Tank battle near Lutsk June 23, 1941. Battle for Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. An excerpt characterizing the Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody

The battle for Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (also known as the battle for Brody, tank battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne, a counterattack by the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, etc.) is the largest tank battle in history, which took place from June 23 to 30, 1941. Five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front took part in it against four German tanks divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht of Army Group South, united in the First Panzer Group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325 tanks) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143 tanks) entered the battle. Thus, 3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault guns) met in the oncoming tank battle.

The formations of the Red Army, which had overwhelming technical superiority in this sector of the front, were unable to inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, and were also unable to seize the strategic offensive initiative and change the course of hostilities in their favor. The tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht and the problems in the Red Army (poorly organized tank corps supply system, lack of air cover and complete loss of operational control) allowed the German troops to win the battle, as a result of which the Red Army lost a huge number of tanks.

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno.

Armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army

On June 22, 1941, the entire German Army Group South, in the offensive area of \u200b\u200bwhich this battle took place, had 728 tanks, including at least 115 unarmed "commander tanks" Sd.Kfz. 265 and about 150 tanks armed with 20 mm cannons and / or machine guns and (T-I and T-II). Thus, the actual tanks - in the generally accepted sense of the word - the Germans had 455 pieces (T-38 (t), T-III and T-IV).

The total list of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Soviet South-Western Front was 3,429 units (in addition, a certain number of tanks were in the rifle divisions of the front). However, three of the six corps were practically in the formation stage, and only the 4th, 8th and 9th mechanized corps could be considered as fully combat-ready formations. They numbered 1,515 tanks, which was more than three times the number of German cannon-armed tanks opposing them. In addition, these three combat-ready corps included 271 tanks of the T-34 and KV types, which not only far exceeded the best German tanks at that time in terms of armament and armor, but were also almost invulnerable to regular Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons.

Previous events

On June 22, 1941, after a breakthrough in the zone of the 5th army of General Potapov at the junction with the 6th army of Muzychenko, the 1st tank group of Kleist advanced in the direction of Radekhov and Berestechko. The General Staff decided to surround the main enemy grouping in the South-Western Front with strikes in the direction of Rava-Russian Lublin and Kovel Lublin and subsequently help the Western Front.

The Directive of the NPO of the USSR dated 06/22/1941 No. 3, endorsed by Zhukov, read:

d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, with concentric strikes in the general direction of Lublin by forces 5A and 6A, at least five mechanized corps and all aviation of the front, encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the front Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol, by the end of June 26, capture the Lublin area. Strongly secure from the Krakow direction.

During the discussion of the directive at the headquarters of the South-Western Front, it was considered that the encirclement operation with access to Lublin was impossible.

The proposal of the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, General Purkaev, to withdraw troops and create a continuous line of defense along the old border, and then to counterattack was also rejected.

We decided to strike with three mechanized corps (15th, 4th, 8th mechanized corps) from the Radzekhov Rava-Russkaya front to Krasnostav and one mechanized corps (22nd mechanized corps) from the Verba Vladimir-Volynsky front to Krasnostav. The purpose of the strike is not encirclement (as required by the directive), but the defeat of the main enemy forces in an oncoming battle.

In pursuance of the decisions taken, on June 23, the 15th mechanized corps of Karpezo advanced from the south to Radzekhov without the 212th motorized rifle division left to cover Brod. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, units reported the destruction of 20 tanks and armored vehicles and 16 German anti-tank guns. It was not possible to keep the Radzekhovs, in the afternoon the Germans captured the crossings on the Styr River near Berestechko.

The breakthrough to Berestechko forced the headquarters of the South-Western Front to abandon the previous decision, the 8th MK from near Yavorov already at 15:30 on June 23 received an order to move to Brody.

During June 24, the front headquarters, together with the representative of the Stavka GK - Zhukov, decided to launch a counterattack on the German grouping with the forces of four mechanized corps at the same time creating rear line defense by front-line rifle corps - 31st, 36th and 37th. In reality, these units were in the process of advancing to the front and entered the battle as they arrived without mutual coordination. Some units did not take part in the counterattack. The purpose of the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front was to defeat the 1st Panzer Group Kleist. In the course of the subsequent battle, the Soviet 22nd, 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the north, the 8th and 15th mechanized corps from the south counterattacked the German troops of the 1st Tgr and 6th Army, entering into an oncoming tank battle with the German 11th, 13th, 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions.

Destroyed T-26 tanks of the 19th Panzer Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on the Voynica-Lutsk highway.

