Power structures of Afghanistan and prospects for their development (2015). Afghan National Army and Police
This text was prepared on the basis of the analytical reports of the CISA specifically for Afghanistan.Ru.
The formation of the modern armed forces of Afghanistan began in 2002 after the fall of the Taliban regime. This process was extremely slow due to the loss of army traditions during the civil war of 1992-2001, when the political vacuum was filled by their own armed detachments of various political forces participating in the conflict. Initially, these formations were given the status of army corps with a prescribed territorial affiliation. In total, 8 corps were created, of which 6 were based on the formation of the Northern Alliance.
In 2002-2003 with the participation of foreign military in Afghanistan, the process of disarming non-governmental armed groups and the formation of regular armed forces began. Initially, this process was extremely difficult, in 2003 the total payroll of the Afghan army was less than 6,000 people, and there were practically no police forces.
By the beginning of 2015, the payroll of the Afghan National Army reached 178 thousand people, the number of police units - more than 150 thousand people. The law enforcement agencies also include local police units (about 28 thousand people) or local armed self-defense units that have received official status.
To date, the ANA has abandoned the divisional link of subordination and has the following structure: roofing felts (company) - kandak (battalion) - brigade - corps. In total, there are 7 corps in the Afghan army:
- 201 Razliv Corps (Kabul), responsible for the security of the Afghan capital and southeastern provinces (considers it the most trained and combat-ready unit);
- 203 Corps "Thunder" (Gardez), operating on the territory of the regional command (military district) "Gardez", including the provinces of Khost, Paktika, Ghazni;
- 205 Corps "Hero" (Kandahar), area of responsibility includes the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
- 207 Corps "Victory" (Herat), provinces of Herat and Farah;
- 209 Corps "Falcon" (Mazar-i-Sharif);
- 215 Corps (Lashkar Gah).
Each corps includes at least 3 combined-arms brigades, a special-purpose battalion, a headquarters battalion, as well as logistics and corps support units.
The number of armed forces in Afghanistan is quite large in comparison with states with similar populations, and this is explained by the need to fight against terrorist groups within the country.
In the current conditions, the state does not have sufficient own funds to finance army units, therefore, foreign financial assistance plays a significant role in the Afghan military development. In addition, the IRA army is dependent on imports of a number of types of weapons, equipment, equipment, and fuel and lubricants, which are not produced domestically in the required volumes. This circumstance makes the armed forces vulnerable in the event of a change in the foreign policy situation, so Afghanistan is faced with the task of increasing the independence of its own armed forces from external support.
The modern Afghan army has abandoned the forced mobilization practiced during the DRA. Soldiers serve on a contract basis. The first few weeks of service, personnel receive training in army training centers, mainly in the Kabul region, then the training process continues in military units, incl. with the participation of foreign instructors.
In the context of unconventional combat operations against enemy mobile units, special forces (“commandos”) play a special role in the ANA. The Special Operations Group, created in 2011, includes 3-4 brigades. Its center, the "Murihed" base, is located in the province of Wardak. The number of units by 2012 was about 1000-1500 people.
ANA is multinational, but traditionally there is a large presence of ethnic Tajiks in its ranks. In 2013, they accounted for about 33.3% of the total personnel and 39% among the officers, which is significantly higher than their share in the total population of the country. According to unofficial data, among the commanders of brigades and above, ethnic Pashtuns are predominantly represented.
After 2011, the tasks facing the ANA became more complex due to the transfer of responsibility for security from ISAF forces to national security structures. The attacks of extremists in 2015 in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Wardak, which were accompanied by heavy losses, had a particularly negative effect on the mood of the Afghan army. During this period, there is an increase in cases of desertion, which is a shortcoming of the Afghan army over the past 35 years.
Despite the voluntariness of recruitment, the ANA is faced with the problem of unauthorized departure of personnel, both "AWOL" during the period of field work, and with flight without the intention of returning before the expiration of the contract. Usually these problems are related to the conditions of service and threats to life in the course of hostilities against the armed opposition. There is also the problem of "ghost soldiers", associated with the concealment of the facts of desertion or the inclusion of parts of fictitious persons in the lists of personnel in order to obtain additional allowances.
In 2015, a parliamentary investigation found an acute problem of corruption and embezzlement in the armed forces, including the illegal sale of fuel, weapons and vehicles, which can lead to the incapacity of individual units.
The ANA also faces a number of other difficulties caused by the rapid increase in the size of the armed forces in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Many units face a shortage of qualified officers, as well as problems in the training of enlisted personnel. The latter is due, among other things, to difficulties in the development of civil educational institutions and the lack of basic literacy among some of the recruits.
Also, the problem of the Afghan armed forces is the lack of certain types of weapons, including aviation and armored vehicles. This is partly due to the reluctance of foreign partners to provide the national army with some types of weapons that, according to foreign experts, the armed forces will not be able to use effectively at present or there is a risk of their capture by extremists. There is also an opinion that the level of equipment of the Afghan army is regulated by some kind of agreement between the United States and some countries in the region that are not interested in the appearance of a powerful army in Afghanistan. It partially compensates for the lack of equipment by supporting the operations of the Afghan military aviation of NATO, which remains in the country after 2014.
At the moment, a significant part of the military units cannot operate fully without the support of foreign military advisers and NATO units stationed in Afghanistan. Most often, there is a need for transport support, the provision of medical services and operational advice from military specialists.
