Historical essays and archival documents. He defeated the Abwehr. Smersh. historical essays and archival documents
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SMERSH. Historical essays and archival documents.
3rd edition, revised and enlarged. M.: Publishing house of GBU "TsGA of Moscow", 2015, 344 p. Compiled by: Khristoforov V., Vinogradov V., Matveev O.
On April 19, 1943, Joseph Stalin withdrew the army Special Departments from the subordination of the NKVD and created a new special service on their basis - SMERSH, putting Viktor Abakumov at its head. SMERSH is called both the most effective counterintelligence of World War II and a punitive machine. There were about 10 thousand military counterintelligence officers, of which 646 were in the central office. All of them, except for a few top leaders, including Abakumov, wore army, not Chekist, ranks. Natives of the Special Departments were recertified in May 1943. Indicative is the name "Death to Spies", personally approved by Stalin. At the same time, among the duties of the special services, set out in the appendix to resolution No. 3222, in second place after "the fight against the activities of foreign intelligence services" was "the fight against anti-Soviet elements."
Historical essays on the fight against enemy reconnaissance during the Great Patriotic War illustrated with unique documents and photographs, including from personal archives counterintelligence agents. All essays presented in the book-album are strictly documentary.
A separate chapter is devoted to documenting the crimes committed by the invaders in the occupied areas, as well as the work to search for and punish war criminals and their accomplices from among Soviet citizens.
"Smersh" as a structure and ceased to exist in 1946, but military counterintelligence continued to be effective. A brief overview of her work in the 1960s-80s and beyond, up to the present day, is given on last pages books, is quite logical and fits into the general concept of the publication.
The gift edition is addressed to veterans of counterintelligence, researchers of the history of domestic special services and a wide range of readers.
© Sever A., 2015
© TD Algorithm LLC, 2015
* * *
Dedicated to military Chekists - veterans of the Great Patriotic War
Introduction
The history of the activities of the Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War has three truths. And each of them has the right to exist.
One is "trench". It was preserved in the memoirs of veterans - military security officers and those who came into contact with the activities of the Special Departments of the NKVD - the Counterintelligence Departments "Smersh" of the NPO and the NKVMF. It is clear that veterans - military security officers remember only good things about their activities at the front and in frontline1
Guskov A. M. Under the stamp of truth. Confessions of a military counterintelligence officer. People. Data. Special operations., - M., 2004; Ivanov L. G. The truth about "Smersh". - M., 2007; Ivanovsky O. G. Notes of an officer of "Smersh". In campaigns and raids of the Guards Cavalry Regiment. 1941–1945 - M., 2006, etc.
And the rest - depending on how communication with the "special officers" ended for them.
The second is "general's" or official. It is reflected in various monographs. 2
Ostryakov S. Z. Military Chekists. - M., 1979; To protect the security of the Fatherland. Counterintelligence of the Petrograd-Leningrad Military District during the years of war and peace (1918-1998). - St. Petersburg, 2000; History of the Soviet state security organs. M., 1977; Nadtachaev V.N. Military counterintelligence of Belarus: Fates, tragedies, victories ... - Minsk., 2008; Sergeev F. Covert operations of Nazi intelligence. 1933–1945 - M., 1999; "Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. - M., 2003, etc.
Published after the end of the war. In it, depending on the political situation at the time of writing, the work of the military counterintelligence agencies is shown in a positive or neutral color. In the first case, successes are listed, and in the second, the reader is simply informed that military counterintelligence was actively working, catching German spies and saboteurs, but leading role the command of the Red Army and the leadership of the state security agencies played in the victory over the enemy.
One of possible causes“dosed” story about the work of military counterintelligence officers during the Great Patriotic War is that the main “special officer” Viktor Semenovich Abakumov (headed military counterintelligence throughout the entire period of the Great Patriotic War) was arrested in July 1951, accused of treason and a Zionist conspiracy in the USSR Ministry of State Security.
At the time of his arrest, he served as Minister of State Security of the USSR. After the death of Joseph Stalin, at the behest of Nikita Khrushchev, the charges against Viktor Abakumov were changed; he was charged with the “Leningrad affair”, fabricated by him, according to the new official version, as a member of the “Beria gang” (in reality, relations between Viktor Abakumov and Lavrenty Beria deteriorated after 1945).
After being tortured and beaten in prison, he became an invalid. He was put on trial (with the participation of Leningrad party workers) in Leningrad, where he pleaded not guilty, and was shot in December 1954. In 1994, Viktor Abakumov was partially rehabilitated by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: the charge of treason was dropped from him, and the sentence was replaced by 25 years in prison without confiscation of property and reclassified under the article "military crimes".
Another reason - there is a persistent myth - military security officers during the Great Patriotic War were exclusively engaged in hunting for true and imaginary enemies of the Soviet government (spies and saboteurs of the enemy's special services; alarmists and deserters; dissatisfied with the Soviet government, etc.) and counterintelligence operations. And to tell something new and sensational is difficult. After all, most counterintelligence operations followed the same scenario. The detention of enemy intelligence agents (not necessarily German, there were also Hungarian, Romanian, etc.) most often took place without shooting, chases, hand-to-hand fights and many days of searching. Any deviation from the "silent" arrest is a "failure" in the work of the military counterintelligence agencies. Most of the agents were well aware that, according to the laws of wartime, and taking into account the “bouquet” of the crimes they committed (treason, cooperation with the Germans, etc.), they would be shot. So they resisted to the end.
