The charter on universal military service of 1874 assumed. Regulations on military service and military service of the Cossacks. See what "Conscription in Russia" is in other dictionaries

June 13, 1882 Alexander III approved the "Regulations on military service and military service of the Cossacks of the Kuban and Terek troops." A special Charter on the military service of the Don Cossack army was also extended to the Kuban army.

According to the states in wartime, the Kuban army had to put up:

30 cavalry regiments of six hundred, bearing the following names: Her Imperial Highness Grand Duchess Anastasia Mikhailovna's Khopersky cavalry regiment, Kuban, Taman, Poltava, Yeysk, Uman, Caucasian, Yekaterinodar, Labinsk and Urup cavalry regiments. Each regiment has a triple composition, of which the 1st is in active field service, and the remaining two make up preferential regiments of the 2nd and 3rd line.

Two Life Guards of the Kuban Cossack squadron of His Imperial Majesty's own escort, of which one is in turn in St. Petersburg under the emperor, the other is on privilege.
Mounted two-hundred division, which is in the service in Warsaw.

According to the military position, the service staff of the Kuban Cossacks is divided into three categories:
Preparatory - service life 3 years;
Stroevoy - 12 years old;
Spare - 5 years and "a total of 20 years of compulsory service for both lower ranks and officers of the military class."

Service began at the age of 18. Later, some changes were introduced, the main of which was the reduction of the preparatory rank from three to one year, upon reaching the age of 21, having passed the one-year preparatory rank, the Cossack was sent to the combat units of the first stage. After serving 4 years, he was enlisted in the second part, and after another 4 years - in the third stage. Then for 5 years he was enlisted in the reserve. After that, until the end of his life he was transferred to the militia.

To be competent in matters related to service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a requirement of the times. On the training session on the problems of military service, students should be introduced to the concept of military service, to the history of military service in our country.

Dictionaries give a fairly close definition of the term "conscription", so you can get by with two examples. "Universal conscription is the statutory duty of the population to serve in the armed forces." "Conscription is the statutory obligation of the population to perform military service in the armed forces of their country."

The modern concept of military duty was invented during the French Revolution. In 1798, a law was passed stating: "Every Frenchman is a soldier and has the duty to defend the nation." This allowed the creation of a "great army", which Napoleon called an "armed nation". She successfully fought against the professional armies of Europe.

The history of military service in Russia goes back several centuries. AT Ancient Russia until the 17th century conscription was carried out in the form of feudal and militia. Created in the 1st half of the 17th century. the regiments of the "new system" gradually replaced the feudal noble militia. In 1699-1705. recruitment has been established. In 1874, during the military reforms of the 1860s and 70s. Russia introduced compulsory military service. The charter of 1874 determined the draft age at 21 years, the total service life at 15 years, of which 6 active service (7 in the fleet) and 9 years in the reserve.

Military duty in the USSR is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens to defend the socialist Fatherland with weapons in their hands and to carry out military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR. According to the law, male citizens of the USSR from the age of 18 are called up for active military service. The number of citizens subject to conscription is established by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The call is preceded by a mandatory registration to the recruiting stations at the place of residence of citizens who turn 17 years old in the year of registration. Evasion of the next call for active military service, as well as from the call for mobilization, was recognized as an infringement on the interests of the defense of the USSR and entailed criminal liability.

The law establishes the following periods of active military service: a) for soldiers and sergeants Soviet army, coastal units and aviation of the Navy, border and internal troops - 2 years; b) for sailors and foremen of ships, ships and coastal combat support units of the Navy and naval units of the border troops - 3 years; c) for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and foremen with higher education - 1 year.

The history of the creation of the modern Russian Armed Forces begins with the signing of the decree "On the Creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" on May 7, 1992 by the first President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin. In accordance with the decree, the staffing of the army was carried out "on the basis of a combination of military service by conscription with military service under the contract." On September 24, 1992, the Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense" was adopted, which enshrined a mixed principle of recruiting the army.

In the new Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, the wording “A citizen of the Russian Federation performs military service in accordance with federal law” remained, but the term “conscription”, which was in the previous Constitution, is not in it. On May 16, 1996, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 722 "On the transition to recruiting the positions of privates and sergeants of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation on a professional basis" was promulgated. In accordance with Decree No. 722, it was supposed to transfer from the spring of 2000 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to staffing positions for privates and sergeants on the basis of voluntary admission of citizens to military service under a contract with the abolition of conscription for military service. However, the full transition of the army to a contract basis was postponed indefinitely.

Under Putin, attempts were made to transfer the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a contract basis. The result of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can be considered the abolition of deferrals from military service. On the other hand, it is expected to reduce the term of service in the army to 1 year.

After getting acquainted with the concept of "military service" and its history, you can ask students how they feel about military service, how legitimate it is to use this practice in our country, and invite them to highlight the arguments "for" and "against" military conscription.

In the process of a broad public discussion that has been going on in our country and the world for more than one year, the following main arguments "for" and "against" military conscription were formulated.

Students can first come up with their own arguments, compare with existing ones, and evaluate them. You can immediately acquaint them with the main arguments and organize a debate, at the end of which determine the most convincing position and its arguments.

Call: arguments "for"

sacred duty

The position that military service in peacetime is an opportunity for a citizen to show loyalty to his country, a kind of active patriotism, has become widespread. A citizen is not just a person who pays taxes, he must be ready to sacrifice his life for the defense of the Fatherland. Military service, tearing young people away from home for the hardships of barracks life, should be a reminder of their highest military duty.

social justice

This argument is based on the belief that the rich and educated people never agree to devote themselves to the military profession voluntarily. Universal conscription acts as a universal social equalizer, making the same demands on the heir of a rich man and the son of a poor man.

"Melting Pot"

The conscription system leads to the fact that people get into the army not only with different financial status, but also with different professional experience, with different views. Thus, some believe, it is the conscription that provides the army with a variety of talents, while a professional army always consists of people of approximately the same kind. Theoretically, it is the combination of people with different abilities that provides the most effective solution to any tasks, including combat ones. In practice, lack of experience and lack of enthusiasm usually make the draft army less effective in specific combat situations, especially in foreign territory. This was shown, in particular, by the US Vietnam War and the Afghan War waged by the USSR.

Educational role of military service

Some believe that peacetime conscription is an ideal tool for teaching the population basic life values ​​and skills, such as emergency survival, first aid, etc.

The draft army is the guarantor of democracy

There is an opinion that the conscription system of staffing the army contributes to the preservation and strengthening of democracy in the country. It is impossible to use a draft army in aggressive wars for a long time, since this leads to moral degradation both at the front and in the subsequent civilian life of the participants in conflicts, as the experience of Afghanistan and Vietnam has shown. Thus, the conscription army restrains the activity of the government in carrying out aggressive campaigns, which contributes to the preservation of peace between peoples.

There is a danger of turning a professional army into a kind of "state within a state." Such military virtues as obedience to orders and respect for superiors can be used to build dictatorial regimes. The military can attract - consciously or subconsciously - people who prefer authoritarianism to democracy.