Undoubtedly, during the period of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the country, the load on the Afghan military will increase, and they will face more and more complex tasks related to countering extremism, especially in the context of new regional threats. The success of solving these tasks will be largely determined by the increase in the combat capability and independence of the Afghan army, as well as the search for new mechanisms for international cooperation and support.
28 years ago, the most combat-ready army in the world at that time was leaving Afghanistan - after ten years of fighting with well-trained Mujahideen and mercenaries from more than thirty countries of the world. The legendary 40th, the basis of the OKSVA (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan), returned home with banners unfurled - undefeated, having fulfilled its military duty to the end. Here, each soldier was a trained fighter, each division was a combat shock fist. But then, alas, this potential remained unclaimed. Many units were disbanded, and the banners covered with glory went to the museum for storage.
In total, the OKSV for the period from December 1979 to February 1989 included about 540 various divisions, formations and organizations. Some of them were withdrawn from Afghanistan and disbanded during the first year of the contingent's stay here. And this process continued until the final withdrawal of troops. Anti-aircraft missile units, tropospheric communications battalions, and numerous construction and installation departments went under the “cutting knife”. 
By the beginning of the first stage of the withdrawal in 1988, the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan included 509 formations, units and institutions with a total number of about 110 thousand people. The final composition of OKSVA consisted of the command of the 40th army with support and maintenance units, 4 divisions, 5 brigades, 4 separate regiments, 6 separate security battalions, 4 aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments , supply teams, pipeline team, medical, repair, construction, apartment maintenance and other parts and institutions.
The contingent mechanism, in addition to the combat component, included a fairly large number of support units. Medics, signalmen, radio direction finders, repairmen, firefighters, Voentorg, bath and laundry plant, mobile bakeries - a full range of live cycle support. The 879th Department of Trade, providing for the everyday needs of the contingent, deployed 177 stores where it was possible to purchase imported food products (albeit canned), tracksuits of famous brands, television and radio equipment (albeit by appointment, but guaranteed). Both the rear and the "front" worked - clearly, like clockwork. And then this whole mechanism, after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, was not needed. Warehouse stocks leaked somewhere, a lot was trivially stolen, a lot leaked to the "national apartments" - the year 1991 was approaching, not only the empire, but also its army was disintegrating. 
The 40th Combined Arms Army itself as a combat unit ceased to exist almost immediately after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. For some period it was recreated as part of the SAVO (Central Asian Military District), then the army became part of the nascent armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, but even here it, already in a greatly truncated composition, with lost command personnel, turned out to be unnecessary. The battle banner of the 40th migrated to the storerooms of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and is taken out to solemn meetings only on the occasion of anniversaries. 
“In the euphoria of the division of the Soviet Union, no one really thought about the combat potential of the already former Soviet army,” says the last commander of the 40th Army, which led it out of Afghanistan, Colonel General Boris Gromov. Each of the new leaders of already sovereign states tried to privatize what was on its territory, including the armed forces. So the 40th Army was almost completely stretched mainly in the Central Asian republics. Something, primarily nuclear weapons, managed to be withdrawn to Russia. Those units and subunits that were originally part of OKSVA from territories in the central part of the country or in Siberia and the Far East, managed to return to their places of previous deployment and remained in service . But in general, the "Afghan" army could not be saved. But it is precisely with her experience, unique achievements of military operations in the mountains, that it would be possible not only to avoid losses in Chechnya, but also to prevent the very fact of an armed conflict. We know the result - untrained and untrained boys were thrown into the battle, forgetting that the battle could have been stopped even before it began. And such a task was within the power of the units of the 40th Army at that time. 
There are also historical analogies here. By August 1945, the Soviet command had transferred large forces of troops liberated on the western front to Manchuria. Having a wealth of experience in combat operations, coupled with the high morale of the victors, the Soviet soldiers defeated the million-strong Japanese Kwantung Army in less than two months. The victory was given not by numerical superiority, but by high professionalism, coherence and discipline. All these qualities, which were among the soldiers and officers of the 40th Army after Afghanistan, remained unclaimed.
Of the largest and most combat formations in the OKSVA - motorized rifle divisions of the 5th, 108th, 201st divisions, only the latter was more fortunate in terms of preserving both the name and tradition. The division, withdrawn to the territory of Tajikistan in 1989, which successfully proved itself during the civil war in this republic to ensure the safety of civilians and covered the border from Afghanistan, turned into a Russian military base in the process of reform. The 201st has retained its serial number and is not only a guarantor of stability in this region, but also the security of Russia's southern borders. 
The 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was withdrawn after Afghanistan to the territory of Turkmenistan, after the collapse of the USSR became a national unit within the Ministry of Defense of this republic with a location in the city of Kushka. The division lost its historical number. The 108th MSD, which since January 1992 became part of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, had a practically similar fate and was disbanded in December 1993. Now its former regiments are part of the 1st Army Corps in Samarkand. The 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle brigades, which suffered this fate back in 1988, also turned out to be disbanded, but the formations themselves did not disappear without a trace, but merged into their former motorized rifle divisions.