Although the military security officers were engaged not only in the neutralization of enemy agents. Another important task is to inform the command of the Red Army and the leadership of the country about the shortcomings and mistakes made by individual officers of the army in the field. In fact, the "specialists" played the role of "the sovereign's eye" in the Red Army and the Navy. Now it is fashionable to attribute the causes of all the failures of the Red Army in the early years of the Great Patriotic War to Joseph Stalin and the command of the Red Army. Say, they gave criminal and impracticable orders, which became the cause of numerous military disasters. Indeed, there is some truth in this. But if we look at the reports of military counterintelligence officers from the active army (and no one doubts the authenticity of the facts reported in them), then even more mistakes, moreover, inaction and criminal negligence were demonstrated by the commanders and officers of the headquarters of armies, divisions, brigades and regiments. Why the officers did this is a topic for a separate discussion, which is beyond the scope of this book. We will only note that the official history of the Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War tries not to focus on this area of activity of the “specialists”.
The third truth about military Chekists is “documentary”. It is in numerous documents that were declassified only in last years. They contain everything from detailed stories about the introduction of enemy intelligence agencies that were not invented by writers and screenwriters of feature films, but how it actually happened, and ending with a description of the shortcomings in the organization of the supply of the Red Army and the criminal negligence shown by individual military leaders in the first year of the war. For example, that most of the blame for the death of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front in the summer of 1942 lies with the command of this army.
The book will tell about the third truth - "documentary". About what veterans usually do not remember - military counterintelligence officers and official historians. The former simply did not know about it, because they were at the forefront and, due to their official position, could not see the work of the entire system of military counterintelligence agencies. And the second, official historians, in most of the “open” works devoted to the activities of military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War, concentrated their attention either on individual battles or on one or more topics - the fight against the German special services, the work of the central apparatus, etc.
Part one
Abakumov's team
Chapter 1
Directorate of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR
Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than those on the front lines of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army. In fact, ordinary employees (security officers serving military units) acted autonomously. Together with the fighters, they first fought on the border, and then rapidly retreated. In the event of the death or serious injury of the unit commander, the counterintelligence officer had to not only replace the commander, but also, if necessary, raise the fighters to the attack. At the same time, they continued to fulfill their professional duty - they fought with deserters, alarmists, enemy agents, who were rapidly filling the front-line zone.
They had to fight from the first hours of the war, relying only on themselves. If their colleagues from other divisions of the NKVD were able to get instructions from their superiors - what to do in "special conditions", then the military counterintelligence officers acted autonomously. It is difficult to say whether they knew about the directive of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR No. 34794 adopted on June 22, 1941. In it, the main task of the Chekists in the army and the military counterintelligence officers of the Far Eastern Front (FEF) was to identify agents of German intelligence agencies and anti-Soviet elements in the Red Army. It was instructed to “speed up the work on creating residencies and providing them with reserve residents”, not to allow disclosure by military personnel military secrets, and special attention should be paid to employees of headquarters and communication centers 3
Directive of the 3rd Directorate of NCOs of the USSR No. 34794 on the tasks of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate in connection with the outbreak of hostilities to repel an aggressive attack Nazi Germany on the USSR // Bodies state security USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Start. June 22 - August 31, 1941, - M., 2000. - S. 37-38.
Maybe they could still tell her.
But about another governing document of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs of the USSR - Directive No. 35523 of June 27, 1941 "On the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs in wartime", most likely not. On the first day of the war, there was no connection between the Stavka and the headquarters of individual armies 4
Sever A. The Great Mission of the NKVD. - M., 2008. - S. 156.
This document defined the main functions of military counterintelligence:
“1) intelligence and operational work:
a) in parts of the Red Army;
b) in the rear, providing units operating at the front;
c) among the civilian environment;
2) the fight against desertion (employees of special departments were part of the barrage detachments of the Red Army, which, contrary to popular belief, were not directly related to the state security agencies. - Auth.);
3) work on the territory of the enemy "(initially in the area up to 100 km from the front line, in contact with the Intelligence Directorate of the NPO of the USSR. - Approx. Aut.) 5
From the directive of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs of the USSR No. 35523 on the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs in wartime dated June 27, 1941 // State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Start. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M., 2000. - S. 90–93.
Military counterintelligence officers were to be located both at headquarters, providing a regime of secrecy, and in the first echelons at command posts. At the same time, military counterintelligence officers received the right to conduct investigative actions against military personnel and civilians associated with them, while the sanction for arrests of average commanders they were supposed to receive from the Military Council of the army or the front, and senior and senior commanding staff from the people's commissar of defense.
The organization of counterintelligence departments of the 3 departments of the military districts, armies and fronts began, their structure provided for the presence of three departments - to combat espionage, nationalist and anti-Soviet organizations and anti-Soviet loners.
Military Chekists took control of military communications, the delivery of military equipment, weapons and ammunition to the army, for which railways 3 and departments were established, the activities of which were intertwined (and, apparently, somewhat duplicated) with the state security agencies in transport.
