Read declassified documents about the beginning of the Second World War. Documents on Soviet assistance to Western countries during the Great Patriotic War have been declassified. And what did Hitler explain to his comrades-in-arms?
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation during the days of the Army-2019 forum for the first time presented archival documents times of the Great Patriotic War, which were previously kept under the heading "Top Secret". They completely refute the theories that have recently become popular in the West that the Soviet Union allegedly “occupied” the countries of Europe after the end of World War II.
Viktoria Kayaeva, deputy head of the research department of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, brought literally several suitcases of papers to the Zvezda studio, from which it was time to declassify, and now they are a real sensation. They documented that the Soviet Union, even at the time when the Great Patriotic War was going on, helped the inhabitants of Poland and Budapest with food.
“If we open this volume, we will see that there is a certificate on the implementation of the decision of the State Defense Committee of February 9, 1945 on sending grain products to the disposal of the provisional government of the Polish Republic. I note that fighting are still underway. Here, directly in tons, it is indicated how much and what kind of material - cereals, flour, rye, that is, food - was sent to the Polish population. In March - 20 thousand tons, in April the same amount. There is an indication of those stations from where it was recovering. These are all stations in the depths of the Soviet Union,” says Victoria Kayaeva.
That is, even in those conditions when there was famine in the Soviet Union, grain stocks and fields were destroyed, the country found funds to send food to Poland, which also survived the occupation.
Another document is dated May 29, 1945. It orders the provision of assistance to the Polish state in the organization of sowing work. It is documented that the population of Poland was supplied with seeds - so that the Poles could sow their fields and get a crop, which they themselves would then dispose of.
“Are there any other documents somewhere that testify that the “occupiers” bring seed material with them, provide food for the local population, and help children. Do the "occupiers" act like this?" asks a representative of the archive of the Ministry of Defense.
The famous footage of Russian soldiers in Berlin drinking the milk of German children can now also be documented. At the Zvezda studio, Victoria Kayaeva presented a resolution of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, which carried out military operations in Berlin, on organizing the distribution of milk to the children of Berlin.
“At that time in Berlin in 1945 there were about a million children. And our servicemen provided milk for children up to 8 years old. That is, in this way, our military took care of the health and future of the nation of Germany. Decree "On the supply of milk to the children of the city of Berlin". Next comes a reference to the decision of the State Defense Committee of May 8, 1945. That is, the act of surrender has not yet been signed. And it is said that the supply of milk to children up to the age of 8 should be organized at the expense of: and then there is an indication of how this is all organized. The districts that will be responsible for the supply of milk have been assigned,” Victoria Kayaeva said.
Another archive volume declassified by the Ministry of Defense contains information about the provision of assistance Soviet Union practically all the liberated countries: Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany. So, on April 23, 1945, it was documented that Poland should be provided with assistance in the form of: cattle - 150 thousand heads, cotton - 20 thousand tons, unwashed wool - 2 thousand tons, large leather - 100 thousand to provide Poland's industry and organization jobs in the country.
In other documents, it is already about the provision of assistance by the Soviet Union to countries of Eastern Europe. In particular, they contain a certificate from the headquarters of the rear of the Red Army and correspondence with the rear department of the fronts about the shipment of food to Budapest.
“It says that grain, sugar and meat were allocated in tons: grain - 15 tons, sugar - 2 tons, meat - 3 tons. At the same time, everything that was transferred and shipped was subject to the most severe control. This program could not be unfulfilled. Responsible for its implementation were appointed, and literally every kilogram transferred was under the personal responsibility of the persons who were responsible for it, ”explains the archive specialist.
With all these documents, according to Victoria Kayaeva, now every citizen of the Russian Federation or a foreigner will be able to get acquainted. This can be done upon request, coming to the reading room of the archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. According to the specialist, permission to declassify documents of the Great Patriotic War is given according to plan, as certain periods of time pass. So any attempts by the West to falsify the history of the war times will suffer a crushing defeat over and over again, and all accusations against Russia and doubts about its role in the Great Patriotic War will remain groundless.
