Beer Putsch in Munich 1923. Beer putsch. The cops stood to the end

The situation in Germany in autumn 1923

The beginning of the coup

On the evening of November 8, about 3,000 people gathered in the Munich Bürgerbräukeller (Bürgerbräukeller) - a huge beer hall in order to listen to the performance of Gustav von Kahr. Together with him on the podium were local top officials - General Otto von Lossow, commander of the armed forces of Bavaria, and Colonel Hans von Seisser, head of the Bavarian police. While Kar spoke to the assembled, about 600 stormtroopers quietly cordoned off the hall. Members of the SA set up machine guns in the street, pointing them at the front doors. Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, surrounded by his supporters, ran swiftly in the darkness between the tables, and in the ensuing silence shouted: “The national revolution has begun!” Then he addressed the astonished audience: “There are 600 armed people in the hall. Nobody is allowed to leave. The Bavarian and Berlin governments are now deposed. Now a new government will be formed. The barracks of the Reichswehr and the police are captured. Everyone must rise again to fight under the swastika banner!”

Carabiners at gunpoint, persuaded by Hitler and Ludendorff, Kahr and Lossow announced that they were joining the march on Berlin. Hitler proclaimed Kahr regent of Bavaria and declared that a new German government would be formed in Munich that same day to remove President Friedrich Ebert from power. Hitler immediately appointed Ludendorff as commander-in-chief of the German army (Reichswehr), and himself as imperial chancellor. Hitler pathetically exclaimed: “The time has come to fulfill the oath that I took five years ago when I was in the hospital!” The hall burst into applause, expressing approval with the clatter of beer mugs on oak tables.

Meanwhile, Gustav von Kahr and Otto von Lossow, Hans von Seisser and other members of the government asked to go home, giving Ludendorff an "honest officer's word" that they supported the "campaign on Berlin." In the general euphoria of such a quick and easy success, and at the moment when Hitler was not in the room, they were released. And as it soon became clear, absolutely in vain. When Hitler found out a few minutes later that the Bavarian leaders had slipped out of the trap, he swore heavily, reproaching Ludendorff for being a mouthful. The Führer had no doubt that Kahr and Lossov were not going to keep the "honest officer's word". Indeed, Kahr's proclamation soon began to circulate, in which he retracted all statements made "at gunpoint" and announced the dissolution of the NSDAP and the Stormtroopers.

March through Munich

Consequences

Having received no support either among the population or among the military (which Hitler especially counted on in connection with the sympathies for the NSDAP of General Ludendorff, the hero of the First World War), the putsch was thus suppressed. The marchers, including Hitler, received prison sentences of varying lengths.

It was in the Landsberg prison, where they were serving their sentences (in very mild conditions - for example, they were allowed to gather at a common table and discuss political issues), Adolf Hitler wrote most of his book "My Struggle".

The National Socialists who died during the putsch were later declared "martyrs" by official propaganda. The flag under which they walked (and on which, according to the official version, drops of the blood of the martyrs fell) was later used as the “sacred” when “consecrating” party banners: at party congresses in Nuremberg, Adolf Hitler applied new flags to the “sacred” banners, thus performing the ritual of "consecration" of new banners.

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See what the "Munich Putsch" is in other dictionaries:

Munich Putsch- See the Beer putsch of 1923... Encyclopedia of the Third Reich

Munich beer putsch- (Munich beer hall putsch) (November 8, 1923), a failed German mutiny attempt. Nazis. A meeting of right-wing politicians that took place in one of the beer halls in Munich, condemned the policy of the Weimar Republic and called for the restoration of the Bavarian ... ... The World History

The Munich Agreement of 1938 (usually the Munich Agreement in Soviet historiography) is an agreement drawn up in Munich on September 29, 1938 and signed on September 30 of the same year by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister ... ... Wikipedia

Munich Process- Trial on charges of treason against the leaders of the Beer Putsch of 1923. The hearings, held in the building of the Infantry Officers' School in Munich, began on February 24, 1924 and lasted 24 days. The building was surrounded by thorns ... ... Encyclopedia of the Third Reich

- (German SS, short for Schutzstaffeln security units) a privileged paramilitary organization in Nazi Germany. The embryo of the SS was formed in May 1923 from the members of the assault detachments (SA) devoted to A. Hitler, the "escort of the Fuhrer" ... ... Big soviet encyclopedia

- (Italian fascismo, from fascio bundle, bundle, association) political. trend that arose in the capitalist. countries during the period of the general crisis of capitalism and expressing the interests of the most reactionary and aggressive imperialist forces. bourgeoisie. F. in power ... ...

This term has other meanings, see Munich (meanings). Munich München Flag Coat of arms ... Wikipedia

- (German Deutschland). *** *** *** Historical outline In the history of G., one can single out the following. main periods: 1) primitive communal system on the territory. G. and the beginning of the emergence of a class society (before the 6th century AD). 2) The early feudal period (6-11 centuries), in which ... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

The Beer Putsch is also known as the Ludendorff-Hitler Putsch. This name was given to an attempt to seize power, which was undertaken by the veteran organization "Kampfbund" back in 1923 (November 9). At the head of this organization then stood: the National Socialist Hitler and General Ludendorff. 1923 became a critical year for Germany, as the French occupied the Ruhr and a crisis erupted as a result. Throwing the social democratic government from extremes to extremes provoked a wave of attacks from the communists and the right. Hitler's choice of allies fell on the right-wing separatist conservatives who ruled at that time in Bavaria.