In early July 1941, the head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, Anatoly Nikolaevich Mikheev, by order of People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, received the right to independently appoint to positions in the structure of special departments up to deputy heads of district and front-line 3 departments 6
"Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. - M., 2003. - S. 21.
By order of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR of July 13, 1941 7
Order of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR No. 00110 on the introduction of military censorship of military mail. July 13, 1941 // State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Start. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M., 2000. - S. 308-309.
The “Regulations on Military Censorship of Military Postal Correspondence” was introduced, which defines the structure, rights and obligations of military censorship units, the methodology and technique for processing correspondence, and also provides a list of information that is the basis for the confiscation of items, and in accordance with which military postal sorting points, military postal bases, military post offices and military postal stations have been formed military censorship departments, which are staffed by 900 controllers transferred by the 4th department of the NKGB of the USSR (of which for the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR - 650 controllers and for the 3rd Directorate of the NKVMF of the USSR - 250 controllers).
In the system of 3 directorates of the NPO and the Naval NK, military censorship departments were created, located at the headquarters of units of the army in the field and in the rear at military sorting points, military postal bases, branches and stations of the Navy (located in the offices of the People's Commissariat of Communications).
Already in August 1941, military censorship was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR (operational equipment headed by Senior Major Yevgeny Petrovich Lapshin), the army, front and district Special Departments continued to carry out operational management.
By a joint order of the NPO and the NKVMF on July 15, 1941, the 3rd departments were organized at the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the North-Western, Western and South-Western directions. Two days later, the subordination of the military counterintelligence agencies of the army, which returned to the state security system, changed.
By Decree of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR No. 187 / ss dated July 17, 1941, signed by Joseph Stalin, the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR were reorganized into Special Departments, and the Directorate of the NPO itself received the name "Department of Special Departments with transfer to the NKVD of the USSR" 8
Lazarev V. I. Activities of military counterintelligence agencies in initial period Great Patriotic War. // Sat. Russian special services. History and modernity. Materials of historical readings at the Lubyanka. 1997–2000 - M., 2003. - S. 217.
The main task of the Special Departments, according to the GKO decree of July 17, 1941, was "a decisive fight against espionage and treason in the Red Army and the elimination of desertion directly in the front line."
The Directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. 169, which appeared the next day, explained that "the meaning of the transformation of the bodies of the third administration into Special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, pests, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors." The leadership of the NKVD expressed confidence that the employees of the Special Departments would justify the confidence of the party and "with selfless work they would help the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army to strengthen discipline in its ranks and defeat the enemies of the Motherland" 9
Lazarev V.I. Activities of military counterintelligence agencies in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. // Sat. Russian special services. History and modernity. Materials of historical readings at the Lubyanka. 1997–2000 - M., 2003. - S. 217-218.
On July 19, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Viktor Semenovich Abakumov was appointed head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR.
The former head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD and the 3rd (secret-political) Directorate of the NKGB, commissar of the 3rd rank Solomon Rafailovich Milshtein (who served in the Special Department of the Caucasian Red Army in the 20s) was appointed the first deputy of Abakumov. The heads of the Special Departments were appointed:
Northern Front - former head of the UNKGB for Leningrad and Leningrad region Commissioner of State Security 3rd rank Pavel Tikhonovich Kuprin;
North-Western Front - the former head of the Special Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR in 1938-1941, and in June 1941 the prosecutor of the USSR (concurrently), Major General Viktor Mikhailovich Bochkov;
Western Front - People's Commissar for State Security of Belarus, Commissioner of the 3rd rank Lavrenty Fomich Tsanava;
Southwestern Front - former head of the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Anatoly Nikolayevich Mikheev;
Southern Front - former People's Commissar of the NKGB of Moldova, Commissioner of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank Nikolai Stepanovich Sazykin;
Reserve Front - the former head of the Third Department of the NKVD, the commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank Alexander Mikhailovich Belyanov.
On the same day, by order No. 00941 of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR, Lavrenty Beria, to combat deserters, spies and saboteurs, it was ordered to form rifle platoons under the Special Divisions of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies under the Special Army Divisions, and separate rifle battalions with the staffing of these units from the NKVD troops 10
Order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 on the formation of units of the NKVD troops under the Special Departments. July 19, 1941 // State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Start. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M., 2000. - S. 366-367.
Approved on August 15, 1941, the structure of the central apparatus of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR looked like this:
Chief and three deputies;
Secretariat;
Operational department (vowel composition);
1st department - the central bodies of the Red Army (General Staff, military prosecutor's office, intelligence department);
2nd department - Air Force;
3rd department - armor tank forces, artillery;
4th department - the main types of troops;
5th department - quartermaster and sanitary service;
6th department - NKVD troops;
7th department - operational search, records, mobwork;
8th department - encryption service 11
"Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. - M., 2003. - S. 26.
In August - December 1941, the structure of the NKVD continued to change and become more complex. In August, two more deputies appeared at the head of the Directorate of Special Departments - divisional commissar Fyodor Yakovlevich Tutushkin and state security major Nikolai Alekseevich Osetrov, in October 1941, Lavrenty Fomich Tsanava became deputy head of the UOO.