Declassified documents about the first days of the war: directives of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR (including a copy of directive No. 1 of June 22, 1941), orders and reports from commanders of military units and formations, orders for awards, trophy maps and decrees of the country's leadership.
On June 22, 1941, a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Timoshenko was handed over from Moscow. A few hours earlier, soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht infantry division, Alfred Liskov, who had swum across the border river Bug. He was taken to the city of Vladimir-Volynsky, where during interrogation he said that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was passed on to the higher command.
Directive text:
“To the commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 10th armies I convey the order of the people's commissar of defense for immediate execution:
- During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO is possible (Leningrad military district. - RBC), PribOVO (Baltic Special Military District, transformed into the North-Western Front. - RBC), ZapOVO (Western Special Military District, transformed into the Western Front. - RBC), KOVO (Kyiv Special Military District, transformed into the South-Western Front - RBC), OdVO (Odessa Military District - RBC). The attack may start with provocative actions.
- The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
- I order:
- during the night of June 22, 1941, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
- before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it;
- put all units on combat readiness without additional lifting of assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects.
Do not conduct any other activities without special orders.
The directive was signed by the commander of the troops Western Front Dmitry Pavlov, Chief of Staff of the Western Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO Alexander Fominykh.
In July, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, the chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General Andrei Grigoryev, and the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, were accused of inaction and the collapse of command and control, which led to a breakthrough in the front, and were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR to death. The sentence was put into effect in July 1941. After Stalin's death they were rehabilitated.
Order text:
“To the military councils of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO.
On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields along the western border and bombarded them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.
In connection with the unheard-of arrogance of the German attack on the Soviet Union, I order ... "<...>
<...>“The troops must use all their strength and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.
From now on, until further notice by the ground forces, do not cross the border.
Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces.<...>
<...>"Powerful blows of the bomber and attack aviation destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of his ground forces. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km.
Bomb Koenigsberg (today Kaliningrad. - RBC) and Memel (naval base and port in Lithuania. — RBC).
Do not make raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.
Signatures: Timoshenko, Malenkov (Georgy Malenkov - member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. - RBC), Zhukov (Georgy Zhukov - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. - RBC).
"Tov. Vatutin (Nikolai Vatutin - Zhukov's first deputy. - RBC). Bomb Romania.
Trophy card "Plan Barbarossa"
In 1940-1941. Germany developed a plan of attack on the USSR, involving a "blitzkrieg". The plan and operation were named after King Frederick I of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor "Barbarossa".
From a brief combat history of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment with a description of the exploits of junior lieutenants Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev
Pilots Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev were the first soldiers to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the war. On June 28, on their I-16 fighters, for the first time during the defense of Leningrad, they used ramming strikes against German aircraft. On July 8, they were awarded the title.
Kharitonov's schemes of action
After the war, Pyotr Kharitonov continued to serve in the Air Force. In 1953 he graduated from the Air Force Academy, in 1955 he retired. He lived in Donetsk, where he worked at the headquarters of the city's Civil Defense.
Scheme of Zdorovtsev's action
After receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 8, 1941, Zdorovtsev flew out on reconnaissance on July 9. On the way back in the Pskov region, he entered into battle with German fighters. His plane was shot down, Zdorovtsev died.
Western Special Military District. Intelligence Brief #2
On June 22, 1941, the 99th Infantry Division stood in the Polish city of Przemysl, which was one of the first to be captured by German troops. On June 23, units of the division managed to recapture part of the city and restore the border.
