"Black" pages of 1941

The mystery of the death of General Zhurba The mystery of the death of General Zhurba

still unresolved... still unresolved...

The beginning of the war in the Murmansk direction contained a lot of historical mysteries and seemingly inexplicable facts. One of these mysteries was the tragic fate of the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, Major General Alexander Afanasyevich Zhurba.

There are few examples in the history of the Great Patriotic War when the commander of a military unit goes missing on the first day of hostilities. And if we take into account the small number of troops that opposed the enemy at the beginning of the summer of 1941 in the Murmansk direction, then the loss of a military leader with the rank of major general is a completely unique incident.

Using famous books on the history of the war in the Arctic, let's try to figure out what could happen to General A. Zhurba on June 29 and 30, 1941.

The two main events that happened to the general raise the most questions and defy any reasonable explanation at first glance. The first event was his departure to the units of the left flank from the command post of the division in the Titovka area. The second event is his subsequent death under unclear circumstances.

What could make A. Zhurba, in the midst of the battle, disregarding the requirements of military regulations and, it would seem, common sense itself, leave his command post in Titovka and head to the units fighting the enemy? Major General G. Veshchezersky explains this by the lack of communication between the command of the division and its units: “The road, bridge and dam were also subjected to persistent air attacks. Telephone communication with the left flank was interrupted, and radio communication was out of order.

Let's take a closer look at the connection issue. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the main means of communication in the Red Army was considered radio communication (radio telegraph and radiotelephone). The following types, in descending order of importance, in our army were: wire telephone, wire telegraph, communication aircraft, personal communication, communication delegates, visual and sound signaling, messengers, dogs for communication and pigeons for communication.

At the same time, radio was an independent means of communication; in a number of cases of a combat situation, it was called upon to supplement or replace all other types of communication. That is why the creation and development of new means of radio communication was given exceptionally close attention in the prewar years. Domestic designers created and sent for use to the troops radio devices that met the latest requirements of their time and were in no way inferior to similar foreign developments.

The massive study of radio engineering within the framework of OSOAVIAKhIM subsequently brought great benefits to the troops: competently using the available radio communications, users sometimes made such improvements to their design that radio designers themselves would envy. So, the commissar of the 104th artillery regiment D. Eremin recalled: “there were other talented soldiers in the regiment. I remember radio operator Shapiro. He redesigned the 6PK radio station, which provides communication only at close range, so that we could even talk with Murmansk ”(“ 1200 Days and Nights of Rybachy ”). This is from the Rybachy Peninsula! Let me explain that the 6PK radio station was intended for communication in the “battalion-regiment” link and allowed communication by telephone up to 8 kilometers and by telegraph - up to 15 kilometers.

But for communication in the “regiment-division” link, by that time the troops had a 5AK radio station in sufficient quantities, which made it possible to work by telephone at a distance of up to 25 kilometers, and by telegraph - up to 50 kilometers. Quite enough for those conditions! Indeed, from Titovka, where the headquarters of the 14th division was located on June 29, 1941, to the command posts of rifle battalions located near the border, it was from 10 to 15 kilometers in a straight line.

It turns out that A. Zhurba could not help but have powerful, reliable means of radio communication at his disposal. With their help, he could well, without using the possibilities of wired telephone communication, confidently direct the actions of rifle and artillery units fighting in the border area without leaving the command post. And this connection could not just take and fail, because the means of communication are supposed to be duplicated and constantly maintained in working order at any cost. Otherwise, in a combat situation, the negligent chief of signalmen could be put up against the wall. You won't get bored here!

The solution is found, one has only to carefully read the memoirs of the direct participants in the war. For example, reconnaissance officer V. Barbolin, recalling the events of the first days of the war, wrote in the book “Unforgettable Rybachy”: “having outlined the lines of patrols, [I] went to the headquarters of the 2nd battalion to link reconnaissance actions. The headquarters was located near the road in the gorge between the hills. The chief of staff, Lieutenant Kalugin, said that a telephone connection with the headquarters of the regiment had not yet been established, and it was forbidden to use a walkie-talkie so as not to be detected by the enemy. The report to the headquarters of the regiment had to be sent by equestrian courier.

G. Veshchezersky is no less frank in his memoirs. Describing the positions of the 112th Infantry Regiment in the area of ​​the Zapadnaya Litsa River, he writes: “By the way, here I encountered symptoms of “radio fear” - a disease that was quite common at that time in our troops. It was believed that a working walkie-talkie would attract enemy fire. It must be for this reason that the radio station of the regiment was located more than a kilometer from the command post. And what else, may I ask?

