Wow Sevastopol battle. Crimean War: Sevastopol. Heroes of the Sevastopol defense

Defense of Sevastopol

Battle for Sevastopol

Opponents

Side force commanders

Heroic defense of Sevastopol 1941-1942. and liberation in 1944.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 became a severe and difficult test for Sevastopol residents and sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was among the first cities of the USSR on June 22, 1941 at 03:15 was attacked by fascist aircraft. The first to strike at the Nazi aircraft was the anti-aircraft artillery battery of the Black Sea Fleet N 74, commanded by Lieutenant I.G. Kozovnik. Following it, the 76th, 80th, 78th and 75th batteries opened fire and successfully repulsed the first Nazi raid.

The sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, the inhabitants of the city organized themselves to defend Sevastopol.

Common data

Crimea was of strategic importance, as one of the ways to oil-bearing regions Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, the Crimea was important as a base for aviation. With the loss of the Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the possibility of raids on the oil fields of Romania, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa.

Characteristics of the parties involved

The only land route to Crimea lay through the Isthmus of Perekop. In general, the defense of the peninsula was assigned to the 51st Separate Army, formed in August, directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov. Three rifle divisions covered the northern direction: the 276th (commander Major General I.S. Savinov) - the Chongar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit, the 156th (Major General P.V. Chernyaev) - Perekop positions, 106- I (colonel A. N. Pervushin) stretched for 70 kilometers along the southern coast of the Sivash. Three cavalry divisions - the 48th (Major General D.I. Averkin), the 42nd (colonel V.V. Glagolev) and the 40th (colonel F.F. Kudyurov), as well as the 271st the rifle division (col. M. A. Titov) had anti-amphibious missions. Four divisions formed in the Crimea - 172nd (colonel I. G. Toroptsev), 184th (colonel V.N. Abramov), 320th (colonel M.V. Vinogradov), 321st (colonel I. M. Aliev) guarded the coast.

On September 12, advanced German units reached the Crimea. The commander of the 11th Army, Manstein, decided to create a grouping of troops consisting of: the 54th Army Corps, the 30th Army Corps, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 49th Mountain Corps, removed from the Rostov direction, artillery, engineering troops and anti-aircraft artillery. Air support was provided by units of the 4th Air Force of the Luftwaffe.

By mid-October, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Primorsky Army was transferred from Odessa. Thus, the Soviet troops began to number 12 rifle divisions (probably, from two to four of them were not finally formed) and 4 cavalry divisions. At the same time, the Germans were able to allocate the 11th Army for the capture of Crimea, consisting of 7 infantry divisions (according to Manstein's memoirs - six: 22nd, 72nd, 170th, 46th, 73rd, 50th) and the Romanian mountain corps of two brigades.

The course of the battle

The defense of Sevastopol lasted almost a year and had several main stages:

• The first offensive of the Germans;
• Second German offensive;
• Quiet period in January-May 1942;
• Third German offensive.

October 25, 1941 German troops broke through the line of defense of the Soviet army and moved towards the Crimea with the aim of occupying the peninsula as soon as possible. At the same time, the Soviet command began a retreat towards Kerch, from where part of the army later crossed to the Kuban. The rest of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol in order to protect the city. The Germans pursued both parts of the Soviet army, and also sent another detachment directly to Sevastopol, bypassing the Russian army, in order to surround the city and capture it.

By November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol, and on November 5, the first clashes began between the Germans and the Soviet army on the distant approaches to the city.

The first German offensive on Sevastopol

On November 11, several German divisions attacked the Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, but they met with serious resistance - fierce battles continued until the 21st. During the battles, the Germans managed to advance several kilometers deep in two directions at once, and the front line was established 12 kilometers from Sevastopol.

After that, both armies began to strengthen their composition, reinforcements arrived to the Soviet troops, and the Germans focused their attention on other territories of the Crimea. As a result, by November 16, the peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was captured by German troops. Hitler decided to “finish off” Sevastopol and all free armies moved towards the city.

Second German offensive on Sevastopol

A new attack was planned for November 27, but due to a number of problems, it took place only on December 17, 1941. The Germans attacked soviet front and fierce fighting began again, as a result of which the German army was again able to gain an advantage and advance towards the city.

On December 19, the Soviet command reports that there are no forces left for the defense and the city will not hold out even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the army was able to resist until November 21, when help arrived.

In two weeks of fighting, the Germans were able to move the front line by an average of 10 kilometers, which meant that they practically came close to the city.

January-May 1942

It was a relatively calm period, the battles took place only small, of local importance, as the German troops went to the east of the Crimean peninsula, and the Soviet army at that time replenished its units with new divisions.

Third German offensive on Sevastopol

On May 18, Soviet resistance in the east of Crimea was finally destroyed, and the German army again concentrated on Sevastopol. It was necessary to capture the city in the near future - for this, artillery was brought up to the border.

On June 2, the assault on Sevastopol began simultaneously from the ground and air, part of the German army distracted the enemy in the east, and part participated directly in the assault.

By June 17, the north of Sevastopol was captured, as well as part of the south. By June 29, the Germans entered the city, and the fighting continued already there.

On July 1, 1942, Sevastopol was completely captured by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet army went to Chersonese, expecting to be evacuated from there. Fighting continued in Chersonese for several more days, no one evacuated the army, and the soldiers were soon captured or killed.

Fighting on the Black Sea communications

The main means of disrupting enemy communications in the Black Sea were submarines. As of January 1, 1942, there were 43 of them in the Black Sea Fleet, including 19 small ones. However, the results of the actions of the boats remained modest - the enemy still used small-tonnage vessels for transportation, which made short transitions in coastal waters: Burgas - Varna (50 miles), Varna - Constanta (80 miles), Constanta - Sulina (80 miles), Sulina -- Bugaz (70 miles).

From January to April 1942, submariners sank only three transports. The fleet during this time lost one submarine. The most stubborn and fierce was the struggle on Soviet sea lanes. From the first days of November 1941, the fate of Sevastopol, blocked from land, largely depended on sea transportation. The main base through which it was supplied was Novorossiysk. Part of the troops and cargo was transported from Poti and Tuapse.

On some days, especially when repelling the Nazi offensive on Sevastopol in November and December, up to 14 transports with cargo were sent here. In addition, from Batumi and Tuapse, ships delivered liquid fuel to the Kerch Peninsula to the troops of the Crimean Front,

By the beginning of the defense of Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet had at its disposal 74 dry cargo ships (264,000 tons) and 16 oil tankers (160,000 tons). To ensure communication with Sevastopol, he could attract 2, leader, 12, 12 base minesweepers, 67 patrol boats. Transportation, as a rule, was carried out by small convoys and single transports. To escort transports, several destroyers, minesweepers, patrol boats, and, in especially important cases, cruisers were usually allocated. When approaching ports and bases and during the stay, the convoys were also covered by fighters. To cover transports and warships from targeted bombing and artillery shelling during their stay in the main base, the smoke of the Sevastopol Bay was widely used.

The main threat to shipping on the Black Sea was enemy aircraft. Its air supremacy, which was largely determined by its favorable base on Crimean airfields, allowed the enemy to reliably control a significant sea area. This forced the command of the fleet to establish routes of movement to Sevastopol in such a way that the convoys would follow most of the way outside the range of enemy aircraft. In total, three routes were determined, which passed along the parallels 43°, 43.5° and 44°. The shortest of them was 250 miles (Sevastopol - Novorossiysk), the longest - 420 miles (Sevastopol - Batumi).

For the purpose of secrecy, the crossings were planned in such a way that the transports entered the bays of Sevastopol and left from there at night.

The main objects of the Nazi air raids were the ships and vessels located in Sevastopol. In total, in the period from November 1941 to May 1942, the Nazis made 1856 sorties to bombard the city. Since the end of April, Novorossiysk and Tuapse also began to be subjected to massive enemy air strikes.

In winter, difficulties in the implementation of maritime transport increased. Due to frequent storms, the use of small warships in convoys had to be reduced. In addition, in late December - early January, most ship's composition fleet was involved in the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation. Due to the shortage of warships, transports to Sevastopol were sent with little or no guards. So, out of 161 ships that arrived in Sevastopol in December, 50 followed on their own.