The draft army as a cheap way to attract specialists

Often, especially in developing countries with corrupt bureaucracy, the prevailing notion is that conscription ends up with the most useless young people, because those who are smarter and smarter shy away from service. However, in principle, the conscription system can be designed in such a way as to weed out unbalanced and low-skilled people and recruit the best representatives of the youth, including those who have professional skills useful for the army. If primarily talented and capable young people are drafted into the army, who are easy to train in anything, then this approach makes it possible to reduce the size of the army and the cost of maintaining it. In addition, if semi-criminal elements are eliminated, the problem of hazing will be solved.

The moral justification for military service

Jean Jacques Rousseau, a famous French educator, vehemently opposed the idea of ​​a professional army, believing that participation in the defense of society and the state is the right and privilege of every citizen, and the transfer of this task into the hands of professionals indicates the moral decline of society. As evidence, he cited the example of the Roman Republic, the collapse of which coincided with the transition from an army based on conscription to a professional army of mercenaries.

The right of a state to call its citizens into military service can be based on rational arguments, if the following two messages are true.

First, the army should never be used for offensive purposes, it serves to protect the borders. Secondly, any foreign occupation is an absolute evil and threatens the lives of most citizens.

If these two premises are accepted, then in order to achieve the greatest good for the majority, a certain number of people should be sacrificed. These people, the reservists serving in the armed forces, must make a sacrifice of altruism - in the name of saving the lives of others. If we agree that the state can require a person to sacrifice his life, then we can recognize that at a certain level of victims (usually numbers are from 1% to 10% of the army personnel), the death in battle of a part of the citizens is preferable, than foreign occupation.

Military service in peacetime, conscription supporters believe, can instill in citizens persistent patriotic convictions and a willingness to die for the good of society.

In the presence of conscription in the country, each person understands that any war means death for himself or his loved ones, or at least the threat of death. As a result, this reduces the desire of society to participate in armed conflicts. However, it should be recognized that public opinion matters only in democratic countries.

Militia army - the solution to the problem of lack of soldiers

Some countries, such as those that are small or experiencing a demographic crisis, are faced with the inability to complete the army. There are two ways to solve this problem. The first is to put all healthy men under arms, but not to tear them away from home and family. Switzerland chose this path, which allowed it to maintain its sovereignty, despite the attacks that did not stop throughout the history of the country's independence. The Swiss militia system was such a successful invention that many of its fighting techniques and weapons were soon adopted by other countries.

For small countries, an attractive way to ensure national security is to join a military alliance like NATO.

The second option is to maintain a professional mercenary army. This approach, however, requires funding and volunteers willing to serve for remuneration. In addition, it is necessary to constantly monitor foreign mercenaries in case they break out of obedience.

Showing a variety of points of view on a particular problematic issue, the teacher teaches teenagers, young people to think responsibly and balancedly, keeping them from hasty conclusions, teaches them the ability to resist manipulation by unscrupulous sources of information.

Call: Arguments Against

Conscription and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Many of the arguments against conscription are based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (...)

Article 2. Everyone shall have all the rights and all freedoms proclaimed in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, etc. (...)

Article 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude (...)

Article 13. (1). Every person has the right to move freely and choose his place of residence within the borders of each state. (2). Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country.

Article 20. (...) No one may be forced to join any association.

Article 23 Everyone has the right (...) to freely choose a job.

The above rights are enshrined in the constitutions of many countries, including those where conscription existed after the Second World War, or those in which conscription is provided for in cases of war.

Appeal as slavery

“Conscription subjects the individual to militarism. This is a form of slavery.

Military service in Russia

Military conscription in Russia- general, for all male citizens, the duty of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Compulsory military service in the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Ground Forces, Naval Forces and Navy is 12 months. It is regulated by the legislation of the Russian Federation, in particular, the law "On military duty and military service" and its amendments.

Story

Pre-Petrine Rus

Military service, as a duty of military service defined by law, common to all citizens, was established in Europe only in modern times. In the Middle Ages, the nobility carried out permanent military service, while the rest of the population was called to serve it only in cases of special danger to the country. Later, the armies were replenished by hiring hunters, and then by forced recruitment. In Moscow Russia, the troops usually consisted of persons endowed with land (estate) under the condition of service; in wartime, additional people were exhibited in proportion to the number of households and the space of land holdings.

1700-1874

Peter I first founded a standing army on the obligatory service of the nobility and the collection of dependent people, the so-called recruits. Little by little, they were exempted from duty - first the nobles (1762), then the merchants, honorary citizens, the clergy, so that its burden lay, finally, exclusively on the peasants and bourgeois.

1874-1914

From 1874 to Russian Empire general personal duty was introduced, to which the entire male population of Russia is subject; cash redemption and replacement by hunters were no longer allowed. The number of people required for permanent troops was determined annually by legislative procedure. The draft age was 21. Entry into active service was determined by lot, and those not accepted for service were enlisted until the age of 39 in the militia warriors.

According to the law of April 26, 1906 on the reduction of the terms of service in the ground forces and in the navy in peacetime in the ground forces in the infantry and foot artillery for drawing lots, the term of active service was 3 years. This was followed by a stay in the reserve of the 1st category (7 years) and in the reserve of the 2nd category (8 years).

In other branches of the military, the term of active service was 4 years. This was followed by a stay in the reserve of the 1st category (7 years) and in the reserve of the 2nd category (6 years).

In the Navy, the term of active service was 5 years. This was followed by a stay in the reserve of the 1st category (3 years) and in the reserve of the 2nd category (2 years).

Educational benefits consisted of a reduction in active service; the term of service for those who completed the course of an institution of the 1st category (as well as 6 classes of a gymnasium) was 2 years plus 16 years in reserve. For preferential serving of service as a volunteer, in addition to the strength of health, an application was required upon reaching the age of 17 and a certificate of completion of the course at an educational institution of I and II category or passing a special exam. The service life for category I was 1 year and 12 years in reserve, for category II - 2 years and 12 years in reserve.

A deferral of service was given for bodily defects (until recovery), for arranging cases on property status (up to 2 years) and for completing education in educational institutions(up to 27-28 years).

Those who were completely unable to bear arms were exempted from service. There were also benefits for the marital status of three categories: I category - for the only son in the family or the only family member capable of working; II category - for the only son able to work with a capable father and incapable brothers; Category III - for persons who, by age, follow in the family a person who is already in active service. The clergy and some clergymen were also released from service; were credited directly to the reserve for 18 years with the degree of doctor of medicine, doctor, veterinarians, pensioners of the Academy of Arts and teachers of government educational institutions.

Those who entered the service after the draft year were credited to the reserve until the age of 43.

1914-2008

Military service in Russia and the USSR is preserved. In 1925, the Law on Compulsory Military Service was adopted, the annual conscription into the army was restored for a period of 2 years for the Red Army, for the junior commanders Aviation and Red Navy - 3 years.

Post-war demobilization ended in 1948. In 1949, a new law was adopted, according to which the call was made once a year in November-December, the term of service in the ground forces and aviation was set to 3 years, in the navy 4 years.

