The Battle of Tsushima is what a war. Causes of the Tsushima disaster. Artillery innovations of the Russo-Japanese War according to the “artillery department”

There are defeats that turn out to be good for the country, when sobered authorities change public policy, turning the country into a peaceful and prosperous power. For example, Sweden suffered such a defeat near Poltava. And Japan, which lost World War II, does not look very shabby. However, there are also defeats from which countries suffer for centuries. Tsushima, the last battle in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, was just such a defeat. The word "Tsushima" became a household word for the Russians - the same as the word "Stalingrad" later became for the Germans, "Pearl Harbor" for the Americans, and "Hiroshima" for the Japanese themselves. The consequences of the Battle of Tsushima for Russia were truly catastrophic - in the end, they led to the death of the Russian Empire, October revolution and 70 years of communist rule. This battle took place exactly one hundred years ago, on May 14, 1905 (May 27, new style).

The battle, in which Russia actually lost its fleet, was preceded by a year of continuous failures on the fronts of the Russo-Japanese War. Formally, this war was started by Japan, but its beginning was inevitable - the two countries divided spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria. After the victory over China in 1894-1895, Japan, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, received the islands of Taiwan and Penghuledao, as well as the Liaodong Peninsula, which it had to give up under pressure from Russia and France. In 1896, Russia received a concession from the Chinese government to build a railway through Manchuria, and in 1898 it leased the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur from China. At the same time, Russia received the right to create a naval base on it. In 1900, Russian troops entered Manchuria.

This war, which lasted more than a year, revealed serious shortcomings in the command system of the Russian army and navy. Due to gross mistakes and miscalculations in preparation for war, in particular, underestimating the enemy, Russia lost battle after battle. In August 1904 - defeat at Liaoyang, in September - on the Shahe River, in December 1904 the besieged Port Arthur fell. The head of the Kwantung fortified area, Lieutenant General Stessel, signed the surrender of the fortress despite the fact that the garrison and squadron could and wanted to resist. In February 1905, Japanese troops inflicted a heavy defeat Russian army at Mukden.

This whole long chain of failures has heated the situation in the country to the limit, and Russian government decided to send the 2nd Pacific Squadron, combined with the 3rd, to help the garrison of Port Arthur, which was then still fighting surrounded. In addition to Port Arthur, the formation under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky was tasked with breaking through to the port of Vladivostok. This would lead to an increase in Russia's military presence in Far East and would have influenced the entire course of the Russo-Japanese War. The combined squadron included eight squadron battleships, three coastal defense battleships, one armored cruiser, eight cruisers, one auxiliary cruiser, nine destroyers, six transports and two hospital ships.

BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE. THE DEATH OF "OSLYABY". Illustration from the site pallada.narod.ru

Before reaching the Korea Strait (in which, near the island of Tsushima, the battle took place), the squadron made a 32.5 thousand-kilometer voyage from Baltic Sea, past the shores of Europe, around Africa and further, stopping in Madagascar, across the Indian Ocean, past the shores of Indochina... Part of the squadron, which left a little later, took a shorter route through the Suez Canal. Along the way, the ships actively replenished coal reserves, which led to their overload and, as a result, to a loss of speed. In addition, the bottoms of the ships became overgrown with algae during the voyage, which also significantly reduced their speed. The only more or less modern ships in the squadron were the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”. However, the squadron, as you know, is equal in low-speed ships...

There were about three days of travel left to Vladivostok, when the squadron passed the section between the island of Tsushima and the shores of Japan. It was there that the Japanese fleet of Admiral Togo was waiting for her - 10 battleships, 24 cruisers and 63 destroyers. By this time, three days before the battle, one of the Russian military leaders- Admiral Felkerzam, whose pennant was raised on the battleship Oslyabya. Although Rozhdestvensky ordered the admiral’s flag not to be lowered on the ship and the squadron was not notified of the incident, this death had a depressing effect on the crew of the battleship itself...

Dozens of works in Russia (USSR) and other countries are devoted to the analysis of the Tsushima battle, which lasted almost a day. The Russian squadron was defeated in it, or rather - complete destruction, since Admiral Rozhdestvensky paid for the three destroyed Japanese destroyers with nine battleships, six cruisers, five destroyers and several transports, and another four battleships and one destroyer surrendered. The reasons for this were flaws in the design of the ships, and their insufficient speed, and the imperfection of Russian artillery, and the fatigue of officers and sailors after a months-long voyage, and command errors...

There were many reasons. Among them there was only a lack of courage, valor and bravery of the Russian sailors, who continued to fulfill their duty to the last. More than five thousand crew members of the Russian squadron died during the battle. Almost six thousand more were captured - Russian ships that received critical damage and had run out of ammunition often simply had no choice but to lower the flag...

On May 14 at 7 o'clock in the morning the first Japanese cruiser was spotted, and a few hours later the main forces of Admiral Togo's squadron appeared. In the first phase of the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese began to cover the head of the Russian squadron, which had reformed from two wake columns into one, and from a long distance opened fire on two flagship battleships - the Suvorov under the flag of Rozhdestvensky and the Oslyaba under the flag of Felkerzam. An hour later, the battleship Oslyabya capsized and sank, and Suvorov, having received severe damage, left the battle. The flagship of the squadron was Alexander III. Then the Japanese ships began to destroy it. A few hours later, Alexander III also sank along with its crew of 900 people. The battleship Borodino, which took the place of Alexander III, was also destroyed along with its crew.

Night fell, and Japanese destroyers attacked the damaged ships. They finished off the wounded Suvorov, and Rozhdestvensky transferred to the destroyer Bedovy, which surrendered to the Japanese the next day. In the evening, Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron. The next day, when the remnants of the squadron were again overtaken by Japanese ships, Nebogatov ordered the St. Andrew's flags to be lowered. The battleships "Nicholas I", "Orel", "Apraksin" and "Senyavin" were captured. Some ships, however, managed to avoid capture. The high-speed cruiser "Emerald" was able to escape pursuit, but the Japanese ships could not catch up with it. He went to Vladivostok, where he was blown up by the team. The cruiser Almaz and two destroyers also broke into the Russian port. Three more cruisers (including the famous Aurora) managed to reach the Philippines, where they were interned.

The Battle of Tsushima remained a deep wound in the soul of Russian soldiers and sailors. Only later, after the country, humiliated by countless defeats and brought to the point of rebellion, overthrew first the tsar, and then the provisional government, when the battles died down Civil War, revenge was taken. In 1939, Japan made exactly the same mistake that Russia made in 1904. The victory in the Russo-Japanese War inspired the Japanese command with confidence that their northern neighbor did not represent any formidable force. This confidence turned into defeat for the Land of the Rising Sun in the conflict at Khalkhin Gol. It may not have been as major a disaster as Tsushima was for Russia, but it still forced Tokyo to abandon plans to attack the USSR for a long time. And in July-August 1945, when the USSR, having declared war on Japan, began to destroy the Kwantung group of the Japanese army, Soviet troops, liberating Chinese cities, remembered not only Stalingrad and Brest, but also the Tsushima disaster...

They still remember her now, 100 years later. On May 27, the day this battle took place, a group of diplomats Russian embassy In Tokyo, employees of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the mayor's office of the city of Tsushima and Nagasaki Prefecture went on the minesweeper of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces "Makishima" to the expected site of the battle. At the site of the sinking of the Russian cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, wreaths were laid on the water and an artillery salute was fired. At the place where the cruiser's crew landed on the shore, a bas-relief was erected in memory of the dead sailors - Japanese and Russian. It was made in Japan. It depicts the famous painting in Japan “Admiral Togo visits the commander of the Baltic squadron Rozhdestvensky at the naval hospital in the city of Sasebo.” Next to the bas-relief there is a monument on which lists of dead Russian and Japanese sailors are engraved. Representatives of Russia and Japan said that their countries would never fight against each other again.

I want to believe it. All the Russian-Japanese military conflicts that occurred in the last century took too many lives.

The Battle of Tsushima is the final period in the Russo-Japanese War. It happened on May 14, 1905 inside the Korea Strait. The forces were distributed approximately like this: the Russians had 8 squadron ships, 3 coastline battleships, 8 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and 5 auxiliary cruisers; The Japanese had 4 squadron battleships, 6 coastline battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. The Russian squadron was led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and the fleet of the Japanese Empire was led by Admiral Togo. The main forces of the Russian side were formed into three groups of four ships. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was on the battleship Suvorov. The fleet of the Empire of Japan was divided into eight detachments, two of which included squadron armored ships led by Togo and Kamimura.

In quantitative terms, the Russian fleet was not inferior to the Japanese. But the Japanese had much more large-caliber and medium-caliber weapons. The Russians were also inferior to the Japanese in the rate of fire. Japanese shells also had more explosives. Moreover, the Japanese were much more experienced than sailors Russian Empire who have not undergone such long shooting training at different distances.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait, forming a marching order. Admiral Rozhdestvensky made a huge mistake by not giving the order for reconnaissance and not darkening the ship. Because of this, it was not difficult for the Japanese to notice the Russians. They were first discovered by the auxiliary cruiser, which informed Togo about this. Rozhdestvensky decided not to interfere with negotiations between Japanese courts. As soon as Togo learned about the location of the Russians, he sent his main forces to the enemy. It was planned to encircle the main forces of the Russian fleet, and, having disabled it, completely destroy the entire squadron at night.

On May 14, towards the morning, Rozhdestvensky formed the fleet into two wake columns. At half past two in the afternoon, the Russian squadron discovered a Japanese ship. The fleet was rebuilt again, but the opportune moment to attack the Japanese fleet was not used. 19 minutes after discovering the enemy, the Russians opened fire, but it was useless. The Japanese fired at the Suvorov and Oslyabya from six battleships and cruisers. By half past three both of these ships were out of action. After this, until the morning of May 15, almost the entire Russian fleet was destroyed due to the complete dispersal of the fleet. About five ships were captured: among them there were 4 battleships and one destroyer. Only two destroyers and the cruiser Almaz managed to survive and reach Vladivostok.

The Battle of Tsushima is a demonstration of the influence of large-caliber artillery on which side will have the advantage in the battle. Medium-caliber weapons did not particularly influence the outcome of the battle. For Russia, this battle showed the need to develop an updated form of artillery fire control and introduce torpedo weapons.

In the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, the Russian Pacific Flotilla and the Imperial Flotilla suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and sunk along with their crew members. Some ships announced their capitulation, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat of the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was a different outcome possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a surprise attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military actions. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence in this section of Russian land.

Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. Russia's small allies, such as France, Germany and others, strongly supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, at decisive strategic moments they still tried to adhere to neutrality. Allied cooperation was provided only when it suited their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive action. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron under the leadership of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

I'm on the road Baltic ships They learn that Port Arthur has been taken and all the ships in the roadstead are sunk. The Pacific Flotilla has been destroyed. This is the maritime history of the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To strengthen the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships from Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was sent.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units on the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

• 8 squadron heavy artillery against 4 Japanese;
• 3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;
• 1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Imperial Japanese Navy;
• 8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;
• 5 against Japan's 24 auxiliary military vessels;
• 9 Russian versus 63 Japanese

The clear combat advantage of Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat riflemen skillfully mastered the art of hitting enemy targets at long distances, and at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet did not have such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of naval equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic objective of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky’s sea campaign was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any force, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would have been a strategically correct decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. The decision was made to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that Japanese Admiral Heitachiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are blocked

The commander of the Japanese fleet strategically chose the right plan possible hostilities. A patrol chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the approaches to Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently placed minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were awaiting the approach of Russian ships. refused naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be discovered by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed crazy to many. Both veterans with worn-out mechanisms, who had logged hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed ships that had not passed tests, were sent on this doomed voyage. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. The battleships with the names of famous commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death.

They got stuck on the descent during a slip, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, and ran aground, as if they were giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe omens?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship Emperor Alexander III burned down in the workshop. The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in a civil harbor, and later ran aground several times while catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship “Slava” was never able to be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command was unaware of any premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II walked around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and join the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, and destroyers left their native shores forever. The 220-day, 18,000 nautical mile voyage to the Japanese shores has begun.

Unseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command was the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time warships the belligerent side could enter the ports of the neutral side only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the route of the squadron, closed its ports to Russian warships.

Supplying the squadron with coal, provisions and fresh water, had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop “Kamchatka” was equipped, staffed by volunteer craftsmen. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. Overall, the implementation of a strategic operation of this scale deserves the highest praise.

The most difficult loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, a severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron loomed like a ghost on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world watched her movements. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

• Port Said (Egypt);
• Djibouti (East Africa);
• Aden (Yemen);
• Dakar (Senegal);
• Conakry (Guinea);
• Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were to no avail. The first long-term stop was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkersam also joined there, taking a short route through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this did not surprise anyone. The crews were formed mostly of recruits and penal prisoners. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The endlessly tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore and the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island were Korean pearl divers. The Battle of Tsushima would begin very soon, and the date of the squadron's destruction was approaching.

First salvo against the enemy

At 13:40, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov”, under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Ignatius, set course north-east 23. Nine minutes later, its guns opened fire on the Japanese squadron, and two minutes later flashes of response flashed volleys The Tsushima naval battle has begun. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear back in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not give up.” The commander kept his word and died along with the entire crew of the battleship.

Battle of Tsushima, briefly about the main thing

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr, with a strong bow on the bow and a huge fire on the rostra, rolled out of formation and fell on the left side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under water, leaving only wooden fragments and people floundering in the water on the surface.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, one after another, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down.

By 16 o'clock the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was out of action, which was severely mutilated by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier we managed to remove Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky with his headquarters to the destroyer “Buiny”. A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. Commanded squadron battleship and the captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two wonderful artists died, both of them graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, complete namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S. O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

• “Sisoy the Great” under the command of captain 1st rank M.P. Ozerov;
• the battleship "Navarin", led by captain 1st rank Baron B. A. Fitingof;
• the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;
• squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", whose commander was captain 1st rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last of the Russian squadron to die);
• "Admiral Senyavin" led by Captain 1st Rank S.I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 increasingly carried Russian sailors and their ships into the abyss of the sea. Another mortally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the fireman - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this terrible battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the north-east 23 course. The main thing is to survive. Many people died with this thought. Russian sailors on the following battleships followed with their gaze the place where their comrades died. They whispered with lips black from burning: “Rest their souls, Lord.”

The battleship Emperor Alexander III and its entire crew perished, and a little later the Borodino. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the indestructibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were surrendered to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. Subsequently, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buiny", who saved Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was captain 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, and commander of the icebreaker Ermak. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he proved himself to be one of the best commanders Russian fleet, N.N. Kolomiytsev commanded different ships. In World War I he became a vice admiral. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications curriculum vitae about N.N. Kolomiytsev end with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, his name was assigned to a new hydrographic vessel. Only very recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought in the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship “Nikolai Kolomiytsev” was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

Historical reference

From the lists of naval fleets of that time, two ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored deck "Aurora" at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including E.R. Egoriev, were killed, and another 83 people were injured. Unable to move forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives more reason for the cruiser Aurora to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversaries of Tsushima, meetings of veterans and participants of the Russian-Japanese War were held there. The Japanese treat this historical monument with great reverence.

Memory of the lost sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three arrived in Vladivostok. The messenger ship "Almaz", the destroyers "Grozny" and "Bravey". Most of the ships and 5 thousand sailors found eternal peace at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Dazhelet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on Water, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with people's money and widows' contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

Tsushima: analysis against myths

V. Kofman

Kofman V. Tsushima: analysis against myths // Naval. ± 1. - St. Petersburg, 1991. P. 3-16.

85 years have passed since that spring day - May 14, 1905, when a naval battle took place, the name of which has since become synonymous with defeat - Tsushima. This battle was the final touch in the unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War, making Russia's victory in it almost impossible. Much can be said about the political consequences of the Battle of Tsushima: internal and external. Without setting such tasks in a short work, we will still try to understand what, how and why happened on May 14 (27), 1905 in the Korea Strait.

There is still great interest in this battle, which is not surprising, since Tsushima occupies a military maritime history visible spot. The only general battle of the heyday of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet, due to its decisiveness and results, attracts the attention of many writers and researchers. Foreign experts believe that in terms of the amount of literature devoted to it, the battle in the Korea Strait ranks second after the Battle of Jutland.

However, quantity does not always provide sufficient quality, and the story of Tsushima is shining example. There are quite objective circumstances for this. Naturally, the bulk of the literature on any battle is supplied by the former opponents themselves: often only they have access to eyewitness accounts, official reports, etc. Of course, the “interested parties” are rarely completely objective, but the situation that developed with the Russo-Japanese War is truly unique.

Both participants in the battle were least interested in establishing the truth. The Japanese spent the entire war under a veil of secrecy and did not want anyone to take advantage of their experience, even their closest allies, the British. The Russian side did no better, indulging in unbridled criticism of everything that was connected with the fleet - people, ships, artillery... The most interesting materials were collected by British observers stationed at the Togo squadron, who personally observed the battle and had access to Japanese materials. But the report of the English naval attaché Pakinham was never published in the open press, remaining in the possession of narrow circles of the Admiralty 1 . The works of French and German historians, often not without interest in their conclusions, are purely secondary in their source materials. The current situation has led to the fact that a very narrow range of literature is usually used as initial factual material.

First of all, this is the official Japanese and Russian history of the war at sea. "Description of Naval Operations in 37-38 Meiji" is an excellent example of the Japanese approach to history. The book apparently does not contain any deliberate distortions. It contains absolutely unique material characterizing all the movements of the Japanese fleet before, during and after the battle, one glance at which evokes great respect for the activity of the fleet of the “land of the rising sun” and the intensity of the use of its ships. But it is futile to try to find in this four-volume edition even traces of an analysis of military operations. The description of the Tsushima battle itself is very laconic.

The domestic official history of actions at sea in the Russian-Japanese War, published for almost 10 years, by the time the volumes dedicated to the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron and the battle in the Korean Strait appeared, had finally “exhausted.” The description of the battle is quite superficial, there is no analysis of the actions of the parties, and all information related to the enemy is simply rewritten from Japanese “descriptions of military operations...” - in large blocks and without commentary. In general, in Russian official history there is a noticeable desire to pass this dark page as quickly as possible, without going into unnecessary details and reflections.

Of the “unofficial” works, the main place is occupied by 3 books: “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy, “On the Eagle” in Tsushima by V.P. Kostenko and “The Battle of Tsushima” from the “Reckoning” trilogy by Captain 2nd Rank Semenov. The documentary novel of the former battalion "Eagle" became a book for millions. The fate of more than one future naval historian was determined in childhood, after reading Tsushima. But in terms of the selection of material, Novikov-Priboy’s book is very secondary and is essentially a fictionalized compilation of well-known memoirs, the main place among which is occupied by the memoirs of V.P. Kostenko.

“On the Eagle in Tsushima” is the most interesting of this “trinity” of unofficial sources. Kostenko was one of the few “pure observers” on the Russian side and, perhaps, the only one who was fully qualified. But one should not overestimate the reliability of his description of the battle itself, and in particular the damage to the Eagle. He is still a very young man and by no means an artillery specialist. For obvious reasons, he made many mistakes in assessing the effect of enemy shells when he first got into battle, and what a battle!

Finally, the “official historian” of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Captain 2nd Rank Semenov, turned out to be a much more emotional witness than the naval engineer Kostenko. In "Reckoning" there are a lot of exclamations, a fair amount of reasoning, but very few facts. Usually presented as a “lawyer” for his patron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, Semenov did not cope with his task very well.

Only recently have several works appeared devoted to the analysis of the Tsushima battle, but, alas, abroad. They more fully reflect the actions of the Japanese squadron, but foreign authors encountered certain difficulties in selecting facts about the actions of the Russians, which is not surprising. The most interesting is their approach to the defeat of Rozhdestvensky - much softer and more sympathetic than in Russian literature.

Indeed, with the light hand of “critics of the autocracy,” the history of Tsushima will always be presented in an exceptionally gloomy and purely accusatory spirit. Depending on the direction of thought of the authors, and sometimes the “social order”, everyone was in the “dock”: the state leadership of Russia, the squadron commander, his officers, especially the artillerymen, and the inanimate participants of Tsushima - Russian guns, shells and ships.

Let's try to sequentially consider all the numerous “reasons”, real and imaginary, that led the Russian squadron to the bottom of the Korean Strait - after an almost round-the-world, multi-month journey.

Strategy

The doom of the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron is completely obvious. However, before once again blaming the Russian leadership for the misfortunes of this war, it is necessary to remember all the strategic realities. The confrontation between Russia and Japan in the Far East turned out to be largely a “maritime affair.” The Mikado troops that landed in Korea and Manchuria were completely dependent on the reliability of sea communications with the mother country. And the landing itself could hardly have taken place with the dominance of the Russian fleet, and simply with more active actions of the Port Arthur squadron. But even when “the train had already left” and the expeditionary force moved across the expanses of Manchuria - towards Port Arthur and towards the main forces of the Russian army, the capture of its supply route could have influenced the entire course of the war. Therefore, the decision to send Rozhdestvensky’s forces (initially including only new battleships and cruisers) to the aid of the 1st Pacific Squadron blocked at its base was not only not senseless, but also perhaps the only active step. Having united, the Russian ships would have had a very noticeable superiority over the Japanese, which would partly compensate for the inconvenience of the strategic position.