On June 24, the 19th Panzer and 215th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the 22nd Mechanized Corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky-Lutsk highway from the Voinitsa-Boguslavskaya line. The attack was unsuccessful, the light tanks of the division ran into anti-tank guns put forward by the Germans. The 19th TD lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Torchin area. Moskalenko's 1st anti-tank artillery brigade also retreated here. The 41st tank division of the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack. The defense on the Styr River near Lutsk was occupied by the advanced 131st motorized division of the 9th mechanized corps of General Rokossovsky.

The 19th mechanized corps of Major General Feklenko moved to the border from the evening of June 22, leaving advanced units on the evening of June 24 on the Ikva River in the Mlynov area. On the morning of June 25, the reconnaissance battalion of the German 11th Panzer Division attacked the forward company of the 40th Panzer Division, which was guarding the crossing at Mlynov, and pushed it back. The 43rd tank division of the mechanized corps approached the Rovno region, being attacked from the air.

By the morning of June 26, 1941, the situation was as follows. The 131st Rifle Division, having retreated from Lutsk at night, occupied the front from Rozhyshche to Lutsk, the troops of the 19th Panzer Division, the 135th Rifle Division and the 1st Rifle Brigade withdrew behind its positions through Rozhische. Lutsk was occupied by the German 13th TD, the 14th TD was located near Torchin. Further, from Lutsk to Torgovytsya, there was no defense; during the day, the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were in the Olyka-Klevan area in the morning, were to take up the defense. The Germans brought the 299th Infantry Division to Torgovitsa. From Torgovytsya to Mlynov, he took up defense along the Moto River rifle regiment 40th TD of the 19th MK RKKA. The rifle regiment of the 228th rifle regiment of the 36th sk of the Red Army took up defense at Mlynov, the German 111th infantry division acted against it. The tank regiments of the 40th TD and the infantry regiment of the 228th Rifle Division were in the forest near Radov in reserve. A motorized rifle regiment of the 43rd TD operated in the Pogoreltsy area, and a rifle regiment of the 228th Rifle Division operated in the Mladechny area. Against them, the German 11th TD occupied the Dubno-Verba area. Further from Surmichi to Sudobichi, there was no defense, the 140th Rifle Division of the 36th Rifle Corps had not yet reached this line. Further, from Sudobichi to Kremenets, the 146th Rifle Division of the 36th Sc. In the Kremenets area, the 14th cd of the 5th cd held the defense.

On the morning of June 26, the German divisions continued their offensive. In the morning, the German 13th TD pushed back units of the 131st MD at the crossroads of the Lutsk-Rovno and Rozhishche-Mlynov roads, and turned towards Mlynov. The positions near Lutsk were transferred to the 14th TD. Rokossovsky's tank divisions were supposed to reach the breakthrough area of the German 13th TD in the afternoon, and before that the road was open. Moving along it, the 13th TD in the afternoon went to the rear of the Soviet 40th TD, which fought with the 299th infantry division at Torgovitsy and the 111th infantry division at Mlynov. This breakthrough led to a disorderly withdrawal of the 40th TD and the regiment of the 228th Rifle Division to Radov and to the north.

The German 11th TD advanced in two battle groups, the tank group pushed back the Soviet infantry of the 43rd TD and the regiment of the 228th SD to Krylov and Radov, and occupied Varkovichi. The German motorized brigade of the 11th TD, moving through Surmichi, met marching columns of the Soviet 140th Rifle Division to the southeast of Lipa, which could not withstand a sudden collision and retreated in disorder to the south, to Tartak. The 43rd Panzer Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps, using 79 tanks of the 86th Panzer Regiment, broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Panzer Division and broke into the outskirts of Dubno by 6 pm, reaching the Ikva River. Due to the retreat on the left flank of the 140th division of the 36th rifle corps, and on the right of the 40th tank division, both flanks of the 43rd TD turned out to be unprotected, and units of the division, by order of the corps commander, began to retreat from Dubno after midnight to the area to the west Smooth. From the south, from the area of Toporov, the 19th TP of the 10th TD of the 15th mechanized corps of General I. I. Karpezo was advancing on Radekhov with the task of defeating the enemy and connecting with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions surrounded in the Voinitsa area and Milyatin. The 37th Panzer Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River in the morning of June 26 and moved forward. The 10th Panzer Division ran into anti-tank defenses at Kholuev and was forced to withdraw. The formations of the corps were subjected to a massive German air raid, during which the commander, Major General Karpezo, was seriously wounded. The 8th mechanized corps of General D. I. Ryabyshev, having made a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and leaving up to half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road from breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25 began to concentrate in the Busk area, southwest of Brody.