They planned a joint action against the Berlin Social Democratic government. Hitler was inspired by the march on Rome, and he wanted to achieve a similar result with Berlin. But the Allies had some disagreements, and when the leaders of Bavaria abandoned a direct attack on Berlin, Hitler took all the initiative. He did not give up his intentions and decided to take von Kara hostage. It all started in the late afternoon of November 8 in Munich in the Bürgerbräukeller (a huge beer hall), where thousands of people gathered to listen to what von Kahr would say. During the speech, the attack aircraft cordoned off the hall, imperceptibly from those present.

Machine guns blocked the exit from the street. Hitler appeared in the hall, and, having fired the first shot at the ceiling, announced the beginning of the revolution. Among his statements were the following demands: - the removal of the Bavarian government and the government of the Reich, - the formation of a provisional government of the Reich; - the capture of the land police and the barracks of the Reichswehr. Hitler received support from Ludendorff, a participant and hero of the First World War, and now, Von Kar, von Seisser and von Lossov agree to take part in the campaign against Berlin. Hitler made new appointments: von Kahr was the regent of Bavaria, Ludendorff was the commander-in-chief of the German army, and Hitler himself was the imperial chancellor. After the subsequent betrayal by the newly appeared "allies", Ludendorff made a proposal to occupy the center, counting on the influence of his authority on the police and army. November 9 was the decisive day in this history of the coup. The Nazis with a swastika column headed to the center of Munich at Marienplatz. They were led by Hitler, Goering and Ludendorff, and Julius Streicher joined them on the square.

The police let them in at first, but stopped them at Odeonsplatz. A shootout broke out between a hundred policemen and three thousand Nazis. Some died, and the rest tried to hide, and Hitler with them. Ludendorff was arrested, and Röhm surrendered. Hitler did not receive the support of the population, and the putsch was crushed. They arrested and condemned all the organizers (except Goering) for different lines. They were serving their sentences in Landsberg.

Munich Putsch

After failed attempt to enter the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts, the death of his mother and defeat in the war, the failure of the putsch of 1923 was the fourth event in the life of Adolf Hitler, which caused him severe moral trauma. Of the first three, the Fuhrer could only blame himself for one - he could not devote himself to architecture, because he did not have a matriculation certificate. Subsequently, he admitted that he had no talent as a painter, but he remained convinced that he could become a great architect. However, he explained his failure by the machinations of others - the unjust society, the Habsburg regime and, of course, the Jews were to blame. During the war years, he had a lot of time to think, and he came to the conclusion: all evil comes from hated internationalism. While he, along with others, risked his life in the war, anti-people forces, Marxists and Jews, were operating inside the country, pushing Germany into the mud and causing its military defeat.

Starting with Pasewalk, a deaf hatred for traitors matured in his soul, a desire to punish them and return the country to its proper place. He was not alone. The right-wing nationalists shared this aspiration: to dismantle the Versailles system and restore Germany to greatness. But, if there were no fundamental disagreements between these people, they differed significantly in understanding the means to achieve the goal and choosing the right moment.

The Munich putsch was like lightning that lit up the republic, corroded by destructive centrifugal forces, and resembled a parody of a revolution, with the goal of overthrowing the Reich government or launching a military campaign against the French occupiers in the Ruhr. To understand how and why the Munich Putsch broke out, it is necessary to analyze the situation at three different levels - the Berlin scene, Bavaria and the National Socialist Party, led by its Fuhrer.

General environment

The occupation of the Ruhr by the French and Belgians on January 11, 1923, hastened the economic, social, but mainly financial crisis of the Reich. To put pressure on Germany to pay reparations arrears, the President of the French Council, Raymond Poincaré, decided to occupy the Ruhr. German Chancellor Wilhelm Kuno, a non-partisan man, but with the support of the "bourgeois coalition", saw only one way out of this situation - "passive resistance", that is, stopping production in the mining and metallurgical industries, and then completely stopping the payment of reparations (which amounted to 132 billion gold stamps), declaring illegal all decrees issued by the occupiers, and prohibiting them from paying duties and taxes. The French initiative did what neither the armistice, nor the Versailles Treaty, nor the struggle for Upper Silesia in 1919 could achieve - it rallied the nation into a "holy alliance". Even the so-called Weimar parties - liberals, centrists and social democrats - condemned the invader.

