Chechen war 94 96 year. War in Chechnya: history, beginning and results. Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

Causes are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. A variety of things are usually cited as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya, which had to be urgently prevented; a terrible amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which a terrible amount of oil from the Caspian had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And many other things. But upon closer examination, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

The rights of the Russian-speaking population were taken care of only when they got involved in the war in full. Nobody thought about it before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of operation of the field, now about 2 million tons are mined there a year, this is complete nonsense. Yes, there was a large oil refinery in Chechnya, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian was not particularly popular. As for Chechen crime, this is a myth built from our modern far away. The fact is that the Chechens were incapable of fighting the mafia. Or rather, they are capable to the same extent as they are capable of statehood. The Chechen, anarchist structure of society (from about the 16th century) did not involve building hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-1993, Chechnya suited everyone in Russia in many respects. She arranged the special services as a kind of offshore, where through the Northern Airport it was possible to transport weapons to third world countries; as an offshore, where it was possible to hire militants to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought with Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but the detachments of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya, as an offshore, suited large oil (then still state-owned) companies, because it was possible to drive oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that suits everyone, but what happened? And what happened to us at that time was a completely intra-Moscow event. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, escalated. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it already happened, was Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But here's what to do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is a Chechen. And then the whole propaganda machine, as part of the confrontation with the Parliament, is being rebuilt on “atu of this Chechen Khasbulatov!”

That is, if we return to the texts of 1993, it will turn out that we do not have a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad, and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that it was the White House security department that guarded about 70 more objects, but at the same time they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this intensified to such an extent that if you listen to the radio communications on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the policemen preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune to be captured in Afghanistan, and for some reason he was charged with this). Somehow, the campaign was raised. And it was then that the talk began about the Chechen mafia. Then a surprise happens: we took a little of the White House and burned it a little on October 4, and on the 12th - bang! - and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Many seats in parliament were occupied by communists and Zhirinovites. And then the political technologists (who were not called that at that time) had a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, to return a fallen province to the bosom of the Empire. Nothing raises the rating.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai's plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and shelved) was suddenly taken out of the shed: a plan of negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure, which should ensure the solution of the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that it was very bad with negotiations, but very good with forceful pressure. All sorts of political technologists and analysts from this project were cut off after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Ministry of Nationalities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB). This project was partly supervised by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give money to the anti-Dudaev opposition, they take the money, but Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons - also Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons with crews - on November 26, 1994, Grozny is stormed (supposedly by the opposition, but in fact there were officers hired by the FSK in the Moscow region units in the tanks). Hybrid fight. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, power can be granted to him! ”, Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But unexpectedly, non-natives crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Further, as always, foxes are hidden in the forest, and small blood can only be washed away with big blood. No one addressed the analysis of errors and return to the previous stage during the year. Then the war starts. What's funny, the war did not raise this rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at a background level. And the elections were won in part, because it was then that his team said: “Peace!”, “Peace!”. Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev flies to Moscow to talk, he is taken away at the ABC special facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya, says: "That's it, peace has come." Yeltsin was elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took a third to his team (and Lebed was then the third), appointed him Secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) gave carte blanche to win his former deputy for Transnistria. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. I must say that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin's inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that they were superior in strength, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master's mood with bad news. Therefore, paralysis reigned for three days, during which time the Chechens surprisingly fortified themselves in the city and it was already impossible to knock them out. After that, Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the place, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we have driving force there was one, simple: no oil, no money, nothing else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

It must be said that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, as about a nightmare. We did not pull out our prisoners, although in the autumn of 1996 this could well have been done. Hostage-taking began, the situation was in shambles, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we come to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya, a year later his remains will be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we would use force. The war machine revved up. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade in Dagestan began (this is not funny, at that time the marines were the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south began. And here, even against someone's will, we irresistibly marched towards war, because the car started spinning from the other side. Why? We go over to the other side and notice that in 1997 Maskhadov won in our elections in Chechnya (convincingly won), and Shamil Basayev took the second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not exactly big ones, but he knew how to unite very restless local comrades under him. At some point, Maskhadov let him steer, for half a year (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant successes: the budget filling rate fell 20 times. After that, it seemed his career was over. Resigning, as promised, six months later from this post, he immediately spoke at the congress of the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring powerful expansion goals. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, having turned out to be a political marginal, found himself on the verge of death, not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the beginning of a war, which would inevitably lead to the rallying of everyone and save him from death (at least postpone this death). And so it happened.