The fleet command had to go to other extreme measures in organizing transportation. When the defenders of Sevastopol needed immediate help, especially during the repulse of enemy assaults, high-speed aircraft were also used to transfer reinforcements. warships. So, from December 7 to 13 - before the next enemy offensive - 2 cruisers, 6 transports, 2 destroyers and a minesweeper brought the 388th rifle division to Sevastopol; from December 20 to 23, when the situation in this area escalated again, a separate naval rifle brigade was transferred from Novorossiysk on cruisers and destroyers and a rifle division from Tuapse.

In total, in December, transports and warships delivered to Sevastopol 34 thousand people, 26 tanks, 78 guns, 178 vehicles and over 23 thousand tons of cargo; 10,630 tons of cargo and about 13 thousand residents of the city and wounded soldiers were taken out.

In January-February 1942, the tension on the Sevastopol communications decreased. The Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation riveted the main attention of the parties to the Kerch Peninsula. The transport fleet and warships were mainly engaged in transporting troops and cargo to this area for the Crimean Front. In February, the convoy routes to Sevastopol, which had been operating since November 1941, were changed due to the fact that the enemy had studied them well. But the new ones soon became known to the enemy. Therefore, in the future, for each convoy, its own route was established, taking into account the situation and technical data of the transports. In total, from January to March, 170 transports and warships arrived in Sevastopol, delivering 46.9 thousand people, tens of thousands of tons of cargo.

By the spring of 1942, the situation near Sevastopol became more complicated again. On the approaches to the Sevastopol Bay, the enemy established a permanent blockade patrol of torpedo boats and torpedo bombers based on the nearest points of the Crimean coast he had captured. The approaches to the city from the sea were controlled by German aircraft and shot through by long-range artillery from land. By April, the Soviet air group in the Sevastopol area consisted of only 52 aircraft and could not provide cover for the convoys. The passage of transport ships into the bays of Sevastopol became practically impossible. The entire burden of transportation fell on warships, but even they could hardly break into the besieged base.

The command of the Black Sea Fleet took effective measures to maintain this communication. In April, it developed a detailed plan for the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food to Sevastopol by submarines. The nomenclature of cargoes, their dimensions, method of packing, weight, organization of loading and unloading operations, schedule of transitions were determined. To increase the carrying capacity of the boats, torpedo-artillery weapons were removed from some of them. Such a submarine could take up to 80-100 people and up to 35-40 tons of cargo.

The maximum use of forces and means allowed the Black Sea Fleet in the winter of 1941/42 to cope with the task of protecting its sea lanes and providing transportation for the besieged Sevastopol and for the Crimean Front.

The Soviet Navy in the winter of 1941/42 waged a tense struggle on the sea routes of communication, provided fighting ground forces in coastal areas. Audio report of 1942 from the besieged Sevastopol:

Defense of naval bases

The advance of the Nazi troops to the advanced defensive line of Sevastopol, naturally, forced us to reconsider the possibility of further basing the main forces of the fleet here. With the approach of the enemy, the threat of strikes against them increased not only by German aircraft, but also by long-range artillery. Therefore, on the night of October 31, the main core of the Black Sea Fleet squadron moved to the bases of the Caucasian coast. Two cruisers and three destroyers remained in Sevastopol for artillery support of the ground forces. A little later, these ships, reinforced by another cruiser and two destroyers, formed a permanent artillery support detachment, which played a very important role in the defense of Sevastopol.

The Sevastopol defensive region was divided into four squares, each of which had detached military formations and units, as well as attached coastal artillery units of the main base.

The fascist German command, which concentrated 4 infantry divisions with reinforcement units, about 150 tanks and 300-350 aircraft near Sevastopol in early November, launched an offensive on the morning of November 11. On November 21, having slightly advanced into the depths of the defense, mainly in the fourth and third sectors, the enemy troops, as a result of heavy losses, were forced to stop the offensive, without having reached their goal. In the Kerch-Feodosiya direction, the situation was unfavorable, since the 51st Army failed to hold the Kerch Peninsula, which made the situation in Sevastopol more difficult.

Having received significant reinforcements, the enemy launched a new offensive on December 17, intending to capture Sevastopol within four days. However, this time he did not reach his goal. The Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, carried out at the end of December 1941 by the Black Sea Fleet and the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, played a major role in disrupting the 16-day offensive of the enemy. This operation forced the enemy to abandon active operations in the Sevastopol direction for more than four months.

Soldiers and commanders of the 7th Marine Brigade under the command of Colonel E.I. Zhidilov, the 8th Marine Brigade of Colonel V.L. Vilypansky, the 25th Infantry Division. Major General T.K. Kolomiets, 95th Moldavian Rifle Division, Major General V.F. .Guz, 1st Sevastopol Marine Regiment Colonel P.F. Gorpishchenko, artillerymen Major N.V. Bogdanov, 10th, 30th, 35th, 19th coastal defense batteries, Black Sea pilots and many others.

An immortal feat was accomplished by the garrison of bunker N 11. Red Navy Komsomol member Ivan Golubets at the cost own life rescued warships and their crews in Streletskaya Bay. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For exploits in those days, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to machine gunner Nina Onilova and sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko.

During the days of defense, the inhabitants of the city showed military and labor heroism. The workers of the Marine Plant, under enemy fire, repaired ships, created military equipment day and night, they equipped two armored trains, built and equipped a floating battery N 3, called "Do not touch me", which reliably covered the city from Nazi air raids from the sea. The Germans called it "Death Square". In the mine workings (adits) on the shores of the Sevastopol Bay, underground special plants were created; N 1 - for the production of weapons and ammunition, N 2 - for tailoring linen, shoes and uniforms. Immediately, underground, dispensaries, a canteen, a club, a school, a nursery and a garden worked, and later a hospital, a bakery.

Supported by naval and coastal artillery and naval aviation, the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region during January - March significantly improved their positions, which contributed to the strengthening of the land defense system. By the beginning of June 1942, the density of artillery and machine-gun emplacements on the land defense front had increased by more than 4 times (17 emplacements per 1 km of front, while in December there were only about 4 emplacements). The ships of the Black Sea Fleet, along with artillery support for the SOR troops, provided transportation by sea in the interests of the base's turnover.

On May 8, fascist German troops launched an offensive on the Kerch Peninsula and captured it by May 25. This put Sevastopol in an exceptionally difficult position. Since May 20, enemy aviation and artillery have sharply increased their activity in operations against Sevastopol. On June 7, the enemy launched a new attack on the city, directing the main efforts to the Kamyshly, Belbek sector and trying to reach the eastern tip of the Sevastopol Bay. Despite fierce attacks that lasted for 11 days, the enemy failed to achieve the desired results. However, on June 18, he managed to break through to the Sevastopol Bay from the north. The defenders of Sevastopol, supported by naval artillery, stubbornly defended the coast of the bay and only on June 23 retreated to its southern coast.

In an effort to split the defense front, from the 23rd until the end of June, the enemy waged a fierce attack on Inkerman from the northeast and Novye Shuli from the southeast.

On June 25, fascist pilots bombed the building of the panorama "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855". From direct hits of 5 bombs and 7 large-caliber shells, the wall was broken, the dome was destroyed and a fire broke out. The pictorial canvas was saved by cadets of the school of middle commanders of coastal defense, fighters of the 11th separate battalion of air surveillance, warning and communications. The fragments of the painting taken out of the fire were taken out on the leader of the destroyers "Tashkent" - the last large surface ship that broke through to Sevastopol, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank V.N. Eroshenko.

On the night of June 29, under the cover of a smoke screen, the enemy crossed to the southern shore of the bay and unsuccessfully tried to land on Cape Fiolent. At dawn on June 29, the Nazis launched an attack on the city from the area of ​​​​the Fedyukhin Heights and from. New Shuli in the northwest direction. On June 30, they managed to break through to the city.