It turns out that bouts of this very "radio fear" regularly tormented our commanders. Under these conditions, any damage to the telephone wire led to the collapse of management and the need to resort to the services of messengers and messengers.

So, wasn’t this very “radio fear” the reason that when, after 10 a.m. on June 29, 1941, telephone communication with the units of the left flank of the 95th regiment fighting was lost, a messenger also had to be sent to clarify the situation? Only the commander of the division, Major General A. Zhurba, acted as this courier on his own initiative, who went with a small escort to clarify the situation on the spot and subsequently died. And would he have done this, fully trusting the means of radio communication at his disposal and being able to use their capabilities to the fullest?

It may well be that A. Zhurbe was also forbidden to use the means of radio communication at his disposal in accordance with the same trend that took place both in the 2nd battalion of the 135th rifle regiment and in the 112th regiment. Or these means of communication were located in such a way that there was no way to use them. This would be the most logical explanation for such an "unreasonable" departure of the division commander from his command post, at the critical moment of the battle he was left without any connection with his left flank units.

Probably, in that situation, this was the only decision that such an experienced military man as A. Zhurba could make. And we should all respect this decision of the division commander. In the end, he bore full responsibility for the troops entrusted to him and, as a commander, was fully aware of his actions.

Now let's try to figure out what could happen to the general after his departure from the command post in Titovka. Veshchezersky writes: “He (Zhurba) ordered the commander of the 95th regiment, Major S.I. Chernov to lead the battle, and he himself, together with the commander of the artillery of the division and the adjutant, got into a car and went to the left flank. After that, no one saw General Zhurba. Only the driver returned to the regimental command post. He reported that the car was destroyed by a bomb near the South Bridge and all passengers were killed. Later it became known that someone saw the general with a group of Red Army soldiers near some lake - they were fighting.

However, it is known that the general's adjutant, senior lieutenant Pavel Abramov, survived, was captured by the Germans and was released by our troops in 1944 in Norway. The statement of the driver that all the passengers of the car died during the bombing near the South Bridge is incorrect, if only for this reason. Probably, the driver, like Abramov, was shell-shocked during the explosion, he could simply not figure out which of his passengers died and which was only injured, and therefore his testimony should be treated with caution.

The protocol of interrogation of P. Abramov in German captivity is known (the circumstances due to which this document became known was written in 2006 by the newspaper "Polyarny Vestnik"). From this protocol, drawn up on July 1 at the command post of the 2nd mountain rifle division of the Germans, it can be seen that the adjutant of General Zhurba was taken prisoner “06/30/1941, from 5 to 8 km east of the [southern] bridge over Titovka by the 137th mountain rifle regiment ". In captivity, P. Abramov said that the place of his service was the headquarters of the 14th Infantry Division, and he himself "is the adjutant of the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, Major General Shurba [Zhurba], who died in battle."

It turns out that P. Abramov, who, by virtue of his official position, was obliged to accompany his boss under any conditions, having been captured at a distance of no more than 8 kilometers east of the bridge (the place of the alleged death of Zhurba), on June 30, 1941, he knew that the general was dead. This may mean that the general either died in the car, as his driver indicated, or took part in the battle in the area of ​​​​the South Bridge across Titovka, was killed and buried there, not far from the battlefield. It was no longer possible to take him to the rear. By the way, this is precisely what could prevent Pavel Abramov from joining the retreating Soviet troops and lead to the fact that he was captured by the enemy.

The version that the general could have been captured, I think, should not be seriously considered. It seems that the Germans really got, as Veshchezersky writes in his memoirs, only the general's overcoat. After all, if Zhurba, like his adjutant, had been captured, no one would have written in the report of the interrogation of the adjutant that the general died in battle. It turns out that Pavel Abramov spoke the truth in captivity. Otherwise, one will have to assume that, having forgotten the oath and military duty, he left his boss to the mercy of fate and went straight to captivity.

This is what the official version of the death of General Zhurba, repeated many times by many authors, invites everyone to believe. This version is based on the memories of the former border guard of the 6th outpost of the 100th border detachment P.I. Terentyev, which suddenly flooded over him many, many years after the end of the war, in April 1975.