In total, in August 1941, according to the states of the Office of Special Departments (together with the investigative unit, the secretariat, the operational department, the administrative, economic and financial department), there were 387 people 12
After the transfer in January 1942 of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVMF, the 9th Department was organized as part of the UOO. By June 1942, the structure of the UOO had the following form.
Leadership (Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, Solomon Rafailovich Milshtein, Fedor Yakovlevich Tutushkin, Nikolai Alekseevich Osetrov, Lavrenty Fomich Tsanava).
Secretariat (Yakov Mikhailovich Broverman).
Operations department (Alexander Vasilyevich Miusov).
Investigative department (Boris Semenovich Pavlovsky):
1st branch (for espionage);
2nd branch (anti-Soviet formations);
3rd branch (in charge of investigative work in the periphery).
1st department (major GB Ivan Ivanovich Moskalenko; General Staff of the Red Army, headquarters of fronts, armies, intelligence agencies):
1st branch (operational directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, headquarters of the fronts and armies);
2nd branch (all departments and departments of the General Staff, communications center, personnel department);
3rd branch (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, intelligence agencies of the fronts and armies).
2nd department (major GB Alexander Alekseevich Avseevich; maintenance of the Air Force, Airborne Forces and Air Defense):
1st branch (Headquarters of the Red Army Air Force);
2nd branch (weapons and rear of the Air Force);
3rd branch (Air Force academies and management of peripheral work in parts of the Air Force);
4th branch (air defense);
5th branch (airborne troops).
3rd Department (Major GB Vyacheslav Pavlovich Rogov; Main Armored Directorate (GABU), Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) of the Red Army, tank troops and artillery, guards mortar units):
1st branch (GABTU of the Red Army, ABTU of fronts and armies, tank armies, tank corps and brigades, research institute tank range);
2nd branch (Main Directorate of the Chief of Artillery (GUNART) of the Red Army, Directorate of Guards mortar units, artillery departments of the fronts, artillery departments of the armies, artillery of the Reserve of the High Command, mortar units of the Red Army);
3rd branch (GAU of the Red Army).
4th Department (Major GB Grigory Samoylovich Bolotin-Balyasny; management of intelligence and operational work of special front agencies by type of troops: infantry, artillery, cavalry, combating treason, desertion, crossbows and barrage service):
1st branch (served the fronts: Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin; 7th separate army and reserve army);
2nd branch (served the fronts: Western, Bryansk, South-Western, Southern and North Caucasian);
3rd branch (to combat treason, desertion and crossbows, organization of a barrage service);
4th department (editors of military newspapers, military prosecutor's offices, military tribunals, the Central House of the Red Army (CDKA), the House of Creativity of the Red Army (DTKA), ensembles, orchestras, military academies).
5th department (Major GB Konstantin Pavlovich Prokhorenko; Main quartermaster department, Main sanitary department, Veterinary department, Main department of military communications, Glavvoenstroy, AHO, Apartment maintenance department, academies):
1st branch (Main quartermaster department, quartermaster departments of the fronts, quartermaster departments of the armies, AHO, Fuel supply department, quartermaster departments of the armies);
2nd branch (Main Sanitary Administration, Veterinary Administration, front-line and district sanitary service and veterinary service, military traffic authorities (VOSO), Main Road Administration, Apartment Operational Administration (KEU), Glavvoenstroy, Military Project, academies).
6th Department (Major GB Semyon Petrovich Yukhimovich; NKVD troops):
1st branch (border troops and educational establishments troops of the NKVD);
2nd branch (internal troops and troops guarding the rear of the fronts);
3rd branch (railway, industrial and escort troops);
4th branch (bodies of military supply of the NKVD troops).
7th department (A.F. Solovyov; operational accounting):
1st branch (current accounting for the management of special departments, reporting from front-line special bodies, accounting for traitors to the Motherland, spies, saboteurs, terrorists, cowards, alarmists, deserters, crossbowmen and anti-Soviet elements, special accounting for traitors to the Motherland, intelligence agents and persons compromised according to the testimony of the latter);
2nd branch (checking the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NPOs, NKVMF, cipher workers, admission to top secret and secret, mobilization and TOS (special secrecy technology) work, checking workers sent abroad, and personnel of the Red Army and Navy).
8th department (Mikhail Petrovich Sharikov; encryption):
1st department (encryption);
2nd branch (undercover and operational maintenance of the cipher organ of the Red Army, inspection of the cipher organ of the OO, accounting and forwarding of ciphers).
9th Department (Major GB Petr Andreevich Gladkov; for servicing the Navy):
1st branch (Main Naval Headquarters, Intelligence Directorate of the Navy, School of Intelligence Department, command of the departments of the People's Commissariat, units and institutions of the NKVMF of central subordination, management of the indicated objects by the periphery);
2nd Branch (Air Force Directorate, Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Communications Center, Air Force Periphery Leadership, Air Defense Directorate).
10th department (major GB Ivan Ivanovich Gorgonov; in charge of counterintelligence work of special bodies of fronts and districts).
11th department (Alexander Evstafievich Kochetkov; for maintenance of engineering and chemical troops, sapper armies, defensive construction and signal troops).
12th department (Pyotr Mikhailovich Tchaikovsky; for servicing the Main Directorate of Formations and Manning of the Red Army).