“Reconnaissance report No. 2 shtadiv (division headquarters. — RBC) 99 forest Boratyche (a village in the Lviv region. — RBC) 19:30 June 22, 1941
The enemy is forcing the San River (a tributary of the Vistula, flows through the territory of Ukraine and Poland. — RBC) in the Baric district, occupied Stubenko ( locality on the territory of Poland. — RBC) to an infantry battalion. Up to the infantry battalion, it occupies Gurechko (a village on the territory of Ukraine. — RBC), small equestrian groups at 16:00 appeared in Kruvniki (a settlement in Poland. - RBC). At 13:20, the Przemysl hospital was occupied by an unidentified enemy.
Accumulation up to an infantry regiment on the opposite bank of the San River in the Vyshatse area. Accumulation of infantry / small groups / 1 km south of Gurechko.
16:00 to the artillery division fired from the Dusovce region (a village in Poland. — RBC). Up to three battalions of large-caliber artillery at 19:30 fired at Medyka m. (a village in Poland. — RBC) from Maykovce, Dunkovychky, Vypattse districts.
Conclusions: on the Grabovets-Przemysl front, more than one PD (infantry division. - RBC), reinforced by artillery / unspecified number.
Presumably the main enemy grouping on the right flank of the division.
Need to establish: enemy action in front of the right [inaudible] division.
Printed in 5 copies.
Signatures: Colonel Gorokhov, Chief of Staff of the 99th Infantry Division, Captain Didkovsky, Head of the Intelligence Department.
The Ministry of Defense has declassified unique documents that tell about the events of the eve and the initial period of World War II, which, in particular, talk about the threat from Poland. The materials are published in the new multimedia section "A Fragile Peace on the Threshold of War".
As noted in the military department, the declassified documents give an idea of \u200b\u200b"why certain decisions were made in such a difficult military-political situation." The new section, timed to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), is also designed to combat attempts to falsify history and revise the results of the Great Patriotic War and World War II.
Among the declassified documents is a memo from the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Boris Shaposhnikov to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov. It contains an assessment of the military threat that various states can pose both independently and as part of military alliances and blocs.
The degree of importance and secrecy of the document is emphasized by the fact that Shaposhnikov did not resort to the help of a secretary-typist, but wrote a 31-page report on his own. According to Soviet military experts, the most likely threat to the USSR during this period was not only the military alliance of Germany and Italy, but also Poland, which was "in the orbit" of the fascist bloc.
As Shaposhnikov noted, "The Soviet Union needs to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the west against Germany-Poland and partly against Italy, with the possible accession of limitrophes to them, and in the east against Japan."
It follows from the document that on the eve of the war, Germany and Poland could field together more than 160 infantry divisions, more than 7 thousand tanks and 4.5 thousand aircraft. For comparison, the People's Commissar of Defense, Voroshilov, at the talks with the British and French military delegations in May 1939, said that Moscow was capable of fielding 136 divisions and 5,000 aircraft.
The material also describes combat operations of the 2nd German Army Corps during the offensive against Poland in 1939, compiled in 1949 by a prisoner of war, Lieutenant General of the former German Army Hermann Boehme, who during the period of the described hostilities held the position of head of the operational department of the unit. In them, he describes in detail how secretly, under the guise of teachings, German troops prepared for an attack, and also reveals the sequence of actions of the troops of the corps during the offensive. Indications German general testify to the fierce resistance of the Poles, describes the tense course of the battles for Warsaw and the Modlin fortress.
World War II lasted six years from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945. Her recent fights were led to Far East. September 2, 1945 on board American battleship"Missouri" signed an act of unconditional surrender of Japan - an ally of Germany.
61 states with a population of 1.7 billion people were drawn into the war, military operations were conducted on the territory of 40 states, as well as in maritime and ocean theaters. The Second World War was the most destructive and bloody of the wars. More than 55 million people died in it. The greatest victims were the Soviet Union, which lost 27 million people.
On August 20, the exposition "1939. The Beginning of the Second World War" opens in the exhibition hall of the federal archives. These are more than 300 documents, almost half of them are originals. Many are rarities, for example, the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939 and the secret protocol to it. Or a telegram from Hitler to Stalin with a proposal to receive Ribbentrop on a visit to Moscow and a response letter from the General Secretary of the CPSU (b). For the first time, the exhibition presents copies of foreign captured documents, which are still classified in the source countries. At the same time, electronic images of more than 700 documents will be available on the Internet.
