Today, the Perm Regional Court sentenced Vladimir Luzgin to a fine of 200,000 rubles for "rehabilitating Nazism." The reason was an article posted by Luzgin on his page on VKontakte. According to the investigation, with which the court agreed, the phrase “communists and Germany jointly attacked Poland, unleashing the Second World War, that is, communism and Nazism honestly cooperated” contradicts the results of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

But then what about the world-famous annex to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which takes place even in high school? We asked historians to evaluate how the fatal phrase from Luzgin's repost contradicts the facts.

Ilya Budraitskis

historian, political theorist

The phrase "communists and Germany jointly attacked Poland" refers to the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 and more precisely to the secret protocols according to which the territory of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was to be divided between Germany and the USSR. The very fact of the existence of these protocols, as well as the responsibility of the Stalinist USSR for the occupation of these countries, was recognized even during perestroika by the Congress of People's Deputies. Since then, despite the huge number of publications and political statements (including by President Putin), which actually deny the aggressive nature of the actions of the Soviet state during this period, and sometimes the very existence of a secret appendix to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, officially the Russian Federation did not revise the 1989 assessment.

However, it does not follow from this that the assertion that the USSR is equally responsible for the outbreak of war does not follow from this. In addition, the conclusion of an agreement with Hitler was a sharp reversal of the entire previous political line of the USSR and the Communist International, which since 1935 (the 7th Congress of the Comintern) called for the creation of general democratic Popular Fronts against the fascist threat. The conclusion of the pact looked like a betrayal in the eyes of many European communists and led to a serious crisis in a number of pro-Soviet communist parties (in particular, in the French Communist Party). Evidence of this stunning impact of the pact on the anti-fascist and labor movement Europe can be found in hundreds of memoirs of its participants, as well as in fiction(for example, in Arthur Koestler's famous novel Blinding Darkness).

Margaret Buber-Neumann, the wife of one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany, who emigrated to the USSR after Hitler came to power and was repressed in Moscow in 1937, was handed over by the Soviet authorities to the Gestapo in 1940 (after the conclusion of the pact) and then spent years in a women's concentration camp Ravensbrück. Book of her memoirs world revolution and the Stalinist regime" presents a terrible testimony to this unprincipled zigzag of the Stalinist foreign policy.

German attack on Soviet Union in 1941, of course, instantly radically changed the Soviet foreign policy line, and the heroic struggle of the Red Army and the European communists - participants in the anti-fascist resistance made many forget the shameful history of 1939.

The temporary cooperation between Stalin and Hitler, of course, was not of an ideological nature; moreover, on Stalin's part it was not "honest" and was an actual betrayal of communist principles. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was thus an act of a cynical and situational raison d'etat, but did nothing to bring Nazism and communism closer together, which were and remain radical and irreconcilable opponents.

Of course, the statement circulated by Vladimir Luzgin contradicts the results of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which unequivocally found Germany solely responsible for starting the war. However, the tribunal itself, in which the prosecution was presented by four allied countries, was supposed to consolidate the results of the victory over Nazi Germany and establish general idea about the justice of this victory, and not to understand the nuances of the history of their own indirect responsibility for the strengthening of Hitler (not only in relation to the Soviet-German pact of 1939, but also the Munich agreement of 1938, as a result of which England and France actually came to terms with the German division of Czechoslovakia) .

The verdict of the Perm court is in fact fully consistent with Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code. And the main question must be raised not only in connection with a specific court decision, but with the very possibility of regulating public judgments about history with the help of the Criminal Code.

The text referred to by Luzgin is certainly evaluative, propagandistic and contains significant distortions of facts. However, the same deliberate distortion, only from a different, “patriotic” position, can also be blamed on the popular panegyrics to Stalin that flooded the shelves of Russian bookstores, justifying repressions, deportations and the aggressive foreign policy of the USSR. Thus, at the center of the problem is the very transformation of history into a tool to justify the current policy of power. Such dangerous games with historical politics, the legitimization of the present through a distorted and constantly reconstructed past, are typical not only for Putin's Russia, but also for most countries of Eastern Europe. The primitive drawing of an equal sign between Nazism and communism, which can be found in the text distributed by Luzgin, unfortunately, has become a key figure in the ideology of most post-socialist countries.

History, used as a stupid tool for the ideological hegemony of the elites, is stripped of its dramatic, complex content and turned into a resource for extracting various national versions of the trampled "historical justice" that are in irreconcilable contradiction with each other.

The history of the 20th century shows that it is with the rhetoric of "restoring historical justice", violated by external and internal enemies, that justifications for future wars all too often begin. This is what we should think about in connection with the current sad Perm verdict.

Sergei Mikhailovich
Solovyov

Associate Professor at Moscow State University of Psychology and Education, Editor-in-Chief of the Skepsis Journal

The phrase “communists and Germany jointly attacked Poland, unleashing the Second World War, that is, communism and Nazism honestly cooperated”, of course, is not the truth, but is nothing more than an ideological stamp. It can be divided into several components.

Throughout the 1930s, the USSR tried by diplomatic methods to create a system of collective security in Europe. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov achieved the conclusion in 1935 of agreements on cooperation with Czechoslovakia and France in opposition to Nazi Germany. In 1936-1939, the USSR helped the Spanish Republicans in their fight against the Nazis, led by General Franco. The USSR supplied weapons, military specialists, raw materials for the military industry, and so on. In this civil war, the Spanish fascists enjoyed the full support of their Italian and German associates, Hitler and Mussolini not only helped Franco with the most modern weapons, but also sent a total of about 200 thousand of their soldiers. Without this help, Franco's rebellion against the republican government would have been doomed. England and France also announced a policy of non-intervention, which played into the hands of the Nazis.

In September 1938, when Hitler presented territorial claims to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership seriously considered the possibility of a military confrontation with Germany, but Great Britain and France agreed to an agreement with Germany, thereby signing the death sentence of Czechoslovakia. This agreement deservedly went down in history as the Munich Agreement. Even before that, France and England did not react in any way to the Nazi violation of the Treaty of Versailles, to the rearmament of the German army, to the capture (Anschluss) of Austria, although they had every opportunity for successful diplomatic and military pressure on Germany. Convinced of his own impunity and the weakness of a potential enemy, Hitler unleashed the war.

Stalin and the Politburo still tried to negotiate with England and France, because they understood that after Poland Hitler could attack the USSR, but these countries (primarily England) frankly sabotaged the negotiations and played for time, hoping that the USSR and Germany would mutually weaken each other in war. For example, for the last round of negotiations, when the war was already on the nose, France and England sent their representatives to the USSR ... by sea, that is, by the longest route. The negotiations stalled on August 21 due to the unwillingness of France and England to conclude any specific agreements and put pressure on Poland, which was not going to accept Soviet assistance in any form.

It was as a result of this policy of encouraging the aggressor that the USSR concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (just two days after the termination of negotiations with Western countries) in order not to become the next victim of the Nazis and to receive (according to the secret protocols to the pact) a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe- a buffer against the inevitable aggression of the Nazis.

In addition, any fascism (German Nazism, Italian and Eastern European fascisms, fascist regimes Latin America like Pinochet's in Chile) is based on anti-communism. Any agreement between the Nazis and the USSR could only be temporary, and that is how it was viewed by both sides in 1939. In this regard, talking about some kind of "honest cooperation" is simply stupid.

The Union sent troops into Poland not simultaneously with the Nazis, not on September 1, but on September 18, when the military defeat of Poland was already a fait accompli, although fighting in different parts of the country was still ongoing. Joint military operations were not carried out, although, of course, the Soviet and German troops established demarcation lines together and so on.

Crossing the border of Poland, the Soviet troops pursued a pragmatic goal - to move the border further to the West, so that in the event of German aggression against the USSR, they would have more time to protect the economic and political centers of the USSR. It must be said that in the Great Patriotic War the German blitzkrieg practically thwarted these plans: the territories newly annexed to the USSR under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were captured by the Nazis in a matter of days.

This statement, of course, contradicts the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, according to which Nazi Germany was recognized as the aggressor and initiator of the war. The process was adversarial, war criminals and Nazi organizations had every opportunity to defend themselves, their lawyers tried to refute this thesis, but they did not succeed.

Speaking about the specific case that gave rise to these questions: the truth on this matter should still be established not by the court and not by the prosecutor's office, but by historians in public discussions.

Kirill Novikov

Researcher, RANEPA

The fact is that Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, and attacked alone, except for the Slovak units. England and France declared war on Germany on September 3, which turned the Polish-German war into a world war, and the USSR invaded Poland only on the 17th, that is, when World War has already been untied. At the same time, the invasion of the Red Army in Poland went in line with the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, so the fact of cooperation between Moscow and Berlin cannot be denied.

However, this does not contradict the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Firstly, the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1946 was still unpublished, so the tribunal could not, in principle, evaluate it. Secondly, the tribunal was established "to try and punish the main war criminals of the European Axis countries", that is, it could judge only the losers, but could not judge the winners. Consequently, the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal cannot be used to determine the degree of responsibility of the USSR and the allies for unleashing the war. Finally, from the fact that the defendants were found guilty of crimes against peace, it does not follow that there were no other guilty parties.

I can comment on the event connected with V. Luzgin as follows. I believe that a person has the right to his own opinion, even if he is mistaken in something, from someone's point of view. This is called freedom of speech, which we have written in the Constitution. History is up for debate. It is necessary to conduct discussions, give arguments, and not drag them into jail.

On September 1, 1939, at 4:00 am, German troops invaded Poland. So World War II started.

The reason for the German attack on Poland was the refusal of the Polish government to transfer the free city of Danzig to Germany and give it the right to build highways to East Prussia, which would pass through the territory of Poland. Danzig with the adjacent territory formed the so-called "Danzig Corridor". This corridor was created by the Treaty of Versailles in order for Poland to have access to the sea. The Danzig region cut off German territory from East Prussia. But not only the passage between the territory of Germany and East Prussia (part of Germany) was the goal of the attack on Poland. For Nazi Germany, this was the next stage in the implementation of the program to expand the "living space". In Austria and Czechoslovakia, Hitler managed to achieve his goals through diplomatic moves, threats and blackmail. Now the power phase of the implementation of predatory goals has frowned.

"I have completed the political preparations, now the road is open to the soldier," Hitler declared before the start of the invasion. Of course, by "political preparations" he meant, in particular, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, which relieved Hitler of the need to wage war on two fronts. Historians will later call this pact the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact". We will discuss this document and its secret appendices in detail in the next chapter.

Wehrmacht soldiers break the barrier at the border checkpoint in Sopot
(border of Poland and the Free City of Danzig), September 1, 1939.
German Federal Archives.

In the early morning of September 1, German troops moved deep into the territory of Poland, having up to 40 divisions in the first echelon, including all the mechanized and motorized formations that Germany then had, followed by another 13 divisions of the reserve. The massive use of tank and motorized forces with the active support of aviation allowed the German troops to carry out a blitzkrieg operation in Poland (Blitzkrieg - lightning war). The million-strong Polish army was dispersed along the borders, which did not have strong defensive lines, which made it possible for the Germans to create significant superiority in forces in certain areas. The flat terrain contributed to the high pace of advance German troops. Attacking the line of the Polish border from the north and west, using superiority in tanks and aircraft, the German command carried out a major operation to encircle and destroy the Polish troops. Despite the powerful onslaught of the enemy, a significant part of the Polish troops managed at the first stage to break out of the encirclement and retreat to the east.