And the inconvenience was truly monstrous. The two Russian bases, Vladivostok and Port Arthur, were separated by 1,045 miles. In reality, the fleet could only be based at one of these points. But Port Arthur is “locked” in the depths of the Gulf of Pechili, and Vladivostok freezes for 3.5 months a year. The repair capabilities of both ports cost each other, namely, they were practically non-existent. In such conditions, only a large advantage in strength gave a chance for active action and success.

As soon as Port Arthur fell and the ships of the 1st squadron were killed, the strategic position of the Russian naval forces in the Far East became hopeless. All momentum was lost. The constant delays of Rozhestvensky's squadron led to the fact that the Japanese ships repaired all the damage, and the Russians gradually lost their combat effectiveness in the grueling tropical voyage. In such a situation, a bold strategic and political decision was required, but... there was none. The government and naval command of Russia found themselves in a peculiar situation called “zugzwang” in chess - a forced sequence of moves. Indeed, recalling the 2nd Pacific Squadron halfway through meant not only admitting its military weakness, but also suffering a major political defeat, and most importantly, completely abandoning the attempt to quickly win the war by cutting off Japan's communications with Korea. But continuing the campaign just as consistently led to loss. Even if Rozhestvensky’s ships managed to safely pass the Tsushima trap, their future would look hopeless. It would have been almost impossible to operate from Vladivostok, far from Japanese communications, as part of a squadron. One or two patrol cruisers of the Japanese fleet were enough to warn Togo in time about the Russians’ exit. In addition, Vladivostok was easily blocked by mines, so the only thing Rozhdestvensky, who arrived safely there, could have done was to choose another day and another place to fight the Japanese fleet.

It has been repeatedly suggested that the commander of the Russian squadron could have “outflanked” the Japanese forces by trying to penetrate Vladivostok not directly through the Korea Strait, but by passing along the eastern coast of Japan, through the Sangar Strait or the La Perouse Strait.

The far-fetched nature of such reasoning is completely obvious. The actual cruising range of Russian battleships (taking into account the amount of coal and the state of the engine teams) was approximately 2500 miles (according to V.P. Kostenko). This means that more than one loading of coal would be required on the open sea, and not in the gentle tropical latitudes, but in the cold spring Pacific Ocean. In addition, such a large and slow squadron along the entire coast of Japan had practically no chance of passing unnoticed. The voyages of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment show how intense shipping was along its eastern coast. And for the full disclosure of such an adventure, one neutral steamer was enough, which could neither be sunk nor forced to remain silent. Togo could calculate further “moves” with great accuracy, and as a result, the Russian squadron would have been forced to take the battle in completely unfavorable conditions in the northern latitudes, with a high probability of taking the battle during a coal overload or insufficient supply.

Considerable difficulties would also arise when trying to pass through the northern straits. The 3 cruisers of the Vladivostok squadron spent unpleasant days when they could not enter the La Perouse Strait due to thick fog. In the end, Rear Admiral Jessen was forced to decide to go to the Sangar Strait. The Russian cruisers nevertheless reached Vladivostok safely with the last remaining fuel. It’s not hard to imagine what would have happened to Rozhdestvensky’s huge, clumsy squadron in a similar attempt! It is quite possible that some of its ships would have suffered the fate of the Bogatyr, which ran aground, but not near its shores, but right in the “lair of the Japanese tiger.” At the very least, one could expect a complete breakdown of the squadron.

If we assume the almost incredible thing that the Russian squadron made its way unnoticed along the entire length of Japan, then passage through any of the straits could not remain secret. But even if Rozhdestvensky had successfully crossed La Perouse or the Sangar Strait, this would by no means save him from the battle. With a very likely early detection, Heihachiro Togo's fleet would have been waiting for him somewhere at the exit of one of the straits. The too low cruising speed of the Russian squadron doomed it to interception by the Japanese long before Vladivostok (the distance from Vladivostok to the La Perouse Strait is 500 miles, to the Sangar Strait - 400 miles, to the Togo anchorage at the southern tip of Korea or to Sasebo - 550 miles: cruising speed of Rozhdestvensky's ships - 8-9 knots, Japanese United Fleet - at least 10-12 knots). Of course, the battle would have taken place much closer to the Russian base, and small Japanese destroyers might not have been able to take part in it, but on the way to such a dubious successful outcome there were many pitfalls - literally and figuratively! Finally, as noted above, even the safe arrival of the squadron in Vladivostok did little to achieve success in the war. A rare and revealing case of strategic hopelessness!

Tactics

If the strategic failures of the 2nd Pacific Squadron’s campaign are usually attributed to the shapeless, poorly functioning “military and political machine of tsarism,” then the responsibility for the tactical decision of the Battle of Tsushima certainly lies with the commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Zinoviy Petrovich Rozhestvensky. There are more than enough reproaches against him. If we briefly summarize them, we can highlight the following main directions " possible reason"tactical defeat of Russian forces:

1) Rozhdestvensky chose the wrong time to pass through the Korean Strait, since the Russian squadron found itself at its narrowest point in the middle of the day; The order “not to interfere with Japanese negotiations” is also criticized.

2) To build the squadron, he chose the extremely inflexible and clumsy formation of a single wake column, without separating the 4 newest battleships and the Oslyabya into a separate detachment.

3) Rozhdestvensky’s orders for battle are minimal. He completely shackled the activity of the junior flagships and did not let anyone in on his plans - after the failure of the Suvorov and the injury of the commander, the Russian squadron was not under control.

4) The Russian commander missed the decisive moment in the very beginning of the battle, not “throwing himself” at the double formation of Japanese ships during the risky turn of Togo and generally behaved extremely passively.

It is not difficult to parry the first of the reproaches. It is unlikely that Rozhdestvensky, like any other sensible sailor, could count on the fact that his “armada” would be able to pass through the narrow strait undetected - day or night. If he had chosen the dark time of day to force the narrowness, he would still have been discovered by two Japanese patrol lines pushed forward and would have been attacked at night by destroyers. In this case, the artillery battle would have taken place the next morning, but the forces of the Russian squadron could have been weakened by one or more torpedo hits by this time. Obviously, the Japanese were counting on precisely this course of action of the Russian admiral, since he almost managed to deceive them. Both patrol lines of Japanese auxiliary cruisers were passed just in the dark, and if not for the more or less accidental discovery of the hospital Eagle carrying all the distinctive lights, Rozhdestvensky could have safely passed them. This arrangement of patrols was subsequently harshly criticized by the famous English naval historian Julian Corbett. However, this would not have allowed the Russian squadron to avoid morning detection by light cruisers of the third line, but perhaps it would have somewhat delayed the start of the battle, which would have taken place in the evening, followed by a completely life-saving night...

There is a second consideration, closely related to two other reproaches against Rozhdestvensky. And the reluctance to pass through a dangerous place at night, and the “primitive” formation in battle, and the extreme simplicity of the orders (which boiled down to indicating the course - NO-23 and the order to follow the maneuvers of the lead ship in a column) - all had their origin in the poor maneuverability training of the Russian squadron and bitter lessons battle in the Yellow Sea. The admiral had no doubt that it would be difficult for him to reassemble his ships scattered during the torpedo attacks in the morning, and he was absolutely right, as shown by the fate of the cruisers of the Enquist detachment, which safely lost the Russian squadron after the battle, although thereby avoiding the tragic fate of the remaining Russian ships. Any ambiguity in the order could lead to the same confusion that befell the 1st squadron after the death of its commander Vitgeft in the battle in the Yellow Sea. The order to follow the lead ship on the indicated course is extremely clear: it is difficult to violate it without compelling reasons and the risk of being prosecuted for non-compliance. Indeed, given the results of the battles of the Arthurian squadron, it is difficult to blame Rozhdestvensky, who considered the disorder in command a more terrible enemy than the Japanese.

The most serious disagreements exist in assessing the tactical position and maneuvering of the enemy fleets in the first minutes of the Tsushima battle. According to some historians, Togo himself put himself in a hopeless position, and as a result of the cunning “deception” of Rozhdestvensky, who only had to reach out and pluck the fruits of victory. Others furiously criticize the Russian admiral for unnecessary changes at the critical moment of the beginning of the battle. To make the right decision, you must be guided by the facts. Below is a brief timeline of Tsushima describing the most important maneuvers and events of the artillery battle.

5 hours of battle

The deployment of the Japanese squadron was simple and effective. Having received the first message about the discovery of a Russian squadron at about 5.00, Togo went to sea 2 hours later (at 7.10 am). By noon he crossed the Korean Strait from west to east and calmly awaited the enemy.

Rozhdestvensky obviously tried to outwit his opponent through several successive tactical changes. At night and early in the morning he sailed in close formation of two wake columns with auxiliary vessels between them, and at 9.30 he rebuilt the battleships into one column. Around noon, the Russian admiral made a second maneuver, ordering the 1st armored detachment to turn “sequentially” to the right by 8 points (at a right angle), and then another 8 points to the left. Confusion arose: "Alexander III" turned behind the flagship "consistently", and the next one in the ranks, "Borodino", began to turn "all of a sudden". The final verdict has not yet been made - which of them was wrong. Rozhdestvensky himself subsequently explained his plan as an attempt to line up the 4 most powerful ships in the front line by turning “all of a sudden.” However, there are many other explanations not for this supposed, but for the actually carried out maneuver (the most complete and elegant justification for Rozhdestvensky’s possible “tactical game” can be found in the article by V. Chistyakov). One way or another, the Russian squadron found itself in the formation of two columns, lined up with a ledge - the right one slightly ahead of the left. At about 2:40 p.m., the Japanese fleet appeared far ahead and to the right. It is interesting that both Russian reconstructions - from two columns to one, then again to two - remained unknown to Togo. Poor visibility and poor radio communications were the reason that the last information that the Japanese commander had about the Russian system was early in the morning. So the statements of observers on the Japanese side are quite understandable, indicating that the Russians are building as two parallel wake columns. It was in this formation that Rozhestvensky’s squadron marched early in the morning, and it was in this formation that it was expected to be seen.

