The perfect operation. How did the Soviet special forces take Amin's palace. Time "h" for country "a" - And as for Amin himself

In the late 70s, Afghanistan was in a severe fever. The country entered a period of coups, successful and unsuccessful uprisings, and political upheavals. In 1973 Mohammed Daoud brought down the old Afghan monarchy. Daoud tried to maneuver between the interests of the USSR and the states of the Middle East, during his reign there is a period of difficult relations with the Soviet Union. Since the time of Khrushchev, the USSR has maintained rather warm relations with this country, Soviet technical and military specialists worked in Afghanistan, and the country was provided with all kinds of support. However, the USSR was inevitably drawn into the internal intricacies of local politics.

Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud (center) with his wife (right). Photo: © RIA Novosti / Yuri Abramochkin

Daoud sat on bayonets and fought simultaneously with Islamic fundamentalists and left-wing radicals from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Moscow did not put all its eggs in one basket and, in addition to official contacts, secretly cooperated with the PDPA. Against the backdrop of general instability in the country, the PDPA decided to take power in the same way as Daoud - through a coup. In April 1978, the "People's Democrats" staged a coup. Daoud died in a brief but bloody clash, and the left took over the country. It was then that the future dictator Hafizullah Amin came to the fore. In the new government, he received the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

First casualties

The USSR officially supported the revolution, but in reality Moscow was not so clear-cut about what was happening. First, the development of events took Soviet diplomats and statesmen by surprise. Even Brezhnev learned about what had happened from the press. Secondly, and much worse, the PDPA was internally divided into two warring factions, and in addition, the members of the PDPA were with the fervor of neophytes regarding the teachings of Marx. Reforms, even reasonable in concept, were carried out rudely, uncompromisingly, without taking into account local traditions. In the spring of 1979, an anti-government rebellion took place in Herat, and at least two Soviet citizens were killed.

First Soviet officer who died in Afghanistan in the 70s was Nikolai Bizyukov, a military adviser. The crowd tore him apart. There could have been more victims, but the local officer Shahnavaz Tanai and the Soviet military Stanislav Katichev sent a detachment of government troops to protect Soviet citizens. Although the Herat rebellion was the first time Soviet citizens were killed, it was only the first of a series of performances. In Afghanistan, a civil war broke out between the opposition and the government. After that, there was talk of involving Soviet troops in ensuring security in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Afghan leader Taraki offered to use Soviet troops with Afghan signs on their equipment to help the government. The Afghan government went into a panic. Then the Politburo refused to send troops, the Afghans received only weapons. However, already in the spring, the formation of the famous military unit of the Afghan war, the Muslim battalion of the GRU, began.

Soviet troops in the mountains of Afghanistan. Photo: © RIA Novosti / Vladimir Vyatkin

Musbat was formed from the natives of the Asian republics of the USSR. Many Tajiks and Uzbeks live in Afghanistan, so that during operations "across the river" the soldiers of this battalion would not be conspicuous. At the same time, a group of special forces of the KGB "Zenit" arrived in Afghanistan to carry out particularly delicate tasks to ensure security. Both units were to play a huge role in the events of 1979. A battalion of paratroopers also arrived in Afghanistan to guard the key Bagram airport. The Soviet Union gradually moved towards direct intervention in local affairs. However, so far the activities of the military have not been advertised.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Afghan government has escalated to the limit. Internal squabbles led to a quarrel between two key figures of the PDPA: Nur Mohammad Taraki, the head of state, and Amin, who gradually came to the fore. On September 14, 1979, the bodyguards of Taraki and Amin started a shootout. Attempts by the Soviet embassy to reconcile these figures failed. Amin accused Taraki - and at the same time the Soviet ambassador - of an attempt on his person. Then, on the orders of Amin, Taraki was arrested and soon killed, and Amin himself proclaimed himself the leader of the PDPA and the head of Afghanistan. Several of Taraki's associates were evacuated by KGB officers.

From left to right: Nur Muhammad Taraki and Amin Hafizullah. Photo: © Wikipedia.org Creative Commons

After that, events developed rapidly. Amin showed himself to be an unreliable and uncontrollable partner. In addition, he immediately got in touch with Washington and began some negotiations with the United States. The Soviet secret services were sure that, of course, the CIA itself did not confirm or deny anything about Amin's work for the CIA, and for obvious reasons it was no longer possible to ask Amin. Be that as it may, in the USSR, the threat of Afghanistan moving into the enemy camp was taken more than seriously. Moreover, the new foreign minister directly accused the Soviet secret services of attempting to assassinate Amin.

Contacts between the USSR and Afghanistan had not yet been severed, but such grave and absurd public accusations infuriated Moscow incredibly. Moreover, Taraki was appreciated, he had a warm relationship with Brezhnev personally, and such a turn made Amin an enemy of the USSR. Amin simply yelled at the Soviet diplomats who came to protest. In addition, opposition detachments, tacitly supported by the United States, quickly increased their zone of influence. Therefore, in Moscow they decided that it was necessary to hurry. Thus began the preparation of one of the most famous special operations Soviet Union.

Amin's Palace

The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979. After that, Amin was doomed, but, oddly enough, he himself did not know about it. Probably, Amin still assumed the opportunity to receive additional preferences from the USSR and retain power. Even before that, army and KGB officers went to Afghanistan to develop the operation. The destruction of Amin was only part of a larger plan - the Soviet troops were to take control of all of Kabul.

Soviet troops on the street of Kabul, Afghanistan

The Muslim battalion of the GRU flew into the city. He was to act in conjunction with the KGB detachment "Zenith" (later it will become widely known as "Vympel"). On Soviet territory at this time, the armada of the combined arms army was unfolding. The entry into the territory of Afghanistan was scheduled for December 25. By the time the main forces arrived in Afghanistan, Amin should have already been neutralized.

Meanwhile, Amin seemed to sense that the clouds were gathering. The dictator moved the residence from a building in the center of Kabul to the outskirts, to the Taj Beck Palace. This capital building, if necessary, was not easy to destroy even with artillery fire. In total, Amin's security was provided by more than two thousand people. The roads leading to the building, except for one, were mined, guns, machine guns and even several dug-in tanks were included in the defensive perimeter.

The nerves of all participants in the events were heated to the limit. Airborne paratroopers were already landing in Kabul. In addition, another KGB unit appeared on the scene, assigned to the role of Amin's gravediggers: the Thunder squad. Under this name, the officers of the Alpha unit were hiding. In general, they planned to storm the palace with the forces of "Thunder", "Zenith" (a total of 54 people), the Muslim battalion and the company of the Airborne Forces.

The attackers were armed with "Shilka" installations - quadruple self-propelled automatic guns. Actually, the main task - the direct capture of the palace - was carried out by KGB special groups led by Colonel Grigory Boyarinov. Shortly before the assault, Yuri Drozdov, a high-ranking KGB intelligence officer, visited the palace. Drozdov sketched the floor plans. At this time, the KGB officers who lodged in the building left the palace under a plausible pretext. Meanwhile, the anti-aircraft gunners did not waste time: two commanders conducted reconnaissance.

From left to right: USSR Major General Yury Drozdov and KGB colonel, Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Boyarinov. Photo: © Wikipedia.org Creative Commons

Interestingly, the KGB hoped to eliminate Amin in some simpler way. However, the attempt to poison the ruler failed: the Soviet doctors, who did not know anything about intelligence plans, managed to pump out Amin and everyone who had tasted the poison. The only thing left to do was to act fast and hard.

On the evening of the 27th, the Soviet military advanced to their cherished goal. The Soviet military were dressed in unmarked Afghan uniforms. The first victims were sentries, who were shot by snipers. Subgroup "Zenith" blew up the communication center. Then the Shilka opened fire. However, the fire on the thick walls did not bring almost any benefit. The fire of automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 and two more "shilok" turned out to be much more effective. The grenade launchers and anti-aircraft gunners did not try to destroy the palace, but barracks cut off the barracks from heavy weapons that could be used by the guards. On the way, one of the assault groups stumbled upon Afghans from the security battalion who were building. The officer in charge of the battalion was rounded up, after which the disorganized soldiers were scattered.

At this time, a specially assigned small group of soldiers captured the tanks. Crews were never able to get to the cars. However, the guards quickly came to their senses and now desperately fought back. The armored personnel carriers of the assault groups came under heavy machine gun fire. Two vehicles were seriously damaged, one armored personnel carrier overturned into a ditch. Because of this, the already few shock group under the walls of the palace even decreased. However, the "shilki" continued to shoot, and their support was unexpectedly effective. One of the installations hit the machine gun, which prevented them from breaking into the building, so the soldiers made their way to the first floor and began to sweep. By this time, many were already wounded, including Colonel Boyarinov, who commanded the assault.

Because of the darkness and stone chips, the white bandages that were supposed to help identification could no longer be useful. The only "friend or foe" system was a furious mate. At this time, another group made its way to the palace along the serpentine. Due to poor coordination of communications, their own did not know their own, and the "shilka" of fire support, along with the Afghans, burned down a friendly infantry fighting vehicle. However, both detachments of KGB special forces eventually rushed into the building.

