Japanese Navy today. Ships of the Japanese Navy. Organizational structure of the Navy
Naval Forces
As a result of Japan's defeat in World War II, its armed forces were disbanded. However, in 1950 the Japanese government, under the pretext of the need to maintain order in the country and with the consent of the American occupation authorities, created a "reserve police corps" of 75 thousand people. In August 1952, the "reserve police corps" was transformed into a "security corps". In 1953, its number increased to 110 thousand people.
In May 1954, in accordance with a specially adopted law, the so-called self-defense forces were created on the basis of the "security corps", which are legally entrusted with the task of defending the country from an external enemy, as well as assisting the police in suppressing anti-government protests inside the country.
Yes, contrary to the rules Potsdam Declaration, the act of surrender and article 9 of the Constitution of 1947, in Japan, the organizational foundations were laid for the creation and build-up of national armed forces as part of ground forces, air force and navy.
The Navy is a branch of the Japanese armed forces. They are designed to solve the tasks of protecting sea lanes, their own naval bases, bases and ports, combating enemy ship groups, blockade of strait zones in the area of the Japanese Islands, providing antiamphibious defense and landing amphibious assault, organization of maritime transportation in the interests of all armed forces, both independently and in cooperation with other branches of the national armed forces and the US Armed Forces.
In peacetime, the Naval Forces, in cooperation with the forces of the Department of Maritime Protection, carry out sentinel service, carry out measures to maintain a favorable operational regime in the adjacent waters, and ensure the protection of the territorial waters of Japan.
The basis of the naval forces are escort and submarine forces, as well as fleet aviation. Mine-sweeping and amphibious landing forces are an important component of the Navy. The fleet has more than 110 warships, including 16 submarines, 100 base patrol aircraft and over 100 combat helicopters.
Organizational structure of the Navy
The command of the naval forces is carried out by the commander (he is also the chief of staff) of the Navy (the staff category is admiral). The commander is subordinate to his deputy (staff category - vice admiral), inspector and chief physician of the Navy (staff category - rear admiral).
Organizationally, the structure of the naval forces includes: a headquarters, a fleet, five naval regions, a training aviation command, as well as formations, units and institutions of central subordination - a squadron of training ships, a communications regiment, three directorates: MTO of the Navy, military police of the Navy, Oceanography, Naval Central Counterintelligence Division, Tokyo Support Battalion, Hospitals (five), Underwater Medicine Research Laboratory, educational establishments(six), Editorial and Publishing Department, Tokyo Navy Band.
Fleet
The Japanese Navy is headed by a Commander (regular category - Vice Admiral), who is subordinate to the headquarters, three commands (escort and submarine forces, aviation), a minesweeper flotilla, a training and experimental group, a separate division of tank landing ships (TDK), as well as an information center and a group maintenance of the ACS of the Navy.
The number of personnel of the fleet exceeds 22,000 people, of which about 8,700 people are in the aviation command.
fleet headquarters(located in Yokosuka) is headed by the chief of staff (regular admiral category). In organizational terms, the headquarters includes the following departments: operational, administrative, intelligence, communications, R&D, rear, inspection. The regular category of heads of departments is a captain of the 1st rank.
Escort Force Command headed by the commander (regular category - vice admiral). Organizationally, the command of the escort forces consists of a headquarters located in Yokosuka), a flagship, four (1-4) destroyer flotillas, directly subordinate support ships (two combat training support ships and four universal supply transports).
The destroyer flotilla is headed by a commander (regular category - rear admiral), includes a flotilla headquarters, a flagship and three squadron destroyer divisions (two or three ships each). The organization of the flotilla has been reduced to the "8-8" structure, which determines the presence of eight ships and eight anti-submarine helicopters (a destroyer-helicopter carrier with three anti-aircraft guns, five destroyers with one helicopter each and two missile defense destroyers capable of providing zonal air defense). The staff category of the chief of staff of the flotilla, commanders of divisions is captain of the 1st rank.
The coastal headquarters of the 1st flotilla of destroyers is located in Yokosuka, the 2nd flotilla is in Sasebo, the 3rd flotilla is in Maizuru, and the 4th flotilla is in Kure. The ship structure of the command of the escort forces of the fleet is assigned to five naval bases in Japan.
The command of the submarine forces is headed by the commander (regular category - vice admiral). Organizationally, the command structure includes: a headquarters (located in Yokosuka), a flagship, two (1.2) submarine fleets, a submariner training center, a submarine training division (equipped with two retired submarines).
The submarine flotilla organizationally includes a headquarters, a flagship (submarine floating base), three submarine divisions (two or three submarines each), and a base detachment. The regular category of flotilla commanders, commanders of submarine divisions and base detachments is captain 1st rank. The headquarters of the 1st and 2nd flotilla are located respectively in the Kure and Yokosuka naval bases.
Air Command located on the Atsugi Avb. Organizationally, the command structure includes: headquarters, seven air wings (1, 2, 4, 5, 21, 22, 31), three separate air squadrons (51,61,111th), as well as four detachments - two aircraft repair (1,2), air traffic control (AvB Atsugi) and civil engineering (AvB Hachinohe). The regular category of the commander is vice admiral, chief of staff, commanders of air wings - rear admiral, commanders of individual air squadrons, air traffic control detachment captain of the 1st rank, engineering and construction detachment - captain of the 2nd rank.
The aviation wing in its composition has a headquarters, two or three air squadrons (patrol, anti-submarine helicopters), two groups (aviation engineering and supply, airfield technical support). In addition, 4 acres additionally includes a separate air group on about. Iwo Jima and a detachment on about. Minamitorishima (Fr. Markus). The number of personnel of the air wing is 1000-1500 people. The regular category of chiefs of staff of air wings, commanders of air squadrons and support groups is a captain of the 1st rank.
Patrol air squadrons (two each in 1, 2, 4, 5 acres, one in 31 acres) are armed with 10 R-ZS base patrol aircraft. Anti-submarine helicopter squadrons 21 acres (121, 124) and 22 acres (122, 123) have SH-60J helicopters (12 units each), and 101 squadrons 21 acres have HSS-2B helicopters (replaced by SH-60J). The 31st Air Wing (AvB Iwakuni) includes the 71st US-1A Seaplane Rescue Squadron and the 81st EW Aircraft Squadron (EP-3 and U-36A). The aircraft repair detachment is designed to carry out military repairs of aviation equipment.
minesweeper flotilla organizationally unites the mine-sweeping forces of the fleet. The flotilla is headed by a commander (regular category - rear admiral). Organizationally, the structure of the flotilla includes: a headquarters, a flagship, five minesweeper divisions (one for sea and four for base minesweepers), two minesweeper floating bases, and a minesweeping support detachment.