On June 29 and 30, enemy aviation made over 3,000 sorties, dropped up to 15,000 bombs on the city, and artillery fired about 8,000 shells, up to 14,000 mines. The fascist command threw all forces and means into battle. The reserves of the city's defenders were melting, shells, cartridges, and grenades were running out. On June 30, fighting began on the Ship side. The defenders stubbornly repulsed the attacks of the enemy on Malakhov Kurgan, Laboratory Highway, Historical Boulevard, near the villages of Kommun, Berman. At night, when the ammunition ran out, the remnants of the SOR troops began to retreat to the bays of Streletskaya, Kamyshovaya, Kazachya and to Cape Khersones. Here the fighting continued until July 4, and in some places - until July 12.

The Nazis, who entered the ruined city on July 3, 1942, rampaged in it for 22 months. They destroyed 3,000 women, old people and children in the Inkerman adits, and more than 400 workers in the Troitsky tunnel. On July 12, the invaders drove 1,500 residents to the Dynamo stadium, and after robbery and bullying, they shot them on the 5th km of the Balaklava highway. During the occupation of the city, the Nazis shot, burned, drowned in the sea, forcibly drove tens of thousands of Sevastopol residents to Germany.

Despite the most brutal occupation regime, the people of Sevastopol did not stop fighting the Nazis. Underground patriotic organizations headed by V.D. Revyakin, P.D. Silnikov, N.I. Tereshchenko began to be created and operate in Sevastopol. Soviet government appreciated the courage and exploits of the Sevastopol underground workers: the head of the Sevastopol underground, VD. Revyakin, was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the Orders of Lenin, the Patriotic War, the medals "For Courage" and "For Military Merit" were awarded to 59 members of the underground.

The defense of Sevastopol gave exceptionally wide experience in all types of military operations of the USSR Navy in the defense of its bases. The experience of the defense of Sevastopol is also valuable in that it largely took into account the results of actions for the defense of naval bases in the initial period of the war.

First of all, this was reflected in the preparation of the land defense front of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. The need to create such a front, as noted, was recognized about six months before the start of the war and was confirmed by the experience of the exercises conducted in April 1941. The decision of the Black Sea Fleet command to create a land defense line, taken after the start of the war, at first glance seems belated. However, such a decision, no matter how paradoxical it may sound now, should be considered timely and undoubtedly correct. We must not forget that the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet adopted it almost two weeks before construction began. defensive lines in front of Tallinn, while the situation in the Baltic states in July 1941 developed much more dynamically than on the Southern Front.

The depth of the main and rear defensive lines turned out to be completely insufficient, since it even allowed enemy divisional artillery to fire at the base. The experience of Odessa forced a decision to increase the depth of defense and create an advanced defensive line 16-17 km from the base. Meanwhile, the enemy's corps artillery guns had a firing range of about 20 km, so the new decision adopted in October provided for the creation of a forward line 25-30 km from the base. But this decision was belated: the enemy began his attack on Sevastopol.

Needless to say, the increase in the depth of the defense system of the base from the land side required a corresponding increase in the number of firepower to create a sufficient density of fire. The forward and rear defensive lines of Sevastopol were provided with fire from coastal batteries, in addition, the Black Sea Fleet allocated a certain number of naval guns with a caliber of 130 to 45 mm to strengthen the fire system of land defensive lines, not counting 30 guns with a caliber of 152-102 mm, previously installed on temporary grounds in the Perekop and Chongar positions.

Thus, the decision to create a forward line 25-30 km away from the base, although it was fundamentally correct, was unlikely that this line could be provided in a timely manner with the necessary number of guns.

The experience of the defense of Odessa was also used organizationally. The Sevastopol defensive region was created. Such an organization of command turned out to be quite expedient and was theoretically envisaged even before the war. So, for example, the Naval Academy believed that the forces defending a point or a certain section of the coast should be led by the commander of that kind of them, who in this case performs the main task. During the defense of Sevastopol, the main task, which consisted of a complex of shock and support tasks, as in the defense of Odessa, was performed by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet.

In essence, the experience of the Second World War and, in particular, the Great Patriotic War confirmed the idea that arose after the Russo-Japanese War about the need to organize in the interests of sustainable defense not a "base-point", but a "base-area". The further development of weapons and military equipment, primarily the development of aviation, confirmed this position. There was a need to defend the area, and not a point subject to the massive impact of artillery and enemy aircraft.

According to the experience of the defense of Odessa, the land front was divided into four sectors and the control of artillery (with the exception of naval artillery) was centralized in the hands of the artillery commander of the Primorsky Army. Such centralization of control made it possible to mass the fire in any direction in a timely manner.

An exceptionally great influence on the stability of the defense of Sevastopol was exerted by its sea communications with Novorossiysk and other naval bases. The reliable provision by the Black Sea Fleet of sea communications between Sevastopol and these bases made it possible to systematically deliver the forces and means necessary for defense.

The great need for coastal artillery fire quickly caused it to overstrain. On the most difficult days for defense, each coastal artillery gun fired from 125 to 300 shells, which led to rapid wear of the barrels. Therefore, in the future, there was a need to limit the use of large and medium caliber coastal artillery. Shooting from large-caliber guns was carried out only with the knowledge of the coastal defense commandant, and from medium-sized guns - the chief of coastal defense artillery.

Favorably on the stability of the defense of Sevastopol, as already noted, the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation affected.

An analysis of the experience of military operations during the defense of Sevastopol would be far from complete without brief conclusions about the role of the Black Sea Fleet aviation. As you know, the development of military events on the Southern Front and in the Crimea in the autumn of 1941 forced a radical change in the system of basing aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. Due to the current situation, its airfield network moved to the southeast, to the Caucasian coast. This circumstance could not but affect the actions of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet in the interests of the defense of Sevastopol. The significant distance of even advanced airfields from the SOR, strictly speaking, excluded systematic aviation assistance to it by the main forces of the fleet aviation. At the same time, the possibility of powerful episodic assistance remained. So, to repel massive enemy attacks or to strike at large enemy groupings and important targets, aircraft were called in from Caucasian airfields. In particular, from November 6 to December 16, 1941, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet made 1112 sorties, including about 300 for assault operations and about 400 for bombing. During the second enemy attack on Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet aircraft made 1090 sorties, of which about 500 were for bombing strikes.

Some of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet (about 100 aircraft), which made up the 3rd special air group of the SOR, was based in the Sevastopol region. Directly within the SOR, several airfields were equipped. Aviation based on them systematically assisted the SOR forces, performing a number of tasks, which mainly boiled down to conducting systematic aerial reconnaissance in the sea and sectors of land defense, destroying enemy manpower and equipment in front of the front line of defense, on the near approaches and on the roads to Sevastopol , delivering strikes against enemy advanced airfields, covering ships and the most important defensive installations from the air.

The pace and scale of hostilities by enemy aircraft during the siege of Sevastopol from land were not always the same. At the beginning of the siege, enemy aviation had 300-350 aircraft, which, during the preparation and conduct of the first, November, assault, operated with maximum tension mainly against coastal batteries and ships located in Sevastopol bays or on close approaches to the base. The same activity was shown by enemy aircraft during the second, December, assault on Sevastopol. After the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation and the emergence of a new direction in the Crimea, Nazi aviation significantly reduced the activity of its operations against the SOR.

In early May 1942, the enemy allocated a group of more than 150 bombers, torpedo bombers and attack aircraft to strengthen the blockade of Sevastopol. Such an increase in German aviation could not but affect the security of sea communications with Sevastopol, as well as the preparation and conduct of the third assault, when the enemy could use over 600 aircraft (of which 280-300 bombers and about 120 fighters. During June 1942, the enemy carried out 17141 sorties of bombers to Sevastopol.

The fascist German command tried in every possible way to extinguish the opposition of the SOR aviation by strikes against its airfields. So, during the June assault on the airfields of the SOR, about 13 thousand artillery shells and almost 2500 air bombs exploded, destroying 30 and damaging 36 aircraft.