The commandos of the Muslim battalion of the GRU and the paratroopers blocked and captured the guard barracks. Agees and "shilki" drove the soldiers inside, did not let them out, and the assault groups captured the stunned Afghans. Resistance was weak: the enemy was completely stunned. The number of prisoners exceeded the number of soldiers in the assault groups. The tank column that appeared on the road was shot with anti-tank missiles and the crews were captured. More dangerous was the situation with the anti-aircraft division. Some gunners broke through to the guns, and the special forces took the battery literally from the wheels, breaking into it in armored vehicles.

How Amin himself died is not exactly known. The body was found at the bar. According to one version, he ran out to meet the special forces in civilian clothes, but with a pistol in his hands - and was immediately shot dead. According to another - he just sat on the floor, waiting for his fate, and was hit by a grenade fragment. Interestingly, Taraki's dignitaries also arrived in the armored personnel carrier of the assault group, who now assumed heroic poses over the body of the dictator.

Some of Amin's relatives also died in battle, however, contrary to popular legend, the special forces spared everyone who could be spared. In total, up to 1,700 people were captured that evening. Nevertheless, civilian casualties could not be avoided. Among others, Amin's 11-year-old son died. “When there is a battle, you are met with automatic and machine-gun fire, everything is burning and exploding around, it is impossible to see where the children are,” Rustam Tursunkulov, the commander of one of the Musbat assault groups, noted. The murdered dictator was wrapped in a carpet and buried without a grave.

WITH Soviet side during the storming of the palace and fighting with the guards, five in the Muslim battalion, five in the KGB special forces were killed. Among the dead was Colonel Boyarinov. Also, by a tragic accident, the military doctor who treated Amin died. The exact number of deaths of the palace guards is unknown, but probably more than two hundred people died. The whole operation lasted 43 minutes, although one of the guard units fought back for some more time and went into the mountains.

In a similar scenario, key facilities in Kabul were captured. It is interesting that the inhabitants reacted sluggishly to these events: they had already become accustomed to the civil turmoil and the shooting that accompanies it. On the other hand, the political prisoners rejoiced noisily, for whom they not only opened the gates, but also drove buses to take them away from prison. In the meantime, the victors almost lost their entire command at once. The fact is that the officers of the army and the KGB moved around Kabul in Amin's captured Mercedes. A young paratrooper stood in the guard of the General Staff, who, without understanding, fired a burst.

Luckily, he missed, only shooting through the body of the car with several bullets. The reconnaissance general Drozdov approached the lieutenant who came running to shoot and said only: "Thank you, son, for not teaching your soldier to shoot." At this time, doctors fought over the victims of those who were taught to shoot. Assistance was provided to both the Soviet military and the Afghans. Later, the participants in the assault noted the highest qualifications of doctors: of those Soviet soldiers who were dragged to the doctors alive, no one died - although there were dozens of wounded in the assault groups. The Afghans were also operated on mostly successfully, among others, the eldest daughter Amin and her grandson were saved.

The next morning, Afghanistan woke up with a new government. Babrak Karmal, who was forced to emigrate under Amin, became the head of state.

The book "100 Great Military Secrets" in no way claims to be an encyclopedia on the history of wars and the art of war. One should not expect from it a detailed presentation of the entire military-political history of mankind. The book contains exactly one hundred essays arranged in chronological order and dedicated to various military events - turning points, famous, little-known or completely unknown. All of them, to one degree or another, are shrouded in a veil of secrecy and still do not have an unambiguous assessment, which is so characteristic of mass consciousness. Reality never fits into a simplified scheme, because it is always multifaceted. It is on this principle of versatility that this collection is built, dedicated to military conflicts, operations, campaigns and battles, both those that took place in ancient times and those that are taking place today. It tells about the great commanders, heroes and ordinary soldiers who survived the triumph of victories, the bitterness of defeat and betrayal.

STORM OF AMIN'S PALACE

STORM OF AMIN'S PALACE

By the time the Kremlin gave the command to eliminate Afghan President Hafizullah Amin, the Soviet leadership decided to put an end to the "Afghan problem" once and for all. The Soviet Union felt that, thanks to the efforts of the US CIA, it could very soon completely lose its influence in Afghanistan, and this would not lead to the realization of an old dream that had haunted Russia since imperial times. However, if earlier, in imperial times, it was about getting access to the southern seas, now, although, perhaps, this was also not lost sight of, we still had to be content with less grandiose plans - ensuring the security of the southern borders.

In 1978, a coup d'etat took place in Afghanistan, after which the People's Democratic Party led by Taraki came to power. But very soon a civil war broke out in the country. The opponents of the authorities loyal to Moscow, the radical Islamist Mujahideen, who enjoy the support of a considerable number of the population, were rapidly advancing towards Kabul. In the situation that had arisen, Taraki conjured the entry of Soviet troops into his country. Otherwise, he blackmailed Moscow with the fall of his regime, which would unequivocally lead the USSR to the loss of all positions in Afghanistan.

However, in September, Taraki was unexpectedly overthrown by his colleague Amin, dangerous for Moscow because he was an unprincipled usurper of power, ready to easily change his external patrons.

At the same time, the political situation around Afghanistan was heating up. In the late 1970s, during cold war» The CIA was actively involved in creating a "New Great Ottoman Empire with the inclusion of the southern republics of the USSR. According to some reports, the Americans even intended to deploy the Basmachi movement in Central Asia in order to later access the uranium of the Pamirs. In the south of the Soviet Union, there was no reliable air defense system, which, if American Pershing missiles were deployed in Afghanistan, would endanger many vital facilities, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iran to create nuclear weapons. And besides, the Kremlin received information that the President of Afghanistan, Amin, may be collaborating with the CIA ...

Under such conditions, the USSR decided to rather rudely interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which, as time has shown, was a big and unforgivable mistake in the policy of the last ten to fifteen years of its existence. The Afghan problem should have been solved exclusively through diplomatic and economic means.

Even before the final decision was made - and it took place in early December 1979 - to eliminate the president of Afghanistan, the so-called "Muslim" battalion of 700 people had already arrived in Kabul in November. It was formed a few months earlier from special forces soldiers who were of Asian origin or simply looked like Asians. The soldiers and officers of the battalion wore the Afghan military uniform. Officially, their goal was to protect the Afghan dictator Hafizullah Amin, whose residence was in the Taj Beck Palace in the southwestern part of Kabul. Amin, on whose life several attempts had already been made, feared only his fellow tribesmen. Therefore, the Soviet soldiers seemed to him the most reliable support. They were placed near the palace. But in the early days of December 1979, the battalion command received a secret order from Moscow: to prepare to seize the most important government offices in Kabul and to suppress possible resistance to the coup from the side. Afghan army and the police.

In addition to the "Muslim" battalion, special groups of the KGB of the USSR, subordinate to foreign intelligence, and a detachment of the GRU of the General Staff were transferred to Afghanistan. At the request of Amin, it was planned to bring a "limited contingent" of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The Afghan army already had Soviet military advisers. Amin was treated exclusively by Soviet doctors. All this gave a special character to the event to overthrow and eliminate him.

The security system of the Taj Beck Palace was - with the help of our advisers - organized carefully and thoughtfully, taking into account all its engineering features and the nature of the surrounding area, which made it difficult for attackers. Inside the palace, the guards of H. Amin, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, served. In their free time from service in the palace, they lived in the immediate vicinity of the palace, in an adobe house, and were constantly on alert. The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which had four sentries armed with machine guns, grenade launchers and machine guns. The outer ring of protection was provided by three motorized rifle and tank battalions of the security brigade. On one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were dug in, which could shoot through the area adjacent to the palace with direct fire. There were two and a half thousand people in the security brigade. In addition, anti-aircraft and construction regiments were located nearby.

The operation to eliminate Amin itself was code-named "Storm-333". The scenario of the coup looked like this: on day X, the fighters of the “Muslim” battalion, taking advantage of the fact that outwardly they are indistinguishable from the Afghan military, captured the general headquarters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Puli-Charkhi prison, where thousands of Amin’s opponents were kept, a radio station and telephone nodes, some other objects. At the same time, an assault group of 50 people, staffed by KGB foreign intelligence special forces officers (Grom and Zenit groups), breaks into Amin's palace and eliminates the latter. At the same time, two divisions of the Airborne Forces (103rd and 104th) landed at the Bagram airfield, which is the main base of the Afghan Air Force, which completely took control of the base and sent several battalions to Kabul to help the "Muslim" battalion. Tanks and armored personnel carriers at the same time Soviet army launch an invasion of Afghanistan across the state border.

Preparations for hostilities to capture the palace were headed by V.V. Kolesnik, E.G. Kozlov, O.L. Shvets, Yu.M. Drozdov. The matter was complicated by the lack of a plan for the palace, which our advisers had not bothered to draw up. In addition, they could not weaken its defenses for reasons of conspiracy, but on December 26 they managed to lead scouts-saboteurs into the palace, who carefully examined everything and made up its floor plan. Special Forces officers conducted reconnaissance of firing points at the nearest heights. Scouts conducted round-the-clock surveillance of the Taj Beck Palace.

By the way, while a detailed plan for storming the palace was being developed, units of the Soviet 40th Army crossed the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This happened at 3:00 pm on December 25, 1979.

It was impossible to launch an assault without capturing the dug-in tanks, which held all the approaches to the palace at gunpoint. To capture them, 15 people and two snipers from the KGB were allocated.