Devices subordinate to the UOO NKVD of the USSR:
OO NKVD Research Institute of the Air Force of the Red Army and the Moninsky air garrison;
OO NKVD of the Separate Motorized Rifle Division of Special Purpose named after. Dzerzhinsky (OMSDON);
NGO NKVD of the Moscow Kremlin garrison 13
Chertoprud S. NKVD - NKGB during the Great Patriotic War. – M., 2005. – S. 58–62.
In June 1942, the staff of the Office of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR was 225 people. 14
Sever A. Marshal from Lubyanka. Beria and the NKVD during the Second World War. - M., 2008. - S. 51.
EXPLAIN, what the new head of department had to do on Rostov land, I think, is not necessary. From many other leaders of the same level, Abakumov differed only in his youth and personal participation in interrogations, during which he, a man of great physical strength, applied the most severe methods of interrogation to those arrested. At that time, methods of physical influence were widespread practice - the top political leadership required state security officers to expose "enemies of the people" by any means. No matter how other "party degenerates" try today to distance themselves from the NKVD-KGB, these bodies primarily carried out the "will of the party", or rather, the orders of the party leadership. However, like every soviet man at your workplace...
The service zeal of the young leader did not go unnoticed by Lavrenty Beria, who himself was not too lazy to participate in interrogations of especially important people. It was people like Abakumov - young, unquestioningly and successfully fulfilling all the instructions of the leadership and, most importantly, not associated with any of the groups of the highest party nomenclature - that Stalin needed in Moscow. At the beginning of 1941, when it was decided to divide the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two independent structures - the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security, new vacancies opened up for senior positions. Abakumov was appointed to one of them - the deputy people's commissar of internal affairs. He was entrusted to supervise not the most important direction: the main departments of the police and fire protection. However, he was also in charge of the 3rd department, which was engaged in the operational-Chekist service of the border and internal troops. So Abakumov began to enter the "Stalinist clip."
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War opened the way for Abakumov to the highest power. On July 19, 1941, he was entrusted to head military counterintelligence - the department of special departments of the NKVD. Later, in April 1943, it was renamed the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The head of Smersh became deputy people's commissar of defense, and this position was occupied by Stalin himself.
But it is interesting that Viktor Semenovich ended the war only with the shoulder straps of a lieutenant general. Military rank he was promoted to colonel-general in July 1945.
IN YEARS Abakumov proved to be a good organizer during the hard times of war. According to the memoirs of veterans of military counterintelligence, he skillfully used the experience of the General Staff and built a management system for Smersh on the model of the active army: front departments were created in the Main Directorate. This allowed the head of military counterintelligence to better understand the operational situation on the fronts and raised his authority in the eyes of Stalin, who did not allow his subordinates to cover up their incompetence with verbiage. The leader was also bribed by the effectiveness of the work of military counterintelligence, whose structures in the fight against enemy agents demonstrated greater efficiency than their counterparts from the people's commissariats of state security and internal affairs.
Being a decisive person, Viktor Semenovich was not afraid to take responsibility and did not want to blindly follow the then established order. The military situation often required quick and unconventional solutions. So, Abakumov ordered to release German agents who had confessed from criminal liability, which greatly helped the military counterintelligence officers in the confrontation with the German special services, in neutralizing their agents.
“Belittling the merits of Abakumov in the successful work of the Smersh Main Intelligence Directorate is not serious, I think that not a single wartime counterintelligence officer will allow himself this. The practical results of Smersh's activities turned out to be higher than those of the NKGB, which was the reason for the nomination of Abakumov.
Memoirs of a Hero Soviet Union Army General P.I. Ivashutin.
The firm character of Abakumov and his ability to go against the opinions of others were manifested in the episode with the search for the remains of Hitler. In the autumn of 1945, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria was inclined to make a decision to acquaint our Western allies with materials on the investigation into the circumstances of Hitler's death. The people's commissars for state security and foreign affairs were of the same opinion. It remained to formally obtain approval from the Smersh counterintelligence department of the People's Commissariat of Defense and give the corresponding instruction to the representative of the NKVD in Germany, General Serov.
In November 1945, a draft cipher telegram was already drawn up:
"Berlin.
Tov. Serov
To your No. 00399
There are no objections to the transfer to the British and Americans of the information you have about the results of the investigation into the circumstances of Hitler's disappearance.
Please note that, in addition, the Allies may request the interrogation of certain persons who are with us: Günsche, Rattenhuber, Baur, etc.
In what form this information should be transmitted to the allies, consider and decide for yourself.
L. Beria"
It seemed that everything was clear, and suddenly, on November 26, the secretariat of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs reported to him about the disagreement of military counterintelligence.
"Reference
T.t. Merkulov, Kruglov, Kobulov agree with the draft telegram. Comrade Abakumov objected and said that he would report to you personally on this issue.
As a result, General Serov did not receive instructions to transfer information on Hitler to the allies. Abakumov, who had gained weight in the apparatus, could already afford to disagree with Beria, to whom he certainly owed his rise in the late 1930s.
"You need to touch someone"
OF COURSE that during the war years, the main department of counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense had to not only deal with the fight against espionage, but also monitor political moods officers. In the archives, by the way, there are many interesting documents about this side of the activities of military counterintelligence officers. For example, on December 23, 1943, in a memorandum labeled "Top Secret", Abakumov reported to Stalin to the State Defense Committee on the responses of the Red Army soldiers to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the State Anthem of the Soviet Union" published in the press.