Such an exposition is far from an ordinary event in the history of research into the origins of the tragedy that broke out 80 years ago. Scientific and public disputes about those who pushed the world to the abyss, which, according to various estimates, from 50 to 70 million people could not cross, are too furious. The surest way to find answers to the difficult questions of the past is to read the archives carefully and without prejudice, says Andrey Artizov, head of the Russian Archives.
Political and diplomatic documents are open. As for the archive of special services, there is a special specificity
Andrei Nikolaevich, how open is the topic of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which the USSR and Germany concluded on August 23, 1939? Ten years ago, experts argued that in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation there are a huge number of documents classified as "Secret". What changed?
Andrey Artizov: I speak responsibly: political and diplomatic documents are open. As for the archive of special services, there is a special specificity. Most of it, which does not harm the sources of information, is open. There are certain restrictions, they are natural for the work of any intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
But we have never shown these materials in such volume as at this exhibition.
Why will the trophy collection be presented only in copies?
Andrey Artizov: Yes, we have a unique French collection. But according to the agreement between Russian Federation and the French Republic in 1992, we returned these captured documents to France. There they are not advertised very much. Many are still labeled Secret. But these are French secrets. Not ours. When they returned, we copied them.
The pact - historical fact, which is again used as a political argument in the information war with Russia. Are the accusations of its then leadership of a special, not characteristic of other political players of that time, cunning and aggressiveness grounded?
Andrey Artizov: We do hear statements about Stalin's double game. On the one hand, negotiations with the British, French, on the other - contacts with the Germans. The events of 1939 are often presented in such a way that the Kremlin plunged a knife into the back of possible allies by accepting the Nazi offer of cooperation. But let's take a closer look at everything. "Knife" was prepared for Moscow by Western partners for a long time. The arrival of the military missions of France and England and lengthy conversations with them became a kind of litmus test for the Soviet leadership. One can argue about how sincerely the British and French were determined to reach an agreement with the USSR on countering German aggression, but most importantly, and this was fundamental for Moscow, the Western allies did not show readiness to provide military assistance to the USSR in the event of a war with Germany. And Hitler made Stalin such an offer that he could not refuse. Stalin, of course, consulted with Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, and his closest associates. If we open the leader's visit log, it clearly records when and who went to his office. During the days of negotiations with the allies, all the people I listed spent hours at his place.
Meeting of the military missions of Great Britain and France at the Leningradsky railway station in Moscow. August 11, 1939
We returned the captured documents to France. There they are not advertised very much. Many are still labeled "Secret". But these are French secrets. Not ours. When they returned, we copied them
The system of collective security at the end of the thirties practically came to naught, the League of Nations was rapidly losing its positions, the political atmosphere was thickening, and each country was forced to take care of its own interests first of all. What benefits did the top Soviet leadership see for their country from the Pact?
Andrey Artizov: From their point of view, the treaty had objective advantages. The USSR remained out of the war for an indefinitely long time. The West was bound by the war in Poland, and then, perhaps, had to fight Germany for a long time. How much? No one could have imagined what would happen in May 1940 and France would crumble so quickly.
Separate negotiations with Germany became impossible for the West. This is also true. So already after the signing of the Soviet-German pact of August 23, intensive contacts began between the British leadership and the Germans: there were trips of Chamberlain's personal representatives to Berlin with letters ... In order not to be unfounded, let me remind you that they were published in official British publications.
The USSR expanded its sphere of influence and had guaranteed support in this matter from Germany. Hitler agreed to large-scale trade and economic cooperation: the Soviet Union got access to German military technologies, our military specialists visited German factories.