In 1999, during the summer, Basayev was already building up his forces in the Tsumadinsky district of Dagestan. And the fact that at the turn of July-August 1999 there bang, could bang a little earlier, could a little later. One way or another, a war began, which was declared a counter-terrorist operation (although there were no explosions in cities yet). I do not want to say that these explosions were staged by the special services, apart from the "Ryazan exercises" the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But it's different. In that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin's rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant, background values. Every week, some kind of brutal statement like "wet in the toilet." And the rating of hop - 7% jumped up until it went to sky-high heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we do not know who arranged all this, but we know exactly who used it.

Ironically, what failed in the first war (using it as an electoral tool) succeeded perfectly in the second. Further war, of course, was not needed by anyone. For example, already before Putin was elected president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! Everything, already a victory! There - in the Komsomol battles. However, the attacks in every possible way reminded of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen power. But attempts to assert that the subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by the special services, they, in my opinion, are also untenable. Nevertheless, we see that here the cause is a thing much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. An uncontrolled power that does not stop at playing with fire in order to maintain this power.

The “Second Chechen War” (officially called the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) is the common name for hostilities in Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date Russian troops entered Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000 year, then, as control is established armed forces Russia over the territory of Chechnya, has grown into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 00:00 on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was canceled.

NCFD - North Caucasian Federal District

The second Chechen war began

August 1999, Chechen militants attacked the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation, this is how the second Chechen war began, terrorist attacks, attacks and incidents also entered a new stage from that moment, many innocent Russians died in August of this year, becoming victims of terrorists.
link: http://russian.people.com.cn/31519/6735684.html

Living history: the beginning of the second Chechen war

It is difficult to name the starting point for the beginning of the war in Chechnya. What will it be? The first attacks of militants on Dagestan? Introduction by Maskhadov of martial law in CRI? The beginning of the bombing of militant bases by our aircraft? Explosions of residential buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk? Or the start of a ground operation of the Russian army?
link: http://www.livejournal.ru/themes/id/21516

Dagestan. The beginning of the second Chechen war

On August 7, 1999, a 1,500-strong group under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded the territory of Dagestan. The militants immediately captured a number of villages in the Botlikh and Tsumadinsky districts. There were no Russian garrisons there, and the small local militia offered no resistance. The militants immediately began to fortify in the occupied territory, intending to use it as a springboard for a further offensive. Their next goal was to unite with their allies - the armed detachments of the Wahhabis, concentrated in the area of ​​​​the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi.
link: http://www.warchechnya.ru/load

Second Chechen war. Beginning of the Chechen crisis

The Chechen crisis is a complex, multifactorial phenomenon. Many of its components are still difficult to assess objectively today. In general, such events cannot have an unambiguous interpretation; each of its participants has its own truth. At the same time, the current degree of knowledge of the problem allows us to draw a number of conclusions. The August events of 1991 in Moscow, followed by the collapse of the USSR, provided the multinational people of the CHIR with a unique chance to change the regime of the communist bureaucracy to a democratic system of power by constitutional means, to determine the status of the republic through a referendum, to find an acceptable form of relations with the Russian Federation, thereby gradually gaining a real economic and political independence within the framework of a renewed federation.
link: http://www.seaofhistory.ru/shists-940-1.html

Causes of the second Chechen war from the point of view of Maskhadov

Ten years ago, the second Chechen war began. The war, which, contrary to the statements of officials, has not yet ended.

Below I publish excerpts from the transcript of an audio letter sent in 2000 by Aslan Maskhadov to his friend and colleague in the Soviet army, who asked not to be named.
link: http://01vyacheslav. livejournal.com/7700.html

Second Chechen War: Russia in the face of terror

After the tragedy at Dubrovka, the Kremlin hastened to announce the "success of a unique operation to free the hostages." Instead of serious organizational conclusions regarding the leadership of law enforcement agencies and special services that allowed the militants to Moscow, awards followed. So the title of Hero of Russia was given to FSB generals V. Pronichev and A. Tikhonov. The first one is Deputy director of the FSB and head of the headquarters for the release of hostages on Dubrovka, the second - the head of the FSB special forces center (which includes the Alfa and Vympel units). In less than 2 years, these same people will “mark themselves” in Beslan - they won’t become Heroes twice, but they won’t bear responsibility for the failed assault and numerous victims among the hostages either. More on this below.
link: http://www.voinenet.ru/voina/istoriya-voiny/784.html

Second Chechen. For Putin?