About this document, recently provided to the editors of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper by the Archive of the President Russian Federation, we will go into more detail, but for now we will give only a few statements. Here is the opinion of the head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General N. Yakovlev: “Abroad, this will be regarded as a step back, as a concession to the allies, but in reality this is not so. After all, how many such steps did we take during the war: the commissars were liquidated - nothing happened, even better than steel fight, generals and officer ranks introduced, put on shoulder straps for everyone - discipline was strengthened.
The Holy Synod was created, the patriarch was elected, the Comintern was dissolved and, finally, the International was canceled - and all for the benefit of the Motherland ... "
Of course, statements of a different kind did not pass by the attention of military counterintelligence officers.
Aviation Lieutenant General Grendal, Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Air Force Headquarters: “It’s good that they finally remembered Rus' in the anthem, but still it seems to me that there is some concession to Roosevelt and Churchill here.”
Lieutenant Colonel Vorobyov, teacher of higher political courses named after Lenin: “All this is being done under the great influence of the allies. They dictate their will, the more they succeed now, when our country is seriously weakened in the war and their will has to be reckoned with.”
Colonel Krylov, head of the department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: “We are gradually moving towards the appearance of the hymn “God Save the Tsar”. We are slowly changing our basic mindset and moving towards being nice to our allies."
Captain of the Quartermaster Service Nordkin, Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: “In the anthem, the exaltation of the Russian nation slips while hushing up other nations. This can be used by dark elements as great-power Russian chauvinism. The consistent protrusion of the Russian people is noticeable.”
Senior Lieutenant Baranov, Assistant Head of the Searchlight Service of the Headquarters of the Separate Moscow Air Defense Army: “The essence of our state has changed so much that we are no longer faced with the task of building a communist society and we are slipping into the bourgeois system. In this regard, Marxism is no longer suitable for us and it needs to be revised.
Sharapov, head of the administrative department of the Central House of the Red Army: “It remains only to change and dissolve the Bolshevik Party. In 1918 - 1919. there was something to agitate, then there was the slogan “Land to the peasants, factories to the workers” and freedom of speech, and then they pressed it so that millions of people laid down their heads.
The leader's resolution is also curious: "Important. Someone needs to be touched."
After the end of the war, the aging Stalin began to think about his successor. It was obvious to him that his closest associates were of little use as statesmen capable of preserving and strengthening the recreated mighty empire. The leader needed new people who were personally devoted to him - those who could be relied upon in the planned purge of the party nomenklatura, which during the war period had come to its senses from the psychological shock of the 30s.
In the upcoming changes in the country, the state security agencies were also called upon to play their role. At their head, Stalin decided to put Abakumov, whose loyalty and efficiency he had the opportunity to personally verify during the war period. In addition, Abakumov did not develop personal relationships with most of the leaders of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was also important for the increasingly suspicious owner of the Kremlin. The cruel school of the struggle for power taught him to be extremely cautious, which over the years more and more developed into suspiciousness. Although who knows, maybe these fears were not unfounded. After all, the mystery of the death of the leader remains unsolved ...
BECOMING in May 1946, instead of General of the Army Vsevolod Merkulov, close to Beria, Abakumov, as Minister of State Security, had to solve such problems that helped him amass many ill-wishers in the upper echelons of power. But this, apparently, is the fate of all the leaders of the "secret police": - the more effectively you work in the interests of the authorities, the more bitter fruits you can reap later. In particular, the new head of the MGB had to do a lot of military affairs - at that time, in the process of reorganizing the state security organs, the Smersh counterintelligence department moved from the military department to the MGB as one of its structural divisions - the 3rd Directorate.
In the picture: "Special folder" GUKR "Smersh".
(To be continued.)
"SMERSH": HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
V.S. Khristoforov, V.K. Vinogradov, O.K. Matveev, V.I. Lazarev, N.N. Luzan, V.G. Makarov, N.M. Peremyshlnikova, A.P. Cherepkov
THE TRUTH ABOUT "SMERSH"
(Book "SMERSH": HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS)
Vadim UDMANTSEV
"VPK" N8. March 3 - 9, 2004
Another closed page from the history of domestic special services has become public knowledge. Many people know that at a certain stage of the Great Patriotic War, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was transformed into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR, and the abbreviation of this organization was composed of the initial letters of the well-known slogan: "Death to spies!" However, not everyone knows that the same decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 19, 1943 created the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVMF of the USSR and the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR.
Unfortunately, it must be admitted that, despite the obvious military merits of the Smershevites, the features of their work were hushed up for many years. Here is what Major General Vasily Khristoforov, head of the Department for Registration of Archival Funds of the FSB of Russia, who at the same time headed the team of authors of the newly published book, said: “During the period of work on the book, we first published materials from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, so even for ourselves we discovered a lot of new and interesting things: disinformation, or an invention of the authors themselves.The most truthful, reflecting the reality of the work of "SMERSH", is Bogomolov's novel "The Moment of Truth. In August 1944 ... "By the way, Vladimir Georgievich Bogomolov also made a significant contribution to the creation of the book" SMERSH. Historical essays and archival documents ", agreeing to informally advise younger authors, but his untimely death did not allow him to hold this publication in his hands.