However, behind a single façade hid deep divisions that continued to cut off the left from all other parties. Syndicalists and socialists agreed to "passive resistance" only in order to erect a barrier to the growth of nationalism; the Communists at first stuck to their previous line of conduct: to break with bourgeois politics, force the rich to pay reparations and, with the help of the USSR, set up a coalition workers' government. More specifically, they proposed a general strike. But, just like the rightists, they were torn apart by internal differences, which Karl Radek, the “eye of Moscow” in Berlin, tried with great difficulty to reconcile. The party leaders put forward the slogan: "Beat Cuno on the Spree, and Poincaré on the Rhine." The position of the minority was expressed by Clara Zetkin, a representative of the left wing of the party, a feminist and a friend of Rosa Luxembourg: “Not tomorrow and not in a bright future, but already today, in the battle with French imperialism and German capitalism, we defend the interests of a great nation with unwavering loyalty and tireless energy workers." At the same time, the CPD tried to win over to its side the petty-bourgeois elements from the reactionary and "fascist" parties - this term had just appeared and had great success. Attempts to establish contact with the French communists did not bring results, on the one hand, due to the lack of interest of the French workers in the Ruhr, on the other hand, because it was too difficult for the German workers to wage war on several fronts - in the name of the International, against French invaders and against daily needs.

But the right-wing and centrist currents should have taken passive resistance much further, finally allowing a transition to a national revival, which included the strengthening of military power. According to the Treaty of Versailles, the German army could number no more than 100 thousand people, but already from 1920, in addition to regular troops, detachments of the “black Reichswehr” began to be created. Their main initiator was General von Seeckt.

With the spread of the crisis in right and far right circles, as well as in the army, voices in favor of the dictatorship of one person or directory were increasingly heard. The military saw in this role von Seeckt, in the role of his assistants - a group of experts and industrialists. But the "sphinx", as it was called, sought to keep the Reichswehr out of politics, making it something like a state within a state.

Since the entry of the Franco-Belgian troops into the territory of the Ruhr, the number German troops increased significantly thanks to loans opened as part of passive resistance. The army received 100 million gold marks and a loan of 300 million for the purchase of weapons in Italy. Volunteers were being trained, detachments of militants were created, capable of intervening in the case in the event of internal unrest; since 1923 they have become well-trained reserve units; defense detachments were formed to resist the invasion from Poland or Czechoslovakia. The German lands were required to contribute to the financing of the troops. They reacted in different ways, depending on the political coloring of local governments. Prussia and Saxony, where the Social Democrats ruled, refused; Bavaria gave a positive answer.

The majority of the population perceived defensive measures as a harbinger new war, including because cooperation between the regular army and illegal paramilitary units forced the army to enter the political arena. Von Seeckt received the leaders of the main patriotic movements - General Ludendorff and Hitler; apparently, their extremism did not please him. But he flatly refused to meet with the former commander of the famous Baltic free detachment Rosbach. In the end, Rosbach ended up in Bavaria, just as Captain Ehrhardt, whose people were implicated in the assassination in 1922 of Foreign Minister von Rathenau, had himself escaped from the Leipzig prison before he was interrogated. In September 1923, he commanded troops on the border of Bavaria and "red" Saxony.

The economic and financial situation deteriorated rapidly. If at the beginning of 1919 inflation had its positive side, allowing to fight mass unemployment, now it has reached the point of no return. Passive resistance cost 3.5 billion marks. At the beginning of January 1923, 7525 paper marks were given for the dollar (the exchange rate on August 4, 1914 was 4.2 marks for 1 dollar); February 1 - 41,500 marks, July 1 - 160 thousand marks, August 1 - 1,102,750 marks, September 1 - 91,724,250 marks. Even the most daring speculators, who made their fortune on inflation, were in danger of ruin. Prices went completely mad, hunger and unemployment reigned everywhere. In October-December 1923, there were 28.2 percent of the completely unemployed and 23.6 percent of the underemployed in the country.

It is not surprising that riots broke out everywhere, especially in large cities and in the occupied territories. The situation was immediately taken advantage of by left and right extremists. The former opposed nationalism, militarism and fascism. There were "proletarian centuries" - paramilitary organizations, mainly in Central Germany and in the Ruhr region. The Prussian Minister of the Interior, the Social Democrat Severing, banned their activities throughout the country. Right-wing extremists have found a second wind. The German Freedom Party, founded in December 1922, absorbed Rossbach's Greater Germany Movement in February 1923, thus filling the gap left by the November 1922 ban on the National Socialist Party in Prussia, Baden, Saxony, Thuringia and Hamburg. . On the day the French entered the Ruhr, Peter von Heydebreck founded the "Werwolf" ("Werewolf"), a group of young soldiers and war veterans. Like the Oberland League, he was engaged in the sports and moral education of his pupils in the spirit of volkishc– anti-capitalist, anti-parliamentary and nationalist. All these movements openly promoted hatred and rejected any idea of ​​reconciliation between peoples. “Hatred at the mother's breast. School hate. Hatred in the church Hatred in the barracks. Hatred in the hearts Hatred in the fists. United, great, deep hatred of 75 million Germans.

Before such difficulties, the will to resist fizzled out by itself. In August 1923 Cuno's cabinet was replaced by a united cabinet led by Gustav Stresemann, a former National Liberal MP and president of the DVP. The need arose for a government of "public salvation", as the danger of secession of the Rhineland, the Palatinate and even Bavaria was added to the economic and financial turmoil.

From an ardent nationalist, Stresemann turned into a reasonable socialist. He saw no other solution than to announce on September 26, 1923, the end of "passive resistance" and the entry into negotiations with France over reparations. In July 1924, a new treaty was concluded in London, ratifying the Dosa Plan.