On September 23, 1999, a presidential decree "On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus region" was signed. Russian Federation". According to the decree, the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus was created to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.
link: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/1829292.html

The Second Chechen War as Part of Putin's PR Campaign

On September 14, 1999, shortly after the explosion of a second residential building in Moscow, Putin spoke at a meeting of the State Duma on the issue of combating terrorism.
link: http://www.razlib.ru/politika/korporacija_

The war against terrorists ended in Chechnya

On April 16, the regime of the counterterrorist operation (CTO), which has been operating in Chechnya since 1999, has been lifted, RIA Novosti reports with reference to the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.
link: http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/16/regime/

"Second Chechen War" officially ended today

Today, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee issued the following statement: “From 00:00 Moscow time on April 16, the Chairman of the Committee, Director of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov canceled the order declaring the territory of the republic as a zone for conducting a counter-terrorist operation.” As a source from the presidential administration told The Morning News correspondent, the NAC made changes to the organization of anti-terrorist activities in the Chechen Republic on the personal instructions of Dmitry Medvedev. The source additionally told The Morning News that this decision was previously agreed with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
link: http://www.utronews.ru/news/politics/001239868105700/

3 years ago the second Chechen war ended

Three years ago, the abolition of the anti-terrorist operation of the federal forces in Chechnya was announced.
link: http://www.rusichi-center.ru/e/2965905-3

10 years ago the second Chechen war began

Everyone has their own date for the start of this war. Dagestanis believe: since August 7, when Basayev's gangs invaded the republic. Muscovites - since September 9, when they blew up the house in Pechatniki. The military - from September 30: the official entry of troops into Chechnya. Everyone has their own date for the end of this war. For the dead, it is long gone. The living have not come from her so far ...
link: http://bosonogoe.ru/blog/1556. html

Second Chechen War and its aftermath

In December 1994, the Russian authorities for the first time made an attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by military means, but after two years of bloody fighting, the army was forced to leave the Chechen Republic. The stubbornness of the Russian authorities, heading for military victory in Chechnya, led to the death of at least 30 thousand Chechens and 4.3 thousand Russian soldiers. This war, the economic damage from which is estimated at 5.5 billion dollars, to a large extent caused the all-Russian economic crisis of August 1998, when the state was unable to meet its exorbitant debts.
link: http://old.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_38/article.php? art=53

The dragon fight is over. The snake chase has begun.

I do not understand why. The second Chechen war was not necessary. The solution to this problem could be based on the agreements signed by General Lebed in Khasavyurt - they could become the basis for achieving long-term peace in Chechnya. I think there are serious doubts that it was the Chechens who blew up the houses in Moscow. As you remember, this was the reason for the start of the second war. However, there are suspicions that it was a provocation of the Russian special services. It is strange that RDX was used in the explosions, which was produced at a factory controlled by the KGB, and then there were incomprehensible exercises in Ryazan. The Chechen war had a negative impact on the credibility of the Russian government and on the attitude towards Russia on the part of democratic states.
link: http://flb.ru/info/34480.html

The Chechen way of "seaside partisans"

The story of the “seaside partisans”, who have been unsuccessfully caught by hundreds of law enforcement officers with helicopters for the third week, and from today by army units with armored vehicles, could have begun 10 years ago. But the Second Chechen War and the petrodollar rain that hit Russia gave the country a reprieve. Now it is over, and it's time to pay old and new bills. If the preliminary information about Roman Muromtsev's group is correct, the Kremlin has for the first time received an organized group of militants on Russian soil who consider the ruling regime an enemy and are ready to kill his minions without hesitation.
link: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article22866.htm

The second Chechen war began exactly 10 years ago. And when did it end? And is it over?

By the time the second war broke out in October 1999, I was 26, with a wife and a two-year-old child who were completely dependent on me. We lived very hard and poor, and I had no time for politics. Then I thought to stay in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the news about the course of the war was rather reassuring: first they expanded the "cordon sanitaire", then they began to take control over the settlements of Chechnya, mostly without a fight. My city, Shali, peacefully let the federal troops in.
link:

The first Chechen war is a military conflict between government troops of the Russian Federation and Chechen armed formations in 1994-1996. The goal of the Russian authorities was to establish their sovereignty over the territory that declared the independence of Chechnya. The Russian army managed to establish its control over most of the Chechen settlements However, the task of suppressing the resistance of the Chechen separatists was not solved. The fighting was characterized big amount casualties among the military and civilians. In 1996, the Russian leadership agreed to sign a peace agreement, according to which they withdrew government troops from Chechnya, and the separatist leaders agreed to postpone the issue of recognizing independence for the future.