And, finally, the situation in the Far East has stabilized. Japan could not decide on any actions against the USSR in the presence of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. The last circumstance was of key importance. Fighting had been going on in the Khalkhin Gol region for several months. And on August 20, two days before Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, the Soviet-Mongol offensive against the Japanese began. The calculation that the agreement with Germany would affect the Land of the Rising Sun and that it would not dare to further escalate turned out to be correct.
After the news of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, a real political crisis erupted in Tokyo. At the exhibition we will show two encrypted telegrams to Sorge about this. The Japanese found the behavior of Germany's closest ally offensive, violating the secret provision of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which states the need to consult with each other in such negotiations. The Japanese government sent an official protest to Berlin. At the request of Ribbentrop, the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker, refused to receive him. On August 28, Japan's cabinet of ministers resigned.
How serious were ideological considerations in Stalin's motives for signing an agreement with Hitler?
Andrey Artizov: Late in the evening of September 7, Stalin, in the presence of Molotov and Zhdanov, received the leader of the Comintern, Dimitrov, and the secretary of this organization, Manuilsky. In his diary, Dimitrov wrote down the following explanation of the leader regarding the treaty on the German attack on Poland. “A war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich, in relation to colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redivision of the world, for dominance over the world. We are not averse to them having a good fight and weakening each other. Germany would be undermined by the position of the richest capitalist countries, especially England. In other words, the mutual weakening of the capitalist countries is beneficial to the world proletariat. It was important for Stalin to explain the situation to his confused comrades in the communist movement, moreover, in terms of the Marxist-Leninist worldview.
And what did Hitler explain to his associates?
Andrey Artizov: He had similar problems. A few days before Stalin's explanation, the Führer gathered the Gauleiters and Reichstag deputies, members Nazi Party. The meeting took place on August 28, 1939 in Berlin. He said that the treaty with the Soviet Union "was misunderstood by many members of the party." He stressed that his attitude towards the USSR had not changed. "It's a pact with Satan to get rid of the devil." And one more thing: "Against the Soviets, all means are good, including such a pact." As you can see, the explanations of the leaders did not differ much in terms of the depth of mutual hostility and distrust. The material and territorial benefits that the treaty brought to the parties have not outlived irreconcilable ideological contradictions. A future clash between Nazis and Communists was inevitable. And before the attack Nazi Germany there was a year and a half left for the Soviet Union.
How did France and England react to the entry of the Red Army into Poland?
Andrey Artizov: Documents on this topic are also on display. Nobody pulled their hair out about it. They understood that the western borders of the Soviet Union were pushed back, the Soviet Union, and this is a possible ally in a future war with Germany, became stronger. Here is a cipher telegram from Yakov Surits, the USSR plenipotentiary in France, who in 1939 was a member of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, in People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs of the USSR of September 23. It tells about the reaction of the social and political circles of France to the establishment of a demarcation line between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in Poland along the Curzon line. "Everyone here agrees that the demarcation line between the Soviet and German armies in Poland is extremely beneficial for the USSR. Moscow's biggest victory! And not only because a very significant part of Poland was placed under the control of Soviet weapons, but also because a barrier was created earlier the outlined and most probable paths of the Hitlerite offensive against the USSR.
Secret additional protocol on the delimitation of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR to the Soviet-German Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact. August 23, 1939 The main archival secret of the XX century.Photo: WUA RF/"1939 Year of the Beginning of the Second World War"
Stalin signed a friendship agreement with Hitler, and French, British, American politicians, if you listen to Western propagandists, did not stain themselves with contacts with the monster ...
Andrey Artizov: There were contacts, and what else. Chamberlain and Daladier had coffee with him. Roosevelt corresponded. His last official letter (can be seen at the exhibition) we received from political archive German Foreign Ministry. The President of the United States addresses Hitler: you are inciting war, stop ... He responded with a devastating speech in the Reichstag, where he stated in a very ironic manner that he would not allow Germany to be humiliated ... Moreover, Roosevelt said in a letter that many peoples afraid of Germany. So Nazi diplomats immediately formally asked the countries that the president spoke about whether they authorized Roosevelt to be concerned. They were told no...
