The influence of Soviet ideology on literature. Soviet ideology. The establishment of Stalin's personality cult. Ideology and politics of Stalinism. Massive political repression
Soviet literature is a set of literary works published in the Soviet Union (1922-1991).
Story
After the October Revolution of 1917, Russian literature was divided into two parts: Soviet literature and literature of the white emigration. The Soviet Union provided a highly developed printing industry, but at the same time applied ideological censorship.
With the victory of the Russian revolution, the poets of the early twentieth century worked to substantiate the facts of the new reality. Poems of a revolutionary nature were created by representatives of the Silver Age of Russian literature, poets V. V. Mayakovsky (“Ode to the Revolution”, “Vladimir Ilyich Lenin”, “Left March”, “Good!”), A. A. Blok (“The Twelve”), S. A. Yesenin (“Anna Snegina”) and others. The work of revolutionary poets played an important role in the creation of new poetry.
socialist realism
In the 1930s, socialist realism became the dominant trend in Russian literature. The leading figure in this style was the writer Maxim Gorky, who laid the foundations of Soviet literature with the novel "Mother" and the play "Enemies" (both 1906). Gorky's autobiographical trilogy describes his path from the poor strata of society to the development of political consciousness. The novel The Artamonov Case (1925) and the play Egor Bulychov and Others (1932) depict the fall of the ruling classes in Russia.
Maxim Gorky defined socialist realism as "the realism of people restoring the world". He considered the main task of the authors to be assistance in the development of a new person in a socialist society. A significant contribution to the development of socialist realism was also made by the Soviet writers A. A. Fadeev, A. S. Serafimovich, A. N. Ostrovsky, K. A. Fedin, D. A. Furmanov and others.
Maxim Gorky initiated the founding of the Writers' Union of the USSR in 1934 and became its first chairman. The charter of the organization proclaimed socialist realism, based on the principles of internationalism, nationality and party spirit, as the main method of Soviet literature.
The first years of the Soviet state were marked by the spread of avant-garde literary groups. One of the leading movements was the OBERIU, which included D. Kharms, K. Vaginov, A. Vvedensky, N. Zabolotsky. A group of literary critics, OPOYAZ, known as Russian Formalism, interacted with the Futurists. The early Soviet literary associations also include LEF, VOAPP, and Proletkult.
Independent writers
Soviet writers who, like members of the Brothers Serapionov group, defended the right of the author to write regardless of political ideology, were forced by the authorities to deny their views and accept the principles of socialist realism. Some writers of the 1930s, such as M. A. Bulgakov and B. L. Pasternak, continued the classical tradition of Russian literature in their novels with little hope of publication. The works of writers were not published until the "Khrushchev thaw", B. L. Pasternak was also forced to refuse the Nobel Prize.
Expatriate writers
Writers whose works contradicted the ideology of the Soviet state were often exiled. Russian emigrant writers V. F. Khodasevich, G. V. Ivanov, M. A. Aldanov, G. I. Gazdanov and V. V. Nabokov, I. A. Bunin and others continued to write in exile.
"Khrushchev thaw" in literature
The period of "Khrushchev's thaw" (mid-1950s-60s) brought a new breath to Soviet literature. Poetry became a mass cultural phenomenon: B. A. Akhmadulina, A. A. Voznesensky, R. I. Rozhdestvensky, E. A. Yevtushenko read their own poems in public, which attracted crowds.
"Dissident Writers"
Some writers dared to oppose the Soviet state, such as V. T. Shalamov and A. I. Solzhenitsyn, who wrote about life in the Gulag camps, V. S. Grossman with his stories about the events of World War II, which contradicted the official historiography of the USSR . Such writers were called dissidents and were banned from publishing until the 1960s. The time of the “Khrushchev thaw” passed quickly. In the 1970s, famous authors were again banned from publication and persecuted by the authorities for anti-Soviet sentiments. Many writers were expelled from the country.
In Soviet literature of the 1970s and 80s, children's literature, science fiction, detective stories, and rural prose were common genres. It is noteworthy that fiction associated with the occult, horror, adult fantasy or magical realism was not welcomed in Soviet Russia. A rare exception is M. A. Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita, which was not published during the author's lifetime. Literary works from the Soviet era, including adaptations and translations of foreign texts, were censored before publication.
SOVIET IDEOLOGY
The Soviet Union was the first super-society on a huge scale in the history of mankind. In its social organization, not just statehood, but super-statehood, not just an economy, but super-economics, not just an ideology, but a super-ideology has developed. I will return to this topic below. And here I will give a brief description of the Soviet ideological sphere. I will use the word "ideology" and not "super-ideology" so as not to complicate the presentation.
The Soviet ideology was state, obligatory for all Soviet citizens. Deviations from it, and even more so the struggle against it, were considered a crime and punished.
The Soviet ideology was officially considered to be Marxism-Leninism. This is true in the sense that Marxism and Leninism served as the basis and historical source material for it, as well as a model for imitation. But it is wrong to reduce it to Marxism-Leninism. It took shape after the revolution of 1917. Thousands of Soviet people, including Stalin and his associates, took part in its development. It included only a part of the ideas and texts of 19th-century Marxism, and in a thoroughly revised form. Even from the works of Lenin, not everything literally entered into it in the form in which it arose in its time. Leninism generally entered it to a large extent in the Stalinist presentation. The reflection of the life of mankind and the intellectual material of the twentieth century has taken its place in it.
Soviet ideology declared itself as a science. This claim is due to historical reasons. It is difficult to name a topic that would not be in the sphere of attention of Soviet ideology. But its core consisted of the following three sections: 1) dialectical materialism (philosophy); 2) historical materialism (sociology); 3) the doctrine of a communist society (it was called "scientific communism").
Marxist philosophy did not become a science of the world, of knowledge of the world and of thinking, for reasons of both an ideological and non-ideological nature. However, this does not in the least detract from the role that she actually played in Soviet society. She led a colossal educational work, which history had not known before. Through her and thanks to her, the achievements of science of the past and present have become the property of the general population. Anti-Soviet criticism drew attention to individual cases where Soviet philosophy played a conservative role (relativity theory, genetics, cybernetics, etc.), and exaggerated these cases so that they overshadowed everything else. But they actually affected a small part of the pro-Western intelligentsia, who understood little about it. Moreover, they brought with them new types of ideological falsification of the achievements of science.
In the sphere of social phenomena, Soviet ideology felt like a complete monopoly. She was sincerely convinced that she alone provided a truly scientific understanding of society. And she had reason to do so. Everything that was done outside of Marxism in relation to the understanding of society from the point of view of the level and breadth of understanding did not in the least surpass what was done in Marxism. In the modern science of social phenomena, there is no less nonsense than in ideology, and the narrowness and pettiness of the results does not draw on the level of general sociological theory. In the modern science of society, not only is there no decent general sociological theory, but there are not even theories relating to individual types of societies. And the Marxist-Leninist social doctrine, although not a scientific theory in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless claimed to explain the historical process as a whole and to explain the main participants in this process - the capitalist and communist systems.
The main goal of the communist ideology in a non-communist society was to substantiate the ways of transforming a given society into a communist one, as the latter seemed to be, namely, as the socialization of all means of production, the elimination of classes of private owners and entrepreneurs (capitalists and landlords), the seizure of political power by the communist party, the centralization of the entire system power and control, etc. And what the ideology has said on this score is not a lie or nonsense, but an eminently serious matter. It was a setting for action, reflecting some aspect of reality. This was the intellectual aspect of the socio-political struggle.
The main goal of the Soviet ideology in the established communist society was the apologetics of this society, the justification of ways to preserve and strengthen it, the justification of the best tactics and strategy for its relations with the outside world. And again, this was not a lie or nonsense. When Soviet ideology, for example, spoke of the absence of classes of capitalists and landlords in the USSR, of the absence of antagonistic contradictions between workers and peasants, of the leading role of the party, of the split of the world into two systems, of the struggle of the peoples of the world for liberation from colonialism, and so on. she didn't lie. She simply stated some obvious facts of reality and gave them her own interpretation.
Ideology from the first days of the existence of communist society has become a practical tool for the activity of the general leadership of society. When the leaders of the Soviet Union said that they were acting in accordance with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, they were not lying or hypocritical. Marxism was in fact a guide to action for them. But not literally, but through a certain system of interpretation, as it should be done with respect to ideological texts. The ideology in this case set a common goal for the leaders of the country, which, regardless of its achievability or unattainability, played an organizing role and indicated the main ways for society to move in the direction of this goal. Ideology gave a unified orientation to the process of society's life and established a unified framework and principles for the activity of its leadership.
The doctrine of the highest stage of communism (complete communism) forms a kind of heavenly part of Marxism. Here this paradise is brought down from heaven to earth. And he was promised, albeit in an indefinite future, but still not after the death of all people, but during the life of our descendants.
Heavenly communism of ideology is not just a beautiful fairy tale. He performed certain ideological functions. People tend to dream of a better future. Dreaming is not believing. You can dream without faith. The dream smooths out the troubles of real life and brings some relief. Ideology satisfied this need of people in abundance, and all variants of such dreams. Different people imagined heavenly communism in fact in different ways. To some it was presented as a society where there will be spiritual relations between people, to others as an abundance of consumer goods. One - as an opportunity to selflessly work, the other - as an opportunity to just as selflessly mess around.
Paradise communism played the role of an ideal towards which society as a whole should strive. And the point here is mainly not in the depiction of the ideal, but in the very fact of its existence, in its formal organizing role. The fact that the goal was unattainable played a secondary role. The goal played the role not of a scientific prediction, but of an orientation and organizing mass consciousness. The country lived with the consciousness of a great historical mission, which justified all the difficulties and misfortunes that befell it. The emergence of such an epoch-making goal was not an accident for communist society. It was a necessary factor in his life as an organic whole. It gave historical meaning to its existence.
The ideological mechanism of Soviet society in its main features was formed in the pre-war years. But he reached his highest state in the post-war years, especially after the death of Stalin. The task of the ideological mechanism included the following. First, to preserve the ideological teaching in the form in which it is canonized at the present time. Protect him from heresies, schisms, revisions, alien influences. Keep the teaching up to date. Important party and state decisions were made. The leaders made long speeches. Important events were taking place in the world. So the ideologues constantly had to "renew" the doctrine, at least with fresh examples to the old dogmas. To carry out the interpretation of everything that happens in the world in the spirit of ideological teaching and in its interests. Secondly, to exercise total ideological control over the entire "spiritual" sphere of society. Thirdly, to carry out ideological indoctrination of the population, to create the required ideological state in society, to suppress any deviations from ideological norms.
Ideological indoctrination of people (ideological "stupefaction") was the basis, essence, core of the process of forming a person in a communist society and preserving him in this capacity. This process began with the birth of a person, continued throughout his life and ended only with his death. Ideological indoctrination covered all strata of society and all spheres of people's lives - their work and social activities, non-work pastime, recreation, entertainment, family relationships, friendship, love, and even illness and crime. And it was not only dupe and deceit. It was also a positive activity for the adaptation of the masses of people to the conditions of their social existence, without which the long life of a human being as a whole is generally impossible.
- Soviet ideology
Introduction. The ideology of Soviet society
1 The ideological attitudes of Soviet society in the spiritual and cultural sphere
2 The ideology of reforming industry and agriculture
3 USSR policy in the military sphere: the burden of global power. The religious component of Soviet society
1 Soviet government and traditional religions. Nomenklatura - ruling class
1 Consistent growth of the crisis of Soviet power in the era of "Developed socialism"
2 Shadow sector in the USSR
3 The emergence and development of Soviet dissidence
Conclusion
Literature
Applications
Introduction
Most of the people who live in modern Russia, witnessed historical events comparable in scale and tragedy to the collapse of a number of large states and entire empires. These historical events are connected with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This huge state in the last years of its existence tried to take measures to prevent such a development of events. this set of measures of an economic, foreign policy and ideological nature is usually called "perestroika".
However, nothing that has happened and is happening in the post-Soviet space since M.S. Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (March 1985) cannot be understood if one does not clearly understand the scale and nature of the crisis that hit the Soviet society by the beginning of the 80s. years. The fact that at first it manifested itself in chronic fevers, and more like a catarrhal chill than a crushing illness, should not obscure from us either its size or its depth. This should be the starting point in all subsequent discussions about the fate of peoples and states in the post-Soviet space.
Leadership of the USSR period 60-80 years. proclaimed the so-called "period of developed socialism", which indefinitely postponed the construction of communism. The sad result of this period of national history was the collapse of the multinational Soviet Union, but also of the entire world system of socialism.
The Russian Federation, essentially built on the same federal principle, today is also experiencing serious economic, political and ideological difficulties. Our country today faces a real threat of regional separatism, and therefore a threat to its territorial unity. All this makes it relevant to study the period of developed socialism in terms of identifying miscalculations and mistakes of the leadership, studying the growth of negative processes in the economy and politics of the country, which ultimately led to the liquidation of the state itself.
The object of this thesis work is the period of the history of the USSR, called in the historical literature "the period of developed socialism".
The subject of our study is the Soviet society of the period of developed socialism, social structure of this society, the economic and political processes taking place in it.
The comparative-historical method and civilizational approach served as the methodological foundations of this study.
The history of the USSR, by historical standards, is not a very long time period. An even smaller period of time falls directly on the period that was proclaimed “developed socialism. However, the number of changes that it brought in all spheres of public life, the development of technology, culture, international relations, its significance is unprecedented in the history of mankind and will determine its course and direction for a long time to come. Therefore, it is most effective to study the history of developed socialism based on the continuity of the development of the USSR and its relations with the outside world. Such continuity makes it possible to reveal a comparatively historical method of research.
The meaning of cultural-historical types, or civilizations, is that each of them expresses the idea of man in its own way, and the totality of these ideas is something universal. The world domination of one civilization would be the impoverishment of humanity.
In modern and recent times, the question of Russia's belonging to the European or Asian civilization is constantly discussed in the domestic historical and philosophical sciences. Eurasianism, as a third approach, considered Russian culture not just as a part of European culture, but also as a completely independent culture that absorbed the experience of not only the West, but equally the East. The Russian people, from this point of view, cannot be attributed to either Europeans or Asians, because it belongs to a completely original ethnic community - Eurasia.
After the revolution, East and West within Russia abruptly drew closer. The dominant type in the public mind was the primitive "Westerners" only armed not with Buchner, but with Marx.
A feature of the Soviet era is the propaganda demonization of Western civilization in the eyes of society. It is clear why this was done: the West, as a starting point, is a competitor to the "only true" ideology. For the same reasons, they fought with religion. In this case, prepared facts were used, i.e. real-life vices of the West, amplified by propaganda to deafening power. As a result, the ability to hear the nuances of the West, a balanced attitude towards it, which was characteristic of both Chaadaev and Khomyakov, was completely lost in the Soviet era. Long before this, O. Spengler noted that capitalism and socialism see each other not as they are, but as if through a mirror glass onto which their own internal problems are projected. Those. The “image of the enemy” created in the USSR, including in the era of “developed socialism”, is an image of the worst features of oneself that consciousness would not want to notice. All this determines the need to consider the features of the development of the USSR during the times of “developed socialism”, using traditional views on Russian civilization and its place among other civilizations of the planet.1
The territorial scope of our study includes not only the territory of the USSR, but also the countries that in one way or another were in the zone of influence of this state. Among them are both the countries of the socialist camp and the leading powers of the capitalist world. A number of non-aligned and Third World countries are also mentioned.
The chronological framework of this work covers the period from 1971 to 1985, which included the era of the so-called "developed socialism". This fifteen-year period is determined by the statement of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, which proclaimed the construction of developed socialism in the USSR (1971) and the election of M. S. Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary in 1985.
However, the views of historians on the historical period of the existence of Soviet society and the state that we are studying are far from homogeneous. Not all researchers evaluate it unambiguously negatively. So the Italian historian, researcher of the history of the USSR and the author of the two-volume monograph “History of the Soviet Union” J. Boffa writes: “The last decade has not been a period of stagnation. The country developed, its development was especially intensive in the field of economy and made it possible to achieve important production results. The economy of the USSR lags behind the American one, and in some respects even the European one, but it is strengthened and balanced so much that it was able to turn the USSR into a colossus of the modern world. He also notes that economic growth allowed the Soviet Union to strengthen its armed forces and bring up traditionally lagging branches of the military, such as the navy, and strike a balance with the United States. On this basis, a dialogue-competition began and developed again (an Italian scientist characterizes Soviet-American relations in the times of developed socialism with such an unusual term) with America.
However, the objective reality - the collapse of the USSR - testifies in favor of those historians who call the "era of developed socialism" the "era of stagnation." The purpose of our work in the light of such controversy is to study the complex of economic, social and political phenomena in the life of Soviet society and the formation of our own ideas about the causes of the crisis in the USSR.
To achieve our goals, we have to solve a number of research tasks, namely:
study the policy of the Soviet leadership in the field of economy and agriculture;
explore the development of Soviet ideology in the period of developed socialism;
find out the position of Orthodoxy and other traditional religions in the USSR in 1965-1985;
Describe the nomenclature ruling class Soviet society;
characterize the corrupting influence of the black market and the shortage of consumer goods on the morale of the Soviet people;
explore Soviet dissidence and the civic position of its representatives.