In order not to arouse suspicion ahead of time, the “Muslim” battalion began to carry out diversionary actions: shooting, going out on alarm and occupying established defense sectors, deployment, etc. At night, flares were fired. Because of the severe frost, the engines of armored personnel carriers and military vehicles were warmed up so that they could be started immediately on a signal. At first, this caused concern to the command of the palace guard brigade. But they were reassured, explaining that the usual training was going on, and rockets were being launched to exclude the possibility of a surprise attack by the Mujahideen on the palace. The "exercises" continued on the 25th, 26th and the first half of the day on December 27th.

On December 26, in order to establish closer relations in the “Muslim” battalion, a reception was held for the command of the Afghan brigade. They ate and drank a lot, toasted combat commonwealth, for the Soviet-Afghan friendship ...

Immediately before the storming of the palace, the KGB special group blew up the so-called "well" - the central node of the palace's secret connection with the most important military and civilian facilities in Afghanistan.

The advisers who were in the Afghan units received different tasks: some had to stay in the units for the night, organize a dinner for the commanders (for this they were given alcohol and food) and in no case prevent the Afghan troops from speaking out against the Soviet ones. Others, on the contrary, were ordered not to stay in the units for a long time. Only specially trained people remained.

Unsuspecting Amin expressed his joy at the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and ordered the Chief of General Staff Mohammed Yakub to establish cooperation with their command. Amin arranged a dinner for members of the Politburo and ministers. Later he was going to appear on television.

However, this was prevented by one strange circumstance. Some participants of the dinner were suddenly drawn to sleep, some lost consciousness. "Disconnected" and Amin himself. His wife raised the alarm. Doctors were called from the Afghan hospital and from the clinic of the Soviet embassy. Products and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination, Uzbek chefs were arrested. What was it? Most likely, a strong, but not a lethal dose of sleeping pills, in order to literally "lull" the vigilance of Amin and his entourage. Although who knows...

Perhaps this was the first, but failed attempt to eliminate Amin. Then there would be no need to storm the palace and dozens and hundreds of lives would be saved. But one way or another, Soviet doctors prevented this. There was a whole group of them - five men and two women. They immediately diagnosed "mass poisoning" and immediately began to provide assistance to the victims. Doctors, colonels of the medical service V. Kuznechenkov and A. Alekseev, fulfilling the Hippocratic oath and not knowing that they were violating someone's plans, set about saving the president.

Why did this happen to doctors? Well, if there really was a plan to eliminate Amin by poisoning, then the person who took responsibility for this decision should have brought it to the end - at any cost not to allow our doctors to get into the palace. In that situation, it was not so difficult to do this. Most likely, inconsistency and excessive secrecy are to blame: the one who sent the doctors did not know that they were not needed there.

The palace guards immediately took additional security measures: they set up external posts, tried to contact the tank brigade. The brigade was brought to a state of combat readiness, but did not receive an order to march, because the special communications well had already been blown up.

The coup began at 19:30 on December 27, 1979, when two special forces - the GRU of the General Staff and the KGB - began a special operation in close cooperation. With a dashing "cavalry" raid on a GAZ-66 car, a group led by Captain Satarov managed to capture dug-in tanks, take them out of the trenches and headed towards the palace.

Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns began to hit the palace with direct fire. Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion advanced to the destination areas. A company of infantry fighting vehicles moved towards the palace. On ten infantry fighting vehicles, two KGB groups were deployed as landing troops. The general management of them was carried out by Colonel G.I. Boyarinov. The infantry fighting vehicles shot down the outer guard posts and rushed to the Taj Beck along a narrow mountain road, serpentine rising up. The first BMP was hit. The crew members and the landing force left it and began to climb the mountain with the help of assault ladders. The second BMP pushed the wrecked car into the abyss and cleared the way for the rest. Soon they were on a level ground in front of the palace. A group of Colonel Boyarinov who jumped out of one car rushed into the palace. The fighting immediately took on a fierce character.

The commandos rushed forward, frightening the enemy with shots, wild cries and loud Russian obscenities. By the way, it was by this last sign that they recognized their own in the dark, and not by the white armbands on the sleeves, which were not visible. If they did not leave any room with their hands up, then the door was broken open and grenades flew into the room. So the fighters moved up the corridors and labyrinths of the palace. When the assault groups of reconnaissance saboteurs broke into the palace, the special forces of the “Muslim” battalion who participated in the battle created a ring of fire, destroying everything alive around and protecting the attackers. The officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard and his personal bodyguards desperately resisted without surrendering: they mistook the attackers for their own rebellious part, from which no mercy could be expected. But, having heard Russian shouts and obscenities, they began to raise their hands - after all, many of them were trained at the landing school in Ryazan. And they surrendered to the Russians because they considered them the highest and just power.

The battle was not only in the palace. One of the units managed to cut off the personnel of the tank battalion from the tanks, and then capture these tanks. The special group took an entire anti-aircraft regiment and its weapons. Almost without a fight, the building of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan was captured. Only the chief of the general staff, Mohammad Yakub, barricaded himself in one of the offices and began to call for help on the radio. But, making sure that no one was in a hurry to help him, he gave up. The Afghan, who accompanied the Soviet paratroopers, immediately read out the death sentence to him and shot him on the spot.

Events unfolded in approximately the same way in other government institutions: a short assault, the arrest of Amin's henchmen, the execution of some of them, and the delivery of the rest to the Puli-Charkhi prison. And from the prison itself, in the meantime, strings of released opponents of the regime of the overthrown dictator were already stretching.

What was happening at that time with Amin and the Soviet doctors? Here is what Yu.I. Drozdov in his documentary book "Fiction is excluded":

“Soviet doctors hid wherever they could. At first they thought that the Mujahideen attacked, then N.M.'s supporters. Taraki. Only later, upon hearing a Russian swear word, did they realize that Soviet servicemen were operating.

A. Alekseev and V. Kuznechenkov, who were supposed to go to help the daughter of H. Amin (she had a baby), after the start of the assault, found "shelter" at the bar. Some time later, they saw Amin walking along the corridor, all in the reflections of the fire. He was in white shorts and a T-shirt, holding vials of saline solution in his hands, entwined with tubes, raised high, like grenades. One could only imagine how much effort it cost him and how they pricked the needles inserted into the cubital veins.

A. Alekseev, running out of hiding, first of all pulled out the needles, pressing the veins with his fingers so that blood would not ooze, and then brought him to the bar. H. Amin leaned against the wall, but then a child's cry was heard - from somewhere in the side room, Amin's five-year-old son was walking, smearing his tears with his fists. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed his legs. H. Amin pressed his head to him, and the two of them sat down against the wall.

Many years after those events, A. Alekseev told me that they could no longer be near the bar and hurried to leave from there, but when they were walking along the corridor, there was an explosion, and they were thrown by an explosive wave to the door of the conference room, where they took refuge . The hall was dark and empty. Cold air was siphoning from the broken window, and the sounds of shots could be heard. Kuznechenkov stood in the wall on the left by the window, Alekseev on the right. So fate separated them in this life.

According to the testimony of the participants in the assault, a doctor, Colonel Kuznechenkov, was hit by a fragment of a grenade in the conference room. However, Alekseev, who was next to him all the time, claims that when the two of them were hiding in the conference room, some submachine gunner, having jumped in there, fired a line into the darkness just in case. One of the bullets hit Kuznechenkov. He screamed and died immediately...

Meanwhile, a KGB special group broke through to the premises where Hafizullah Amin was, and during the shootout he was killed by an officer of this group. Amin's corpse was wrapped in a carpet and taken out.

The number of Afghans killed has never been established. They, along with Amin's two young sons, were buried in mass grave near the Taj Beck Palace. The corpse of H. Amin, wrapped in a carpet, was buried there that same night, but separately from the others. No tombstone was placed.

The surviving members of Amin's family were imprisoned by the new Afghan authorities in Puli-Charkhi prison, where they replaced N.M. Taraki. Even Amin's daughter, whose legs were broken during the battle, ended up in a cell with a cold concrete floor. But mercy was alien to people whose relatives and friends were destroyed by order of Amin. Now they took revenge.

The battle in the courtyard did not last long - only 43 minutes. When everything was quiet, V.V. Kolesnik and Yu.I. Drozdov moved the command post to the palace.

That evening, the losses of the special forces (according to Yu.I. Drozdov) amounted to four killed and 17 wounded. The general head of the KGB special groups, Colonel G.I., was killed. Boyarinov. In the "Muslim" battalion, 5 people were killed, 35 were wounded, of which 23 remained in the ranks.

It is likely that in the turmoil of the night battle, some people suffered from their own. The next morning, the special forces disarmed the remnants of the guard brigade. More than 1,400 people surrendered. However, even after the white flag was raised from the roof of the building, shots were fired, one Russian officer and two soldiers died.

The wounded and surviving KGB special forces were sent to Moscow just a couple of days after the assault. And on January 7, 1980, the “Muslim” battalion also left Kabul. All participants in the operation - living and dead - were awarded the Order of the Red Star.