The book contains a large number of photographs, color and black-and-white images of various documents, posters of the war years. On separate pages there are schemes of the SMERSH GUK, the SMERSH NPO of the fronts, the SMERSH NPO of the armies, as well as photo galleries of portraits of the leaders of these structures during the Great Patriotic War. A significant part of the photographs and documents are from personal archives, and this is very encouraging, since not so many veterans survived, and also because service in the "authorities" left its mark for many years - most of these people are used to "keep their mouths shut." It is known, for example, that the remarkable Russian classic writer Fyodor Abramov, having front-line experience behind him, did not leave to his descendants any noticeable purely "military" works or memoirs. Meanwhile, having spent several months in hospitals after being seriously wounded in the battles near Leningrad, from April 1943 he served in the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the Arkhangelsk military district. Incomplete university education and knowledge of German and Polish languages allowed Abramov to make a good career in a short time: from a detective reserve to a senior investigator. And, perhaps, it is precisely in the "Smershev" training that the guarantee of the writer's amazing observation and the accuracy of the transfer of psychological portraits of genuine characters in a number of his stories?
On the pages of the book "SMERSH". Historical essays and archival documents" in detail, on concrete examples tells about the opposition of Soviet counterintelligence officers to espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army, about the fight against traitors to the Motherland, deserters and those who engaged in self-mutilation on the fronts. Several chapters are devoted to the counterintelligence work of the "Smershevites" both in the rear of the enemy and in the front line, on the brilliantly conducted operations on the air, as a result of which the military counterintelligence of the USSR in this area knew no equal during the Great Patriotic War. Here is how, in turn, the living chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation, holder of three Orders of the Red Banner, three Orders of the Red Star and many other military awards, Lieutenant General Alexander Matveev, commented on the book "SMERSH": "The book is written in a simple, understandable language. face of the Abwehr. Equipped with everything necessary, they behaved arrogantly and aggressively..."
Indeed, since the years of repression and the first months of the war had a deplorable effect on most Soviet "organs", yesterday's students, teachers, engineers - who made up the bulk of the employees of SMERSH departments and departments during the Great Patriotic War - were opposed by top-class professionals who worked for years in intelligence and counterintelligence. In this regard, a separate chapter of the book contains detailed information about the structures and methods of work of the special services of the four main states opposing the USSR: Germany, Japan, Romania and Finland. These pages are illustrated with schemes of enemy organizations, trophy photographs of the leaders and most valuable agents of the German Abwehr, Zeppelin, Waffen SS Jagdferband, Romanian SSI, as well as Japanese and Finnish intelligence and counterintelligence, certificates of members of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and weapons and equipment confiscated from them by SMERSH bodies. Of particular interest are photographs of buildings that have survived to this day in the territories of Germany, Poland, Russia and the Baltic countries, in which during the war years the headquarters of enemy special services and structures were located.
One of the chapters - "The Big Sieve" of military counterintelligence "- tells about the work of "Smershevites" among prisoners of war. It was also not an easy job, because during the entire period of the Second World War, the Red Army captured 4,377,300 military personnel of enemy European states and 639,635 of the Kwantung Army. Special services hid among the soldiers and officers, while the agents recruited and trained by them still continued to shoot in the back of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the liberated territories. However, SMERSH units still installed over 2,000 former employees of the German Abwehr and the RSHA and about 900 intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers of Imperial Japan. The book contains memorandums on the results of the work of collection points, on the results of intelligence and operational work among enemy prisoners of war, intelligence reports, denunciations and statements of German prisoners of war about their readiness to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence, corresponding photographs.
The same chapter talks about the filtering by military counterintelligence of hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers and other persons who were captured or surrounded by the enemy, about numerous cases of hiding former punishers, accomplices of enemy services and their agents. Among others, specific facts of the recruitment of citizens of the USSR by the special services of foreign, including allied states, are given. For the first time, photographs of fake IDs of members of partisan detachments of the French Resistance, as well as corresponding memorandums to the head of the Main Directorate of the NPO "SMERSH" V. Abakumov, marked "Top Secret" were published.
The only thing left to regret is that the book, being a "gift edition", was published in a small edition - only 4,000 copies - and is expensive, which is why both historians and veterans are unlikely to afford it. However, some hope for a possible mass and less expensive reprint of "SMERSH" was inspired by the phrase of a member of the author's team - the head of the Main Archives of Moscow Alexei Kiselev, said at the presentation of the book: "These materials should be available to the general reader. They must be published, first of all, for young people - so that they know the real, not fictitious truth about those events ..."
"Smersh": Historical essays and archival documents
The second, corrected and supplemented edition of the book-album "Smersh" has been published: Historical essays and archival documents "(M., 2005. - 343 s). Different things have been written and written about Smersh in our country and abroad. They write, sometimes excessively carried away, accidentally or intentionally, interfering with truth with lies, reality with legends. Some stereotypes are being replaced by others.
Today, for the first time, historians have had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the texts of authentic materials from the funds of the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, which are directly related to the activities of Smersh. All essays presented in the book are strictly documentary.