In short, the essence of these memoirs of P.I. Terentyev is that he happened to witness the last battle with the participation of the general, which took place somewhere in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe height of Big Musta-Tunturi. He, Terentiev, allegedly took part in the burial of the general after his death, and many years later he found his remains at the battlefield.

It does not make much sense to analyze the details of this version - it is well known, and there are a lot of details of it and all of them are very contradictory. All the authors describing this version state what they have learned from Terentiev's words. I will dwell on only a few of these details, which are ridiculous or even simply absurd. Each of these "details" in itself can easily destroy the entire version of Terentiev, but all the more so all together. Judge for yourself.

Meeting of the detachment of sergeant-border guard N.O. Remizov, which included Terentiev, with the group of General Zhurba happened, as Barbolin describes, on the evening of June 29 in the region of height 298.4. This height, according to the Soviet pre-war map, is located not far from the place where the headquarters of the Nord grouping of the enemy was subsequently located. This is very far north from Titovka (where the headquarters of the 95th regiment and the 14th division were located) and even further (more than twice) from the South Bridge, where the general went in the middle of the day on June 29th. The question is, what was a general to do with a group of fighters in a roadless wilderness when he should have returned to headquarters at the first opportunity and stayed there? How, and most importantly, why was he able to move so quickly within one day on June 29 from the border area past his headquarters to the place of the described battle?

The direction that, according to Terentyev's version, their group, led by the general, chose in order to break through to their troops, was completely unsuitable for this purpose. There were no roads in this area in 1941; the enemy built them to supply his front in the isthmus much later. But according to Terentyev, the general had with him topographic map, and so strangely "get lost" he simply could not. In the area of ​​​​the alleged battles with the participation of the general, since the morning of June 29, a whole regiment of the enemy, the 136th mountain rifle regiment, was operating, which would easily destroy such a small group of Soviet troops, not allowing it to pass even half of the path described by Terentyev.

Surprisingly, all the rest of the Soviet troops chose a completely different path of salvation - along the only Titovka-Kutovaya road. And they were saved! Barbolin writes about this: “On the night of June 30, soldiers of the 95th regiment and border guards departing from the Titov direction began to appear on the Titovka-Kutovaya road in small groups and alone. Among them were many wounded. But not a single officer or sergeant was present. To my question: "Where are your commanders?" - followed the answer: "Killed in battle, we are leaving the encirclement." If the general were alive and he went out to his troops past his headquarters in Titovka - he had a direct path along the only road and along the path along with these retreating troops. But that did not happen. It turns out that there really was no one to lead these people, and all the stories about the general’s battle on the side of the road are just Terentyev’s inventions.

Surprisingly, after the battle, which allegedly took place at the foot of the Great Musta-Tunturi, a detachment led by a general stubbornly tried to break through to the west of the ridge. But our troops were in the opposite direction - in the northeast! This inexplicable desire of our fighters to the west defies any logical analysis.

In addition, among the personal belongings that were allegedly removed from the general after his death, Terentyev strangely does not mention the Order of the Red Star, although he describes in detail the rest of the personal belongings of the deceased. This detail speaks volumes in itself. Orders in those years were constantly worn, without taking off, and Zhurba simply could not lose his order. Where could he go then?

The fact that the general’s personal belongings, despite a long search, were never found by Terentyev during a specially organized trip in 1976 to the place of the alleged death of General Zhurba, finally underlines the far-fetchedness and implausibility of his version. What a "greatly changed area" here! Stones remain stones. Those veterans who really watered these stones with their blood, and after more than sixty years, even today, unmistakably find the places of their former battles. And then a little more than thirty years had passed since the war.

All this, taken together, allows us to conclude that the version of P.I. Terentyev has no real grounds. Unfortunately, at some point national history it turned out to be in demand and fell, as they say, "to the court." Any soviet man, who went missing during the war years, automatically fell into the category of potential suspects of surrendering to the enemy or of betrayal. However, I think that General Zhurba himself would hardly have been happy with such a “lawyer” as P.I. appeared for him on his own initiative or on someone’s prompt. Terentiev.

The most probable version of everything that happened in 1941: the general really died during the bombing in the area of ​​​​the South Bridge across the Titovka (now the Titovka frontier post is located here) and was buried near the place of death. Surely, General P. Abramov's adjutant participated in his burial and kept silent about it during interrogation in captivity. But he had to tell the right person about it after his release from German captivity in 1944.

And so there is only one thing left - to search ...

Dmitry DULIC

This article was prepared at the request and with the assistance of
Murmansk educational center "Dobrokhot"