“On that dramatic night in Kabul, there was not just another coup d'état,” an officer of the “Muslim” battalion later recalled, “during which power passed from the hands of the Khalqists into the hands of the Parchamists, supported by the Soviet side, but the beginning of a sharp intensification of civil war in Afghanistan. A tragic page was opened both in Afghan history and in the history of the Soviet Union. Soldiers and officers - participants in the December events - sincerely believed in the justice of their mission, that they were helping the Afghan people to get rid of Amin's tyranny and, having fulfilled their international duty, would return to their home. They were not political scientists and historians, scientists and sociologists who should have predicted the further course of events and assessed it. They were soldiers who followed orders.”

Soviet strategists, even in a nightmare, could not foresee what awaited them: 20 million highlanders, proud and warlike, fanatically believing in the tenets of Islam, would soon rise to fight against foreigners.

Palace of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin. Photo from the author's archive

Amin's palace was stormed on December 27, 1979. A lot has been written about this operation, skillfully planned in less than three days and carried out in less than an hour, but, unfortunately, one-sidedly. The fact that the palace was stormed by "Alpha" and "Vympel", which then had the name "Thunder" and "Zenith", respectively, is currently known to many. For a long time it remained a mystery to the world community what happened then in Kabul. Many different opinions were expressed, the most incredible rumors and conjectures hovered.

In "Literaturnaya Gazeta" (02.08.95), Russian Ambassador to Sweden Oleg Grinevsky published an excerpt from his memoirs "How we took Afghanistan", where he presented his version of the capture of the Taj Beck Palace, which, to put it mildly, is very doubtful. He writes: “The fatal decision was made by the Politburo on December 12, 1979 in strict secrecy - no protocols were kept.

Fifteen days later, a KGB special squad of about a thousand men stormed the palace of President Amin, and Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On the eve of the assault, Amin's personal doctor, a major in the medical service of the Soviet army, gave his patient a horse dose of sleeping pills. But he sensed something was wrong - by that time he no longer trusted his Soviet entourage. Water, for example, he drank only from different vessels in small portions, he was afraid that he would be poisoned. At night I slept in different places, sometimes even in a tank. Therefore, sleeping pills did not work properly. But still Amin felt some kind of weakness and malaise ...

Amin was put to bed, washed and put on a drip. He dozed off, but put the machine gun next to him.

At this time, the first shots rang out - it was the paratroopers who began to storm the palace and rushed upstairs. A second group was thrown from the helicopter onto the roof, which made its way down. Amin was guarded by Soviet soldiers - Uzbeks, dressed in Afghan uniforms, who did not know who was storming the palace, and therefore staunchly defended the Afghan president.

The shooting was approaching, but Amin lay quietly and slept. The doctor hid in a closet in the same room, and the embassy doctor and nurse ran out into the corridor and took refuge in some kind of niche. Soldiers in camouflage ran past them with a clatter and burst into Amin's office. On the move, they fired a line of machine guns crosswise across the cabinets, and the body of a military doctor, pierced by bullets, fell out from there.

Suddenly, Amin, who until then seemed to be sleeping peacefully, grabbed a machine gun and began to shoot. Although the order was to take him alive, the paratroopers gave a turn on the bed, and the president fell silent forever.

This sad story was told to us at the Foreign Ministry by Vasily Stepanovich Safronchuk, an adviser to the Afghan president on foreign policy issues, who was also in the palace on the day of the assault.

I don’t know where Safronchuk was at that time, but I know for sure that there is not one iota of truth in his story.

The military historian Shishov is far from the truth. “On December 25, 1979, the 105th Airborne Division, numbering four thousand people, landed at the airfields in Kabul and Bagram. Together with her, a detachment of special forces from the Main Intelligence Directorate arrived, which was tasked with eliminating Amin, writes Shishov. - On December 27, President Amin gave a big dinner at his Darulaman Palace. By that time Soviet paratroopers have actually taken control of the Afghan capital. Dressed in the uniform of the Afghan army, special forces and paratroopers in armored vehicles began an assault on the presidential palace, but Amin's guards took the fight. During a 5-hour attack, Darulaman was taken, while Colonel Boyarinov and General Paputin, who led the special operation, were killed.

Firstly, Colonel Boyarinov never served in the GRU special forces, and secondly, the operation to take Amin's palace was led by GRU Colonel Vasily Kolesnik. As for General Paputin, he had nothing to do with this operation and does not appear in the lists of the dead.

The experience of such operations, and indeed of all wars, shows that even their participants are not always fully and accurately aware of all the circumstances and facts that influence the course and outcome of certain events. Their full picture can be revealed not in hot pursuit, but after their completion of scrupulous work of researchers.

Many thought that only a small handful of officers from the special forces of the KGB of the USSR were in Kabul, who were actually suicide bombers. It was believed that it was they who independently completed the main task of capturing the Taj Beck Palace and removing Amin from power. In the early 1990s, individual ordinary officers of the KGB special forces of the USSR were the first to appear on TV screens and said that they had stormed and captured the Taj Beck Palace, forgetting to add that they were not alone there. A false belief formed among the general public that Amin's palace was captured by the Alfa group alone (24 people), making a decisive contribution to the outcome of the entire operation in Kabul.

Books have been written about the participation of Group A and Group B in the operation, which was codenamed Storm-333. As for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, it has always been distinguished by outstanding modesty and super secrecy. It is precisely because of this that the main performers of this one-act play with a continuation of nine years have remained in the shadows until recently. Without detracting from the merits of the KGB special forces who participated in the assault, it would be unfair not to talk about those without whom this assault simply would not have taken place.

Scheme of the assault on the palace of Amin.
Drawing from the author's archive
We are talking about GRU special forces colonel Vasily Kolesnik, who on May 2, 1979 received an order from the head of the GRU, General of the Army Ivashutin, to form the 154th separate special forces detachment. Fulfilling the order, Kolesnik developed the staff of the battalion and proceeded to its formation. His staff included Combat vehicles and personnel with a total number of 520 people. Before that, there were no such weapons, no such staff in the special forces. But the main feature of the detachment was the principle by which soldiers, sergeants and officers were selected into it. These were supposed to be persons of three nationalities: Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks.

A detachment in spetsnaz corresponds to a battalion in the ground forces. Hence the name - "Muslim battalion". The fighters were selected only for two calls: those who had served for a year and six months. Each company had a translator, a cadet of the Military Institute foreign languages sent for an internship. The battalion was headed by Major Khalbaev, who previously served in the 15th brigade as deputy commander of one of the special forces units for airborne training. The formed detachment during June-August was engaged in combat training.

Meanwhile, the uniforms of the Afghan army were already sewn on the personnel of the battalion in Moscow, and the necessary documents were also being prepared.

The decision to transfer the special battalion to Afghanistan was made at the very high level. Minutes No. 156 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and possible measures to improve it” stated: “... In early August of this year, after completing preparations, send a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to the DRA (Bagram airfield) in order to use in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the protection and defense of especially important government facilities.

Formally, the GRU special detachment, which was mentioned in the Politburo document of December 6, 1979, was sent in response to Amin's request.

Top secret

Extract from the protocol No. 176 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU

On sending a special detachment to Afghanistan.

Agree with the proposals on this issue, set out in the note of the KGB of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense dated December 4, 1979 No. 12/2/0073 (attached)

Secretary of the Central Committee L. Brezhnev

Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin has recently been persistently raising the question of the need to send a Soviet motorized rifle battalion to Kabul to guard his residence.

Taking into account the current situation and the request of Kh. Amin, we consider it expedient to send to Afghanistan a detachment of the GRU of the General Staff with a total number of about 500 people, trained for these purposes, in a uniform that does not reveal its belonging to the Armed Forces of the USSR. The possibility of sending this detachment to the DRA was provided for by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 29, 1979 No. P156 / IH.

Due to the fact that the issues of sending a detachment to Kabul have been agreed with the Afghan side, we believe it is possible to transfer it by military transport aircraft in the first half of December this year. Tov. Ustinov D.F. agree.

Yu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov

Of course, the "Muslim battalion" was sent to Afghanistan not to protect Amin, but exactly the opposite - to overthrow him. In November, the detachment was airlifted to Bagram. According to the initial plans of the leadership, the detachment was supposed to advance from Bagram and immediately capture the residence of Amin, which was originally located in Kabul. Taj Beck was Amin's newly rebuilt residence, which he created for himself after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on him in the city. Apparently, in connection with the change in the location of the residence, changes were made to the plans.

In December, the detachment was tasked with making a march on its own and arriving in Kabul to strengthen the protection of the palace of the head of state. That was the legal task of the detachment.

The palace itself was guarded by a bodyguard company - it was considered the first line of defense. The second line was to be made up of a "Muslim battalion", and the third was a security brigade, headed by Major Jandat, Amin's main guarantor. At one time he graduated from the foreign faculty of our airborne school in Ryazan, and later studied at the Frunze Military Academy.

From air strikes, the palace was covered by an anti-aircraft regiment. The guns and machine-gun mounts were in positions that made it possible to fire at a ground enemy if necessary. The total number of these military units was about 2 and a half thousand people.

From our side, the combined forces of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR participated in the operation to capture the Taj Beck Palace: the Thunder group - 24 people (commander Major M.M. Romanov), the Zenit group - 30 people (commander Major Semenov), " Muslim battalion "- 530 people (commander Major Khalbaev), the 9th parachute company of the 345th OPDP - 87 people (commander senior lieutenant Vostrotin) and an anti-tank platoon - 27 people (platoon commander senior lieutenant Sovostyanov).