Educational and experimental group consists of a headquarters (Yokosuka), a central naval training ground (Yokosuka), four centers: research combat use weapons and military equipment, guided weapons, tactical simulators (two training - in Yokosuka and Sasebo), as well as from five training detachments for the training of ship specialists for junior officers, foremen and enlisted personnel (the 1st detachment is located in Yokosuka, the 2nd detachment is in Kure, 3rd detachment - in Sasebo, 4th detachment - in Maizuru, 11th detachment - in Etajima) and the testing laboratory of ship weapons (Kagoshima). A division of experimental ships, which is based in the Yokosuka naval base, closes on the test site. The training and experimental group is headed by a commander (regular category - rear admiral). The staff category of the chief of staff of the training and experimental group, chiefs of the test site, laboratory, research and training centers (with the exception of the 11th training center, which is headed by a captain of the 2nd rank), division of experimental ships is a captain of the 1st rank.
Separate division of tank landing ships has a tank landing ships type "Miura", which are assigned to the naval base
Information Center(Yokosuka, town of Funakoshi) organizationally includes a headquarters and three departments (operational information, information and analytical, electronic warfare). The center is engaged in the analysis of intelligence information, the preparation of information materials, and the planning of activities for the organization of naval radio and electronic intelligence. The regular category of the heads of the center and departments is a captain of the 1st rank, the chief of staff is a captain of the 2nd rank.
Naval ACS Service Group(Yokosuka, Funakoshi town) is processing and issuing information in the interests of the top leadership of the fleet and naval forces. Atsugi has a separate ACS service unit. The regular category of group and detachment commanders is captain 1st rank.
Naval areas
The Japanese Navy has five operational-tactical formations, called naval areas (Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and Ominato), each of which has a zone of responsibility. The area of operational responsibility of the IWR Yokosuka includes the southern (from Mie Prefecture inclusive) and eastern (through Iwate Prefecture inclusive) coasts of about. Honshu and the adjacent waters of the Pacific Ocean, as well as small islands in the Pacific Ocean belonging to the Tokyo Prefecture, with the exception of about. Okinotorishima; WMR Kure - the Inland Sea of Japan, the coasts of the islands of Shikoku and Honshu from Wakayama Prefecture to Ube of Yamaguchi Prefecture inclusive, coastal waters of the Pacific Ocean to the southern tip of about. Kyushu (Oita and Miyazaki prefectures), as well as about. Okinotorishima; VMR Sasebo - west coast of about. Honshu (Yamaguchi Prefecture); the western and southern parts of the Ryukyu and Kyushu islands with adjacent water areas (including the Korea Strait); WMR Maizuru - northwest coast of about. Honshu (from Shimane Prefecture to Akita Prefecture inclusive) and the adjacent waters of the Sea of Japan; VMR Ominato - the coast of the northern part of the island. Honshu (Aomori Prefecture) and all about. Hokkaido with the adjacent waters of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, as well as the Pacific Ocean (including the La Perouse and Sangar Straits).
The naval area is headed by the commandant (the staff category is vice admiral), to whom, in addition to the main formations and units, the heads of naval bases (basing points), coastal units and services that provide basic support for ships and ships of the Navy are administratively subordinated.
Organizationally, the naval area includes: headquarters, one - three separate divisions of ships, a naval base, one - two bases (in the VMR Kure, Sasebo, Ominato), individual ships and vessels, as well as coastal units and services for various purposes - communications detachments, basic, medical, training (except for the Ominato VMR), counterintelligence department, two supply bases (ships, ammunition), an orchestra. In addition, the three naval regions (Kure, Sasebo and Ominato) have separate aviation units - squadrons of anti-submarine helicopters. The number of personnel of the VMR is from 2,000 to 3,000 people.
The Tsushima Surface and Underwater Control Center, which is designed to control the situation in the Korea Strait, is directly subordinated to the commandant of the VMR Sasebo. The staff category of the head of the center is captain of the 1st rank. The center is subordinated to the control points of the surface and underwater situation (KNPO) Kaminoshima, Shimonoshima and Iki (the standard category of the chiefs of the points is the captain of the 2nd rank).
In the naval region of Yokosuka, there is a separate base detachment on about. Chichijima.
The formations and units that make up the VMR are designed to provide defense and maintain the necessary operational regime in their areas of responsibility, protect water areas, organize control of the surface and underwater situation in the areas of responsibility,
The headquarters of the VMR is headed by the chief of staff (regular category - rear admiral). A deputy, assistants for supply and equipment, an inspector and a senior doctor are subordinate to him. The headquarters of the VMR consists of three departments: administrative, operational, financial. The regular category of heads of departments at the headquarters of the VMR is a captain of the 1st rank.
Separate divisions of ships. Each VMR has one or two divisions of escort ships (em, fr; two or three ships in each). The naval areas of Yokosuka and Maizuru also include a separate division of basic minesweepers (three ships each). The regular category of commanders of divisions of escort ships is captain of the 1st rank, commanders of divisions of base minesweepers - captain of the 3rd rank.
The naval base organizationally includes a headquarters, a coast guard detachment, a raid service, a group of divers, as well as separate base detachments stationed outside the base (Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru). KNPO points are closed for raid service. The staff category of the head of the base is a captain of the 1st rank, the chief of staff of the naval base is a captain of the 2nd rank.
The basing point (in the Kure - Hanshin navy, in the Sasebo navy - Katsuren (Okinawa) and Shimonoseki, in the Ominato navy - Yoichi and Hakodate) includes a headquarters, a minesweeper division consisting of three ships (in the basing point of Yoichi - a boat division), several KNPO points separate ships and boats. In addition, the Hanshin PB has a division of patrol boats, and the Katsuren PB has a group of divers. The staff category of the head of the PB is a captain of the 1st rank (the head of the PB Hansin is a rear admiral), the chief of staff is a captain of the 2nd rank.
A separate air squadron of anti-submarine helicopters consists of a headquarters, an aviation detachment, aviation engineering and airfield technical support detachments. The air squadron is armed with about 10 HSS-2B helicopters. In addition, a separate detachment of helicopters (2 S-61A, 1 OH-60) is available on the Shirase icebreaker (assigned to the Yokosuka Navy), based in Tateyama.
Naval Air Training Command
Naval Aviation Training Command organizationally includes a headquarters (AvB Shimofusa), three training aviation wings (Simofusa, YS-11T, P-ZS aircraft; Tokushima - TS-90, 11S-90; Otsuki - KM-2, T-5), 211 -th training helicopter squadron (HSS-2V, OH-6D helicopters). The regular category of the commander is vice admiral, the chief of staff is captain of the 1st rank.
The training aviation wing in its organizational structure is similar to the combat air wing: it includes a headquarters, one or two training air squadrons, two groups (air engineering support and supply, airfield technical support).
The Otsuki training acre includes 221 squadrons intended for initial training of cadets (there is no aircraft). The airfield technical support group is subordinated to a rescue squadron equipped with two UH-60J or S-61A helicopters. The regular category of the commander of the aviation wing and the chief of staff is a captain of the 1st rank, the commanders of training air squadrons and groups are a captain of the 2nd rank, a captain of the 1st rank.