On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the further task of advancing on Dubno. Corps reconnaissance discovered German defenses on the Ikva River and on the Sytenka River, as well as parts of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, advanced from Brody the day before. On the morning of June 26, Major General Mishanin's 12th Panzer Division crossed the Slonovka River and, having restored the bridge, attacked and captured the city of Leshnev by 4 p.m. On the right flank, the 34th Panzer Division of Colonel I.V. Vasiliev defeated the enemy column, taking about 200 prisoners and capturing 4 tanks. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th mechanized corps advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, pushing out units of the 57th infantry and motorized brigade of the 16th tank divisions of the enemy, who retreated and entrenched themselves behind the Plyashovka River. The tank regiment of the 16th TD continued the offensive in the direction of Kozin. The Germans sent the 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to the battle area. The 212th Motor Rifle Division of the Red Army did not receive an order to support the strike of the 8th MK. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps. On the night of June 27, the mechanized corps received an order to withdraw from the battle and begin concentrating behind the 37th sk.

The commander of the 5th Army, Major General M. I. Potapov, even in the midst of the fighting of the previous day, not knowing about the breakthrough of the German 13th TD near Lutsk, gives the order to the tank division of the 9th MK, which was at that time in the Novosyolka region -Olyka, stop moving west and turn south towards Dubno. The corps completed the maneuver only by two in the morning on June 27, having taken the starting positions for the attack along the Putilovka River. On the morning of the same day, the 19th mechanized corps also received an order to resume the counterattack from Rovno to Mlynov and Dubno. Parts of the 15th mechanized corps were to go to Berestechko. On June 26-27, the Germans transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Panzer, 299th Infantry, and 111th Infantry Divisions against the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps.

At dawn on June 27, the 24th tank regiment of the 20th tank division of Colonel Katukov from the 9th mechanized corps attacked units of the 13th German tank division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners. During the day, the division itself lost 33 BT tanks. The offensive of the 9th MK RKKA bogged down after the German 299th Infantry Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th RD RKKA near Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka endangered the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshei and Petushki. With battles, the 20th TD breaks through to Klevan. The tank divisions of the 19th MK of the Red Army were unable to go on the offensive, and with difficulty repulsed the attacks of the tank regiment of the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion of the 13th TD of the enemy on Rovno. The Soviet 228th Rifle Division, which had only a quarter of ammunition on June 25, after two days of fighting was without ammunition, in a semi-encirclement near Radov and during the retreat to Zdolbunov was attacked by reconnaissance units of the German 13th and 11th TD and 111th Infantry Division, during the retreat was all artillery thrown. The division was saved from defeat only by the fact that the German 13th TD and 11th TD were advancing in divergent directions and did not seek to destroy the 228th division. During the retreat and under the blows of aviation, part of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the 19th mechanized corps was lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was not combat-ready and did not have a unified leadership (the headquarters made its way through the forests to its divisions from near Mizoch), so it also could not go on the attack. In the Dubno district, the German 111th Infantry Division approached from Mlynov. Near Lutsk, the German 298th Infantry Division launched an offensive with the support of the tanks of the 14th Panzer Division.

It was supposed to organize an offensive from the south direction, to Dubno, by the forces of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps of the Red Army with the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigadier Commissar N.K. Popel were able to go on the offensive. The remaining parts of the division by this time were only being transferred to a new direction.

The blow in the direction of Dubno was unexpected for the Germans, and having crushed the defensive barriers, the Popel group entered the outskirts of Dubno by evening, capturing the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy and several dozen intact tanks. During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th motorized, 75th and 111th infantry divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the gap, interrupting the supply lines of the Popel group. Attempts by the approaching units of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army to break through a new gap in the defense failed, and under the blows of aviation, artillery and superior enemy forces, he had to go on the defensive. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the Soviet 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. The division commander, Major General T. A. Mishanin, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34 tanks, which managed to stop the breakthrough.

The offensive of the 15th MK of the Red Army was unsuccessful. Having suffered heavy losses from the fire of anti-tank guns, its units could not cross the Ostrovka River and were thrown back to their original positions along the Radostavka River. On June 29, the 15th mechanized corps was ordered to change units of the 37th rifle corps and withdraw to the Zolochiv heights in the area of Biala Kamen - Sasuv - Zolochiv - Lyatsk. Contrary to the order, the withdrawal began without changing parts of the 37th sk and without notifying the commander of the 8th MK Ryabyshev, in connection with which German troops freely bypassed the flank of the 8th mechanized corps. On June 29, the Germans occupied Busk and Brody, held by one battalion of the Soviet 212th motorized division. On the right flank of the 8th mechanized corps, without resisting the Germans, units of the 140th and 146th rifle divisions of the 36th rifle corps and the 14th cavalry division withdrew.