Colonel of the GRU special forces Kolesnik was appointed head of the operation to capture Amin's palace, and Major General Drozdov, head of the KGB Illegal Intelligence Directorate, was appointed his deputy for the leadership of the special forces of the KGB of the USSR.

The plan for storming the Taj Beck Palace worked out on the map was signed by Colonel Kolesnik and brought to the embassy. He later recalled: “I brought the plan worked out on the map and signed by me to Magomedov and Ivanov for signature. However, having approved the plan orally, neither one nor the other put his signature on the plan. It was clear that at the time when we were deciding how to fulfill the task set by the country's leadership, these cunning people were thinking about how to avoid responsibility in case our action failed. Then, in their presence, I wrote on the plan: “The plan was orally approved by the chief military adviser Magomedov S.K. and chief adviser to the KGB Ivanov B.I. They refused to sign, ”put the time, date and his signature, after which he went to the battalion to set tasks for the participants in the upcoming assault.”

On the morning of December 27, Drozdov and Kolesnik, according to the old Russian custom, washed themselves in the bathhouse before the battle, changed their linen. For the rest of the fighters, they also set up a camping bathhouse. They gave out fresh linen and vests.

The time of the assault on the palace was postponed for more early term because there were suspicions that the Afghans suspected our plans.

Colonel Kolesnik recalls: “In this regard, at nineteen hours and fifteen minutes, the Sakhatov group, according to the plan, fifteen minutes before the start of the assault advanced to their object. But, passing through the location of the third battalion, they saw that the alarm was declared in the battalion. In the center of the parade ground stood the battalion commander and his deputies. The personnel received weapons and ammunition. Instantly assessing the situation, Sakhatov decided to seize command of the third infantry battalion. Moving at full speed, the car with our scouts suddenly stopped near the Afghan officers, and in a matter of seconds they were lying in the back of a GAZ-66, which rushed forward, leaving behind a trail of dust. In the first minutes, the soldiers of the battalion did not even understand what had happened, but then they opened fire after the retreating car, but it was too late. Due to the dust that hid the machine, it proved to be ineffective. Sakhatov, having driven about two hundred meters, stopped the car, the personnel was in a hurry, who immediately lay down and opened fire on the attacking soldiers of the guard. Left without control, they attacked in a crowd and were an excellent target. Two machine guns and eight assault rifles of the special forces left more than two hundred people killed on the battlefield. Snipers, meanwhile, removed sentries from the tanks.

Hearing firing at the location of the third battalion, I gave the command to start the operation by launching a series of missiles. Two "Shilka" opened fire on the palace, and two more - on the location of the tank battalion in order to prevent its personnel from the tanks. Calculations AGS-17 opened fire on the location of the second battalion, not allowing the personnel to leave the barracks. The second, third and company of paratroopers advanced to block the battalions of the security brigade, and the first company jointly rushed to the palace.

The palace stood on a hill, towering over the surroundings. A serpentine road and a pedestrian staircase a meter and a half wide led to it. Under the cover of fire "Shilok" Sharipov's company on the BMP went to the palace along the serpentine. Based on the documents and memoirs of the direct participants in that operation, the events developed as follows.

As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and drove up to the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beck, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier, where there was a subgroup of Boris Suvorov, was immediately knocked out, it caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The subgroup commander himself was hit by a bullet in the groin, just below the body armor. It was not possible to save him. The landing party sitting in it left the car and, with the help of assault ladders, began to climb the hill.

At this time, the Thunder subgroups also began to move towards the Taj Beck. The first combat vehicle successfully overcame the barrier, crushing an Afghan soldier who rushed to close it, and the rest, knocking down external guard posts, rushed along the only road that serpentine climbed uphill with an exit to the area in front of the palace. The road was heavily guarded, it was well targeted, and other approaches to the palace were mined.

Twenty minutes after the start of the assault, nine infantry fighting vehicles of the first company were on the platform in front of the palace. The doors of the airborne squads swung open, and the KGB and GRU special forces rushed into the palace. A fierce battle ensued with Amin's personal guard, which consisted mainly of his relatives.

KGB and GRU special groups covered the main forces of Sharipov's company and Tursunkulov's platoons. Other units of the "Muslim battalion" and a company of paratroopers provided the outer cover ring, repelling the attacks of the battalions of the security brigade. Two platoons of the 1st company and a group of the 4th company of the "Muslim battalion" under the command of Captain Kudratov, with the support of two "Shilok", blocked the barracks of the 1st infantry and tank battalions, captured tanks. Tank guns and machine guns did not have breechblocks. This is what our military advisers did.

Hurricane fire was fired from the windows of the palace, he pressed the special forces to the ground. The attack faltered. It was the most climactic moment of the battle, when it was necessary at all costs to raise people to the attack. At this moment, the main part of the fighters was injured. Commanders Boyarinov, Kozlov, Karpukhin, Golov were the first to storm.

The battle in the building itself immediately took on a fierce character, since only a small group managed to break into the palace. The commandos acted desperately and decisively. If they did not leave the premises with their hands up, they broke down the doors and threw grenades.

Of the thirty "Zenit" and twenty-two fighters from the "Thunder" in the palace of Amin, no more than 25 people managed to break through, and many of them were injured. These forces were not enough to ensure the elimination of Amin. The situation was close to critical. Colonel Boyarinov, in violation of his own order, jumped out of the front door in an Afghan uniform and began to call on the soldiers of the “Muslim battalion” to go to the palace to help. At that moment, a burst of machine-gun fire overtook him: one of the bullets, ricocheting off his body armor, hit the colonel in the neck. Due to his official position and age (57 years), Colonel Boyarinov could not personally participate in the assault, but exercise leadership while at headquarters. However, this contradicted his position in life - his graduates, his guys went to the assault, so he had to be next to them. He had to coordinate the actions of the Thunder and Zenit groups and, in fact, act as a simple attack aircraft. Lieutenant Tursunkulov, having heard the cry “Guys, help!”, He raised the fighters to attack, entered the palace building with them and began to help in suppressing the resistance of the guards. This assistance was timely and effective, it made it possible to turn the tide.

In the palace, officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted staunchly, not surrendering. They were killed by the fact that they were all armed mainly with German MP-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.

From the memoirs of the adjutant, it is known that Amin ordered him to notify our military advisers about the attack on the palace. At the same time, he said: "Soviet assistance." But the adjutant reported: "The Soviets are shooting." These words infuriated the general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, he grabbed an ashtray and threw it at the adjutant, shouting: "You're lying, it can't be!" Then he himself tried to call the Chief of the General Staff. There was no longer a connection. Amin paused, and then dejectedly said: "I guessed about it, that's right."

Gradually, the shooting stopped, and the powder smoke dissipated, the attackers recognized Amin's man lying near the bar. He was dead. Perhaps he was overtaken by a bullet from one of the special forces, perhaps a fragment of a grenade. Some expressed the version that Amin was killed by the Afghans. What actually caused his death is now quite difficult to find out. And who needs it.

The company commander, senior lieutenant Sharipov, contacted the chief of staff of the "Muslim battalion" Ashurov and reported that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff informed the battalion commander Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik about this. The capture of the palace and the liquidation of Amin was reported to Lieutenant General Guskov, and he reported to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ogorkov.

After the capture of Amin's palace, the Kabul radio station broadcast a message that, by decision of the revolutionary tribunal, the traitor Hafizullah Amin was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out. Then, at 2 am on December 28, Babrak Karmal's taped address to the peoples of Afghanistan was broadcast. It contained the following words: “Today, the torture machine of Amin and his henchmen, wild executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousands of our compatriots - fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters, children and old people, was broken.”

Although a significant part of the brigade soldiers surrendered, the battle did not stop after the capture of Amin's palace. Part of the units continued to resist. In particular, our fighters fought with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went to the mountains. The bulk of the Afghan soldiers and officers surrendered. So, for example, an anti-aircraft regiment surrendered almost without a fight. The tank battalion also offered no resistance. In total, about 1700 people were captured.

The assault and battle for the palace lasted 30–40 minutes. During the assault, 11 people were killed, among them Colonel Boyarinov, 4 paratroopers and 6 special forces from Major Khalbaev's "Muslim battalion", 38 people were injured of varying severity.

During the night, KGB special forces and soldiers of the “Muslim battalion” guarded the palace, as they feared that the divisions stationed in Kabul and the tank brigade would storm it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers who worked in parts of the Afghan army, and parts of the airborne troops deployed to the capital, did not allow them to do this. In addition, the special services paralyzed the control of the Afghan forces in advance.

Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj-Bek Palace, KGB special forces groups, supported by paratroopers from the battalion of the 345th parachute regiment, which was in Bagram before the described events, captured the General Staff, the communications center, the buildings of the KhAD and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. An important role in the fact that parts of the Kabul garrison were not alerted was played by the sabotage carried out by the "Zenith" immediately before the assault. They demolished the communications center of the city, located in a special concrete well. Thus, a coup d'état in Afghanistan was carried out with minimal forces with minimal losses. Amin's family members were guarded by the battalion for another day. We also had some members of the future Afghan leadership. The operation to bring Babrak Karmal to Afghanistan was carried out by the KGB.