This name determined the main task - the protection of the Red Army from the enemy's special services. In addition to combating the activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army, "Smersh" also solved the tasks of "creating conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity"; had to fight against treachery and desertion, check military personnel and other persons who had been captured, and also carry out "special assignments People's Commissar Defense". The head of the GUKR "Smersh" V.S. Abakumov reported directly to I.V. Stalin and was appointed deputy people's commissar of defense.
The structure of "Smersh" was built strictly vertically, each unit was subordinate only to its higher counterintelligence agencies.
The Smersh counterintelligence officers received their baptism of fire on the Kursk Bulge. For the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia prepared a special edition, which for the first time presented materials related to the participation of Smersh in these events. Therefore, in the book under review, the description of some points related to the Battle of Kursk is given concisely in order to avoid repetition.
Behind the lines of previously unknown materials given in the book, one can see how the war grinded human destinies. The recent scandal that erupted around the film "Bastards", which dealt with the supposedly existing school of teenage saboteurs in the USSR, showed once again that the so-called. "rulers of thoughts" from among the "creative intelligentsia" do not know (or do not want to know) the true history.
#comm#If they had looked at the published documents in due time, they would have learned that it was the German, and not the Soviet, as the film claims, that the special services actively used children to carry out reconnaissance activities and carry out sabotage.#/comm#
Having selected several groups of homeless children, the Abwehr officers taught them mine-explosive work and threw them into the rear of the Soviet troops, setting the task of disabling steam locomotives. To accomplish this goal, teenagers were given explosive devices disguised as pieces of coal.
The captured Red Army soldiers, whom the Germans transferred across the front line, were also actively used for reconnaissance and sabotage operations. According to official data, during the war years, counterintelligence neutralized 43,477 agents of the German special services.
It is no secret that there were those in the USSR who were waiting for the arrival of the Germans and were ready to provide them with all possible assistance. Some radio games ("Monastyr", "Janus") were specifically aimed at preventing the appearance of a "fifth column" of various anti-Soviet groups; others ("Rout", "Reeds") were called upon to paralyze the attempts made by the Germans to organize armed uprisings against Soviet power in the national-territorial formations of the USSR. From published sources, we today became aware of the Baltic, Turkestan, Tatar, Caucasian, Ukrainian and Russian formations of the armed forces of the Third Reich from among the citizens of the USSR and emigrants. The book contains information about how the Germans trained a special group, which was entrusted with the task of "unifying the small insurgent groups operating in Kalmykia and organizing an uprising of Kalmyks against Soviet power, as well as carrying out major acts of sabotage in the Soviet rear." Some of the landing enemy paratroopers were captured, after which we managed to start the radio game "Aryans", during which our counterintelligence obtained important information, misinformation was transmitted to the enemy, his agents were liquidated or captured, destroyed military equipment etc.
Radio games not only contributed to obtaining valuable information, but also made it possible to disorient the enemy. The largest radio game, called "The Riddle", lasted from the summer of 1943 until April 1945 and was carried out against the Zeppelin-Nord intelligence agency.
#comm#During the war, Soviet counterintelligence carried out 183 radio games, as a result of which over 400 agents and employees of German intelligence were identified and neutralized. #/comm#
The publication touches upon the circumstances of the transition to the side of the enemy, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov; describes the circumstances of Hitler's suicide and the methods of ideological warfare. Until recently, these were closed topics. This circumstance gave rise to many myths, which still continue to excite the minds of publicists, with a frequency worthy of better use, who continue to publish books about " tragic fate"a traitor (according to all the laws of officer ethics, Vlasov committed precisely a betrayal).
This book about "Smersh" is the first documented description of the activities of the most successful counterintelligence of the twentieth century. Its effectiveness was recognized not only by the allies, but also by the opponents of the USSR. This was the merit of those who thought through, led and directly carried out special operations. On the pages of the book, we repeatedly meet the name of a person whose activities as the head of Smersh were forgotten for many years. Arrested in July 1951, USSR Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov, was shot in December 1954. Since then, if his name was mentioned, it was only in a negative context, next to the names of L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulova and others.
A separate chapter is devoted to the special services of those countries with which the USSR waged war (Germany, Romania, Finland, Japan). in the most detailed way the confrontation between the Abwehr and the Soviet counterintelligence is shown, a diagram of the organizational structure of the German military intelligence is presented; provides information about its leaders; photographs and documents. It is characteristic that the activity of the enemy special services is analyzed objectively and impartially, without any "party" pathos.
#comm#The desire for objectivity is generally one of the distinguishing features of the work of the authors of this publication.#/comm#
The book-album is illustrated with rare photographs, including from the personal archives of counterintelligence officers who took part in the Great Patriotic War.
A separate chapter is devoted to documenting the crimes committed by the invaders in the occupied areas, as well as the work to search for and punish war criminals and their accomplices from among Soviet citizens.
In the afterword to the book, the authors throw a bridge to the present. Although Smersh as a structure ceased to exist in 1946, military counterintelligence continued to operate effectively. A brief overview of her work in the 1960s-80s and beyond, up to the present day, given on the last pages of the book, is quite logical and fits into the general concept of the publication.
Note that on all-Russian competition journalistic and literary works "We are proud of our Fatherland" in April 2004, the team of authors of the book was awarded the first prize in the "Documentary" section.
Special for the Centenary