The source base of the work consists mainly of published sources. A feature of the selection of sources on the topic was that for the researchers of the Soviet period, party documents were considered the main and most reliable. The greatest value was recognized for their study. Moreover, a separate historical-party source study was created specifically for the history of the CPSU. Next in importance were laws and regulations. Planned documentation was singled out as a special kind of Soviet-era sources, although it is clear to everyone that plans and reality are far from the same thing. This approach made it possible to explore how power, its institutions and institutions operate in history. Society here acts as a passive element, a product of the activity of the authorities. Thus, in assessing the significance of individual groups of sources, the party and state-institutional approach prevailed, clearly establishing a hierarchy of values for Soviet historians.
In this regard, we had to select sources in such a way that the data given in them are consistent with other, post-Soviet, or foreign estimates. This applies in particular to statistical data. The most valuable published records management documents for us were verbatim records of the CPSU Congresses, Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, minutes of meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. No less important materials on the topic of the study were obtained from published sources of the planning and economic authorities of the USSR. Among them are the minutes of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, published in 1987. Materials and documents on collective farm construction in the USSR, reports of the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, etc. Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, collections of which were published once every three years, were of particular importance for our work.
Among the published records management sources, it seems to us rational to single out such a group as declassified sources, i.e. documents that entered the scientific circulation only after the actual cessation of the existence of the Soviet Union itself. An example is the declassified archival materials Politburo concerning questions of religion and church, published in 1999, Materials on the history of the Cold War (collection of documents), published in 1998, a collection of A. D. Bezborodov, which presents materials on the history of the dissident and human rights movement in the USSR 50- 80, published in 1998 and a number of other collections of documents.1
Statistical data presented in reference books, various collections of documents reveal various aspects of the socio-economic, political, cultural and demographic development of the USSR in the era of "developed socialism". Of particular interest is the comparison of statistical and other data published directly in the studied period of the history of the Soviet Union and declassified later. Such a comparison makes it possible to recreate not only the dynamics of the country's economic development, but also to identify, on the basis of the discrepancy between the realities of life and the causes of the spiritual and ideological crisis of Soviet society proclaimed from the stands.
Among the published narrative sources, a certain amount of material was studied, consisting of memoirs, memoirs of participants in historical events. We attached particular importance to the study of the works of L. I. Brezhnev - his memoirs, literary works, official program speeches. This is due to the fact that it was this person who headed the party and, consequently, Soviet society throughout the overwhelming time of the existence of "developed socialism" in the USSR. Recently, a number of authors have made attempts to collect and systematize the memories of "ordinary people" who lived and worked in the era of "developed socialism". In this regard, we note the work of G. A. Yastrebinskaya, Candidate of Economic Sciences, senior researcher at the Research Institute of Agrarian Problems of the Russian Federation, “The History of the Soviet Village in the Voices of the Peasants.” Her book, which consists of the memoirs of people of the older generation, highlights the history of the Russian and Soviet peasantry on the example of one of the northern villages. The author managed to create a complete picture of the life of the Russian village, using sociological research methods and live communication with the inhabitants of the Russian remote village. A certain comparison of the materials of the “ceremonial” autobiographies and literary opuses of the leaders with the ingenuous statements of ordinary Soviet citizens, being, of course, an empirical method of historical research, still provides rich material for understanding the “spirit and contradictions” of the historical period under study. one
In general, we note that in the source Soviet period ideology clearly dominated, which turned into a system of Marxist dogmas that were not subject to revision and discussion. Over time, among practicing historians, a persistent antipathy to such source studies has developed. In practice, however, historians adhered to the principle of “every historian and source critic for himself”, which, in essence, meant the position of extreme methodological individualism or the rejection of any methodology at all.
English historian M. Martin, author of the monograph “Soviet tragedy. The history of socialism in Russia" notes that for the first time Soviet history became truly history precisely with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And this completion of it allows us to see the pattern, the logic by which it developed during its life. The present study attempts to define the parameters of this model and establish the dynamics that drive it.
He says that many Western scholars have studied the phenomenon of Soviet history "through a dull glass," oracles. This was because, almost to the very end, Soviet reality remained a closely guarded secret.
The passionate Sovietological debate in the West focused on the main question: was the USSR a unique embodiment of "totalitarianism", or, on the contrary, is a kind of universal "modernity". Therefore, this work is an attempt to "put in place" the concepts and categories with which the West tried to decipher the Soviet riddle.
In modern Russian historiography, the attitude to the methodology of studying the period of developed socialism can be described in terms of chaos and confusion. The whole Soviet history turned out to be upside down, odiously interpreted.
There was a noticeable emancipation of thought, in the professional environment increased attention to the development of both Western and domestic historical thought. At the same time, contradictions and paradoxes began to grow, leading to a crisis in historical science and historical knowledge about such a relatively recent past.
The number of lightweight, opportunistic works has increased enormously. The practice of drawing facts from dubious and unreliable sources has become widespread. There is an exploitation of the same plots with slight variations. Instead of raising the level of the historical consciousness of society, there has been a disintegration of the integrity of the vision of the historical process and the inability of historians to create any intelligible concept of Russian history in the second half of the 20th century.
Historiography. It should be noted that a comprehensive, in-depth and objective study of the history of the USSR in the period we are studying has not yet been done. However, there are works that reveal in some detail and reasonably certain aspects of the life of Soviet society.
For example, M. S. Voslensky in his work “Nomenclature. The ruling class of the Soviet Union" deeply studied the genesis and traditions of the Soviet bureaucracy. In his work, he cites as an extensive statistical material confirming that the bureaucracy has become a self-sufficient, self-reproducing class of Soviet society. He gives an assessment of the economic, economic and political efficiency of the work of the Soviet state machine, the main ones, and cites a number of unspoken patterns of its functioning.
Yu. A. Vedeneev in the monograph "Organizational Reforms of State Administration of Industry in the USSR: Historical and Legal Research (1957-1987)" from the point of view of modern management science revealed the features of the functioning of management structures in the USSR. The fate of domestic culture in the second half of the XX century. S. A. Galin considers in detail. He argues that there were two opposing tendencies in Soviet culture. On the one hand, Soviet propaganda spoke of "the flourishing of socialist art and culture." The author agrees that there were outstanding artists in the USSR, but at the same time demonstrates that in a totalitarian society there were stagnation phenomena not only in the economy, but also in culture. He shows that in the conditions of lack of freedom and “social (ideological) ordering, culture in the USSR degenerated, became smaller, entire genres and directions did not develop, entire types of arts fell under the ban.
Dissidence as a unique phenomenon of the Soviet way of life is described by A. D. Bezborodov and L. Alekseeva. The authors explore not only the spiritual and ideological prerequisites for this phenomenon. They, on the basis of the study of criminal and administrative processes, legislation, make an attempt to study the spread of dissent in the USSR from the point of view of statistics.
Academician L. L. Rybakovsky in his monograph “The Population of the USSR for 70 Years” reveals in detail the dynamics of almost all aspects of demographic processes in our country from 1917 to 1987. His monograph contains a retrospective analysis of the demographic development of the USSR from the first years of Soviet power to 1987. It examines the interaction of demographic, economic and social processes that influenced the change in various structures of Soviet society.
Experts speak of A. S. Akhiezer's monograph "Russia: Criticism of Historical Experience" as an important breakthrough in knowledge about Russia. Philosopher, sociologist, economist - author of more than 250 scientific papers, in his conceptual two-volume monograph makes us look at the mechanisms of change in the history of Russia through the prism of the formation and change of the foundations of morality, which are the basis of Russian statehood. The book shows how society's attempts to get rid of sociocultural contradictions are realized in the consciousness and activity of the individual and in mass processes.1
It should be noted that works of literature, cinema, photographic documents, eyewitness accounts of recent events are of great importance in the study of the recent history of the USSR. However, it must be remembered that "big things are seen at a distance." Therefore, future historians will apparently be able to give this era a much more objective assessment than contemporaries of the events we are studying.
I. The ideology of Soviet society
1 The ideological attitudes of Soviet society in the spiritual and cultural sphere
Since the second half of the 60s. the process of overcoming the Stalinist political legacy has practically ceased. The point of view prevailed that the stabilization of social relations could be achieved only by abandoning the course adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This largely determined the socio-political and spiritual climate of these years - the climate of falsehood and doublethink, tendentiousness and unscrupulousness in assessing political events and facts of the past and present.
Under the pretext of preventing “slandering”, social scientists were required not to focus on the mistakes and shortcomings in the historical experience of the party. Increasingly, warnings were heard from above against scientists involved in Soviet history. For example, R. Medvedev's book "To the Judgment of History", dedicated to exposing Stalin's personality cult, which fully corresponded to the spirit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was impossible to publish in the USSR: in the leading party spheres, the author was told: "We now have a new line regarding Stalin."
At the same time, the “school” of P.V. Volobuev was destroyed at the Institute of the History of the USSR: the scientists who were part of it tried to shed light on the problems of the history of the labor movement, the October Revolution, in a new way.
In 1967, Yu. A. Polyakov was removed from the post of editor-in-chief of the journal History of the USSR. The journal tried to investigate the problems of the revolution more or less objectively. At the end of the 60s. was expelled from the party and forced to go abroad historian M. M. Nekrich, who in the book “1941. June 22 "revealed the events of the beginning of the war in a new way, showed the mistakes made. Similar examples could be continued.
Political life in the country became more and more closed, the level of publicity dropped sharply, and at the same time the dictate of the ideological structures of the party in relation to the mass media intensified.
After the overthrow of Khrushchev, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to revise the characterization given to Stalin at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. An attempt to officially rehabilitate Stalin at the 23rd Congress (1966) failed due to protests from the intelligentsia, especially scientists and writers. Shortly before the opening of the congress, 25 prominent figures of science and art, academicians P. L. Kapitsa, I. G. Tamm, M. A. Leontovich, writers V. P. Kataev, K. G. Paustovsky, K. I. Chukovsky, folk artists M. M. Plisetskaya, O. I. Efremov, I. M. Smoktunovsky and others wrote a letter to L. I. Brezhnev, in which they expressed concern about the emerging partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. The leadership of a number of foreign communist parties spoke out against the rehabilitation of Stalin.
However, in the 1970s criticism of Stalinism was finally curtailed. At the party congresses, a new cult began to take hold - the cult of L. I. Brezhnev. In 1973, a special note “On the need to strengthen the authority of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev” was sent to the regional committees, regional committees, and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics.
"Leader", "Outstanding figure of the Leninist type" - these epithets have become almost obligatory attributes of Brezhnev's name. Since the end of 1970, they have been sharply discordant with the image of the aging and weakening general secretary.
For 18 years in power, he was awarded 114 highest state awards, including 4 stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Gold Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor, the Order of Victory. Unctuous doxology, which began already at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU (1971), intensified at the XXV (1976) and reached its climax at the XXVI (1981). All over the country there were "scientific-theoretical" conferences at which Brezhnev's literary "works" - "Small Land", "Renaissance", "Virgin Land", written for him by others, were pompously extolled.1
The situation in the country became disastrous not only due to socio-economic deformations, but also due to the growing paralysis of intellectual and spiritual life. Every report of the Central Committee of the Party spoke of the flourishing of socialist democracy, but these are empty and meaningless declarations. In practice, there was a strict regulation of political and spiritual life. Brezhnev and his entourage returned to pro-Stalinist practices, to the dictates of the center, to the persecution of dissent.
The period of the late 1960s 1980s created his own ideology. Already in the second half of 1960, it became clear that the goals set by the Program of the CPSU, adopted at the XII Congress of the CPSU, could not be achieved within the scheduled time frame. The party leadership, headed by L. I. Brezhnev, needed new ideological and theoretical foundations for their activities.
In party documents, a shift in emphasis begins from propaganda of the goals of communist construction to propaganda of the achievements of developed socialism. L.I. Brezhnev stated that the main result of the path traveled was the building of a developed socialist society.2
In the new constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1977, this provision received legal status. “At this stage,” the Basic Law emphasizes, “socialism develops on its own basis, the creative forces of the new system and the advantages of the socialist way of life are revealed more and more fully, and the working people are increasingly enjoying the fruits of the great revolutionary achievements.” That is, propaganda proclaimed a society of developed socialism as a natural stage on the path to communism. one
In the Soviet press, annoying talk about the imminent onset of communism was replaced by equally demagogic talk about the tireless struggle for peace waged by the Soviet leadership and Comrade Brezhnev personally.
The fact that Soviet stockpiles of conventional and nuclear weapons were many times greater than the stockpiles of all the Western powers put together was not supposed to be known to the citizens of the USSR, although in the West, thanks to space intelligence, this was generally known.
L. I. Brezhnev said: The new constitution is, one might say, the concentrated result of the entire sixty-year development of the Soviet state. It vividly testifies that the ideas proclaimed in October, the precepts of Lenin, are being successfully implemented.”2
In the historical literature, it is considered an indisputable fact that during the transfer of power from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the neo-Stalinist line prevailed in the field of ideology. This is largely due to the fact that Khrushchev, during the purge of the Central Committee of Stalin's associates (anti-party group), left intact the entire Stalinist ideological headquarters of the Central Committee, headed by M. Suslov. All of his leading cadres remained in place, deftly adapting to Khrushchev's "anti-cult" policy.
Having set in motion all the ideological levers and taking advantage of the theoretical helplessness of the members of the "collective leadership", yesterday's students of Stalin from Suslov's headquarters substantiated a new point of view on Stalin's activities. It turns out that there was no “cult of personality” at all, and Stalin was a faithful Leninist who only allowed some violations of Soviet legality. His theoretical works are quite Marxist, and the 20th and 22nd Congresses "went too far" in Stalin's assessment because of "N. S. Khrushchev's subjectivism." In the light of this ideological concept, the Soviet press apparently received instructions to stop criticizing Stalin. From now on, it was again allowed to use his works, to quote them in a positive way.
This is how the neo-Stalinist ideological line took shape. But in fairness, it must be said that there was no open praise of Stalin in the Soviet mass media.
During all 18 years of Brezhnev's rule, M. A. Suslov remained the main party ideologist. He saw his main task in curbing social thought, inhibiting the spiritual development of Soviet society, culture, and art. Suslov was always wary and distrustful of writers and theatrical figures, whose "ill-conceived" statements can be used by "hostile propaganda." Suslov's favorite thesis is the impossibility of peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology and the intensification of the ideological struggle in present stage. From this, the conclusion was drawn about the need to strengthen control over all types of creative activity.
The growing crisis of society was felt and realized "above". Attempts were made to reform a number of aspects of public life. So, since the 1960s. Another attempt was made in the country to bring school education in line with the modern level of science. The need to improve the general level of education was associated, in particular, with the process of urbanization. If in 1939 56 million Soviet citizens lived in cities, then in the early 1980s. there were already more than 180 million city dwellers in the early 1980s. specialists who received higher or secondary specialized education accounted for 40% of the urban population. The general level of education of the population of the USSR increased significantly. (Attachment 1)
However, already in the second half of the 1970s. among young professionals who received a good education, but were forced to work outside their specialty, there was a growing general dissatisfaction with their work. The process of promotion to responsible positions and positions of "gray", incompetent people, mainly from the party environment, has become more noticeable.
Unresolved problems of public education in the late 1970s - early 1980s. became more and more aggravated. Therefore, in April 1984, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was forced to approve a new draft of the "Basic Directions for the Reform of General Education and Vocational Schools." This next school reform was supposed to be a means of combating formalism, interest mania, poor organization of labor education and preparing schoolchildren for life. The structure of the general education school changed again: it became an eleven-year school, while in the early 1960s it was abandoned.1
The “fundamental innovation” in the work of the school was considered to be a doubling of the number of hours for labor training, and the expansion of work practice for schoolchildren. Special work on vocational guidance was called upon to carry out interschool educational and production complexes. All schools were assigned basic enterprises, which became responsible organizers of labor education.
An ostentatious company began to create training workshops for schoolchildren. However, all these good intentions have been reduced to another formal company in the field of school education. The bureaucracy of the old administrative-command system did not allow for any progress in school reform. At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in February 1986, the failure of the old school reform was stated and the beginning of a new one was announced.
The cultural level of the people who came to power after Brezhnev was even lower among Khrushchev's entourage. They missed culture in their own development, they turned the culture of Soviet society into a hostage of ideology. True, initially Brezhnev and his entourage announced the continuation in the field of artistic culture of the line of the “golden mean”, developed back in the period of the “thaw”. This meant the rejection of two extremes - slander, on the one hand, and varnishing of reality, on the other.
And in the materials of party congresses, there was invariably a stereotyped thesis that a real "flourishing of socialist culture" had been achieved in the country. With mythical pathos, the party program of 1976 once again proclaimed that “a cultural revolution has been carried out in the country”, as a result of which a “giant rise to the heights of science and culture” allegedly took place in the USSR.1
The principles written in the party program were embodied in the sphere of artistic culture in the form of stilted plot schemes, ridiculed in the Soviet press 15-20 years before. In stories, plays, films, the "production theme" flourished. In firm accordance with the norms of socialist realism, everything ended happily after the intervention of party officials.
Returning to the Stalinist tradition, on January 7, 1969, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On increasing the responsibility of the heads of the press, radio and television, cinematography, cultural and art institutions." The pressure of the censorship press on literature and art increased, the practice of banning the publication of works of art became more frequent, ready-made films appeared on the screen, performances of various musical works that, according to ideologists, did not fit into the framework of the principles of socialist realism and Leninist party spirit.
In order to provide the theme of works of art, films, theatrical productions necessary for the party elite, since the mid-1970s. introduced a system of state orders. It was determined in advance how many films should be made on historical-revolutionary, military-patriotic and moral topics. This system operated everywhere and extended to all genres and types of art.