As the actions of enemy aviation intensified, it became more and more difficult for the SOR fighters and anti-aircraft artillery to "counteract it. Fighter aviation, due to its small number, almost did not fight against aerial reconnaissance. It mainly repelled bomber raids and escorted its bombers and attack aircraft. patrolling in three zones: Chersonese Lighthouse - Balaklava, Chersonese Lighthouse - Kacha, Balaklava - Belbek Three groups of fighters were at the airfields in readiness No. 1, which had the task of repelling the raid of the main group of enemy bombers.

The forced weakening of counteraction to the enemy by fighter forces allowed his aircraft to gradually reduce the bombing height from 5000-7000 m to 800-1000 m. The superiority of the enemy in the air, which began to have a special effect in May 1942, made it very difficult to carry out all types of defensive actions and to ensure them.

The defense of Sevastopol, which lasted 250 days, fettered a large grouping of Nazi and Romanian ground forces, which greatly contributed to the disruption of the plan of the German command to seize the Caucasus in the autumn of 1941 and favored the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Rostov in November 1941. To capture Sevastopol, the German - the fascist command had to concentrate in May - early June 1942 over 11 infantry, light and mountain rifle divisions, reinforced by artillery of the reserve of the main command, tanks and aircraft. By the beginning of the June assault, the enemy had 208 batteries near Sevastopol, i.e. on average, about 24 barrels per 1 km of the front, not counting several anti-aircraft artillery regiments. However, the Nazis themselves admit that so far the Soviet Navy acted in the area of ​​​​the fortress, the assault on it could not end successfully. Only the massive offensive actions of the German aviation forced the Soviet ships to withdraw, as a result of which the fortress remained isolated. Indeed, the gradual fading of the artillery support provided by the ships of the Black Sea Fleet squadron, and the undoubted superiority of the enemy in the air, played a decisive role in the third assault on Sevastopol, which the enemy would hardly have succeeded if it were not for these circumstances. For 8 months of defense, the enemy lost up to 300 thousand soldiers killed and wounded near the walls of Sevastopol.

The defense of Sevastopol once again confirmed the decisive importance of the moral factor in all types of military operations. Even the worst enemies of the Soviet Union were forced to recognize the endurance and incredible stamina of the Soviet soldier.

The advantage in the moral factor ensured not only the long-term stability of the defense forces in extremely difficult conditions of struggle, but also the use of more daring and flexible methods of action.

Losses and results

The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as an example of the courage of Soviet soldiers, and also as one of the most difficult and lengthy operations of the first period of the war. Despite resistance, the city was taken, which meant that the entire Crimea came under the jurisdiction of Germany. Hitler received a very advantageous position, and the Soviet command was forced to admit that they had actually lost Ukraine.

The total losses of the Soviet troops for the entire period of the defense of Sevastopol from October 30, 1941 to the beginning of July 1942 amounted to 200,481 people, of which 156,880 were irretrievable losses, and 43,601 were sanitary losses.

During the 250 days of the siege of the city 11, the German army lost 60 thousand people killed, died from wounds and died from accidents and accidents, and 240 thousand were sanitary losses. This is the same as the entire German armed forces lost during the capture Western Europe and the Balkans between September 1, 1939 and May 15, 1941.

Evaluation of the event by contemporaries

250-day heroic defense of Sevastopol 1941-42. was of great military and moral-political importance. Sevastopol fettered large enemy forces. Only the killed Germans lost about 300 thousand people. For Soviet people and the whole world, Sevastopol has become a symbol of courage, fortitude, boundless love for the Motherland. Soldiers and sailors, inspired by the stamina and exploits of their ancestors who defended Sevastopol in 1853-54, stood to the death, not flinching in the face of a superior enemy who brought down all their strength on them. military equipment XX century Here, as in Brest, Leningrad, at the Dubosekovo junction, and in many other places on the great Russian plain, the German war machine faced an irresistible "power of the Spirit." It became clear to the whole world that a nation that defends its land with such courage and self-sacrifice cannot be defeated. In 1965 Sevastopol was awarded the honorary title of a hero city in commemoration of the courage and steadfastness of its defenders. Lyubimov G. A.

The defense of Sevastopol is one of the large and extended military operations of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

Background and position of the troops

Ukraine was an important point for the Germans, the capture of which would allow the fascist troops to open the way to Moscow from the south, as well as secure supplies of food and coal for the continuation of hostilities in the winter. By the end of September 1941, Hitler's troops were already able to capture Smolensk and. Leningrad was taken into the ring, significant success was also achieved in the South-Western direction - most of the Soviet troops in this direction were defeated, and the south-western part of Ukraine was already under the control of the German command. In mid-September, the fascist troops approached the Crimea - another important point in the course of the conquest of Ukraine.

The Crimea was necessary for the Germans, as it was one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus. Moreover, aviation was based in the Crimea, with the loss of the peninsula, the Soviet army would lose the opportunity to raid Romania (it was under the control of Hitler), and the Germans themselves would be able to bomb the Caucasus. It was because of the importance of Crimea that the Soviet command decided to abandon and redirect troops from the city to the peninsula.

At the time of the beginning of the defense of Sevastopol, the forces of the opponents were approximately equal.

The course of the defense of Sevastopol

Since the operation was very lengthy, several main stages can be distinguished in it:

• the first German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from November 11 to November 21, 1941;
• the second German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from December 17 to December 31, 1941;
• relative calm, which lasted from the beginning of January to May 31, 1942;
• The third German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from June 7 to July 4, 1942.

On October 25, German troops broke through the defenses of the Soviet army at the Ishun positions and broke into the Crimea - seven divisions and two Romanian detachments were supposed to occupy the peninsula in the shortest possible time. The Soviet command, seeing the pressure of the Germans, decided to retreat towards Kerch, later this part of the army went to the Kuban. A smaller part of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol through the mountain passes of the Crimea, and then along the coast. Both parts of the army were pursued by German troops, and a separate detachment of two German divisions headed directly towards Sevastopol to capture the city.

As a result, by November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On November 5, clashes began between Soviet and German troops on the outskirts of the city.

First attack on Sevastopol

On November 11, several German divisions attacked the Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, the fighting continued until November 21. The Germans managed to advance several kilometers to the south and east, and the front line was established 12 km from Sevastopol. At the same time, the fighting subsided, both sides began to strengthen their armies, the Soviet received reinforcements in the form of soldiers and ammunition.

While the Soviet command in Sevastopol was engaged in strengthening the defense, the German troops continued to seize the Crimea, and as a result, by November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied by the Germans. The remaining forces of the Nazis reorganized and headed towards the city in order to break the last stronghold of the Soviet defense.

Second offensive on Sevastopol

Initially, the next attack on the city was planned for November 27, but due to a delay, the offensive began only on December 17, 1941. During a fierce battle, the Germans again managed to suppress Soviet resistance and significantly move inland to the north.

On December 19, Admiral Zhukov reported that the front without support would not last even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the soldiers were able to hold back the Germans until December 21, after which reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol.

As a result, in two weeks of fighting, the Germans managed to advance to the city by an average of 10 km. The offensive stopped on December 31 due to the heavy losses suffered by the German army during the battles with the Soviet defensive detachments.

January-May 1942

In early January, reinforcements again arrived in Sevastopol, and the German army, on the contrary, thinned out, as a significant part of it went to the east of Crimea. In January-February 1942, only minor skirmishes took place between German and Soviet troops. In general, this period can be considered relatively calm. Until May, the Soviet army was regularly replenished with new detachments.

Third offensive on Sevastopol

On May 18, after the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet army in the east of Crimea, the German command again concentrated on Sevastopol: an assault on the city was planned, for which the Germans drove a large amount of heavy artillery to the borders.

On June 2, German artillery and aircraft began to deal heavy blows to Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On June 7, several German divisions went on the offensive from the land, and the Romanian army distracted Soviet soldiers by fighting in the east.

By June 17, the north of the defense of Sevastopol was actually captured, the Germans advanced significantly to the south. Although reinforcements were actively sent to the Soviet troops, this did not help. On June 29, 1942, the Germans entered Sevastopol.