The financial disaster has culminated; the brand is no longer convertible. The Central Bank issued a new monetary unit backed by gold, the Rent Mark.

Bavaria

The coming to power of Stresemann and the measures taken by his government served as an extreme right-wing pretext to increase unrest in Bavaria. The indignation of the Bavarians reached a paroxysm during the "capture of the Ruhr". With the exception of rural residents inclined towards "blue and white" politics (the colors of the land of Bavaria), the population - the small and medium urban bourgeoisie, the broad masses of the people - spoke out in favor of pan-Germanism, racism and anti-Bolshevism. Separatist tendencies were also present, since Bavarian isolation had a long historical tradition. The most powerful party, the BVP (Party of the Bavarian People), a spin-off from the Catholic Center, called for federalism; the royalists relied on Prince Supprecht of Wittelsbach, son of Louis III. Most Bavarian politicians considered themselves to be a "cell" of the German bourgeoisie, called upon to work for the good of the revival of the Reich. As we have already had the opportunity to see, this land has become a refuge for all kinds of extremists and enemies of the republic. Among the plethora of patriotic, paramilitary and national activist (a term used with equal pleasure by both Ernst Röhm and the president of the Bavarian Committee Manfred von Knilling) movements, the Association of Patriotic Organizations, the Oberland League and the Banner of the Reich should be mentioned. At the insistent request of Rem, Hitler, after some hesitation, spoke in favor of the creation of a Labor Association of Patriotic Fighting Associations, to which he devoted a long speech on April 19. The task of the association was to turn Bavaria into a hotbed of German renaissance in the middle of a rotten "Marxist Reich".

On September 2, the movements that formed the core of patriotic organizations formed the Fighting League (Kampfbund), which later came under the political leadership of Hitler and the military leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel. Alongside these highly paramilitary organizations was the Bavaria and Reich league, which was led by Dr. Pittinger. Confessing separatism, she maintained close ties with the Austrians and the French, from whom she received financial assistance.

In such a situation, the Bavarian ruler von Lerchenfeld chose to evade the implementation of the law on the defense of the republic, adopted by the Reichstag in the summer of 1922 and providing for a ban on the activities of organizations hostile to republican institutions (as a result of which the Party was banned in Prussia and some other lands Nazis- this term first appeared at the same time). Tensions between Bavaria and the Reich eased slightly during the Cuno years, especially after Lerchenfeld was replaced by Killinger. Kuno even paid a visit to Bavaria, and one of his employees met with Hitler. In addition, the occupation of the Ruhr markedly changed the general alignment. From now on, the issue of confronting the "nationalist elements" was no longer on the agenda, especially given the fact that they enjoyed the support of the Bavarian chief of the Reichswehr, General von Lossow, with whom Hitler met regularly.

At the end of 1922, Ludendorff moved to Bavaria, which significantly strengthened the position of the anti-republican forces. The core of the counter-revolution formed around him. In turn, von Seeckt arrived in Munich to see for himself that here, under the guise of "spring training", wholesale mobilization was in full swing. He fully approved of the measures taken by von Lossow in order to strengthen the Reichswehr, along the way giving advice not to succumb to anyone's influences. He looked into the water - if Hitler's intentions were by no means to cede the first role to the military, he perfectly understood that without the support of the army he would not be able to do anything, and subsequent events showed that the Fuhrer was not mistaken in this.

On August 16, State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery Hamm warned Stresemann that the formation of a government might meet with an unpredictable reaction in Bavaria:

“The overwhelming majority of the population of Bavaria sees in the coalition not progress, but an obstacle to the creation of an energetic national government composed of strong personalities and concerned about their political and economic interests.

In addition, Gamm foresaw that the new Minister of the Interior, the Social Democrat Solmann, would not arouse sympathy, since the Bavarians were sure that he did not understand the historical nature of the German lands, the peasant-bourgeois character of Bavaria and its Christian orientation.

Indeed, as soon as he took office, Solmann wrote a lengthy report in which he listed the "sins" of the Munich government. He not only pointed out the failure to comply with the law on the protection of the republic, but also emphasized that the Bavarian government was trying with all its might to get out of the control of the Reich. As evidence, he cited a long list of demands left unaddressed by Bavaria; reported on the continued operation of emergency tribunals (called people's tribunals), which were originally allowed to exist only during the transitional period. In addition, he accused the Bavarians of abusing paragraph 3 of article 48 of the Weimar constitution, which gave the German lands the right to independently take security measures in the event of an imminent threat. Finally, human rights are not respected in Bavaria, it has become a "refuge for political criminals", clearly striving for autonomy, if not complete independence, thereby opposing itself to the Reich.

There was some truth in all this, as subsequent events proved: Hitler seized the political leadership of the Kampfbund and announced new meetings. It is not known exactly for what reason - out of fear of a putsch or due to the refusal of passive resistance in the Ruhr - but on September 26 the Bavarian government declared a state of emergency, transferring executive power to von Kahr. The Reich responded by declaring a nationwide state of emergency on 27 September and handing executive power over to Defense Minister Gessler; in the event of a state crisis, the fate of the Reich was to be taken into his own hands by the head of the military administration, General von Seeckt. On the same day, the Volkischer Beobachter published an article entitled "The Dictatorship of Stresemann-Seckt", which stated that Frau von Seeckt was a Jewish convert. This was the first link in the chain of events that led to the crisis.