Despite the growing ideological and censorship pressure, the party nomenklatura failed to completely drown out the voice of those writers whose work opposed the ideology of neo-Stalinism. The literary event of 1967 was the publication of M. Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita. Objectively, the ideology of neo-Stalinism was opposed by the so-called "village prose". The books of F. Abramov, V. Astafiev, B. Mozhaev, V. Rasputin artistically expressively showed the process of depeasantization of the village.
The works of L. I. Brezhnev became a real farce in the history of Russian literature. For the creation by a group of journalists on the basis of his memoirs of three brochures: "Small Earth", "Renaissance" and "Virgin Land", he was awarded the Lenin Prize in Literature.
As the ideological onslaught of the authorities intensified in the country, the number of writers, artists, musicians grew, artists whose work, for political reasons, could not reach readers, viewers, listeners legally. A large number of representatives of the creative intelligentsia, against their will, ended up outside the USSR, however, banned works continued to live in lists, photocopies, films, photos and magnetic films. So in the 1960s. in the USSR, an uncensored press arose - the so-called "samizdat". Typewritten copies of texts by scientists and writers objectionable to the authorities went from hand to hand. Actually, the phenomenon of samizdat was not something new in the history of Russian culture. So "Woe from Wit" by A. Griboedov, which was banned for publication in Russia, was nevertheless known to literally all literate people thanks to several tens of thousands of handwritten lists, the number of which was many times greater than the usual circulation of the then publications. A. Radishchev's book "Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow" was distributed among the lists.1
In Soviet times, samizdat circulated manuscripts of works by A. Solzhenitsyn, A. D. Sakharov, O. E. Mandelstam, M. M. Zoshchenko, V. S. Vysotsky. Samizdat became such a powerful cultural and social factor that the authorities undertook a large-scale struggle against it, and one could go to jail for storing and distributing samizdat works.
At the beginning of the 1960s-1970s. artists developed a new, so-called "severe style". It was at this time that the artists showed a desire to bypass ideological obstacles to recreate reality without the usual splendor, smoothing out difficulties, without superficial fixation of conflict-free insignificant plots, an ingrained tradition of depicting the struggle of “good with the best”. At the same time, party ideologists in every possible way pursued the development of avant-garde art. All ideological retreats were severely suppressed. So, in September 1974 in Moscow, in Cheryomushki, bulldozers (that's why this exhibition is called a bulldozer) destroyed an exhibition of modern avant-garde art, arranged right on the street. Artists were beaten and paintings crushed by bulldozers. This event received a great response among the creative intelligentsia in the country and abroad.2
Thus, in the 1960-1980s. in artistic life, the opposition of two cultures in society has finally taken shape: on the one hand, the official culture, which followed the course of the party ideological program and neo-Stalinist ideology, on the other hand, the humanistic culture, traditional for the democratic part of society, which took part in shaping the consciousness of people of different nationalities, prepared the spiritual renewal of the country.
In the perverted system of state distribution of material wealth, the natural desire of people to live better sometimes led to the loss of traditional concepts of duty, to an increase in crime, drunkenness, and prostitution. By the beginning of the 80s. about 2 million different crimes were committed annually in the country. Alcohol consumption per capita by this time had increased compared to the 1950s. more than 2.5 times.1 All this led to a significant reduction in life expectancy, especially for men. In the USSR and in modern Russia there is a constant preponderance of the female population over the male population. (Annex 2)
The fight against drunkenness and alcoholism that began at the enterprises (the starting point was the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the issues of strengthening socialist labor discipline, adopted in August 1983) suffered from formalism and campaigning. All this reflected the growing problems in the socio-cultural sphere. So, despite the fact that in the 70s. The country's housing stock grew (more than 100 million square meters of housing were commissioned annually), which made it possible to improve the living conditions of more than 107 million people in 10 years, it was far from a radical solution to this acute problem. And the number of investments in housing construction was decreasing: in the eighth five-year plan they accounted for 17.2% of the total volume of capital investments in the national economy, in the ninth - 15.3, in the tenth - 13.6%. Even less funds were directed to the construction of social facilities. The residual principle in the allocation of funds for social needs became more and more evident. Meanwhile, the situation was aggravated by the increased migration of the rural population to the cities and the importation of labor by enterprises, the so-called limiters, that is, people who have temporary residence permits in large cities and work temporarily. Among them there were many who were unsettled in life. In general, compared with the poverty of the late 30s. and the post-war period, the situation of the bulk of the population has improved. Fewer people lived in communal apartments and barracks. Televisions, refrigerators, and radios were included in everyday life. Many people have home libraries in their apartments.
Soviet people enjoyed free medical care. The health sector also felt the problems of the economy: the share of expenditures on medicine in the state budget decreased, the renewal of the material and technical base slowed down, attention to health issues weakened. There were not enough polyclinics, hospitals, children's medical institutions in rural areas, and the existing ones were often poorly equipped. The qualifications of medical personnel and the quality of medical care left much to be desired. Changes in the remuneration of medical workers have been slow to resolve.1
Thus, emerging in the 70s. disruptions in the development of the economy affected the well-being of workers. The social orientation of the economy, especially at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, turned out to be weakened. The residual principle of resource distribution had an increasingly negative impact on the development of the social sphere.
A certain increase in the standard of living had a downside. The concept of "public socialist property" looked abstract to millions of people, so they considered it possible
use it to your advantage. The so-called petty theft has become widespread.
So, during this period, all the main resources of the old economic growth - extensive - were exhausted. However, the Soviet economy could not switch to the path of intensive development. The curve of growth rates went down, social problems began to grow, passivity, the whole set of problems associated with this manifested itself.
Thus, Soviet society in the late 60s - early 80s. had a fairly complex stratified structure. The party-state power managed to keep society in a state of relative stabilization. At the same time, the beginning structural crisis of the industrial society, accumulating economic, socio-political, ethno-demographic, psychological, environmental, geopolitical aspects, predetermined the growth of discontent that threatened the foundations of the system.
The relative material prosperity was temporary and reflected the growing crisis. In the Soviet Union, the average life expectancy has ceased to increase. By the beginning of the 80s. The USSR dropped to 35th place in the world in this indicator and 50th in terms of infant mortality.1
2 The ideology of reforming industry and agriculture
The task of improving the well-being of the people was proclaimed the main one in economic policy. Party congresses demanded a deep turn in the economy towards solving the diverse tasks of improving the well-being of the people, increasing attention to the production of consumer goods (Group B industry), and ensuring fundamental changes in the quality and quantity of goods and services for the population.
Since the mid 60s. the country's leadership has taken a course primarily to increase the cash income of the population. The remuneration of labor of workers and employees, collective farmers was improved in order to stimulate highly productive work. Real per capita income rose by 46% over the decade. Significant sections of the working people have secured some prosperity for themselves.
The guaranteed wages of collective farmers increased, the salaries of the low-paid segments of the population were pulled up to pay the average paid. This continued until a growing gap between the money supply and its commodity supply became apparent. It turned out that in case of non-fulfillment of the tasks of the five-year plans for the growth of labor productivity, the cost of wages systematically exceeded the planned ones. The incomes of collective farmers grew more slowly than expected, however, they also significantly outpaced the growth of labor productivity in the agricultural sector of the economy. In general, they ate more than they created. This gave rise to an unhealthy situation in the sphere of production and distribution of public goods, and complicated the solution of social problems.
The regularization of wages, the increase in tariff rates and official salaries concerned mainly low-income workers. Often, highly qualified specialists were infringed in wages. The levels of remuneration for engineering and technical workers and workers were unjustifiably close, and in mechanical engineering and construction, engineers received on average less than workers. The salary of pieceworkers grew, and the salaries of specialists did not change. The equalization of wages without strict consideration of the final results undermined the material incentives for the growth of its productivity, gave rise to a parasitic mood. Thus, the organic connection between the measure of labor and the measure of consumption was broken. At the same time, the growth of monetary incomes of the population continued to lag behind the production of goods and services. Until a certain time, the problem of balancing the incomes of the population and their coverage could be solved by achieving an increase in the mass of goods. As incomes and consumption grew, the question of the need to take into account demand, assortment and quality of goods became more and more acute. Changes in the level and structure of public consumption were most clearly manifested in the outpacing growth in the sale and consumption of non-food products, especially for durable items with higher consumer properties: television and radio products, cars, high-quality and fashionable clothes, shoes, etc. hunger. For example, by the beginning of the 80s. The USSR produced leather shoes per capita several times more than the USA, but at the same time, the shortage of high-quality shoes increased every year. Industry, in fact, worked for a warehouse. In the 70-80s. A number of resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted, aimed at increasing the production of high-quality goods for the population, improving their range. However, due to economic inertia, the problems were solved extremely slowly. In addition, the level of technical equipment of the light and food industries did not meet modern requirements, scientific and technological achievements were poorly introduced into production. And this not only hindered the growth of labor productivity, but also affected the quality of products, their cost. Many types of products did not find a market and accumulated at the bases. Trade did not help to solve sales problems, where the culture of service remained low, there was practically no study of the demand of the population, bribery, theft and mutual responsibility flourished. All this led to an increase in the imbalance of supply and demand for goods and services. The gap between the effective demand of the population and its material support increased. As a result, the population found itself in the hands of a rapidly increasing balance of unspent money, some of which was invested in savings banks. The amount of deposits in savings banks in the ninth five-year plan increased 2.6 times compared with the growth in the sale of consumer goods, and in the tenth five-year plan - 3 times.1
The discrepancy in the amount of money in circulation and quality goods since the mid-70s. led to price increases. Officially, prices rose for the so-called high-demand goods, unofficially for most others. But, despite the rise in price, in the late 70s. the general shortage of consumer goods has increased, the problem of meeting the demand for meat and dairy products, goods for children, cotton fabrics and a number of other consumer goods has become more acute. Social differentiation began to grow, based on the degree of access to scarcity. It was aggravated by the growth of undeserved and illegal privileges for certain categories of the party and state apparatus, which exacerbated social tension in society.
All these phenomena were largely the result of the fact that in October 1964 a grouping came to power, basically not in the mood for a serious reform of the country's economy, primarily in the field of agriculture and industry. However, by this time it was already difficult not to react to the current state of affairs: in some regions of the country, due to a shortage of food, it became necessary to introduce a rationed supply of the population (by coupons), and it became impossible to hide the situation.1
In March 1965, a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, at which the new leader of the party, L. I. Brezhnev, made a report "On urgent measures for the further development of agriculture". The Plenum, in its decision, was forced to admit that in recent years “agriculture has slowed down its growth rates. Plans for its development proved unrealistic. Crop yields have been slowly increasing. The production of meat, milk and other products also increased slightly during this time. The reasons for this state of affairs were also named: the violation of the economic laws of the development of socialist production, the principles of the material interest of collective farmers and workers of state farms in the development of the social economy, the correct combination of public and personal interests. It was noted that unreasonable restructuring of the governing bodies, which “created an atmosphere of irresponsibility and nervousness in work,” brought great harm.
The March (1965) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU developed the following measures designed to ensure the "further rise" of agriculture: 2
Establishment of a new procedure for planning the procurement of agricultural products;
Raising purchase prices and other methods of material incentives for agricultural workers;
Organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms and state farms, the development of democratic principles for managing the affairs of artels ...
Thus, we see that in 1965 the Central Committee of the Party saw the further development of agriculture on the basis of the laws of economics: material incentives for workers and granting them a certain economic independence.
Nevertheless, the policy of the party and the state after the March Plenum, unfortunately, did not actually change fundamentally, but still it became a very noticeable milestone in the history of the organization of agricultural production. After 1965, appropriations for the needs of the village increased: in 1965 - 1985. capital investments in agriculture amounted to 670.4 billion rubles, purchase prices for agricultural products sold to the state increased by 2 times, the material and technical base of farms was strengthened, and their power supply increased. The system of agricultural management bodies was simplified: the ministries of production and procurement of agricultural products of the Union republics were transformed into the Ministries of Agriculture, the territorial production collective farm and state farm departments were abolished, and the structural subdivisions of the executive committees of local Soviets responsible for agricultural production were restored. Kolkhozes and state farms were granted greater independence for a short time, state farms were supposed to be transferred to full self-financing. Among other things, during the Brezhnev years, the volume of investment in agriculture has increased enormously; as a result, they amounted to a quarter of all budget allocations. The once neglected village has finally become the regime's number one priority. And the productivity of agriculture really increased, and its growth rates exceeded those of most Western countries.1 Nevertheless, agriculture remained a crisis zone: crop failure every time became a national scale, the country had to regularly import grain, especially fodder grain.
One reason for this relative failure was that Soviet agriculture was initially in such a deep depression that even rapid growth could not raise output high enough. In addition, the incomes of both urban and rural populations have increased, resulting in a significant increase in demand. Finally, a considerable part of the population was still employed in agriculture, which led to a low level of labor productivity and an increase in the cost of production: the urban population in the USSR for the first time became more numerous than the rural population only in 1965, while the latter still accounted for 30% of the total population and in 1985 (Annex 3)
It is clear that the root cause of agricultural inefficiency was organizational in nature: the overall direction of huge investments, chemical fertilizer strategies, and harvesting campaigns was still top-down and centralized. The regime continued to speed up its policy of turning collective farms into state farms, and in the 1980s. the share of the latter already accounted for more than half of all cultivated land in the country. At the same time, the orthodox collective-farm leadership nullified the results of several timid, but rather crude experiments with the “link system”. In short, the regime, by intensifying the traditional command-and-control methods, produced the usual counterproductive results; however, it was still impossible to speak in favor of any other policy.
In 1978, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU passes the following resolution concerning the development of agriculture: “Noting the significant work carried out since the March (1965) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the rise of agriculture, the Plenum of the Central Committee, at the same time, considers that the general level of this industry is still does not meet the needs of society and requires further efforts to strengthen the material and technical base of agriculture, improve organizational forms and increase its efficiency.”1
As a result, by the end of the Brezhnev era, the food supply of the population increasingly lagged behind demand, and agriculture, which under Stalin was a source of (forced) accumulation of capital for investment in industry, has now become a common burden for all other sectors of the economy.
Thus, certain attempts to reform Soviet agriculture were determined by a clear discrepancy between the needs of the population, living, as it was proclaimed, under "developed socialism", and the low level of labor productivity in the country's agrarian complex. The reasons for such a low efficiency of agriculture consisted, on the one hand, in the poor technological equipment of the peasantry. This pushed the country's leadership under N. S. Khrushchev to extensive farming - the development of new areas. In the period under study, an attempt was made to intensify agricultural production. One of the directions of such intensification is a short-term, but demonstrative attempt to introduce the peasant's material interest in the results of his labor. Elements of cost accounting and piecework wages of the peasant, in our opinion, are a significant symptom of the crisis of the idea of the communist mode of production, where the material incentive for labor is denied.
However, in general, a new decline was indicated in the agricultural sector. Agrarian policy of the 60s - mid-80s. was based on further nationalization, centralization and concentration of agricultural production. Administration continued, incompetent interference in the affairs of collective farms, state farms and, in general, rural workers. The apparatus of agricultural management grew. The development of inter-farm cooperation and integration in the mid-70s, chemicalization and land reclamation did not bring the desired changes. The economic situation of the collective farms and state farms was aggravated by the unfair exchange between town and country. As a result, by the beginning of the 1980s many collective farms and state farms turned out to be unprofitable.
Attempts to solve the problems of agriculture only by increasing the volume of capital investments (over 500 billion rubles were invested in the country's agro-industrial complex in the 1970s and early 1980s) did not bring the expected result. one
Money was mortified in the construction of expensive and sometimes useless giant complexes, spent on ill-conceived reclamation and chemicalization of soils, went nowhere due to the lack of interest of rural workers in the results of labor, or was pumped back into the treasury through rising prices for agricultural machinery. Introduced in the mid 60s. guaranteed wages on collective farms - in fact, an important achievement of that time - turned into an increase in social dependency.
Attempts to find a better organization of agricultural production did not find support; moreover, they were sometimes simply persecuted. In 1970, an experiment was suppressed in the experimental farm of Akchi (Kazakh SSR), the essence of which was simple: the peasant receives everything that he earns by his labor. The experiment was not pleasing to the employees of the Ministry of Agriculture. The chairman of the farm, I. N. Khudenko, was accused of receiving supposedly unearned big money, convicted of imaginary theft, and died in prison. The well-known organizers of agrarian production V. Belokon, I. Snimshchikov paid off with broken destinies for the initiative and creative approach to business.
The strategic task of the CPSU was to eliminate the differences between town and country. It was based on the idea of the priority of state property in comparison with collective-farm cooperative and private property, and, consequently, on the total consolidation and nationalization of agricultural production. The implementation of this task led to the fact that in the 60s - the first half of the 80s. the process of state monopolization of property in agriculture was completed. For 1954-1985 about 28,000 collective farms (or a third of their total number) were converted into state farms. Collective farm property, which, in fact, was not cooperative, since the collective farm had never been the owner of the products produced and the state withdrew funds from the accounts of collective farms even without their formal permission, was curtailed. Contradictions and difficulties, including mismanagement in agriculture economy of the country, the leadership tried to compensate for the import of food and grain. Over 20 years, imports of meat have grown 12 times, fish - 2 times, oils - 60 times, sugar - 4.5 times, grains - 27 times. one
Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. The country's agriculture was in a state of crisis. In this situation, it was decided to develop a special food program, which was approved by the May (1982) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, the program developed under the outdated management system was half-hearted. It did not affect the main link in agriculture - the interests of the peasantry, did not change the economic relations in the countryside and the economic mechanism. As a result, despite all the measures and decisions taken, the food problem has become much worse. By the mid 80s. rationed supply of a number of foodstuffs was introduced almost everywhere.