In 1968, the term of soldier's service was reduced in the ground forces to two years, in the navy to three years, was introduced spring call. According to some reports, this could contribute to the emergence of dedovshina: conscripts completing their service could oppress new ones due to the fact that they got to serve a year less. For graduates of institutes who did not receive military training, the term of soldier's service was set at 1 year.

Position since 2007

At present, the basis is the Federal Law of 03/06/1998 "On military duty and military service", some provisions of which have been amended or repealed by numerous subsequent laws.

Legal ways to avoid draft in Russia

Most of the legal ways to avoid being drafted involve obtaining deferrals or exemptions from draft.

• Admission to the University
• Postgraduate admission
• Obtaining an exemption or deferral for health reasons
• Permanent residence outside Russian Federation
• Passing military service in another state

see also

Notes

Links

• All about military service on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
• Federal Law "On military duty and military service", 03/06/1998
• Deferment from the army on the website of the "Conscript Support Center"

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010 .

See what "Conscription in Russia" is in other dictionaries:

Conscription in Russia is the duty and obligation of a citizen of the Russian Federation to protect the Fatherland. Conscription in Russia provides for: military registration; compulsory preparation for military service; conscription; the passage of the military ... ... Wikipedia

conscription- (English description) the obligation of the population established by national legislation to carry out military service in the armed forces of their country. Each formation has its own forms of V.p. In the slave-owning society, V.p. constituted a duty and a right... Encyclopedia of Law

British! (Lord Kitchener) needs you! Join the army of your Motherland! God save the king. (World War 1 poster) I need you for the US Army! It's time to sign up! Conscription (conscription) is an obligation imposed on citizens ... ... Wikipedia

The obligation to personally defend one's homeland existed at all times and in all states, although its very fulfillment was subject to various fluctuations and distortions. At first, the right to personally defend the fatherland was the privilege of only full-fledged ... ...

The statutory obligation of the population to perform military service in armed forces of their country. In a slave-owning society, VP was a duty and a right of free, mainly property-owning people. With the appearance in Greece and Rome ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

conscription- the legal obligation of the population (usually from the age of 18) to carry out military service in the armed forces of their country. For the first time V.p. introduced in 1798 in France (conscription). In the Russian Federation, the term military duty is used, similar in meaning. * * * … Big Law Dictionary

The statutory duty of the population to bear the military. service in the armed the forces of their country. Each socio-economic formations have their own specifics. forms V. p. In the slave-owner. about ve V. of the item made a duty and the right free, hl. arr. ... ...

Such a system of military service, in which the state determines how many of each community (rural, urban, etc.) should be supplied with fit recruits, providing a distribution of what is required from the community ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary F. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron

The statutory duty of the husband. the population of all classes to bear the military. service in the armed the strength of his state. First introduced in 1798 in France by a special law (Conscription). In the 19th century V. in. n. introduced all the major state wa Zap. Europe, except ... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

In the last period of the existence of serfdom, all classes of society that rose in any way above the level of the masses of the people were exempted from compulsory military service. This exemption extended to nobles, merchants, honorary citizens and persons with education. German colonists and settlers from other countries also enjoyed exemption from military service. In addition, benefits were provided for serving military service to residents of Bessarabia, remote regions of Siberia, foreigners, etc. In general, more than 30% of the population were either released at all, or could pay off the supply of recruits with a cash contribution. The staffing of the army bore a vivid imprint of the estate system: the entire burden of military service fell on the lower classes of the Russian population, on the so-called tax-paying estates. Among them, recruiting kits were made. The very choice of recruits from the landlord peasants actually depended on the power of the landowner. Recruitment among other peasants (state, appanage) and among the burghers was carried out on the basis of the Recruitment Charter of 1831. The latter established the “next” order, taking into account the interests of the families from which recruits were to be taken. Until 1834 active service lasted 25 years. Then the period was reduced to 20 years, so that the remaining 5 years the lower rank was on indefinite leave. The duration of the service completely separated the recruits taken from the rest of the population and therefore, in fact, turned all the ranks of the army, as it were, into a separate estate.

After the liberation of the peasants in 1861, such a procedure for manning the armed forces could not continue to exist.

The government of Emperor Alexander II, which was rebuilding Russia on new social principles, could not uphold such an unfair distribution of military service. However, the victory of Germany in the war of 1870-1871. showed quite clearly that the armed force of a modern state cannot be based on the former, relatively small and isolated from the people, purely professional armies. The armed force, put forward by the states during the war, more and more approached the "armed people".

The report to Emperor Alexander II, submitted by the Minister of War, General (later Count) Milyutin, reads: “Your Imperial Majesty, turning his attention to the extraordinary increase in the size of the armed forces of European

states, on the unusually rapid transition of their armies, especially the German one, from a peaceful situation to a military one and on the means they extensively prepared for the constant replenishment of the loss of ranks in the active troops, ordered the Minister of War to present considerations on the means to develop the military forces of the empire on a basis corresponding to current state armaments of Europe.

In the Manifesto of Emperor Alexander II of January 1, 1874, which declared universal military service in Russia, the government considered it necessary to put forward new idea nationwide state protection as the main idea of ​​compulsory military service.

“The strength of the state,” the Manifesto says, “is not in the number of troops alone, but mainly in its moral and mental qualities, which reach high development only when the cause of defending the Fatherland becomes the common cause of the people, when everyone, without distinction of rank and status, unites for this holy cause.

Law on Compulsory military service was issued in the form of the Charter of 1874 on universal military service.

The first paragraph of this law read: “Protection of the Throne and the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian subject ...”, thus, military service was declared obligatory, universal and personal.

According to the principles of the new structure of the armed force, the army maintained in peacetime should first of all serve as a school for the training of a reserve of military-trained people, by means of which the wartime army was deployed during mobilization. In this regard, the Charter on military service appoints completely different terms of service than before. Initially, such a period was set at 5 years, and then reduced to 4 and 3 years. The wall separating the army from the people thus collapsed, and the social bond between them was established extremely close.

The military service charter of 1874 lasted for 40 years, right up to the World War. True, in 1912 a law was issued amending the Charter, but these changes, which were introduced into the “Charter on Military Service of 1874” by the law of 1912, could not yet be fully reflected in real life, since two years later a flare-up of World War.

That is why the study of the conditions created by Russian legislation for the use of the "manpower" of the state in war should be based primarily on consideration of the Charter on military service of 1874.

Territorial distribution of hardships of military service

According to the Charter of 1874, complete exemption from military service was granted to the entire non-native population of the Astrakhan province, Turgai, Ural, Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk regions, Siberia, as well as the Samoyeds living in the Mezen and Pechora districts of the Arkhangelsk province. This exemption was also preserved by the law of 1912.

Until 1887, the entire population of the Transcaucasus, as well as the foreigners of the North Caucasus, were also completely exempted from military service. But then the non-native population of the entire Caucasus was gradually drawn to military service on a general basis. In addition, some of the mountain tribes of the North Caucasus were involved in military service (but according to a special, facilitated position).