Surrounded by the enemy, the 8th MK of the Red Army managed to retreat in an organized manner to the line of the Zolochev Heights, breaking through the German barriers. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines, taking up all-round defense in the Dubno region. The defense continued until July 2, and only when ammunition and fuel came to an end, the detachment, having destroyed the remaining equipment, began to break through from the encirclement. After passing through the rear of the enemy for more than 200 km, the Popel group and the units of the 124th rifle division of the 5th army that joined it went to the location of the 15th rifle corps of the 5th army. In total, more than a thousand people left the encirclement, the losses of the 34th division and units attached to it amounted to 5363 people missing and about a thousand killed, the division commander, Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, died.

Factors

In comparison with German tankers, Soviet tankers in the early days of the 1941 war had no combat experience and had very little experience of only training, even the drivers of Soviet tanks had about 2-5 hours of driving practice, while the Germans at one time even at the Kazan Tank School had about 50 hours of driving practice.

The superiority of the armor of the T-34 and KV turned out to be untenable against the German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, which the Germans took advantage of, shooting up to 20-30 tanks in an hour at long distances. Subsequently, these guns were installed regularly on the Tiger tanks and others.

The almost complete or complete absence of armor-piercing shells from the Soviet tankmen who participated in the battle.

The extremely inept and illiterate conduct of Soviet tank attacks, in the absence of high-quality standard radio communications between groups and individual combat vehicles, with overall coordination of forces (in comparison with the qualitatively different state of radio communications in the German tank forces), led to heavy losses of Soviet crews and equipment, including on march.

“The failures of the Soviet tank troops are explained not by the poor quality of materials or weapons, but by the inability of the command and the lack of experience in maneuvering ... […] The commanders of brigades-divisions-corps are not able to solve operational tasks. This is especially true for the interaction of various types armed forces..” - Captain Ya. I. Dzhugashvili, the former commander of the howitzer battery of the 14th Panzer Division, who was captured near Senno, said during interrogation.

Losses

Losses on June 30, 1941, South-Western Front: 2648 tanks (85%) against 260 German vehicles. And if the Germans had the opportunity to repair their cars and had trophies (using them under white crosses), then Soviet losses were irretrievable. For 15 days of the war, the losses amounted to: 4381 tanks out of 5826.

German losses by September 4, 1941 (1st Panzer Group Kleist): 222 repairable vehicles + 186 irretrievable.

Consequences

The shock formations of the Southwestern Front could not carry out a single offensive. The actions of the Soviet mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a delay for a week of the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist and the disruption of the enemy’s plans to break through to Kiev and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov ledge. The German command, through competent leadership, managed to repel the Soviet counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.

Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, Corps Commissar N. N. Vashugin, shot himself.

The German 11th Panzer Division, supported by the left flank of the 16th Panzer Division, at that time entered Ostrog, advancing into the deep rear of the Soviet troops.

The offensive of the 11th panzer division of the Wehrmacht

From the south, from the Brody region, the 15th mechanized corps of General Gnat Karpezo advanced on Radekhov and Berestechko with the task of defeating the enemy and linking up with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions surrounded in the Voinitsa and Milyatin regions.

In the afternoon June 25 units of the 15th Corps crossed the Radostavka River and moved forward, but ran into a well-organized anti-tank defense of the Germans and was forced to retreat. The positions of the corps began to be flanked by German infantry units.

The 8th mechanized corps of General Dmitry Ryabyshev, having carried out a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and leaving up to half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road as a result of breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25 began to concentrate in the Busk area southwest of Brody.

June 26 it was decided to inflict powerful blows on the flanks of the Kleist tank group from the north by the forces of the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps from the Lutsk and Rovno regions and from the south from the Brody region - by the 4th, 15th and 8th mechanized corps . A huge mass of tanks was thrown in order to finally "cut" the flanks of the German group and surround it.

At dawn 27th of June The 24th tank regiment of the 20th tank division of Colonel Katukov from the 9th mechanized corps attacked units of the 13th German tank division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners. But the offensive of the 9th MK RKKA bogged down after the German 299th Panzer Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th RD RKKA near Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka endangered the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshei and Petushki.

The 19th mechanized corps also failed to go on the offensive. Moreover, under the blows of the German 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions, he retreated to Rovno, and then to Goshcha. During the retreat and under the blows of aviation, a significant part of the tanks, vehicles and artillery of the corps was lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was not combat-ready and did not have a unified leadership, so it also could not go on the attack.

From the south, it was planned to organize an attack on Dubno by the 8th and 15th mechanized corps from the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. After noon 27th of June only the combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment and the 34th Tank Division of the 8th Corps under the command of Brigadier Commissar Nikolai Popel were able to go on the offensive. Other parts of the division by that time were only being transferred to a new direction.

The blow in the direction of Dubno was unexpected for the Germans. Having crushed the defensive barriers, Popel's group reached the outskirts of Dubno by evening, capturing the rear supplies of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact tanks.

Bold actions of the 8th mech. