the Finnish troops, who were trying to regain their lost positions. But the wedge of the Soviet offensive slowly widened the breakthrough gap. By the end of February 13, on the third day of the offensive, the 123rd rifle division with tanks attached to it - the 112th tank battalion of the 35th light tank brigade and the 90th battalion of the 20th tank brigade - broke through the main defensive strip to its entire depth ( 6-7 km), expanding the breakthrough to 6 km. The Sumy node of resistance, with its 12 bunkers and 39 bunkers, was completely defeated. On February 14, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded the 123rd Infantry Division of Colonel F.F. Alyabushev with the Order of Lenin.

Parts of the 123rd Rifle Division managed to advance up to 7 kilometers into the depth of the Finnish defense and expand the breakthrough along the front to 6 kilometers. During heavy fighting, 12 bunkers and 39 enemy bunkers were destroyed. Successful operations in the offensive zone of the division were largely facilitated by effective shelling by artillery. An important role was also played by two prototypes of the KV-2 tank, which largely destroyed the combat positions and barriers of the Sumy resistance center, but got stuck in the thick of anti-tank barriers.

On February 14, consolidating the success of the 123rd Infantry Division, the command of the North-Western Front sent additional forces into battle. Developing a breakthrough in depth, the 84th Infantry Division struck in the direction of Leipyasuo. The offensive of the 7th Infantry Division was aimed to the north-west, bypassing the Khotinensky knot of resistance. The exit to the rear of the Finnish positions of the 7th division chained a significant part of the 11th Finnish corps to itself, thereby allowing the 100th rifle division to take Khotinen with a frontal attack on February 15th. On February 16, the offensive of the 138th and 113th rifle divisions created a threat of bypassing the Karkhul knot (Dyatlovo) of resistance.

The fighting in the breakthrough sector of the 13th Army also developed successfully. On February 11, the left-flank units of the army achieved the greatest result, the 136th Infantry Division, with the support of the 39th Tank Brigade, broke through into the depths of the Finnish defense in the direction of the isthmus between the lakes Muolaanyarvi (Deep) and Yayuryapyaanyarvi (Big Cancer). The offensive on the right flank was somewhat lagging behind. In the region of lakes Punnusjärvi and Kirkkojärvi, the advance of the Soviet troops was held back by a powerful defensive center of the enemy. Stubborn battles unfolded for the heights of "Round", "Melon", "Rooster".

By mid-February, units of the 13th Army, overcoming fierce resistance from the Finns, reached the Muolaa-Ilves-Salmenkaita-Ritasari line.

After the war Finnish defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus were destroyed. Special teams of sappers dismantled and blew up long-term firing points that had survived during recent fighting. Separate parts of Finnish pillboxes - fragments of concrete and armored caps - took places as exhibits in the expositions of Moscow and Leningrad museums dedicated to the last war. In the spring of 1941, an armored cap, internal equipment, ventilation devices and doors dismantled from the bunker of the fortified Summa unit were delivered to Moscow. An eight-ton viewing armored cap was installed in the park of the Central House of the Red Army. The remaining exhibits were planned to be presented at summer exhibitions in other parks of the capital.

Estimates of the defensive value of the line

Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify a long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population.

Here is the opinion of the fortified line of one of the official participants and leaders of the armed conflict - Mannerheim:

... the Russians, even during the war, set in motion the myth of the "Mannerheim Line". It was asserted that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus was based on an unusually strong and state-of-the-art defensive wall, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The breakthrough of the Russians was “a feat that has not been equaled in the history of all wars” ... All this is nonsense; in reality, the situation looks completely different .... Of course, there was a defensive line, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the Mannerheim Line. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.

- Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Memoirs. Publishing house "VAGRIUS". 1999. p. 319: line 17 bottom; p. 320: lines 1 and 2 from above. ISBN 5-264-00049-2

The senior instructor of the Belgian Maginot Line, General Badu, who worked as Mannerheim's technical adviser, wrote:

Nowhere in the world natural conditions were not as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. From wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete, the famous Mannerheim line was built. The greatest fortress of the Mannerheim Line is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was not enough granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.

Isaev A.V. Ten myths of the Second World War. Publishing house Eksmo

However, the Russian historian A. Isaev notes that the territory of the Karelian Isthmus as a whole is flat and the picture of powerful granite fortifications is simply fantastic. According to him:

In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete buildings in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the "millionth" type had two levels, three more pillboxes had three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly buried in the ground with embrasures and completely buried galleries connecting them with barracks. Structures with what can be called floors were negligible"

- Isaev A.V. Ten myths of World War II. Publishing house Eksmo

This is much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov Line, not to mention the Maginot Line, with two-three-story caponiers, underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow-gauge railways (in France). The gouges were designed for obsolete Renault tanks of 1918 and were weak against the new Soviet technology.

Anastas Mikoyan later wrote: “ Stalin, an intelligent, capable person, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered the well-equipped Mannerheim Line. A special motion picture was released showing these installations to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win.»

On his own initiative, the largest structures of the defense complex were created.

The defenses of the Mannerheim Line were greatly exaggerated by propaganda on both sides.

Geographical characteristics of the area

As follows from the geological map of the Karelian Isthmus, the main line of defense in its most critical western section ran approximately along the border of the discordant location of geological morphostructures: to the northwest they were rapakivi granites and gneisses, to the southeast - clays with sandstone interlayers, which was typical for preglacial times. After the end of the epochs of glaciation, all this was buried under a layer of moraine deposits brought by repeatedly retreating glaciers. A hilly-hollow kame relief, characteristic of this area, was formed, composed of glacial sandy deposits.

The basis of the defense was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of medium and small lakes and rivers. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. Rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere in the forests. With the rational placement of nodes of resistance and firing positions of each of them, the terrain made it possible to organize an effective defense with relatively small forces. This was noted by Mannerheim during his inspection of the then-existing "Enckel Line" in 1931. At the same time, he noted its significant drawback, which consisted in the absence of a rocky foundation, which significantly increased the cost of building modern bunkers, requiring the creation of a concrete "cushion" under them, which prevented the structure from sinking into the ground. It was decided to take the existing facilities of the Enckel Line as a basis and seek funds for their modernization and the construction of modern bunkers.

Name

The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish war in December 1939, when the Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in the autumn, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work on the complex. Much was written at that time about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Akseli Galen-Kallela, Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the journalists, in a conversation called the complex of defensive structures the "Mannerheim Line". With the outbreak of the Winter War, this name appeared in newspaper articles, whose journalists inspected the buildings in the fall of 1939.

History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after the independence of Finland in 1918. Construction continued intermittently until the start of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.

The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.

Pillbox SJ-5, sweeping areas to Lake Zhelannoye to the west, and to Pillbox SJ-4 to the east (2009)

"N" - Humaljoki [now Ermilovo]
"K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo]
"N" - Nyayukki [now defunct.]
"Ko" - Kolmikeeyala [non-existent]
"Well" - Hülkeyala [non-existent]
"Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
"Sk" - Summakylä [non-existent]
"La" - Lahde [not creatures]
"A" - Eyyräpää (Leipäsuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankylä [now Mushroom]
"Ma" - Sikniemi [non-existent]
"Ma" - Myalkelya [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [non-existent]
"No" - Neusniemi [now Cape]
"Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo]
"Ke" - Cell [now Portovoye]
"Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects the armored cap on the Finnish bunker Sk2

"R" - Rempetti [now Key]
"Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct]
"Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoe]
"Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe]
"Le" - Leviainen [non-existent]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo]
"Y.-Sa" - Julia-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo]
"Ly" - Luyukulya [now Ozernoe]

The knot of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and 1.5-2 kilometers in depth. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine-gun and much less often artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.

Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches that linked the structures of the node, and if necessary, could be turned into trenches. There were no trenches between nodes of resistance. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one to three shooters. There were also rifle cells covered with armored shields with visors. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire.

The flanks of the line ran into the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim Line" are divided into buildings of the first (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

Engineering barriers

During the war, the line held the offensive of the Red Army for about two months. On the part of the USSR, on the entire Soviet-Finnish front from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Ocean, initially (on November 30, 1939) participated: , 8, 9, 13, 14 armies, 2900 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 24 divisions with a total number of 425,000 people.