Far ahead, Togo crossed the course of the Russian squadron from east to west and went on a counter course to cross the left, weakest Russian column. There is an opinion that he wanted to attack it, quickly defeat it, and then deal with the main forces of the enemy - 4 new battleships. This is hardly true: the entire course of the Tsushima battle shows that the Japanese admiral concentrated his fire on the most powerful Russian ships, quite rightly believing that only they could have a real influence on the course of the battle, and believing that the “old men” would not go anywhere anyway . In addition, an attack on a collision course could not have been included in Togo’s plans. Before his eyes stood the ghost of a battle in the Yellow Sea, when, having separated from the 1st Pacific Squadron on a counter course, the Japanese had to catch up with the enemy for 4 hours, losing almost the entire remainder of the daylight hours. The transition to the other side can be explained by a completely different reason, which for some reason the Tsushima researchers forget about. The fact is that the weather conditions on the fateful day of May 14 were bad: a strong southwest wind (5-7 points) created quite large waves and powerful fountains of spray. Under these conditions, the casemate system for arranging auxiliary artillery on Japanese battleships and armored cruisers became a significant drawback. Shooting from the casemates of the lower tier, where half of the Japanese 6-inch guns were located, which, as will be seen later, played a very important role, was difficult. In slightly worse conditions, the English armored cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth, “sisters” of Japanese ships of the same class, in the battle at Coronel could not fire at all from the guns of the lower casemates.

By moving to the western side of the Russian column, Togo gained an additional tactical advantage. Now the Russian ships were forced to fire against the wind and waves. 2

The deployment of forces was approaching a decisive moment. At about 1:50 p.m., Rozhdestvensky ordered a changeover - back into formation of one wake column. To quickly carry out the maneuver, the 1st armored detachment did not have enough superiority in speed and the distance between it and the 2nd detachment. There are many assessments of the “quality” of the latest change in the Russian formation - from one that completely ruined the beginning of the battle to one that was almost clearly carried out. It is only obvious that, to one degree or another, this maneuver prevented the alignment of the column of 12 armored ships. But at that time Togo was also engaged in, at first glance, very strange maneuvering exercises.

Ten minutes later (at 14.02), the detachments of Togo and Kamimura, maneuvering separately, but walking one after the other with a slight gap, having reached approximately abeam the head of the Russian column, began to turn “sequentially” to the left almost on the opposite course, being less than 50 cables from the Russian squadrons. Indeed, this maneuver looks very risky. However, Togo could rely on the same experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea, believing that Russian guns were unlikely to be able to inflict significant damage on his battleships in the 15 minutes that he needed to lay down Kamimura’s last cruiser. new course. But the successful execution of such a maneuver promised many tactical advantages. The Japanese approached the head of the Russian squadron, enveloping it from the right. Their advantages in location relative to the wind and wave remained. This situation could be regarded as close to ideal and was certainly worth the risk.

Rozhdestvensky nevertheless gained a small and short-term advantage. Most of those who criticize his actions unanimously believe that the 1st Armored Detachment should have “rushed towards the enemy.” But, in essence, going to the head of the 2nd detachment, the Russian commander did just that. The expression “rush” sounds quite bold for ships that at that time had a speed of no more than 12 knots! In order to increase the speed, time was required comparable to the time of the Japanese maneuver. When attempting to maneuver independently, Russian battleships could completely lose formation. Rozhdestvensky had to fear like hell a repetition of the confusion that befell the 1st squadron at the decisive moment of the battle in the Yellow Sea. and chose to take a much more logical step, trying to realize his fleeting advantage: he opened fire in the wake column.

The first shot was fired from the Suvorov at 14.08 local time. It is convenient to count further events of the battle from this moment, taking it as the “zero point”.

Two minutes after the start of the battle, the Japanese opened fire. By this time, only Mikasa and Shikishima had set a new course. Some of the rear Japanese ships were forced to open fire even before the turning point - the general nervous tension of the beginning of the general battle had an effect.

It is often pointed out that at this moment Togo was almost in a hopeless situation, since his ships, turning “sequentially,” passed the same turning point, but which was easy to target. This is a gross mistake, since there was no central guidance system at that time, even within the same ship. Based on the rangefinder data, an approximate distance was obtained, and then almost every gun or turret was targeted individually, monitoring the fall of its shells relative to the ship being fired upon. Shooting at an “imaginary” turning point on the open sea was probably even more difficult than at a real target. The only “damage” to the position of Togo’s ships at that moment was that only those of them that had already turned and were on a stable course could shoot accurately enough.

It is not for nothing that so much space is given to the initial minutes of the battle: it was during these moments that both Russian and Japanese ships received a large number of hits. In addition, it was in the first half hour of the battle that the fate of the flagships of the 1st and 2nd armored detachments of the 2nd Pacific Squadron - "Suvorov" and "Oslyabi" - was essentially decided.

Further events unfolded according to the same pattern: under Japanese fire, the Russian squadron leaned more and more to the right, quite naturally trying to get out of the head-covering position in which it found itself. But the significant, almost one and a half superiority in speed of the Japanese made it possible, moving along an arc of a large radius, to maintain tactical superiority, being in front and to the left of the Russian column.

Within 10 minutes after the opening of fire, the Oslyabya received its first significant damage, and 40 minutes later there was a severe fire on it. Around the same time, Rozhdestvensky was seriously wounded, and 50 minutes after the start of the battle, “Suvorov” left the formation. An hour after the first shot, the Oslyabya sank, and it became clear that the Russian squadron would no longer be able to win this battle by any means.

The further course of the battle consisted of a series of attempts by the Russian squadron to hide in fog and smoke. After 10-30 minutes, these efforts were countered by the ships of Togo and Kamimura, which, having restored contact, immediately went to the head of the enemy column. So, for the first time the squadrons separated 1:20 after the start of the battle. The second loss of contact occurred two and a half hours after the first shot, the third - another hour later. Before darkness fell - after 7 pm, the opponents had barely more than an hour of respite, and artillery fire continued for 4 hours.

It makes no sense to analyze in detail the tactics of the battle after the end of its first hour: the maneuvers of the Russian squadron were, as a rule, meaningful, but at the same time completely aimless. The Japanese, with enviable tenacity, “adjusted” to them, all the time maintaining an advantageous tactical position of covering the head of the enemy column. Both sides did their best. Only a huge superiority in speed allowed Togo to complete his task as he understood it. The behavior of the Russian commander in the initial stage of the battle certainly raises a number of questions, but the tactical decisions he made cannot in any way be considered reprehensible. Even left without control, the 2nd Pacific Squadron did not lose its “mind”; there was simply no real way out of this situation.

The disadvantages of the tactical situation did not prevent the Russian battleships from maintaining continuous fire until the very last moment. Therefore, critics of the unfortunate squadron, having dealt with its “incompetent commander,” usually move on to “the ineffectiveness of Russian artillery.”

Guns and shells

Russian artillery was accused of several “sins”: low weight of the projectile, insufficient rate of fire, etc. In this case, emotions often appear instead of arguments. Let's try to understand artillery technology using technical data (Table 1).

gun	Caliber, mm	Barrel length in calibers 3	Projectile weight, kg	Initial speed, m/s
Russian 12-inch.	305	38,3	331	793
Japanese 12-inch.	305	40	386,5	732
Russian 10-inch.	254	43,3	225	778
Japanese 10-inch.	254	40,3	227	700
Russian 8-inch.	203	32	87,6	702
Japanese 8-inch.	203	45	113,5	756
Russian 6-inch.	152	43,5	41,3	793
Japanese 6-inch.	152	40	45,4	702

Indeed, Russian shells of the same caliber as Japanese ones are somewhat lighter, but this difference is not so great: for a 6-inch - 9%, for a 10-inch - only 1%, and only for a 12-inch - about 15%. But the difference in weight is compensated by a higher initial velocity, and the kinetic energy of Russian and Japanese 12-inch shells is exactly the same, and Russian 10- and 6-inch shells have an advantage over Japanese ones by about 20%.

A comparison of 8-inch guns is not indicative, since in Rozhdestvensky’s squadron only one ship had obsolete guns of this caliber - the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov. Higher starting speed with equal energy, it provided a more flat firing trajectory at all real distances of the Tsushima battle.

The rate of fire is one of the most important factors, but it is not always determined only by technical capabilities. Thus, the relatively higher technical rate of fire of the English guns of Japanese battleships in real battle conditions turned out to be not at all important. Observers on both sides, Russian and English, unanimously describe the enemy's shooting as "exceptionally frequent", in contrast to the slowness on their part. Thus, Packingham points to the rapid fire of the Russians in comparison with the slow and careful fire of the Japanese. Psychologically, such conclusions are quite understandable. With the nervous tension that reigns at all combat posts, willy-nilly it seems that an eternity passes between shots from one’s own ship, while enemy shells, each of which brings death, perhaps to the observer himself, “rain down like hail.” In any case, in Russian historical literature there has long been a firmly established tradition of attributing a significant part of its failure to the “slow firing of the 2nd Pacific Squadron”. The truth can only be established by an objective method - by calculating the consumption of ammunition.

The numbers reveal a completely unexpected picture. 4 Japanese battleships - the main force of Admiral Togo - fired a total of 446 twelve-inch shells. This means that they fired on average 1 shot from a gun per 7 minutes of battle, with the technical ability to shoot at least 7 times more often! 4 There is nothing surprising in this: even when loading using mechanisms, physical capabilities there are simply not enough people to maintain a high rate of fire for several hours. In addition, the Japanese had other reasons, which will be discussed later.

How were things on the Russian squadron? The battleship Nicholas I alone fired 94 shells at the enemy from two twelve-inch guns - 20 more than the Shikishima's four! "Eagle" fired at least 150 shells. It is unlikely that "Alexander III" and "Borodino", which fired until the very end of the battle, fired fewer shells than "Eagle", whose main caliber guns failed in the middle of the battle. Even the coastal defense battleships located at the very end of the column spent more than 100 shells each.

The simplest and most approximate calculation shows that Rozhdestvensky’s squadron fired over a THOUSAND large-caliber shells at the enemy - TWICE as many as the Japanese. But the outcome of the battle of the battleships was decided by large-caliber shells.

But it could also be that all Russian shells flew into the “milk”, and most of the Japanese ones hit the target? However, objective data refute this assumption. Reports from Japanese experts meticulously describe each hit on their ships, indicating the caliber of the projectile and the damage it caused. (Table 2.)

	12"	8"-10"		3" or less	Total
"Mikasa"
"Shikishima"
"Fuji"
"Asahi"
"Cassouga"
"Nissin"
"Izumo"
"Azuma"
"Tokiwa"
"Yakumo"
"Asama"
"Iwate"
Total:					154

It would seem that even such an impressive number of hits pales in comparison to the success of the Japanese. After all, according to V.P. Kostenko, which has become widespread in Russian historiography, the “Eagle” alone was hit by 150 shells, of which 42 were 12-inch. But Kostenko, who was a young naval engineer during the Tsushima era, had neither the experience nor the time to accurately examine all the damage to the ship in those few hours of the morning of May 28 before the ship was delivered. Much was written down by him already in captivity from the words of the sailors. The Japanese and British had much more time and experience. "Eagle" was examined by them "in situ", immediately after the battle, and from numerous photographs. A special album was even released dedicated to the damage to the Russian battleship. The data of foreign experts differ somewhat, but even the number of hits given in the Japanese official history of the naval war is much less than that of Kostenko (Table 3.) 5.