The weakening of state power in the USSR during the years of perestroika led to the activation of nationalist movements, including in Chechen-Ingushetia. In 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was created, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was led by General Dzhokhar Dudayev. In 1991, a dual power actually developed in the republic: the National Congress of the Chechen People opposed the official party and state apparatus.

During the August events of 1991, the official leadership of Checheno-Ingushetia supported the State Emergency Committee. After the failure of the attempt to remove M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin from power On September 6, 1991, D. Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Chechen republican state structures, his Dudayev supporters stormed the building of the Supreme Council of Chechen-Ingushetia. At first, the Russian authorities supported the actions of the Dudayevites, but it soon became clear that the new Chechen authorities did not recognize the supremacy of Russian laws on their territory. A massive anti-Russian campaign began in Chechnya, the genocide of the entire non-Chechen population.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of Chechnya, and nationalist sentiments prevailed among the deputies of parliament. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree declaring a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. The situation in the republic escalated - armed groups of separatists blocked the buildings of the internal affairs bodies and state security, military camps, transport arteries. In fact, the state of emergency was not introduced, the withdrawal of Russian military units, parts of the internal troops and the police began from the republic, which was completed by the summer of 1992. At the same time, the separatists seized and plundered a significant part of the military warehouses, getting into their hands large stocks of weapons, including heavy ones.

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the disintegration of Checheno-Ingushetia. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and part of the Sunzhensky district, inhabited by the Ingush, formed the Republic of Ingushetia, whose authorities advocated the further development of their people as part of the Russian Federation. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992. After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

In 1991-1994, Chechnya was actually an independent, but legally unrecognized state. Officially, it was called the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, had state symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem), authorities - the president, parliament, government, courts. On March 12, 1992, its Constitution was adopted, declaring Chechnya an independent secular state. State system Chechnya turned out to be ineffective and took on a criminal character. Armed attacks on railway trains took on a massive scale, which forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop railway traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994. Chechen criminal groups received more than 4 trillion rubles on false advice letters. Hostage-taking and the slave trade became commonplace. Despite the fact that the Chechen authorities did not transfer taxes to the national budget, Chechnya received funds from federal sources, in particular, for the payment of pensions and social benefits. However, the Dudayev leadership spent this money at its own discretion.

The reign of Dzhokhar Dudayev is marked by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population, primarily Russians. Most non-Chechens were forced to leave Chechnya, expelled from their homes, deprived of their property. Anti-Russian propaganda was kindled in the media, Russian cemeteries were desecrated. Both state and Muslim religious figures of independent Chechnya addressed the Chechens with calls to kill Russians. In the camp of the separatists, contradictions related to the division of power were quickly revealed. authoritarian style The leadership of Dzhakhar Dudayev tried to oppose the Parliament. On April 17, 1993, the President of Chechnya announced the dissolution of the parliament and the constitutional court. On June 4 of the same year, an armed detachment of Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev finally dispersed a meeting of deputies of the Chechen parliament and the constitutional court. Thus, a coup d'etat took place in Chechnya, which established the regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev's personal power. It was only in August 1994 that legislative powers were returned to Parliament.

After the coup d'état on June 4, 1993, the formation of an anti-Dudaev opposition began in the northern regions of Chechnya. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which intended to overthrow Dudayev's power by force. However, his troops were defeated. The KNS was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the sole legal authority on the territory of Chechnya. SCHR was recognized Russian authorities who provided him with support, including weapons and volunteers.

Since summer 1994 fighting between the Dudayevites and the forces of the opposition VSChR took on a broad character. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts controlled by the opposition. Tanks and artillery were used in the battles. The military operations went on with varying success, relying on Russian assistance, the opposition twice (September 12 and October 15, 1994) tried to capture Grozny, but to no avail. The Russian authorities sought to prevent the defeat of the opposition and were increasingly drawn into the intra-Chechen conflict. After another failure of the storming of Grozny (November 26, 1994), Russian President B.N. Yeltsin decided to eliminate the Chechen problem by force.