By analogy with other countries of the USSR in the 70s. passed a series of progressive environmental protection laws. But, like many progressive undertakings, they remained on paper. The ministries were the first to break them. Due to the global and ruthless exploitation of natural resources, which caused irreparable damage to entire regions of the country, the ecological situation has deteriorated extremely. Air pollution in cities was a particular danger to human health and the national economy. industrial centers. As a result of inefficient and ecologically illiterate agricultural production, an increase in the areas of unsuitable lands was revealed, soil salinization, flooding and flooding of vast areas significantly affected the natural fertility of cultivated land, led to a drop in productivity. A large number of unique Central Russian chernozems were destroyed during the development of deposits of the Kursk magnetic anomaly, where iron ore was mined in an open pit. one
The quality of water in many rivers has dropped to dangerous levels. Such well-known ecological systems as Lake Baikal and the Aral Sea were destroyed. In the early 80s. preparatory work began on the transfer of part of the flow of the northern rivers to the Volga, as well as the turn of the Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan, which threatened the country with another environmental disaster.
Enterprises and departments were not interested in increasing the cost of environmental protection, as this led to an increase in the cost of production and reduced gross production efficiency. Emergencies at nuclear power plants were carefully hidden from the people, while official propaganda painted their complete safety in every possible way.
The lack of objective and reliable information on environmental issues was an important ideologically destabilizing factor in Soviet society, as it gave rise to many rumors and discontent. Moreover, it is far from a fact that all these rumors were justified, but they certainly shook the official Soviet ideology.
As a result, L. I. Brezhnev was forced to make declarations about the “danger of the formation of lifeless zones hostile to man,” but nothing changed. Nevertheless, information about the real environmental situation reached the public. The emerging environmental movement becomes a new opposition movement, indirectly, but very effectively opposing the country's leadership.1
From the beginning of the 70s. in the developed capitalist countries, a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution (NTR) began. In the world there was a curtailment of "traditional industries" (mining industry, metallurgy, some areas of mechanical engineering, etc.), a transition was made to resource-saving technologies, knowledge-intensive industries. Automation and robotization of production have reached significant proportions, which has affected the increase in the efficiency of social production.
The implementation of the course to increase the efficiency of social production, the country's leadership is inextricably linked with the acceleration of scientific and technological progress (STP), with the introduction of its results into production. At the 24th Party Congress, for the first time, an important task was formulated - to organically combine the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism, to develop wider and deeper the form of combining science with production inherent in it. Landmarks of scientific and technical policy were outlined. In all official documents, economic policy was assessed as a course towards the intensification of production.
in the context of the evolving scientific and technological revolution.
At first glance, the potential of the country made it possible to solve the set tasks. Indeed, every fourth scientist in the world came from our country, hundreds of research institutes were created.
All party and state documents of that time indicated the need for the planned use of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. To this end, the State Committee for Science and Technology of the Council of Ministers of the USSR began to create comprehensive intersectoral programs that provide for the solution of the most important scientific and technical problems. Only for 1976-1980. 200 integrated programs were developed. They outline major measures for the development and improvement of mechanical engineering - the basis for the technical re-equipment of all branches of the national economy. Emphasis was placed on the creation of machine systems that completely cover the entire technological process, the mechanization and automation of labor-intensive types of production, primarily in industries where a significant part of the workers are engaged in heavy manual labor. And although, on the whole, the production of mechanical engineering increased 2.7 times over the decade, it developed at an average level and did not satisfy the needs of the national economy, did not meet the tasks of its technical reconstruction in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution. In some of its leading industries (machine-tool and instrument-making, the production of computer facilities), the growth rates even slowed down. This ruled out the possibility of quickly creating the necessary base for the technical re-equipment of industry. Therefore, the old practice remained: capital investments were spent on new construction, and the equipment of existing plants and factories became more and more old. The evolutionary development of most industries continued. Enterprises fought not for the integration of science and production, but for the fulfillment of the plan at any cost, as this ensured profits.1
It was in the 70s. the immunity of the national economy of the USSR to technological innovations was discovered. Scientists have developed effective methods for the synthesis of refractory, heat-resistant, superhard and other materials, technologies for special electrometallurgy, in the field of robotics, genetic engineering, etc. About 200 thousand completed scientific studies were registered annually in the country, including almost 80 thousand author's invention certificates.
Often, Soviet developments and ideas found the widest application in the industrial production of the West, but were not implemented in any way inside the country. The innovative potential of the country was used very poorly: only every third invention was introduced into production (including half at only 1-2 enterprises). As a result, by the end of the 80s. 50 million people in industry were employed in primitive manual labor at the level of the early 20th century.
Electronics and computer science were discovered at the turn of the 70-80s. path to dramatic changes in the economy and social life. Soviet scientists were clearly aware of the significance of the leap generated by the progress of electronics. Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR N.N. Moiseev in the late 60s. noted that the invention of computers affects not only technology, not the entire sphere of human intellectual activity, that in the future the development of the state will directly depend on how deeply electronic computing methods have penetrated not only into economic calculations, but also directly into government. In practice, the introduction of machine methods in solving the economic problems of the USSR was episodic. Here, natural conservatism, the weakness of the education of the relevant personnel, and the shortcomings of the wage system, which was not oriented towards the introduction of innovations, affected. The organizational design of a nationwide automated system for collecting and processing information was hampered and discredited the expediency of creating another industry - the information processing industry, while it already existed abroad. In this direction, the backlog of the USSR was significant, and subsequently it was not possible to reduce it. So, in the first half of the 80s. about 800 thousand computers were used in the USA, and 50 thousand in the USSR.
The absence of a unified technical policy became a brake on the path of intensification of production; due to the dissipation of funds and scientific forces, the results were ineffective. In particular, more than 20 ministries were involved in the introduction of robotics in the eleventh five-year plan. But most of them did not have the appropriate strength and experience. The robots they created cost more than foreign ones and were 10 times inferior in reliability. In the first half of the 80s. the number of released robotics exceeded the plan by 1.3 times, and only 55% were implemented. Despite the first-class, sometimes unique developments of Soviet scientists in fundamental science, in practical life, the progress of science and technology was not felt.
One of the most important reasons for this situation was the growing militarization of the economy. Successful scientific research in areas that were not of a military-applied nature was universally ignored by the top economic leadership. The same scientific and technical developments that appeared in defense research and could be applied in the civilian sphere were classified. In addition, labor productivity was several times lower than the American one. Therefore, military parity with the United States went to the national economy of the USSR with an immeasurably greater burden. In addition, the Soviet Union almost completely shouldered the financing of the Warsaw Pact. The traditional policy of advanced development of military industries with the maximum concentration of material and human resources in them began to falter, as these industries were increasingly dependent on the general technological level of the national economy, on the effectiveness of the economic mechanism. Along with this, the selfish interests of some branches of the military-industrial complex began to manifest themselves tangibly. 1970s - the time when, in a certain sense, epoch-making problems for the defense of the country were solved. In furious disputes about which strategic doctrine will prevail and which missiles will be “main”, the ministers of defense, general engineering, chief designer V. Chelomey, on the one hand, and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU D. Ustinov, director of TsNIIMash Yu. Mozzhorin, chief designer Design Bureau "Yuzhnoye" M. Yangel (he was later replaced by V.F. Utkin) - on the other. In the most difficult struggle at the top, Academician Utkin managed to defend many fundamentally new technical solutions. In 975, a silo-based combat strategic missile system, which the Americans called "Satan", was put into service. Until now, this complex has no analogues in the world. It was the appearance of "Satan", the best weapon in the world, that, according to international experts, prompted the United States to sit down at the negotiating table on the limitation of strategic arms.
The use of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution in our country took on a one-sided, contradictory character, since the USSR continued to carry out an expanded reproduction of the industrial structure with an emphasis on traditional industries. The country did not carry out a radical modernization of production, but was in the process of "embedding" in the old mechanism of individual achievements of scientific and technological revolution, new technologies. At the same time, obviously incompatible things were often combined: automated lines and a lot of manual labor, nuclear reactors and the preparation of their installation using the “people's assembly” method. A paradoxical situation has arisen when the achievements of scientific and technological revolution, instead of changing the mechanism of a marketless industry, prolong its life, give a new impetus. Oil reserves were declining, but advances in pipe-rolling and pipe-compressing technologies made deep gas fields available; difficulties began with the development of underground coal seams - excavators were created that made it possible to extract brown coal in an open way. Such a peculiar symbiosis of industry without a market and new technologies contributed to the accelerated, predatory destruction of natural resources and led to an unprecedented phenomenon - structural stagnation in the era of scientific and technological revolution. The developed world has already entered a new post-industrial technological era, while the USSR remained in the old industrial one. As a result, by the mid-1980s The USSR again, as it was before the 1930s, faced the threat of lagging behind the Western countries. Appendix 4, in particular histogram 1, clearly show the steady decline in all economic indicators in the USSR.
Workers - the senior partner in the "bond" - along with the entire industrial sector of the economy, found themselves under Brezhnev in a similar impasse. Here, the failure of Kosygin's economic reform in 1965 served as a turning point. However, this was not just another deplorable episode of Brezhnevism: what happened marked the failure of the key program of the entire undertaking, known as "communist reformism."
Economic reform in a centralized economy is only possible in one direction - towards decentralization and the market. It is with this overtone that all attempts at reform have been made since the 1930s. Stalin created a command economy. The first timid hints of movement along this path appeared after the Second World War during discussions about the “system of links”. The first time the communist government openly admitted that decentralization could be the goal of reforms was Tito's proclaimed in the early 1950s. the policy of "self-management of enterprises" and his draft program of the SKJ, published in 1957. This line was theoretically worked out by the old market socialist Oskar Lange, who was completely ignored at first when he returned to Poland in 1945 to participate in the construction of socialism in his own country. homeland, but later received with much greater understanding during the “Polish October” of 1956. Thanks to the Khrushchev “thaw”, this movement became the subject of discussion in Russia as well: in the 1960s. the local tradition of academic economics in the 1920s, one of the most advanced in the world, begins to timidly revive not only as a theoretical and mathematical discipline, but also as a school of thought with practical applications.
Its application in practice was first mentioned in 1962 in an article by Professor Yevsey Lieberman, which appeared in Pravda under the heading "Plan, profit, bonus." Supporters of the current soon to be called "Libermanism", advocated greater autonomy for enterprises and for them to be allowed to make profits, which in turn would provide capital for investment and create a material interest for workers and management. Moreover, since it was assumed that the industry would begin to work on the principle of Lenin's "cost accounting", which meant profit and loss, bankruptcy would also be allowed for enterprises. If Libermanism were put into practice, the Stalinist system would be turned upside down: production indicators would then be calculated not only in physical quantities of quantity and tonnage, but also taking into account quality and costs, and the decisions of the management of enterprises would be determined not from above, but by market forces of demand and suggestions. Pseudo-competitive technologies and moral and ideological incentives - "socialist competition", "shock work" and "Stakhanovite movement" - would be replaced by less socialist, but more effective incentives for profit and benefit.
These ideas received the support of the leading representatives of the resurgent Soviet economic science, among whom we can name V.S. Nemchinov, L.V. Kantorovich and V.V. Novozhilov. Libermanism was seriously improved by them: they preached the reorganization of the economy in a more rational and scientific direction by introducing the achievements of cybernetics and system analysis(up to that time labeled "bourgeois sciences") and the use of electronic computers in the development of the plan, which would give it greater flexibility. Moreover, they hinted that such changes would require reforming the party-state itself.
Khrushchev and his colleagues were interested in this new way of thinking, although, of course, they did not suspect how destructive the potential for the existing system was hidden in it. None other than Khrushchev himself approved the appearance of Lieberman's article, and later, literally on the eve of his fall, introduced the methods he proposed at two textile factories. Two days after Khrushchev's dismissal, Kosygin extended the experiment to a number of other enterprises, which will be crowned with success. The next year, another reformist economist, Abel Aganbegan (who would later play an important role under Gorbachev), sent an alarm to the Central Committee. In a report intended for a narrow circle of people, he detailed the decline of the Soviet economy compared to the American one, attributing it to the consequences of over-centralization and exorbitant defense spending. It was with the aim of preventing further decline and at the same time supporting the defense complex that Kosygin began his reform in 1965.
Consider the "Basic Measures Designed to Ensure Further Improvement of Socialist Management", announced by the September (1965) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU:
Transition to the branch principle of industry management;
Improving planning and expanding the economic independence of enterprises;
Strengthening economic incentives for enterprises and strengthening cost accounting;
Strengthening the material interest of employees in improving the work of the enterprise.1
Thus, we see the emergence of market views in the economy of the USSR.
The first step in this reform was, as we have already said, the abolition of economic councils and their replacement by central ministries. The second is the expansion of the independence of enterprises, which, in theory, should now operate on the basis of profitability. From now on, enterprises received from the ministries an abbreviated register of planned figures, or “indicators” (eight instead of forty), and sales volume replaced gross production as the main criterion for success. At the same time, financial incentives in the form of remuneration or bonuses paid to both management and workers began to be linked to the size of profits through a complex system of calculations.
As an example of the work of a Soviet enterprise on the basis of partial economic independence, consider the Shchekino experiment, which was carried out from 1967 to 1975. at the Shchekino Chemical Association "Azot". It was based on 3 pillars: a stable production plan for several years, an unchanged wage fund for the entire period, the right to pay bonuses for the intensity of labor.
Its results were as follows: for the period from 1967 to 1975. the volume of production at the plant increased by 2.7 times, labor productivity increased by 3.4 times, while wages increased by 1.5 times. And all this was achieved with a decrease in the number of personnel by 29% (per 1500 people): 2
Histogram 1. The main economic results of the "Shchekinsky experiment" 1967-1975.
(Production indicators for 1967 are conditionally taken as a unit, indicators for 1975 show the dynamics of this indicator)
However, businesses have never won the right to set their own prices based on demand or social needs; prices were determined by a new organization - Goskomtsen, using the old criterion of compliance with "needs", determined by the plan, and not by the market. But when enterprises do not have the right to independently set prices for their products, profitability as a factor determining the success of their activities goes to the far end. In addition, there were no funds through which to create incentives for workers by paying them higher remuneration. Similarly, the return to the ministries crossed out the newly acquired independence of enterprises.
These contradictions, which were originally laid in the foundation of the reform, after 1968 will lead to its curtailment. Another reason would be the "Prague Spring" of the same year, which marked the most significant experiment in the introduction of "communist reformism" ever undertaken. One of its main features was an economic reform similar to Kosygin's, but more daring. And one of the lessons the Soviets learned from the Czech reform was the realization that economic liberalization could easily escalate into a political one that would call into question the very existence of the foundations of the regime. So the Czech experience struck fear into the Soviet bureaucracy at all levels: Kosygin - at the top - lost all desire to push through his reform, and the grassroots apparatchiks began to spontaneously curtail it.1
But, even without the Prague Spring, the very structure of the system still doomed Kosygin's program to failure. Enterprise directors preferred to use their autonomy to carry out the plan rather than introduce risky innovations in production, while the ministries were happy to adjust the indicators in a new way: generated by the command culture of the Stalinist economy, both of them considered it best not to break with their usual routine. The tacit agreement of the bureaucrats gradually emasculated the reform, production continued to fall, and the quality of products deteriorated. At the same time, the bureaucratic machine grew: Gossnab (responsible for logistics) and the State Committee for Science and Technology (responsible for development in the field of science and technology) were added to Gosplan and Goskomtsen, and the number of sectoral ministries increased from 45 in 1965 to 70 by 80.
Nevertheless, despite the expansion of the base of Soviet industry and its bureaucratic superstructure, the growth rates of the gross national product and labor productivity continued to fall. Although the relevant specific indicators can be disputed, the general trend is not in doubt.
What measures did the Soviet leadership take to stop this process? Let us turn to the following document: it is “Materials of the 24th Congress of the Party. “The main task of the upcoming five-year plan,” the document says, “is to ensure a significant rise in the material and cultural level of the people on the basis of high rates of development of socialist production, increasing its efficiency, scientific and technological progress and accelerating the growth of labor productivity.” 1Thus, from specific market-type economic measures proclaimed in the 60s. the country's leadership again switched to empty ideological rhetoric on the topic of the economy.
At that time, the world had to choose between official Soviet statistics and somewhat more modest calculations prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and there was an opinion, shared even by some Soviet economists, that the latter were closer to the truth. But by the end of the 1980s. it became clear that the numbers coming from the CIA were only slightly less inflated than the official Soviet ones. The CIA calculations turned out to be so inaccurate for two reasons: firstly, the Soviet statistics that the CIA had to work with were often “corrected” in order to create an exaggerated idea of the success of the plan, including counting on “encouragement”: and . second, and more importantly, the Western method of estimating the gross national product (GNP) of the USSR—calculations that the Soviets themselves did not make—was fundamentally flawed.