The head of the Airborne Forces task force, Lieutenant General Guskov, recalled: “When the plane was landing and was already on the first drive, the lights suddenly went out at the entire airfield in Bagram. As a rule, military transport or combat aircraft landed here, and this was the Tu-134. During the flight of the aircraft, the airfield functioned normally, but when it had already begun to descend, extended the landing gear and was about to touch the runway, the lights went out everywhere. The plane landed in complete darkness. True, his headlights were on. The crew commander was forced to throw out the braking parachute, but the plane rolled almost to the very edge of the runway.

As it turned out later, the head of the Hakim air base, an ardent supporter of Amin, suspected something was wrong and turned off the lights when landing an unusual aircraft, thus deciding to arrange a plane crash. However, the high professional skills of the pilots allowed them to get out of this difficult situation. After the report of the causes of the incident, the management received a command - at X-hour, the head of the air base, Hakim, was arrested so that there would be no more misunderstandings.

From the memoirs of Colonel Kolesnik: “In the evening of the day following the assault, all the leaders of the operation were almost killed by a Soviet soldier with a machine-gun burst. Returning in Amin's Mercedes from a banquet dedicated to the successful completion of the operation, we were fired upon not far from the General Staff building, which was guarded by paratroopers. The first to notice strange flashes on the pavement and figured out what they meant, O.W. Shvets. He jumped out of the car and covered the sentry with a choice obscenity. It was better than a password.

The chief of the guard was called. The lieutenant who appeared first received from Shvets in the ear, and only then listened to the procedure for using weapons by sentries at the post. We approached the car, in the hood of which several bullet holes gaped. A little higher, and neither I nor Evald Kozlov would have been alive for sure. General Yu.I. Drozdov went up to the lieutenant and said quietly: "Thank you, son, for not teaching your soldier to shoot." After this incident, we came to our location and in order to film nervous tension, drank four or five bottles of vodka. But the stress was so strong that the vodka did not take us. Despite two sleepless nights and a fight, I still couldn't sleep."

On January 2, 1980, the personnel of the "Muslim battalion" were deployed by two An-22s to Tashkent. Colonel Kolesnik said goodbye to the personnel of the detachment and departed for Moscow. Arriving in the capital, he immediately reported on the results and progress of the operation to General of the Army Ivashutin, who was then in charge of the GRU. He listened to the report, took the documents prepared by him from the colonel, closed them in his safe and told Vasily Vasilyevich not to tell anyone about anything without his knowledge. But the next day, he again called Kolesnik, gave his guarantor, a car, handed over his plan of operation and told him to come for a report to the Minister of Defense Ustinov.

Colonel-generals and army generals were waiting in the minister's waiting room. It is difficult to convey the curiosity and amazement that appeared on their faces when they saw that the Colonel was met by the minister's assistant, who himself was a lieutenant general, and helped him take off his overcoat. The guarantor, hanging up Vasily Vasilyevich's overcoat, said: "Come in, the minister is waiting for you."

From the memoirs of Colonel Kolesnik: “In the office, Ustinov hugged me, kissed me, then seated me at the table and, taking out a Marlboro, offered to smoke. I apologized and said that I only smoke Belomor, but left the cigarettes in my overcoat. Ustinov asked the messenger to bring them, we lit a cigarette, and I began to talk. When I took out the plan in order to explain how we acted, the minister saw that it was not approved, and the inscription that I made in Magomedov's office. Shaking his head, he said: “I understand why the cautious Caucasian Magomedov did not put his signature on your plan. But why Ivanov didn’t sign, I can’t understand.” Tactfully silent, I continued the story. The minister listened very attentively, he was interested in everything, but he was especially interested in technology. How she behaved in battle, how effective were the ZSU and AGS-17, engineering ammunition. Then the first RPG-18 "Flies" appeared, and he asked how they showed themselves in a combat situation.

At the end of the conversation, the minister escorted the colonel to the door. Seeing this, Marshal Sokolov, who was then the first deputy minister, said: “Well, colonel, the minister has not yet escorted any of us to the door.”

For courage and courage shown during the capture of Amin's palace, Colonel Vasily Kolesnik was awarded high rank Hero of the Soviet Union.

About how the operation "Storm-333" to seize the residence of the head of state Hafizullah Amin was carried out, the participants in the operation themselves, soldiers of the special forces unit of the GRU and the KGB of the USSR, tell.

“It just so happened that it was I who eliminated Hafizullah Amin ...”


Plyusnin Alexander Nikolaevich, senior lieutenant. In the KGB - from December 1974 to 1982. Detective in the first set of group "A". Member of the Kabul operation, stormed Amin's palace.

“We were called at night, we were collecting special weapons all night, preparing for loading ... Why did we fly to Kabul, I learned from my colleagues in Bagram. They told me about the preparations for the assault. In the same place, on the territory of the military airfield, we met ours - a group of Yuri Izotov, under the protection of which were Babrak Karmal and other members of the government. They lived there, on the airfield, in caponiers, and everything was arranged so secretly that neither I nor anyone from my group knew about Karmal's whereabouts. If there was a leak, they would all be slammed by Amin's people. So everything was VERY serious. The jokes are over. Or us - or we ...

When we saw the object, which was to be taken by the forces of two platoons, we immediately fell silent. We were opposed by 200 Amin's guards, who occupied a perfectly defended "hard nut". They took the palace with the following forces: 500 people (battalion) of the GRU - “musbat” and KGB special forces. The task of "musbat" is to carry out external blocking. Some of their fighters were actually sitting behind the levers of military vehicles - ordinary conscripts, mainly of Tajik and Uzbek nationality. There were 48 of us - fighters from the KGB special forces. 24 officers from Grom and 24 from Zenith.

They began to prepare for battle. For several days, in order to dull the vigilance of the palace guards, we accustomed the guards to the noise of car engines, deliberately drove back and forth at night, practiced disembarking from the BMP on the move. To the questions of the guardsmen, they reasonably answered that we were conducting exercises. 2 days before the assault, they settled in the barracks, changed into the issued uniform of the Afghan army, sewed additional pockets for grenades and magazines on it ... They split into fives, each dragged 45 kilos of ammunition, sat down in cars. We, the Grom group, were sitting in the BMP, the Zenit troops were in the armored personnel carriers. There were nine cars in total. Five - at "Thunder" and four - at "Zenith". On the day of the operation, I was worried, jittery. None of our real experience of military operations had ... We drank 150 grams. Before landing on the technique, I retired to tune in. I said goodbye to my family, to loved ones just in case. One of my commanders, Balashov, teased me just before the jump: "Now let's see how the saboteurs behave in battle!" It pissed me off.

The start of the assault is 19.00. Immediately, the first car was knocked out at the very top, before leaving for the upper platform near the Taj Beck. The second "armor" pushed her, and I rode in the third. In total, the guards burned two of our armored personnel carriers and damaged one infantry fighting vehicle. Perhaps our five were lucky that they managed to “bring the limousine” to the very porch, almost stopped at the steps! The entrance doors were taken out of the BMP turret cannon (one second), dismounted (two seconds) and jumped under the visor (three more seconds). I landed first. Then we covered the landing (half a minute), then, under the fire of the guards, we leaked into the hall of the palace (five minutes, or even less). In battle, time passed unusually slowly. Every jerk, every throw from column to column, from corner to wall - these seconds, they were so long, my legs did not want to move, and I still remember some columns, because I looked at them and thought - I will have time to run to cover up?

The fight itself in the lobby took another five minutes. It was necessary to act quickly. Rapidly!

At first there was chaos. We were all untouched. When you shoot live at people, and they shoot at you, when you run past your corpses, when you slip on their blood... How many guards did I kill then in battle? I honestly don't remember... Maybe five, maybe more... Knowing that our strength is getting smaller every second (we already had dead and seriously wounded), I immediately ran up the front stairs to the second floor. Kolomeets ran after me. Before reaching two steps to the top of the flight of stairs, I was forced to lie down: the fire was dense, and grenades fell like cucumbers. Some, however, did not explode ... The Afghans with whom we fought were athletic guys, under two meters tall, many were trained at the Ryazan airborne school. Anisimov removed one such athlete in front of my eyes from the “Fly”. He fired from below, from a distance of 15 meters. A tall Afghan machine gunner, who was sitting on the balcony with a light machine gun, fell with a crash from above to the floor of the marble hall. After the fall, he ... rose to his full height, walked four meters to the porch, sat down near the column and died there.

I threw a grenade at the door of the meeting room of the Council of Ministers. It was located to the left of the glass door of the dictator's private quarters. I did not calculate the force of the throw, the grenade hit the wall and bounced back towards me. Fortunately, the brace did not allow it to roll smoothly, and the explosion went into the column. I was only shell-shocked and doused with marble chips. Kolomeets could not stand the tension and ran downstairs. I do not blame him, of course, especially since he was wounded in battle. Rolling over on my back, I began to shoot prone, from the bottom up, at the guardsmen, this duel continued for another half a minute. Then I looked around and realized that on the patch in front of the entrance to the terrace of the second floor I was left ... alone. I kept firing until I ran out of ammo. I immediately found a dead corner, where bullets and shrapnel did not reach. Hiding behind the walls and taking advantage of the fact that the rapid-fire "Shilka", firing from the outside, did not allow the guardsmen to stick out in this area, I "tweeted" cartridges into the magazine from the bag. I equipped five or six magazines from a bag, and then Golov, Karpukhin, Berlev and Semenov climbed the stairs ...