On December 11, 1994, a decree “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic” was signed. On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of parts of the Russian army and internal troops, entered the territory of Chechnya from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia), from the east (from Kizlyar, from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Chechens-Akkins. The western group was also blocked by the inhabitants of Ingushetia, came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, broke through into Chechnya. On December 12, the Mozdok group approached the village of Dolinsky, 10 km from Grozny. Here, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen rocket artillery installation "Grad" and entered the battle for the village.

On December 15, the Kizlyar group reached the village of Tolstoy-Yurt. On December 19, the Western group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky Range. The next day, Dolinsky was occupied, the Mozdok group blockaded Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar group approached the city from the east. Units of the 104th Airborne Division closed the path to Grozny from the side of the Argun Gorge. However, the approaches to the city were not cut from the south.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began, about 250 armored vehicles entered the city. In street battles, its extreme vulnerability was revealed, the Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared for hostilities, there was no reliable communication between the units, there was no interaction and coordination of actions of individual units. The expectation that the separatists would retreat in front of the armored shaft did not materialize. The western and eastern groupings of Russian troops, having lost a significant part of their armored vehicles, were unable to break into the city. In the northern direction, the 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, which were under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, managed to break through to the railway station and the Presidential Palace. But there they were surrounded and defeated.

The Russian troops had to change tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, maneuverable air assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation, went into battle. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By January 9, 1995, the building of the Grozny Oil Institute and the airport were occupied. By January 19, the city center was cleared of separatists, and the Presidential Palace was occupied. The Chechen detachments retreated across the Sunzha River, took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Open paths to the south allowed them to transfer reinforcements and ammunition to Grozny, to quickly escape from under attack.

By early February, the number of Russian troops in Chechnya had increased to 70,000. General Anatoly Kulikov became the commander of the OGV. On February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the blockade of Grozny from the south began. On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between Anatoly Kulikov and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Chechnya Aslan Maskhadov on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. Active fighting in Grozny resumed in the 20th of February, but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city. On March 6, 1995, Shamil Basayev's detachment retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists. As a result of the assault, the city was reduced to ruins. After the fall of Grozny, new state authorities were organized in Chechnya, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, who advocated the preservation of the Chechen Republic as part of the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, Russian troops were establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya. The Russian command was actively negotiating with the local population, urging them to expel the militants from the settlements. Federal troops occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to such tactics, on March 15-23, detachments of Chechen fighters left Argun (March 23), Shali (March 30), Gudermes (March 31). In the western part of Chechnya, since March 10, there have been battles for the village of Bamut. In the same place, on April 7-8, detachments of internal troops and police carried out an operation to clear the village of Samashki from militants, during which civilians were also killed. The operation in Samashki caused a resonance in the media around the world, negatively affected the image of the Russian army, and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the assault on Bamut began. Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. However, the militants kept in their hands the dominant heights above the village. The fighting for Bamut continued until 1996. But, in general, by April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, the separatists had to limit themselves here to purely sabotage and partisan operations.
On April 28, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part. On May 12, actions began to establish control over Mountainous Chechnya. Russian troops attacked the villages of Chiri-Yurt (at the entrance to the Argun Gorge) and Serzhen-Yurt (at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge). A significant superiority in manpower and equipment allowed the Russian troops, despite difficult mountain conditions and enemy resistance, to capture the regional centers of Vedeno (June 3), Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt (June 12). Thus, by the summer of 1995, most of the settlements in Chechnya came under the control of the federal authorities. Detachments of Chechen separatists switched to guerrilla warfare. They largely retained their fighting strength, enjoyed the support of the population of Chechnya, the fight against them was to be long and intense. Chechen fighters widely maneuvered throughout the territory of the republic, already in May 1995 they reappeared near Grozny.

On June 14, 1995, a group of 195 Chechen fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, managed to drive on trucks to the territory of the Stavropol Territory. In the city of Budyonnovsk, after the attack on the building of the city department of internal affairs, the Basayevites occupied the city hospital and herded the captured civilians into it. In total, about two thousand hostages turned out to be in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The leadership of the Russian law enforcement agencies decided to storm the hospital building. The battle lasted about four hours, but the terrorists held main building hospitals with most of the hostages. The second assault also ended in failure. After the failure of the military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin and Shamil Basaev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

After the Budyonny events, on June 19-22, negotiations were held in Grozny between the Russian and Chechen sides, at which it was decided to impose a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. At a new round of negotiations (June 27-30), an agreement was reached there on the exchange of prisoners on the principle of "all for all", the disarmament of separatist detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and the holding of free elections. In general, these agreements proved to be beneficial for the separatists. The moratorium on hostilities tied the hands of the Russian army, combat operations she couldn't carry on. There was no real disarmament of the Chechen armed formations. The militants returned to their villages, where "self-defense units" were created.