The 103rd Airborne Division was not part of the 40th Army, as well as the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment (Bagram), was operationally subordinate, but it was the paratroopers who always participated in the most complex and responsible operations. They were among the last to leave the territory of Afghanistan - covering the withdrawal of the main forces. Even before 1991, the 103rd Airborne Division, withdrawn to Belarus (headquarters in Vitebsk), was transferred to the KGB Border Troops of the USSR and performed tasks on the border with Iran on the territory of Azerbaijan. And after the collapse of the country, it became part of the armed forces of Belarus and its regiments were transformed into separate guards mobile brigades, and the former 317th RAP inherited the Banner of the legendary unit. Now it is in the 103rd Guards Airborne Brigade. 
An interesting fate developed for the 345th Airborne Regiment, which, shortly after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, happened to be part of the 104th and 7th airborne divisions and had to perform combat missions in Transcaucasia and Abkhazia. In May 1998, the 50th military base was created on the basis of the regiment, which was soon renamed the 10th peacekeeping airborne regiment. Plans for the formation of the 345th Separate Air Assault Brigade are still under consideration. From the traditions of the regiment remained the annual meeting on February 11 at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow - at exactly 11 am. On this day, the regiment crossed the border from Afghanistan, and the commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Valery Vostrotin, told fellow soldiers: "We'll meet on the 11th at 11 at the Bolshoi." For 28 years, this tradition has remained unchanged. The 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade (Gardez-Ghazni) also remained in combat formation. She also had to go through a difficult path in “peaceful life”, but was lucky to remain in the Airborne Forces, which saved the brigade from disbandment. Now it still bears the proud name of the Red Banner Order of Kutuzov and the Patriotic War of the Don Cossack Airborne Assault Brigade and is stationed in the glorious city of Kamyshin. 
... Only the memory of the "Afghans" was not disbanded, for whom February 15 is a special day. Someone will celebrate it at a gala reception in the Kremlin, someone will raise a glass for the "third toast" in the company of friends. Here in Khimki, near Moscow, veterans will traditionally visit all the cemeteries where eight of their countrymen are buried, then they will gather at the only monument in Russia to the fallen special forces and commemorate their friends. And there will be no differences between them, even if the current head of the Interregional Public Organization "Union of Combat Veterans" Sergei Makarov was a simple soldier in Afghanistan, and his current deputy Alexander Ponamarev served as an officer there. On this day, all "Afghans" are equal.
"Foreign military review" No. 7.2006 (pp. 15-18)
Colonel A. VASILIEV,
candidate of military sciences
The military-political leadership (MPR) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), in the interests of stabilizing the situation and creating conditions for the implementation of plans for the economic and social development of the country, is interested in the speedy formation of national armed forces. At the same time, in the course of the practical implementation of plans developed with the participation of the United States and Western countries to speed up the construction of a 70,000-strong Afghan National Army (AHA) by the beginning of 2007, the VPR encountered serious difficulties. The low combat skills of the personnel of the new army against the background of the growing desertion of soldiers and sergeants, especially in units and units taking part in the hostilities against the Taliban, an acute shortage of ammunition, the lack of military equipment to equip the units being put into operation forced the command of the American armed forces to revise the previously planned deadlines for the final formation of the AHA, pushing them to a later time. According to calculations by US military advisers, this army will reach its planned size only by May 2008, and full operational readiness - only by September 2009.
The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the IRA continue to recruit departments (operational, organizational and mobilization, training and combat training of troops, personnel, financial, external relations, military procurement and supplies, medical, parliamentary and public relations, control and revision) and commands (intelligence, communications, rear and supply). To date, the central office of the Moscow Region is staffed by 55 percent. (1,650 military personnel out of 3,000 assigned by the state), and the General Staff, including its command and control, - only 35 percent. (2,450 out of 7,000). As of the end of 2005, the AHA had reached 30,663 members.
According to the decree of the President of the IRA H. Karzai of December 2, 2002 "On the creation of the Afghan national army" and the new organizational and staff structure developed in accordance with it, the country's armed forces are represented by only two types - the ground forces and the air force. The basis of the combat power of the AHA should be the SV, including five army corps (AK, 13 brigades) with a total strength of 46 thousand people. At present, the headquarters of all the corps and the nine brigades that make up them have been formed and number 19,790 people.
The most combat-ready unit is 201 AK. However, it is currently represented by almost only two brigades (1st light infantry brigade (lpbr) and 3rd rapid reaction brigade), while in the 2 lpbr, after sending four battalions to recruit other corps that are under formations, the headquarters of the brigade and the fire support battalion (BOP) were preserved.
Two light infantry brigades each, the second of which are incomplete, are available in both 203 and 205 AKs, and it is planned to equip them with third brigades (on a priority basis) by May 2006 and April 2007, respectively. 2 lpbr 201 AK will be deployed again only by September-October 2006.
In 207 and 209 AK at the moment there is only one LPBR each. Their additional staffing will begin only after the completion of this process in the cities of Kandahar, Kabul and Gardez.
Currently, the IRA Armed Forces are armed with 44 T-62 tanks, 41 BMP-1, 13 M-113 armored personnel carriers, 55 BRDM-2, 52 D-30 122-mm howitzers, 120 mortars of various calibers. Besides,
a large number of equipment is in a dismantled state and is used as spare parts.
In addition, according to a long-term plan for the phased construction of AHA ground forces developed by US military advisers, four regional commands will be deployed by 2010: two by the end of 2008 - in the cities of Kandahar and Gardez and two by 2010 - in the cities of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.