From the first days of the war, miscalculations of the Polish military leadership were revealed. The Polish main headquarters proceeded from the fact that the allies would strike at Germany from the west, and the Polish army would carry out an offensive in the direction of Berlin. Polish offensive doctrine armed forces did not provide for the creation of a reliable line of defense. Therefore, the Germans, with relatively small losses in people and equipment from September 1 to 6, 1939, achieved the following results: the 3rd Wehrmacht Army (along with the 4th Army was part of the Northern Army Group under the command of General von Bock), breaking through the Polish defenses on the border with East Prussia, went to the Narew River and crossed it at Ruzhan. The 4th Army, with a blow from Pomerania, passed the "Danzig corridor" and began to move south along both banks of the Vistula. The 8th and 10th armies advancing in the center (Southern Army Group under the command of General von Rundstedt) advanced - the first to Lodz, the second to Warsaw. Three Polish armies ("Torun", "Poznan" and "Lodz") made their way to the southeast or to the capital (at first unsuccessfully). This was the first stage of the encirclement operation.

Already the first days of the campaign in Poland showed that the era of new war. Gone are the positional sitting in the trenches with painfully long breakthroughs. The era of engines, the massive use of tanks and aircraft has come. French military experts believed that Poland should hold out until the spring of 1940. But five days was enough for the Germans to defeat the main backbone of the Polish army, which turned out to be unprepared for modern warfare. The Poles could not oppose anything to the six German tank divisions, especially since the territory of Poland was best suited for the blitzkrieg.

The main forces of the Polish army were located along the borders, where there were no fortifications that represented any serious obstacles for tank formations. Under such conditions, the courage and perseverance that the Polish wars everywhere showed could not bring them victory.

Polish troops that managed to break out of the encirclement, as well as the garrisons of cities located beyond the Narew and Bug rivers, tried to create a new defensive line on the southern banks of these rivers. But the created line turned out to be weak, the units that returned after the battles suffered heavy losses, and the newly arriving fresh formations did not have time to fully concentrate. The 3rd Army, which was part of the German group "North", reinforced by Guderian's tank corps, broke through the defenses of the Polish troops on the Narew River on September 9 and moved to the southeast. On September 10, units of the 3rd Army crossed the Bug and reached the Warsaw-Brest railway. Meanwhile, the German 4th Army was moving forward in the direction of Modlin-Warsaw.

Army Group "South" defeated the Polish troops in the interfluve of the San and Vistula and advanced on the connection with the troops of Army Group "North". At the same time, the 14th Army crossed the San River and launched an offensive against Lvov. The 10th Army continued its offensive against Warsaw from the south. The 8th Army was advancing on Warsaw in the central direction, through Lodz. Thus, in the second stage, the Polish troops retreated in almost all areas.

Although the bulk of the Polish troops were forced to retreat to the east, stubborn battles still continued in the west. The Polish troops succeeded here in preparing and inflicting a surprise counterattack from the Kutno region against the rear of the 8th German Army. This counterattack was the first tactical success of the Polish army, but, of course, it had no effect on the outcome of the battle. The Polish grouping of three divisions, which carried out a counterattack from the Kutno region, was surrounded by German troops in one day and ultimately defeated.

On September 10, formations of the 3rd German Army came to the northern suburbs of Warsaw. Guderian's tank corps advanced east of Warsaw in a southerly direction and on September 15 reached Brest. On September 13, the encircled Polish grouping in the Radom area was defeated. On September 15, German troops operating beyond the Vistula took Lublin. On September 16, the formations of the 3rd Army, advancing from the north, joined in the Vlodawa region with units of the 10th Army, that is, the troops of the Army Group North and South joined behind the Vistula, and the encirclement ring of Polish troops east of Warsaw closed. German troops reached the line Lvov - Vladimir-Volynsky - Brest - Bialystok. Thus ended the second stage of hostilities in Poland. The organized resistance of the Polish army at this stage actually ceased.

Poland's allies - Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, but for the entire Polish campaign there was no practical help Poland was not provided.

The third and last stage of hostilities in Poland consisted in the suppression by German troops of individual pockets of resistance and in the battles for Warsaw. These battles ended on 28 September. The desperate resistance of the defenders of Warsaw stopped only when the ammunition ran out. Prior to this, Warsaw had been subjected to artillery shelling and aerial bombardment for six days. The death toll from the barbaric bombardment of Warsaw was five times more number who died defending it.

The Government of Poland, in the most difficult hour of trials for its people, on September 16 shamefully fled to Romania. The army and the entire Polish people were left to the mercy of fate, or rather, to the mercy of the fascist aggressors. The last battles were fought by one of the Polish divisions near the city of Kotsk. Here, on October 5, 1939, the remnants of the division laid down their arms and surrendered.

Shortly after the invasion of Poland, the Germans offered the Soviet Union to intervene in the course of hostilities in order to immediately occupy those areas of Poland that, according to the secret annex to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, were to be annexed by the Soviet Union. But the Soviet leadership gave its troops, concentrated at the western border of the USSR, an order to occupy the eastern regions of Poland only after it became clear that the Polish army was defeated, and help from Poland's allies would no longer come, since the Polish government left the country. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border. The liberation campaign of the Red Army began, as it was called then and many years later. The Soviet leadership motivated the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland by the need to protect the Ukrainian and Belarusian population of the eastern regions of Poland in the conditions of the outbreak of war and the complete defeat of the Polish armed forces. It should be noted that the Soviet Union repeatedly offered Poland military assistance in repelling German aggression, but these proposals were actually rejected by the Polish government, which was more afraid of Soviet assistance than a German attack.

The number of Soviet troops participating in the campaign against Poland was about 620 thousand people. The Polish armed forces did not expect the offensive of the Red Army at all. In most areas occupied by Soviet troops, the Poles did not put up armed resistance. Only in certain places in the Ternopil and Pinsk regions, as well as in the city of Grodno, did the Soviet units meet stubborn resistance, which was quickly crushed. Resistance was provided, as a rule, not by regular Polish troops, but by units of the gendarmerie and military settlers. The Polish troops, completely demoralized by the defeat from the German troops, surrendered en masse to the Soviet troops. In total, more than 450 thousand people surrendered. For comparison: the German troops operating on vast territory Poland, surrendered about 420 thousand Polish soldiers and officers. One of the possible reasons for this was also the order of the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, General Rydz-Smigly, to refrain from hostilities with the Soviet troops.

One of the main goals of the Polish campaign of the Red Army in September 1939 was the return of the territories of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, captured by Poland during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Here we would like to briefly remind our readers of the prehistory of the issue. The eastern borders of Poland were established at the suggestion of the Supreme Council of the Entente in December 1919 along the line: Grodno - Brest - the Bug River - Przemysl - Carpathians (the so-called "Curzon Line"). But the then Polish government, headed by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), unleashed a war for the lands lying much to the east of this border. During the undeclared war with Soviet Russia, Polish troops, together with the military formations of the Ukrainian People's Republic, transferred to the Polish command by Semyon Petlyura, seized the lands of Ukraine and Belarus, lying much to the east of the Curzon Line. So, in Belarus, by the end of 1919, Polish troops reached the Berezena line, and in Ukraine they went to areas east of Kyiv, Fastov, Lvov. The Red Army as a whole unsuccessfully conducted the largest operations of the Soviet-Polish war and was ultimately defeated. The Polish campaign of the Red Army, which began on September 17, 1939, was supposed to restore the western lands of Belarus and Ukraine as part of the USSR.

The Soviet media were silent for a long time about the war with Poland in 1920. Actually Soviet Russia was at war with Poland throughout 1919 (the first clashes between the Red Army and Polish troops took place in the western part of Belarus in December 1918) and until October 12, 1920, when a truce was concluded between Poland and Soviet Russia in Riga. Long peace negotiations began, and the Riga Peace Treaty was concluded only on March 18, 1921. Soviet Russia failed to push the Soviet-Polish border to the "Curzon Line". Under the terms of the Riga Peace Treaty, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus withdrew to Poland.

The Soviet leadership preferred not to talk about the Soviet-Polish war for obvious reasons: who is interested in talking about their defeat? In addition, the Soviet troops in that war were commanded by two marshals - M.N. Tukhachevsky and A.I. Egorov, who were slandered and in 1937 were shot on Stalin's orders as "enemies of the people."

No more than the Soviet official organs spread about the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 and about the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in September 1939. Whatever they say about the “liberation mission” of the Red Army, but the black shadow of the secret protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, relentlessly followed this noble mission.

The campaign of the Red Army, which began on September 17, continued as follows. On September 19-20, 1939, advanced Soviet units met with German troops on the line Lvov - Vladimir-Volynsky - Brest - Bialystok. On September 20, negotiations began between Germany and the USSR on establishing a demarcation line.

As a result of these negotiations, on September 28, 1939, the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. The new Soviet border now differed little from the so-called Curzon Line. Stalin, during negotiations in Moscow, abandoned the initial claims to the ethnic Polish lands between the Vistula and the Bug and suggested that the German side abandon its claims to Lithuania. The German side agreed with this, and Lithuania was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. We also agreed that the Lubelskie and partially Warsaw Voivodeships would pass into the zone of German interests.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and the Border, economic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany became noticeably more active. The USSR supplied Germany with food and strategic materials, such as cotton, oil, chromium, copper, platinum, manganese ore, and others. The deliveries of raw materials and materials from the Soviet Union made almost imperceptible for Germany the economic blockade imposed against it by Western countries with the outbreak of the war. From Germany, the USSR received rolled steel, machinery and equipment in exchange for the supply of its goods. The confidence of the top leadership of the USSR in the Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939 and in the Treaty of Friendship and Border of September 28 of the same year was quite high, although not unlimited. This, of course, influenced the increase in the share of Germany in the foreign trade of the USSR. This proportion rose from 7.4% to 40.4% between 1939 and 1940.

The Polish campaign of the Red Army actually meant the entry of the USSR into World War II. The losses of the Soviet troops during the Polish campaign amounted to 715 people killed and 1876 people wounded. The Poles lost in combat clashes with the Red Army 3.5 thousand people killed, 20 thousand wounded and over 450 thousand people captured. Most of the prisoners were Ukrainians and Belarusians. Almost all of them (primarily the rank and file) were sent home.

The total losses of the Germans during the hostilities in Poland in 1939 amounted to 44 thousand people, of which 10.5 thousand were killed. The Poles lost in battles with the German army 66.3 thousand people killed and missing, 133.7 thousand wounded and 420 thousand prisoners.

Hitler, especially in the first weeks of fighting in Poland, personally controlled the actions of the German troops. According to the memoirs of Heinz Guderian, on September 5, Adolf Hitler unexpectedly arrived in his tank corps in the Plevno region. Seeing the destroyed Polish artillery, he was surprised to learn from Guderian that this was done not by dive bombers, but by tanks. Hitler asked about casualties. Learning that in five days of fighting in four divisions there were 150 killed and 700 wounded, he was very surprised at such insignificant losses. By way of comparison, Hitler cited the loss of his regiment during World War I after the first day of operations as about 2,000 killed and wounded in the regiment alone. Guderian pointed out that the slight losses of his corps in battle were due mainly to the effectiveness of the tanks. At the same time, he described his opponent as brave and stubborn.

The results of the German aggression against Poland were as follows: the western regions of Poland were annexed to Germany, and on the common territory of the Warsaw, Lublin and Krakow voivodships, a general government was created, occupied by Wehrmacht troops. The state of Poland, having gained independence in November 1918, practically ceased to exist after a little over twenty years until the spring of 1945, when Poland was liberated by the Soviet Army with the participation of the Polish Army.

The result of the Polish campaign of the Red Army in 1939 was the reunification of the divided peoples - Belarusians and Ukrainians. The territories inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR in November 1939. The territory of the USSR increased by 196 thousand square kilometers, and the population - by 13 million people. Soviet borders moved 300-400 km to the west. Of course, it was a good territorial and demographic result. But the Polish campaign also had a certain negative result. We mean that the ease with which the goals of this campaign were achieved could create illusions in the military-political leadership of the USSR about the invincible power of the Red Army. Here the praise of the victories of the Red Army over the Japanese in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan (1938) and the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939) also played a role, which, by the way, did not come easily to the Soviet troops. Soviet propaganda insisted that the results of the Polish campaign are proof of the "invincibility" of the Red Army. But to everyone normal person it was clear that the “ease” of the actions of the Red Army was ensured by the defeat of Poland by the troops of the German Wehrmacht. About how dangerous self-confidence, overestimated self-esteem and simultaneous underestimation of the enemy’s forces are, the Soviet military leadership was convinced very soon in the war with Finland, which began on November 30, 1939.