On July 1, Sevastopol was completely occupied by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet troops left for Chersonese, where fighting continued for some time. The Soviet soldiers waiting for the evacuation did not wait for her and were taken prisoner.

The results of the defense of Sevastopol

The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as one of the most difficult and lengthy defensive operations in which Soviet troops suffered heavy casualties. In addition, the surrender of Sevastopol was the last stage in the conquest of the Crimea by the Germans, which opened up a number of new directions and opportunities for Hitler.

When the implementation of the Barbarossa plan began in mid-1941, an attack on the Crimean peninsula was not even planned. It was understood that when the major Soviet political centers, like Moscow, came under German control, the entire Soviet Union will fall apart on its own.

But those hopes were quickly dashed in July 1941, when two Soviet air attacks on Axis oil fields in Romania, launched from Sevastopol, destroyed 11,000 tons of oil.

Composition of the Attack Forces of the Wehrmacht

On July 23, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 33, which prioritized the conquest of the Crimea. On August 21, Hitler declared that "the capture of the Crimean peninsula is of tremendous importance for the protection of oil supplies from Romania."

The attack on Sevastopol was entrusted to the eleventh army under the command of a colonel general. In October 1941, the army was released from other tasks of the Barbarossa plan, so now it was focused on attacking the Crimea.

Lacking sufficient tanks, Manstein could not carry out the mobile action with which he had succeeded in France. Instead, he relied on his infantry. Romanian troops were also under his command. Some of the Romanians, especially the Mountain Brigade troops, were known as elite fighters, but in general the Romanians were ill-equipped, so they never deployed independently without close German support.

The beginning of the invasion of the Crimea

On October 18, General Erik Hansen, the commander of the 54th German Corps, together with the 22nd, 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, launched an attack on the Soviet 51st Army in Ishuni. Despite the Soviet army being heavily outnumbered and air superior, Hansen's army advanced slowly, capturing Yishun on 28 October after the arrival of three groups of BF109s that overwhelmed the Soviet air force. Soviet troops retreated to Sevastopol, which marked the beginning of the siege.

The beginning of the siege of Sevastopol

Even before the remnants of the Soviet 51st Army began to retreat towards Sevastopol, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky had already prepared thousands of people for the construction of defensive structures.

He also formed several naval infantry units from the ship's sailors; the sailors were not trained in ground combat, but they helped raise the numbers that Oktyabrsky desperately needed on the front lines. On October 30, the Navy's Black Sea Fleet brought in the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade from Novorossiysk to further alleviate the situation.

On October 30, 1941, advanced units of the German 132nd Rifle Division were discovered. The Soviet army opened fire with 305 mm coastal defense guns on the suspected German position; the location of these guns, coastal battery 30, would soon be called "Fort Maxim Gorky I".

Meanwhile, the Soviet naval infantry withstood the first attack on Sevastopol. On November 9, 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26 tanks, 152 guns and 20 mortars arrived from the sea, and Oktyabrsky already had 52,000 soldiers at his disposal.

On November 10, Manstein finally decided that he was prepared enough to launch a full-fledged offensive. The German 50th Rifle Division under General Friedrich Schmidt attacked first, capturing the village of Uppa near the Chernaya River southeast of Sevastopol.

The next day, the 132nd Infantry Division, under the command of Lieutenant General Fritz Lindemann, captured the Mekenzia farm in the northeast. By November 15, the attack was halted by a furious response from Soviet soldiers and sailors, supported by naval artillery from the Paris Commune. Manstein refused to advance on November 21, having lost 2,000 soldiers, although the losses of the Soviet army were much greater.

In December 1941, Oktyabrsky received reinforcements from the sea in the form of the new 388th Rifle Division, and Soviet engineers took advantage of the brief respite to lay extensive minefields while Manstein's men regrouped for another attack.

The next German attack began on December 17, at six in the morning artillery bombardment began. 34 Yu-87 "Shtuka" and 20 bombers were preparing for the attack, which began with the advance of the 22nd Infantry Division into the territories held by the Soviet 8th Naval Brigade north of the Belbek River.

Soon the German 50th and 132nd rifle divisions also launched an attack on central line defense. On December 22, the 8th Naval Brigade retreated towards the city, and on December 23 the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade captured a strategic point southeast of the city.

Meanwhile, the Axis forces also headed towards Kerch on the eastern side of the peninsula. Soviet Lieutenant General Vladimir Lvov made a daring amphibious landing with 5,000 soldiers of the 51st Army on 26 December, followed by a larger landing of 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army with a tank battalion at Feodosiya on 29 December. This move forced Germany to delay the next attack on Sevastopol in order to deal with the new threat.

Previously, Hitler had demanded that Sevastopol be captured by the end of the year in order to raise the morale that had fallen after the unsuccessful invasion of Russia, but this demand was not fulfilled. At that time, the losses of the German army were much higher than expected - only from December 17 to December 31, they lost 8,595 soldiers. The Soviet army, as in almost any battle of the Second World War, received much greater losses of personnel - 7,000 dead and 20,000 prisoners.

On January 15, 1942, Manstein launched a hasty counterattack, capturing Feodosia, however this offensive was launched before his troops were ready, due to which they failed to destroy the 44th and 51st armies, but this attack did not allow the Soviet armies to keep the initiative. The Soviet soldiers knew that it was vital to seize the initiative and launched a series of attacks from February to April 1942. All attacks failed in an attempt to break through the line of defense of the German army, which continued to besiege Sevastopol on land.

The course of the defense of Sevastopol

After a long period of preparation, Manstein decided that the time had come for a new large-scale offensive. On May 8, 1942, he launched Operation Bustard Hunting, which called for an attack by General Maximillian's corps on the Soviet 44th Army on the south coast.

The operation began at four in the morning with a ten-minute artillery barrage, and by half past seven the forward Soviet troops were defeated under the pressure of German attacks from the front and the landing of the 902nd assault group and the 436th infantry regiment in the rear. After numerous German and Romanian forces moved towards Kerch.

On May 9, the important airport in Marfovka, thirty kilometers from which the offensive began, was already captured by German troops, who destroyed 35 I-153 fighters stationed there. Lieutenant General Dmitry Kozlov panicked, which allowed Manstein to advance further with the 22nd Panzer Division, which quickly destroyed the remnants of the 51st Army.

On May 14, German troops entered Kerch from the eastern side of the peninsula, and on May 20 they captured the city completely. Due to the panic and inaction of Kozlov and his men, only 37,000 soldiers were evacuated from Kerch, while 28,000 were killed and 147,000 captured. Manstein's victory effectively destroyed three Soviet armies with only 3,397 casualties.

After Operation Bustard Hunting, 22nd tank division was moved from the Crimea to the north, in preparation for the operation in Kharkov.

With pressure relieved in the east, the Germans again concentrated on Sevastopol, launching Operation Sturgeon Fishing. At five forty in the morning on June 2, 1942, a major bombardment of defensive positions near Sevastopol began. At six in the morning the Luftwaffe joined the attack and dropped 570 tons of bombs.

On the night of June 6, the Soviet army, which had previously fired artillery against the attacks of German batteries, opened fire on German positions. Oktyabrsky knew that this bombardment had to come from the north, otherwise it would not have lasted so long. As Oktyabrsky suspected, the Germans were on the move. The soldiers of the 132nd Rifle Division moved towards the Belbek River, and the 22nd Rifle Division also changed its location. Progress was slow, but the Germans advanced through heavy Soviet mortar fire and air strikes. In the afternoon, at about seven in the evening, the first and only counterattack of the battalion of the Soviet 747 began. rifle regiment; the Germans lost 2,357 men, including 340 killed.

Also, on June 7, Fretter-Pico, whose corps occupied the southern defensive line of the Soviet army, decided that he would not sit back while the generals in the north earned glory in a large-scale offensive, and began to probe the Soviet defenses. He achieved little but success, but his attack resulted in a disproportionate number of casualties, and Manstein forbade him to attack in this manner.