On the basis of archival materials that are now available to the historian, can the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" be objectively assessed?
Andrey Artizov: This is a natural result of the "appeasement policy" of the German aggressor, which was pursued by the Western allies (primarily Great Britain and France). The consent of the Soviet leadership to the treaty with Hitler was made in the atmosphere of general mistrust that prevailed then in Europe.
The documents that can be seen at the exhibition also show what a negative impact the position of the then Polish government had on the course and result of the Moscow negotiations between the military missions of the Allies and the USSR. Why are these materials important? Because this is not a "Russian official" speaking, but French archives. Read and draw your own conclusions.
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Document
On July 13, 1939, the French military attaché in the USSR Palas addressed Daladier with a note on the strategic situation in Eastern Europe and its likely impact on the position of the USSR government on the issue of concluding an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual assistance treaty:
"Poland is completely isolated from its allies, France and England, as it was with Czechoslovakia. By its own will, it has lost, to date, effective Soviet military assistance, refusing any passage of troops through its territory ... It seems to me more and more obvious that these considerations did not escape both the Soviet military and Mr. Stalin, foreign policy which every day is more and more clearly aimed at protecting Russian state interests. Having witnessed in 1938 that his mutual assistance agreements with France and Czechoslovakia remained a mere piece of paper, because they were not backed up by military treaties and because we seemed to constantly evade even simple tripartite meetings [representatives of] headquarters, the USSR certainly not going to make the same mistakes today.
The USSR, as it has repeatedly said, including before the opening of the current negotiations, will agree to expose itself to a German attack only if the military problem is satisfactorily resolved, if it considers [joint] actions sufficiently prepared and coordinated to believe in success and consider yourself protected.
The meaning of the long negotiations between the Allies and the Poles boiled down to the following: you and I are civilized people, but the Russians cannot be trusted
The wariness and distrust that arose during the negotiations will disappear only if clear agreements are developed that establish the duties of everyone in the event of aggression.
I do not think that the USSR, having studied the military problem, will henceforth agree to sign and implement a political treaty, unless it is convinced that an agreement can be concluded on the basis of military agreements, reliably strengthening, despite all the mentioned complexity, the strength of the eastern front.
General Palace called on his government to take concrete military and political action in order to establish "an alliance with Russia in order to create a grouping of forces that is really capable of stopping aggression and, perhaps, avoiding war." Obviously, not really believing that his opinion would be heeded, he concluded the note with the following gloomy forecast: “Finally, let me add that I consider it quite possible that if we fail to quickly agree, we will see that the USSR will first isolate itself , taking a neutral wait-and-see position, and then achieve an agreement with Germany on the basis of the partition of Poland and the Baltic countries.
Document 2
Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov with the head of the French military mission Joseph Doumenck, which took place on August 22, 1939, the day before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Soviet marshal announces that he will not participate in the further work of the Anglo-French-Soviet conference and points out to his interlocutor that the negotiations of military missions have been reduced in fact to "marking time" because of the unwillingness of the Western powers to conclude a full-fledged, guaranteed agreement with the Soviet Union.
"Comrade VOROSHILOV: ... The issue of military cooperation with the French has been with us for a number of years, but has not received its resolution. Last year, when Czechoslovakia was dying, we were waiting for a signal from France, our troops were ready, but so and didn't wait.
gene. DUMENK: Our troops were also ready.
comrade VOROSHILOV: What's the matter then? Not only were our troops ready, but the Government, the whole country, the whole people - everyone wanted to help Czechoslovakia, to fulfill their contractual obligations.
American magazine Newsweek. May 15, 1939Photo: Sergey Kuksin.
gene. DUMENCK: If the Marshal had been in France at that time, he would have seen that everything was ready to fight.