Occupation of Poland. The struggle of the Polish people against the Nazi invaders.

The occupation of Poland by the Nazi troops, which began on September 1, 1939, continued until May 1945. All this time, the Polish people put up courageous resistance to the invaders. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were the first to enter the territory of occupied Poland on July 17, 1944, and on July 20, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Polish Army.

On July 22, in the city of Chelm, liberated by the Soviet Army (then the Red Army) and parts of the Polish Army, the Polish Committee of National Liberation was established, which took over the functions of the government of Poland.

On July 31, 1944, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the tasks of the Soviet Army in connection with the entry into the territory of Poland. The resolution emphasized that the Soviet Army, having entered the territory of Poland, was carrying out a liberation mission against the Polish people.

This mission was not easy. Let us give just one figure: almost 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died in the battles for the liberation of Poland. All of Poland is covered with mass graves of Soviet soldiers.

Soviet-Polish relations were not easy, starting from the first years of the existence of Soviet Russia. The Soviet-Polish war of 1920 and the entry of Soviet troops on September 17, 1939 into the territory of Poland showed the complexity of these relations. It is known that the ruling circles of Western countries constantly pushed Poland to aggravate relations with the USSR. Great Britain was especially successful in this ignoble business.

The entry of Soviet troops on September 17, 1939 in eastern regions Poland, populated mainly by Belarusians and Ukrainians, was agreed with the leadership of Nazi Germany. The non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, concluded between the USSR and Germany, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, provided for the division of Poland into zones of interests of the Soviet Union and Germany.

On September 28, 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a new German-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany”. This treaty officially and legally fixed the division of the territory of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Two additional secret protocols were attached to this treaty. In one of them, the borders of the division of Poland were specified: the Lublin Voivodeship and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship went into the sphere of influence of Germany, and the entire Lithuanian territory was given to the Soviet Union as an additional sphere of influence. In another secret protocol, both sides undertook the obligation not to allow any Polish agitation on "their territories" and even to "eliminate the germs" of such agitation. In other words, the USSR and Nazi Germany agreed on joint actions against agitation and propaganda for the revival of Poland. The meaning is clear, but we will not expand on the moral and ethical side of such a collusion.

In the years that have passed since then, nothing has been written or said about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its appendices, as well as about the Treaty of Friendship and Borders. For objective historians, it has long been clear that these documents recorded a conspiracy between the leaders of the two largest states: the USSR and Germany, and the conspiracy was forced for both one and the other side. The intentions of each side were determined by the current situation. Germany, with the help of these documents, tried to convince (at least for a while) the Soviet leadership of the supposedly peaceful intentions of the Nazi regime in order to guarantee itself from the need to wage a war on two fronts (in the west and in the east). The Soviet leadership, realizing the inevitability of war with Germany, hoped to win at least a little time before the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the armed forces for the upcoming trials. This was vital for the USSR in that tense situation.

The agreement of August 23, 1939 did not provide for the seizure of Polish territories by the Soviet Union. It was only supposed to reunite the western lands that historically belonged to Ukraine and Belarus, but passed to Poland after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Therefore, the campaign of the Red Army on the territory of Poland, launched on September 17, 1939, was not an act of aggression against Poland, as it was represented by Polish nationalist circles and many Western politicians.

In anticipation of the complete defeat of Poland from the Nazi troops, the Polish government left the country and emigrated to London. On July 30, 1941, an agreement was signed in London between the USSR and Poland on the restoration of diplomatic relations, on mutual assistance in the war against Nazi Germany and on the creation of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR.

On December 3-4, 1941, Soviet-Polish negotiations were held in Moscow and a declaration of the governments of the USSR and Poland on friendship and mutual assistance was signed. But on April 25, 1943, the Soviet government sent a note to the Polish government in exile in London about breaking off relations with it. The reason for this step was the criticism of the policy of the Soviet leadership by the Polish government, perceived by Moscow as a slanderous campaign.

The Union of Polish Patriots, organized in the USSR, turned to the Soviet government with a request to form Polish military units on the territory of the USSR. This request was granted, and in May 1943, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko began to form on the territory of the USSR. This Polish division for the first time entered into battle with the Nazi invaders on October 12, 1943 near the village of Lenino (Goretsky district of the Mogilev region) as part of the 33rd Army of the Soviet Western Front. October 12 was previously considered the Day of the Polish Army. We do not know what this day is considered in Poland now.

We only know that modern Poland is a member of NATO, and the Polish leaders, clearly confusing day with night, are talking about some kind of danger coming from Russia, a country that once saved the Polish people from destruction. Having lost orientation in space, the Polish government clung to the maternal breast of NATO, seeking protection from this military-political organization. NATO instructors, mentors and other military experts have already arrived in Poland. It is likely that more militarily tangible NATO forces and assets will appear here soon. Then the Polish leaders will breathe freely: Polska has not yet perished ...

The nationalist aspirations of the leading circles of Poland, on the one hand, and the inexorable desire of the Soviet leadership to keep Poland in its sphere of influence, on the other, were the reason why, in the struggle against the Nazi invaders in Poland, national forces of different goals, organized in Home Army and People's Army.

Let us briefly recall what these two military organizations were. The Home Army (Armia Krajowa - Polish. Fatherland Army) is an underground military organization created in 1942 by the Polish government in exile in the territory of Poland occupied by Nazi Germany. It operated until January 1945. In 1943-1944. its number ranged from 250 to 350 thousand people.

With the help of the Home Army, the emigrant government hoped to retain its power after the liberation of Poland, prevent the loss of Poland's independence and avoid its dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Army of Ludowa (Armia Ludowa - Polish. People's Army) is a military organization created by the Polish Workers' Party by decision of the Home Rada of the People on January 1, 1944 on the basis of Guards of the People - an underground military organization of the Polish Workers' Party and operating since January 1942. The Army of Lyudov and the Guards of Lyudov, which preceded it, waged a rather active struggle against the Nazi occupiers. Geographically, Ludov's Army was divided into six districts. Organizationally, it consisted of 16 partisan brigades and 20 separate battalions and detachments. Ludov's army fought 120 major battles, destroyed more than 19 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers, and collaborated with Soviet partisan detachments operating in Poland. The Soviet Union helped the Human Army with weapons and other materiel. In July 1944, the Ludov Army (about 60 thousand people) merged with the 1st Polish Army into a single Polish Army.

Ordinary people always suffer from political confrontation within any country, as well as from international political disagreements and conflicts. A great drama for the inhabitants of Warsaw and the entire Polish people was the Warsaw armed uprising of 1944. Short-sighted, to put it mildly, acted the leadership of the Home Army, which prepared this uprising against the Nazi invaders without establishing contact with the Soviet command and the leadership of the People's Army. Yes, the leadership of the Home Army could not do otherwise, following the instructions of the Polish government in exile. The victory of the uprising would enable this government to establish its power in Warsaw, and then in the whole camp.

The uprising, prepared in a hurry and militarily weak, began on August 1, 1944. It quickly took on a mass character, and then the rebels were supported by detachments of the People's Army, not notified in advance of the impending uprising. However, the forces were not equal. The fascist German garrison of Warsaw rushed at the insurgents with all its might. The weakness of the preparations for the uprising was already evident in the first clashes between the rebels and the Germans. The rebels turned to the Soviet Army for help. The Soviet leadership, of course, did not want such a turn of affairs that, as a result of the victory of the Warsaw Uprising, the former bourgeois-landowner power was established in Poland. Therefore, Stalin did not immediately respond to the appeal of the Poles for help. But in order to create the appearance of helping the rebels, he ordered them to drop weapons, ammunition and other necessary equipment on airplanes. The order was carried out, but, unfortunately, a significant part of the dropped weapons fell into the hands of the Germans. It was impossible to do more, since the Soviet troops could not yet take Warsaw by storm. Warsaw was liberated from the Nazi occupation by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front with the participation of the 1st Army of the Polish Army only on January 17, 1945.

After fierce fighting, the rebels were defeated. The leadership of the Home Army withdrew the remnants of the troops and signed the surrender on the terms dictated by the Nazi command. This event took place on October 2, 1944. As a result of hostilities on the part of the rebels, about 200 thousand people died, and Warsaw received severe destruction.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"

Background of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939

Russian-Polish relations over the centuries have developed very difficult. There was no fundamental change after October revolution when Soviet Russia welcomed the declaration of Poland's independence. In the 20-30s. these relations did not have a stable character, old prejudices and stereotypes affected.

In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Poland, which recognized that the peace treaty of 1921 still remains the basis of their mutual relations and obligations. The parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy, pledged to refrain from aggressive actions or attacks on each other separately or jointly with other powers. Such actions recognized "any act of violence that violates the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political independence" of the other side. At the end of 1938, both governments reaffirmed that the non-aggression pact of 1932, extended in 1934 until 1945, is the basis of peaceful relations between countries.

However, the outwardly peaceful nature of Soviet policy actually covered up the notorious confrontational nature of the Soviet policy of the Soviet leadership in the 1920s–1930s. regarding Poland. Significantly exacerbated mutual distrust in these years and the failed attempt to establish a Soviet regime in Poland during the Soviet-Polish war, and the results of the Riga Peace Treaty, and the activities of the Comintern aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation in Poland and preparing a pro-communist coup. It is impossible not to take into account the presence of insurmountable ideological contradictions.

Until 1939, the Soviet leadership considered Poland a springboard used by European states for subversive activities against the USSR and a possible military attack. The development of Polish-English, and then Polish-German relations was seen as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. However, Poland itself was perceived as an adversary. The Polish secret services, sometimes in cooperation with the British, carried out active intelligence activities to identify military potential, both in the border regions and in the deep regions of the Soviet Union. The understandable desire of the leadership of Poland, which had recently experienced a massive invasion of the Red Army, to have reliable information about possible Soviet military preparations, was perceived in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as Yu. Pilsudsky's preparation of aggressive actions against the USSR.

In our opinion, during that period, those special messages of Soviet intelligence residents from Poland were not always correctly perceived, in which the real situation was most adequately reflected. So, for example, at the beginning of 1937, S. Shpigelglas, deputy head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, drew the following conclusion from the report of the Othello source: “The report is undoubtedly interesting. It is replete with facts that are confirmed by other documents. The main idea of ​​the report: Poland is not an aggressor, she is eager to maintain neutrality with the help of England - maneuvering between the USSR, Germany, France - may turn out to be disinformation. This is the danger of the report.” As you can see, the Polish state was clearly seen as a potential adversary. Obviously, this is one of the main reasons for the fact that among the victims of mass repressions of the era of the Great Terror, a very significant proportion were Poles and people accused of having links with Poland.

In 1934-1935. a number of factors led to the intensification of repressions against people of Polish nationality, and, above all, against representatives of the KPP and its autonomous organizations - the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB). The repressive policy was reflected in the general change in the attitude of the USSR towards the communist movement: it was in 1935 that the 7th Congress of the Comintern staked on the creation of a united workers' front, thereby recognizing that the policy of relying only on the Communist Parties of the countries of the world, including Poland, had failed. The attitude of the Soviet leadership towards Poland and the Poles was also hardened by the successful actions of the Polish secret services to curb the subversive activities of the Comintern. The Polish-German agreement of 1934 and G. Goering's visit to Poland caused particular irritation of the Soviet leadership.

From the first months of 1936, purges began among political emigrants. In the process of preparing a special resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on political emigrants, special attention was paid to the Polish communists. Preparation for mass repressions against people of Polish nationality was manifested not only in the registration of political emigrants. In the period preceding the Great Terror, about 35% of those arrested throughout the country allegedly for espionage were accused of belonging to Polish intelligence agencies: in 1935 out of 6409 arrested - 2253, and in 1936 out of 3669 - 1275.