The AHA Air Corps (AC) will organizationally consist of an air transport and helicopter "wing", an engineering battalion and an air control group. In addition, it is planned to create four air bases at the airfields of Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Gardez, where army corps are deployed. The VK aviation fleet has five An-32 (An-26) aircraft, seven Mi-8 and six Mi-24 helicopters, and two L-39 training aircraft. The issue of equipping the air corps with combat aircraft is not yet on the agenda. As of December 1, 2005, the number of personnel of the VK was 189 people, and by 2009 it will be increased to 3,000 military personnel. The largest airfields - Bagram, Kandahar and Shindand - remain under the control of the Americans for an indefinite period.
With funding provided primarily by the United States, foreign instructors train personnel for the newly formed AHA battalions at the Kabul Military Training Center (HTC). In total, it is planned to prepare it for 78 battalions, including infantry, tank, mechanized, fire support, combat support, transport. As of December 1, 2005, only 44 battalions had received training at the HCU. The rest of the servicemen will be trained in accordance with the schedule developed by US military advisers. At the same time, it is planned to increase its duration in the CVUV from the current 14 to 16 weeks, and reduce the number of units in one stream from five to four.
According to the forecasts of Western experts, the pace of AHA construction in 2006 will be slowed down due to a number of objective factors. Americans are concerned about the low level of professional training of personnel. The formed brigades and battalions, according to US advisers, are not capable of conducting independent combat operations. In their opinion, one of the main reasons for this is the unresolved issues of logistics for the newly formed units. So, when the 44th battalion (according to the organizational and staffing structure is a fire support battalion (BOP)) was released from the KVUTs in November 2005, only eight vehicles were allocated from the 120 units of armored vehicles required by the state. In addition to them, the BOP did not receive a single howitzer (8 122-mm D-30s are required by the state), not a single BRDM-2 (there should be eight), not a single piece of engineering or special equipment (22 are required), as well as anti-tank weapons. The troops are experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition for tank guns (T-62) and 122-mm D-30 howitzers, shots for BMP-1 (BMP-2), RPG-7, mines for 82- and 120-mm mortars.
The Americans, in an effort to limit Russian participation in the creation of the Afghan armed forces, are attempting to solve the problem of meeting the AHA's primary needs in weapons and military equipment by supplying Soviet-made samples to the country from former Warsaw Pact countries that have expressed a desire to join NATO. Deliveries of spare parts for armored vehicles are carried out from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, artillery-from Slovakia and Mongolia, small arms - from the Czech Republic and Hungary.
At the same time, a significant part of the Afghan generals adhere to somewhat different positions, which are in favor of expanding the independence of the IRA Defense Ministry in resolving the issues of training and using troops, the formation and expenditure of defense budget items, and determining priority partners for themselves in military-technical cooperation. Among them were named Russia, China and India.
The difficulties of military construction in Afghanistan, along with the above reasons, are also explained by insufficient funding for this process. MoD IRA budget for the new fiscal year (beginning March 21, 2006), including assistance
donor countries, compared with the current period, it is expected to increase by almost 50 percent, after which it should amount to about 1.4 billion US dollars. At the same time, the Afghan share in it will reach 165 million dollars (8 billion afghani).
Taking into account all the circumstances noted above, military construction inAfghanistan will take at least another five to seven years. The direction and content of this process, as well as the formulation of the military-political doctrine of the state, will be determined by the results of the confrontation between representatives of the main political groups in the country's leadership, the maintenance of the US military presence on Afghan territory, as well as the capabilities and nature of the sources of funding for the army and supplies of weapons and military equipment. ®
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In the context of a chronically unstable situation in the country and the ongoing armed confrontation with the opposition forces, one of the most important tasks of the Afghan leadership is to increase the efficiency and combat effectiveness of the national security forces, which are based on the armed forces (Afghan National Army, ANA). The construction of the ANA is carried out on the basis of the national development strategy of the republic and the national military strategy developed on its basis. We also note that the process of creating the Afghan armed forces took place and continues to take place with the most active participation, financial and technical assistance from the United States and its NATO allies.
Today, the ANA (191 thousand people) consists of ground forces, the Air Force (National Air Corps), special operations forces (SOF) and various auxiliary formations. By 2014, the size of the army is planned to be increased to 195 thousand people. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is the President of Afghanistan, who directs them through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
The basis of the ANA is the ground forces (130 thousand people). Their combat composition is represented by the headquarters of six army corps (AK, the corps includes 23 brigades), the 111th division and three separate brigades (security, military police, cargo support and escort). In military-operational terms, the territory of Afghanistan is divided into six zones of responsibility of the AK and the zone of Kabul (111th division). The main tactical unit in the ANA is a battalion of up to 600 people. The battalions are part of the brigades (3-5 thousand people each). The ground forces are armed with approximately 50 T-62 tanks, T-55 tanks, about 1000 field artillery guns, mortars and MLRS, including 194 122-mm D-30 howitzers, about 200 armored combat vehicles (M-113 armored personnel carriers and BTR-80, BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored vehicles "Humvee"). Air defense means are represented by a small number of ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", ZU-23-2 installations and anti-aircraft machine guns. The exact number of weapons is unknown, but, according to experts, the ANA lacks artillery and armored vehicles, modern means of communication, and engineering equipment.