After these events in Europe, if it is necessary to create a peace front, then it must be created now. I repeat that I am at your disposal and ready to work when you want, as you want, and with very specific methods.
comrade VOROSHILOV: If the British and French missions arrived with all the specific and clear proposals, I am convinced that in some 5-6 days it would be possible to complete all the work and sign a military convention.
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I don’t know if the echoes of historical battles in social networks reach you, but now there is a real “holivar” on the topic of “preventive war” from the Soviet Union. Again they remembered Suvorov-Rezun with his book "Icebreaker". By the way, she turns 30 this year. Has the position of Russian science in relation to the version of history presented there changed somehow?
Andrey Artizov: First, in Russian science there are different points of view: it is not soviet history where everything was built under one ideology. Secondly, fundamental research devoted to the topic of preparing the Soviet Union for war, has not appeared recently. Except for the multi-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War", which is being done under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Defense. But this is a team effort.
As for Rezun himself and his book, a brilliant study with estimates of his pseudo-professionalism was done by the Israeli scientist Gabriel Gorodetsky. There is nothing more fundamental. And I adhere to his point of view, because it is closest to the truth.
So Stalin was going to attack Germany after all or not? Was there preparation for a preventive war?
Andrey Artizov: I'll tell you this: any army in any historical period, unless, of course, it deserves the name "army" and its general staff includes smart people, must calculate the various turns of events and prepare various options for action. Both defensive and offensive. But there is a long distance from preparation to announcement. Because wars are declared not by the military, but by the political leadership.
We have one document from 1939 (it can be seen at the exhibition). They prepared for the arrival of the British and French military missions in Moscow very seriously: the entire composition of the Soviet delegation was the highest, starting with the member of the Politburo of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, the head of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov ... The USSR had serious intentions to cooperate with England and France in the war against Hitler, and that it will be, few doubted. So, before the arrival of the allied missions in Moscow, Shaposhnikov prepared a document for Stalin, which was called "Note of the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, considerations on negotiations with England and France, the final version reported to Stalin." It says that the Soviet Union is ready to field 100 divisions. How is this to be assessed? As treacherous preparations for war or as real proposals to the allies?
And now future allies come: from the French, some general, a member of the military council, and from the British, an even less significant figure for making serious decisions, a naval adjutant, an admiral ...
Or another example of "preparation". 1938 Hitler occupies the Sudetenland. And we have an agreement on mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia and France. The USSR announced mobilization, troops were brought up. Even our planes flew to Czechoslovakia. Is this preparation for war? Certainly. Another conversation is that France refused to fulfill its obligations, and Czechoslovakia ultimately did not go for unilateral military action. Although she had a decent army, very well armed. And Poland categorically forbade the passage of our troops through its territory to help Czechoslovakia, declared that it would shoot down our planes ... Moreover, with the tacit consent of Nazi Germany, Poland received the Teszyn region. To then itself be surrounded by Germany. Well, how to evaluate it?
German troops enter Prague Castle. March 1939 Photo: Gettyimages
Andrey Artizov:
Where are the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact kept now? Why was there so much fog around them?
Andrey Artizov: The German originals have not been preserved; during the bombing of Berlin, the Foreign Ministry archives were destroyed. But even in the middle of the war, Ribbentrop ordered that copies be made of the most important documents. And he entrusted it to one of his employees. He did it and hid it. Then, having found himself in the American zone under occupation, this man picked up the cache and handed it over to the Americans. Those published documents during the beginning of the Cold War. And then the copies were handed over to the Germans.
The Soviet leadership claimed that we did not have the originals. In fact, for some time they were kept in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Molotov ceased to be People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the documents were transferred to the Politburo archive. And they stayed there until the end of the last century. Nobody had access to them. They learned about them after it collapsed Soviet authority. They were published in 1992 in the journal New and recent history"Academician G. Sevostyanov. And they were shown for the first time at an exhibition in the Tretyakov Gallery in 1995.