The change at the beginning of 1936 in the attitude towards immigrants from other countries, primarily from Poland, was reflected in the “purge” not only of the Comintern apparatus, one of the instruments of the USSR’s foreign policy, but also of the NKVD apparatus, the most important instrument for implementing domestic policy. In organizing the campaign against the Poles (in particular, employees of the NKVD bodies), the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Party Control Commission N. I. Yezhov, who skillfully aroused Stalin's manic suspicion, played a huge role. Yezhov, who in September 1936 replaced Yagoda as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, sharply intensified the campaign against Polish espionage.

On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded, on September 28, 1939, an agreement on friendship and borders, and secret protocols to them. These documents were directly related to the fate of the Polish state.

The entry of Soviet troops into the eastern provinces of Poland and their advance to the line of the Narew-Vistula-San rivers were, in principle, predetermined by the content of the secret protocol of August 23. But the German side was naturally interested in joint operations with the Red Army from the very beginning of the war against Poland.

The high command of the German army admitted the possibility of Soviet troops entering Poland, but did not know its timing. As for the commanders in the army in the field, and especially the commanders of the advanced units, they were completely unoriented in the general situation and planned their actions to the depth of the border with the Soviet Union.

Using the delay in the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, the German command from September 1 (the date of the attack of Nazi Germany on Poland) to September 16 advanced its troops up to 200 km east of the agreed Narew-Vistula-San line. The movement of German troops to the twice-changing line of "state interests" on the territory of Poland was completed only on October 14, 1939.

There was a real danger of interference in the events of the Western powers. Chamberlain and Halifax publicly announced on 24 August that Britain would fight for Poland. This position became known to the Soviet government the very next day, when the British Foreign Secretary and the Polish ambassador in London signed a pact establishing that the parties would assist each other in the event of an attack by a third country. Stalin and Molotov could not but understand the consequences if the Soviet Union intervened from the very beginning and the German-Polish conflict on the side of Germany. To Ribbentrop's inquiry, Molotov replied through Schulenburg that the Soviet Union would begin concrete actions at the right time, but “we believe, however, that this time has not yet come. We may be mistaken, but it seems to us that excessive haste can harm us and help unite our enemies.

The Soviet leadership had to wait until the final clarification of the situation in Poland. Only on September 17, 1939 at 05:40 did the Soviet troops cross the Soviet-Polish border.

Military campaign of Soviet troops against Poland

A fairly large grouping of Soviet troops was created for the Polish operation.

By the evening of September 16, the troops of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts were deployed in the initial areas for the offensive. The Soviet group united 8 rifle, 5 cavalry and 2 tank corps, 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank, 2 motorized brigades and the Dnieper military flotilla (DVF). The air forces of the fronts, taking into account the 1st, 2nd and 3rd special-purpose aviation armies relocated to their territory on September 9-10, totaled 3,298 aircraft. In addition, about 16.5 thousand border guards of the Belarusian and Kyiv border districts served on the border.

On the eastern border of Poland, apart from 25 battalions and 7 squadrons of the border guard (about 12 thousand people, or 8 soldiers per 1 km of the border), there were practically no other troops, which was well known to Soviet intelligence. So, according to intelligence data of the 4th Army, “the border strip to the river. Shara is not busy with field wars, and the KOP battalions are weak in their combat training and combat effectiveness ... Serious resistance from the Polish army to the river. It is unlikely to expect a shchar from the Poles.” At 05:00 on September 17, the advanced and assault detachments of the Soviet armies and border troops crossed the border and defeated the Polish border guard. Crossing the border confirmed the data of Soviet intelligence about the absence of significant groupings of Polish troops, which made it possible to accelerate the offensive.

For the Polish leadership, the intervention of the USSR was completely unexpected. Polish intelligence did not record any threatening movements of the Red Army, and the information received on September 1-5 was perceived as an understandable reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe. And although on September 12 information was received from Paris about a possible action by the USSR against Poland, they were not taken seriously.

The behavior of the Soviet troops also seemed strange - they, as a rule, did not shoot first, they treated the Polish troops with demonstrative goodwill, treated them to cigarettes and said that they had come to the aid against the Germans. On the ground, they waited for the instructions of the commander-in-chief. At first, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Rydz-Smigly, was inclined to give the order to repel the Soviet invasion. However, a closer examination of the situation showed that there are no forces, except for the KOP battalions and a certain number of rear and spare parts of the army, in Eastern Poland. These weakly armed troops had no chance in battle with the Red Army. As a result, on September 17, the Polish leadership was faced with a fait accompli and, based on the statements of the Soviet government and its note, believed that the Red Army was introduced in order to limit the zone of German occupation. Therefore, at about 23.40 on September 17, the order of Rydz-Smigly was transmitted by radio: “The Soviets have invaded. I order to carry out a withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves against the Germans, is unchanged. The units to which the Soviets have approached must negotiate with them in order to withdraw the garrisons to Romania or Hungary. Only units of the KOP, retreating from Zbruch to the Dniester, and units covering the "Romanian suburb" were ordered to continue resistance.

Of course, Polish command there was a plan for the deployment of troops on the eastern border - "Vskhud", which was developed from 1935-1936. On the eastern border, it was planned to deploy all available forces of the Polish Army. Of course, in the real situation of the second half of September 1939, when Poland spent all the available defense potential on attempts to continue resisting Nazi Germany, which was superior to the Poles in manpower and equipment and had already practically won the war, this whole plan remained on paper.

On the right flank of the Belorussian Front of the Red Army, from the Latvian border to Begoml, the 3rd Army was deployed, which had the task of reaching the Sharkovshchina-Dunilovichi-Lake Lake by the end of the first day of the offensive. Blyada - Yablontsy, and the next day to the front, Sventsyany, Mikhalishki and then move on to Vilna. The main blow was dealt by the right wing of the army, where the troops of the 4th Rifle Corps and the mobile group of the 24th Cavalry Division and the 22nd Tank Brigade were concentrated under the command of the divisional commander of the 24th brigade commander P. Akhlyustin.

To the south of the 3rd Army, on the front from Begoml to Ivanets, the troops of the 11th Army were deployed, which had the task of taking Molodechno, Volozhin by the end of September 17, the next day - Oshmyany, Ivye and moving further to Grodno. Having crossed the border at 5 o'clock on September 17, the 6th tank brigade occupied Volozhin at 12 o'clock, formations of the 16th rifle corps at the same time entered Krasnoye, and by 19 o'clock they reached Molodechno, Benzovets. The formations of the 3rd Cavalry Corps had already reached the area of ​​​​Rachinety, Poryche, Marshalka by 15 o'clock, and on the morning of September 18 they moved further towards Lida, reaching the front of Rynoviche, Constanta, Voishtoviche by 10 o'clock. At this time, the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 6th Tank Brigade were given the task of advancing on Vilna, which they were ordered to occupy.

At that time, only insignificant Polish units were in Vilna: about 16 infantry battalions (about 7 thousand soldiers and 14 thousand militia) with 14 light guns. However, the Polish command in Vilna did not have a general attitude towards the Bolshevik invasion. At 9 o'clock on September 18, the commander of the garrison, Colonel Ya. Okulich-Kozarin, gave the order: “We are not at war with the Bolsheviks, units, by additional order, will leave Vilna and cross the Lithuanian border; non-combat units can start leaving the city, combat units remain in position, but cannot fire without an order. However, since some of the officers took this order as treason, and rumors spread in the city about a coup in Germany and a declaration of war by Romania and Hungary, Colonel Okulich-Kozarin around 16.30 decided to refrain from issuing an order to retreat until 20 hours.

Around 19.10, the commander of the 2nd battalion, deployed on the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city, Lieutenant Colonel S. Shileiko reported on the appearance of Soviet tanks and asked if he could open fire. While Okulich-Kozarin gave the order to open fire, while this order was transmitted to the troops, 8 tanks had already passed the first line of defense and reserve units were sent to fight them. At about 20 o'clock Okulich-Kozarin ordered the troops to withdraw from the city and sent Lieutenant Colonel T. Podvysotsky to the location of the Soviet troops in order to notify them that the Polish side did not want to fight them and demand that they leave the city. After that, Okulich-Kozarin himself left Vilna, and Podvysotsky, who returned at about 21:00, decided to defend the city and at about 21:45 issued an order to suspend the withdrawal of troops. At that time, uncoordinated battles were going on in the city, in which the Vilna Polish youth played an important role. The teacher G. Osinskiy organized volunteer teams from gymnasium students who took up positions on the hills. The oldest ones fired, the rest delivered ammunition, organized communications, etc.

Approaching at about 19.30 on September 18 to Vilna, the 8th and 7th tank regiments started a battle for the southern part of the city. The 8th tank regiment broke into the southern part of the city at 20.30. The 7th Panzer Regiment, which ran into a stubborn defense, was able to enter the southwestern part of the city only at dawn. Due to the stubborn defense, the city was taken only the next day.

While all these turbulent events were taking place in the Vilna region, the troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army were turned to the northwest and moved towards Lida.

While the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies occupied the northeastern part of Western Belarus, to the south, on the front from Fanipol to Nesvizh, units of the KMG went on the offensive, with the task of reaching Lyubcha and Kirin on the first day of the offensive, and the next day to force the river. Keep quiet and move to Volkovysk. The 15th Panzer Corps, advancing on the southern flank of the group, crossed the border at 0500 and, breaking the slight resistance of the Polish border guards, moved west. By the evening of September 17, the 27th tank brigade crossed the river. Servech, 2nd tank brigade - r. Usha, and the 20th Motorized Brigade was pulling up to the border. At about 4 p.m. on September 18, the 2nd Tank Brigade entered Slonim.

In Grodno there were insignificant forces of Polish troops: 2 improvised battalions and an assault company of the reserve center of the 29th Infantry Division, the 31st guard battalion, 5 platoons of positional artillery (5 guns), 2 anti-aircraft machine gun companies, a two-battalion detachment of Colonel Zh. Blumsky, the national defense battalion "Poctavy", the dismounted 32nd division of the Podlasie cavalry brigade, there were a lot of gendarmerie and police in the city. The commander of the "Grodno" district, Colonel B. Adamovich, was determined to evacuate units to Lithuania. On September 18, riots took place in the city in connection with the release of prisoners from the city prison and the anti-Polish speech of local "red" activists. Soviet troops were expected from the east, but they approached the city from the south, which was beneficial for the defenders, since the right bank of the Neman was steep.

Only as fuel arrived, units of the 15th Panzer Corps began to move towards Grodno in peculiar waves from 07:00 on September 20. At 1300, 50 tanks of the 27th Tank Brigade approached the southern outskirts of Grodno. The tankers attacked the enemy on the move and by the evening occupied the southern part of the city, reaching the banks of the Neman. Several tanks managed to break through the bridge to the north bank in the city center. However, without infantry support, the tanks were attacked by soldiers, policemen and youths, who used a few guns and Molotov cocktails. As a result, some of the tanks were destroyed, and some were taken back beyond the Neman. The 27th tank brigade, with the support of the 119th rifle regiment The 13th Infantry Division occupied the southern part of the city. A group of junior lieutenant Shaikhuddinov, with the help of local workers, crossed in boats to the right bank of the Neman, 2 km east of the city. On the other side, battles began for cemeteries, where machine-gun nests were equipped. During the night battle, the 119th regiment managed to gain a foothold on the right bank and reach the approaches to the eastern outskirts of the city.