The Air Force (6 thousand people) consists of three air wings and two air support squadrons. There are more than 40 Mi-17 multi-purpose helicopters, 7 Mi-35 combat helicopters, up to 50 military transport (An-12, An-32, An-26) and up to 10 combat training (L-39) aircraft in service. There are plans by 2016 to increase the strength of the Air Force to 8 thousand people, and the number of aircraft - up to 200 vehicles. The Afghan Air Force has up to 450 American advisers and technicians. The Pentagon decided to continue cooperation with Rosoboronexport on the purchase of Mi-17 helicopters, since no other alternative solutions were found that would meet the requirements of the Afghan military. The United States has already purchased about 70 of these machines for the ANA Air Force and wants to buy 30 more. In addition, 20 Brazilian A-29 (EMB-314 Super Tucano) combat training aircraft will be purchased. They will be used both for pilot training and as light attack aircraft. According to the US military, the Afghan Air Force will not be able to operate independently until 2016-2017.
The ANA Special Operations Forces began to be created in 2007. Currently, the SOF has a special forces division (8 battalions). It is planned to increase the number of battalions to 15 in three brigades. Afghan special forces are fully equipped with American weapons and special equipment.
The ANA is staffed by volunteers, mostly males aged 22 to 30, who enter into a contract with the Ministry of Defense for a period of four years. The Afghan constitution and law on parties prohibit political parties and associations from having their own armed formations, and party members do not have the right to hold command posts in the army, interior ministry, and security services.
The troops are experiencing a chronic shortage of both personnel in general and especially qualified personnel in various fields. The number of volunteers entering the ANA does not cover the needs of the army due to the low level of pay. Many formations and units have a significant shortage of personnel. The dropout rate for recruits is as high as 25 percent. Many soldiers have poor physical training. A large number (up to 80%) of illiterate and illiterate soldiers serve in the army. In the troops there are frictions between servicemen on the basis of ethnic and religious affiliation. Desertion remains a characteristic phenomenon, especially among privates and sergeants. Thus, according to the Afghan command, more than 400 servicemen and police officers desert from the army and police every month. The combat losses of personnel of power structures are also growing. Some of the soldiers are linked to the Taliban militants. Among the military, including officers, there is growing uncertainty about the possibility of achieving victory over the armed opposition. The command regularly purges the army of persons suspected of disloyalty to the current government. Corruption has become widespread in the armed forces.
Training of Afghan military personnel is carried out according to NATO standards with the broad participation of advisers and instructors from the countries of the alliance, primarily the United States (about 7 thousand people in total, including over 5 thousand American military personnel). Some Afghan officers are being trained abroad, mainly in Western countries. The process of training military personnel is organized in many cases at a low quality level. The troops and military educational institutions lack instructors and teachers, including foreign ones. The educational and material base for the training of troops and military personnel does not always meet modern requirements. Carrying out measures for the combat training of units and subunits is also hampered by the fact that the troops are almost constantly involved in combat operations against the forces of the armed opposition and various measures to ensure security. For the better, the training and equipment of special forces units stands out. Joint command-staff and tactical exercises with the troops of the Western coalition are of great importance for increasing the combat capability of the ANA, especially for improving the quality of command and control.
A significant part of weapons and military equipment is in a dismantled state and is used as spare parts. In general, ANA weapons require an extension of the operational life, deep modernization or replacement with new models. There continues to be a shortage of various types of ammunition. The situation with the repair of equipment is bad. The rear, medical and food supply are at a low level. The shortage of weapons and equipment hinders the creation of combat-ready formations and units. At the same time, the Afghan government does not have large-scale plans to rearm the army and the necessary funds for this.
Afghanistan in matters of technical equipment of the army is completely dependent on the supply of weapons and military equipment from abroad. Moreover, the bulk of military aid comes to Afghanistan from the United States or through American mediation. And this state of affairs will continue for the foreseeable future. Thus, after 2014, when foreign troops will have to leave the country, the annual US military aid will amount to 2.3-2.7 billion dollars. At the same time, Afghanistan's military budget in 2012 amounted to $1.8 billion. Moreover, the bulk of these funds went to the payment of monetary allowances and various benefits to military personnel.
On June 18, 2013, the command of the Western coalition troops placed the entire territory of the country under the control of the Afghan security forces. Today, approximately 80 percent of combat operations in Afghanistan are carried out by the national army and security forces. However, the combat capability of the ANA is at a low level. Troops and command and control bodies are not able to fully solve the tasks assigned to them. Planning and directing combat operations, especially large ones, are usually carried out by officers from NATO countries. Foreign military experts note some progress in improving the combat capability of the Afghan army, but consider it "very slow."
Thus, today the Afghan Armed Forces, in terms of their condition (the number of personnel, the quality of their training, the availability of the necessary weapons and military equipment, the moral and psychological state of soldiers and officers, as well as a number of other parameters) do not meet the tasks they face. And this situation will continue in the near future. All this does not allow us to consider the ANA as a reliable and fully capable support of the power existing in the country.
SCHEMEdeployment of formations and units of the DRA army.
(as of 1979)
The RA Armed Forces consisted of regular troops (ground troops, air force and air defense troops) and auxiliary troops (military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security).
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - Head of State - Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Chairman of the Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland.
Direct leadership is entrusted to the Minister of Defense.
General management was carried out by the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff was in charge of: general operational command and control of troops, issues of mobilization, combat and operational training.