And from the archives of the former Politburo, the originals were again transferred to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
key question
Andrey Artizov: Much becomes clear if one reads the report of the French military attache in Warsaw Muss to the French Minister of War Daladier. On August 24, in particular, he writes that he has been entrusted with the mission of bringing the Polish General Staff into the course of military negotiations with Moscow and telling them about the Russian proposals. And the Russians put forward one condition: the Poles must let them through their territory to fight the Germans.
Muss reports that on August 17 at 21 o’clock Captain Beaufre arrived in Warsaw, sent secretly by General Dumenok from Moscow: “He orally gave me all the useful details about the progress of the negotiations in Moscow. interrupted. Their resumption depends on a favorable response from the Polish General Staff and, finally, that time is pressing, and this resumption cannot be delayed further than August 20 or 21."
And then he writes that the next day he met with the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General Stakhevich. He listened with great attention, without interrupting and making numerous notes. Most of the arguments of the French attache did not raise a single objection. Let me quote: "Then he expressed surprise and distrust in relation to the proposals of the Russians." In particular, Stakhevich said: “I can’t believe that the Russians really want to fight the Germans. It’s so convenient for them to stay on the second line…”. We had a long discussion, I reiterated my arguments, I also insisted on the danger of failure of the negotiations in Moscow. He did not dispute this, regretting that we were at an impasse. As for agreeing to the Russian proposal, he saw it in the darkest colors ... Stakhevich: "If the Russians are on our territory, they will remain there. Even if they win, Poland will lose part of its territory."
Ultimately, he concluded that such a decision was beyond my powers.
The next day, August 19, the same thing happened again. Only the British military attaché also took part in the conversation. And again, the Poles categorically refused to let the Soviet troops through their territory. The meaning of these long dialogues is something like this: you and I are civilized people, but Russians cannot be trusted.
The statement that appeared in the press of the German Information Bureau about the forthcoming conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow on August 23 had the effect of an exploding bomb in Warsaw.
Summary: the then Polish leadership did not want any allied obligations or normal interactions with the Red Army and the Soviet Union. It thought it could handle itself. And that the French and the British will help.
On August 23, the French ambassador in Warsaw made a hasty demarche against Beck (Polish foreign minister). The minister seemed to tremble, but asked for a delay in the answer. New meeting took place on the afternoon of 23 August. Let me remind you that the Soviet-German treaty was signed in Moscow on the same day in the evening. At this second meeting, Beck relented, not failing to demonstrate once again the deep dislike felt by the Poles regarding the entry of Soviet troops. He agreed to the following wording, with which General Dumenk went to Voroshilov. Here it is: "We (that is, the Poles, French and British) have reached confidence that in the event of joint action against German aggression, cooperation between Poland and the USSR, with specifications to be determined is not excluded (or possible). But it was too late.
On the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of Defense published on its website more than 100 pages of declassified memoirs of Soviet military leaders. Documents from the declassified funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense include the answers of the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders to five key questions prepared by the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff Soviet army.
In 1952, in the Military History Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, a group was created under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, which began to develop a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
Assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, who exercised control in the first days of the war.
The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis of fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military specialists.
DEREVYANKO KUZMA NIKOLAEVICH
lieutenant general
In 1941 - deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front)
"The grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in last days before the war was known to the headquarters of the district quite fully and in large part and in detail.
The opened grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive grouping with a significant saturation with tanks and motorized units.
BAGHRAMYAN IVAN KHRISTOFOROVYCH
Marshal of the Soviet Union
In 1941 - Head of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District (South-Western Front)
“The troops that directly covered the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to and including the regiment. Field positions were prepared for them along the entire border. These troops were the first operational echelon.
"The cover troops, the first operational echelon, were stationed directly at the borders and began to deploy under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities."
"Their advance exit to the prepared positions by the General Staff was prohibited in order not to give a pretext for provoking war on the part of fascist Germany."