		8"-10"		3" or less	Total
V.P.Kostenko
History of the War at Sea (Meiji)					about 60
Pakinham
M. Ferrand*

It is obvious that the Eagle received no more than 70 hits, of which only 6 or 7 were 12-inch hits.

Expert data is indirectly confirmed by historical experience. In the battle between the Spanish and American squadrons off the coast of Cuba in 1898, in which the Spanish squadron was completely defeated, out of 300 large-caliber shells fired by US battleships, only 14 found the target (4.5% of hits). American ships in artillery and firing organization were not much different from the battleships of the Russian-Japanese War. The distances at which the battle took place were also similar - 15-25 cables. The largest battles of World War 1 took place over long distances, but fire control also improved significantly. In none of them did the number of shells hit exceed 5%. But even if we assume that the Japanese performed a miracle and achieved as much as 10% hits in Tsushima, this gives approximately the same number of Japanese shells that hit the target as the Russians - about 45.

The assumption remains that Russian ammunition is ineffective. The main argument has always been the relatively low content of explosives in them (1.5% of the total weight), its quality - high humidity and too tight a fuse. Against this background, Japanese, but in fact English, thin-walled high-explosive and “semi-armor-piercing” shells filled with potent “shimosa” seemed to look very advantageous. But you have to pay for everything. For an armor-piercing projectile to be effective, it must be durable, therefore thick-walled, and equally consistently it simply cannot have a large charge. Real armor-piercing shells used by naval artillery in almost all countries and at all times contained approximately 1% to 2% explosives and had an insensitive fuse with a large delay. It is necessary, otherwise the explosion will occur even before the armor is completely penetrated. This is exactly how the Japanese “suitcases” behaved, exploding when they hit any obstacle. It’s not for nothing that they NEVER penetrated any thick armor of Russian ships. The choice of pyroxylin is also not accidental - it is not as sensitive to impact as picric acid (“shimosa”), which in those days was simply not suitable for equipping armor-piercing projectiles. As a result, the Japanese never had them, much to the displeasure of their British “teachers.” Russian shells pierced rather thick armor: the Japanese counted 6 holes in 15-centimeter plates after the battle. Moreover, just after breaking through such thick armor, an explosion occurred, often causing quite a bit of damage. This is confirmed by one of the hits, which could, if not change the fate of the battle, then at least brighten up the defeat of the Russian fleet.

At 3 o'clock local time, just 50 minutes after the first shot, a Russian armor-piercing shell pierced the 6-inch frontal plate of the main battery turret of the battleship Fuji and exploded above the breech of the first gun. The force of the explosion threw overboard the heavy armor plate covering the rear of the turret. Everyone in it was killed or wounded. But, most importantly, the hot fragments ignited the powder charges. At the same time, over 100 kilograms of gunpowder “pasta” burst into flames. Fiery splashes flew in all directions. Another second - and Captain Packinham would have been able to observe from aboard the Asahi a terrible picture, which he nevertheless witnessed 11 years later in the Battle of Jutland, already with the rank of admiral, while being on the bridge of the battle cruiser New Zealand. A column of thick black smoke hundreds of meters high, a resounding thud, and debris flying into the air: all that remained of the ship when the ammunition detonated. English nitrocellulose gunpowder - cordite - was very prone to explosion when burned quickly. Such a difficult fate befell 3 British battlecruisers in Jutland. Now it is clear that “Fuji” was on the verge of death (the Japanese used the same cordite). But Togo’s ship was lucky: one of the fragments broke the hydraulic line, and the water gushing out under high pressure extinguished the dangerous fire.

Another “feature” of Japanese shells also had an impact in the Tsushima battle. A very sensitive fuse, combined with an easily detonating “filling”, led to the fact that the artillery of the Togo squadron suffered more from its own shells than from enemy fire. Japanese "suitcases" repeatedly exploded in gun barrels. Thus, on the flagship battleship Mikasa alone, at least 2 twelve-inch shells detonated in the bore of the right gun of the bow turret. If everything went well the first time and the fire continued, then at about 6 o’clock in the evening, on the 28th shot, the gun practically exploded. The explosion displaced the front turret roof plate and knocked out a nearby gun for 40 minutes. A similar incident occurred on the Shikishima: on the 11th shot, its own projectile destroyed the muzzle of the same right gun of the bow turret. The consequences were just as serious: the gun was completely out of action, the neighboring one was forced to stop firing for a while, and the roof of the tower was also damaged. Explosions in the barrels of the 8-inch guns of the armored cruiser Nissin had an even greater effect. After the battle, the Japanese claimed that Russian shells “cut off” the barrels of three of the four main caliber guns of this ship. The likelihood of such an event is negligible, and indeed, British officers who examined the damage to the Nissin discovered that this was the same result of the action of Japanese fuses. This list could be continued. There is no doubt that it was precisely the “premature explosions” with the failure of the guns that were one of the reasons for the relatively small number of large-caliber shells that Togo’s ships were able to fire. It is also known that the English “teachers” of the Japanese after Tsushima excluded shells with a charge of picric acid from the ammunition of their large-caliber guns, returning not even to pyroxylin, but to such a low-power, but at the same time insensitive explosive like ordinary gunpowder.

The arguments in favor of certain aspects of the artillery equipment of the Russian and Japanese fleets could be continued, but I would like to have clearer quantitative characteristics to evaluate the result of an artillery battle.

The most objective criterion of damage caused by gunfire to ships of approximately the same class is the number of people incapacitated 6 . This indicator sums up numerous contradictory and often difficult to evaluate separately elements of combat power, such as shooting accuracy, quality of shells and armor reliability. Of course, individual hits may be more or less successful, but if there are a significant number of them, the law comes into play large numbers. Particularly characteristic are losses on armored ships, on which most of the crew are protected by armor, and losses indicate only “real” hits.

It should be noted that this system for assessing the effectiveness of artillery is somewhat biased in favor of high-explosive projectiles, which produce a large number of small fragments, sufficient to injure or even kill a person, but unable to seriously damage the ship itself and thereby cause damage to his combat power. So the resulting result can in no way be beneficial for the Russian fleet, which did not have such shells.

What were the losses in people caused by artillery in the Battle of Tsushima? Among the Japanese, they are known to the accuracy of one person: 699 or 700 people, including 90 killed during the battle, 27 who died from wounds, 181 seriously and 401 relatively lightly wounded. The distribution of losses by units and individual ships is interesting (Table 4).

Togo Squad:	Killed	Wounded
"Mikasa"
"Shikishima"
"Fuji"
"Asahi"
"Cassouga"
"Nissin"
Total:
Kamimura Squad:
"Izumo"
"Azumo"
"Tokiwa"
"Yakumo"
"Asama"
"Iwate"
"Chihaya"
Total
Light cruiser squads

Data on losses on destroyers is not entirely complete: it is reliably known that at least 17 people were killed and 73 wounded. The total for individual ships and detachments gives a slightly different result from the overall losses, but the discrepancies are not too significant and are quite understandable: some of those who died from wounds on individual ships could have been included in the lists of the dead; there is no data on several destroyers damaged in the night battle, etc. More important general patterns. The ratio of killed to wounded on the heavily armored ships of Tōgō and Kamimura's units ranged from 1:6 to 1:5; on less protected light cruisers and destroyers this ratio drops to 1:4-1:3.

How significant were the Japanese losses in Tsushima? A very significant comparison is with the number of casualties on Russian ships in the battle in the Yellow Sea, for which complete data is available. On 6 Russian battleships, 47 people were killed and 294 were wounded - almost exactly the same number as in one detachment of Togo! The heavily damaged Russian cruisers Askold, Pallada, Diana and Novik lost 111 people, including 29 killed.

Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from this comparison. Firstly, Japanese losses in Tsushima can be assessed as very serious. About 500 people in the main forces of the United Fleet alone were out of action - almost as many as both fleets lost in the Yellow Sea. It is also clear that in the Korean Strait the fire of Russian ships was distributed more evenly than a year earlier near Port Arthur, when of the Japanese ships only the flagship battleship Mikasa was badly damaged - 24 killed and 114 out of action. Apparently, despite Rozhestvensky’s strict order to fire at the enemy’s lead ship, the unfavorable tactical position of the Russian squadron forced individual ships to transfer fire to other targets. However, it was the two end ships of the Togo detachment that were most seriously damaged - its flagship "Mikasa" and "Nissin", which, when turning, "all of a sudden" became the lead ship several times (113 and 95 casualties, respectively) 7 . In general, in the battles with both the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons, the most severely damaged ship of those remaining afloat in both fleets was the Japanese Mikasa. The greatest severity of the battle fell, as one would expect, on the share of the main forces. Kamimura's detachment of armored cruisers suffered significantly less damage than Togo's other ships. Knowing the relative weakness of the armor of his cruisers, Kamimura tried whenever possible to evade the fire of the Russian battleships. In general, the role of this. The "flying squad" in the Battle of Tsushima is usually greatly exaggerated.

It is much more difficult to determine the losses of the Russian squadron. The battleships "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino" and "Navarin" died very quickly, taking almost the entire crew to the bottom of the Korean Strait. It is impossible to document how many people on board were previously disabled by enemy shells. The issue of losses of the battleship Oslyabya is also not entirely clear. Among those rescued there are 68 wounded. It is difficult to say whether this figure is underestimated due to those victims who were wounded at the beginning of the battle and died along with the battleship, or, on the contrary, overestimated - due to those injured after death, in the water or after their rescue on the Donskoy and Bystroy. .

For the remaining Russian ships there is detailed data on losses in the daytime battle on May 14 (Table 5).

Armadillos:	Killed	Wounded
"Eagle"
"Sisoi the Great"
"Nicholas I"
"Admiral General Apraksin"
"Admiral Senyavin"
"Admiral Ushakov"
Armored cruisers
"Adm. Nakhimov"
Total:		264
Cruisers:
"Dmitry Donskoy"
"Vladimir Monomakh"
"Oleg"
"Aurora"
"Svetlana"
"Pearl"
"Emerald" "Diamond"		6 18
Total:		218

There were 9 killed and 38 wounded on the destroyers. The next day, in single battles with significantly superior enemy forces, "Admiral Ushakov", "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Buiny", "Grozny" and "Gromky" lost another 62 people killed and 171 wounded, but it is hardly fair to include these losses were the result of an artillery battle. This was no longer a fight. but just execution.