The entire population of the Turkestan Territory, Primorsky and Amur regions and some remote areas of Siberia. As the railways in Turkestan and Siberia, this seizure was reduced.

Finland until 1901 was serving military service on the basis of a special position. But in 1901, out of fear for the capital of the empire - St. Petersburg, in the event of a war with Germany, the government disbanded the Finnish troops and, until the processing of the new Regulations, completely freed the population of Finland from military service.

Finally, on the basis of special Cossack charters, the Cossack population of the regions served military service: the Troops of the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Siberian, Semirechensky, Transbaikal, Amur and Ussuriysk. But the Cossack statutes not only did not represent relief in serving military service, but in some respects made greater demands on the population than the general Statute. The existence of special Cossack statutes was explained by the desire of the government to give the Cossacks a law, although built on the same basis as the general Charter, but at the same time adapted to their way of life and historical traditions.

Summing up the above, we can express the following figures for the distribution of the hardships of "military service" for the entire population of the Russian Empire in 1914:

From this we see that, compared with the previous recruiting charter, our legal provisions on military service significantly expanded the base on which the armed forces were built. The exemption of part of the population from military service, although maintained, is an exemption loses its former class character, it is determined by the causes of the general state order, and it can be likened to the exemptions from military service granted by other European states to the populations of their colonies. Thus, in the exemptions mentioned above, one cannot yet see a violation of the basic principles, namely: obligatoriness, universality and personal duty, on which our law on military service sought to be based.

Service life

The idea of ​​the personal duty of every citizen to defend his fatherland is the basic principle of the law on compulsory military service.

The implementation of this idea among the indigenous population of Russia received a special moral significance. But in order for this idea to take root in the minds of the masses, especially those of little culture, it was necessary that the law on compulsory military service strive to the fullest extent for social justice. All European states base their laws on compulsory military service on the age and physical fitness of the conscripted citizen. Such a formulation of the question is, in fact, most in line with the idea of ​​compulsory military service. A young and healthy person is the best warrior and more easily endures all the hardships of military life. With the decrease in the age of the fighters, the number of soldiers with many families also decreases, for whom military service is incomparably more difficult than for single soldiers. Therefore, a young army is able to show more energy than an army filled with elderly people, often burdened with a large family.

The past war forced some compromises to be introduced for qualified

workers, whose knowledge and skills it is more useful for the state to apply not at the front, but in the rear. But all these compromises do not violate the basic idea of ​​the law on compulsory military service in the event that they are dictated solely by the benefit of the state, and not personal. That is why, when we said above that compulsory military service laws should strive to bring about the fullest possible justice, we added the word "social". By this we wanted to highlight the idea that we are not talking about justice in the ordinary sense of individual life, but about justice, determined by the benefit of the entire social organism.

Such a point of view causes great complications, but even in these complicated conditions, the correct solution will be found only if the age principle is taken as the basis for the distribution of burdens imposed on the shoulders of the population by the law on compulsory military service; in other words, the distribution of these hardships should be made according to the age strata of the male population of the country, observing the greatest uniformity in the requirements within each age class and lowering these requirements as the age of the class increases.

Let us now see to what extent this basic requirement has been fulfilled by our law.

The call was subject to young people who had just passed 21 years old. In peacetime, young people accepted for service entered the permanent troops, which consisted of the army, navy and Cossack troops. After serving active service for the period established by law, the ranks of the army, navy and Cossack troops were transferred to the "reserve". By the time the law was issued in 1912, the term of active service was 3 years for infantry and artillery (except horseback), 4 years for other ground forces, and 5 years for the navy. In the reserve, the ranks who served in the infantry and artillery (except for the cavalry) were listed for 15 years, the ranks of other ground forces - 13 years and the ranks of the fleet - 5 years.

The ranks of the reserve were intended for staffing in the event of the mobilization of units of the army in the field. In peacetime, reserve ranks could be called up for training camps, but no more than twice for the entire time, and each time for no more than six weeks. Out of a desire to save money, the duration of training camps was actually reduced: thus, those who had been in active service for more than three years were called up only once and for two weeks, and those who had served less than three years, twice, but only three times each time. weeks.

At the end of the statutory period of stay in the reserve, the persons who were in it were transferred to the state militia, in which they were until the age of 43.

Comparison with German law

From here we see that the Russian law divided the duties of military service into three age strata. In order to see how such a simplified solution of the issue did not have the flexibility to fully implement the age principle, we refer the reader to scheme No. 1 placed at the end of the book. In it, we indicate for comparison the solution of the same issue by German legislation. While our legislation divided the hardships of military service into three layers, German legislation divided them into six. In peacetime, this difference could not directly affect, because only those persons who were in active service carried the burden of compulsory military service in peacetime, while the rest, who were in the reserve or militia with us and in the reserve, Landwehr and Landsturm in Germany, did not broke away from their privacy. But in wartime, the difference between the categories indicated in the table was significant. With us, categories I and II went immediately with the declaration of war to the ranks of the active troops to die on the battlefields, and the III category partly went to replenish the losses of the army in the field, partly to the formation of special militia units for rear service, i.e. without the risk of injury and death. In Germany with

by declaration of war, they were immediately intended for active military operations of the II and III categories. IV category (Landwehr I category) was intended for the formation of special units, which were originally supposed to be assigned secondary combat missions. Category V (Landwehr II rank) formed special units, originally intended for rear service, but they could later be involved in secondary combat missions. Category VI (landsturm over 39 years old) formed special units intended exclusively for rear service and border protection. Finally, category I (landstorm under 20 years of age) could be called up, if necessary, in the form of early calls for staffing active troops.

In anticipation of the enormous need for "manpower" in the event of a European war, German legislation provided the War Office a certain freedom at the disposal of age classes, for example, younger ages Landwehr, if necessary, could be used to staff field and reserve troops, and the younger ages of the Landsturm of the II category could be used to staff the Landwehr.

From a comparison of the data of the scheme we cite (No. 1), we first of all see that Germany was preparing to show greater tension in the war than Russia. Germany considered it necessary for its defense to have at its disposal an army of 28 ages, while Russia had only 22.

In the next chapter, we will consider the special conditions that existed in Russia and did not allow her the same “tension with people” that was available to other Western European states. But here it is necessary to pay attention to the difference in the attitude of Russian and German legislation to the question of the use of younger ages. The draft age, according to Russian legislation, was determined as follows: the annual draft took place in the month of October, and young people were called up who had reached the age of 21 by October 1 of the same year. According to German law, young people who had turned 19 the previous year were involved. At the same time, presenting very strict requirements for the physical readiness of a recruit, German legislation provided a deferral for entry into the service of physically not fully developed young people. This led to the fact that the average draft age increased slightly, equaling 20 and a half years. Such a system made it possible, without forcing the weak part of the male population, to still have a draft age a year younger than ours.

But not only that. German law foresaw the need for early drafts in the event of war. It established a procedure according to which every German, upon reaching the age of 17, was enrolled in the Landsturm, i.e., became liable for military service.