On June 8, the Soviet army launched a counterattack, but despite tank support, coordination between infantry, artillery, and tanks was poor and the attack failed. At ten in the morning the Germans attacked, and, having suffered losses of 1,700 soldiers, advanced three kilometers closer to Sevastopol. On June 9, the 132nd German Rifle Division attacked the coastal battery 30 Fort Maxim Gorky, but was pushed back twice, at ten in the morning and at noon, by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. Several other Soviet counterattacks also took place on June 9, but they did not significantly contribute to the course of the battle.

On June 11, Major General Ivan Petrov launched a large-scale counterattack using all the artillery available in Sevastopol against the German 132nd Infantry Division. The counterattack reached a distance of a kilometer behind the German front line, but the Soviet troops were exhausted both morally and in ammunition to make something of this success. By the end of the day, they had lost the captured territories under the attacks of effective German aircraft. To the south, Fretter-Pico also made another attempt to advance. The 401st Regiment of the German 72nd Rifle Division allowed it to advance two kilometers, and Fretter-Pico sent his reserves, the 266th Rifle Division, and captured one of the forts.

On June 13, Hansen's corps captured Fort Stalin, which was a weakly defended anti-aircraft position with three machine gun points. Despite only 200 soldiers inside, the fort's defenders fought bravely for over an hour before falling. At five thirty in the morning, when the Soviet troops learned that Fort Stalin had fallen, the nearest fort, Volga, opened fire on it, followed by a counterattack that failed to recapture the fort. Nearly all of the fort's two hundred defenders were dead. Smaller but fierce battles like the one at Fort Stalin were repeated over the next few days in a war of attrition.

On June 16, Hansen dispatched the 132nd Infantry Division against Coastal Battery 30, Fort Maxim Gorky, while the 22nd and 24th Rifle Divisions attacked the center of the Soviet line of defense held by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division, broke through the defenses, destroying the front line and leaving shore battery 30 itself. The German 436th and 437th Infantry Regiments reached the fort and began their attack. A strike bomber destroyed the fort's western tower as the others slowed down due to lack of ammunition. Under such pressure, the entire northern defense line collapsed. While the Germans were methodically clearing Soviet bunkers with grenades and flamethrowers, on June 20 their troops reached Severnaya Bay. On June 21, after a two-day battle, the Germans captured Fort Lenin along with 158 prisoners. On June 23, Fort Konstantinovsky was captured. With the defeat of the northern defenses, Hansen's troops moved south, where Fretter-Pico advanced much more slowly.

To compensate for the slow advance of the corps, Romanian reinforcements were called in. Prior to this, the detachments of Major General George Avramescu were not instructed to carry out any major offensives. However, when they launched their first major offensive, they proved their worth by breaking through Soviet defenses near the Chernaya River, where the Germans failed, capturing a Soviet stronghold dubbed "Bastion II", and then driving off a counterattack. On June 27, Hansen's troops joined forces with Avramescu's troops east of the Chernaya River.

On June 29, at night, the German troops achieved the effect of complete surprise when the 902nd and 90th assault teams crossed the North Bay with 130 boats. The Soviet forces realized what was happening too late and fired flares to alert headquarters when the coast was already overrun. Petrov had six T-26 tanks at his disposal, which could have been used to protect the coastline, but due to his indecision, the moment was lost. In the south, the German corps attacked, defeating the 7th Soviet naval brigade and the 775th rifle regiment. German victories on the border of the Northern Bay and in the south cut off the Soviet troops, weakening them for the upcoming attack on Sevastopol.

On the night of June 30, Soviet troops destroyed a large ammunition depot near Severnaya Bay to prevent the Germans from capturing it. This warehouse was inside a champagne factory whose buildings also served as a field hospital for 2,000 wounded, some of whom may have still been in the building when it collapsed.

On June 30, the order was given to evacuate Sevastopol. All defenses afterward fell as the soldiers ran in every possible way for their lives. On July 1, Petrov and Oktyabrsky left the city in a submarine, leaving behind 23,000 people, many of them wounded. Later that day, German troops entered the city. Manstein tried to exclude the Romanians from the final offensive, not wanting to share the glory with them, but Major General Georg Manoli disobeyed the order, sending the 4th Mountain Division into the city and placing the Romanian flag on the statue of Nakhimov. final act The defiance was committed by troops of the 109th Rifle Division fighting bunkers around Coastal Battery 35 and men who were fighting on the airstrip at Cape Khersones. Both flanks were defeated on 4 July.

The result of the battle for Sevastopol

The battle for Sevastopol cost both sides a lot, even according to the most modest calculations. About 18,000 Soviet soldiers died, 95,000 were captured, only 25,157 people were successfully evacuated. The German 11th Army suffered 4,264 dead, 21,626 wounded and 1,522 missing, for a total of about 27,000 soldiers. Romanian casualties were 1,597 dead, 6,571 wounded and 277 missing, for a total of 8,454.

The city itself was also badly damaged, mainly due to prolonged and powerful artillery shelling, half of the buildings in Sevastopol were destroyed. The capture of Sevastopol had.

Epilogue

Even before the city was completely captured, Manstein received the rank of field marshal for his victory, and a vacation in Romania. As soon as he left, For the next two years, Germany held the city, and the killings continued under the control of SS Gruppenführer Alvenslieben.

Turned into colossal losses for the Red Army, ended with the retreat of our troops. The summary of the Soviet Information Bureau noted "selfless courage, fury in the fight against the enemy and the dedication of the defenders." The first years of the war were not easy for us, not everyone could even believe in the reality of everything that was happening - it seemed like a terrible dream. The stoic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 entered the history of the country all the brighter, but at the same time more tragic. The heroism and courage of all those who were involved in the events of those days are immeasurable.

Surrender Odessa, but keep Crimea

By September 12, 1941, the Germans came close to the Crimea. The peninsula was of strategic importance both to us and to the invaders. From here, a direct air route opened to the oil-industrial points of Romania, which supplied the Wehrmacht troops with fuel. With the loss of these routes, our aviation was deprived of the opportunity to destroy the fuel reserves of the Germans by bombing, and they, in turn, could receive not only Romanian oil products, but also Soviet ones - the road to the Caucasus, to our reserves, was opened for them. The headquarters of the Red Army understood the importance of free flights of aircraft of the opposing sides, so it was decided to transfer additional units to the Crimea, recalling them from Odessa. Thus, to save the peninsula, an entire city had to be sacrificed. The battle for Sevastopol, which had to be held by any means, was carried out from water, air and land.

By the end of September, Kyiv and most of Ukraine, Smolensk, all approaches to Leningrad were under the Germans, it was scary to think about the blockade of which. In addition, the proximity of the enemy army and its too rapid advance inland spoke of a protracted and difficult war. By September, in the battles near Uman and Kiev, units of the Southwestern Front were utterly defeated, now it has come to the Crimea Great War. The defense of Sevastopol became that last frontier on the peninsula, the successful defense of which could, albeit a little, but hold back the offensive breakthrough of the German army.

Along the Perekop Isthmus

The only land route through which it was possible to get to the Crimea was the Perekop Isthmus. The 11th Army of the Wehrmacht opposed the 51st Separate Army formed in August, which was entrusted with the defense of the peninsula. The Soviet troops were commanded by Colonel-General f. I. Kuznetsov, German - commander Erich von Manstein. To the credit of the enemy, it is worth noting that one of Hitler's most talented military leaders spoke on the enemy side. Unfortunately, on both sides of the front, sometimes against each other, quite worthy people fought who could compete in professionalism in peacetime if they had not been made mortal enemies by the Great Patriotic War. Sevastopol and the defense of the Crimea in this regard can serve as an indicator of the competence of the military leaders of the opposing armies.

The 51st Separate Army included three rifle divisions: the 276th under the command of Major General I.S. Savinov, the 156th, commanded by Major General P.V. Chernyaev, and the 106th, under the command of Colonel A N. Pervushina. Savinov was supposed to defend the Chongar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit. Chernyaev was faced with the task of holding the Perekop positions directly to the last, and Pervushin’s division, stretched along the southern coast of the Sivash for 70 km, had to block the road of the German army on its way to Sevastopol on its sector of the front. The year 1941 became indicative for not only in terms of the defense of the Crimea, but also in the degree of preparation for the war in general.