The reason for the error was the incompatibility of the command
economy and market economy, and hence the impossibility
creating a methodology that would allow comparing the indicators of one with the indicators of another. Contrary to popular belief, GNP does not exist in fact, but only conceptually; more precisely, it is a certain measurable quantity, while measurements are always based on theoretical premises. Thus, any attempt to determine the value of the Soviet GNP will be a reflection of the theory that underlies the measurements. And it is here, in the field of theory, that the main problems arise. All our theories about economic performance are based on Western experience and Western data, with prices being the main data. But Soviet prices have no economic logic; their "logic" is political logic.1
3 Soviet policy in the military sphere: the burden of global power
The shortcomings of the system's economy are only becoming more apparent against the backdrop of the success of its only internationally competitive sector, the military industry. As we have already emphasized, all sectors of the Soviet economy were organized according to a military model, but the production of military products proper became its main task only after 1937. Of course, given the circumstances that prevailed at that time and lasted until 1945, all this is fully justified. However, in the post-war period, the situation changed dramatically, and the system's obsession with military power acquired a more permanent, institutionalized character. For the Soviet Union was now freed from the direct threat of a hostile neighbor and could fully engage in maneuvering to gain a "position of power" in Europe and East Asia in the face of the "imperialist camp". The nature of the conflict has also changed, since the Cold War was not a duel where the outcome is really decided by the force of arms, but only relentless preparation for such a duel. The resulting continuous military-technical mobilization in peacetime conditions over four decades is a phenomenon in the history of international conflicts, perhaps unique. Of course, the American “side” also bore the burden of this conflict, but in the Soviet Union, Cold War efforts absorbed a much larger share of national resources. The above is especially true for the Brezhnev era.
After 1945, the scale of demobilization in the USSR almost coincided with the American one. Soviet remobilization began only as a result of the Korean War, and then, in the late 1950s, as already mentioned, Khrushchev again reduced the size of the armed forces, while simultaneously trying to quickly catch up with the United States in terms of missile power. And only in the 1960s, after the dangerous “Cuban episode”, did the Soviet Union begin a long and systematic build-up of armaments in order to equal or surpass the United States in all areas. This meant, firstly, an increase in the size of the ground forces to about four and a half million people. With the arrival of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, this also meant the creation of a first-class world-class navy - especially a submarine fleet - capable of operating on all oceans. And, finally, it meant reaching nuclear-missile parity with the United States. And by 1969, the USSR finally acquires this long-awaited status: for the first time, it really becomes a superpower, equal in strength to its rival. Since the regime sought to retain this status at all costs and, if possible, to get ahead, the arms race continued and reached its peak under Brezhnev and Andropov. The Soviet Union of that time was spoken of as a state that did not have a military-industrial complex, because it itself was such. More precisely, it was the party-military-industrial complex, since it was by no means the military who stood at the helm of power, and the causes of the arms race stemmed not from considerations of strategy proper, but from the party-political worldview, according to which the world was divided into two hostile camps. And only the ability of the party to the total mobilization of society could give birth to a military-industrial complex of such gigantic proportions as it became under Brezhnev.
At that time, the CIA believed that the Soviet military machine was absorbing approximately 15% of the USSR's GNP, while US defense spending averaged 5% annually.1
The Soviet Union managed to achieve an approximate strategic parity in the nuclear race with the United States both by strengthening its nuclear missile potential and by diversifying its armed forces, especially the development of the fleet.
In this alignment, however, gaps are formed, since there were factors that weakened and undermined the unbalanced power of the USSR. These factors manifested themselves just where the USSR could previously count on great support. This is how the conflict with China developed throughout the 1970s, even after Mao's death: it was a powerful force capable of inspiring fear and suspicion. There were problems with the "Iron Triangle of the Warsaw Pact" - that is, the Soviet Union was losing influence in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Japan has become the second economic power in the world. Thus, the favorable results of "détente" dissipated, Moscow had fewer and fewer friends in the world, since the invasion of Afghanistan caused discontent even among the so-called non-aligned countries that stood outside the two blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). There was even a threat that against the USSR, without agreeing, all the main world powers would form a common coalition: from China to the USA, from European states to Japan. In any case, of course, that for the first time in many decades in 1975-1980. Moscow, more or less justifiably, felt danger in almost all sections of its border: in the Far East, in the south - from Afghanistan and Khomeini's Iran, in the West - because of Poland. Even the allies under the Warsaw Pact, despite their apparent obedience, accumulated internal discontent - so that in the event of international complications, they could not be relied upon. Brezhnev's rule, which began with such favorable international prospects, ended with such a heavy liability that none of the previous governments knew.
In the second half of the 1970s, following the general line chosen in the post-Stalin period, the Soviet Union continued to globalize its foreign policy, taking on ever new obligations, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
So the USSR inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, helped the Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, then directly intervened in the conflict in the Horn of Africa, first on the side of Somalia, then, returning to the alliance with Ethiopia, General Mengistu and supported him in the war in Ogaden. The positions in Africa won by the Soviet Union opened up new opportunities for the expansion of its naval power, which in the 70s. has increased significantly.
Not limited to protecting its maritime borders, the Soviet fleet, guided by the new strategy proposed by Admiral Gorshkov, demonstrated its presence and exerted political pressure in the waters of the World Ocean.
The mortal blow to "détente" was dealt by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. When the Soviet leaders decided to send troops to Afghanistan, they, of course, could not imagine what serious consequences this "initiative" of theirs would entail. Committed immediately after the conflict in Angola and Ethiopia, after the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the intervention in Afghanistan seemed to be the climax of the unprecedented scope of Soviet military expansion. Thanks to the reaction caused by this intervention in the United States, R. Reagan won the elections in the fall of 1980, and his foreign policy became the main obstacle to Soviet diplomacy in the 1980s.
The policy of overmilitarization, as the USSR's response to foreign policy circumstances, had the most negative impact on the country's economy. Despite its crisis state and the failure of economic reforms, Soviet leaders increased the pace of military development. The most modern high-tech industries worked entirely for the defense industry. In the total volume of engineering products, the production of military equipment was more than 60%, and the share of military spending in the gross national product (GNP) was about 23% (diagrams 2, 3, 4).1
Diagram 2. The share of military orders (%) in the production of heavy industry in the USSR. 1978
Diagram 3. The share of military orders (%) in light industry products of the USSR. 1977
Diagram 4. The share of the military sector (%) in the GNP of the USSR. 1977
An excessive military burden on the economy sucked all the profits out of it and created disproportions. Due to the difference in cost in different sectors of the economy, the purchasing power of the ruble was also different. In the defense industry, it was equal to 4-6 US dollars, while in other industries it was much lower. The military orientation in the development of Soviet industry also affected civilian production. It was inferior to Western countries in all respects.
On the other hand, the favorable international situation for the USSR in the early 1970s was rapidly changing. The United States has shaken off the burden of the Vietnam War and is now in a position to take the initiative in world affairs with renewed vigor.
The USSR, on the contrary, found itself in a situation where politics, ideology, economics and culture, that is, all those factors on which a strong foreign policy of the state can be based, were hit by a crisis. These conditions prompted the Soviet leaders to rely on the only means in respect of which they could still talk about certain successes - armaments. But excessive faith in the possibilities of one's own military power became, in turn, the reason for making decisions that entailed other grave political consequences. Perhaps the worst of these was the decision to send an expeditionary force to Afghanistan in late 1979 to support a group of leftist officers who had previously seized power through a coup d'état but then proved unable to hold it. one
This was the beginning of a protracted and exhausting war, a kind of Soviet Vietnam. One of its results was that due to the sanctions taken by the West against the USSR after the outbreak of the Afghan war, access to the country of the best foreign models of equipment and high technologies actually stopped. So by 1980, there were 1.5 million computers and 17 million personal computers in the USA, in the USSR there were no more than 50 thousand such machines, mostly outdated models. (Diagram 5)1
Diagram 5. Comparatively: the number of computers in industrial operation in the USA and the USSR (pcs) (1980)
The war in Afghanistan and other military companies of the USSR during the times of "developed socialism" became an abyss, continuously absorbing both people and material resources. The 200,000-strong expeditionary corps fought a war in Afghanistan that was extremely unpopular in the Soviet Union because of the thousands of dead and even more wounded and crippled young people, outcast and embittered.
No less negative were the consequences of the decision to deploy in Europe and the Far East a large number of missiles with nuclear warheads, aimed at the western part of the European continent, or at the Asian neighbors of the USSR - this was a signal for a new round of the arms race, which was destined to be exhausting above all for the Soviet Union itself. The answer to the unrest in Poland in 1980, which put the communist government of that country in a critical position, was military pressure: the direct intervention was preceded by a coup d'état carried out by the Polish army in December 1981.
The above data testify to the catastrophic information and technical lag of the USSR. And one of the reasons for this was the Cold War, which took the Union out of the global technology exchange system. As a result, Soviet science was losing ground even where it had traditionally been in the lead. This was partly due to the fact that many Soviet scientific developments were of a military-applied nature and were strictly classified.
At the same time, military rivalry with the United States led to the fact that in terms of the technical equipment of science and the number of highly qualified personnel in the period 1975-1980. The Soviet Union lagged behind the West less than in terms of industrial equipment. This made it possible to successfully solve individual scientific and technical problems of world significance. In 1975, there were 1.2 million scientists in the USSR, or about 25% of all scientists in the world.
Thus, in the 1970-1980s. the gap between the USSR and the West, both in the field of politics and in the field of technology, production and the economy as a whole, continued to grow. Even more ominous was the fact that the speed of the backlog increased from year to year. The only sector of the Soviet economy that did not lose competitiveness was the military, but even here this state of affairs could not be maintained for long if the rest of the system was becoming obsolete. And yet, against the backdrop of the rhetoric about the "struggle for peace"1, the Soviet government continued to escalate the arms race, subordinating all the remaining scarce human, intellectual and natural resources to senseless and dangerous competition with the entire surrounding world.
II. The religious component of Soviet society
1 The situation of traditional religions in the USSR in the period 1965-1985.
Domestic policy of the mid-60s-70s. was based on the rejection of the accelerated construction of communism, on the gradual improvement of existing social relations. However, criticism of the past quickly turned into an apology for the present. The course towards stability led to the loss of a utopian, but noble goal - the general welfare. The spiritually organizing principle, which set the tone for the movement towards socially and morally important milestones, and formed a special mood in public life, disappeared. In the 70s. these targets simply did not exist. The impoverishment of the spiritual sphere actually led to the spread of consumer sentiment. This formed a special concept of human life, built a certain system of life values and orientations.
Meanwhile, the course taken to improve well-being needed not only economic, but also moral support. The situation was further complicated by the fact that by the 1970s the effect of compensatory mechanisms that influence human behavior, regardless of the external conditions of his life, has weakened: the old ones have lost their significance, and new ones have not been created. For a long time, the role of a compensating mechanism was played by faith in the ideal, in the future, in authority. The universally recognized authority in the mass consciousness of the 70s. did not have. The authority of the party has noticeably decreased, representatives of the upper echelon of power (with a few exceptions) were simply unpopular among the people. The crisis of trust in the authorities, the collapse of official ideals, the moral deformation of reality increased the craving for traditional forms of faith in society. At the end of the 50s. sociological studies of various aspects of religions and teachings, surveys of believers, for all their imperfection, bias and programming, in fact, for the first time in the Soviet era, gave a more or less concrete picture of the spiritual life of Soviet society.
If in the first half of the 60s. Soviet sociologists talked about 10-15% of believers among the urban population and about 15-25% among the rural population, then in the 70s. among the townspeople there were already 20% believers and 10% vacillators. At this time, Soviet religious scholars are increasingly noting an increase in the number of young people and neophytes (new converts) among believers, stating that many schoolchildren show a positive attitude towards religion, and 80% of religious families teach their children religion under the direct influence of clergy.1 The official political doctrine at that time moment was unable to block this trend. Therefore, the authorities decided to put into play some of the old ideas of "god-building". Sociological calculations gradually led the ideologues of the Central Committee to the conviction that religion could not be done away with by force. Seeing in religion only an aesthetic shell and the strength of a certain ethnic tradition, the ideologists intended to plant models of Orthodox and other religious holidays and rituals (for example, christening, marriage, etc.) on a non-religious one; secular soil. In the 70s. they began to put forward a new model - not the physical destruction of faith, but its adaptation to communism, the creation of a new type of priest, who at the same time would be an ideological worker, a kind of communist priest.
This experiment began to advance especially actively in the years when Yu. V. Andropov became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This was a period when, with comparative tolerance for official church structures and "worship", the authorities severely persecuted independent manifestations of God-seeking. In 1966, the Council for Religious Affairs (SDR) was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in 1975. amendments to the legislation of 1929 were published. about religious associations. All this testified that the pressure on religion continues, although it is acquiring civilized forms. The powers to open and close temples, which were previously in the competence of local Councils, now passed to the SDR, which left the final decision, and without any time limit. (The local council was given one month to make a decision on the legislation of 1929.) Thus, the Council for Religious Affairs was now transformed from a body of communication between the state and the Church and appealing against decisions into the only decisive organization, and the Church was deprived of appeal possibilities. At the same time, the new version of the laws somewhat brought the Church closer to the position of a legal entity. For the first time certain economic rights of the Church were stipulated. It was possible to remove the unspoken ban on the admission of persons with diplomas from Soviet universities to theological schools and almost double the enrollment in the seminary. So, by the mid-70s. a new generation of young clergymen and theologians emerged from the Soviet intelligentsia: physicists, mathematicians, doctors, not to mention the humanities. This testified to the process of religious revival in the country, especially among young people, and also to the fact that completely new people were coming to the Church, and it became more and more difficult for the atheistic leadership of the country to claim that pre-revolutionary clerics, reactionaries and ignorant peasants were seeking refuge in it.
A prominent representative of this generation was V. Fonchenkov, who was born in 1932. in the family of a hero of the Civil War, a graduate of the history department of Moscow State University, an employee of the Museum of the Revolution. In 1972 he graduated from the Theological Academy, worked in the Department for External Church Relations, as an editor of an Orthodox magazine in East Berlin, and then as a teacher of the history of Byzantium and the Soviet Constitution at a seminary and the Moscow Theological Academy.
The regime failed to erect an insurmountable barrier between Soviet society and the Church. Although the anti-religious orientation of the policy during the Brezhnev period remained unchanged, there was no general persecution of the Church, as before. This was also explained by the growth of spontaneous decentralization of power, its internal decay.1
In the 70s. extra-church Christian activity intensified significantly. There are religious-philosophical seminars and circles, catechism groups, mainly consisting of young people. The best known are the seminars led by A. Ogorodnikov (Moscow) and V. Poresh (Leningrad). They acted in a number of cities, with the aim of promoting Christianity everywhere, up to the creation of Christian summer camps for children and adolescents. In 1979-1980. the main figures of the seminars were arrested, convicted and sent to prisons and camps, from which they left during the years of perestroika.
The dissident Orthodox intelligentsia, mainly composed of neophytes, transferred to church life those methods of struggle for human rights that were used in secular activities. Ever since the late 60s. dissidence increasingly turned to spiritual historiosophical and culturological searches.
Another manifestation of non-church activity was the activity of the Christian Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Believers in the USSR, established in 1976. clergy G. Yakunin, V. Kapitanchuk and a former political prisoner in the early 60s. Hieromonk Barsanuphius (Khaibulin). The committee was not sanctioned by the authorities, but lasted for four years. He scrupulously collected information about the persecution of believers of all denominations and made them public. In 1980, G. Yakunin was sentenced to 5 years in prison and 7 years in exile and was released only in 1987.
Clergymen D. Dudko and A. Men' were active in catechesis. Tragic is the fate of B. Talantov, a mathematics teacher from Kirov, a prisoner of the Stalinist camps, who died in prison after being convicted in 1969 for letters of protest addressed to the Moscow Patriarchate, the Soviet government, the World Council of Churches and the United Nations against the closure of churches and the expulsion of priests.
The coincidence in time of the emergence of new theological personnel with the emergence and spread of religious and philosophical circles, underground literature, and the search for spiritual roots is not accidental. All these processes reflected the search for new guidelines for spiritual life, were interconnected, fed each other and paved the way for the ideological renewal of society.
The new processes had little effect on the mood of the majority of priests. The church episcopate as a whole, with rare exceptions, remained passive and obedient and did not try to take advantage of the obvious weakening of the system to expand the rights of the Church and its activities. During this period, the control of the Council for Religious Affairs was by no means comprehensive and the subordination of the Church to it was far from complete. And although the authorities still did not abandon repressive methods, they applied them with an eye on world public opinion. An enterprising and courageous bishop, especially a patriarch, could achieve more from the authorities than happened in the 70s and early 80s. The Georgian Patriarch Ilia was very active, having managed in five years, by 1982, to double the number of open churches and seminarians studying, as well as to open a number of monasteries and attract young people to the Church. 170 new communities appeared in the second half of the 70s. at the Baptists. The Russian Orthodox Church opened only about a dozen new or returned churches during the Brezhnev years, although there were many unregistered communities.1
Yu. V. Andropov's short stay at the highest party post was marked by a certain ambivalence in relation to the Church, characteristic of periods of crisis. He, in fact, was the first supreme leader of the USSR, who was aware of the seriousness of the situation. As a former chairman of the KGB, he was the most aware of the true situation in the country, but it was as a person who held this post that he preferred repressive methods to overcome crises. At this time, repressions sharply increased, including those for religious activity, but at the same time minimal indulgences were given to church structures. In 1980, the Church was finally allowed to open a plant and workshops for church utensils in Sofrino, for which the Patriarchate had been petitioning since 1946; in 1981 - The publishing department of the Moscow Patriarchy moved from several rooms of the Novodevichy Convent to a new modern building. In 1982 (officially still under L. I. Brezhnev, but in the conditions of a sharp deterioration in his health and practical inaction, the country was actually led by Yu. V. Andropov), the Moscow St. Danilov Monastery was transferred to the Church for restoration to the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia. The attitude towards the clergy and traditional believers (not engaged in non-church religious activities) became more respectful. In an effort to strengthen discipline at all levels, Yu. V. Andropov imagined that truly believing people do not steal, they drink less, they work more conscientiously. It was during this period that SDR Chairman V. A. Kuroyedov emphasized that harassment for religiosity at work or at the place of study is a criminal offense, and admitted that this had taken place “in the past”.