In the same time guerrilla war against the federal forces did not stop, local battles were going on throughout the territory of Chechnya. From time to time, detachments of militants occupied large settlements, which had to be liberated using armored vehicles and aircraft. On October 6, 1995, against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General A.A. Romanov was assassinated, he was seriously wounded. This event contributed to the escalation of tension, and to a large extent crossed out hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On the eve of the elections of new bodies of power in the Chechen Republic, scheduled for December, the Russian leadership decided to replace Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov with Doka Zavgaev, who seemed more authoritative former leader of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov, and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14, battles began for the city, but only by December 20, Russian troops cleared Gudermes from militants. Against this background, on December 14-17, 1995, elections to local authorities were held in Chechnya. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. The election was won by Doku Zavgaev, who received over 90% of the votes.

Hopes for the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya as a result of the elections did not come true. On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar in Dagestan. The goal of the militants was a helicopter base and an ammunition depot of federal forces. The terrorists managed to destroy two Mi-8 transport helicopters. When parts of the Russian army and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, the militants seized the hospital and maternity hospital, rounding up about three thousand civilians in them. The federal authorities entered into negotiations with the terrorists and agreed to provide them with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved from Kizlyar. In the village of Pervomaisky, the column was stopped, the militants captured the village. Fruitless negotiations took place from January 11 to January 14, and on January 15 the federal troops launched an assault on Pervomaisky. On January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of Chechen terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship and threatened to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault on Pervomaisky was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities. The battle for Pervomaiskoye lasted for several days, on January 18, under the cover of night, the militants broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, fired at Russian checkpoints. Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, but during the retreat, the separatists took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. By the spring of 1996, it became obvious that the war in Chechnya had become protracted and required large budget investments. In the context of the beginning presidential election campaign in 1996, the continuation of hostilities had a negative impact on the chances of B.N. Yeltsin to keep his post.

On April 21, 1996, Russian aviation managed to destroy Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, and on May 27-28, a meeting of Russian and Chechen delegations was held in Moscow, at which a decision was made on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. On June 10, in Nazran, during the next round of negotiations, a new agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was again temporarily postponed.

After the re-election of B.N. Yeltsin for the presidency of Russia (July 3, 1996), the new Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities in Chechnya. However, by that time, the units of the Russian army in Chechnya had largely lost their combat effectiveness, were disoriented towards the goals of the war, the definition of the enemy. The Chechen population in the bulk did not trust the local and federal authorities, they considered Russian soldiers as occupiers. The increased power of combat formations of Chechen separatists was demonstrated by the August battles of 1996, when Russian troops, despite their superiority in manpower and equipment, were forced to leave the cities of Grozny, Gudermes, and Argun. These failures prompted the federal authorities to end the war. On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

The Khasavyurt Accords effectively granted Chechnya its independence, but its sovereignty was not legally recognized by any country in the world. During the fighting, Russian troops lost 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing. The losses of the Chechen side are estimated at 17 thousand people, the civilian population lost 30-40 thousand people killed. Almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya. The economy, infrastructure, cities and villages of the republic were largely destroyed. After the end of hostilities, Chechnya entered a period of deep crisis, against which the followers of radical and aggressive forms of Islam gained more and more influence.

25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the President of Russia "On measures to ensure the rule of law, law and order and public security on the territory of the Chechen Republic" Russian forces regular army entered the territory of Chechnya. The reference of the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of the events that preceded the start of the war, and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.

The First Chechen War lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya, including 2 thousand people - Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand - militants, and the rest of the losses - civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and military personnel of the federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.

Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control

The turn of the 1980-1990s in the post-Soviet space was marked by a "parade of sovereignties" - the Soviet republics of various levels (both the SSR and the ASSR) adopted declarations of state sovereignty one after another. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin delivered his famous phrase: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."

On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (subsequently transformed into the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People (OKCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKChN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.