The possibility of placing the base of the Pacific Fleet on the island of Matua in the Kuril chain increases the military presence on Sakhalin. Measures to strengthen our presence in the department are called "unprecedented."
Few people know, but in 2012 Japan decided to change its military doctrine and turn its purely “peaceful” self-defense forces into an army, giving it an offensive character. Including for this, formations of marines are being created.
In the light of such events, we propose to take a closer look at and to their maritime segment.
War concept
If Russia, by the will of the ancient emperors, spread out in a natural fortress, then fate prepared Japan to gain a foothold in a natural outpost, which is difficult to capture, but from which there is nowhere to retreat.
The Japanese ground forces are the last line of defense. They are lined up accordingly: the infantry is motorized, but not mechanized, the infantry divisions are barely diluted with tank squadrons. Only one in the whole country tank division, one mechanized infantry division with infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers and one artillery brigade is the shock fist of the Japanese army, designed to throw out the enemy landing troops from the islands.
The landing that will survive after meeting with the Japanese fleet.
It is on the fleet that the main task of protecting the Land of the Rising Sun falls. And since 2012 - and the protection of its interests in the disputed territory.
Fleet Composition
Serves in the Navy 44.5 thousand people.
The Japanese build their ships at domestic shipyards, but they put weapons mainly of foreign production, mainly American. In cases where it is possible, they prefer not to purchase ready-made copies, but to organize their own production under license.
In this regard, the weapons on the ships are of the same type, corresponding to the era.
The American art complex is almost always used as anti-aircraft artillery. Mark 15 Phalanx CIWS or, more simply, " Phalanx". This is a 20-millimeter six-barreled automatic cannon capable of firing 1,500 100-gram bullets into the sky in 30 seconds. Two radars go to her aid. The complex was developed in the 1970s.
Anti-aircraft missile weapons
Anti-aircraft missile system ASMD. Actually, this is a carriage standing on the outer deck, or vertical modules hidden below the deck. In the first case - 21 launch containers, in the second - five cells per module. But the main thing is cruise missiles RIM-116A, capable of intercepting a target at a distance of 500 meters to 10 km and at an altitude of 4 meters. Development of the 70s.
Medium-range anti-aircraft missile RIM-162ESSM with a semi-active homing head. The maximum range is about 50 km, and the flight speed is more than Mach 4. Used with MK.41 TLU, 4 missiles per launch cell. Adopted in the United States in 2004.
short-range anti-aircraft guided cruise missile RIM-7 "Sea Sparrow". Developed back in the 60s, the key word in talking about this rocket is manually controlled.
Medium-range anti-aircraft guided missile Standard RGM-66 with a passive aiming head. More like museum pieces, these 1960s rockets sit on old Japanese ships. On the new ones are the following series of missiles - "Standard 2", a little less ancient stuff, but now with an inertial autopilot.
Vertical launcher Mk 41- a universal thing. It is installed below deck in containers, and its cells carry a variety of missiles.
Anti-submarine weapons
anti-submarine missiles RUM-139. They are placed in the TLU Mk 41. The principle of the device is simple: fired - the rocket went into autonomous flight, cut down the engines at a given distance and dropped a torpedo by parachute. The torpedo splashed down, turned on the engines and went to ram the enemy. The maximum range is 28 km, developed in the 80s.
anti-ship weapons
Anti-ship cruise missile RGM-84 Harpoon. Ceiling - from 2 to 900 meters in height and 850 km / h speed, carries a high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 221 kg. Developed back in the 70s.
anti-ship missile "Type 90". Japanese alternative to the Harpoon, adopted in 1992.
The pride of the Japanese fleet is a destroyer-helicopter carrier of the type "Izumo" off the stocks in 2015. 248 meters of steel in length and 27 thousand tons of displacement. 14 helicopters, two powerful Phalanx units and two ASMD units. Electronic warfare system, radar. Instead of helicopters, the ship can carry 400 troops along with 50 vehicles up to 3 tons.
The Japanese can be cunning as much as they like, calling this ship a destroyer-helicopter carrier, but it is obvious to everyone that this light aircraft carrier is a symbol of the revival of the Japanese fleet.
And in 2017, another one of these will be completed, but according to rumors, with the ability to carry the F-35 Lightning II and the MV-22 Osprey convertiplanes. You can’t be sure about the planes, but they really planned to buy convertiplanes for the emerging units of the Marine Corps.
Photo: Internet
Two destroyer-helicopter carriers of the Hyuga type, manufactured in 2009 and 2011. 13,950 tons of displacement and a crew of 360 people.
12.7 mm machine gun, two Phalanx anti-aircraft gun mounts, sixteen RIM-162 anti-aircraft and twelve RUM-139 anti-submarine gun mounts in the TLU Mk 41. Two installations of three 324-mm torpedo tubes. Eleven helicopters. Electronic warfare system, radar.
These guys can take care of themselves.
Photo: Internet
Shirane-class destroyer launched in 1981. Displacement - 5200 tons. 159 meters long.
Two 127 mm guns. Armed with eight anti-submarine RUR-5 ASROK and two installations of three 324-mm torpedo tubes. It is protected by eight Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx anti-aircraft gun mounts.
Carries three helicopters. The younger brother for a year from the same series was written off back in 2014, how much is left for this is unknown.
Photo: Internet
Guided missile destroyers are represented by three series:
- Two destroyers of the "Hatakaze" type built in the 80s and with a displacement of 4600 tons. They still have the same two 127-mm guns, two Phalanx installations. Armed with anti-ship "Harpoons" and anti-submarine ASROK, eight pieces each. Naturally, two torpedo launchers for 3 vehicles. They defend themselves, if you can call it that, with anti-aircraft missiles « Standard" in the amount of 40 pieces. They have one helipad. Electronic warfare equipment was not found.
- Four destroyers of the Congo type built in the 90s and with a displacement of 7250 tons. Everything is the same, but due to the fact that the boat is bigger, it was possible to stick as many as two TLU Mk 41s into it - one at the bow with 29 cells and one at the stern with 61 cells. They already have Standard 2 anti-aircraft missiles (instead of Standard) and ASROK anti-submarine missiles. Electronic warfare equipment was also not found.
- Two Atago-class destroyers built in the 2000s with a displacement of 7750 tons. Here, instead of the Harpoons, there are Japanese Type 90s. Also, new HOS 302 torpedo tubes were installed, the gun was left alone, but the barrel was lengthened. Plus, stealth technologies have been implemented, but there are still no means of electronic warfare. In addition to the heliport, a helicopter hangar has also been built.
Photo: Internet
Destroyers of smaller displacement, up to 5 tons, are represented by five series. A total of 29 warships built from 1985 to 2014.