In total, for the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, 40 rifle divisions, 11 motorized rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 2 cavalry divisions, 2 motorized cavalry divisions, 1 reserve rifle brigade, 1 motorized rifle and machine gun brigade , 1 brigade of reserve troops, 8 tank brigades, 3 airborne brigades, as well as 4 rifle divisions of the Finnish People's Army. Total - 67 settlement divisions. [ ]

From the Finnish side on the Karelian Isthmus there were 6 infantry divisions (4th, 5th, 11th infantry division of the II army corps, 8th and 10th infantry division of the III army corps, 6th infantry division in reserve), 4 infantry brigades , one cavalry brigade and 10 battalions (individual, chasseurs, mobile, coastal defense). A total of 80 settlement battalions. From the Soviet side, 9 rifle divisions (24, 90, 138, 49, 150, 142, 43, 70, 100th rifle divisions), 1 rifle and machine gun brigade (as part of the 10th tank corps) and 6 tank brigades. A total of 84 calculated rifle battalions. The number of Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus was 130 thousand people, 360 guns and mortars and 25 tanks. The Soviet command had manpower in the amount of 400,000 people (introduced into hostilities in parts - at the beginning there were 169 thousand), 1,500 guns, 1,000 tanks and 700 aircraft

There were 150 machine-gun bunkers on the Mannerheim line (of which 13 were two-machine-gun and 7 were three-machine-gun, the rest had one machine gun), 8 artillery bunkers, 9 command bunkers and 41 shelters (shelter). Basically, terrain features were used for defense. The amount of concrete spent on the entire 135-kilometer line (14,520 cubic meters) is less than was spent on the building of the Finnish National Opera in Helsinki [ ] .

First assault

By the beginning of the war and during it, the engineering intelligence of the 7th Army had not been institutionalized. The engineering troops did not have special reconnaissance groups or units. According to the wartime states, intelligence squads were provided as part of the control platoons of engineer battalions, but they were not ready to perform the complex and diverse tasks of special engineering intelligence. Therefore, the engineering troops did not have specific data on the nature of the engineering preparation of the Finnish troops for the war. The description of the fortified area on the Karelian Isthmus was given in general strokes, the drawings of reinforced concrete points in the majority turned out to be incorrect, and the designs of anti-tank mines were a surprise. There was not enough information about the types of anti-tank barriers.

A frontal strike carried out from the move did not give a result. It was not even possible to establish the location of the enemy's defense points. Along with the poor preparation of the offensive operation, the lack of forces and means, came the realization that it was impossible to capture the main line of defense on the move. It became clear that to overcome the Mannerheim Line, a completely different procedure and thorough special training were required.

Training troops to break through the Mannerheim Line

The captured Finnish training ground in Bobochin (Kamenka) was adapted to practice actions on the ground. The head of the engineering troops of the 7th Army, A.F. Khrenov, developed a draft instruction for breaking through the defense line. The front commander approved it, making several additions and clarifications.

Then infantry and tanks moved forward, artillery was brought to direct fire. It was assumed that the bunker had not yet been suppressed, but its combat power had been weakened. The actions of the infantry, artillerymen and tankers were supposed to make it easier for the sappers to complete the main task: to go to the rear of the bunker with the necessary amount of explosive and blow up the structure. Thus, the assault group fulfilled its purpose, and the entire battalion went on the attack. Battalion after battalion, regiment after regiment passed through the training ground. Not a single one of the units that had to operate on any of the sectors of the 110-kilometer front passed it. It took about a month to complete the instructions.

In addition, manuals, memos, instructions on engineering were developed and sent to the troops. They helped the personnel of the engineering troops to better study the engineering weapons of the Finns, various kinds of obstacles, master the new engineering weapons of the Red Army and learn how to use them effectively. The measures taken made it possible to meet the needs of the engineering troops of the front with trained command personnel and Red Army personnel.

Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line

Scheme of the fortified area Summajärvi - Lyakhde. It was in this fortified area that the 123rd Rifle Division broke through the Mannerheim Line.