Hitler and the NSDAP

To everyone's astonishment, the NSDAP leader refused to join the united front in condemning the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr. On January 11, in front of a large crowd gathered in the Circus Krone, he declared that it was not the slogan "Down with France!" that should be supported, but the slogan "Down with the November criminals!" Since there are no weapons yet to fight France, we must first restore order within the Reich. (Many commentators saw in this statement signs of Hitler's Francophilia and confirmation of rumors that he received money from France. A few months later, Hitler categorically denied these rumors.)

The refusal to support the united front was primarily dictated by Hitler's unwillingness to consolidate with those whom he considered his worst enemies - the Marxists and Jews, of whom the republic served as the embodiment. On the other hand, the Association of Patriotic Organizations was a formation of a rather loose structure and without a clear political program - it was not a party, but a kind of fusion of nationalist-minded groups, devoid of a single leadership.

Hitler, more than ever, needed to prove that the NSDAP was an independent force to be reckoned with. In November 1922 he announced that in Bavaria alone it had 40,000 to 50,000 members. The congress scheduled for November 27-28 was supposed to confirm its power.

For many months, rumors about the impending putsch circulated stubbornly. The Bavarian government, fearing that Hitler would use the upcoming congress to start it, banned all street demonstrations. Hitler threatened to lose face in front of party members and members of the assault squads. The solution was helped by General von Lossow. Worried about the unrest in Munich, he called his officers to discuss the state of affairs. Many of those invited, including General von Epp, sympathized with Hitler. Therefore, he was also invited to the meeting, and the leader of the NSDAP, in the presence of the chief of the Bavarian police, gave his word of honor that there would be no unrest at the congress. Then Hitler, together with Rem, went to the head of the government of Upper Bavaria, von Karu, who promised him his support. After that, he visited the prefect of the Munich police, Eduard Northz, three times and reassured him in the same way. There were supposed to be 12 meetings, all in closed rooms. An attempt to reduce their number to six failed due to organizational reasons. A solemn dedication of the banners took place on the Field of Mars. Hitler made several speeches in which he ridiculed the government and all those who suspected him of preparing a putsch. The Nazis didn't need a putsch, he said, they were doing brilliantly anyway.

Rejecting the idea of ​​joining a united political front, Hitler did not at all refuse to have his assault troops trained in the Reichswehr barracks. He even went to Berlin to persuade representatives of other patriotic movements to send their people to the Reichswehr as part of a general mobilization against France, which took place under the guise of "spring exercises." He agreed to hand over his weapons if the Reichswehr made such a demand. This happened on May 1, 1923.

In the run-up to traditional left-wing demonstrations, Hitler approached the Labor Union organizations to prepare for the day. He hoped that the Bavarian government, fearing a possible putsch, would ban left-wing parties from celebrating Labor Day. The government did not succumb to the provocation and authorized the demonstration, limiting the procession to a certain area of ​​the city. Therefore, the working demonstration took place without any excesses in Teresenwese. On the other hand, von Lossow ordered the representatives of the patriotic organizations to surrender their weapons.

Thus, despite Hitler's speech at the circus Krone, this day ended in failure for him. Goering was indignant at von Lossow, who promised them his support and did not keep his word, but Hitler defended the general. It turned out that the day before he had received a letter from Minister of Defense Gessler, which stated that members of the Reichswehr were not entitled to take part in events held by political associations.

Remus as a result of this had to leave the "Banner of the Reich", transferring his authority to Captain Seidel. In addition, he was threatened with a transfer to Bayreuth, which Röhm did not want, and he preferred to retire.

Meanwhile, Hitler continued to give speeches in Munich and other cities, but with slightly less aplomb. Addressing his listeners, he emphasized that they should not look for a person who would save Germany, but forge the sword that this person needed. He spent several days in Berchtesgaden, at the Moritz boarding house, from where he was pulled out with some difficulty and persuaded to return to Munich to take part in a march in memory of Albert Schlageter, who was executed by the French on May 26 for sabotage. This man became a real hero of National Socialist propaganda, and even the Communists used the "Schlageter line" for some time, playing on the national feelings of the Germans.

A new surge in Hitler's activity was caused by the fall of Cuno's cabinet and the creation of the Grand Coalition. In an interview published on August 20, 1923, he predicted the imminent collapse of the new government and called democracy "a bad joke." A day later, he issued a power of attorney to Kurt Ludecke, with which he went to Italy as an official representative of the NSDAP. That same evening, at the Circus Krone, where 8,000 to 9,000 people gathered, Hitler delivered a long speech demanding the establishment of a dictatorship and viciously attacking Kuno and Stresemann. In his next speech, on 6 September, he assured the audience that Germany was on the verge of a second revolution. The question is not, the Fuhrer said, what Stresemann or Knilling will do in Munich, but "when it starts." There is no choice: either Berlin will go to Munich, or Munich must go to Berlin. Bolshevik Germany in the north and nationalist Bavaria cannot coexist side by side. On September 12, he talked about the fall of the November Republic and the "mission" of the NSDAP, calling it the army for the liberation of the new Germany.