Our charter of 1874 did not at all foresee the possibility of early conscription in the event of a war. The 1912 Act attempted to rectify this shortcoming. But our young people's representation did not realize the tremendous tension that would be required from Russia in two years. Our military department was not fully aware of this either. And the above attempt came out very timid. The 1912 law, although it provided for the possibility of early conscription, spoke about them very vaguely.

Art. 5 of the law of 1912 read: “In the event of emergency wartime circumstances that cause an urgent need to speed up the entry of recruits into the ranks of the troops, the next call can be, by the Highest command, announced by the Highest decree to the Governing Senate, made ahead of schedule, in the previous article (Article 4 ) specified ... "

Meanwhile, Art. 4 speaks of the terms of conscription in a given year; an indication of the age at which young people are subject to conscription, we find in Art. 2, which in Art. 5 links are missing.

A further comparison of the data in Chart No. 1 shows us that, despite the fact that Germany is preparing for conscription in the event of war, much more age classes,

than Russia, nevertheless, she creates a system that allows her to adjust the size of the use of her manpower with the size of the emerging needs of the war, while strictly adhering to the age principle.

This system is not only flexible; attentive attitude to the age principle gives it a moral significance, accordingly educating the people's consciousness.

The same cannot be said about Russian law. Although it is designed for less voltage than German, it lacks flexibility. It does not make it possible, in the tension of the country, to exercise fair consistency in the use of age classes. In one word, our law - handicraft.

He inherited this handicraft from the Recruiting Regulations of 1831. But the latter corresponded to a different task, namely, the conduct of war by a professional army, while the new task required the conduct of war by an armed people.

Distribution of hardships of military service by age

The backwardness of Russian legislation on compulsory military service from the requirements of modern warfare becomes even clearer if we deepen our analysis.

We have already mentioned above that the law on compulsory military service, when putting into practice the principle of the duty of every citizen to defend his fatherland, is forced to make some deviations from absolutely the same performance of this duty for everyone.

We will deal with this issue in detail in the following chapters. Here we will also touch upon another issue related to the one just indicated, namely, the question of which of the categories indicated in diagram No. 1 included persons who received exemption from active service in peacetime. At first glance it may seem that this question has only a formal meaning, but in fact it is not.

According to the Russian Statute on military service of 1874, persons who were not accepted for active service in peacetime were enrolled immediately upon being drafted into the state militia. The latter was subdivided by our law into two categories:

I category - was intended not only for the formation of special militia units, but could also be used to equip active troops.

II category - was intended exclusively for staffing special militia units, which were used only as rear guards or as labor force.

As we will see later, the greatest development in the field of benefits has been received in our legislation by a benefit based on marital status. It was used by up to 48% of those drafted. And now, about half of this number (preferential 1st category) were enrolled directly in the militia of the 2nd category, that is, in the event of war, they were exempted by law from real military service. The other half of the privileged by marital status was enlisted in the militia of the 1st category. Although, according to the meaning of the law, militia warriors of the II category could be involved in case of need to replenish the existing troops, but, according to our legal provisions, only warriors of the I category who had previously served in the troops (i.e., aged 39 to 43 years) were registered and only to the younger four ages of other warriors of the 1st category. The number of this part of the militia of the 1st category was considered sufficient "for the probable need: 1) for additional staffing for permanent troops and 2) for the formation of militia units."

Thus, our law intended to exempt not only from combat service, but also from any type of military service also warriors of the 1st category, with the exception of those who previously served in active service and the four younger ages.

As a result, instead of distributing the hardships of military service by age strata, our

the law, as it were, cut off part of the male population, destining it for military service up to the age of 43, and freed a completely different part from combat and even from any kind of military service.

The world war that broke out in 1914 upset all the calculations of the Russian military department. I had to hastily change the laws during the war. But the basic defects of the Charter on military service were expressed in all their force. Scheme No. 2 shows the terms of conscription of age classes in various categories of our military servicemen. From this cartogram it is clearly seen that the age principle was completely violated.

To clarify our thoughts, let's look at an example of how the world war affected the people of the draft in 1897.

In 1914, the people of this call were 38 years old.

According to what we have said above, they can be divided into three categories with regard to the burden that falls on them with a declaration of war.

First: active duty, enlisted Last year in reserve.

Second: enlisted in 1897 in the militia of the 1st category.

Third: enlisted in 1897 in the militia of the II category.

The first on the very first day of the announcement of mobilization were drafted into the army and went on a campaign in its ranks, the second began to be called up only on March 25, 1916, that is, twenty months after the start of the war; and still others began to be called up only on October 25, 1916, that is, twenty-seven months later. In order for this third category to be involved in combat service, and not to remain in the militia, even a radical change in the law was required.

This huge difference in the requirements of the state for the above three categories was predetermined as early as 1897, in most cases, depending on what kind of worker the conscript was then in the family of his father (or grandfather). Since then, 17 years have passed. The family of the father, and even more so of the grandfather, broke up (at the same time, as the distance from serfdom, the separation of young families occurred earlier and earlier). By 1914, the conscript's family had become a completely independent unit. Meanwhile, the following picture was being created: the head of a large family, with young children, goes to the battlefield, and a healthy bean is blissful in the rear, and only after 27 months of bloody slaughter is called up, and often only in order to guard supplies in the distant rear.

The social injustice is enormous. It increases even more if we compare a 42-year-old former soldier with many families, although he was already listed as a warrior of the 1st category, but called up five days after the announcement of mobilization and soon after that fell into the ranks of the active troops, with a 21-year-old single young man, according to the situation in father's family falling into the warriors of the II category. It could happen that this young man, released from military service, turned out to be the son of that former soldier who himself went to die for the Motherland.

In order to compensate for the violation of the economic interests of the families from which the head left, the government appointed the issuance of a special cash ration. This measure was reasonable and fair. But with this money only economic justice was restored, but not social justice: life, injury - money does not redeem.

From this we see that our law fundamentally violated the principle of using "manpower" according to age. Instead of dividing the male population according to horizontal age strata, as we see in cartogram No. 1, in reality, the male population of the Russian Empire was divided, as it were, along vertical lines (see Diagram No. 2), and this division extremely unevenly distributed the burden of military service during the war , imposing all of it on the shoulders of one part of the population and almost freeing another from it. Together with the violation of the principle of "age" use of the population, the idea of ​​compulsory compulsory military service was lost. In violation of the principle of age, our law allowed a kind of succession. The conscription of warriors of the militia of the 1st category was carried out after the exhaustion of all ages of persons who served in peacetime in

troops, and the call-up of militia warriors of the II category was carried out only after the use of almost all age classes of the militia of the I category.

Scheme No. 2, with the terms of conscription indicated on it, is a very interesting illustration in this respect.