In close combat, the resistance of the strongholds of the Sumy defense center was broken. Building on success, the 245th Infantry Regiment launched an offensive in the direction of the Figurnaya grove. By the end of the day, the 123rd division, having destroyed 8 reinforced concrete bunkers and about 20 bunkers, advanced one and a half kilometers deep into the Finnish defense. Parts of the 24th Infantry Division in the Vaisyanen area reached the edge of the Redkaya grove and in hand-to-hand combat captured a key position - the height dominating the grove.

February 12-13 passed in stubborn counterattacks of the Finnish troops, who were trying to regain their lost positions. But the wedge of the Soviet offensive slowly widened the breach. By the end of February 13, on the third day of the offensive, the 123rd rifle division with tanks attached to it - the 112th tank battalion of the 35th light tank brigade and the 90th battalion of the 20th tank brigade - broke through the main defensive strip to its entire depth ( 6-7 km), expanding the breakthrough to 6 km. The Sumy node of resistance with its 12 bunkers and 39 bunkers was completely destroyed. On February 14, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded the 123rd Rifle Division of Colonel F.F. Alyabushev with the Order of Lenin.

Parts of the 123rd Rifle Division managed to advance up to 7 kilometers into the depth of the Finnish defense and expand the breakthrough along the front to 6 kilometers. During heavy fighting, 12 bunkers and 39 enemy bunkers were destroyed. Successful operations in the offensive zone of the division were largely facilitated by effective shelling by artillery. An important role was also played by two prototypes of the KV-1 tank, which largely destroyed the combat positions and barriers of the Sumy resistance center, but got stuck in the thick of anti-tank barriers.

By mid-February, units of the 13th Army, overcoming fierce resistance from the Finns, reached the Muolaa-Ilves-Salmenkaita-Ritasari line.

Modern view of the South-East (to the "Valley of Death") Left - UR Summa-Khotinen, right UR Summa - Lyakhde. Next Karhul

After the war, the Finnish defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus were destroyed. Special teams of sappers dismantled and blew up long-term firing points that had survived during recent fighting. Separate parts of Finnish bunkers - fragments of concrete and armored caps - took places as exhibits in the expositions of Moscow and Leningrad museums dedicated to the Soviet-Finnish war. In the spring of 1941, an armored cap, internal equipment, ventilation devices and doors dismantled from the bunker of the fortified Summa unit were delivered to Moscow. An eight-ton viewing armored cap was installed in the park of the Central House of the Red Army. The remaining exhibits were planned to be presented at summer exhibitions in other parks of the capital. [ ]

Estimates of the defensive value of the line

Here is an opinion about the fortified line of one of the official participants and leaders of the armed conflict - Mannerheim:

... the Russians, even during the war, set in motion the myth of the "Mannerheim Line". It was asserted that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus was based on an unusually strong and state-of-the-art defensive wall, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The breakthrough of the Russians was “a feat that has not been equaled in the history of all wars” ... All this is nonsense; in reality, the situation looks completely different .... Of course, there was a defensive line, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the Mannerheim Line. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.
- Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Memoirs. Publishing house "VAGRIUS". 1999. p. 319: line 17 bottom; p. 320: lines 1 and 2 from above. ISBN 5-264-00049-2

The senior instructor of the Belgian Maginot Line, General Badu, who worked as Mannerheim's technical adviser, wrote:

Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. From wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete, the famous Mannerheim line was built. The greatest fortress of the Mannerheim Line is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was not enough granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.
Senior instructor of the Belgian "Maginot Line" General Badu

However, the Russian historian A. Isaev notes that the territory of the Karelian Isthmus as a whole is flat and the picture of powerful granite fortifications is simply fantastic. According to him:

In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete buildings in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the "millionth" type had two levels, three more pillboxes had three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly buried in the ground with embrasures and completely buried galleries connecting them with barracks. Structures with what can be called floors were negligible"
- Isaev A.V. Ten myths of World War II. Publishing house Eksmo

This is much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov Line, not to mention the Maginot Line, with two or three-story caponiers, underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow gauge railways (in France). The gouges were designed for obsolete Renault tanks of 1918 and were weak against the new Soviet technology.