The most difficult thing remains - to estimate the losses of the battleships that died before the morning of May 15. "Navarin" was not too badly damaged in the daytime battle and had no more losses than the "Sisoi the Great" (66 people) or "Emperor Nicholas 1" (40 people) marching next to it in the ranks. Located closer to the head of the column than the "Eagle", the same type "Borodino" and "Emperor Alexander III" could have suffered slightly more from Japanese fire, but if we remember the possible total number of hits on Russian ships, it is unlikely that they received much more more shells. Undoubtedly, Rozhdestvensky's flagship, the Suvorov, suffered the most. At the very beginning of the battle he was under concentrated fire large number armadillos, and then throughout. During all 5 hours of the daytime battle, already being out of formation of the Russian squadron, he repeatedly served as a target for various Japanese detachments. It is not for nothing that Rozhdestvensky’s long-suffering flagship serves in naval historical literature as a symbol of a ship’s stability in battle. It is clear that the losses on it must be very large. However, until the very last torpedo attack, the Suvorov was controlled and even tried to fire. According to the experience of the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars, a ship that was “on its last legs” after an artillery battle and was about to sink, by that moment had lost no more than a third of its crew. This figure should be used to determine possible casualties on the Suvorov.

Putting the loss on" Alexandra III" and "Borodino" by 1.5 times, and on the "Suvorov" - 3 times more than on the "Orel", we can assume that they can in no way be underestimated. In this case, the flagship of the Russian squadron should have lose 370 people killed and wounded, or about 40% of the entire crew. Although the Oslyabya was under concentrated fire from 5 or 6 ships, it was for a very short time, and its losses could not significantly exceed the losses on the Orel, which was fired upon by the Japanese in within 5 hours. Summarizing, we get the total approximate figure for the losses of the Russian squadron from artillery fire at 1550 people. By detachment, losses, actual and expected, are distributed as follows: 1st armored detachment no more than 1000 people, 2nd armored detachment - 345 people , 3rd and armored detachment - 67 people, cruisers - 248 people, destroyers - 37. With a high degree of certainty, we can say that the total lies between 1500 and 2000 sailors and officers out of action, which is 2-3 times more than the Japanese losses .

Comparing the losses of the parties allows us to quantify all the visible and invisible advantages of the Japanese. They turn out to be not that significant. Since the artillery battle of ships is a typical example of a system with negative feedback, which is usually expressed by a peculiar formula - “an artillery battle feeds on itself,” the losses of each of the opponents are proportional to the residual combat power of the other - for one of the opponents to inflict twice as many losses, double superiority is not required . A simple calculation shows that if we consider the Japanese fleet to be 20% stronger before the battle, 8 which is obviously quite reasonable, then all other factors of the battle: tactical maneuvering, shooting success, quality of shells and protection, etc. - give a superiority coefficient of 1.5-1.7 in favor of the Japanese. This is quite a bit, given the almost continuous position of the coverage of the head of the Russian column and the rapid failure of the Oslyabi and Suvorov. Such a calculation, if it contains some inaccuracies, is in any case always not in favor of Russian weapons. which will create a certain “charge of strength” for all reasoning. It is likely that the picture should look noticeably better for Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. At least based on the results of losses in an artillery battle, Japanese gunners and Japanese shells cannot be considered significantly superior to Russian ones.

After such a conclusion, a completely reasonable question arises: where did such a complete defeat come from, and why the results of Tsushima are so strikingly different from the results of the battle in Yellow Mors. Here it is worth recalling some features of naval battles. Any battle has its own “turning point”, up to which one of the opponents, although suffering greater losses than the others, still has a certain ability to resist. Then the "potentially defeated" either retreats, saving his frustrated forces for the next fight, or suffers a complete defeat, and the more he is exposed to the enemy, the greater the losses he suffers - while causing less and less damage to his enemy. This feature of any process, in particular a combat encounter, is called “negative feedback.” The effect of this general law is also noticeable at sea: up to a certain point, the more damaged enemy keeps his ships afloat, even if in a damaged state. This is exactly what the battle of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the Yellow Sea was like. According to tradition, it is believed that the Arthurian squadron, well sailed and having better training, almost achieved victory in this battle. In reality, the Russians fired fewer shells at the enemy - about 550 10 and 12 inch shells versus 600 Japanese 12 inch shells, achieving far fewer hits. Although the most damaged ship of both squadrons was Togo's flagship Mikasa, the rest of the Japanese battleships, as well as the cruisers, suffered very little damage, while the Russians were “evenly” and heavily beaten. "Tsarevich", "Retvizan", "Peresvet", "Pobeda" and "Poltava" each received more than 20 hits; the appearance of "Askold", which lost 59 people, differed little from the appearance of the Russian cruisers after Tsushima. There is a version that Togo was just about ready to stop the fight himself. Even if such a thought did occur to him, there are a lot of completely reasonable considerations in favor of such a decision. There is nothing to suggest that he intended to end the entire battle this way. Togo really had to take care of his ships: Japan threw all its forces into action, while the Russian fleet could, at least theoretically, receive significant reinforcements. There was night ahead. Japanese destroyers had already taken up their positions between the Russian squadron and Vladivostok - a position that did not allow them to effectively attack the Russian ships returning to Port Arthur. It would be a different matter if the Arthurian squadron had to “push through” this curtain on a collision course. Togo still had an advantage in the process. Most likely, in the morning he would have appeared before the Russian squadron in full combat readiness, as happened on May 15, 1905! But... none of this happened. The “critical point” was not passed. Turning away from the enemy, the Russians, having successfully repelled torpedo attacks as they retreated, returned to Port Arthur and scattered to neutral ports. The damage was partially corrected the night after the battle. In any case, the cheerful assumption that the battleships of the 1st squadron were ready to go into battle the next day, if not entirely fair, is not so far from the truth.

The battle between Togo and Rozhestvensky looks completely different. In the very first minutes of the battle, the opponents inflicted heavy damage on each other. But the start of the battle turned out to be extremely unsuccessful for the Russians: the battleship Oslyabya received exactly the damage that caused it imminent death, and the flagship "Suvorov" lost control and left the formation. The Japanese immediately received a significant head start: their 12 ships were opposed by only 10, four of which (Nakhimov and coastal defense battleships) were significantly weaker than any Japanese ship. The subsequent hours of artillery battle inflicted more and more defeats on the ships of both sides, but due to its relative weakness, the Russian squadron suffered more and more.

But even after 5 hours of the Tsushima battle, the position of the Russians did not outwardly look tragic. Not only Russian, but also Japanese ships were significantly damaged - the Mikasa received 10 twelve-inch shells - twice as much as the Eagle. According to some reports, the Japanese flagship may not have even been informed that it was the Oslyabya that had sunk - this was visible only from the end ships of its squadron, and even then the sinking ship was mistaken for a Zhemchug-class cruiser. It is unlikely that Togo was satisfied with the results of the battle at that moment. 5 hours of almost continuous fire and only one sunken ship! Night was falling. Another half hour - and the Russian fleet would have received the desired respite. Some of the damage could be repaired, and the battered squadron would have at least some chance.

But a “turning point” has arrived. In half an hour, from 7 to 7.30 pm, the Alexander and Borodino, two of the newest Russian battleships, sank. The first of them apparently simply exhausted the further possibility of resisting the continuous impact of enemy fire. Most likely, the same fate would have befallen “Eagle” if the battle had dragged on for another half hour. The fate of the Borodino turned into a cruel irony of a naval battle: the last salvo of the Fuji, which had so happily escaped destruction two hours earlier, caused a severe fire in the 152-mm turret of the Russian battleship, which apparently resulted in the detonation of the charges. In any case, the death of Borodino in Packinham’s description is very reminiscent of the instant “departure from the scene” of the British battlecruisers.

Literally in those same minutes, the fate of “Suvorov” was decided. Deprived of its own artillery and squadron support, the ship was attacked by torpedoes literally at point-blank range and sunk.

However, the “critical point” does not arise on its own; it is carefully prepared by enemy fire. What are the reasons for the difficult state in which the Russian battleships found themselves in the fifth hour of the battle, if the number of hits from large-caliber shells on both sides was approximately the same?

To explain, it is enough to familiarize yourself with the number of medium and small caliber shells fired by the Japanese. Togo and Kamimura's 12 ships fired more than 1,200 eight-inch, 9,450 six-inch, and 7,500 three-inch shells at their targets! Even if we assume that the probability of a hit from main caliber guns exceeds the similar probability for 8- and 6-inch guns by 1.5-2 times, this means that Russian ships took hits from at least THOUSANDS of Japanese “gifts” weighing 113 and 45 kilograms! 9 Undoubtedly, this was the very path that prepared them for the onset of the “turning point” of the Tsushima battle.

The conclusions that naval experts made regarding medium-caliber guns are also not surprising, despite the seemingly significant results achieved with their help. It was the ability of battleships at the beginning of the century to “absorb” a large number of such shells that was one of the reasons for the appearance of “All-big-gun ships” - dreadnoughts. The ungrateful British considered that the role played by auxiliary artillery in Tsushima was clearly insufficient to achieve the maximum effect: Russian ships did not sink quickly enough. Their more conservative students expressed much greater "appreciation" for medium caliber guns, as did armored cruisers, continuing the construction of ships with similar weapons for several years after the battle in the Korea Strait. 10

Let's return to Tsushima: the outcome of the battle was a foregone conclusion, but Togo did not calm down. He did not want to repeat the mistake he had made the year before in the Yellow Sea. Continuous attacks by numerous Japanese destroyers continued throughout the night. And here the actions of Togo’s ships cannot be considered particularly successful: out of 54 torpedoes fired almost point-blank, only 4 or 5 hit. But this was enough - “Navarin” died with the entire crew, except for 3 people, and the “wounded wounded” “Sisoy”, “Nakhimov” " and "Monomakh" the next morning were caught individually and scuttled by teams. Togo’s significant superiority in speed allowed him to cut off all retreat routes for Nebogatov’s detachment, which had retained a semblance of organization, and which “Eagle” joined. One can argue for a long time about the decision of the last Russian commander in this sad battle, but one thing is certain: his ships would no longer be able to cause any damage to the enemy. The last of the Russian ships that continued to fight, the obsolete cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, withstood a fierce battle. In a battle with an entire detachment of Japanese cruisers and destroyers on the evening of May 15, he lost 80 people killed and wounded. The battle is over. Rarely in maritime history has a winner been able to so fully realize all his advantages, successfully avoiding a possible response.