Ground troops.
Combat strength: infantry divisions (pd) -10, mountain infantry divisions (gpd) - 1, separate brigades -4, artillery brigades (abr) - 1, separate regiments - 11.
The highest tactical formation is an army corps of various combat strengths (2-3 infantry divisions, corps units, units of combat, technical and logistic support and maintenance). The divisions were consolidated into three army corps, covering the main operational areas with Pakistan: 1st AK - Jellalabad (Khyber Pass), 2nd AK - Kandahar, 3rd AK - Gardez. The leadership of the ground forces of the Kabul garrison was carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the DRA through the command of the Central Army Corps - CAC.
The regular strength of the ground forces as of 1979 is about 150 thousand people. The staffing of the units at the end of December 1979 was about 60% (according to the memoirs of advisers, the units remote from the headquarters of the divisions were completed no more than 40 - 50%).
Organizationally, the infantry division consisted of 3 infantry (motorized) regiments, an artillery regiment, separate tank, reconnaissance, engineering and sapper battalions, a communications battalion, an anti-aircraft division, combat, rear and technical support units.
Infantry regiment of three battalions (3 companies each) composition. The regular strength of the infantry regiment was about 130 officers and 1.5 thousand soldiers, the division was about 7 thousand people.
The tank brigade consisted of 3 tank battalions, an infantry fighting vehicle battalion, and auxiliary companies, platoons and services: remrota, vehicle fleet, fuel and lubricants service, fin. service, etc. The staff strength of the brigade is up to 750 people.
Air Force and Air Defense Forces.
Consisted of three types of troops: air force (Air Force); anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missile troops (ZA and ZRV); radio engineering troops (RTV). The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Air Defense exercised leadership through the Air Force Commander (the headquarters of the combat and auxiliary aviation commands) and the Air Defense Commander (the headquarters of the Air Defense Command). The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Air Defense was also subordinate to the flight technical school (LTSH), which was later transformed into the Air Force and Air Defense School.
Combat line-up:
Air Force: aviation regiments - 6;
Air defense: - ZRA and ZRV: anti-aircraft missile brigade -1, anti-aircraft artillery regiment - 2 (77 zenap: 100 mm guns -12, twin 23 mm ZPU-2 automatic installations - 16), individual divisions ZA - 4.
- RTV consisted of a regiment and 2 separate radio engineering battalions.
The total number of Air Force and Air Defense at the end of 1979 was about 120 fighters and fighter-bombers, about 30 bombers, 20 transport aircraft, 25 helicopters, about 15 thousand people.
In Bagram, an aircraft repair plant (ARZ) operated, specializing in the MiG-17, and the training base of the LTS was located in Kabul.
The Bagram air garrison was considered the most combat-ready.
With the intensification of the organized actions of the rebels, the importance of air travel increased. In this situation, in order to provide for the Afghan army, as well as to solve priority economic tasks, a military-technical aviation detachment of 10 An-12 aircraft arrived at the disposal of the advisory apparatus. It was led by experienced pilots Mamatov, Ishgiuratov and others. The detachment was based at the Bagram airfield.
In order to organize interaction with ground forces and increase the effectiveness of the combat use of aviation for the period of hostilities, it was practiced to send aviation representatives and command and control groups to divisions and corps.
Acquisition of aircraft.
The mobilization and recruitment of troops is entrusted to the mobilization department of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. There were no special territorial bodies responsible for the organization of conscription, registration of military personnel and reservists. The call (by trapping) of those liable for military service was entrusted to the commanders of formations and units. By the spring of 1979, the work of recruiting centers was organized, but this did not solve the problem of recruiting troops and the system of "catching" existed along with the call.
Mobilization opportunities - about 1 million people.
Combat training.
The training of officers was carried out at the Harbi Pukhantun Joint Military School, officer courses, at the Polytechnic Institute, at the Military Medical Faculty of Kabul University, in educational units and subunits and military educational institutions of the Soviet Union and other foreign countries. The military lyceum (like the Suvorov School) prepared boys in grades 5-12 for officer service.
Combat training of units was carried out according to training programs developed by Soviet military specialists and advisers, which were copies of the programs of the Soviet Army of the 60s, without taking into account the characteristics of the terrain and the level of educational training of personnel. The educational material and technical base was practically absent.
Regimental and divisional artillery are practically incapable of performing fire missions from closed firing positions.
On the territory of the 4th tank brigade there was a training center - the so-called. "courses -B". The courses provided training for specialists of tank units.
The training of flight and technical personnel was carried out mainly in the USSR (pilots - in Kyrgyzstan and the Kuban, engineers - in Ukraine). The training of helicopter pilots on the Mi-25 and Mi-24 was carried out in the USSR, additional training was carried out on the spot by an instructor group of 3 pilots and 4 engineers. Afghan pilots gained combat experience in the difficult conditions of the civil war. Realizing that they were fighting against their own fellow citizens, they were far from always fully aware of the tasks and goals of this struggle. Many of them evaded assignments for various reasons, including religious ones. Taking advantage of the lack of control over the results of strikes, some pilots reported on the accomplishment of the task, but in fact they dropped deadly cargo in deserted areas. Often the bombing was carried out from heights below the minimum allowable, and the bombs fell to the ground without exploding. However, in general, the Air Force and Air Defense were loyal to the new leadership. Cases of hijacking aircraft and the direct transition of aviators to the rebels in 1978-1979. did not have.