By the morning of September 21, the 101st Rifle Regiment approached, which also crossed to the right bank and deployed north of the 119th Regiment. From 6 o'clock on September 21, the regiments, reinforced by 4 guns and 2 tanks, attacked the city and by 12 o'clock, despite the counterattacks of the Poles, they reached the railway line, and by 14 o'clock they reached the center of Grodno, but by evening they were again withdrawn to the outskirts. In these battles, the regiments were supported by a motorized group of the 16th Rifle Corps, which, after spending the night on the highway a few kilometers from Skidel, moved towards Grodno at dawn on September 21. Approaching the city, the tanks suppressed firing points on its eastern outskirts, which provided support to the 119th and 101st rifle regiments. The attack of the city from the east was successful, but after crossing the railway line, the main forces of the rifle units again retreated to the outskirts. As a result, the tanks were forced to fight alone.

In the second echelon behind KM G, the troops of the 10th Army advanced, which on September 19 crossed the border with the task of reaching the front of Novogrudok, Gorodishche and moving further to the Palace. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 10th Army reached the line of the river. Neman and Usha. Continuing the slow advance in the second echelon of the Belorussian Front, by the end of September 20, the army troops reached the Naliboki, Derevna, Mir line, where they received the task of advancing to the Sokulka front. Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Svisloch, Novy Dvor, Pruzhany. In the evening, by order of the commander of the Belorussian Front No. 04 of the army, the troops of the 5th rifle, 6th cavalry and 15th tank corps were subordinated. However, during the negotiations between the commanders of the 10th Army, KMG and the Belorussian Front on September 21, it was decided to leave the 6th Cavalry and 15th Tank Corps as part of the KMR.

On the front of the 4th Army, which had the task of advancing on Baranovichi with access to the line of Snov, Zhilichi by the end of the first day of the operation, the offensive began at 5 o'clock in the morning on September 17. At 22:00, the 29th Tank Brigade occupied Baranovichi and the fortified area located here, which was not occupied by Polish troops. The tank battalion under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was the first to enter the city. Up to 5 thousand Polish soldiers were captured in the Baranovichi region, 4 anti-tank guns and 2 food echelons became Soviet trophies.

The 29th tank brigade, which remained on the outskirts of Pruzhany, on September 20 was engaged in a technical inspection of tanks and conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Brest. Vidomlya had contact with the German units. As the brigade commander S. M. Krivoshey later recalled, “the intelligence sent forward under the command of Vladimir Yulianovich Borovitsky, secretary of the party commission of the brigade, soon returned with a dozen soldiers and officers of the German motorized corps of General Guderian, who managed to occupy the city of Brest. Having no precise instructions on how to deal with the Germans, I asked the chief of staff to contact the commander [Chuikov], and I myself engaged in a non-committal conversation with the commissar. The conversation took place in Lenin's tent, where, along with indicators of combat training and the growth of the industrial power of our country, posters were hanging on folding portable stands calling for the destruction of fascism. Many Germans had cameras. After looking around, they asked permission to photograph the tent and those present in it. One of them took a picture of us with the commissar in a group of German officers against the background of an anti-fascist poster.

Having fed the Germans with rich Russian borscht and kara-style barbecue (the guests devoured all this with enviable zeal), we sent them home, instructing them to convey “warm greetings” to General Guderian. The brigade commander forgot to mention that during dinner the brigade band played several marches.

Troops of the 23rd Rifle Corps were deployed in Polesie, who were forbidden to cross the border until further notice. The appeal of the corps commander to the Military Council of the Belorussian Front with a request to go on the offensive along with the rest of the troops of the front was rejected. As a result, the corps crossed the border at 16.25 on September 18. At 11 a.m. on September 19, the advance detachment of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Lakhva. Moving on, the Soviet troops in Kozhan-Gorodok were fired upon by a detachment of the 16th battalion of the KOP. Turning around, the units entered the battle and soon pushed the Poles into the forest north of Kozhan-Gorodok. During the battle, the Soviet units lost 3 people killed and 4 wounded. 85 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner, 3 of them were wounded and 4 were killed. At about 5 p.m., the 205th Infantry Regiment with the 1st Battalion of the 158th Artillery Regiment occupied David-Gorodok after a small battle. At 19.30, units of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Luninets. In the meantime, the ships of the Soviet Dnieper flotilla reached the mouth of the Goryn River, where they were forced to stop due to shallows and flooded Polish ships.

The troops of the Ukrainian Front also crossed the Polish border on September 17 and began to move deep into Poland. On the northern flank, on the front from Olevsk to Yampol, the troops of the 5th Army deployed, which was tasked with "delivering a powerful and lightning strike against the Polish troops, resolutely and quickly advancing in the direction of Rovno." The 60th Infantry Division, which had the task of advancing on Sarny, concentrated in the Olevsk area. In the area of ​​​​Gorodnitsa - Korets, the troops of the 15th rifle corps deployed, which had the immediate task of reaching the river. Goryn, and by the end of September 17, take Rovno. The 8th Rifle Corps, deployed in the Ostrog-Slavuta region, was supposed to take Dubno by the end of the day. On September 18, both corps were to occupy Lutsk and move towards Vladimir-Volynsky.

By the end of September 22, the troops of the 5th Army reached the line Kovel - Rozhitsa - Vladimir-Volynsky - Ivanichi. To the south, on the Teofipol-Voytovtsy front, the troops of the 6th Army deployed, with the task of advancing on Tarnopol, Ezerna and Kozova, later reaching the Buek-Przemyshlyany front and further on to Lvov.

At 04:00 on September 17, an assault group of border guards and Red Army soldiers captured the Volochinsky border bridge. At 04:30, the troops of the 17th Rifle Corps launched an artillery strike on enemy firing points and strongholds, and at 05:00 they began to force the river. Zbruch, using the captured bridge and established crossings. Forcing the river practically without any resistance from the enemy, units of the 17th Rifle Corps around 8.00 turned into marching columns and moved towards Tarnopol. Mobile formations quickly overtook the infantry and after 1800 on September 17, the 10th tank brigade entered Tarnopol. The 24th Tank Brigade advancing north of the city with the 136th Rifle Regiment of the 97th Rifle Division passed Dobrovody already at 12 o’clock and, bypassing Tarnopol from the north-west, reached its western outskirts at about 22 o’clock and began to clear it of Polish units . At 7 pm, 11 tanks of the 5th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Corps entered the city from the north, however, not knowing the situation, the tankers decided to wait until the morning to attack. Having entered Tarnopol, the 5th division had to clean up the city from disparate groups Polish officers, gendarmes and just the local population. During skirmishes in the city between 10.20 and 14.00 on September 18, the division lost 3 people killed and 37 wounded. At the same time at 10.30 rifle divisions of the 17th rifle corps entered the city. Up to 600 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.

The formations of the 2nd Cavalry Corps advancing north from the morning of September 18 crossed the river. Seret and at 10.00 received an order from the command of the Ukrainian Front to move to Lvov with a forced march and capture the city.

The consolidated motorized detachment of the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade with 35 bales approached Lvov at about 02:00 on September 19. After stubborn fighting, the city was taken.

On September 20, the troops of the 12th Army advanced to the Nikolaev-Stryi line. In the Stryi region, at about 1700, contact was made with German troops, who on September 22 handed over the city to the Red Army. On September 23, the 26th tank brigade approached the same place. As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet troops were stopped on the reached line.

At 10.30 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 16693, demanding to stop the troops on the line reached by advanced units by 20.00 on September 20. The troops were tasked with bringing up lagging units and rear areas, establishing stable communications, being in a state of full combat readiness, being vigilant and taking measures to protect the rear areas and headquarters. In addition, the command of the Belorussian Front was allowed to continue the offensive in the Suwalki salient. At 22.15 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received order No. 156 of the People's Commissar of Defense, which outlined the contents of the Soviet-German protocol and was allowed to start moving west at dawn on September 23. The next day, the Military Council of the Belorussian Front issued the corresponding order No. 05. On September 25, the troops received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 011 and the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front No. 06, warning that "when the army moves from the reached line of Augustow - Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk to the west in the territory left by the German army, it is possible that the Poles will crumble collect units into detachments and gangs, which, together with the Polish troops operating near Warsaw, can offer us stubborn resistance and in places deliver counterattacks.

On September 21, the 2nd tank brigade in Sokulka formed a detachment for operations in the Augustow-Suwalki area under the command of Major F.P. Chuvakin, in which there were 470 people, 252 rifles, 74 machine guns, 46 guns, 34 BT tanks - 7, 6 armored vehicles and 34 cars. Moving north, at about 5 o'clock on September 22, at Sopotskin, the detachment caught up with the Poles retreating from Grodno, who hoped to gain a foothold in. old forts of the Grodno fortress, where there were military depots. In the ensuing battle, which lasted up to 10 hours, 11 Red Army soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, 4 tanks and 5 vehicles were hit. The enemy made extensive use of Molotov cocktails, which created significant problems in the conditions of tank operations without infantry cover.

Meanwhile, a detachment of the 27th Tank Brigade of 20 BT-7 tanks and 1 armored vehicle under the command of Major Bogdanov was combing the border line with Lithuania and arrived in Suwalki at 24:00 on September 24.

The troops of the 3rd Army continued to guard the Latvian and Lithuanian borders from Drissa to Druskininkai. The 11th Army began redeployment along the Lithuanian border to Grodno. Formations of the 16th Rifle Corps continued to advance towards Grodno and on September 21 occupied Eishishki. By September 24, the troops of the corps deployed on the Lithuanian and German borders north and northwest of Grodno.

By September 26-28, the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies entrenched themselves on the border with Lithuania and East Prussia from Druskininkai to Shchuchin. Meanwhile, on September 21, at negotiations in Vaukavysk, representatives of the German command and the 6th Cavalry Corps agreed on a procedure for withdrawing the Wehrmacht from Bialystok.

To the north, the 20th motorized brigade operated, transferred to the 10th Army, which on September 25 at 15 o'clock took Osovets from the Germans, on September 26, moving along the bank of the river. Biebrzha, entered the Falcons, and by the evening of September 29 reached Zambruv. On September 27, the forward detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps occupied Nur and Chizhev, and in the area of ​​Gainuyka, parts of the corps again stumbled upon a Polish warehouse, where about 14 thousand shells, 5 million rounds of ammunition, 1 tankette, 2 armored vehicles, 2 vehicles and 2 barrels of fuel.

On the southern sector of the front, the troops of the 4th Army moved to the west. At 3 p.m. on September 22, the 29th Tank Brigade entered Brest, which was occupied by the troops of the 19th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht. As Krivoshey later recalled, in negotiations with General G. Guderian, he proposed the following parade procedure: “At 4 p.m., parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop at streets where the German regiments pass, and salute the passing units with their banners. Bands perform military marches. In the end, Guderian, who insisted on holding a full-fledged parade with preliminary formation, agreed to the proposed option, "having stipulated, however, that he would stand with me on the podium and greet the passing units."

By September 29, the troops of the Belorussian Front advanced to the line Shchuchin - Staviski - Lomza - Zambruv - Tsekhanovets - Kosuv-Latski - Sokoluv-Podlaski - Siedlce - Lukow - Vohyn. On October 1, the commander of the 4th Army, Divisional Commander Chuikov, issued an order, which demanded that "with the forward detachments, there should be one commander of the headquarters and political department for negotiating with the German troops."

By the end of September 29, the troops of the Ukrainian Front were on the line Pugachev - Piaski - Piotrkuv - Krzemen - Bilgoraj - Przemysl - the upper reaches of the river. San.

Here we should dwell on another side of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, associated with various military crimes of Soviet military personnel. Lynching, looting and robbery as manifestations of the class struggle were not only not persecuted, but even encouraged. Here are some very illustrative examples.

On September 21, having disarmed the Polish troops, units of the 14th Cavalry Division let the soldiers go home, while the officers and gendarmes were left until further notice on the scale in Sasuva. At 7 pm, the prisoners entered the basement of the school, killed a worker who was guarding weapons, and opened fire from the windows. The battalion commissar Ponomarev with the Red Army men suppressed the uprising of the officers and, having arrived at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, told about what had happened. At the same time, he expressed the idea that all officers and gendarmes are bastards that need to be destroyed. Impressed by what they heard, on September 22, in the village of Boshevitsy, 4 Red Army soldiers, under various pretexts, took 4 captured officers from the custody of the people's militia and shot them.