Sources and literature

"Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905." (Work of the historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905 and the Naval General Staff), vol. 3, “Naval battle in the Yellow Sea”, Petrograd, 1915

-"-, vol. 7, "Tsushima Operation", Petrograd, 1917

"Conclusion of the investigative commission to clarify the circumstances of the Tsushima Battle", Petrograd, 1917

"Report on the case of the surrender of the detachment's ships on May 15, 1905 former admiral Nebogatova, St. Petersburg, 1907

V. Semenov, "Reckoning" (trilogy), part 2 "Battle of Tsushima", St. Petersburg, 1909

"Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji", vol. 4 "Actions against the 2nd Pacific Squadron", St. Petersburg, 1910

N.J.M. Campbell, "The Battle of Tsu-Shima", "Warship", N5-8, 1978

R. Hough, "The Fleet that Had to Die", London, 1963

N.F. Bush, "The Emperor's Sword", New-York, 1962

J.N.Westwood, "Witnesses of Tsushima", Tokyo, 1970

"Admiral Togo: A Memoir", Tokyo, 1934

E. Falk, "Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power", New-York, 1936

G.Laur, "Tsushima", St. Petersburg, 1911

G. Blond, "Admiral Togo", New-York, 1960

F.T.Jane, "The Imperial Japanese Navy", Calcutta, 1904

H.Jentschura, D.Jung, P.Mickel, "Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1869-1945", London, 1982<Комментарии редакции журнала "Наваль"

Retired captain 1st rank P.D. BYKOV

Preparation and march of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The first months of the Russo-Japanese War clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.

Underestimation of the enemy's strength and military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained dominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his representations and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was reconsidered with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, called the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that were nearing the end of construction, as well as some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was planned to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent problems, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of Chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Ship composition of the squadron

The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: “Alexander III”, “Prince Suvorov”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”, of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, the battleship “Eagle” did not have time to test large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which reached a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before leaving for the Far East, as they had to take on board increased supplies of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them that were not provided for in the original design. As a result, the draft was 0.9 m higher than designed, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of the ships. Of the other battleships, only Oslyabya belonged to the modern ships that had already sailed. But it was a weakly armored ship, which also had 256 mm guns instead of 305 mm.

The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Navarin” were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305 mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203 mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had very different armament, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the remaining ships were of outdated design.

The cruisers that were part of the squadron were even more diverse in their tactical and technical elements. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, the modern ones were “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald”. The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, “Svetlana” and “Dmitry Donskoy” were old ships, and “Almaz” was an armed yacht.

Of the cruisers, two - “Pearl” and “Emerald” - were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to assign five armed high-speed steamers to the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance ships - “Ural”, “Kuban”, “Terek”, “Rion” and “Dnepr”, which at different times joined the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very small. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Bravey”, “Bodriy”, “Bystryy”, “Bedovyy”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Loudy” and “Groznyy”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and reached a speed of no more than 26 knots.

Despite the fact that the decision to send a squadron was made in April, its formation and equipment took a very long time.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new ships and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

The majority of the squadron's personnel arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, on the ships of the squadron there were many young officers released early from the naval cadet corps due to the war, as well as called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “reserve warrant officers.” The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; others, although they had experience and knowledge of maritime affairs, did not have any military training. This staffing of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that there was only enough personnel to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.

Preparation and organization of the squadron

Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the entire squadron never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint voyages. Therefore, practice in joint swimming and maneuvering was insufficient. During the short period of stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to carry out a very limited number of firings, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. There was also not enough torpedo firing from destroyers. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, so during the first firing many torpedoes sank.

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationships and influence of detachment commanders on their subordinates and on the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with resolving various minor issues that could have been resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each one worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, when the squadron entered the theater of operations, it did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

Ensuring the transition of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that Russia did not have a single base of its own throughout its entire route (about 18,000 miles), was a very complex and difficult task.

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the commander of the squadron decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on the island. Madagascar. For greater safety of the transition, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the squadron’s entry into any specific ports, since this would make its route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the length of stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron’s anchorage, and the possibility of relations with the squadron en route, etc. Some private issues, such as the security of ships traveling through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, no diplomatic preparations for the transition were made.

Because of this, the transition of the squadron became extremely complicated due to protests from foreign countries when the squadron entered a particular port, a reduction in the stay period, and the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, since the time of arrival of the squadron to the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign companies in this.

Thus, the possibility of the squadron moving to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their fulfillment of contracts. As one would expect, such an organization of supplies could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on the island. Madagascar.

The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be made on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign companies. To repair ships en route, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop “Kamchatka”. This steamer and several other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

The news of the Russian government sending such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely to assume that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron’s movement, up to and including a direct attack on the squadron and acts of sabotage.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of protecting the squadron’s route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent who were supposed to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, nor provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, protecting the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the established organization for guarding the squadron along the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident during the squadron’s passage of the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hullic Incident.”

Departure of the squadron and the Gull incident

The completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the departure of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived in Revel and, after staying there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron set sail for the Far East. However, not all ships left on October 2. Two cruisers, some of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about suspicious ships spotted and about an allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were supposed to weigh anchor sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. The first two detachments were destroyers, the next two were cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to weigh anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Admiral Rozhestvensky considered this dismemberment of the squadron to be the most appropriate from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - the battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of them colliding at night, in case of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would have given the main forces, who were also marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhestvensky in no way met the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22:00. About 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment was approaching the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it was being attacked by destroyers.

As Dogger-bapka passed ahead of the detachment of battleships, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which were crossing the detachment’s course and approaching it. The squadron decided that the battleships were under attack and opened fire. But when the spotlights were turned on, it turned out that fishing boats had been shot. The fire was stopped. However, during the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were noticed, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots, it became clear that these were the Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the Aurora, two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel and arrived in Vigo (Spain) on October 13. Here the squadron stayed until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called “Hull Incident,” was resolved.

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which would worsen Russia's position in the Far East.

After the “Ghull Incident,” the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that arose, agreeing to compensate for losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

Transition of the squadron to the island. Madagascar

On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 arrived in Tangier (North Africa), where by this time the entire squadron was concentrated. Having loaded coal, provisions and taken on water, the squadron, according to the previously developed plan, was divided into two detachments. The battleships “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin”, together with the cruisers “Svetlana”, “Zhemchug”, “Almaz” and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, went through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to join the squadron again.

The voyage of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way took place without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships had reached their destination.

The remaining ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Orel”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. “Korea”, “Malaya” and “Meteor”, led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stopover along the way, and coal loading was carried out on the open sea. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of one thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To accept such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in living decks, cockpits, mine artillery batteries and other places, which extremely constrained the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in intense heat on the ocean swell and waves was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus, the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, were left without rest. Moreover, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were filled with coal, it was impossible to conduct any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment arrived in Madagascar. Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron united in Nosi-be Bay (west coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stay. Here the squadron stayed from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.

3. Complications in the further supply of fuel to the squadron.

The situation at the time of the squadron's arrival in Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The defeat of the Russian Manchurian Army and the 1st Pacific Squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in the ruling spheres of Russia. By getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not come true. Defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur are what the war brought Russia instead of the desired victory.

The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron the 2nd Pacific Squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of the squadron's further movement, since after Russia lost Port Arthur the squadron was forced to move. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that due to the changed strategic situation, the squadron’s immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had completely failed. In this regard, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov in Madagascar.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud” and destroyers “Gromky” and “Grozny”, was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after Rozhestvensky left. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship “Nikolai I”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov” and the old armored cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. “Nicholas I” was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305 mm guns. Coastal defense battleships were armed with 256 mm guns, which, although long-range, were not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

When Rozhdestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government’s point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he looked at only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not have time to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in the battles so quickly, Rozhdestvensky hoped that he would still be able to break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with coal supplies delayed the squadron's departure for almost two months.

Unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative impact on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had noticeably decreased by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting commanding officers and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells did not make it possible to make up for the most important deficiency—teaching the squadron to shoot. The Irtysh transport, which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libau. There was an accident on it and it was abandoned for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified about this. After the repairs were completed, the Irtysh set out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of much-needed ammunition for firing training en route. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The squadron's joint maneuvering showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and stay on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained as before unprepared for the task.

On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not communicate his further route in order to achieve secrecy of the transition. And at this time, the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which had left Libau in February, was en route to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, knew where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Along the way, coal was accepted six times on the open sea. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, dropped anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, where the ships had to carry out repairs, load coal and accept materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, it was joined by the 3rd Pacific Squadron.

The stops in Cam Ranh Bay and then in Van Phong Bay were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, and on the other, a Japanese attack could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which, citing poor health, he asked to be replaced by another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.

Transition from Indochina to the Korea Strait

After the addition of Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment, the 2nd Pacific Squadron moved on on May 1. Admiral Rozhdestvensky considered the squadron’s immediate task to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was supposed to develop actions against the Japanese fleet.

The squadron could enter the Sea of ​​Japan through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperuzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to choose the shortest route through the Korean Strait, the widest and deepest of all the others. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, and besides, the strait could be mined (the depths allowed this). The passage through the Strait of La Perouse in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky due to the prevailing fogs, navigational difficulties and lack of coal for this longer passage.

The decision to go through the Korean Strait created the most favorable conditions for the battle for the Japanese fleet, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting the Japanese, but still the latter would have been in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would have been able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers “Rion” and “Dnepr” were sent to the Yellow Sea, separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest trading port, connected by telegraph cables to all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freed from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were the battleships - 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhestvensky flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (Felkerzam’s flag), “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - “Nikolai I” (Nebogatov’s flag), coastal defense battleships “Apraksin”, “Senyavin”, “Ushakov”, cruisers “Oleg” (Enkvist flag), “Aurora”, “Dmitry Donskoy” , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers “Svetlana” (the pennant of captain 1st rank Shein), “Almaz” and “Ural”, walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cabins. from the squadron. The cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald” stayed on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron walked in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, tugs Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships “Orel” and “Kostroma” were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The progress of the squadron was determined by the progress of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; On hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate Red Cross signs.

In this order, the squadron approached the Korean Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming steamships, only one was detained; the rest were not even inspected. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full lighting. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any kind of secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korean Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet there. In addition, he believed that the deployment of reconnaissance officers would only help the enemy detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that given the Japanese superiority in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by reconnaissance to perform any maneuver.

Refusal of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s reference to the desire to maintain the secrecy of the squadron’s movement does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily have been detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.