For 1983-1984 characterized by a more rigid attitude towards religion. An attempt was made to take away the St. Danilov Monastery from the Church. This was prevented, among other things, by the promise to make it the church-administrative center of the Department for External Church Relations, and not a monastery.
The main real achievement of the era of Patriarch Pimen (Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia from 1971 to 1990) was the reduction of taxes on the income of clergy. Previously, they were considered as taxes on private business activities and amounted to 81%, and since January 1981. - as taxes on free professions and began to amount to 69% (except for the production and sale of religious items). Metropolitan Sergius petitioned for this in 1930.
For many reasons, Patriarch Pimen was far from being an active person. His speeches at the UN General Assembly in 1982, at the World Council of Churches in 1973, and at the General Assembly of the WCC in 1975 were strongly dissonant with the gradual emancipation of individual representatives of the Church.
Duality was forced to manifest itself in everything. In official speeches at the sessions of the WCC, at various forums of the world, representatives of the Russian Church resolutely denied not only human rights violations in the USSR, but also the existence of material poverty and social injustice, and avoided criticizing their government. In church practice, in cases where this was allowed by the authorities, the hierarchs ignored civil sentences to the clergy, which, in essence, recognized the existence of persecution for the faith.1
This duality had a corrupting effect on inner life Church, on the spiritual integrity of its hierarchy. The behavior of the patriarchy and the speeches of the patriarch were subjects of controversy in samizdat. Religious samizdat grew noticeably in the 1970s. both in terms of quantity and quality. To a large extent, the works of samizdat belonged to Christian neophytes. Many converts came to the Church through a common civil and human rights movement, first rejecting the ideology on which the repressive social and political system was based, and then discovering Christianity in search of an alternative worldview. As a rule, they did not abandon their former human rights activities, but continued it on the new basis of Christian ethics.
III. Nomenklatura - ruling class
1 Consistent growth of the crisis of Soviet power in the era of "Developed socialism"
Eighty years after the revolution that gave birth to it, Soviet society continued to be the subject of discussion. There are many definitions - both apologetic and polemical - but they are more influenced by political passions than by objective study. The Kremlin ideologists wanted to present the USSR as the first state in which the working masses directly exercise political power. This assertion is not supported by facts. It is refuted by the hierarchical structure of Soviet society. The absence of popular participation in the development of public life is a disease from which the Soviet country suffered. This thought slips even in many official documents.
It should be noted that after the removal of N. S. Khrushchev, whose policy was aimed at the democratization of power, the process of such democratization continued. After the removal of Khrushchev, the principle of collegial leadership was again proclaimed. More recently, people who knew the USSR well were ready to assume that this decision was made for a short time. The facts have refuted this notion. Of course, there were some, albeit few, personal changes in the oligarchy, Brezhnev, who adopted the legacy of Khrushchev, gradually rose above his colleagues for him in 1966, the Stalinist post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was restored (albeit without unlimited power). But the post was completely separate from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. However, while holding the post of General Secretary, in 1977 Brezhnev took the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to whom the new Constitution gave more rights, actually equating him to the head of the Soviet government.
Thus, formally, Khrushchev's sole rule was replaced by a collegiate leadership in the person of L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin. However, soon there was a departure from the principle of collegial government. In 1966, Minister of the Interior V. S. Tikunov was replaced by Brezhnev's protege N. A. Shchelokov. In 1967 there was also a change in the leadership of the KGB. Taking advantage of the flight to the United States of Stalin's daughter S. Alliluyeva, Brezhnev forced the resignation of the chairman of the KGB Semichasny, who was replaced by Yu. V. Andropov. The death of the Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, led to a reshuffle in the military department, which from 1967 to 1976 was headed by Marshal A. A. Grechko, Brezhnev’s combat ally.1
Serious personnel changes during this period took place in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Of the 17 members of the highest party body after 10 years, only 7 remained in its composition. At the same time, Brezhnev had an unconditional preponderance of his supporters here, the so-called "Dnepropetrovsk group".
All of them were united by care in Dnepropetrovsk, Moldova and Kazakhstan. In addition to Kirilenko, Shchelokov, among Brezhnev's supporters were the leaders of the party organizations of Kazakhstan - D. A. Kunaev and Ukraine - V. V. Shcherbitsky, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee K. U. Chernenko.
Strengthened position in the party and Brezhnev himself, who became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (since 1977, he will also be Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR).
Occupying leading positions in the party and state authorities, Brezhnev placed his supporters everywhere. Fedorchuk and Tsvigun were appointed to head the KGB Andropov as deputies, N.A. Tikhonov, who began his career in Dnepropetrovsk, became Kosygin's deputy in the USSR government in 1965. Brezhnev had his representatives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. At the same time, the Secretary General did not close all the levers of state power, leaving
M. A. Suslov was responsible for ideological work, Yu. V. Andropov was responsible for issues of external and internal security, and A. A. Gromyko was responsible for the foreign policy activities of the USSR. Since 1973, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, internal affairs and the chairman of the KGB have become members of the Politburo. Thus, there is a merging of party and state authorities. The general secretary's contacts were clearly established with the first secretaries of the regional committees of the CPSU, with whom he contacted by phone at least once a week. Having strengthened his position in the party and the state, Brezhnev spoke in the 70s. in the role of a representative of the interests of the majority of the Politburo, not interested in new personnel changes, in changing the political system of Soviet society. Members of the Politburo now left their post only in case of death. Their average age in 1980 was 71 years. The ruling stratum began to acquire the features of a gerontocracy (the power of the elderly).
Despite certain steps towards democratization and separation of powers, the societal management system, which researchers now call the command-administrative system, functioned worse and worse in terms of achieving the goals that - at least on paper - it set for itself: centralized planning of production and distribution, control over these processes. Even a simple acquaintance with official documents (and there was always a desire to present reality in the most optimistic light) indisputably testifies: the tasks set, the proclaimed ideas and projects were either not implemented at all, or were implemented minimally. The so-called state plans (five-year or annual) - in the end turned out not to be economic imperatives, but endless repetitive appeals doomed to failure.
In Soviet society, there was a leading stratum. The most common definition of it, which has become almost a commonplace, was the identification with the bureaucracy. Everyone who holds any position, including in the economy, is a functionary of the vertical state. However, this does not say anything about the nature and composition of this broadest stratum of Soviet society in the time of developed socialism, which, due to its size, was highly differentiated. On the other hand, the spread of the bureaucracy to a greater or lesser extent is a common phenomenon in all modern societies.1
In our opinion, the definition of “new class”, “new bourgeoisie”, which has become widespread in scientific use since Yugoslav Djilos used it, gives little. Western historians note that when concepts are used that have turned out to be suitable for the analysis of other historical situations, the originality of the Soviet phenomenon is lost. Until now, the attempts made to analyze the history of the Soviet Union in this vein and its reality during the times of developed socialism, on the contrary, have not added such knowledge, because they have not revealed the specifics Soviet development in the past and present.
The ruling stratum that has formed in Soviet society is not really a class, at least in the Marxist sense of the term. Although his position in the state allows him to widely use the instruments of production and resources of the country, this special relationship to the means of production does not determine his essence. This stratum coincides only partially with the privileged strata that still existed, or with the holders of the greatest social prestige: after all, there were numerous groups of artists, scientists, intellectuals who had a better financial situation or were better known because of their activities, but still not were included in the leadership.
The real characteristic of this stratum, on the contrary, lies in its political origin: a party that has become a hierarchical order. Both terms are very important for the problem of interest to us. Being a party that has become the leading institution of the state, the CPSU sought to gather in its ranks everyone who "means something" in Soviet society - from the head of the Research Institute to the sports champion and cosmonaut.
In 1982, the state of health of L. I. Brezhnev deteriorated sharply. Under these conditions, the question is raised about a possible successor and, consequently, about the path of evolution of Soviet society. In an effort to increase his chances in the fight against the "Dnepropetrovsk group" that nominated K. U. Chernenko, Yu. V. Andropov goes to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU in place of M. A. Suslov, who died at the beginning of the year. The death in November 1982 of Brezhnev raised the question of a new party leader. Andropov is supported by Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, as well as young members of the Politburo M. S. Gorbachev and G. V. Romanov. On November 12, 1982, he became the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from June 1983 Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces and Chairman of the Defense Council.
During the short period of his reign, Andropov made an attempt to reform the political elite of society, to carry out a "personnel revolution." The most odious personalities were removed from power, and the leadership of elected bodies of power was rotated. Economic reforms were outlined and partially carried out (for more details, see the second part of Chapter 6). At the same time, the positions of the official ideology of the state were strengthened. The opposition and the dissident movement, previously represented by numerous figures, were crushed by the KGB and virtually ceased to exist as a mass phenomenon. A special June 1983 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, where the problem of a developed socialist society was subjected to a comprehensive analysis. Criticizing the established stereotypes and dogmas, Andropov said: "We do not know the society in which we live", calling for a new look at socialism, updating the ideological baggage, creating an effective
counter-propaganda of Western ideology. To this end, it was planned to carry out school and other reforms. The sudden death of Andropov in February 1984 suspended the implementation of the program of planned transformations of Soviet society.
The representative of the “Dnepropetrovsk group”, K. U. Chernenko, who replaced Andropov, during the year of his tenure as Secretary General of the CPSU, actually only marked a return to the Brezhnev era of stagnation in the field of economy, ideology and public life. About 50 senior officials of the Central Committee, removed by Andropov, were returned to their former positions; Stalin's ally V. M. Molotov was reinstated in the party with the preservation of the party seniority. The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, dedicated to the issues of intensification of production, was canceled. Only the envisaged school reform was partly implemented in the form of salary increases for teachers.1
2 The shadow sector of the economy in the USSR
But the “shadow economy” became a true pillar of the system only under Brezhnev. It unfolded in two broad areas, which can be conditionally called retail and wholesale trade. In its "retail" incarnation, the "second economy" satisfied the consumer needs of the population, offering them those goods that were in short supply - the so-called deficit. In fact, it provided consumers with services from tailoring and car repair to medical care not provided by the state system, supplied with imported goods - from jeans and luxury goods to sophisticated technology, so coveted because of its incomparably better quality and foreign chic. In its second, "wholesale" incarnation, the "shadow economy" acted as a system to keep the official economy afloat - or as a source of entrepreneurial ingenuity, somewhat compensating for the sluggishness of the plan. So, she supplied state production structures with literally everything, from raw materials to spare parts, in those numerous cases, once or another enterprise could not receive what was required from official suppliers in the time frame necessary for the timely implementation of the plan. "Shadow" entrepreneurs often "pumped", plundered goods belonging to the institution of the official system in order to sell them to another. And it happened that the "shadow economy" evolved even further, growing into a parallel production of household goods and industrial equipment.
Thus, the "second economy" often gave rise to real "mafias" - by the way, this term entered the Russian language precisely under Brezhnev. Such mafias sometimes merged even with the party hierarchy, forming a kind of symbiosis, when entrepreneurs acquired the patronage of politicians in exchange for material benefits and all kinds of services. For in a world where the economic system was primarily a political system, political power became the primary source of wealth. Moreover, in some outlying republics, the mafia literally took control of the local communist parties - more precisely. local communist parties almost entirely degenerated into mafias. The most famous example was probably Georgia under its first secretary and at the same time a candidate member of the Politburo, Vasily Mzhavanadze, who was eventually removed from power by the republic's interior minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. But an even more colorful example of the above was Rafik Adylov, a party secretary in Uzbekistan who maintained a harem and set up a torture chamber for his critics; the Uzbek top party boss regularly overestimated the production of cotton, for which he received money from Moscow. But corruption could also be found at the very top of the system, among the "Dnipropetrovsk mafia" represented by friends and relatives of Brezhnev, which the population somehow learned about and which further undermined its confidence in the regime.
And these "blunders" were as little determined by chance as the failures of Soviet agriculture were determined by bad weather. The fusion of the apparatus with the mafia became a serious problem under Brezhnev because of his policy of "stability of personnel", which, in turn, was the result of a long evolution of the party as an institution; the same reasons gave rise to a new phenomenon - gerontocracy, so conspicuous at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, but in fact dominated at every level.1
Criminal behavior was also driven by an economic logic that flowed from the very nature of directive planning. The Soviet experiment, which celebrated its half-century anniversary under Brezhnev, by that time had shown its complete inability to suppress the market: despite all efforts, it revived again and again - whether illegally, in the person of "sackbags" - under Lenin's "war communism", or on legal grounds - under the New Economic Policy, or under Stalin - in the form of household plots and the collective farm market. However, the experiment also showed that it is possible to drive the market underground for an indefinite period of time, making it criminal in terms of both the law and the norms. social behavior. But since this underground market was brought to life not by frenzied “speculation”, but by the real needs of society, which it also served, the entire population turned out to be involved in it to one degree or another; so that literally everyone was criminalized to a certain extent, for everyone had to have their own little "racket" or "case" in order to survive. Corruption, of course, exists in the West, but there people still have a choice, and it is not an indispensable condition for survival. In the former USSR, it was impossible to do without it. As a result, every now and then turned out to be guilty of something, and activities that simply cannot be done without were stigmatized and suppressed.
How big was the "second economy"? None of the economists "with a name" even tried to give her an accurate assessment. Although evidence of its existence came from everywhere; but this inevitable uncertainty is only the clearest instance of the general uncertainty we face when it comes to the Soviet economy as a whole. As for quantitative indicators, one can only say about the "parallel economy" that its volume was very impressive; but its most important property was of a qualitative order: this economy turned out to be absolutely necessary for the entire life of the system as such. Contrary to the claims of the regime, it was by no means an isolated defect or the result of abuses that could be eliminated by developing a better policy or tightening discipline. It was inevitably generated by an artificially created state and a monopoly in the sphere of the economy, at the same time being an indispensable condition for maintaining such a monopoly. The fact that the performance of such important functions turned into an object of police persecution not only undermined the economy, both official and underground, but also undermined public morality, as well as the very idea of \u200b\u200blegality among the population. And all this increased the price that had to be paid for the "rationality" of the plan.
3 The emergence and development of Soviet dissidence
In his report at the XXII Congress (1966), L. I. Brezhnev formally spoke out against two extremes: "slandering" and "varnishing reality." Along with this, critics of AI Solzhenitsyn's work, including his story One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, were openly voiced at the congress. On February 10-14, 1966, the trial of the writer A. Sinyavsky and then translator Yu. Daniel took place in the Moscow Regional Court. They were accused of agitation and propaganda in order to undermine and weaken Soviet power in the works that they published abroad under pseudonyms. Sinyavsky was sentenced to 7 years, Daniel to 5 years in prison. Strengthening censorship, the practice of banning publications and demonstrations of works took place in the future. In 1970, from the post of editor-in-chief of the journal Novy Mir, A. T. Tvardovsky. In cinema, theater and literature, a regulated thematic repertoire was introduced, fantasizing the authors of high incomes, but narrowing the possibilities of creative search. In the USSR, there is a distinction between official and underground culture. A certain part of the intelligentsia was forced to leave the USSR (A. Tarkovsky, A. Galich, Yu. Lyubimov, Neizvestny, M. Rostropovich, V. Nekrasov, and others). Thus, in the USSR and abroad in the late 60s - early 70s. there was a spiritual opposition.1
There were several reasons for the fact that the dissident movement arose at this time. The fall of Khrushchev not only brought an end to open discussions about the Stalin era, but also gave rise to a counteroffensive from the orthodox, who, in essence, sought to rehabilitate Stalin. It is not surprising that the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, which took place on the eve of the first party congress under the new leadership, was regarded by many as a prelude to active re-Stalinization. Thus, dissidence was primarily a movement of self-defence against the possibility of such a development of events, which remained very relevant until the 90th anniversary of the birth of Stalin. But dissidence was also a manifestation of growing disillusionment with the system's ability to reform. The somewhat feigned optimism of the Khrushchev years was replaced by the realization that the reforms would not be sent down from above, but - at best - would be the result of a long and slow process of struggle and pressure on the authorities. However, the dissidents so far have been talking only about reforms, and not about breaking the system itself. And, finally, dissidence as such became possible only because the regime no longer wanted to resort to the brutal terror of the previous years. This was not because the system was becoming liberal or mutating from totalitarianism to conventional authoritarianism; the change happened for a very pragmatic reason: terror in its extreme forms was destructive for itself. Therefore, now the regime carried out repressions using softer and more indirect methods, preferring to act gradually, hiding behind the veneer of “socialist legality”, as in the case of the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel.
And therefore, it would be a mistake to consider the Brezhnev period as the time of the new Stalinism.1 Brezhnev as a person - even acting in tandem with Suslov - was no match for Stalin, and if he tried to start a revolution "from above" and unleash mass terror, he would not get away with hands in the 1960s. As already noted, any communist regime experiences Stalinism only once - at the decisive moment in the building of socialism. Only the service of such a higher goal is able to give rise to the fanaticism and violence inherent in real Stalinism. But once socialism has been built, the regime's first task is to "protect its gains"; Stalinism, or rather, the Stalinist system, becomes a routine and stabilizes in the form of “developed socialism”. The once ardent ideology of class struggle and battles turns into a cold ideology of orthodox incantations. And as a result, the leadership of the Soviet system passes from the hands of the revolutionaries to the hands of the guardians. It was “soft” Stalinism that was practiced under the “gray” protection of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov.