In the battles for Perekop

In addition to rifle divisions, the 51st Army also included cavalry divisions, there were also three of them: the 48th under the command of Major General D.I. Averkin, the 42nd Colonel V.V. Glagolev and the 40th Colonel F.F. . Kudyurova. All three divisions of the 51st Army, plus the 271st Rifle Division under the command of Colonel M.A. Titov, were supposed to hold back tank attacks on the Perekop Isthmus and not let the enemy deep into the peninsula, where the battle for Sevastopol was already brewing. Four Crimean divisions: 172nd, 184th, 320th and 321st - guarded the coast. They were commanded, respectively, by colonels I. G. Toroptsev, V. N. Abramov, M. V. Vinogradov and I. M. Aliev.

On September 24, the Germans went on the offensive. Two infantry units, supported by artillery and aircraft, made an attempt to break through the Perekop isthmus. By September 26, they stormed the Turkish Wall and captured the city of Armyansk. Two rifle and one cavalry divisions thrown to the defense of the city, organized by the commander of the operational group, Lieutenant General P. I. Batov, did not create any special obstacles for the German army - their offensive was so powerful. By September 30, Soviet troops left their previous positions and retreated.

Departure to the Taman Peninsula

Having entrenched themselves in the Ishun positions, by October 18, when the 11th German Army launched a new offensive, the 9th Rifle Corps and several separate units of the Black Sea Fleet regrouped and prepared to adequately meet the enemy’s blow. Of course, the forces were not equal. The leaders of the defense of Sevastopol understood that without reinforcements they would not be able to restrain the advance of the German army, but fierce battles were going on along the entire front, and there was no way to transfer additional units under the Ishun positions.

The battle went on for 5 days, during which the enemy pushed the Soviet troops even further deep into the peninsula. The arrival of the Primorsky Army did not save the situation either. Manstein, having fresh forces at his disposal, threw two infantry divisions to the front line, which on October 28 broke through the defenses. Parts of the Red Army were forced to withdraw near Sevastopol. The history of the city was replenished with new, most tragic pages for all the years of its existence.

It was not easy near Kerch, where our troops also retreated. All the mountainous terrain in the district served as one battlefield. All attempts by the Red Army to gain a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula were unsuccessful - the 42nd German Army Corps of three divisions defeated the main forces of our 51st Army, and on November 16, its surviving battalions were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The future Hero Cities of Sevastopol Kerch experienced the full power of the Wehrmacht. In order to break through to the southern coast of Crimea, the German army was replenished with the 54th Army Corps, which included two infantry divisions and a motorized brigade, and the 30th Army Corps, also consisting of two infantry divisions.

On the way to Sevastopol

The impenetrable power at the beginning of the war was the Sevastopol Defensive Region (SOR), which was perhaps the most fortified place in European territory. This included several dozen gun positions reinforced with pillboxes, forts armed with large-caliber artillery, or, as they were called in those years, armored turret batteries (BB). The defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 dragged on for several months, largely due to the very fortified defensive area.

Throughout November 1941, fighting continued on the distant approaches to the city. The defense was held by the infantry of the Black Sea Fleet, since by that time there were practically no ground forces of the 51st Army on the peninsula - they were evacuated. Separate anti-aircraft, artillery and training units, as well as coastal batteries, helped the infantry. The remnants of Soviet divisions scattered along the coast also joined the ranks of the city's defenders, but they were negligible. So we can safely say that the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 was carried out exclusively by the forces of the Black Sea.

By November, the Soviet grouping numbered about 20 thousand sailors. But at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, they understood how important it was to keep this last frontier of the Crimea, and the Sevastopol garrison was reinforced by units of the Primorsky Army, which had previously defended Odessa, commanded by Major General I.E. Petrov.

Reinforcements were transferred by sea, since there was no other way. The defensive garrison was replenished with 36,000 manpower, several hundred guns, dozens of tons of ammunition, tanks and other weapons. From November 9 to 11, the Wehrmacht army managed to completely surround Sevastopol from land, and in the next 10 days wedged into the defense line in several places. Then there was a pause in the fighting.

united front

The hero cities of Sevastopol Kerch in those difficult days of the war for the country received their immortality at the cost of the death of thousands of their defenders, who found the strength to resist the more powerful enemy army. After a short lull, the fighting in the Crimea resumed with particular ruthlessness in the first days of January 1942. In Evpatoria, occupied by that time by the Romanians, an uprising broke out, organized by the local population and the partisan formations that had rushed to it. On January 5, units of the Black Sea Fleet that landed on the coast were transferred to the city.

The first battles brought a small victory to the united Soviet troops - the Romanian garrison was driven out of the city. But the superiority of the defenders was short-lived: on January 7, having pulled up reserves, the Germans defeated the landing units. Many of our soldiers were taken prisoner. The weapon was also lost. At the turn of Alushta - Sevastopol, which for a long time was held by defensive troops, the Germans were also now in charge. From now on, all hopes were turned to the coast, where the defense of Sevastopol was reliably carried out for a long time. There were practically no days of silence, shelling of the city was carried out constantly.

Under the blows of the Luftwaffe

On the city, in addition to artillery, Manstein threw his strike force- Luftwaffe. Army Group "South", which consisted of two air corps, which numbered about 750 aircraft, was also supported by the German fleet. For the complete capture of the Crimean peninsula, Hitler spared neither equipment nor manpower. The fifth air corps of the Luftwaffe was deployed near Sevastopol just at the beginning of the winter of 1941, and already in May of the 42nd, this deadly equipment was able to provide tangible support for the ground operation conducted by Manstein. The defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, despite the steadfastness and courage of the Black Sea sailors, did not last long after enemy aircraft attacked the city. Moreover, just in the spring, the eighth air corps, commanded by V. von Richthoffen, was transferred to this sector of the front. Hitler assigned one of his best military leaders to the most complex and responsible ground operations.

The heroes of the defense of Sevastopol, who survived and remained alive after those fierce battles, shared their memories of the ongoing bombing of the city. Every day, Luftwaffe planes dropped tons of high-explosive bombs on Sevastopol. Our military recorded up to 600 sorties daily. In total, more than two and a half thousand tons of bombs were dropped, including large-caliber ones - up to a thousand kilograms each.

All German power - to storm the city

The conquerors paid tribute to the artillery forts of Sevastopol. For so long, it was possible to resist the many times superior forces of the opponent only if there were long-term defensive structures, which were exactly in the Crimea. To destroy them, the Germans had to use large-caliber siege artillery. Over two hundred batteries, which consisted of heavy guns, Manstein placed along a line 22 kilometers long. In addition to heavy 300 mm and 350 mm howitzers, super-heavy 800 mm siege guns were also used.

A gun was secretly delivered from Germany, especially for a breakthrough in the Sevastopol direction. total weight over a thousand tons. It was placed in the rocks not far from Bakhchisaray. It was impossible to resist such power. Participants in the defense of Sevastopol said that not a single weapon had such a deafening roar and destructive power.

For a long time, the German troops could not start an assault on the city - the partisans, the weather and the lack of a clearly developed offensive plan interfered. But by the spring of 1942, everything was ready. For the summer assault, the German 11th Army was reinforced with six new corps: the 54th, 30th, 42nd, 7th Romanian, 8th Romanian and 8th Aviation Corps. As can be seen from the description of the corps, they had both ground troops and air forces.

In the ring of fire

The 42nd and 7th corps were located on it, they were planned to be used for ground operations and brought into battle only to replace the defeated divisions. The 4th Mountain and 46th Infantry were to enter at the last stage of the battle, so that the enemy had four divisions with relatively fresh forces for the final capture of the city. So in the end it turned out - under the powerful onslaught of German units, the multi-day defense of Sevastopol ended. The Second World War lasted only a year, there were three more ahead, and the losses of Soviet troops on the Crimean sector of the front alone were colossal. But no one thought to surrender to the superior forces of the enemy - they stood to the last. They understood that the decisive battle would be fatal for the majority, but they did not see a different fate for themselves.