In fact, the same biting devils as "Atago" and "Kongo", only small.
Accordingly, on the old series there are 8 Harpoon launchers, and in the younger series - one TLU Mk 41 for a maximum of 32 cells. They contain anti-aircraft ESSMs and the same anti-ship "Type 90".
Photo: Internet
Six Abukuma-class frigates built from 1989 to 1993. Displacement 2 thousand tons. Armed with one 76.2 mm universal gun mount from OTO Melara and one very familiar Phalanx anti-aircraft gun mount. Plus eight Harpoon launchers, and six torpedoes.
Seventeen combat submarines of two series: Oyashio and Soryu.
- Eleven multi-purpose submarines "Oyashio" were built from 1994 to 2008. Underwater displacement of 3 thousand tons. They are powered by two air-independent diesel-electric engines. Armed with six 533-mm torpedo tubes. There are either 20 torpedoes on board, or the notorious Harpoon missiles, only now submarine-based.
- Seven multi-purpose Soryu submarines have been built since 2005. At least four more submarines are planned. They differ from the previous series by an increased displacement - 4,200 tons in a submerged position, the presence of 30 torpedoes or missiles, and four Stirling engines installed instead of two conventional electric generators.
In addition, there are various support ships, in the amount of 11 pieces, including five landing ships.
- Seven missile boats;
- Eight landing craft;
- Twenty-five minesweepers;
- Auxiliary ships.
Is it a strong fleet?
Compared to the ground forces, the Japanese fleet makes a much more spectacular impression. This is a well-thought-out and balanced tool, tailored to local conditions, which is definitely a plus for Japanese generals. It is better to bet more on someone who, having a smaller fleet, knows how to use it, than on mediocrity, standing at the head of even the largest squadron.
However, let's take a look.
Although Japanese helicopter carriers are increasing in size, losing their accompanying weapons, they are not yet aircraft carriers.
Their scope is the fight against submarines. Taking off helicopters crawl for tens of kilometers around, sanitizing the water column in search of hidden submarines. Having found it, they drop torpedoes or depth charges. The beauty is that the submarine has nothing to answer, from there, from the depths, and the helicopter carrier itself remains outside the reach of its torpedoes.
At the same time, if the new Izumo has only anti-aircraft weapons, then both ships of the Hyuga type have anti-submarine missiles and even torpedo tubes. A very reasonable tactic, given that the North Korean submarine fleet has a hundred units.
These ships are fully equipped to fight submarines or support marines.
Four destroyers of the Congo type and two destroyers of the Atago type, among a variety of weapons, also carry anti-ship missiles, but only on the Atago these are not the ancient Harpoons, but the Type 90, which was put into service in 1990.
Of the 29 small destroyers, only 18 are modern ships, the rest are two series, one of which has already been almost completely written off, and the other, Asagiri, is being prepared for decommissioning.
All other ships approach the title of "old trough".
And the Japanese understand this, promptly decommissioning old and inefficient ships and launching a series of new ones.
The Chinese fleet, compared with the Japanese, gives the impression of a Chinese bazaar, but the number of ships still dominates. There are already 12 destroyers built in the new century with a displacement of more than 6 thousand tons, and two more are undergoing sea trials. A variety of frigates - 43 pieces, most of which went to the water no later than the 90s.
The Japanese submarine fleet is also seriously inferior to the Chinese.
Comparing the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces with the Russian Navy is an interesting task, but for a separate article. However, you know its capabilities ...
The Japanese fleet is often called the second in the Pacific region, perhaps it is. But only after American, Russian and Chinese.
The Japanese fleet is a successful instrument for the defense of the island nation, but nothing more.
Photo: Missile cruiser Varyag
Photo: Missile submarine cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh"
Instability in the Asia-Pacific region poses a threat to all neighboring states, including Russia. As interesting topic I propose to consider Japan Naval Self-Defense Force- the Japanese fleet is rarely covered in the Russian media, despite the fact that this is perhaps the second most important Navy in the world.
Despite the intimidating potential of the Chinese Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force looks much more attractive. The PRC creates the illusion of having a strong fleet: the only aircraft carrier Shi Lan (formerly Varyag) is not a full-fledged combat unit and is used as a test and training ship, and DF-21 ballistic anti-ship missiles, despite loud statements, are still rather a dream than a realistic weapon, the combat capabilities of this anti-ship system are doubtful.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force does not have any large-scale and scandalous combat systems, such as the Soviet-Chinese aircraft carrier or "ballistic anti-ship missiles." But, unlike the Chinese Navy, the Japanese Navy is a well-thought-out combat system: balanced ship's composition, the latest technology and ancient samurai traditions, numerous bases and all the necessary infrastructure- educational institutions, hospitals, research centers, among which, for example, an underwater medicine laboratory stationed at a naval base with the dissonant name of Yokosuka.
One of the wonderful Japanese traditions is the beautiful poetic names of warships. No surnames of admirals and in general anything connected with war or aggression. The names of Japanese ships contain only natural phenomena, reproduced with an incredible range of shades, so inherent in Eastern philosophy. Destroyers Yamagiri (Mountain Fog), Akizuki (Autumn Moon), Teruzuki (Shining Moon), Hatsuyuki (First Snow), Asayuki (Morning Snow) etc. Agree, it sounds great.
Launch of the SM-3 anti-missile from the destroyer URO type "Kongo".
The combat core of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces are 9 modern destroyers with the Aegis system, and two unusual "destroyers" are enrolled in this class only formally: "Hyuga" and "Ise" in all respects correspond to light aircraft carriers.
Despite the confusing and contradictory classification of ships, the main vectors of the development of the Japanese fleet are clearly visible: exotic “helicopter destroyers”, URO destroyers (these include ships with long-range anti-aircraft missile systems capable of providing zonal air defense of the squadron) and conventional destroyers, focused on solving anti-submarine, anti-ship, escort tasks, as well as for fire support and special operations.
Often, the official classification does not correspond to reality: for example, a more modern “ordinary” destroyer can significantly outperform the destroyer URO of the previous generation in terms of air defense capabilities. And most destroyers built in the 80s correspond in size and capabilities to a modest frigate. However, let's go directly to the list of ships and consider all the nuances of the Japanese Navy with specific examples.
DESTROYERS - HELICOPTER CARRIERS
Hyuga type- two ships are in service: Hyuga (2009) and Ise (2011)
Full displacement 18.000 tons.
Armament: an air group of 11-15 helicopters for various purposes, 16 Mk.41 UVP cells, 2 anti-aircraft self-defense machines, 2 triple-tube 324 mm Mk.32 ASW torpedo tubes.
The brute with a total displacement of 18,000 tons is shyly classified as a destroyer, but the Japanese obviously went too far - the size and appearance of the Hyuuga correspond to a light aircraft carrier. Many experts agree that aviation as the main striking force gives the Japanese destroyer-helicopter carrier increased flexibility when performing tactical tasks.