Dessidency, as a contradiction between ideology and culture, is connected with the unsatisfied need for political democratization, which manifested itself after the death of Stalin. Soviet society remained hierarchical. At the same time, the circle of those who made decisions in the era of developed socialism expanded significantly: the opinion of engineering and technical workers gained more influence. Around specific problems of the economy, education, labor, more free discussions are taking place among competent persons, which never happened in the past. The collegiate leadership itself has become not so much a source of correct or erroneous instructions to society from above, but a place of rivalry and supreme arbitration between different pressure groups. However, there was little public debate. There were no political disputes at all. The higher hierarchy remains inaccessible and shrouded in mystery.
Elections in the USSR to rule Brezhnev continue to be a formality. The very type of relationship between rulers and ruled reflects a long absence of democratic customs. Decisions continue to come down from above, without giving the broad masses of citizens the opportunity to influence them. All this entails the development of political apathy, indifference and inertia.
At the same time, the ideological influence of the USSR greatly decreased precisely when it reached the maximum of its strength. This influence was strong when the country was weak and isolated. Then the outside world actively defended itself against the "contagion" of his propaganda. In the era of “developed socialism”, the Soviet state protected itself from other people’s thoughts with outdated prohibitions.
Even in countries that remained allies of the USSR and were in its political and military subordination, the Union no longer had absolute hegemony. There they began to question the Stalinist system. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1956 became the norm of behavior between the socialist countries.1
The decline of Soviet influence is better shown in the relations between the USSR and the communist movement in 1969, when Moscow finally managed to convene an international meeting of the communist and workers' parties, which Khrushchev did not succeed in 1964. Representatives of many parties did not come, and those who arrived were not unanimous on many issues until the end of it.
Conclusion
Without a serious study of the past, progress is impossible. History is the study of the past. However, it must be remembered that history is a "slow" science. This feature is very important in relation to the topic of our work. In our opinion, it is very difficult for our generation, which witnessed the historical event of a tremendous effect, namely perestroika, to give an objective assessment of such a recent past that directly predetermined our present. In this regard, today it is difficult to write a true history of the Brezhnev years. Perhaps the conditions for this will ripen in the near future, however, in this case, such work will require the study of a large amount of documents and time. But the main condition for the objectivity of such studies is the elimination of its emotional component.
At the same time, many documents of those years have been disclosed today, and on the basis of publicity, we can freely rely on the opinion of the many living witnesses of that time. This unique opportunity must not be missed: modern historians must do much to collect and accumulate materials on the history of "developed socialism."
Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn about the main trends in economic, political and social processes in the USSR in 1971-1985.
The sixties of the twentieth century are called the turning points in the history of Soviet society. By the beginning of the 70s. in the Soviet Union, at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices, a powerful industrial and scientific potential was created: more than 400 industries and sub-sectors of industry functioned, space and the latest military technologies developed at an accelerated pace. The share of industry and construction in the gross national income increased to 42%, while the share of agriculture, on the contrary, decreased to 24%. A so-called demographic revolution took place, which changed the way of life and the nature of the natural reproduction of the population. Soviet society became not only industrial, but also urban and educated.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to state that in the Soviet economy in the 1970s. there was an imbalance, as a result of which, for its further development, a constant increase in production resources was required. On the other hand, the modernization dictated by the party's policy in many respects led to the chronic lag of the agrarian sector of the Soviet economy. And this meant, in fact, the absence of a reliable base for the development of industry and infrastructure.
In the 70s. XX century, the key role in the management of Soviet society, determining the nature and pace of its development are transferred to the "new class", the class of managers. After the removal of Khrushchev from power, the final formation of this class as a powerful political force takes place. And in the Stalinist period, the highest stratum of party and economic functionaries was endowed with enormous power and privileges. Nevertheless, in those years there were no signs of integrity, cohesion and, consequently, the consolidation of the nomenklatura as a class. Step by step, this privileged stratum strengthened its position. The idea of maintaining power, expanding benefits and powers rallied, united his ranks. The basis of the "new class" was the highest stratum of party functionaries. In the 70s. In the 20th century, the ranks of the "managing class" are expanding at the expense of the top of the trade unions, the military-industrial complex, and the privileged scientific and creative intelligentsia. Its total number reaches 500 - 700 thousand people, together with family members - about 3 million, i.e. 1.5% of the total population of the country.
In the early 70s. The 20th century was a blow to all concepts of the turn to a market economy. The very word "market" has become a criterion of ideological ill will. The state of affairs in the economy worsened, the growth of the living standards of the people stopped. But the “shadow economy” flourished. Its breeding ground was the bureaucratic system, the functioning of which required constant hard non-economic coercion and a regulator in the form of a deficit. The latter absurdly demonstrated itself everywhere against the background of absolutely incredible surpluses of various raw materials and materials. The enterprises could not sell or exchange them for the necessary goods on their own. The underground market supported the collapsed economy.
The most important consequence of Khrushchev's liberalization is a sharp increase in the critical potential in Soviet society, the crystallization of sprouts independent of the state, scattered elements of civil society. Since the end of the 50s. In the 20th century, various ideological currents, informal public associations are formed and declare themselves in the USSR, public opinion is taking shape and strengthening. It is in the spiritual sphere, the most resistant to totalitarian state intervention, that in these years there is a rapid growth of elements and structures of civil society. In the 70-80s. both in the political sphere itself and outside it, in the field of culture, in some social sciences, discussions began to arise that, if not openly “dissident”, then, in any case, testified to obvious divergences from officially recognized norms and values. Among the manifestations of this kind of disagreement, the most significant were: the protest of most of the youth, attracted by samples of Western mass culture; environmental public campaigns, for example, against the pollution of Lake Baikal and the diversion of northern rivers into Central Asia; criticism of the degradation of the economy, primarily by young "technocrats", who often worked in prestigious scientific centers far from the center (for example, in Siberia); the creation of works of a nonconformist nature in all areas of intellectual and artistic creativity (and waiting in the wings in the drawers of desks and workshops of their authors).
All these phenomena and forms of protest will be recognized and flourish in the period of "glasnost".
However, in conditions of controllability, planned public life by the state and the absence of broad public support, the emerging civil structures were doomed to one-sidedness, conflict, marginality. This is how Soviet dissidence was born and developed.
In the country, there is a revival of people's needs for faith and true spiritual guidance. However, religious illiteracy, which was the result of state policy, became the reason for the widespread emergence and spread of various pseudo-religions and frankly destructive cults. They were especially popular among the intelligentsia.
Thus, during the period under study, almost all aspects of the life of Soviet society were struck by a serious crisis, and no effective means against it were proposed by the country's leadership. The USSR thus found itself in a situation where politics, ideology, economics and culture, that is, all those factors on which a strong foreign and domestic policy of the state can be based, were hit by a crisis. By the beginning of the 1980s, Soviet foreign policy was also entering a period of crisis. However, its crisis was a reflection of the crisis in domestic politics.
The diagnosis of the situation in which the development of our society found itself is stagnation. In fact, a whole system of weakening the instruments of power has emerged, a kind of mechanism for slowing down socio-economic development has been formed. The concept of "braking mechanism" helps to understand the causes of stagnation in the life of society.
The braking mechanism is a set of stagnant phenomena in all spheres of the life of our society: political, economic, social, spiritual, international. The braking mechanism is a consequence, or rather a manifestation of the contradictions between the productive forces and production relations. The subjective factor played a significant role in folding the braking mechanism. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the party and state leadership turned out to be unprepared to actively and effectively counter the growing negative phenomena in all areas of the country's life.
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Russian history. XX - the beginning of the XXI century. Grade 11. Basic level Kiselev Alexander Fedotovich
§ 15. SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE
"Down with illiteracy!" With the victory of the Bolsheviks, Russian culture was placed under strict control of the party. Freedom of creativity was declared a "bourgeois relic". All citizens of Soviet society, under the leadership of the party, were to participate in the construction of socialism.
The state controlled education, science and culture. Formally, he was in charge of this area People's Commissariat education, headed by A. V. Lunacharsky. However, the key issues of managing culture and science were resolved in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.
The revolution caused enormous damage to Russian culture and science. Outstanding writers and artists, artists and musicians left the country: I. A. Bunin, A. I. Kuprin, I. E. Repin, F. I. Chaliapin, S. V. Rakhmaninov and others. Scientists and engineers emigrated or were expelled . I. I. Sikorsky, who emigrated to the United States, became a pioneer in the helicopter industry, V. K. Zworykin - the inventor of television, P. A. Sorokin brought glory to the American sociological science, historians S. P. Melgunov, A. A. Kizevetter, P. N. Milyukov, philosophers S. N. Bulgakov, N. A. Berdyaev, I. A. Ilyin and many other talented people were forced to realize their talents away from homeland. Emigration gave impetus to the emergence of centers of Russian culture abroad - in Europe, Asia, and America.
The Bolsheviks believed that socialism should be built by "new people", free from bourgeois prejudices. The education and upbringing of young people in the spirit of the communist doctrine began to come to the fore. Moreover, in pre-revolutionary Russia, 4/5 of the population were illiterate.
The slogan "Down with illiteracy!" became one of the main for the ruling party. Courses were organized to eliminate illiteracy (literacy programs). They taught millions of people to read and write. During the first three years of Soviet power, more than 7 million people became literate. However, the conclusion that the illiteracy of the population has forever sunk into the past was made only in the late 1930s.
At the same time, a new Soviet school was also “built”. Lenin's wife N. K. Krupskaya played a significant role in organizing the work of the Commissariat of Education. In 1918, the declaration "On a unified labor school" was adopted: the school was declared public, unified and labor at all levels of education. Compulsory primary education was introduced in 1930.
The development of education was greatly influenced by industrialization, which required skilled workers and specialists. From the mid 1920s. schools of factory apprenticeships began to operate, which gave the working class a multimillion-dollar replenishment. The scope of industrial transformations sharply raised the problem of training engineering personnel. Workers' faculties (workers' faculties) were opened in universities, which were supposed to prepare people from workers and peasants to study at institutes. This was how the task of forming a new, Soviet intelligentsia was solved.
Poster. Artist A. Radakov
In literacy courses
Soon the share of workers and peasants among students of higher educational institutions reached 65%. Many of them persistently mastered knowledge, became qualified specialists. Due to the efforts of the first generations of the Soviet intelligentsia, the country was updated.
Industrial modernization demanded from the government more attention to the development of science. Moreover, it was different in relation to the social and natural sciences. The former underwent a rigorous "reforging" on the basis of Marxism, which was declared the only true doctrine. K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, and later I. V. Stalin were literally canonized, and their works were declared the only methodological basis for the development of the humanities, the key that unlocks the secrets of the universe.
Scientists in the humanities were more often repressed than natural scientists. Social sciences were literally driven into the Procrustean bed of Marxist-Leninist ideology, deviation from which was mercilessly punished. In 1937 - 1938. Prominent economists N. D. Kondratiev, A. V. Chayanov, L. N. Yurovsky were executed by the verdict of the Military Collegium.
Repression could not stop the development of science. V. I. Vernadsky (geology and geochemistry), N. I. Luzin, N. I. Egorov (mathematics), N. E. Zhukovsky (aircraft building), P. L. Kapitsa and A. F. Ioffe continued to work in Russia (physics), etc.
V. I. Vernadsky
Ideological pressure and repression did not bypass those scientists who worked in the field of natural sciences, but in general the state supported scientific developments, especially those that served to strengthen the country's defense capability. So, back in the years of the Civil War, under the leadership of N. E. Zhukovsky, the Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) was opened in Moscow, and the radio laboratory of M. A. Bonch-Bruevich in Nizhny Novgorod was launched. Optical and physico-technical institutes headed by the luminaries of science, the physicists D. S. Rozhdestvensky and A. F. Ioffe, were created at public expense. Academician A.N. Bakh headed the Institute of Biochemistry, V.I. Vernadsky - the Radium Institute, and the Institute of Physiology was headed by the Nobel laureate I.P. Pavlov. Large-scale fundamental research was carried out at the USSR Academy of Sciences, which has become one of the most authoritative scientific organizations in the world. The structure of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR included branch scientific institutes of various profiles, which made a significant contribution to the development of domestic and world science.
In the future, an outstanding role in the development of Soviet science was played by those who declared their talents in the 1920s and 1930s. scientists: physicists P. L. Kapitsa and L. D. Landau, mathematicians A. N. Kolmogorov and P. S. Alexandrov, chemist N. N. Semenov, polar explorers I. D. Papanin and O. Yu. Schmidt, designer spacecraft S. P. Korolev, aircraft designers A. N. Tupolev and A. S. Yakovlev and many others.
The establishment of socialist realism. The Communist Party controlled literature and the arts. So, as early as 1922, censorship bodies (Glavlit) were created, designed to exercise control over the “ideological consistency” of published works.
In the first post-revolutionary decade, various styles, directions, currents competed in art, which stimulated creative searches and undertakings. Realism has been renewed, the main theme of which is the life of workers, peasants, and the Soviet intelligentsia.
During the work of the 1st Congress of Soviet Writers. Moscow. 1934
Proletkult stood on the left positions. He called for abandoning the former, noble and bourgeois culture, throwing it overboard the revolutionary ship and writing proletarian culture from scratch.
In literature, along with writers who had formed before the revolution (A. A. Akhmatova, A. M. Gorky, O. E. Mandelstam, V. V. Mayakovsky, S. A. Yesenin), new names appeared: L. M. Leonov, E. G. Bagritsky, A. A. Fadeev, M. A. Sholokhov, M. A. Bulgakov and others. They enriched the palette of literary talents.
In painting in the 1920s the variety of styles was maintained. A. E. Arkhipov, P. D. Korin, B. M. Kustodiev, A. V. Lentulov, A. A. Rylov worked at that time. Freshness and innovation emanated from the paintings of avant-garde artists - V. V. Kandinsky, K. S. Malevich, V. E. Tatlin, P. N. Filonov and others. The features of the new life were reflected in their paintings by A. A. Deineka, Yu. Pimenov, A. N. Samokhvalov.
However, by the mid-1930s the diversity of styles in literature and art is a thing of the past. Socialist realism, which the ruling party considered its ideological weapon, is declared the only "true" one. Despite the censorship press, talented works made their way to life. The novel by N. A. Ostrovsky “How the Steel Was Tempered”, which was popular with readers, became an example of new literature, in which the heroism of the revolutionary time breathed disinterestedness and fortitude.
An outstanding work was the novel by M. A. Sholokhov "The Quiet Don", dedicated to the dashing fate of the Don Cossacks, filled with the exceptional power of the author's thought and the depth of the image of revolutionary events, the characters and destinies of people who fell into the millstones of the revolution.
Premiere of S. Eisenstein's film "Battleship Potemkin". 1926
Monumentalism, with its pomposity and feigned optimism, began to predominate in art. Painters created portraits of "leaders" and leaders in production, architects erected huge buildings in a pseudo-classical style. At the same time cultural monuments were destroyed. For example, in Moscow they blew up the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, on the site of which the grandiose Palace of Soviets was supposed to appear. The project was not implemented and an outdoor pool was later built on the site of the temple.
Soviet cinema has loudly declared itself. Pictures directed by S. A. Gerasimov and the Vasiliev brothers, G. M. Kozintsev and L. Z. Trauberg, V. I. Pudovkin and S. M. Eisenstein were classics of Soviet cinema, and actors L. P. Orlova, L. O Utyosov, N.K. Cherkasova and others were loved by the whole country.
For many years, the film Chapaev, dedicated to the legendary commander of the Civil War, enjoyed exceptional popularity.
More than one generation of Soviet people grew up on films made in the 1930s. The reality in them was often depicted as embellished, deliberately happy and carefree, but people yearning for a normal life wanted to see it at least on the screen.
The fate of artists was different. It is bitter that the repressions did not bypass many people gifted with genuine talent. O. E. Mandelstam, N. A. Klyuev, B. A. Pilnyak and others ended up in prisons and camps. A. A. Akhmatova, M. A. Bulgakov, B. L. Pasternak, A.P. Platonov. Others, having submitted to the ideological dictate, experienced the inner drama of people forced to adapt. However, despite all the difficulties, writers, artists, composers, architects managed to create a number of outstanding works that have not lost their significance to this day.
New ideology. The persecution of the church, which the party considered as a competitor in the struggle for the worldview of the people, turned into the closure, destruction and robbery of monasteries and churches. Lenin’s letter to the members of the Politburo, terrible in its cynicism, is known, in which he noted that it was possible to put an end to the resistance of the “Black Hundred clergy” precisely “now, when widespread famine reigns”, and the only way to do this is to shoot as many representatives of the church as possible.
Project of the Palace of Soviets. Architect B. Iofan
The position of the authorities towards Orthodoxy was especially cruel. One of Dzerzhinsky's associates, Chekist Rogov, wrote in his diary: “I don’t understand one thing: the red capital and church bells. Why are the obscurantists on the loose? On my character: to shoot the priests, the churches under the club - and the cover of religion. In 1928, Stalin, starting collectivization, complained in one of his interviews about the "reactionary clergy" poisoning the souls of the masses. “The only thing to be regretted,” he said, “is that the clergy were not completely liquidated.”