After the publication of another article in the Volkischer Beobachter criticizing Stresemann and Seekt, Gessler demanded that von Lossow close the newspaper. He tried to settle the matter amicably, but not only did not succeed in this, but was also removed from his post.

The removal of von Lossow marked the break between Bavaria and the Reich. The Munich government decided to take command of the troops stationed on Bavarian soil. Soon the Reichswehr troops entered Leipzig, Meissen and Dresden. Eight days later, the social communist government of Saxony was overthrown. On October 22, a communist uprising broke out in Hamburg. In Koblenz, Treves, Wiesbaden and Bonn, putschists seized several public buildings. The Socialists attempted to separate the Palatinate from Bavaria with the help of the French. Unrest began in East Prussia.

The political, military and police authorities of Bavaria, represented by the Kahr-Loss-Seisser triumvirate, saw three possible scenarios. The first, maximalist, was based on the creation of a directory in Berlin under the leadership of Zecht; the intermediate one assumed the support of the right and the Reichswehr in order to suppress the uprisings of the communists and separatists, and then the creation of a directory; the minimalist was to bide their time, keeping Bavaria as a bastion of nationalism until the first scenario was possible. But Hitler recognized only the first option. On October 23, at a meeting of attack aircraft commanders, he spoke with the utmost clarity: it is necessary to directly raise the German question, starting from Bavaria, to proclaim the creation liberation army and hoist a black-white-red banner with a swastika over the Reichstag as a symbol of the struggle against everything that is not German. According to one piece of evidence, though not indisputable, he allegedly still on March 10, 1923, during a meeting with von Seeckt, when asked by the general about how he would react to the idea of ​​inviting all officials and the military to take an oath of allegiance to the republic, he replied that he would personally hang all members government on lanterns in front of the Reichstag, after which he will burn the building and take command of all the workers. In this case, we have nothing more to talk about, the general supposedly answered him. In addition, in the fall, Hitler made it clear to Kahr that he could join him if he directed his forces not to fight the parties, but to fight Berlin. During the putsch, the Fuhrer once again confirmed that Bavaria for him was nothing more than a springboard for seizing power in the government of the Reich. And if Kar has not yet freed himself from doubts, he does not intend to hand over to him the tool, over the creation of which he has struggled for the past four years.

Kahr really doubted, and the reason for his hesitation was the uncertainty about how von Seeckt would react to all this. Therefore, he decided to send Seisser to Berlin to be sure. Before leaving, Hitler came to him, warning him that if he did not bring a final answer from Berlin, he would consider himself free from any obligations and take measures that he considered necessary. His people are unwilling to wait any longer.

Meanwhile in Berlin the situation had changed. Frightened by the communist and separatist uprisings, Stresemann decided to negotiate with Munich. However, the Social Democrats, dissatisfied with the intervention of the Reichswehr in the affairs of Saxony, were wary of Bavaria. In addition, they put pressure on Stresemann, who hoped to get the support of the Americans and the British on the issue of reparations, so that he would enter into negotiations with France, primarily on the Ruhr problem, and on November 1 they put forward an ultimatum to the chancellor. But the Reichswehr, which until recently shared their position on Bavaria, suddenly made a somersault and turned away from them: “If there were frictions between Generals von Sect and von Lossow, from now on they should be considered a misunderstanding. Since November 1, von Seeckt's views have completely coincided with those of the Bavarian leaders.

The fate of the Grand Coalition was decided at a meeting on November 2, where Stresemann dissociated himself from the socialists. Gessler spoke out categorically against the "possible victory of the fascist movement", calling it "a great misfortune for Germany."

At a meeting with the chief of the Bavarian police, von Seeckt assured his interlocutor that he did not intend to repeat the sad experience of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (Bavaria was then an ally of Austria-Hungary and suffered defeat with it) and would not go along with the Reichswehr against Bavaria. As for the creation of a “national dictatorship free of parliament and ready for energetic measures against socialist rubbish,” which Seisser spoke of, the general assured that this was his goal, although it would be much more difficult to achieve its implementation in Berlin than in Munich, since have to follow the legal path.

In a letter to Karu, which he received only on November 5, the chief of the military administration recalled their previous meeting, which left him with the impression of their "complete agreement on many fundamental issues." Von Seeckt emphasized that he saw it as his duty to turn the Reichswehr into a means of supporting the power of the Reich, and not any particular government. At first, he pointed out, he was fed by a belief in the possibility of converting Social Democracy to the benefit of the people's cause, but the latter did not justify his hopes, refusing to accept the idea of ​​rearming the country. The same was true of pacifist and internationalist movements. "Maintaining the unity of the Reich, the possibility of rearmament, worthy foreign policy support of state power” – these were, in his opinion, the main tasks.

Having become acquainted with this information, on November 6, the triumvirate again convened a meeting of patriotic organizations, inviting Kampfbund as well, and addressed them with a warning: not to take any rash steps. Speaking in favor of creating a directory, he suggested that everyone wait until November 11th.