So, there were five of us at this door, and we had to act. Move on. Until the guards guessed to take up all-round defense and crushed us. I kicked the glass door open and threw a grenade inside. Deafening explosion. Then immediately a wild, heart-rending, piercing female cry “Amin! Amine! Amin! ”, Scattered through the corridors and floors. Jumping into the room, I saw Amin's wife first. She sobbed loudly, sitting over the corpse of the dictator. There was no longer any doubt that Hafizullah Amin was dead. He was lying on the floor, wearing only shorts and a T-shirt. He lay on his side, in a pool of his own blood, crooked and somehow small. It was dark in the room, we shone our flashlights and made sure that everything was ready. It just so happened that my grenade exploded in the very depths of the small room, killing Amin himself, who was hiding behind his women and children, and injuring his household. I remember that in addition to Amin's family, in the room we found our nurse from the brigade of Soviet doctors assigned to the dictator after an attempt to poison him ...

If the guards took up all-round defense and managed to hold out until the approach of their fifth tank army, then we would have had a very difficult time, but almost immediately after the elimination of Amin, his guards began to surrender. They were seated in the hall, on the floor, squatting, hands on the back of the head. And they filled the whole hall and lobby...

For the official identification of the corpse of Amin, our Afghan comrades Gulabzoya and Sarvari were invited, whom I later ordered to take out of the palace at any cost and deliver to our embassy. It took us three hours. We got drunk. Either the BMP will stall, then we will get lost. Then, after their speech on the Kabul radio, in which they spoke about the “victory of the people over the bloody dictator,” we fiddled with them for another three days until we returned to our location.

The Kabul operation of the KGB special forces entered the history of the world's special services. The history of the department had never known anything like this before. Nevertheless, such was the political will of the leadership of our state. Now I think that it was not necessary to climb there, into Afghanistan. And now I wouldn't go there. It is a pity for the Soviet guys who laid down their heads “across the river” for ten years, and those who were crippled in a foreign country, and then forgotten by our state.

I was discharged from the authorities in 1982 with the rank of senior lieutenant. After my dismissal, I could not find a job for three years. First he went to work in a factory. Welder again. Then he got a job in the security service of a hotel. I kept silent about my work in the KGB special forces for twenty years.

Later I heard a tale about the fact that in case the assault bogged down, there was an order to cover the palace itself with “Grad” with everyone who would be there. I don't know if this is true or not. Many of us believe this. There was also a rumor that the plane on which we flew home should have been shot down. Well, so as not to leave witnesses... On the other hand, why didn't they shoot down? And the assault itself, the battle itself with the guards, without cleaning up, took about forty minutes, an hour at most. But it felt like an eternity to me. We were few. The only advantage of the KGB special forces on the evening of December 27, 1979 was only speed, Russian mate and luck. I often think of that evening in December. Many of the KGB special forces consider December 27 their second birthday.

* * *
“In the hospital, we danced for joy that we had survived in hell near Kabul ...”

Repin Alexander Georgievich, colonel of the KGB of the USSR, work in the KGB - from 1974 to 1998, detective in the second set of Group "A" since 1978.

At the time when the Kabul epic started, I was in the rank of ensign and I was only 26 years old. I, like most of my colleagues in the Group, was born in peacetime, and what war is, I imagined only from films about the Great Patriotic War, combat experience didn't have. I was called to the emergency department. Everyone was gathered in Lenin's room and announced that we were flying on a business trip. Each was given a bottle of vodka and a set of equipment: body armor, reinforced ammunition, machine gun, pistol. I also received an SVD sniper rifle. We took quite a lot of warm clothes, because the previous shift told us: "Heat is not waiting for you there." To tell the truth, the nights in the winter in Afghanistan are very cold, and we, in addition to dressing very warmly, warmed ourselves with vodka for sleep. We set off on board Andropov from Chkalovsky, just before the flight, Seryoga Kuvylin managed to photograph us, despite the prohibitions of the special officers. He also filmed us afterwards - there, in Bagram and in the Musbat. If not for him, there would be no historical memory of the Kabul operation. I flew in a plane next to Dima Volkov, who later died in battle, in Kabul. Some of our vodka was printed on the plane. Before landing, the Tu-154 suddenly turned off all landing lights. They sat down in total darkness. A minute before the wheels touched the take-off Bagram, Romanov ordered everyone: “Recharge!” This was the very first sign that something serious was waiting for us. However, they sat down safely, "regularly", as they say.

The next day, upon arrival, we went to shoot weapons. My teacher was Golovatov. He prepared me well. I understood that the entire outcome of the operation could depend on the effectiveness of the sniper's work. I already knew that in the mountainous rarefied air the bullet flies along a different trajectory, as if being attracted to the ground, so before work it was necessary to understand what the excess was, to make corrections on the sights. We have done it. We were settled in one of the Musbat barracks. Meals in the battalion were well organized, and I remember that I slept excellently all the nights spent near Kabul. Nothing worried. When on the evening of December 26 the whole future of the Politburo of Afghanistan was delivered to the Musbat, they were not shown to anyone. I had no idea who was being delivered. Everyone was hidden in a separate room, in the most inconspicuous corner of the battalion. In addition to the external security of the “musbat” itself, guards were also posted around the perimeter of the premises where people unknown to us were sheltered. V. Grishin and I were assigned to guard for the night. I remember that it was very cold that night, and we envied with black envy our employees N. Shvachko and P. Klimov, who closed themselves together with unknown persons from the inside and, as we suspected, drank tea or something stronger with them. So the night passed. The next day, Romanov finally told us that an order had been received to storm the residence of the President of Afghanistan, the Taj Beck Palace, and destroy the "X-Man" who was in the palace. No special political work was carried out, no one was gathered and no lectures were given, but they simply said that “unhealthy forces” were rushing to power in a country friendly to us and we needed to help stop them. Before that, “quiet” conversations had already been going on in the battalion that we would storm the handsome palace, located on the mountain, right above us, a 15-minute drive along the serpentine, and joked about the assault ladders. We even began to knock them together, according to the order of Romanov. Mikhail Mikhailovich also instructed to “drive” the equipment so that the palace guards got used to the noise of military vehicles, and to conduct reconnaissance. I did not take all this seriously then, because of my youth. No, I understood that the real combat work that it would be necessary to shoot, including at live targets, and was ready for this. But until the very moment of landing from the BMP, I did not imagine what kind of hell awaited us. On the evening of December 27, we started to the Taj Beck. I was sitting at the very end of the car. Major Romanov, Captain II rank Evald Kozlov, G. Tolstikov, E. Mazaev and one of the leaders of the opposition A. Sarvari, a future member of the government of Afghanistan, were with me.

Thirty years have passed. This is now clear to everyone. And then ... I did not imagine what a flurry of fire would fall on us, and I was completely unprepared for the development of the situation. When landing, I noticed that Kozlov was landing without a bulletproof vest. Now I think that he knew more than us and assumed that we didn’t care f ... c. I was in armor, in a "tigovskaya" helmet, armed with a machine gun, pistol, RPG-7 and SVD, which I never got out of the BMP. As soon as we approached the palace, several thousand invisible little men armed with hammers surrounded our BMP and began to hammer loudly on the armor. It was a hail of bullets that hit us. For a few moments we sat in armor and listened to these "hammers". Then Romanov gave the command: “Get to the car!”, and, in obedience to the order, I pressed the button, opened the hatch and literally fell out onto the asphalt. As soon as I touched the ground, something painfully hit my legs and warm flowed down my left shin. I didn't attach any importance to this. The body mobilized to complete the task - it was necessary to extinguish the enemy's firing points, to cover their attackers. Zhenya Mazaev and I immediately opened fire from machine guns from behind the parapet at the windows of the palace. It was about 25 meters to the porch of the building, and I saw the results of my work. From two windows after I fired at them, a guardsman fell out. We worked for about fifteen minutes. Then Romanov again commanded: "To the car!" He decided to jump on the armor to the very porch of the palace. I took a step and suddenly my legs gave out. I settled on my right knee, tried to get up, but neither the right nor the left listened to me. I shouted to Mazaev: “Zhenya! I can't go!" Then they went to the BMP to the main entrance, and I was left alone in an open, shot-through place, all in the same 25 meters from the palace. I realized that I was seriously wounded by a grenade that exploded under my very feet. Out of anger, I fired all five RPG-7 rounds at the windows of the palace, after which I somehow began to hobble to its walls. I moved on my knees. All around it rumbled and crackled. Behind beaten "Shilki", in front - the defenders of the Taj-Bek. How I didn't get killed in this hell, I'll never know. I got to the side porch. Gena Kuznetsov was sitting on the steps, also wounded in the legs. He, apparently, was still seriously shell-shocked, because he spoke inadequately. I knew about the order not to provide assistance to the wounded until the main task was completed and wanted to leave him there and move to the main entrance, but he began to persuade me not to leave him and help. I started bandaging him. As it turned out later, out of excitement (for the first time I healed a real wound), I excellently bandaged both his wounded and absolutely healthy leg! (The doctors then laughed heartily at the first-aid post). Yes, in this hell I was also inadequate ...