Such a presentation of the matter could not, during the war, strengthen in our popular masses the consciousness of the general obligation of the duty to defend one's fatherland. For the uncultured masses of the Russian people, the practical implementation of the law was much more convincing than the words about sacred duty printed in the first article of the law. After the revolution, at soldiers' rallies, phrases were often heard: "we are from Tambov" or "we are from Penza", "the enemy is still far from us, so there is no need for us to fight." These phrases formulated not so much the lack of patriotism among the lower ranks of the Russian people as the lack of understanding of the idea of ​​a general obligatory military service. Our legal provisions on "military service", as we have seen, did not educate the people's consciousness in this direction.

German legislation, in contrast to ours, was extremely attentive to this issue, and its main educational device was the careful implementation of the age principle in its requirements for citizens. Forced, like the Russian (albeit to a lesser extent), to reckon with exemptions from active service in peacetime, it creates a special category for these persons, called the Ersatz Reserve. All physically fit for service in peacetime, as well as those released from the troops before the expiration general term services were credited to this Ersatz reserve.

With the declaration of war, the ranks of the Ersatz Reserve, under the age of 28, were called up, along with their peers who were in the reserve, to staff the field and form reserve troops. The ranks of the Ersatz Reserve aged 28-32 were called up on a par with their peers who were listed in the Landwehr of the 1st call. Finally, the ranks of the Ersatz Reserve at the age of 32-38 were called up, again along with their peers, the Landwehrists, to form parts of the Landwehr of the 2nd call. Upon reaching the age of 38, the ranks of the Ersatz Reserve were enrolled on a general basis in the Landsturm.

From this we see that with the declaration of war, all the exemptions and benefits that German legislation had to make for peacetime lost their significance and the entire population German Empire equalized in their duties to protect the fatherland.

Cossack statutes on military service

We have already mentioned above that 2.5% of the population of the Russian Empire in relation to military service was subject to special Cossack regulations. We also said that the reason for the separation of the Cossack population was due to the desire not to violate those historical traditions that had developed among the Cossacks.

The main type for the Cossack charters was the Charter on the military service of the Don Cossacks (published in 1875).

According to this charter, the armed force of the Don Cossacks consisted of "service personnel" of the army and "militia".

"Servants" was divided into three categories:

a) "Preparatory" category, in which the Cossacks received preliminary training for military service;

b) "Combatant" category, from which the combatants put up by the troops were recruited

c) "Reserve" category, intended to replenish the loss in combat units in wartime and to form new military units in wartime.

The service of each Cossack began when he reached the age of 18 and lasted 20 years. During this period, he was in the "service staff", and he stayed in the "preparatory" category for 3 years, in the "combat" - 12 years and in the "reserve" - ​​5 years.

During the first year of being in the preparatory category, the Cossacks were exempted from personal taxes, both in kind and in cash, and had to prepare the equipment necessary for the service. From the autumn of the second year, the Cossacks of the preparatory category began to receive primary individual military training in their villages. In the third year, in addition to this training, they were assigned camp fees for one month.

Upon reaching the age of 21, the Cossacks were enlisted in the “combat” category, and of them such a number as was necessary to replenish the combat units was enlisted in February of the following year for active service, in which they remained continuously for 4 years. The regiments and batteries exhibited by the Cossacks were divided into three stages, of which in peacetime the 1st stage was in the service, and the 2nd and 3rd were “on privilege”. The above-mentioned Cossacks of the combatant category of the first 4 age classes were in the service in parts of the 1st stage; then, at the end of 4 years of active service, they are credited for 4 years - in part of the 3rd line. Preferential Cossacks, who belonged to the regiments of the 2nd stage, were subject annually to two control fees and one three-week training fee. Those belonging to the shelves of the 3rd line were subject to collection only once, namely, in the third year of their stay in this line, also for three weeks.

The Cossacks of the "reserve" category in peacetime were not going to any fees. In wartime, they were called up for service as needed, starting from a younger age.

Finally, all the Cossacks who were able to carry weapons and did not belong to the “service staff” were in the “military militia”, and the Cossacks of the militia up to the age of 48 were kept account.

We plotted on scheme No. 3 the distribution of military service, according to the Cossack regulations, by age strata. Comparing this distribution with that created by our general statute, and that created by German legislation, we cannot but see a greater resemblance to the second than to the first. In the Cossack regulations, as well as in the German legal regulations, we see an extremely careful distribution of the hardships of military service by age strata, and even the number of such age strata coincides.

This similarity between the Cossack charters and German legislation does not end there. It goes deeper.

According to the Cossack statutes, young people physically fit for military service, but for one reason or another released from active service in peacetime, were enrolled in "preferential regiments." Thus, they were not immediately made militia warriors, as happened according to the general charter, but fell into the combat reserve of the 2nd stage. As a result, with the declaration of war, they lost their peacetime privileges and went on an equal footing with their peers in defense of the fatherland.

The similarity between the Cossack statutes and the German legal provisions on compulsory military service is all the more striking since there can be no question of any mutual borrowing.

We meet here only with an extremely interesting social phenomenon: the same ideas, logically and consistently put into practice, led to the same consequences.

The only difference was that Germany implemented the idea of ​​compulsory military service on a grander scale. She approached this realization by

empirical (a strong impetus in this regard was given by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, under whose secret article Napoleon forbade Prussia to maintain more than 42,000 troops in peacetime) and through deep scientific development under the guidance of such a brilliant organizer as Field Marshal Moltke. The Cossacks, on the other hand, followed an exclusively empirical path. The age-old struggle that fell to their lot to defend Russia from the peoples of the East, which required the participation in this struggle of all the male population capable of bearing arms, not only educated the Cossacks in the idea of ​​a general mandatory military service, but also grew up the very forms of implementing this idea in practice.

Thus, at the disposal of Russian statesmen, along with the experience of recruiting the army, there was also the historically established experience of the Cossack compulsory military service. The question involuntarily arises why this “Cossack” experience was not used in the general charter, since the idea of ​​universal military service extended to the whole empire.

The answer to this question must be sought in the field of general social and political conditions.

The implementation of the idea of ​​compulsory military service is very closely connected with the democratization of the social system. The Prussian archives preserve a number of projects of interesting reforms considered before Vienna (1806). One of them, Knesebek, who proposed the establishment of universal military service, was rejected in 1803. A critic of this project wrote: “The state system and military institutions are closely connected; throw away one ring and the whole chain falls apart. Universal conscription is possible only with the reform of the entire political system of Prussia. These archival projects testify to the impossibility of carrying out universal military service in the presence of obstacles rooted in the general political conditions of the then Prussia. In the same way, the outstanding military minds of the 18th century. they expressed ideas in the field of tactics, those ideas that Napoleon later carried out, but the old order was powerless to accept them. So it was in Prussia - it took a cruel blow, a shock to the foundations of feudal survivals, in order to translate the reform from the realm of wishes into reality. Only after Vienna did Scharnhorst become possible as a creator military reform. The full entry of Prussia onto the path of universal military service, the path leading to the "armed people", became possible only after the revolution of 1848.