There was no compelling justification for leaving six transports with the squadron, since they did not carry any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their defense. In addition, the presence of the low-speed transport Irtysh reduced squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance of the enemy, and did not speed up the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13–14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships included in the squadron, its marching order was very complex. The squadron marched in formation of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; The masthead lights were extinguished. On hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron, all lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, whose proximity it knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhestvensky was on the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov”. The junior flagships, rear admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were: the first on the battleship “Nicholas I”, and the second on the cruiser “Oleg”. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that were part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were the 4 new Borodino-class battleships. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and heavy overloading of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship Oslyabya was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery (Oslyabya was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoi the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all the ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the characteristics of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

From a comparison of these figures it is clear that the Japanese ships were better armored and had greater speed. The artillery on Japanese ships had a rate of fire twice as high as that of the Russians, which allowed the Japanese to fire a significantly larger number of shells per minute.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosive, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones in terms of high-explosive effect. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimoza) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that Japanese ships were significantly superior to Russian ships in terms of artillery preparation, and also that Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than Japanese ships (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. The Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers against 9 Russians. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various types of obsolete and auxiliary ships.

When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base in Mozampo. The fleet commander, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between the island. Kvelpart and the Goto Island group.

About 2 o'clock. 25 min. The auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the patrol chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began preparing for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the spot where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken positions around her. At 5 o'clock. all warships went to the places assigned according to deployment near the island. Okinoshima.

The Russian squadron, based on the intensive work of Japanese telegraph stations, concluded that it had been discovered, however, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempts to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, sailing on a course parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Counting, ; Because the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to fire successfully, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might encounter superior Japanese forces in the fog.

Day fight May 14

On the morning of May 14, the weather was hazy, visibility 5-7 miles, wind 3-1. At 7 o'clock. Admiral Rozhestvensky ordered the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment to take places in the rear and cover the transports. Thus, he not only did not interfere with Japanese reconnaissance, but he himself voluntarily abandoned it and walked forward, not knowing where the enemy was. At 9 o'clock The armored detachments formed into one wake column, with 4 new battleships in front. The transports and the cruisers covering them came from the right behind. Japanese scouts remained in sight of the squadron all the time. At 12 o'clock the squadron set course 23°. Then Admiral Rozhdestvensky made an attempt to deploy the squadron into the front line.

Having no doubt that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data about its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for a corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, using the finding stripes of fog, to shoot down the enemy’s crews. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding began, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Without finishing the started rebuilding, Rozhdestvensky raised the cancellation signal. The squadron found itself in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.

Since the movement of the Russian squadron continued to take place in front of Japanese reconnaissance officers, Admiral Togo had all the information about the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and formations. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of his advantage in speed, he crossed its course. At the same time, the light cruisers were supposed to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.

At 1 p.m. 30 min. from the Russian squadron, on the right bow, the Japanese fleet was discovered, heading to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This restructuring was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the left side of the Russian squadron, began to make a consistent turn to the left in order to cross its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a risky position. Turning successively at 24 points, they described a loop almost in one place, without being able to shoot.

At the moment of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and Togo’s flagship, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron “Suvorov” opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity to strike the enemy’s lead ships at the very beginning of the battle. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in one wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a distance favorable to them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire from Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.

Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this time had decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nicholas I. Having an advantage in progress, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, entering its head.

Japanese artillery caused great destruction on Russian ships; The two flagships especially suffered. At 2 p.m. 25 min. The battleship Oslyabya, having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes capsized and sank. At 2 p.m. 30 min. Due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov was disabled to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The lead was the battleship "Alexander III", which, not knowing why the "Suvorov" was out of action, first followed it, but then turned left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were on the right of the Russians.

This was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which had no battle plan and was now also deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried to somehow get through to Vladivostok.

Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” to the opposite course in order to again reach the head of the Russian squadron. At the moment of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned behind the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle temporarily stopped. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. Each time the Japanese crossed the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.

At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. The fog again thickened so much that the battle stopped. The Russian squadron, now with Borodino as its lead, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers headed south. Russian battleships, following south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off Japanese cruisers. With their fire they drove away the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that it had to go to the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. “Borodino,” and behind it the entire squadron, gradually turned north.

At 6 p.m. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, walking on an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cabs from a distance. fire on “Borodino” and “Alexander III”. The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer “Buiny” was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was located, photographed together with his headquarters at about 17:00. from “Suvorov”. The signal was raised on the destroyer to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not noticed on “Nicholas I”, and therefore at about 19:00. The destroyer Bezuprechny approached him, from which Rozhdestvensky’s order was transmitted to lead the squadron to Vladivostok.

Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. At about 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. "Alexander III" capsized and died at 19:00. 10 min. “Borodino” died in the same way. At 7 p.m. 10 min. Japanese destroyers attacked the broken Suvorov and sank it.

The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun set, dusk was coming, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships north, to about. Evenlet, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that Russian ships would go this way. He sent destroyers for night attacks against Russian ships.

During the daytime battle, the Russian cruisers, following the orders of Admiral Rozhestvensky, stayed close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron had absolutely no idea where the Japanese fleet had gone.

In the growing darkness, Japanese destroyers were visible from the Russian squadron approaching from the north, east and south, and only in the southwest was it clear.

Admiral Nebogatov, who took command of the squadron at this time, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the southwest in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and walked ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their positions.

This ended the day's battle. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships received heavy damage.

Of the Japanese ships, the cruiser Kasagi, which was out of action, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, Admiral Togo's flagship battleship Mikasa was the most damaged, being hit by more than thirty shells. The inside of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Shikishima. The Nissin suffered several hits to its gun turrets, destroying three large guns and demolishing part of the bridge. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship; Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.

The battleships Fiji and the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This day of battle was replete with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. Thus, artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the “Sisoi the Great” caused a large fire on the Japanese cruiser “Iwate” with a successful hit from a shell. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the sailor of the 1st class, Molokov, when the ship’s magazine with ammunition was flooded, took turns diving into the water and taking out shells. The helmsman of the cruiser “Oleg” Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich promptly noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was heading in the wake, was also “warned by signalmen from Oleg” and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser “Aurora” wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: “Our teams behaved in battle above all praise. Every sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of the explosion. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. They didn’t even go to bandages! You send it, and they say, “It’ll be in time, later, now there’s no time!” It was only thanks to the dedication of the crew that we forced the Japanese cruisers to retreat, sinking two of their ships and putting four out of action, with a large list.” What the officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but also for all the ships of the Russian squadron.

Battle on the night of May 14-15

With the onset of darkness, the Japanese launched a series of attacks, using all their destroyer forces - about 40 large and small destroyers. The attack began at about 21 o'clock and lasted until 23 o'clock, when the Japanese destroyers lost sight of the Russian squadron. Four Russian ships were hit, and one of them was killed. Repelling attacks and dodging Japanese destroyers, the Russian ships lost each other and subsequently acted independently.

Only Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment held together, with which the only surviving new battleship “Eagle” and the cruiser “Izumrud” were sailing. Having retreated to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 21 o'clock to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded attacks from destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment found itself surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without offering any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered his ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser “Emerald”, having heard the signal of surrender, gave full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed towards Vladivostok. On the way there, he entered Vladimir Bay, where he ran into rocks and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team arrived in Vladivostok by land.

The cruising detachment led by the cruiser “Oleg”, evading Japanese destroyers, went south. Some of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.

Only the cruisers Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug remained united. They walked south all night and in the morning they found themselves south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to independently break through to Vladivostok, tentatively decided to call at a neutral port to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.

The remaining Russian ships sailed in single order. The ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron, repelling attacks from destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.

The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, at night only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo; the rest survived on the water until the morning and were then destroyed by their crews.

On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or escape, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.

The destroyer “Grozny”, traveling together with “Bedov”, seeing that the latter raised the signal of surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Having entered into battle with him, “Grozny” caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop pursuing him. Without a compass, with serious damage, “Grozny” nevertheless arrived in Vladivostok.

Around the same time that “Grozny” was fighting, the battleship “Admiral Ushakov” died valiantly. This old ship, due to damage received in the day's battle, fell behind and was heading north alone. At 5 p.m. 30 min. Two Japanese armored cruisers approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay, opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 6 p.m. 10 minutes, when all the combat reserves were used up, by order of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.

Somewhat later, at about 7 p.m., the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching the island. Dazhelet was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite this inequality of forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of the island. It even flies. The Japanese ships lost it and retreated to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage it received in this battle was so significant that the Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was scuttled at great depths, and the crew was brought ashore.

In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the 2nd rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, having been separated from the squadron, evaded the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. This was all that remained of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Results of the battle

In the Battle of Tsushima, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, the rottenness of the autocracy and the disastrousness of its policies were fully revealed. Tsushima went down in history as an ominous monument to tsarism. At the same time, Tsushima serves as a symbol of the courage and greatness of Russian sailors. They, despite enormous difficulties, carried out the first 220-day voyage of an entire squadron in the history of the fleets from the Baltic through the North Sea, the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans, covering 18,000 miles.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the ships in the squadron were outdated, the shells were poor, and the incompetent tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They heroically and selflessly fought the Japanese.

This battle completely revealed the incompetence of the squadron's high command.

1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who ignored all the experience of the battles at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.

2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to get to Vladivostok one way or another.

3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet caught the Russian squadron having not completed its combat formation.

4) Battle management and transfer of command were not organized.

5) The Russian squadron entered the battle at a disadvantage; only the lead ships could fire.

6) The combination of new and old ships in one wake column was impractical, since it made it impossible to fully use the most powerful ships.

7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to encircle the head.

8) The incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron helped the Japanese destroyers successfully attack the Russians.

9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having completed a seven-month journey.

Regarding the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:

1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modernly equipped, faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.

2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.

However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in battle.

1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized; the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main forces of the Russians, being carried away by the battle with transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships were separated from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.

2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. Admiral Nebogatov's maneuver confused their crews, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.

The results of the attacks show insufficient preparation of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three hit the same ship.

conclusions

1) The Battle of Tsushima was decided by artillery weapons, the growth of which during the war was expressed: a) in the transition to new shooting methods, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire from several ships at one target; b) in the use of new high-explosive shells of considerable force, which caused enormous destruction in the unarmored parts of the ship and caused large fires.
2) In the Battle of Tsushima, an attempt was made to use torpedoes in daylight combat. Although it did not have serious results, it led to the further development of this issue. The destructive effect of torpedoes turned out to be insufficient. Only one ship was killed by torpedoes.
3) The battle at Tsushima confirmed the previously identified need for the success of an attack to point destroyers at the enemy. At the same time, the need was confirmed. refusal to use searchlights when repelling an attack by destroyers.
4) The Battle of Tsushima showed the need to strengthen the freeboard armor in order to provide the ships with the necessary combat stability.

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a huge impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for a favorable outcome were completely destroyed.

The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.