Imagine: I gave part of my equipped ammunition to a soldier from the “musbat”, who was especially fiercely eager to fight and “watered” around the palace, telling everyone that “they, those from the palace, killed their brother” and that now he “will tear everyone ". I also gave something to Kuznetsov, and I myself climbed to recharge ... on the platform, brightly lit by the searchlight of the palace. An ideal target - and I did not realize the illogicality of my actions! Only after I was brought back to reality by Fedoseev's loud swearing, I returned to Gennady and already equipped stores there, behind the columns. There were still about ten meters to the main entrance, which we - two invalids, Kuznetsov and Repin - nevertheless overcame with sin in half. At the very entrance, we were met by colleagues from Zenit and said: “Let's row to Emyshev!” Kuznetsov remained with Petrovich, whose arm was torn off at the very beginning of the battle in the hall, and I hobbled to the front stairs, where I again ran into a delighted Mazaev. He smiled at me and shouted: “And Mikhalych (Romanov) told me that you already f ... c!” It made me laugh too. I thought, "I'll live longer."

It has already become known that the “Main” is the end. The guards began to surrender. Romanov ordered me to go to the hospital along with other wounded - Baev, Fedoseev and Kuznetsov. Together with us was the body of the Soviet doctor Kuznechenkov, who was killed during the assault. On the way, we, as expected, got lost and almost drove into the barracks of Amin's guards. But that is not all. At the entrance to the embassy, ​​our own paratroopers fired at us. Rescued again vigorous Russian mat! In the Soviet embassy itself, disturbed like a beehive and turned into a temporary medical battalion, everyone stood on their ears. The wives of our diplomats sobbed, looking at the wounded commandos. We were operated on, and the next day we were sent to Tashkent on a special plane.

We celebrated the new, 1980th year in Uzbekistan. We had a good time then! Local comrades from the KGB department for Uzbekistan provided us with all possible assistance in this, creating all the conditions. And that's where we were released! There, in the hospital, my friends and I began to realize WHAT it was! Forgetting about the wounds, we danced with joy that we had survived the December hell near Kabul. Seryoga Kuvylin, not paying attention to his foot crippled by BMP tracks, "fried" the hopak! The next day, his leg hurt, but it was nothing ... It also turned out funny with Gena Kuznetsov: we rolled him out in a wheelchair into the corridor to set the table in the ward, and forgot about the hungry and sober Gennady! He yelled at us and knocked from the corridor - it's useless! They remembered him when everyone had already drunk!

Two days later, just before the operation, I passed out in the hallway. Went and fell. I woke up already on the operating table, where they had to remove the remaining small fragments from my legs. All, by the way, have not been removed. Seven pieces left.

* * *
Ending to be...

On December 27, 1979, Amin's palace near Kabul was stormed. Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was eliminated as a result of a special operation codenamed Storm-333. This operation, the active phase of which lasted about 1 hour, became the prologue to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and marked the beginning of a series of local conflicts involving our country at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.

About 650 people took part in the operation to seize Amin's residence. The Muslim battalion - 520 people, the company of the Airborne Forces - 87 people and two special forces groups of the KGB of the USSR "Thunder" (24 people) and "Zenith" (30 people), which were supposed to directly capture the palace. The attackers were dressed in Afghan uniforms with white armbands, the password for identifying friend or foe was the shout "Yasha - Misha."

The Muslim battalion was created from soldiers and officers of Central Asians (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens). In the selection process, particular attention was paid to physical training, only those who had served half a year or a year were involved, the principle of voluntariness was the basis, but if there were not enough specialists, a good military specialist could be enrolled in the detachment without his consent. The detachment, which, due to its size, received the name of the battalion, consisted of 4 companies. The first company received the BMP-1, the second and third BTR-60pb, the fourth company was an armament company, it included an AGS-17 platoon (which had just appeared in the army), a platoon of rocket infantry flamethrowers "Lynx" and a platoon of sappers. The detachment had all the relevant rear units: platoons of automotive and software support, communications, and an additional platoon of ZSU "Shilka" was attached to the battalion. An interpreter was attached to each company, but, given the national composition, their services were hardly used, all Tajiks, half of the Uzbeks and part of the Turkmens knew Farsi, one of the main languages ​​​​of Afghanistan. The curiosity came up only with the vacancy of an anti-aircraft gunner officer, it was not possible to find the necessary person of the required nationality, and the dark-haired Russian captain Pautov was taken to this position, who, when he was silent, did not stand out in total mass. The detachment was headed by Major Kh. Khalbaev.

The detachment received an Afghan uniform and documents and arrived in Afghanistan at the Bagram base already in August 1979. Officially, the battalion was supposed to protect the President of the DRA, Hafizullah Amin, but in fact, the battalion was used in the exact opposite way. If you call a spade a spade, the leadership of the USSR immediately prepared a battalion to carry out a coup d'état in Afghanistan with the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in power. Prior to this, Afghanistan had already asked for military assistance and appealed to both the USSR and the United States, the leadership of the USSR decided to go its own way, to provide assistance only after the elimination of the current leader of the country.

To implement the plan, a company of the Airborne Forces and two special forces units were redeployed to Bagram, the formation of which was carried out by the KGB of the USSR. Detachment "Zenith" consisted of 24 people of the special group A, which later became known as the group "Alpha". The Thunder detachment consisted of 30 officers of the special reserve of the KGB of the USSR. All divisions participating in the assault were armed with the most modern at that time. So the capture of Amin's palace was the first case of the use of the RPG-18 "Fly". This grenade launcher has become widely known, and now the image of a soldier with a “Fly” is strongly associated in the mind with the participants of the first and second Chechen wars.

Taking Amin's palace was not an easy task. An infantry brigade consisting of 3 battalions was deployed around the palace, in addition, the protection of the palace was reinforced by a tank battalion and an anti-aircraft regiment, armed with 12 100-mm cannons and a large number of DShK machine guns, given that the palace was on a hill, this artillery could become an insurmountable obstacle for the attackers. A company of Amin's personal guards was located directly in the palace, largely consisting of his relatives. Thus, the forces of the defenders were many times greater than the forces of the attackers.

Operation plan

The plan of the operation provided for the capture of the palace and the destruction of the anti-aircraft regiment's air defense systems. The rest of the units were supposed to be blocked in military camps. For the destruction of air defense systems, 2 AGS-17 crews and an engineering platoon were allocated. The grenade launchers were supposed to cut off the anti-aircraft gunners from the air defense systems located in the positions, at which time the engineering platoon was supposed to undermine them.

A separate group was supposed to capture 3 tanks dug in near the palace. For this purpose, 12 people were allocated. Two snipers who were supposed to remove the guard from the tanks, 2 machine gunners, tank crews. They were supposed to pass by the positions of the 3rd security battalion in a GAZ-66 car and capture the tanks.

The 2nd and 3rd companies of the Muslim battalion and the company of paratroopers attached to them were supposed to block the location of the battalions of the security brigade and the tank regiment. To storm the palace, the first company was involved, which, on its infantry fighting vehicles, was supposed to bring the assault detachments "Thunder" and "Zenith" to the palace.

Storm

The assault on the palace was carried out in accordance with the plan of the operation, the active phase of the battle lasted about an hour, although the shooting did not stop for another day, some soldiers and officers of the infantry brigade did not want to surrender and fought their way into the mountains. Afghan losses amounted to about 200 people killed, including Amin and his son, about 1,700 soldiers surrendered. Our losses amounted to 19 people, 5 from the KGB assault groups, another 5 paratroopers lost, 9 people lost the "Muslim battalion". Almost all members of the assault groups were injured.

The group was the first to leave in a GAZ-66 car, but when the car drove past the location of the 3rd battalion, an alarm was already announced in it, the battalion commander and his deputies stood in the center of the parade ground, the soldiers received weapons and ammunition. The group commander Sakhatov did not lose his head and decided to seize the leadership of the battalion. The car drove to the parade ground at full speed, the scouts instantly captured the Afghan officers and rushed off. When the Afghans came to their senses, it was already too late, having driven away, the group lay down by the road and met the Afghan soldiers who set off in pursuit with fire, advancing in a crowd without the leadership of officers, they became easy prey. The snipers of the group at that time destroyed the sentries near the tanks.

As soon as the shooting began at the positions of the 3rd battalion, a general assault began. Two "Shilka" began to work around the palace, 2 more and AGS crews began to fire at the barracks and courtyards, preventing the soldiers from leaving the barracks. At the same time, motorized infantry advanced to block the barracks. And assault groups advanced to the palace on BMPs. The Afghans quickly came to their senses and opened heavy fire on the infantry fighting vehicles moving along the serpentine, they managed to knock out the first car, the paratrooper had to leave it and climb up the mountain using stairs specially prepared for this case. As a result, the combat vehicles were at the palace 20 minutes after the start of the operation, followed by an assault and a battle for each room of the palace, simultaneously with the start of the assault, the Shilki were supposed to be silent, but this did not happen. The communication channel was filled with requests for help from the commander of one of the armored personnel carriers, who fell into a ditch, so a messenger had to be sent to the Shilok location to cease fire on the palace. An hour later, President Hafizullah Amin was already dead.

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