By virtue of historical conditions the Cossack population bore in their traditions and social skills the stamp of deep democracy. The rest of Russia only with the liberation of the peasants took the first step along this path. History cannot fail to note all the greatness of the reforms of Emperor Alexander II. But at the same time, it is quite natural that for the employees of this great emperor, who directed the development of Russia along new paths, it was difficult to get rid of the influence of outdated ideas. Therefore, militarily, the ideas of the Recruitment Charter of 1831 were closer to the compilers of the Charter on military service of 1874 than the experience of the compulsory service of the Cossacks. Meanwhile, the Recruit Charter of 1831 was built on completely different principles, namely, on the idea of ​​a professional army, isolated from the rest of the population; this charter was quite logically justified, so to speak, on the “vertical” division of the male population of the country: one small part of the male population had to fight until they were physically useless, while the rest could calmly stay in the rear, believing that the defense of the Fatherland was not her business. The influence of the Recruiting Regulations introduced into the Charter of 1874 inconsistency in the implementation of the age principle in practice.

The influence of the ideas of the 1831 Recruitment Regulations on the drafters of the 1874 Regulations finds yet another explanation. In 1874 the idea of ​​an "armed people" was new not only to Russia, but to all other European states except Germany. It was quite natural on the part of the drafters of the new Rules to strive to smooth out, as far as possible, the break with the old forms that occurred under the new organization of the armed forces. In the natural course of things, the Charter on military service of 1874 with

would improve over time, losing the harmful vestiges borrowed from the Recruitment Regulations. But the bomb explosion that killed Emperor Alexander II on March 1, 1881, put a bloody end to the further development of the reforms of the Tsar-Liberator, orienting the reign of the emperor Alexander III on a different path. AT best case, the activities of Emperor Alexander II remained without further improvement. A similar fate befell the law on general military service.

The revolution of 1905, caused by the unsuccessful war with Japan, forced the Russian government to again look for a path in the direction indicated by the great reforms of Emperor Alexander II. But when the country calmed down, the government takes all measures to evade the undertakings proclaimed in the Manifesto of Emperor Nicholas II of October 17, 1905. After the revolution of 1905, the government of Emperor Nicholas II no longer believed in the old political ideas and at the same time did not want to accept new ones. This duality of politics gives the government of the state the character of lack of ideas.

Hesitation and lack of ideas are also reflected in the sphere of organization of the armed force.

Under the direct impression of the defeats on the fields of Manchuria, such enlightened people who understood modern military affairs as Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Generals Palitsyn and Rediger. The Grand Duke was entrusted as chairman of the Council of State Defense with the overall management of the activities of the General Staff, General Palitsyn and the Minister of War, General Rediger. At the same time, an important organizational reform was carried out in the form of the separation from the War Ministry of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Such a distinction was especially important for Russia of this era, as it made it possible to focus on the scientific development of the main ideas for the organization of the Russian armed forces. Under the direct supervision of General Palitsyn, such work began.

Minister of War General V. A. Sukhomlinov

But already in 1908, a new luminary appeared in the sky of the Petrograd bureaucracy - General Sukhomlinov. The Council of State Defense is abolished, and at the same time, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich is removed from the general leadership of the organization of the armed forces. Generals Palitsyn and Rediger have been removed from their posts. The General Staff again submits to the Minister of War, which General Sukhomlinov becomes.

The appearance of the latter in the post of Minister of War is not an accident. In every social organism a kind of social selection takes shape. The well-known English aphorism “the right man on the right place” is only the result of such selection in a healthy social organism. In a diseased organism, social selection is expressed in the fact that the most “convenient” people are selected. In this state of affairs, the appearance of "the right people" is, in turn, an accident. The appearance as Chief of the General Staff of General Palitsyn and Minister of War General Rediger was an “accident”, explained only by the acuteness of the impressions of the failures in the Japanese war and the pressure exerted by the revolution. Generals Palitsyn and Rediger had the civic courage to point out the backwardness of our military training and the need for long, hard work put on a scientific basis; by doing so they destroyed the legend of our innate invincibility.

As the sharp impression of defeat began to fade, and the revolution that had flared up subsided, General Sukhomlinov turned out to be more in tune with the policy of "turning back." Having graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in the 1970s and decorated with the St. George Cross for the war of 1877–1878, he allowed higher education and combat experience. But with the rapid development of military affairs, the higher military education received without constant hard work in studying the evolution of military affairs loses its value. Sukhomlinov was fully convinced that the knowledge he received decades ago, and often already outdated, remained unshakable truths. The ignorance of General Sukhomlinov was combined with amazing frivolity. These two shortcomings allowed him to be surprisingly calm about the most complex issues of organizing military power. People who did not understand the full complexity of modern military affairs were given the false impression that Sukhomlinov quickly understood the matter and was very decisive. Meanwhile, he was simply likened to a man who, walking near the abyss, does not see it.

We had to dwell in somewhat more detail on the figure of General Sukhomlinov, because this minister of war, who had become all-powerful in the field of military training of the country, led to a return in this area to lack of ideas and lack of system.

To what extent there was no understanding of the need for the opposite, the following fact testifies.

The body responsible for the detailed scientific development and at the same time the synthesis of decisions on all particular issues of the military training of the state is an institution corresponding in German terminology to the "Great General Staff". In Russia there was a Main Directorate of the General Staff, but due to many reasons it was far from corresponding to the high and responsible mission that was assigned to it. One of the main reasons for this was the constant change of chiefs of the General Staff. From the time General Sukhomlinov took over the administration of the War Ministry until the start of the war, that is, for 6 years, 4 persons held this post (General Myshlaevsky, General Gerngross, General Zhilinsky, General Yanushkevich). Meanwhile, in Germany, the successive tenure of the same post also by four persons (Count Moltke, Count Waldere, Count Schlieffen, Count Moltke Jr.) lasted 53 years. Any change of chiefs of the General Staff inevitably has a destructive effect on all work in preparation for war. Therefore, it is not necessary to speak seriously about the possibility of uniting all the numerous and diverse measures for the preparation of armed power in the era of Sukhomlinov. Depending on the ability, degree of training, and even the tastes of this or that person, we paid attention to this or that question; this question was resolved one way or another, but we did not have that scientifically substantiated synthesis that was available in France or Germany.

The unsystematic and unprincipled management of the ministry by General Sukhomlinov was clearly revealed in the preparation of such basic military regulations as the "Regulations on the field command and control of troops." “The crown of all work on the reorganization of the army,” writes General Yu. Danilov, “was to serve as a revision of the “Regulations on the field command and control of troops in wartime.” This provision should have determined: the organization of higher military formations, their management, the organization of the rear and the service of all kinds of supplies. The current regulation was published in the nineties of the last century and modern conditions was completely inapplicable. This was shown even by the war of 1904–1905, during which a lot of fundamental changes had to be made. Despite a number of commissions working on a new project, things did not go well, and

only by January 1913, when the drawing up of the project, at the request of the department of the quartermaster general, was withdrawn from the commissions that hindered it and concentrated at the named department of the General Staff, the work was completed. However, the project met with many objections, mainly from the departments that occupied a privileged position and wished to see their representatives more independent than it was determined. general scheme. Its consideration dragged on for more than a year, and only the impending events of 1914 accelerated the successful resolution of the case. What seemed insoluble under peaceful conditions of life for many months was resolved in anticipation of war - in one night meeting. Only on July 1, 6/29, 1914, i.e. just three days before the start of the war, was it approved supreme authority one of the most important wartime provisions."