The "complaint" of the "great proletarian leader" was heard. In 1932, the "godless five-year plan" was announced. By 1936, the last church in the Soviet Union was planned to be closed. It was not only the Orthodox Church that suffered. Repressions became the lot of all confessions - Islam, Buddhism, etc.
Society needed a new ideology. The party had to give an ideologically justified explanation from the positions of Marxism-Leninism of the reasons for the victory of socialism in one country. The famous work “History of the CPSU (b.)” was born. Short Course” (1938), created with the participation of Stalin.
The significance of the "Short Course" as the largest ideological monument of the Soviet era, which was republished for 1938-1953. 301 times with a circulation of 43 million copies in 67 languages of the peoples of the world, far exceeded its intended purpose. The book was supposed to give the Soviet people new historical knowledge, the only true and worthy of study in Soviet society.
In the 1920s - 1930s. major demographic changes have taken place. In January 1937, the All-Union Census of the country's population was carried out. Its results were depressing. In 1934, at the 17th Party Congress, Stalin said that 168 million people lived in the USSR. On January 6, 1937, according to the census, the population was only 162,003,225 people. Compared with the previous All-Union census of 1926, the population increased by 15 million people, i.e., the average growth was 1% per year, which at that time exceeded the natural population growth in France (0.11%), England (0 .36%), Germany (0.58%), USA (0.66%). However, the results of the census did not suit the Soviet leadership, and the organization of the census was recognized as unsatisfactory, and its materials - defective, underestimating the country's population.
In 1939 a new census was taken. Its brief results were published in Pravda. According to these data, the population of the USSR was 170,500 thousand people. More detailed results of the 1939 census were not summed up because of the war that began soon after. The materials preserved in the archives have been studied in our time. Scientists have found that the census recorded the population in the USSR at 167,305,749 people.
With the beginning of perestroika in Russian literature, when characterizing Soviet society, the emphasis was on violence and terror, and the entire Soviet era was presented as a black "failure" in history, criminal in nature. At the same time, they forgot that this was a difficult era in the formation of a new society, in which changing the way of life of tens of millions of people cannot be attributed to criminal.
Parade on Red Square. Still from a 1930s film
Let's listen to the opinion of a person - one of the figures of that era, convicted under Stalin and rehabilitated under Khrushchev: “But it was a grandiose experience in overcoming difficulties, in organizing large masses of people into a whole. How many people have acquired working professions! Many have become highly skilled craftsmen. How many engineers and technicians! And the elimination of illiteracy of many thousands of people! And lessons, lessons, lessons. Do you know how it all came in handy during the war? Without such an experience, we might not have won the war. What leadership without such experience would dare to evacuate a plant of military importance directly to the deserted steppe! And a few days later the plant began to produce products that were important for the front! In just a few days! What - all this does not count ?! To ignore this is unfair to the people of that era and historically false.”
Questions and tasks
1. How was the Soviet education system formed? What features distinguished her? 2. What were the contradictions in the development of Soviet science in the 1920s-1930s? 3. Using additional literature, prepare a report on the organization of the Union of Soviet Writers. 4. On the example of posters and paintings, tell us about the Soviet fine arts of the 1920s - 1930s. 5. Analyze any of the films you know of the 1930s. Tell us about the director who directed it. What characteristic features of Soviet art are reflected in this film? 6. How did the state fight religious ideology? What ideas have come to replace it?
Working with a document
“Now here's something else - in every letter you always ask: when will I come to the Soviets. Look in the book “Correspondence of Chekhov and Knipper”, here are the callouts you will find there: “Chaliapin Fedor Ivanovich (born in 1873). The famous singer, had the title of People's Artist of the Republic, but was deprived of it because, while abroad, he stood in solidarity with white emigrants. "Here's to you, grandmother, and St. George's Day." And you say - come. What for? After all, in my time I was very "solidary" with Gorky and Lenin, but the tsar did not deprive me of the title of soloist. For what they give me the title - for talents or all fours. Kiss. Goodbye. F. Sh.
1. Why do you think the great singer did not want to return to his homeland?
2. Which of the national cultural figures known to you shared the fate of F. I. Chaliapin?
This text is an introductory piece.At the theoretical, ideological (in the broad sense of the word) level of culture of the twentieth century. plays a decisive role the science. It already occupied a significant place in the spiritual life of tsarist Russia. In post-revolutionary Russia, its importance increased dramatically. All types of sciences have been developed: natural, technical, logical-mathematical and humanitarian. The main scientific center was the Academy of Sciences. In 1925, the Russian Academy of Sciences was renamed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In the 1920s, such institutes as radium, physics and mathematics, etc. appeared in its composition, in the 30s - physics, metallurgical, etc. In 1936, in connection with the entry of the Communist Academy into its structure, institutes of history, philosophy, etc. appeared. Since 1932, republican and regional branches of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (for example, Ural) were created, on the basis of which the republican Academy of Sciences was then formed.
They began to play a big role learned societies, for example, the Perm Medical Society (founded in 1923) and scientific research institutes, the first of which in the Urals was the Biological Institute, which arose in 1922 under Perm University. The number of scientific workers increased from 11.6 thousand in 1913 to 98.3 thousand in 1940. In 1985 it exceeded 1.5 million people*. The state took care of professional growth and implementation of the achievements of the most talented scientists. Back in 1922, the government adopted a decree "On the conditions that ensure the scientific work of Academician I.P. Pavlov." In 1934, the degrees of Candidate and Doctor of Sciences were established and academic titles: assistant, associate professor and professor. By 1940, there were 1,500 Doctors of Science and 8,000 Candidates of Sciences in the USSR, and by 1985 their number had increased by 30 and 60 times, respectively*.
These impressive figures should not obscure the contradictions and problems of the development of Soviet science. The struggle for the "ideological purity" of the ranks of the intelligentsia, psychological pressure, administrative and criminal prosecution, up to the physical removal of scientists, became a fairly common phenomenon in the 30s. They were used, albeit not on such a scale, and later. Suffice it to recall the post-war “doctors' case” or the exile of Academician A.D. Sakharov. Moreover, not only scientists, but also entire scientific directions and schools were subjected to repression.
The biggest example here is genetics. Thanks to the efforts of the brilliant scientist and organizer of science, President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, N.I. Vavilov and his associates, by the 1930s, Soviet genetics stood at the most advanced world frontiers. His opponent, T.D. Lysenko, having not succeeded in science, managed to convince the Stalinist leadership (as later Khrushchev's) that his scientific (supposedly) methods would give a rapid increase in agricultural production. As a result, N.I. Vavilov was repressed, and the falsifications of T.D. Lysenko were exposed only in 1965! Our scientific and agricultural losses during this time are simply difficult to calculate.
However, in general, Soviet science is rightfully considered a unique phenomenon in the history of culture. World science is proud of the achievements of P.L. Kapitsa, I.V. Kurchatov, A.D. Alexandrov and other prominent Soviet scientists. Largely due to their work, the USSR, at the end of the 30s, went from 5th to 2nd place in the world in industrial production, won World War II, began space exploration, etc. As our scientists, who worked in difficult conditions, at low material costs for the development of projects, in the shortest possible time managed to achieve such high results?
This is due to the special style of solving major scientific problems, which was distinguished by a broad vision of the problem, very (even unnecessarily - from the point of view of common sense) its deep theoretical study and rapid (by the method of "brainstorming, or storming") progress towards the goal. At the same time, the “academic” norms and rules accepted in Western science were often violated, but a good practical result was achieved. For example, the design of the famous "Katyusha" was extremely simple, they welded it from tram rails, but no matter how hard the Germans tried, they could not reproduce it, because. behind this simplicity were the brilliant developments of mathematicians, physicists, aerodynamicists and other specialists.
Although this style was polished already in Soviet times, to some extent, it was always characteristic of Russian science, because. she often had to solve major problems on her own and quickly. A certain analogy can be seen here in the entry of Japanese electronics to the world market, etc. At the same time, many of our scientists were distinguished not only by their encyclopedic breadth of knowledge, but also by their philosophical and cosmic view of the world, a characteristic manifestation of which was the so-called “Russian cosmism” at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. (the period of the “Silver Age” of Russian culture), which gave a galaxy of brilliant thinkers (N.A. Berdyaev, K.E. Tsiolkovsky, A.A. Bogdanov and many others), who limitedly linked the solution of specific problems with the fate of Russia, the world and Universe.
So, for K.E. Tsiolkovsky, the issues of rocket science were just a “stepping stone” in his philosophical thoughts that a person, having populated the cosmos and knowing its laws, will be able, having passed into a new (non-physical) energy state, to live in space, no longer using technical devices. This approach gave remarkable discoveries “at the intersection of sciences” and gave birth to new sciences. For example, Academician V.I. Vernadsky, who in the 1930s proposed a rather deep philosophical concept of the noosphere (see question 1), became the founder of genetic mineralogy, geochemistry, biogeochemistry, radiogeology, and hydrogeology.
Scientific and technological revolution has created a serious problem: a sharp rise in the cost of science. In the USSR (as always in Russia), the state was involved in its financing. Today, the state cannot and does not want to take full responsibility for this. The help of foreign "sponsors", to put it mildly, is not disinterested. It remains to be hoped that the patriotism and endurance of our scientists will help to preserve and develop the still very rich scientific potential in tomorrow's Russia.
Less other branches of knowledge were lucky in Soviet times social thought and social sciences. Revolutionary storms did not interrupt the Russian philosophical renaissance at the end of the 19th century. Despite the difference in political views, many "Russian cosmists" - philosophers, scientists, artists - remained in Russia. Do not lose hope for the restoration of ties with the motherland and some emigrants. In 1921-22. they publish in Paris the journal Smena Vekhi, which also finds support among the liberal intelligentsia who have remained in Russia. The “Smenovekhites” believed that the transition to the NEP meant not only a multistructural structure in the economy, but also pluralism in culture.
In the context of the ongoing civil war in the Far East, wishing to strengthen their ideological positions, the Bolsheviks in August - September 1922 expelled 160 prominent scientists, writers and public figures from the country (N.A. Berdyaev, P.A. Sorokin, etc.) who disagree with their ideology, thereby making it clear that freedom of creativity in Russia can exist only within the framework determined by the authorities. This, of course, did not mean the end of social thought, although it seriously impoverished it.
Along with the theorists of Marxism (and often in polemics with them), until the end of the 1920s, such well-known social scientists as P.A. Florensky, A.V. Chayanov, A.L. Chizhevsky and others. Many of their ideas found recognition only decades later. Thus, the outstanding philosopher, economist, biologist, mathematician, doctor, revolutionary, science fiction writer, theorist of proletarian culture A.A. Boganov created a “general organizational science” or “tectology”, which anticipated many ideas of the modern science of management - cybernetics. In 1926 he founded the world's first Institute of Blood Transfusion. In 1928, he died as a result of a blood transfusion experience.
In the 1920s, N.D. Kondratiev tried to develop a scientific concept of a regulated market (about which there is so much controversy today). He believed that when planning, long-term (48-55 years) fluctuations in the economic situation should be taken into account. Recessions and rises in inventive and entrepreneurial, investment and other activity are interconnected, regular and have a “wave” character. The theory of "long waves in the economy" was not supported by the Soviet leadership. In 1930, N.D. Kondratyev was arrested on false charges, and in 1938 he was shot. Subsequently, his ideas were developed and put into practice, though not here, but in the West.
By the 1930s, all non-Marxists, as well as former and potential opponents of I.V. Stalin, were removed from the discussion of social problems. By the mid-1930s, thanks to the efforts of his comrades-in-arms, Marxism in the USSR turns into a rigid dogmatic scheme, which is instilled into the population as a state religion (for more details, see Question 1, Topic 1). The narrowness of the methodological base gives rise to numerous errors in social theory and practice. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, cybernetics was considered “bourgeois pseudoscience” in the USSR. Sociology practically did not develop in the 1930s and 1950s. Having correctly grasped the beginning of scientific and technological revolution (it was discussed at the July 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU), our leadership did not find strong levers for stimulating it in production. Of course, shortcomings in the methodology did not preclude serious concrete work by social scientists. For example, in 1955, the publication of the multi-volume World History began.
In the 1960s there was a revival of the social sciences. Serious research is being carried out in the field of sociology, cultural studies, history, etc. In the 1970s, a systematic approach to the study of social phenomena became widespread. On its basis, complex programs for the social and economic development of enterprises, cities, regions and the country appear (for example, the Food Program of 1982). In 1983, Yu.V. Andropov declared the need to study the contradictions of socialism (they have not even been mentioned since the 1930s); on his initiative, a commission of social scientists is being created to work out possible reforms in the economy and politics.
At the end of the 70s. Clearly non-Marxist motives also appear in domestic social science, and discussions are underway about parapsychology and the information field. The works of the ethnographer and historian L.N. genetic factors. The ideological pluralism generated by perestroika created certain problems in the public mind. But it is he who gives hope that our social scientists, freed from dogmatism, will prompt politicians for the best options for solving today's problems.
soviet art, being the heir to the pre-revolutionary Russian, as well as reflecting the general trends in the development of culture of the twentieth century, especially European, it became, at the same time, a rather distinctive phenomenon.
The October Revolution forced artists to make difficult choices. Many preferred emigration (almost all famous writers and poets, S.V. Rakhmaninov, F.I. Chaliapin and others), some openly sided with the Soviet government (V.V. Mayakovsky and others), some took a neutral position. Emigration caused great damage to our artistic culture. The return of some emigrants (A.N. Tolstoy, A.M. Gorky and others) compensated for it to a very small extent. True, the talents of many emigrants were not wasted, enriching foreign culture and largely defining the face of modernism in the 20th century.
However, the artistic life in Russia has not died out. On the contrary, the 1920s gave rise to a surge in a wide variety of art movements, especially modernist ones. The latter gave impetus to the formation of a new, proletarian culture, the expression of which was the emergence of RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers), AHRR (Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia), RAPM (Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians) and other creative associations. The attitude of the Soviet government towards artistic culture is characterized by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the policy of the party in the field of fiction” (June 1925), in which, on the one hand, party organizations were called upon to support proletarian writers, to help them take leading positions in literature; to fight against counter-revolutionary manifestations in literature, the liberalism of the “Smenovekhites”, but on the other hand, free competition of various forms and styles of literary creativity was proclaimed.
Gradually, the method of socialist realism began to take shape in Soviet art, which influenced the creation of such well-known works as “The Quiet Flows the Don” by M. Sholokhov, “How the Steel Was Tempered” by N. Ostrovsky, “Walking Through the Torments” by A.N. Tolstoy, the film “Battleship Potemkin” (directed by S. Eisenstein), the work of such artists as M.B. Grekov, M.S. Saryan, sculptors - V.I. Mukhina, I.D. Shadra, composers - I.O. Dunayevsky, S.S. Prokofiev, R.M. Glier and many others.
At the turn of the 20-30s in art, as in other areas of culture, the influence of the emerging administrative-command system began to be felt. Dozens of creative unions break up or close. Units of new ones are being created instead. So, according to the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 1932 “On the restructuring of literary and artistic organizations”, all literary associations were abolished, and writers were to unite in the Union of Soviet Writers (established at the first congress of the Union of Writers of the USSR in 1934). After that, the remaining 6 creative unions that existed until recently are formed.
Socialist realism is declared to be not only the prevailing, and even not only the dominant, but the only possible method. At the same time, the understanding of the essence of the method itself also changes: it is driven into narrow limits, beyond which even the most outstanding artists had no right to go. Lenin's idea that "art should be understood by the masses" is replaced by the fact that it should be "understood by the masses". “Incomprehensible” artists were declared formalists (for whom the main thing is the form, not the content of the work). Mostly modernists fell into their category, incl. representatives of the proletarian culture. Thus, modernism in the USSR was officially finished, although some of its technical methods were firmly included in the arsenal of Soviet art. Novelty, avant-gardism, revolutionism were no longer needed by the Stalinist regime, which was striving to strengthen its position. This also explains the fact that the traditions of not only realism, but also classicism of the 18th century, with its apparent simplicity and monumentality, were being revived.
The fate of many artists was tragic. Some were repressed. A part “fitted into the administrative system” (A. Fadeev, A. Tolstoy) and even continued to create works at a high level. Some were torn between democracy and Stalinism. For example, O. Mandelstam (who went mad in exile in Suchan) wrote poems against Stalin and an ode to Stalin.
The orientation of socialist realism primarily on “heroic-patriotic” themes in the difficult conditions for the country of the 1930s and 1950s is quite understandable, and in some cases was even justified. So, at the beginning of the war, it was necessary to aim the population not just for victory, but for hatred of the enemy and a long struggle, because. notions of the invincibility of the Red Army and the feeling of class solidarity of the German workers were very common. The contribution of artists to the victory and the rapid post-war reconstruction of the country can hardly be overestimated.
But life wasn't all about that. However, any fascination with everyday or pre-revolutionary topics, a manifestation of interest in the true life of people in the West, a lack of “party spirit” in works of art, and in general, independence of views - in the post-war years they were severely punished: remember the persecution of A.A. Akhmatova under Stalin and avant-garde artists under Khrushchev, etc. It can be said that the struggle of the authorities for the ideological consistency of art and of the intelligentsia for the freedom of creativity was "with varying success." However, the palette of the artistic life of the USSR in the 40-80s, of course, was much wider than this struggle, and even the framework of socialist realism, into which it is very difficult to fit V. Vysotsky and A. Makarevich, M. Shemyakin and I. Glazunov, A. Solzhenitsyn and V. Shukshin, hundreds of other talents.