On September 22, during the battles for Grodno, at about 10 o'clock, the commander of the communications platoon, junior lieutenant Dubovik, received an order to escort 80-90 prisoners to the rear. Having moved 1.5-2 km from the city, Dubovik interrogated the prisoners in order to identify the officers and persons who took part in the murder of the Bolsheviks. Promising to release the prisoners, he sought confessions and shot 29 people. The rest of the prisoners were returned to Grodno. This was known to the command of the 101st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, but no action was taken against Dubovik. Moreover, the commander of the 3rd battalion, senior lieutenant Tolochko, gave a direct order to shoot the officers.

On September 21, the Military Council of the 6th Army, represented by Commander Commander Golikov and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Zakharychev, while in parts of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, issued an obviously criminal decision on the production and procedure for lynching - the execution of 10 people (surnames are not indicated in the decision). On this basis, the head of the special department of the 2nd cavalry corps, Koberniuk, went to the city of Zlochow, arrested various employees of the Polish prison, police, etc., such as Klimetsky V.V., according to the position of head. prison, Kuchmirovsky K. B., pom. early prison, Lukashevsky M.S., vice city prosecutor. Plakht I. - an official of the beaten headman and others in the amount of 10 people, and all these persons, at the expense of the limit established by the Military Council of the 6th Army, was shot in the prison building. This lynching was attended by ordinary employees of the prison. This criminal decision of the Military Council on lynching was quickly passed on to the leading circles of commanders and commissars of formations and units of the 2nd cavalry corps, and this led to grave consequences when a number of commanders, military commissars and even Red Army soldiers, following the example of their leaders, began to lynch prisoners, suspicious detainees and etc.

Noteworthy is the question of what tasks were assigned to the troops during the action in Poland. For example, Commander of the Ukrainian Front Army Commander 1st Rank Semyon Timoshenko noted in his order that "the Polish government of landlords and generals dragged the peoples of Poland into an adventuristic war." Approximately the same was said in the order of the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Front, commander of the 2nd rank Kovalev. They contained an appeal to the population to turn "their weapons against the landowners and capitalists", but said nothing about the fate of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. This was apparently due to the fact that after the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, the Soviet government never raised the question of reuniting the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. But in subsequent documents, such a task of the troops as the salvation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples from the threat of “ruin and beating” from the enemies, it was emphasized that the Soviet troops were coming to Poland not as conquerors, but as liberators of Belarusians, Ukrainians and working people of Poland.

The actions of the Red Army on the territory of Poland lasted 12 days. During this time, the troops advanced 250-300 km and occupied a territory with a total area of ​​​​over 190 thousand square meters. km with a population of more than 12 million people, including more than 6 million Ukrainians and about 3 million Belarusians.

Partition of the Polish territories by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany

After the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland, relations between England and France with the Soviet Union sharply escalated. On September 19, an Anglo-French note was received in Moscow, which demanded to stop the advance and withdraw Soviet troops from Poland. Otherwise, the note said, in accordance with the Polish-French alliance treaty, the declaration of war on the Soviet Union could happen automatically.

Stalin and his entourage could not fail to understand that the nature of Soviet-German relations and the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland could make an extremely negative impression on world public opinion. Therefore, in a joint German-Soviet communiqué, adopted at the suggestion of Ribbentrop on September 18, 1939, but published only on September 20, it was said that the goal of the German and Soviet troops was “to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of the Polish state, and to help the population Poland to reorganize the conditions of its state existence.

The Soviet leadership went even further with regard to the “Polish question” during the negotiations and the conclusion of the friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939. These negotiations, dedicated to clarifying the border of the “state interests” of the USSR and Germany on the territory of Poland, began on the initiative Soviet side. On September 20, Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that, in Molotov's opinion, the time had come to jointly decide the fate of Poland and that Stalin was inclined to divide it along the Tissa-Narew-Vistula-San line: "The Soviet government wishes to immediately resolve this issue at negotiations in Moscow with the participation of the highest statesmen of both countries. In a reply telegram to Molotov on September 23, Ribbentrop said that "the Russian point of view on the passage of the future border along four rivers is acceptable." The atmosphere in which the negotiations took place in Moscow is testified by Ribbentrop himself, who said that in the Kremlin he "felt like he was among the old party genosses."

The adopted document established the border of the "state interests" of both states on the territory of Poland, although in the German-Soviet communique of September 22, 1939 it was also called the "demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies" and was supposed to run much east of the line agreed on August 23 1939

It is interesting to note that both texts of the treaty - in German and Russian - were recognized as authentic. But at the same time, it becomes unclear why the title of the treaty for German the word "friendship" is placed after the word "border", and in the text in Russian - on the contrary. Is this really due to the difference in style between the two languages, or is there a political implication here: that Stalin was more interested in the “friendship” he offered than Hitler?

In one confidential and two secret protocols attached to the September 28 treaty, some territorial changes were specified in the strip from the Baltic to the Black Seas. In particular, the territory of Lithuania was included in the sphere of "state interests" of the USSR, and the territory of Lublin and part of the Warsaw voivodeships fell into the sphere of "state interests" of Germany. The parties also agreed that they would stop the actions of the Polish population directed against the other side.

In the treaty of September 28 there is not a word about the right of the Polish people to state existence; the "reorganization" of Poland announced in it is considered only from the point of view of the "further development of friendly relations" between the USSR and Germany.

Some Soviet studies claim that the Soviet leadership decisively prevented the advance of German troops east of the agreed border line with the Soviet Union. However, in the light of the German documents, a different picture emerges. So, as early as September 5, 1939, Molotov informed Ribbentrop that the Soviet leadership understood that “in the course of operations, one of the parties or both parties may be forced to temporarily cross the demarcation line between their spheres of influence, but such cases should not interfere with the direct implementation of the planned plan. ". On September 15, Ribbentrop informed Molotov for the second time that Germany was bound by demarcation spheres of influence in Poland and therefore would welcome the early action of the Red Army, which "will free us from the need to destroy the remnants of the Polish army, pursuing them all the way to the Russian border."

In Berlin, at the beginning of hostilities, the idea arose of the possibility of creating, as a buffer, somewhere in the zone between the lines of interests of Germany and the USSR, a "residual Polish state." On this issue, General Halder wrote in his diary on September 7: “The Poles propose to start negotiations. We are ready for them on the following terms: Poland's break with England and France; the remainder of Poland will be kept; areas from Narew to Warsaw - Poland; industrial area - to us; Krakow - Poland; the northern outskirts of the Beskydy - to us; regions of Western Ukraine are independent”. As is clear from the entry dated September 10, the German leadership prepared a special appeal to the population of Western Ukraine, in which they promised them an "independent state" under the auspices of Germany.

Ribbentrop also spoke about the options for dismembering Poland on September 12. With reference to Hitler, he stated that with this version of the “solution of the Polish question”, it would be possible, if necessary, to negotiate the conclusion of an “Eastern peace”. At the same time, Ribbentrop did not rule out the option that would provide for the dismemberment of Poland into separate constituent parts, including Western Ukraine.

But Hitler did not yet know what would be the position of Stalin and Molotov on this issue. Schulenburg found this out only the next day and informed the Führer that Stalin was resolutely against the preservation of the "Polish residual state" and for the partition of Poland. On September 28, Stalin announced that the dismemberment of areas with a purely Polish population would inevitably cause his desire for national unity, which could lead to friction between the USSR and Germany.

The decision of the German and Soviet governments on September 28 to divide the territory of Poland caused serious concern among the Polish people and officials. Thus, the Polish ambassador in Paris, according to the Havas agency, protested to the French government, calling the Soviet-German treaty a violation of the rights of a sovereign state and people, international obligations and human morality.

The position of the Polish patriots was aggravated by the fact that there was a Soviet-German agreement on cooperation in the fight against Polish agitation. It was not a formal declaration; such cooperation between the military authorities of Germany and the USSR in the Polish campaign, as the German military attache in Moscow, General Kestring, declared, was a reality and proceeded flawlessly at all levels. To establish cooperation between the Gestapo and the NKVD in December 1939 in the city of Zakopane, i.e. in the Polish territory occupied by Germany, a joint training center was established.

After the delegations of the USSR and Germany delimited the border between the "spheres of interest", by mid-October 1939 it was demarcated. Thus, if earlier the border of the USSR with Poland was 1446 km long, then the border with Germany was 1952 km, i.e. 506 km more - from the village of Marinovo (the southern point of the USSR border with Latvia) to the village of Kazachuvka (the northern point on the Soviet-Romanian border). Retaining the oil-bearing region of Lvov-Drogobych, which was occupied by German troops in the first half of September, Stalin undertook to supply Germany from this region with 300,000 tons of oil annually.

On September 21, a secret protocol was signed, according to which, in particular, the German command was obliged to ensure the safety and transfer of all abandoned objects to the Soviet troops. It was also agreed that "to destroy the Polish gangs along the way, Soviet and German troops will act together."

A clear example of the interaction between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army at that time can be an agreement on the use of the Minsk radio station to direct German bombers to Polish cities. It is worth recalling that Goering, as a token of gratitude for military cooperation in the fight against a common enemy, presented the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov with an airplane.

In the course of hostilities, the commanders of the forward units of the German and Soviet armies exchanged liaison officers. Cooperation was also established with the command of the German Navy in the Baltic. Joint parades were held in Grodno, Brest, Pinsk and a number of other cities even before the capitulation of Warsaw. For example, in Grodno, along with the German general, commander Chuikov took over the parade, in Brest - General Guderian and brigade commander Krivoshein.

The statements of high-ranking Soviet political and military leaders indicate that the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland, and later in the Baltic states and against Finland were considered mainly from the point of view of expanding the territory, increasing the population of the USSR and other military-strategic advantages. It was precisely this concept that Mekhlis formulated at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), referring to Stalin's opinion: Soviet republics.

At a solemn meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of October on November 6, 1939, Molotov emphasized that after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the population of the USSR had grown from 170 to 183 million people. In June 1941, the draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda “On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future” stated: “The entire personnel of the Red Army must be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out offensive foreign policy, resolutely eliminating the hotbeds of war at their borders, expanding their territories ... ". When discussing the project at the Main Military Council, Zhdanov said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The war with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of offensive policy.



When the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border on September 17, 1939, the bulk of the armed forces of the Second Polish Republic fought against the Wehrmacht in the west. Nevertheless, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army (killed, died from wounds and missing) for 2 weeks of fighting of the "liberation campaign" amounted, according to Soviet data, to almost one and a half thousand people. Who did the Soviet soldiers face in the west of modern Belarus and Ukraine?

difference in point of view

On September 17, 1939, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army invaded Poland with the forces of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts, deployed the day before on the basis of the border Belarusian special and Kyiv special military districts. In Soviet historiography, this operation is usually called the "Liberation Campaign of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army", and it is fundamentally separated from the German invasion of Poland, which began on September 1.

At the same time, both in Polish and in Western historical literature, the German and Soviet invasions are often considered parts of a single whole. The general name for the events of the autumn of 1939 in Poland is the term "September campaign" (along with it, "Polish campaign of 1939", "Defensive war of 1939", "Polish war of 1939" can be used). In English-language literature, a combination of German and Soviet operation the term "Invasion of Poland" (Invasion of Poland). As is often the case, views and attitudes greatly influence the assessment of what happened in the past and even its name.

From the Polish point of view, there really was no fundamental difference between the attacks of Germany and the USSR. Both countries attacked without a formal declaration of war. Both states also found suitable reasons for the invasion. The Germans justified their aggression by Poland's intransigence on the issue of the Danzig Corridor, the infringement of the rights of the German minority, and, in the end, organized the Gleiwitz provocation, which allowed Hitler to announce a Polish attack on Germany.