Putsch

But Hitler and his entourage did not want to wait any longer. They decided to move on November 11 and developed a plan to bring the largest cities of Bavaria under their control, involving the capture of railway stations, post office, telegraph, telephone and city halls. The question arose: why wait for November 11, and not speak on the 8th, on the fifth anniversary of the "criminal revolution"?

The details of the putsch seem so improbable that they hardly deserve interest. If it were not for the human sacrifice, one could call it a comedy of errors, the plot of which is based on the principle "a thief stole a baton from a thief." Hitler and several of his henchmen burst into the hall where Kar was making a speech. Hitler climbed onto a chair and, calling the assembly to silence, fired a pistol at the ceiling. Then he moved to the table. In his long coat, under which he wore a black jacket with an Iron Cross pinned to it, he looked more like a waiter than a revolutionary. "The people's revolution has begun," he shouted in a hoarse voice. - You are surrounded. I have six hundred armed men. No one will leave the hall." He also threatened that a machine gun would be placed on the balcony of the second floor. Indeed, Goering entered the hall with several armed attack aircraft. The Führer declared the governments of Bavaria and the Reich deposed and added that provisional governments would be formed. The Reichswehr and police barracks are occupied by his people, he said, and the soldiers, as well as the police, are moving under the swastika banner. Then, in a peremptory tone, he suggested that von Kahr, von Lossow and von Seisser move to the next room.

The accounts of what happened next differ in detail but agree in essentials. Hitler informed the triumvirate that the former Prefect of Police Poner had been appointed Minister-President of Bavaria with dictatorial powers; Kahr becomes regent of the Bavarian state, he himself takes over the leadership of the political department of the Reich, and Ludendorff takes command of the army. Von Lossow is appointed Minister of Defense, and von Seisser is appointed Chief of Police. On the contrary, there is no exact information as to whether Hitler threatened the interlocutors. According to some reports, he allegedly stated: “I have four rounds in my pistol; three for you, the last one for me.” During the trial, Hitler denied this accusation, stating that he had seven rounds of ammunition in his pistol, so he could not utter such a thing. Of course, his words prove nothing. It also remains unclear whether Kar actually replied that he was not afraid of death, or whispered to his colleagues that they should pretend that they accepted the terms of the ultimatum. All this perfectly illustrates the vaudeville style of this, so to speak, coup d'état.

Meanwhile, soon Ludendorff appeared on the spot, for whom he was sent. He was not aware of the putschists' plans, but took their side. Under similar pressure, the members of the triumvirate agreed to accept the posts offered to them, which was reported to the participants in the meeting.

Hitler's henchmen arrested members of the Bavarian government - Knilling, Schweier and Mantel. Rem and his people occupied the building of the military commandant's office. Members of the Oberland League were unable to capture the building of the infantry barracks, they were more fortunate with the barracks engineering troops. The school of infantry officers went over to Hitler's side.

The Fuhrer did not hide his joy: "Finally, I will do what I swore to do five years ago, when, blind and crippled, I was in a military hospital: to ruthlessly punish the November criminals and raise Germany from the ruins." Much later, on November 9, 1936, in a speech in Munich, he admitted that from 1919 to 1923 he could think of nothing but a coup d'etat.

Since Röhm had certain problems in the city, Hitler rushed to his aid. However, when he returned to Byrgenbräu, he no longer found the members of the triumvirate here, whom Ludendorff released, taking an honest word from von Lossow that they would not do anything against the “people's revolution”. He did not keep his word. Together with Seisser, he went straight to the city commandant, General von Danner. Confident that Hitler was bluffing, he called in the Reichswehr troops. Lossov, in turn, went to the infantry barracks, where he met with officers who did not want to submit to the putschists.

It is not known exactly at what time the triumvirate decided to “show their backs,” as Hitler put it in court. Since they accepted his proposals under obvious pressure, two explanations are possible. Von Lossow could have phoned Seckt, to whom the cabinet, having learned about the putsch, handed over executive power, and he advised him to dissociate himself from the conspirators. The second hypothesis suggests that the triumvirate, with the support of the officers of the Seventh Military District, independently decided to turn their weapons against Hitler. Many representatives of the Bavarian authorities called Berlin, and all of them answered one thing: to maintain order in the city and wait for orders from Berlin.

Be that as it may, at 2:55 a.m., a radio message sounded that von Kahr, General von Lossow and Colonel von Seisser strongly condemned the putsch undertaken by Hitler. Around five in the morning, Lossow sent Lieutenant Colonel Leupold to Hitler with the message that the triumvirate was refusing to support him. In court, Hitler will say that he did not believe him, believing that pressure was put on von Lossow. Never in my life, he exclaimed, would I believe that these three betrayed me.

Hitler and Ludendorff, not having exact information about what was going on until 11-12 the next morning, decided that they should act outside of Munich and win public opinion over to their side. There is an assumption that this decision was made by Ludendorfer, who said: "Let's go!" This did not have any special prospects, but at least it made it possible to give the undertaking a heroic character. Recalling the assurances of Lossow, who promised support provided that the probability of success was not less than 51 percent, Hitler spoke in the sense that a real strategist, even knowing that he is doomed to failure or his chances of winning do not exceed three percent, is still obliged to act. However, he had no doubt: neither the army nor the police would dare to shoot at Ludendorff.