Armament and military equipment.
The Afghan army was adequately equipped with Soviet-made military equipment. In service consisted of:
- tanks of various modifications (T-34/85, T-55, T-62) - about 600 units, incl. T-62 - 92 units;
- armored vehicles (BTR-60, BRDM, BMP-1, BTR-152) - about 300 units;
- artillery pieces - caliber 76 mm and above - about 1500 units.
To increase the mobility of the "K" regiments, they were armed with ZIL-157 vehicles.
A significant part of the weapons and military equipment was out of order due to the low level of technical training of personnel, gross violation of the rules of operation and the frequency of maintenance. The personnel neglected her savings. At the slightest malfunction, it was left unattended, no measures were taken for restoration, or it was dismantled, plundered and was unsuitable for further operation.
Organization of life.
Units and subunits were located in military camps. In large garrisons (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar), units were located in the barracks. The barracks were low adobe buildings. Soldiers slept on wicker beds. Cooking (soup-shurpa and rice for the main course with gravy) was carried out at food stations. Officers and soldiers ate separately. Meat was included in the diet of officers daily. The soldiers were supposed to eat meat twice a week.
In remote garrisons, in addition to the barracks, soldiers could be located in dugouts and small tents. Most of the soldiers had no beds. Soldiers slept on the floor or in yards on mattresses and bedding brought from home during the call. Dining room, kitchen, bath were absent. The soldiers cooked their own food on fires in small cauldrons.
The officers were treated at the Charsad Bistar Central Military Hospital.
Moral and psychological state.
The attitude of various categories of officers to the April Revolution was ambiguous. The materially secure part of the officer corps immediately after the April Revolution left the army and took a wait-and-see position. Some of them (mostly senior officers) occupied secondary economic or staff positions that did not correspond to their rank, since the salary of an officer was determined not by the position held, but by his rank. Some officers emigrated or went over to the side of the counter-revolution.
The lack of unity in the PDPA had a negative effect on the relationship between the officers, of which they were members. Most of the officers, especially junior officers, members of the PDPA (Khalk faction) unconditionally supported the revolution and had high hopes for its results. Having seized power, the Khalkovites accused the Parchamites of passivity and evading active struggle. Following such an accusation, they began to diligently root out their allies from the party and the state apparatus. Repressions followed, up to the physical destruction of the Parchamists, which forced the members of this faction to go underground and hide their affiliation with it.
Intra-party struggle in the form of arrests and shake-ups of army personnel (at least 10 during 1978-1979) led to command positions (including the Ministry of Defense, command of corps, divisions and brigades) a significant number of officers (mainly on the basis of family ties or personal loyalty management) who do not have the appropriate knowledge and skills. The number of officers was reduced by almost 10 times, the army by more than 2 times. The command staff of the army broke up into separate groups, depending on the commitment to party leaders. Many openly opposed the PDPA.
The soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction with the land reform.
Fighting troops.
Under the conditions of the unfolding armed opposition to state reforms, the army was entrusted with the protection of a large number of objects (county centers, infrastructure facilities), which could be carried out only if small garrisons were created with a force from a platoon to a battalion. The units allocated for protection were at a considerable distance from each other and had no communication not only among themselves, but also with the headquarters of their units. The RA government, in essence, controlled only the centers of the provinces, relying on the garrisons stationed there. In a number of county and even provincial centers, the garrisons were blocked by the rebels - Urgun, Asadabad, Khost. In the places of permanent deployment of the divisions, up to two infantry battalions remained, which accompanied the cargo necessary to maintain the vital activity of the units. Often such detachments had to fight their way through the territory controlled by the rebels. The small number and dispersion of the garrisons did not allow for combat training and educational work. At the same time, such conditions were favorable for the impact of enemy propaganda on personnel.
Projectionism and a dependent position of the leadership of the republic and the passivity of the military authorities led to the fact that by mid-1979 the regular army of about 100 thousand people actually went on the defensive against the disunited and poorly armed opposition detachments, numbering about 25-40 thousand people.
State border protection.
Total border length approx. 5,529 km, including from the USSR approx. 2,350 km
There were no border troops as a branch of service or type of armed forces. There was no single body responsible for organizing border protection and managing border battalions in the country. As part of the infantry divisions, there was a department of the border service, which was responsible for protecting only a separate section of the border. One or two border battalions were subordinate to him, which served on the main roads connecting Afghanistan with other states and through which the crossing of the state border was officially allowed. In total, there were about 15 border battalions in the Armed Forces, staffed by 30-50%. Small battalions, not equipped with means of transportation and communications, could not protect the state border and it was not controlled (except for the checkpoint).
To a large extent, the protection of the state border was entrusted to the tribes living along it, for pay and benefits. In addition, the state provided them with weapons and ammunition. After the April Revolution, the new government stopped funding and providing border tribes. The spread of compulsory conscription to the border tribes was considered by them as an encroachment on centuries-old traditions and threw the tribal armed formations into the ranks of the opposition. The tribal militias ceased to fulfill the traditional role of border guards.