One of the surviving Polish-built pillboxes in Belarus
http://francis-maks.livejournal.com/47023.html

The USSR, in turn, justified the invasion by the collapse of the Polish government and state, which "show no signs of life", taking care of "oppressed" in Poland "half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians, left to the mercy of fate" and even about the Polish people themselves, who "was thrown" their "irrational leaders" in "ill-fated war"(as indicated in the note handed to the Polish ambassador in Moscow on the morning of September 17, 1939).

At the same time, it should be remembered that "no sign of life" the Polish state, whose government at that time was not yet in exile, continued to resist on its own land. The Polish president, in particular, left the country only on the night of September 17-18, after the Red Army had crossed the border. However, even after the complete occupation, Poland did not stop resistance. Her government did not capitulate, and ground units, aviation and navy fought on the fronts of World War II until its very end in Europe.

A very important caveat must be made here. Undoubtedly, the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War lies with the military-political leadership of Germany. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, signed on August 23, 1939, was one of numerous similar treaties signed between European states in the interwar period. And even the notorious additional protocol to it on the delimitation of spheres of interest was not something unique.

The division of the world into spheres of influence between the great powers by the first half of the 20th century was a well-established practice in international relations, dating back to the 15th century, when Spain and Portugal, having concluded the Treaty of Tordesillas, divided the entire planet along the “papal meridian”. Moreover, sometimes spheres of influence were established without any agreements, unilaterally. So, for example, the United States acted with its "Monroe Doctrine", according to which both American continents were determined by their sphere of interests.

Neither the Soviet-German treaty nor the secret protocol contained obligations on the part of the states that concluded it to unleash a war of aggression or participate in it. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact only to some extent untied the hands of Germany, securing it from one of the flanks. But that's what non-aggression pacts are made for. The Soviet Union cannot bear any responsibility for the manner in which Germany used the resulting opportunities.

Let's use an appropriate analogy. In 1938, during the annexation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland, Germany had a non-aggression pact with Poland. Moreover, Poland itself took part in the division of Czechoslovakia by sending troops into Cieszyn Silesia. Such actions, of course, do not paint the Polish government. But all this in no way refutes the historical fact that it was Germany that initiated the division of Czechoslovakia and that it was she who was responsible for it.

But back to the September events of 1939.

In a famous speech People's Commissar Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov on June 22, 1941, there are such words about the German attack on the USSR:

« This unheard-of attack on our country is treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany ...»

Unfortunately, such perfidy in the history of civilized peoples was far from unparalleled. Treaties between states were violated with enviable regularity. For example, in the 19th century, in the Paris and Berlin treatises, European states guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ottoman Empire. But this did not prevent France from subsequently seizing Tunisia, Italy - Libya and the Dodecanese archipelago, and Austria-Hungary - Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first articles of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed on July 25, 1932 and extended in 1934 until the end of 1945

In legal terms, the essential difference between the German attack and the "liberation campaign" of the Soviet Union was the following. At the beginning of 1939, Poland had signed non-aggression pacts with both the USSR and Germany. But on April 28, 1939, Hitler broke the treaty with Poland, using this demarche as leverage. The Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact in May 1934 was extended right up to 1945. And in September 1939 it remained in force.

It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the expediency, legitimacy and, moreover, the moral component of the Soviet invasion. Let us only note that, as Edward Rachinsky, the Polish Ambassador to the UK, noted in his communiqué dated September 17,

“The Soviet Union and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, according to which an act of aggression is considered to be any intrusion into the territory of one of the parties by armed military units of the other side. An agreement was also reached that none[highlighted by the author] considerations of a political, military, economic or other nature may in no case serve as a pretext or justification for an act of aggression.”

East defense plan

If the composition of the Red Army forces that took part in the Polish campaign is fairly well described in Russian literature, the situation with the Polish units opposing them in Eastern Kresy is more vague. Below, we will consider the composition of the Polish units that were stationed on the eastern border in September 1939, and also (in the following articles) describe the nature of the combat operations of these formations when they came into contact with the formations of the Red Army.

By September 1939, the main part of the Polish armed forces was deployed against Germany and its satellite, Slovakia. Note that such a situation was not typical for the Polish army of the 1930s - most of the time since gaining independence, the Second Commonwealth was preparing for a war against the USSR.

Polish reinforced concrete dam on the river. A sphere designed for rapid flooding of the territory. Minichi village, Lyakhovichi district, Brest region, Belarus
http://francis-maks.livejournal.com/48191.html

Until the beginning of 1939, the Soviet Union was regarded by the Poles as the most likely source of military danger. In the east, most of the military exercises were carried out and long-term fortifications were erected, many of which are still well preserved. The usual bunkers in the swampy lowlands of Polesye were supplemented by a system of hydraulic structures (dams and dams), which made it possible to quickly flood large territories and create obstacles for the advancing enemy. However, like the fortified areas located “opposite” of the much more famous “Stalin Line” in 1941, the Polish fortifications on the eastern border in 1939 met the enemy with extremely weakened garrisons and could not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.

The length of the border of Poland with the USSR was 1412 kilometers (for comparison, the border of Poland with Germany had a length of 1912 kilometers). In the event of a war with the USSR, the Poles planned to deploy five armies in the east of the country in the first line of defense (Vilna, Baranovichi, Polesie, Volyn and Podillia, a total of 18 infantry divisions, 8 cavalry brigades). Two more armies ("Lida" and "Lvov", only 5 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade) were to be in the second line. The strategic reserve was to consist of 6 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry and 1 armored brigade, concentrated in the area of ​​Brest-nad-Bug. Deployment in accordance with these plans required the involvement of almost the entire Polish army - 29 out of 30 divisions available by March 1939, 11 out of 13 (two were missing!) Cavalry brigades and a single armored brigade.

Only from the beginning of 1939, when Germany began to demonstrate determination to bring the issue of the Danzig corridor to the end by any means, the Poles, in addition to the East defense plan, began to develop the West defense plan. They hastily transferred formations to the western border, and in August they mobilized. As a result, by the beginning of World War II in Eastern Kresy, the most significant armed structure was the Border Guard Corps (KOP, Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza).

All that's left

The territorial divisions of the Corps, an approximate Polish analogue of the more familiar border detachments for us, were regiments and brigades. In total, there were eight such units on the eastern border after the mobilization on August 30 (listed from north to south):

• Regiment "Deep"
• Regiment "Vileyka"
• Regiment "Snov" (marked as "Baranovichi" on the map below),
• Brigade "Polesie"
• Regiment "Sarny",
• Regiment "Rivne"
• Regiment "Podillia"
• Regiment "Chortkov".

A group of non-commissioned officers of the 24th battalion "Sejny" of the Polish Border Guard Corps, guarding the border with Lithuania
visainfo.pl

Another regiment of the Corps, "Vilna", was deployed on the Polish-Lithuanian border. Considering the geographical position of the Vilna Voivodeship, which was “elongated” in a narrow strip to the north relative to the main territory of what was then Poland, it was also in close proximity to the border with the Soviet Union.

Regiments and brigades of the KOP were of variable composition. In addition, since March 1939, individual units of the Corps were transferred from the eastern border to the west. As a result, by the end of August 1939, the Vilna regiment consisted of four infantry battalions, the Deep regiment and the Polissya brigade - from three, the Snov regiment - from two. The Vileyka regiment and the Podolia regiment included three infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron each, the Sarny regiment - two infantry, two special battalions and a cavalry squadron. Finally, the "Chortkov" regiment consisted of three infantry battalions and an engineering company.

The total number of headquarters (with the outbreak of war transferred from Warsaw to Pinsk), eight regiments and the KOP brigade on September 1, 1939 was about 20 thousand people. There were few regular servicemen among them, since these were primarily "withdrawn" to recruit new divisions. Basically, the border units were staffed by reservists, many of whom belonged to the ethnic minorities of the Second Polish Republic, mainly Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews and Germans.

The disposition of the Polish, German, Slovak and Soviet troops at the beginning of the Second World War and the general course of the September campaign of 1939. In the eastern part, the areas of deployment of the regiments and brigades of the Polish Border Guard Corps and the places of the most important battles between the Polish and Soviet units are marked

The personnel of the Polish border guard units, located on the border with Germany and Slovakia, completely went to staffing the newly formed four infantry divisions (33rd, 35th, 36th and 38th) and three mountain brigades (1st, 2nd th and 3rd).

In addition to the Border Guard Corps, fighting against the Soviet units in the early days of the Soviet invasion, units that arrived in the east to re-form after heavy fighting with the Germans, as well as the newly formed territorial divisions, were involved. Their total strength in Eastern Kresy on September 17 is estimated at 10 incomplete infantry divisions. Subsequently, with the advance to the west, the number of Polish troops that the Red Army had to face increased: more and more Polish units were on the way, retreating before the Nazis.

According to data published by Grigory Fedorovich Krivosheev in the statistical study “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: Losses of the Armed Forces”, the irretrievable losses of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts during the “liberation campaign” amounted to 1475 people. This figure includes 973 killed, 102 died from wounds, 76 died from disasters and accidents, 22 died from disease, and 302 were missing. The sanitary losses of the Red Army, according to the same source, amounted to 2002 people. Polish historians consider these figures to be greatly underestimated, citing figures of 2.5–6.5 thousand dead and 4–10 thousand wounded. For example, Professor Cheslav Grzelyak in his publication estimates Soviet losses at 2.5–3 thousand killed and 8–10 thousand wounded.

Patrol of the Polish Border Guard Corps near the modern Kolosovo station (Stolbtsovsky district, Minsk region, Belarus)

Small, disorganized and weakened Polish units, of course, could not offer serious resistance to the numerous, fresh and well-equipped units of the Red Army. However, as can be seen from the above casualty figures, the "liberation campaign" was by no means an easy walk.

The battle clashes between the units of the Border Guard Corps and the Polish Army with the Red Army in September 1939 will be described in the next article.

Literature:

• Paweł Piotr Wieczorkiewicz, Kampania 1939 roku, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Warszawa 2001
• Rajmund Szubanski, Plan operation "Wschód", Warszawa 1994
• Dr Jerzy Prochwicz, Walki oddziałów KOP na obszarach północno-wschodniej Polski http://kamunikat.fontel.net/www/czasopisy/bzh/13/13art_prochwicz.htm
• Toland, John. Adolf Gitler. Chapter "Disaster like no history has known (August 24 - September 3, 1939)"
• Krivosheev G. F. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: losses of the armed forces. Statistical research. Liberation campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus http://rus-sky.com/history/library/w/w04.htm#007
• Newspaper PRAVDA, December 23, 1939 and December 25, 1939 http://www.histdoc.net/history/ru/stalin60.htm
• Potemkin V.P. History of diplomacy. diphis.ru

According to the generally accepted opinion, on September 1, 1939, World War II began - the Third Reich attacked Poland, although in China they count from 1937. At 04:45, at the mouth of the Vistula River, the old German battleship Schleswig-Holstein opened fire on the Polish military warehouses at Westerplatte in Danzig, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive along the entire border line.

Poland at that time represented a rather artificial public education– created from the actual Polish territories, the wreckage Russian Empire, German Empire and Austria-Hungary. In 1939, out of 35.1 million people in Poland, there were 23.4 million Poles, 7.1 million Belarusians and Ukrainians, 3.5 million Jews, 0.7 million Germans, 0.1 million Lithuanians, 0.12 million Czechs. Moreover, the Belarusians and Ukrainians were in the position of oppressed slaves, and the Germans also sought to return to the Reich. Warsaw, on occasion, was not averse to adding territory at the expense of its neighbors - in 1922 it captured the Vilna region, in 1938 the Teszyn region from Czechoslovakia.