The failure of the Sukhomlinov ministry to carry out the necessary reform in the legal provisions on universal military service was even more evident, because such a reform required not only an in-depth scientific understanding of modern warfare, but also a broad point of view on all aspects of public life.

We will again cite here excerpts from General Yu. Danilov's book Russia in the World War.

“The basis of our entire military system was the Charter on military service, published back in the reign of Emperor Alexander II and, of course, significantly outdated. It was felt both in government circles and in the Duma spheres - the urgent need for its complete revision. But this took time. And so, in order to move forward more reliably and quickly, the State Duma decided to refuse the government to increase the contingent of recruits annually approved by it until the new Charter is passed through the legislative institutions ... "

“The complexity of the issue, internal interdepartmental tensions, of which there have always been many, led to the fact that the new Charter on military service was approved in 1912. Having thus become a law shortly before the war, it had almost no effect on the conditions for the actual recruitment of the army and the procedure for transferring it to a state of war. In addition, the new Charter did not go far from its predecessor and in no way ensured that the Russian army in peacetime would turn it into an armed people with the declaration of war.

“Theoretically, the need to build the armed forces of a modern state on the given basis may have been recognized, but this provision has not received real implementation.”

The modern concept of military duty was invented during French Revolution. In the same year, a law was passed stating: "Every Frenchman is a soldier and has the duty to defend the nation." This made it possible to create the "Great Army", which Napoleon called "an armed nation" and which successfully fought against the professional armies of Europe.

Military conscription in Russia

Controversy about military duty

In democracies, military conscription has often been the subject of political conflict, especially when conscripts are sent to fight in foreign wars when it is not necessary for the security of the nation. For example, during the First World War, serious conflicts arose in Canada (see en:Conscription Crisis of 1917), Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand. Canada also had conflicts over this issue during World War II, in the year. Likewise, mass anti-draft protests during the Vietnam War took place in the US and other countries in the 1960s. During the American Civil War, there was serious turmoil in New York City (the New York Conscription Riots (1863)) when the call to the Union Army was announced.

The question of gender equality

Some believe that the drafting of only men in the armed forces is a violation of the principle of gender equality (which is written in the Declaration of Human Rights and the constitutions of many countries).

Conscious objection to military service

Conscious refusal includes either total refusal (refusal of military service and any kind of its substitution) or simply refusal of military service. In case of refusal of military service, most countries provide an opportunity to perform alternative service. It can look like an alternative military - service in military formations but without weapons, or as an alternative civilian - work as civilian personnel outside military formations at various enterprises and organizations.

• In the Russian Federation, the right to alternative civilian service is enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and a number of laws.

Draft evasion

Countries with and without military conscription

*Green: No armed forces
* Blue: No military duty * Orange: Conscription planned to be abolished in the next three years * Red: There is military duty * Grey: No information Note: In China, military service is almost optional.

Countries in which there is a call

• North Korea Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Citizens are subject to conscription upon reaching the age of 17. Conscript's term of service:

- in the ground forces - 5-12 years. - in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces - 3-4 years. - in the Navy - 5-10 years.

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Arguments in favor of military conscription

Valuable training

Almost all the skills acquired during the conscription period can be acquired independently as a result of classes in shooting clubs, hiking and survival classes, while practicing various sports.

Defense against military coups

Insignificant argument. In history, there are cases of military coups, both with a draft system for recruiting the Armed Forces, and with a contract one. So the coup in Greece and the establishment of the regime of "black colonels" was carried out on the basis of the draft system.

Lack of people

The argument, as a rule, comes from outdated ideas about the importance of the number of military personnel, and not their quality. In reality, the effectiveness of the performance of the assigned task by the military is important. As a rule, contract soldiers (mercenaries) significantly outperform the conscripts here. According to the Pentagon, a contract soldier who has completed at least five years of service can be taken as a unit. Thus, when comparing the effective number with the real one, a contract soldier is worth approximately five conscript soldiers.

It doesn’t matter, in the event of a clash of two militarily powerful states, without global superiority, it will be necessary to carry out an appeal, since the tension of all the forces of the state will be observed, and the entry of volunteers into military service will be sharply limited. Contractors should be recruited only for very serious military equipment, which takes a long time to learn how to operate and maximum amount leadership positions, in fact, an increase in the number of officers and ensigns. In the 20th century, thanks to the development military equipment a person is able to easily and quickly learn to kill - it's all about the organization of military training and the level of patriotism in the state, which is a big problem for the CIS states, since the draft age is this moment, either the same age or older than the states themselves. Contract aircraft have an advantage over draft ones. Conscripts may refuse to shoot at their people, to maintain power in the state it is better to have mercenaries. Also, in a situation where a democratic state needs to start bloody wars, contract aircraft fit perfectly.

Staff Diversity

The quality of recruits

Maybe not too important, but also an argument in favor of conscription can be the fact that the conscription determines the state of health of modern youth, reveals typical diseases and problems in an extremely important age interval for the state. It should be noted that such work is also carried out during the medical examination of young people as part of preventive examinations in schools and other educational institutions and is in no way connected with conscription for military service.

Political and moral motives

Arguments against military conscription

Appeal and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Many of the arguments against military conscription are based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular,

• Article 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. (…)
• Article 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
• Article 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade are prohibited in all their forms.
• Article 20 Everyone has the right to move freely and choose his residence within the borders of each state. (...).
• Article 20. (…) No one may be compelled to join any association.
• Article 23 Everyone has the right (…) to freely choose a job (…).

Similar rights are written into the constitutions of many countries, even those with military conscription.

Appeal as slavery

Military duty subordinates the individual to militarism. This is a form of enslavement. The fact that many nations allow this is just another indication of its harmful influence. Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, H.G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Mann. "Against military duty and military training of youth", 1930.

Many groups, such as libertarians, believe that conscription is slavery, as it is forced labor. Under the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution, slavery and forced labor are prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes. Therefore, these people believe that conscription is unconstitutional and immoral. However, in 1918 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that conscription in time of war was not a violation of the Constitution, arguing that the rights of the federal government included the right to conscript citizens into military service.

In the USSR and other socialist countries, conscript soldiers were often used for free labor that had nothing to do with military needs - for example, for laying rails, picking potatoes, etc.

However, according to article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, as well as article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, all types of military service and service assigned instead of compulsory military service are not forced labor.

Problems with discipline

Nationalism

Justifying attacks on civilians

The question of the quality of conscripts

see also

• One hundred days before the order - on dismissal from military service

Links

• Website of the Public Initiative "CITIZEN AND ARMY" - Russian human rights organizations in support of conscripts, military personnel and alternative servicemen: actions to ensure the rule of law
• Coalition for Democratic Alternative Civil Service

Sources

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