Parts and divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In August 1978, with the help of advisers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, instead of the previously existing police and gendarmerie, the formation of "Tsarandoi" and the local government apparatus began. It was planned to entrust "Tsaranda" with duties to combat banditry (units were created following the example of our "Alpha" - their training was assigned to employees of the Balashikha school), the protection of communications (roads, bridges, tunnels and other government facilities). In addition to these functions, it was planned to entrust the protection of the state border.
Already in the spring of 1979, the formation of the Main Directorate for the Defense of the Revolution began, to which operational battalions were subordinate (it was planned to create 12 battalions with a total number of 9-10 thousand people, BRDM - 72 units, 82 mm mortars - 72 units), a training regiment for training personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs .
As of October 1979, several subdivisions (companies of 60-80 people each) of "Tsarandoi" (with a total number of about 1600 people) were created, which were entrusted with the duties of combating banditry, but in fact were engaged in the protection of local authorities (at the level of provincial centers) . They were armed with PPSh assault rifles and carbines. Up to 2 battalions of "Tsarandoy" performed tasks for the protection of facilities in Kabul.
Since 1972, the number of Soviet military specialists and consultants has been about 100 people.
The training of national military cadres was organized in the USSR and locally. The provision of economic assistance and the training of Afghan military personnel allowed the USSR to become the largest supplier of financial resources and technical assistance. Gradually, Afghanistan found itself in the sphere of Soviet influence. With the coming to power of M. Daud, consultants were admitted to the Moscow Region and the military command and control bodies of the Ground Forces: MO - 11, in army corps -3, in divisions 21 (3 consultants for each division completed at least 50-60%). Lieutenant General L. Gorelov was appointed chief military adviser from October 1975 to December 4, 1979.
By 1978, there were more than 2,000 Soviet technical and economic specialists in Afghanistan.
Immediately after the Saur Revolution (April 27, 1978), at the request of the Afghan leaders, the number of Soviet specialists began to increase sharply. The signing of an intergovernmental agreement on military advisers (in May 1978) made it possible to change their status (instead of advisers-advisers), tasks and number (up to 400 people). Almost immediately after that, advisers were sent to Afghanistan to form the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the DRA. Major General V. Zaplatin was sent as an adviser to the head of the main political department of the Afghan army. By August 1978, political bodies of corps, divisions and brigades were created.
In January 1979, 409 specialists and advisers were working in Afghanistan.
By the end of June, their numbers increased dramatically: almost 2,500 soldiers. advisers and 2000 advisers from other departments and power structures of the USSR.
The Tsarandoy Soviet apparatus was subordinate to the KGB representation in Afghanistan.
KGB officers also worked under cover of the diplomatic apparatus. In addition, advisers from the central apparatus of the KGB, incl. teachers of the Balashikha school (KUOS).
It should be noted that there is practically no information on the activities of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff during this period in Afghanistan. At the same time, the military analysts of the General Staff correctly assessed the situation in Afghanistan, which indicates the presence and effective work of the GRU residency.
Before the PDPA came to power, the Soviet apparatus was inviolable. For an encroachment on the life of a military adviser, all the relatives of the assassin were to be destroyed. Beginning in March 1979, the position of advisers (many living there with their families) in outlying provinces was very precarious. They are exposed to both shelling and the risk of being captured by the rebels and the possible betrayal of their sub-Soviet. Moral and psychological pressure from isolation and remoteness from the center. However, they performed their duty conscientiously.
Ground troops.
1 AK (headquarters - Kabul):
- 7 pd (Kabul, Rishkhor garrison - southwestern outskirts of Kabul): 38, 45 (Pulo-Alam), 75 (Pulo-Allam) bp, 3 ap (Kabul), 170 rebate (Kabul); 8 pd: 32, 71, 76 p; 11 pd (Jalalabad): 66 pp, 77 pp, 7 ap; 190 ap (Kabul).
2 AK (Kandahar):
- 5 pd; 7 brigade; 43 gpp; 191 app; oreadn
3 AK (Gardez)
- 12 pd (Gardez): 67 pp (Gardez); 25 pd (Gardez): 18 pp (Khost), 59 ap; 32 gpp; 192 ap
Parts of central subordination:
- 18 pd (Mazar-i-Sharif); 17 pd (Herat); 14 pd (Ghazni): 15, 58 pp, pp (Urgun); 20 pts (Baglan): 10 pts (Puli-Khumri), 31 pts ((Kunduz, units are scattered), 24 pts (Faizabad), 27 pts??, 4 ap (Nakhrin); 9th rpd (Asadabad): 30 gpp (Asmar), gbp 69 (Asadabad), gbp 55 (Barikot);
- 4, 15 brigade (Kabul, Puli-Charkhi); 88 Abr (Kabul); brigade "Commandos" (subdivisions are located in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Khost); 26 pdp (Kabul); 157 pdp (Bamiyan); 517 pdp (Maldanishahr); 52 ops (Kabul); 10 SAP engineers regiment; 21 security regiment; 1 Guards regiment (Kabul).
Air Force and Air Defense
Air Force: 373 Tap (Kabul); 322 IAP (Bagram); 355 apib (Bagram); 335 glanders (Shindand); 366 IAP (Kandahar); 393 UAP (Mazar-i-Sharif);Air defense: - 99 zrb (3 S-75 "Dvina" divisions, 3 S-125 "Pechora" divisions, 2 technical divisions), 77 zenap: 100 mm guns -12, twin 23 mm ZPU-2 automatic installations - 16), separate divisions FOR - 4.