During the August putsch of 1991, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, the OKChN, which was in opposition, opposed the GKChP and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between the supporters of the OKChN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).

On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree "On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic." In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the introduction of a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures to implement it failed - two planes with special forces that landed at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.

As early as November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military towns, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and Internal Troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In the autumn of 1992, the situation in the region sharply worsened again, this time due to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny district. Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the neutrality of Chechnya, however, during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.

In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev escalated. The disagreements that emerged eventually led to the dispersal of parliament and the consolidation of opposition politicians Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov escalated into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.

After an unsuccessful assault, the Security Council of the Russian Federation decided to military operation against Chechnya. BN Yeltsin issued an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya would stop, or Russia would be forced to "go to extreme measures."

Preparing for war

Active hostilities on the territory of Chechnya were conducted from the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out pinpoint bombardments of military facilities on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which did not have identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District, the Air Force Command and the Army Aviation Command of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.

On November 30, 1994, President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin signed a secret decree No. 2137s "On measures to restore constitutional law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic", which provided for "disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic" .

According to the text of the decree, from December 1, it was ordered, in particular, "to carry out measures to restore constitutional law and order in the Chechen Republic", to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed formations, to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.

On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev announced that "an operation has begun to forcibly transfer to the central regions of Russia officers of the Russian army who are fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition." On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on "the inviolability of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya."

On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation took place regarding the Chechen events. The meeting adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Chechen Republic and Measures for Its Political Settlement", according to which the activity of the executive branch in resolving the conflict was recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 2166 "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict." By this decree, the president instructed the Russian government "to use all the means available to the state to ensure state security, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of public order, the fight against crime, and the disarmament of all illegal armed formations." On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Decree No. 1360 "On ensuring the state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the disarmament of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus", which assigned a number of ministries and departments the obligation to introduce and maintain a special regime similar to the state of emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without a formal declaration of a state of emergency or martial law.

The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, on December 12, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were to begin in Vladikavkaz.

The beginning of a full-scale military campaign

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure the rule of law, law and order and social activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic", repealing Decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the President addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: "Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism".

On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through the regions of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).

On the same day, December 11, an anti-war rally organized by the Russia's Choice party took place in Moscow. Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky demanded to stop the movement of troops, announced a break with the policy of Boris Yeltsin. A few days later, the communists also came out against the war.

Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located about 10 kilometers north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired from the Grad installation by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian servicemen were killed and 12 wounded, more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The "Grad" installation was destroyed by return fire.

On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and established fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of the shelling of settlements by Russian troops, numerous victims appeared among civilians.

Another column of Russian troops, moving from Dagestan, was stopped on December 11 before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where Akkin Chechens live mainly. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of servicemen were captured and then transferred to Grozny.

A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three APCs and four vehicles were damaged. As a result of return fire, the first civilian casualties appeared. Helicopters fired on the Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the direction of the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. Among the Russian servicemen were killed and wounded, in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. The further advance of the Russian troops would have led to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with the militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These detachments were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI were based, which had heavy weapons.

As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces entrenched themselves along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - Novy Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.

On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire "before the start of a major military operation that could entail great casualties among the peaceful population", receive a written order Supreme Commander. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel-General A. Mityukhin.

On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it proposed that the President of the Russian Federation immediately stop hostilities and the advancement of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Prime Minister of Russia V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his formations.

On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign the document for the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, literally read: "I suggest that you meet without delay with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok." At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 2200 "On the Restoration of Federal Territorial Bodies of Executive Power on the Territory of the Chechen Republic."

Siege and assault on Grozny

Starting from December 18, rocket and bomb strikes were repeatedly carried out on Grozny. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on the quarters where residential buildings were located and obviously there were no military installations. As a result, there were great casualties among the civilian population. Despite the statement of the President of Russia on December 27 to stop the bombing of the city, aviation continued to strike at Grozny.

In the second half of December, Russian federal troops advanced on Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern, and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages in Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.

On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and entrenched themselves in the area of ​​the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.

On December 26, the bombing of settlements in the countryside began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.

On December 26, the creation of a government of the national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev was announced for the second time and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it without putting forward a demand for the withdrawal of troops.

On the same day, at a meeting of the Security Council of Russia, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Prior to this, there were no concrete plans for taking the capital of Chechnya.