The Wehrmacht was also preparing for heavy losses. The command of the 11th Army, in addition to the reserve hidden on the outskirts of Sevastopol, requested from the headquarters an additional three infantry and several anti-aircraft artillery regiments. Three divisions of self-propelled guns, a separate tank battalion and deployed batteries of super-heavy guns were waiting in the wings.

Many years later, when WWII researchers summed up the results of the battle, which went down in history as the Defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, it turned out that Hitler did not use such a massive use of aviation and artillery throughout the Second World War.

As for the ratio of manpower, at the beginning of the defense, according to experts, it was almost equal, both on one side and on the other side of the front. But by the summer of 1942, the numerical superiority of the German army was undeniable. The decisive assault on Sevastopol began on June 7, but for almost a month the Soviet troops held the line.

Last Assault

Stubborn confrontation did not subside for almost the entire first week. Perfectly protected in pillboxes and forts, the Black Sea sailors put up mortal resistance - a lot of Wehrmacht soldiers died on the outskirts of Sevastopol.

The decisive battle, which changed the course of the confrontation, took place on June 17 in the southern sector. The Germans took up a position known in history as the "Eagle's Nest" and approached the foot of the Sapun Mountain. By that time, the fort "Stalin", which held the defense on the north side, had already been captured by German soldiers. The Mekenzian Height was also in their hands. By evening, several more forts passed to the advancing, among which was Maxim Gorky-1, as the Germans called it, with a BB-30 battery. The entire North Bay could now be freely fired upon by German artillery. With the loss of the BB-30 battery, the defenders lost contact with the regular Red Army on the other side of the front. The delivery of ammunition and the approach of reinforcements became impossible. But the inner ring of defense was still dangerous for the Germans.

The southern coast of the Northern Bay was fortified quite strongly, and Manstein did not dare to storm it on the move. He gambled on the surprise factor to avoid losing too much. On the night of June 28-29, on almost silent inflatable boats, the advanced units of the 30 Corps approached the bay unnoticed and began the assault. By the evening of June 30, Malakhov Kurgan was captured.

The defenders were running out of ammunition and food, at headquarters they decided to evacuate the highest and senior command staff defense forces of Sevastopol, as well as the party activists of the city. It's about saving sailors, soldiers, including the wounded, as well as the lowest officers didn't go...

Terrible loss figures

It was possible to carry out with the use of aviation, submarines and light watercraft, which are in the assets of the Black Sea Fleet. In total, about 700 people of the top leadership of the troops were taken out of the peninsula, aviation delivered about two hundred more people to the Caucasus. Several thousand sailors were able to escape from the encirclement on light ships. On July 1, the defense of Sevastopol was practically stopped. At some lines, the sounds of shots were still heard, but they were of a local nature. Abandoned by the commanders, the Primorsky Army withdrew to where for another three days it also stubbornly resisted the enemy. In an unequal struggle, thousands of Crimean defenders died, the rest were taken prisoner. Established in memory of those events, the medal for the defense of Sevastopol was received by a few survivors. As the German command reported to its headquarters, at Cape Khersones they managed to capture over a hundred thousand Soviet soldiers and sailors, but Manstein denied this information, declaring only forty thousand prisoners. According to Soviet data, the army lost 78,230 captured soldiers from the survivors. Information about weapons is fundamentally different from those provided by the Germans to their command.

With the loss of Sevastopol, the position of the Red Army deteriorated significantly, until the days when our troops entered the city as victors. It happened in the memorable year 1944, and there were long months and miles of war ahead ...

Defense of Sevastopol 1941-1942 The unusually favorable strategic position of the Crimean peninsula at all times forced opponents to fight fiercely for its possession.

Was no exception. The operation to capture the Crimean peninsula by the German army was the most important in terms of "Barbarossa".

The battle for the Crimea, and in particular for Sevastopol, is one of the most heroic and dramatic pages of the Great Patriotic War.

Strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula

For the advancing army of the Nazis, it was a vital springboard because:

direct and shortest airlifts of oil products from Romania became available, which were necessary for aviation and tank formations of the Wehrmacht army;

the shortest road to the Caucasus was opened, where the main reserves of Soviet oil were concentrated.

The loss of the Crimea for the Soviet army is the loss of the ability of our aviation to destroy the fuel reserves of the German army at close range.

The situation on the fronts

The position of the Red Army by the end of the summer of 1941 was not just difficult - it was catastrophic. The blockade closed around Leningrad. Smolensk and Kyiv fell. Most of Ukraine was captured by the enemy, and by mid-September 1941, the Wehrmacht troops came close to the Crimea.

Defense of Sevastopol WWII photo

The command of the Red Army was well aware of the strategic importance of this region and transferred military units defending Odessa to its defense. The Soviet troops are the 51st Separate Army, formed in August 1941 specifically for the defense of the Crimea, under the command of Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov.

German troops advanced with the forces of the 11th Wehrmacht Army, commanded by one of the talented German military leaders and Hitler's favorite Erich von Manstein.

The defense of the Crimea and the defense of Sevastopol were organized competently and took place without any serious mistakes on the part of the Soviet command. But our troops lacked equipment, which the German army had in abundance. As a result of fierce battles, Soviet troops were pushed back to Sevastopol, which by the end of September 1941 remained practically the only center of resistance.

Defense of Sevastopol

Sevastopol fought and was not going to give up when almost the entire Crimea was in the hands of the enemy. The selfless defenders of Sevastopol, who showed extraordinary heroism, courage, devotion and courage, pulled back significant enemy forces, preventing him from finally gaining a foothold on the peninsula and moving on. The whole city was on fire. They tried to capture it simultaneously from land, water and air.

Defense of Sevastopol photo

German troops received fresh reinforcements. The enemy army was reinforced by a motorized corps and two infantry divisions. But at first, all the attempts of the Germans were in vain, I do not look at all the military power. The Sevastopol defensive region was one of the most fortified places that the German army had to face.

Thanks to well-fortified weapons positions, which consisted of pillboxes, minefields, forts with large-caliber artillery, the defense of Sevastopol stretched out for several months.

Heroic participants in the defense of Sevastopol

Until December 1941, the defenders of Sevastopol held the enemy on the distant approaches to the city. The remnants of the ground forces of the 51st Army were by this time evacuated to mainland and the defense of the city was carried out by infantry sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Their number was about 20 thousand.

Scattered forces from the surviving formations and units of anti-aircraft and artillery coastal batteries poured into the number of defenders of the city. But for the full protection of Sevastopol, this was a drop in the ocean. The command of the Red Army replenished the garrison of defenders with a 36,000-strong Primorsky Army, which was transferred by sea from Odessa.

In addition to manpower, several hundred guns, tens of tons of ammunition, as well as tanks were transferred. But by mid-November, Sevastopol was completely surrounded by land, and the siege of the city began. Until January 1942, no decisive military action was taken - the Germans accumulated forces and transferred super-heavy artillery. And already in early January, the entire power of aviation and ground artillery fell upon the city, which did not stop day or night.

More than 700 Luftwaffe aircraft made almost 600 sorties daily and dropped tons of bombs on the city and its defenders. Manstein's special large-caliber ground artillery ironed the city from land. The German fleet did not allow any serious naval operations to be carried out. But despite all the super powerful efforts of the Nazis, the defense of Sevastopol stretched out until the end of June 1942.

Only after the Germans, at the cost of huge losses, were able to capture the position called the Eagle's Nest and ended up at the foot of the Sapun Mountain, it became clear that the days of Sevastopol were numbered. On the night of June 29, the German landing forces crushed the heroic defenders of the Malakhov Kurgan. After this event, the defense of the city ended.

The surviving defenders of the city retreated to Cape Khersones. All who could not evacuate or break through the German ring were captured. The Germans transmitted information about one hundred thousand prisoners. The Soviet command called the figure 78 thousand 230 people.

In memory of the courage and heroism of the defenders of the city, in December 1942, the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol" was established. It is a pity that the fallen heroes who received this award, there were many more survivors. For the heroism and courage of its defenders, the city of Sevastopol was awarded the title Hero City .