In Germany, they were forced to accept territorial losses in the east - West Prussia, part of Silesia, the Poznan region, and Danzig, predominantly populated by Germans, was declared a free city. But public opinion regarded these losses as a temporary loss. Hitler initially did not focus on these territories, believing that the problem of the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland was more important, and Poland even became an ally of Berlin, receiving crumbs from the master's table (Cieszyn region of Czechoslovakia). In addition, in Warsaw they hoped, in alliance with Berlin, to go on a campaign to the East, dreaming of creating a “Great Poland” from the sea (Baltic) to the sea (Black Sea). On October 24, 1938, the Polish ambassador to Germany, Lipsky, received a demand for Poland's consent to the inclusion of the free city of Danzig in the Reich, and Poland was also offered to join the Anti-Comintern Pact (directed against the USSR, it included Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary), during the ensuing later negotiations, Warsaw was promised territories in the East, at the expense of the USSR. But Warsaw showed its age-old stubbornness and constantly refused the Reich. Why were the Poles so self-confident? Apparently, they had complete confidence that London and Paris would not abandon them and would help in case of war.

Poland at that time pursued an extremely unwise policy, quarreling with almost all its neighbors: they did not want help from the USSR, although Paris and London tried to agree on this, there were territorial disputes with Hungary, they captured Vilna from Lithuania, even with the formation in March 1939 years, Slovakia (after the German occupation of the Czech Republic) had a fight - trying to seize part of the territory from it. Therefore, in addition to Germany, in September 1939, Slovakia also attacked Poland - they put up 2 divisions.

Polish "Vickers E" enters the Czechoslovak Zaolsie, October 1938.

France and England gave her a guarantee that they would help, but the Poles had to hold out for a week or two in order for France to complete the mobilization and concentrate forces for the strike. This is official, in reality in Paris and London they were not going to fight with Germany, thinking that Germany would not stop and go further, to the USSR, and the two enemies would grapple.

The disposition of enemy forces on August 31, 1939 and the Polish campaign of 1939.

Plans, forces of the parties

Poland began covert mobilization on March 23, 1939, managed to mobilize for war: 39 divisions, 16 separate brigades, only 1 million people, about 870 tanks (most of the wedges), a certain number of armored vehicles, 4300 guns and mortars, up to 400 aircraft. In addition, the Poles were sure that from the very beginning of the war they would be supported with all their might by the Allied aviation and the British Navy.

They planned to defend for two weeks, to hold back the Wehrmacht along the entire length of the border - almost 1900 km, against East Prussia, in favorable conditions, they even expected to conduct an offensive. Plan offensive operation against East Prussia was called "West", it was supposed to be carried out by the operational groups "Narew", "Vyshkow" and the army "Modlin". In the "Polish corridor", which separated East Prussia and Germany, the "Help" army was concentrated, it, in addition to defense, was supposed to capture Danzig. The Berlin direction was defended by the army "Poznan", the border with Silesia and Slovakia was covered by the army "Lodz", the army "Krakow" and the army "Carpathians". In the rear, southwest of Warsaw, the Prussian auxiliary army was deployed. The Poles stretched their orders along the entire border, did not create a powerful anti-tank defense in the main directions, did not create powerful operational reserves for flank attacks on the enemy that had broken through.

The plan was designed for several "ifs": if the Polish army held out for two weeks in the main positions; if the Germans concentrated a small part of their forces and means (especially aircraft and tanks), the Polish command expected that Berlin would leave a significant grouping in the west; if in two weeks the Anglo-French forces launch a major offensive. Another weak point of the Polish army was the leadership, it almost from the very beginning of the war thought only of its own skin. It is surprising that with such a command, the Polish army held out for almost a month.

Germany, against Poland, the Third Reich involved 62 divisions (of which 40 were first-strike personnel divisions, of which 6 were tank and 4 mechanized), a total of 1.6 million people, approximately 6,000 guns, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks (of which more than 80% were light , tankettes with machine guns). themselves German generals they assessed the combat capability of the infantry as unsatisfactory, and they also understood that if Hitler made a mistake and the Anglo-French army struck in the west, then disaster was inevitable. Germany is not ready to fight France (its army was considered the strongest in the world at that time) and England, they had superiority at sea, in the air and on land, the defenses were not prepared (“Siegfried Line”), the western front was bare.

It was planned (White Plan) to destroy the Polish army with a powerful strike of the maximum number of troops and means within two weeks (the idea of ​​"blitzkrieg"), due to the exposure of the western border. They wanted to defeat the Poles before they could go on the offensive in the west, creating a strategic turning point in the war. At this time, the western border was covered by 36 understaffed, almost untrained divisions, devoid of armored vehicles and aviation. Almost all tanks and armored vehicles were concentrated in five corps: 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th and mountain. They had to find weaknesses in the enemy's defense, overcome the enemy's defense, enter the operational space, going into the rear of the enemy, at this time the infantry divisions pinned down the enemy along the front.

Army Group North (4th and 3rd armies) hit from Pomerania and East Prussia in the general direction of Warsaw, in order to join with units of Army Group South east of Warsaw to close the encirclement over the remaining Polish troops north of the Vistula. Army Group "South" (8th, 10th, 14th armies) hit from the territory of Silesia and Moravia in the general direction of Warsaw, where it was supposed to connect with units of the Army Group "North". The 8th army beat in the direction of Lodz, the 14th was supposed to take Krakow, to advance on Sandomierz. There were weaker forces in the center, they were supposed to tie down the Poznan Polish army, imitate the direction of the main attack.

Dislocation of troops on 09/01/1939.

Occasion

In order to maintain the appearance of allegedly retaliatory actions, the German security services organized a provocation - the so-called "Gleiwitz incident". On August 31, SS fighters and criminals in Polish uniforms specially selected from prisons attacked a radio station in Gleiwitz, Germany. After the capture of the radio station, one of them in Polish read a specially prepared text on the radio, provoking Germany to war. Then the criminals were shot by the SS (one of the names of the operation is “Canned food”), left on the spot, they were discovered by the German police. During the night, the German media announced that Poland had attacked Germany.

The first shots of the new war, training battleship "Schleswig-Holstein".

War

During the first day, the Luftwaffe destroyed most of the Polish aviation, and also disrupted communications, control, and the transfer of troops along railways. The German shock groups quite easily broke through the front and moved on, which is not surprising given the dispersion of the Polish units. So, the 19th mechanized corps (one tank, two mechanized, two infantry divisions), which fought from Pomerania, broke through the defenses of the 9th division and the Pomeranian cavalry brigade, passing 90 km by the evening of September 1st. In the Gulf of Danzig, the German Navy destroyed a small Polish squadron (one destroyer, one destroyer and five submarines), even before the start of the war, three destroyers left for England, and two submarines were able to break through from the Baltic (they later fought as part of the British Navy).

Already on September 1, the president left Warsaw, followed by the government on the 5th, and so began their movement to Romania. The last “heroic” order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army Edward Rydz-Smigly on the 10th, after which he did not get in touch, then showed up in Romania. In his last orders, he ordered Warsaw and Modlin to keep the defense surrounded, the remnants of the army to keep the defense near the border with Romania and wait for the help of England and France. Rydz-Smigly arrived in Brest on September 7, where in case of war with the USSR they were supposed to prepare the Headquarters, but it was not prepared, on the 10th he arrived in Vladimir-Volynsky, on the 13th in Mlynov, and on September 15 - closer to the Romanian border, to Kolomyia, where there was already a government and a president.

Marshal of Poland, Supreme Commander of the Polish Army Edward Rydz-Smigly.

On the 2nd, the "Help" army, which was defending the "Polish corridor", was dissected by counter attacks from East Prussia and Pomerania, most of it, the seaside, was surrounded. In the southern direction, the Wehrmacht found the junction of the Lodz and Krakow armies, the 1st Panzer Division rushed into the gap, going to the rear of the Polish units. The Polish command decides to withdraw the Krakow army to the main line of defense, and the Lodz army to the east and southeast beyond the line of the Nida and Dunajec rivers (about 100-170 km). But the frontier battle had already been lost, from the very beginning it was necessary to defend not the entire border, but to concentrate troops in the main directions, to create operational reserves for counterattacks. The defense plan of the Polish command was thwarted, in the north of the Wehrmacht, advancing from East Prussia, by the 3rd day they broke the resistance of the Modlin army, its remnants retreated beyond the Vistula. And there was no other plan, all that remained was to hope for the allies.

On the 4th, the Poles in the center withdrew to the Warta River, but they could not hold out there, they were almost immediately shot down by flank attacks, already on the 5th, the remnants of the units retreat to Lodz. The main reserve of the Polish armed forces - the Prusa army - was disorganized and simply "dissolved", by September 5 the war was lost, the Polish army was still fighting, retreating, trying to gain a foothold on some lines, but ... The Polish units were dissected, lost control, did not know what to do, were surrounded.

German tanks T-1 (Light tank Pz.Kpfw. I) in Poland. 1939

On September 8, the battle for Warsaw began, its defenders fought until September 28. The first attempts to take the city on the move, on September 8-10, were repulsed by the Poles. The Wehrmacht command decided to abandon the plan to take the city on the move and continued to close the blockade ring - on the 14th the ring was closed. On the 15-16th the Germans offered to capitulate, on the 17th the Polish military asked for permission to evacuate civilians, Hitler refused. On the 22nd, a general assault began, on the 28th, having exhausted the possibilities of defense, the remnants of the garrison capitulated.

Another grouping of Polish forces was surrounded west of Warsaw - around Kutno and Lodz, they held out until September 17, surrendering after several attempts to break through and when food and ammunition ran out. On October 1, the Baltic naval base Hel surrendered, the last center of defense was liquidated in Kotsk (north of Lublin), where 17,000 Poles capitulated on October 6.

September 14, 1939.

The myth of the Polish cavalry

With the filing of Guderian, a myth was created about the attacks of the Polish cavalry on the tanks of the Wehrmacht. In reality, horses were used as transport (as in the Red Army, in the Wehrmacht), there was reconnaissance on horseback, soldiers of the caval units entered the battle on foot. In addition, cavalrymen, due to their mobility, excellent training (they were the elite of the army), good weapons (they were reinforced with artillery, machine guns, armored vehicles) turned out to be one of the most combat-ready units of the Polish Army.

In this war, only six cases of attacks on horseback are known, in two cases there were armored vehicles on the battlefield. On September 1, near Kroyants, units of the 18th Pomeranian Lancers met the Wehrmacht battalion, which was at a halt, and, taking advantage of the surprise factor, attacked. Initially, the attack was successful, the Germans were caught by surprise, they were cut down, but then German armored vehicles intervened in the battle, which the Polish scouts did not notice, as a result, the battle was lost. But the Polish cavalry, having suffered losses, withdrew into the forest and were not destroyed.

On September 19, near Vulka Venglova, the commander of the 14th regiment of the Yazlovetsky Lancers, Colonel E. Godlevsky (a unit of the 9th Regiment of the Lesser Poland Lancers joined him) decided to break through the German infantry in cavalry, relying on the factor of surprise, to Warsaw. But these turned out to be the positions of motorized infantry tank division, besides, artillery and tanks were not far away. Polish cavalry broke through the positions of the Wehrmacht, losing about 20% of the regiment (at that time - 105 people killed and 100 wounded). The battle lasted only 18 minutes, the Germans lost 52 people killed and 70 wounded.

Attack of the Polish Lancers.

The results of the war

Poland, as a state, ceased to exist, most of its territories were divided between Germany and the USSR, some lands were received by Slovakia.

On the remnants of the lands not annexed to Germany, a general government was created under the control of the German authorities, with the capital in Krakow.

Lithuania ceded the Vilnius region.

The Wehrmacht lost 13-20 thousand people killed and missing, about 30 thousand wounded. Polish army - 66 thousand killed, 120-200 thousand wounded, about 700 thousand prisoners.

Polish infantry on the defensive

Sources:
Halder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff ground forces 1939-1942 (in 3 volumes). M., 1968-1971.
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, 1999.
Kurt von Tippelskirch. World War II, St. Petersburg, 1998.
Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939 M., 2001.
http://victory.rusarchives.ru/index.php?p=32&sec_id=60
http://poland1939.ru/