On December 27, Boris N. Yeltsin made an address on television to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. BN Yeltsin stated that ND Egorov, AV Kvashnin and SV Stepashin were entrusted with negotiating with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that it was not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began by parts of the Russian army. It was planned to deliver "powerful concentric strikes" by four groups and link up in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment advancing from the north-western direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky were almost completely defeated. More than 100 soldiers were taken prisoner.

As deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke into the center of the city. The defenders of Grozny cut the armored columns into pieces and began to systematically destroy them. Their crews were killed, captured or scattered around the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat."

The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that Russian army during the New Year offensive on Grozny suffered losses in manpower and equipment.

January 2, 1995 press office Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital is "completely controlled by federal troops", "the presidential palace" is blocked.

The war in Chechnya continued until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist acts outside Chechnya (Budennovsk, Kizlyar). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Alexander Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen rebels. As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on a "postponed status" (the question of the status of Chechnya had to be resolved by December 31, 2001). Chechnya has de facto become independent state.

Notes

1. Chechnya: old turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
2. How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
3. The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
4. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic".
5. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Groups on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict".
7. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
8. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
9. 1994: War in Chechnya // General newspaper, 12/18.04.2001.
10. 20 years of the Chechen war // Gazeta.ru, 12/11/2014.
11. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
12. Grozny: New Year's Eve's bloody snow // Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
13. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
14. The signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.

The Chechen War is an armed confrontation between the Armed Forces of Russia and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. These events are among the darkest in recent history Russia. Events unfolded in two campaigns, sometimes two Chechen wars are distinguished: the first - from 1994 to 1996, the second - from 1999 to 2009.

In the fall of 1991, during a coup d'état, the parliament of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was removed from power. At the same time, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into Chechen and Ingush. Elections were held in Chechnya, which were declared illegal by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, as they were more of a performance than an actual election. Thus, the separatists led by Dzhokhar Dudayev broke through to power in Chechnya. On October 27, Dudayev was declared president; on November, the independence of Chechnya was proclaimed. Chechnya was named Ichkeria. In the spring of 1992, the republic's constitution was adopted. This state has not been recognized by any state in the world.

Chechnya was in an economic and political crisis: during 1991-1994, a criminal economy flourished (abductions and human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking), armed confrontation between Dudayev and the opposition took place, ethnic cleansing took place against the non-Chechen population, primarily against Russians. The Russian leadership tried to impose a state of emergency, but to no avail. Several rounds of negotiations also came to nothing. The Chechen leaders wanted the central authorities to recognize an independent Chechnya. Meanwhile, Chechen fighters carried out the seizure of weapons, military depots, and this took place with the consent of the Russian Minister of Defense Grachev.

On December 11, 1994, Russian troops entered the territory of Chechnya. started. The army came from three directions and was aimed at Grozny. On New Year's Eve, troops began to storm Grozny. February 22, 1995 the city was taken, the movement of Russian troops deep into Chechnya began. Dudayev's troops by the summer of 1995 were in a very difficult position. On June 14, a hostage-taking took place in Budenovsk (Stavropol Territory), which led to the start of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the separatists and the delay in military operations on the part of Russia. In April 1996, the leader of the Chechen militants, Dudayev, was eliminated. In August 1996, the separatists managed to capture Grozny. On August 31, 1996, the parties signed an agreement called the Khasavyurt Accords. Under the terms of the agreement, a truce was declared, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, the question of independence was postponed until 2001.

After the end of the first campaign, a regime was established in Chechnya, characterized by a criminal economy (drug trafficking, arms trafficking), officially permitted blood feud, genocide of people of non-Chechen nationality. The ideas of Islamic extremists were spreading in the republic, and outside the territory of Chechnya in Russia, Chechen fighters carry out terrorist attacks. In August 1999, separatist troops led by Basayev and Khattab invaded Dagestan. Russian troops repel the attack and enter Chechnya.
The second Chechen war begins with battles with Basayev and Khattab. On September 30, 1999, troops entered Chechnya. The end of this war is considered to be April 16, 2009, when the CTO regime was abolished in Chechnya. It is sometimes said that the Chechen war is still going on.

The war brought enormous damage to the Russian people. This, first of all, is expressed in the human losses of Russian soldiers and officers, as well as civilians. Losses cannot be accurately calculated. Data vary from 10 to 26 thousand killed soldiers. In any case, the Russian-Chechen war became a personal tragedy for a huge number of people.