And they performed. Hitler - in a raincoat and a constant velor hat - strode ahead, side by side with him - two standard bearers. They were followed by Ludendorff, Weber, Graf and Schneiber-Richter; columns of the Fuhrer's personal guard (the core of the future SS), the Munich assault squad, members of the Oberland League, cadets of the infantry school and members of the NSDAP. At Marienplatz they were greeted by an enthusiastic crowd. They reached the Feldernhalle, and here they had to stop in front of a triple police cordon.

Suddenly, a gunshot rang out, followed by a volley. The marchers rallied their ranks. Schneiber-Richter, mortally wounded, fell, dragging Hitler with him.

The count tried to cover him with his body. Ludendorff also fell. Göring was wounded in the thigh. Hitler, who sprained his leg in a fall, managed to crawl to his old car, abandoned nearby, with a supply of dressings. He was given first aid and, not without incident, was transported to a villa in the outskirts of the city, in Uffing. He made a pitiful impression - a broken man, on the verge of suicide. Here he was arrested and transported to Landsberg, placed in cell number seven, previously occupied by the murderer Kurt Eisner. He no longer felt like a Wagnerian hero, on the contrary, reading the newspapers, he realized how absurd and ridiculous he was. Journalists unanimously called him a traitor who did not keep his word. He refused food and was severely depressed.

The coup cost the lives of 16 of his associates. Subsequently, they were elevated to the rank of martyrs, and in their honor, on November 9, a solemn march was held annually along the Feldernhalle. In addition, Hitler dedicated the first volume to them, " Mein Kampf". Many others were arrested, some managed to escape, including Goering - seriously wounded, he took refuge in Austria. Drexler, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis Knirsch and Frau Bechstein, the wife of the famous piano manufacturer and his passionate admirer, tried to bring the head of the NSDAP out of the lethargy into which he plunged, but in the end the deputy prosecutor general Hans Ehard managed to break the ice of his silence. His sister Angelica and friend Winifred Wagner came to visit him, bringing him gifts. Little by little, Hitler came to his senses and regained the ability to read and think. He soon became convinced that Providence had saved him. History repeated itself: Frederick the Great was saved by the death of Empress Elizabeth, himself and Germany - by the death of Lenin. Soviet Union and communism are doomed to an early death.

The line of defense he chose shows how closely he connected his own fate with the fate of Germany. Betrayed in 1918, she again became a victim of treason. If the triumvirate had not deceived him, if they had marched on Berlin, the whole country would have joined them and driven the November criminals out. As in his political speeches, Hitler managed to win over not only the public, but also the judges, who listened to him with increasing indulgence. On April 1, the day when the verdict was passed, in the hall, full of bouquets brought by women, there was literally nowhere for an apple to fall. Ludendorff was acquitted, Hitler was sentenced to five years in prison, from which six months of pre-trial detention was deducted. For a brief moment, he again fell into despair, but quickly pulled himself together and began to work on Mein Kampf.

Five years of political studies are over. Hitler no longer wanted to be anyone's "mouthpiece". The role of the "drummer of the revolution" no longer suited him - he wanted to become its political leader. He was convinced that he would have to become the dictator that Germany needed to do away with Marxism. He is made for politics as a bird is made for flight. Until now, he thought he was using Bavaria as a springboard to free the Reich from the lawless government. From now on, the Fuhrer was convinced that a revolution in one single land would not help. To win power over Germany, it is necessary to act by legal methods. He will use the system itself to destroy the system.

The year 1923 and the experience of the coup showed what united and what separated right-wing conservatives and right-wing radicals. The conservatives were waiting for the right moment to put pressure on the legitimate government and replace it with a dictatorship, but did not want to act by violent means. As for Hitler, he expected to start with actions, if necessary, bloody, in the hope that the rest would happen by itself. But both of them dreamed of the revival of Germany.

Worth mentioning is the fact that the tactics used by Hitler in 1923 were subsequently used more than once by the leader of the Third Reich. So, he appointed the start of the putsch on a day off, when all administrative institutions were closed. He learned many lessons from the putsch: for example, he was convinced that improvisation could not be counted on. The events of 1923 revealed a number of Hitler's traits that would later come to the fore, including his erratic nature: his outbursts of anger alternated with moments of deep despair - a sign of cyclothymia. During the process, he either tried to pity the judges, or was rude to them - in the future he will show himself to be a person who is easily subject to tearfulness, but does not stop at any crime (he has already managed to speak out in the sense that all means are good for him).

The Munich period proves that Hitler, by and large, did not care what legal form the state would take (of course, excluding parliamentary democracy), as long as it was headed by a person endowed with unlimited powers. In his opinion, both the party and the state are the essence of instruments designed to “organically” change depending on the circumstances.

What distinguished Hitler from opponents and temporary allies was his political program, as well as his vision of the world. During the years 1919-1924, he gained significant experience, but his political convictions, by and large formed, on some points still had to undergo some changes.