First of all, the eternal problem with the radio horizon is partially solved - the best shipborne radar cannot be compared in terms of the ability to detect surface targets with the radar of a helicopter flying at an altitude of several hundred meters. Moreover, 30 years ago, light aircraft (Sea Skua, Pinguin) were adopted for arming sea helicopters, which proved their effectiveness many times over in local conflicts.
Secondly, the destroyer-helicopter carrier acquires completely unique qualities. A dozen anti-submarine helicopters make it possible to organize round-the-clock patrols at a distance of tens of kilometers from the side of the ship; helicopters, depending on their type, can land landing groups in the zone of military conflicts and cover them with fire, and be used as vehicles for the delivery of military and humanitarian cargo.
Thanks to its large air wing, the Hyuga has great capabilities in search and rescue operations, and if there are minesweeper helicopters on board, it can be used as a mine-sweeping ship.
For self-defense, the Hyuga is equipped with the Mk.41 UVP - 64 ESSM anti-aircraft missiles or 16 ASROC-VL anti-aircraft missiles in any proportion can be placed in 16 cells. The destroyer's armament is controlled by the OYQ-10 CICS and the FCS-3 radar with AFAR, which are the Japanese version of the Aegis system.
Sirane type - There are two ships in service.
Full displacement - 7.500 tons.
Armament: 2 x 127-mm guns, 8 ASROC anti-submarine missile torpedoes, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, 2 Falanks anti-aircraft guns, 2 Mk.32 ASW torpedo tubes, three helicopters.
Shirane-class destroyers-helicopter carriers are the oldest ships in the combat strength of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (commissioned in 1980 and 1981). Former flagships of the Japanese Navy, predecessors of the Hyuga. At first glance, they are mediocre destroyers with weak weapons and an outdated air defense system, but there is one caveat: the aft part of each of them is made in the form of a spacious flight deck. The Japanese have been experimenting with aircraft weapons on ships for a long time, and, obviously, they are pleased with the result.
DESTROYERS URO
Type "Atago"- two destroyers are in service - "Atago" (2007) and "Ashigara" (2008)
Full displacement - 10,000 tons.
Armament: 96 Mk.41 UVP cells, 8 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, 1 x 127 mm gun, 2 Falanx assault rifles, 2 Mk.32 ASW torpedo tubes, one helicopter.
"Atago" is a clone of the American destroyer "Arleigh Burke" subseries IIa with minimal differences in design and armament. The Japanese destroyer uses the entire standard range of Mk.41 launcher ammunition, with the exception of the Tamahawk cruise missiles - the destroyer's weapons system includes Standard-2 and ESSM anti-aircraft missiles, ASROC-VL anti-aircraft missiles, and even Standard-3 interceptor missiles of the missile defense system.
On the upper deck of Japanese ships, unlike their modern American counterparts, 8 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles manufactured by Mitsubishi are installed. In technical terms, they are conventional subsonic anti-ship missiles: launch weight 660 kg, warhead 250 kg, cruising speed 0.9M.
Thanks to the presence of the Aegis system, both of the latest destroyers are integrated with the Japanese missile defense system.
Type "Congo"- 4 destroyers in service (built in the period from 1990 to 1998)
Full displacement: 9.500 tons
Armament: 90 Mk.41 UVP cells, 8 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 1 x 127 mm gun, 2 Falanx assault rifles, 2 Mk.32 ASW torpedo tubes.
These ships have nothing to do with Africa. Destroyers "Congo" - copies of the American destroyers "Arleigh Burke" of the first generation. The US Congress for a long time did not give consent to the export of new technologies, which led to a delay in their construction.
Like on the American destroyers of the sub-series I, on the Japanese destroyers of the Kongo type there is no helicopter hangar (there is only a landing pad), and three cells of the bow and stern groups of the Mk.41 launchers are occupied by a loading crane - as time has shown, loading of ammunition on the high seas too complicated and time-consuming process, so an unnecessary device did not take a useful place for a long time. Already on the next versions of the destroyers, the crane was abandoned, increasing the number of launchers to 96.
Type "Hatakase" - 2 destroyers of this type entered service in 1986 and 1988.
With a friendly visit to Pearl Harbor.
Full displacement - 5.500 tons.
Armament: 1 Mk.13 launcher with 40 anti-aircraft missiles, 8 ASROC PLUR, 8 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 2 x 127 mm guns, 2 Phalanx, 2 ASW.
Despite their status as "URO destroyers", the old Khatakaze overshoes are practically useless in combat. modern conditions- suffice it to say that the Standard-1MR anti-aircraft missiles they use were completely decommissioned by the US Navy 10 years ago.
Their anti-submarine capabilities also leave much to be desired - the destroyers do not have an anti-submarine helicopter, and the ASROC system can hit underwater targets at a distance of no more than 9 km. However, the Hatakaze destroyers are cheap and easy to maintain.
DESTROYERS
Type "Akizuki" - the lead Akizuki was commissioned on March 14, 2012, the remaining 3 destroyers of this type will be completed only by 2014.
Displacement: 6.800 tons.
Armament: 32 Mk.41 UVP cells, 8 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, 1 x 127 mm gun, 2 Falanx assault rifles, 2 ASW, one helicopter.
Another representative of the Aegis destroyer family. Purely Japanese development based on Western technology. The destroyer is designed to protect ship groups from low-flying anti-ship missiles. The main armament is up to 128 ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missle) anti-aircraft missiles with an effective firing range of 50 km. It is quite enough to repel any provocation from the DPRK or China, while the small destroyer can show its own "fists" - on board 8 anti-ship missiles and a whole sea of other weapons.
When creating a promising destroyer, the Japanese focused on cost savings, as a result, the cost of the Akizuki amounted to "only" 893 million dollars - almost two times less than that of the destroyers of the Arleigh Burke family.
Type "Takanami" - 5 destroyers in service, built in the period from 2000 to 2006.
Full displacement - 6.300 tons.
Armament: 32 UVP cells, 8 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, 1 x 127 mm gun, 2 Falanx assault rifles, 2 ASW, one helicopter.
"Takanami" - one of the Japanese destroyers of the "transitional period". The expensive and complex Aegis system is missing, but the destroyer already has a universal Mk.41 launcher installed, and “stealth technologies” clearly appear in the tuning designs. The main tasks of strong modern destroyers are anti-submarine defense and anti-surface warfare.
Type "Murasame" - in the period from 1993 to 2002. 9 destroyers of this type were built.
Full displacement: 6.000 tons.
Armament: 16 UVP cells Mk.48, 8 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, 1 x 76 mm gun, 2 Falanx assault rifles, 2 ASW, one helicopter.
Another destroyer of the "transitional period". As the main weapon, two 8-charger UVP Mk.48 modules (a shortened version of Mk.41), an ammunition load of 16 Sea Sparrow or 48 ESSM anti-aircraft missiles are installed. Artillery is represented by the only 76-mm gun of the Italian company OTO Melara.
Destroyers of this type can be used for the blockade of sea areas and for operations as part of escort forces - the cruising range is 4500 miles at a speed of 20 knots.
Asagiri type - from 1985 to 1991 8 destroyers of this type were built.
Full displacement: 4.900 tons.
Armament: 8 ASROC anti-submarine missiles, 8 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, 1 x 76 mm gun, 2 Phalanx, 2 ASW, one helicopter.
A frigate pretending to be a destroyer for solidity. Neither in size, nor in armament, nor in radio electronics, Asagiri completely satisfies modern requirements. A distinctive feature of this ship is an ugly silhouette with a disproportionately large helicopter hangar in the stern.
Currently, obsolete destroyers are being withdrawn from the fleet, two of them have already been converted into training ships. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of the old destroyers still have their own resource for going to sea, and 8 Harpoon missiles and an anti-submarine helicopter can play a significant role in a naval battle.
Type "Hatsuki" - in the period 1980-1987. 12 ships built.
Full displacement: 4.000 tons.
Armament: 8 ASROC anti-submarine missiles, 4 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, 1 x 76 mm gun, 2 Phalanx, 2 ASW, one helicopter.
A representative of the old Japanese school of shipbuilding, a classic set of weapons and ship systems. Despite the dilapidation, destroyers (more correctly, frigates) use a modern gas turbine power point. Of course, in modern conditions, the destroyers "Hatsuki" have lost their combat value, so many of them are put into reserve or converted into training ships.
SUBMARINES
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has 17 multi-purpose diesel submarines built between 1994 and 2012. The most modern of them are Soryu-class submarines, equipped with a unique diesel-stirling-electric power plant and capable of moving under water at a speed of 20 knots. The maximum diving depth is 300 meters. Crew - 65 people. Armament: six 533 mm torpedo tubes, 30 torpedoes and Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
Landing helicopter carrier-dock "Osumi". Full displacement - 14 thousand tons
Also in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces are 3 amphibious assault helicopter carriers of the Osumi type (built in the early 2000s), several dozen missile boats and minesweepers, high-speed tankers, icebreakers and even UAV control ships!
Naval aviation consists of 34 squadrons, which include 100 basic anti-submarine aviation aircraft, as well as two hundred helicopters for various purposes.
In my opinion, the history of the beginning of the 20th century is repeating itself, when Western democracies armed the Japanese militarists to the teeth, which subsequently led to a bloody denouement.
“I will die on the deck of the Nagato, by which time Tokyo will have been bombed 3 times”
- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
The defeat of Japan in World War II seems so natural that there can be no options and discrepancies here. The total superiority of the United States in natural, human and industrial resources, multiplied by a powerful economy and high level development of science - in such conditions, America's victory in the war became only a matter of time.
If with common causes the defeat of the Japanese Empire is extremely obvious, then the purely technical side is of genuine interest naval battles in the Pacific Ocean: The Imperial Japanese Navy, once one of the most powerful fleets in the world, perished under the blows of numerically superior enemy forces. He died in terrible agony, suffering and torment. Armor warped and rivets flew out, plating burst, and streams of gushing water collided in a roaring whirlpool on the decks of the doomed ship. The Japanese fleet was leaving for immortality.
Nevertheless, before their tragic death, the Japanese sailors were marked by a number of bright victories. "Second Pearl Harbor" off Savo Island, a pogrom in the Java Sea, a daring raid by aircraft carriers into the Indian Ocean ...
As for the famous attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base, the role of this operation is largely exaggerated by American propaganda: the US leadership needed to rally the nation in the face of the enemy. Unlike Soviet Union where every child understood that terrible war marches on the territory of his own country, the United States had to wage a naval war on foreign shores. This is where the tale of the "terrible attack" on the American military base.
Memorial on the hull of the lost "Arizona" (the battleship was launched in 1915)
In reality, Pearl Harbor was a pure failure of the Japanese carrier-based aviation - all "success" was the sinking of four decrepit battleships from the First World War (two of which were raised and restored by 1944). The fifth damaged battleship, the Nevada, was refloated and returned to service by the summer of 1942. In total, as a result of the Japanese raid, 18 ships of the US Navy were sunk or damaged, while a significant part of the "victims" escaped with only cosmetic defects.
At the same time, not a single bomb fell on:
Power plant, shipyards, port cranes and mechanical workshops. This allowed the Yankees to begin restoration work within an hour after the end of the raid.
Giant 10/10 dry dock for battleship and aircraft carrier repairs. The unforgivable mistake of the Japanese carrier-based aviation will become fatal in all subsequent battles in the Pacific: with the help of their superdock, the Americans will repair damaged ships in a matter of days.
4,500,000 barrels of oil! The tank capacity of the U.S. Naval refueling station at Pearl Harbor at that time exceeded all the fuel reserves of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Fuel, hospitals, berths, ammunition depots - Japanese pilots "gave" the US Navy the entire infrastructure of the base!
There is a legend about the absence of two US Navy aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack: they say, if the Japanese had sunk the Lexington and the Enterprise, the outcome of the war could have been different. This is an absolute delusion: during the years of the war, the US industry handed over 31 aircraft carriers to the fleet (many of which did not even have to participate in battles). If the Japanese had destroyed all aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers in the Pearl Harbor, along with Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands, the outcome of the war would have been the same.
We should dwell separately on the figure of the "architect of Pearl Harbor" - the Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. There is no doubt that he was an honest military and competent strategist, who more than once warned the leadership of Japan about the futility and disastrous consequences of the coming war with the United States. The admiral argued that even with the most favorable development of events, the Imperial Japanese Navy would last no more than a year - then the inevitable defeat and death of the Japanese Empire would follow. Admiral Yamamoto remained true to his duty - if Japan is destined to die in an unequal battle, he will do everything so that the memory of this war and the exploits of Japanese sailors enter forever.
Japanese aircraft carriers en route to Hawaii. In the foreground - "Jikaku". Ahead - "Kaga"
Some sources call Yamamoto one of the most prominent naval commanders - around the figure of the admiral, the image of an “oriental sage” has formed, whose decisions and actions are full of genius and “incomprehensible eternal truth.” Alas, real events showed the opposite - Admiral Yamamoto turned out to be completely mediocre in tactical matters of fleet management.
The only successful operation planned by the admiral - the attack on Pearl Harbor - demonstrated a complete lack of logic in the choice of targets and disgusting coordination of Japanese aviation. Yamamoto was planning a "stunning blow". But why were the fuel storage and infrastructure of the base untouched? - the most important objects, the destruction of which could really complicate the actions of the US Navy.
"They don't take a hit"
As Admiral Yamamoto predicted, the Japanese military machine moved forward uncontrollably for six months, bright flashes of victories one after another illuminated the Pacific Theater of Operations. Problems began later - the continuous strengthening of the US Navy slowed down the pace of the Japanese offensive. In the summer of 1942, the situation almost got out of control - the tactics of Admiral Yamamoto with the splitting of forces and the separation of "shock" and "anti-ship" groups of carrier-based aviation led to a disaster at Midway.
But the real nightmare began in 1943 - the Japanese fleet suffered defeat one after another, the shortage of ships, aircraft and fuel was becoming more and more acute. The scientific and technical backwardness of Japan made itself felt - when trying to break through to the squadrons of the US Navy, Japanese planes fell from the sky like cherry petals. At the same time, the Americans confidently flew over the very masts of the Japanese ships. There were not enough radars and sonar stations - more and more often Japanese ships became victims of American submarines.
The Japanese defensive perimeter was bursting at the seams - colossal reserves allowed the Americans to land troops simultaneously in different regions of the Pacific Ocean. In the meantime ... more and more new ships appeared in the vastness of the Pacific theater of operations - the US industry daily handed over to the fleet a couple of new combat units (destroyers, cruisers, submarines or aircraft carriers).
The ugly truth about the Imperial Japanese Navy has been revealed: Admiral Yamamoto's bet on an aircraft carrier fleet has failed! In the conditions of the total superiority of the enemy, the Japanese aircraft carriers died as soon as they reached the combat zone.
Japanese carrier-based aviation achieved notable success in raiding operations - a raid on Ceylon or Pearl Harbor (if you do not take into account missed opportunities). The surprise factor and the large combat radius of aviation made it possible to avoid return fire and return to base after the successful completion of the mission.
The Japanese had an equal chance of winning squadrons with the US Navy (Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, Santa Cruz). Here everything was decided by the quality of training of pilots, crews of ships and, most importantly, His Majesty Chance.
But in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy (i.e., when the probability of falling under return fire was equal to 100%), the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet did not even have a ghostly hope for any favorable outcome of the situation. The principle of “winning not by numbers, but by skill” turned out to be useless - any fire contact ended in the imminent and inevitable death of an aircraft carrier.
It turned out that the once formidable aircraft carriers completely "do not hold a blow" and drown like puppies, even with a weak effect of enemy fire. Sometimes, a few hits from conventional bombs were enough to sink an aircraft carrier. It was a death sentence for the Imperial Navy - aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft proved to be extremely ineffective in a defensive war.
The battle of Midway Atoll best of all told about the disgusting survivability of aircraft carriers: a group of 30 Dontless dive bombers, under the command of Captain McCluskey, who broke through, literally burned two Japanese attack aircraft carriers Akagi and Kaga in just a minute (burned through boxes of hulls sank by evening ). A similar fate befell the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu on the same day.
American attack aircraft carrier Bellow Wood after a kamikaze attack
Everything is known in comparison: in October 1944, the Japanese squadron of 12 battleships and cruisers walked for several hours under continuous attacks by more than 500 American carrier-based aircraft. Without any air cover and with primitive air defense systems. The result was only the death of the Suzuya cruiser and heavy damage to a couple of other ships. The rest of the squadron of Admiral Takeo Kurita safely left the zone of American aviation and returned to Japan.
It’s even scary to imagine what would happen if large aircraft carriers were in place of the Yamato and Nagato battleships - a hail of small-caliber bombs would cause uncontrolled fires on the flight and hangar decks, and then quick death ships from internal explosions.
The reason for the poor state of Nagato's add-ons is - nuclear explosion with a capacity of 23 kt.
The old Japanese battleship turned out to be stronger than nuclear fire!
The squadron of Admiral Kurita happily escaped death. Meanwhile, in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, a real massacre took place:
Sunk on 19 June 1944 heavy aircraft carrier"Taiho". A single torpedo hit from the submarine Albacore did not cause significant damage, but caused a depressurization of the fuel line. A minor imperceptible problem turned into a disaster - 6.5 hours after the torpedo attack, the Taiho was torn to shreds by an explosion of gasoline vapors (1650 dead sailors).
The trick was that the brand new Taiho aircraft carrier was destroyed in its first combat campaign, just three months after launching.
A day later, on June 20, 1944, under similar circumstances, the strike aircraft carrier "Hiyo" was lost. The only difference is that the carrier-based aircraft dropped the fatal torpedo.
The fantastic sinking of the supercarrier Sinano 17 hours after its first entry into the sea is just a common curiosity in the history of naval battles. The ship was not completed, the bulkheads were not sealed, and the crew was not trained. However, in every joke there is a share of a joke - eyewitnesses reported that one of the torpedo hits fell exactly in the area of jet fuel tanks. Perhaps the crew of the aircraft carrier was very lucky - at the time of the sinking, the Sinano was empty.
It seems that the aircraft carrier "Shokaku" has problems with the flight deck
However, aircraft carriers failed for less significant reasons. During the battle in the Coral Sea, three aerial bombs took the heavy aircraft carrier Shokaku out of the game for a long time.
The song about the rapid death of Japanese aircraft carriers would not be complete without mentioning their opponents. The Americans faced the same problem - the slightest impact of enemy fire caused terrible fires aboard aircraft carriers.
In October 1944, just from the hit of two 250-kg bombs, the light aircraft carrier Princeton completely burned down.
In March 1945, the aircraft carrier Franklin was heavily damaged - only two 250-kg bombs hit the ship, which caused one of the largest US Navy tragedies in terms of the number of victims. Bombs fell in the center of the flight deck - the fire instantly engulfed 50 fully fueled and ready to fly aircraft. Result: 807 dead, a completely destroyed air wing, uncontrolled fires on all decks of the ship, loss of speed, a 13-degree list to port and readiness to sink the aircraft carrier.
The Franklin was saved only due to the absence of the main enemy forces nearby - in a real battle, the ship would certainly have been flooded.
The aircraft carrier "Franklin" has not yet decided whether to stay afloat or sink
Survivors pack their bags and prepare to evacuate
Kamikaze got the aircraft carrier "Interpid"
Fire on the aircraft carrier "Saint Lo" as a result of a kamikaze attack (the ship will die)
But the real madness began with the advent of Japanese kamikaze. The "live bombs" falling from the sky could not damage the underwater part of the hull, but the consequences of their fall on the flight deck lined with aircraft were simply terrible.
The incident on the strike aircraft carrier Bunker Hill became a textbook: on May 11, 1945, the ship was attacked by two kamikaze off the coast of Okinawa. In a terrible fire, Bunker Hill lost its entire air wing and more than 400 crew members.
From all these stories, the obvious conclusion follows:
The Imperial Japanese Navy was doomed - building a heavy cruiser or battleship instead of the Taiho aircraft carrier would have made no difference. The enemy had a 10-fold numerical superiority, coupled with overwhelming technical superiority. The war was already lost by the time the Japanese planes struck Pearl Harbor.
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that having highly protected artillery ships instead of aircraft carriers, the Imperial Navy, in the situation in which it found itself by the end of the war, could prolong its agony and cause additional damage to the enemy. The American fleet easily smashed the Japanese aircraft carrier groups, but every time they met with a heavy Japanese cruiser or battleship, the US Navy had to pretty "tinker".
Admiral Yamamoto's bet on aircraft carriers proved disastrous. But why did the Japanese continue to build aircraft carriers until the very end of the war (even rebuilt last battleship type "Yamato" in the aircraft carrier "Shinano")? The answer is simple: the dying industry of Japan could not build anything more complicated than an aircraft carrier. It will sound incredible, but 70 years ago an aircraft carrier was structurally quite simple and cheap, much simpler than a cruiser or battleship. No electromagnetic supercatapults or nuclear reactors. The simplest steel box for servicing the same small and simple aircraft.
True, the aircraft carrier's trough will sink even from small-caliber bombs, but the aircraft carrier's crew hopes that they will have to fight only against a deliberately weak and unprepared enemy. Otherwise - the manner of "overkill".
Epilogue
Low survivability is inherent in the very idea of an aircraft carrier. Aviation needs SPACE - instead, it is driven onto the cramped decks of a rocking ship and forced to carry out takeoff and landing operations with a runway length three times shorter than required. The dense layout and overcrowding of aircraft inevitably serves as a source of increased accident rate for an aircraft carrier, and the general lack of security and constant work with flammable substances lead to a natural result - a serious sea battle is contraindicated for an aircraft carrier.
8-hour fire aboard the aircraft carrier Oriskani (1966). The explosion of a magnesium flare (!) led to a massive fire in the hangar, with the death of all aircraft in it and 44 sailors from the crew of the ship.
The terrible fire on the aircraft carrier Forrestal (1967), which became the largest tragedy in terms of the number of victims in the post-war history of the US Navy (134 dead sailors).
A repetition of similar events aboard the aircraft carrier Enterprise (1969).
Urgent measures were taken to increase the survivability of aircraft carriers, automatic deck irrigation systems and other special equipment appeared. It would seem that all the troubles behind.
But ... 1981, an unsuccessful landing of an electronic warfare aircraft EA-6B Prowler. Explosions rumble on the flight deck of the Nimitz nuclear aircraft carrier, flames rise above the ship's superstructure. 14 victims, 48 wounded. In the fire, in addition to the Prowler itself and its crew, three F-14 Tomcat interceptors burned down. Ten Corsair II and Intruder attack aircraft, two F-14s, three Viking anti-submarine aircraft and a Sea King helicopter were seriously damaged. "Nimitz" at one point lost a third of its wing.
A similar case on the aircraft carrier "Midway"
An ineradicable problem with safety and survivability will haunt aircraft carriers as long as there is a circus called "carrier-based aviation."
Japan is a key player in the Pacific theater
Flag of the Japanese Navy
On the Sunday before last, the Japanese Navy found two Chinese warships off the island of Okinawa heading for the Pacific Ocean. The ships were in international waters, but their proximity to Okinawa, where American and Japanese troops are stationed, worried Tokyo. Traditionally, the fleets of states inform neighboring states in advance about the courses of their ships, especially if the ships must pass in close proximity to the borders of these states.
This is not the first time the Chinese Navy has broken with tradition. Three months earlier, two Japanese warships while on patrol off the coast of Okinawa spotted a flotilla of Chinese ships, including two submarines. Then a Chinese helicopter flew around the Japanese ship, which forced Tokyo to make an official protest.
Because of these and other incidents, the PRC enjoys a reputation as a maritime aggressor in a region where no neighbor dares to contradict it. Nobody, except, perhaps, Japan, which is gradually building up its naval power. Despite the rapid development of the Chinese fleet, the US and Japanese navies still dominate the Pacific region. According to the course of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, this advantage should be maintained.
Japanese Navy
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has about 100 warships of the main classes, including 2 helicopter carriers, 18 submarines, 47 destroyers and frigates, 29 mine-sweeping, 9 patrol and 9 landing ships with a total displacement of 432,000 tons; about 180 aircraft and 140 helicopters. The personnel of the fleet - 46,000 people.In recent decades, China has focused on the construction of large displacement warships, which are replacing hundreds of coastal patrol vessels. These destroyers, frigates and landing craft can operate far from the coast. In addition, China is working on the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, developing the DF-21 ballistic anti-ship missile and developing a satellite system.
Undoubtedly, China wants to be able to display its flag anywhere in the world. Another goal of the PRC is a show of force in the border waters. But Beijing is not alone in pursuing a defensive strategy. Today's Japan is testing supersonic anti-ship missiles that could well target Chinese ships. The island state has at its disposal the most modern non-nuclear submarines, which pose a danger to surface ships and submarines of China. In addition, Japan announces the expansion of intelligence capabilities.
"China is developing means to keep the US out of the region, but Japan is doing the same to China," said Eric Wertheim, an independent military analyst and author of the popular book The World's Battle Fleets.
Generally speaking, instability in the Pacific region poses a threat not only to the navies of the United States and China, but to the navies of all states in general. According to Jim Thomas, an analyst with the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, the world is entering "an era that has come after the era of military power projection." The naval strategies of states take on a defensive character. And, despite the terrifying military potential of the PRC, in this light, Japan looks more profitable. According to Wertheim, "the strategy of non-admission is more characteristic of Japan, the Japanese Navy is a more flexible and mobile force."
This is evidenced by the fact that the Japanese Navy managed to detect Chinese ships last Sunday and in April. Submarines, aircraft, satellites and surface ships of Japan are ready to track the movements of the Chinese Navy in order to transmit guidance data to Japanese or American units.
But Japan is ready not only to defend itself. The country has the potential to break through Chinese defenses, including intercepting DF-21 missiles. The latest Japanese Kongo-class destroyers, some of the most powerful and advanced ships in Asia, are equipped with radar and interceptor missiles capable of eliminating the threat of a ballistic missile attack. The Kongo provide missile defense for the Japanese islands, but "these anti-missile capabilities could also be used to protect American aircraft carriers in the event of hostilities," Wertheim said.
But does Japan intend to strengthen military cooperation with the United States? Last month, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced his resignation after failing to deliver on a campaign promise to move the US military base, Futenma, outside Okinawa Prefecture. Hatoyama's successor as Naoto Kan avoids touching on this issue. In the event of a crisis that could flare up due to another incident at sea, such ambiguity in relations between Japan and the United States could have a bad effect on the interaction of the armed forces of the states.
However, according to an analyst at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nicholas Zhechenya, the Kahn government is moving in the right direction. "We are seeing an emphasis on the critical importance of the US-Japanese alliance in light of the Chinese threat. Any development will be carried out in a bilateral context, perhaps through a strategic dialogue between Japan and the United States in the coming months," the expert said.
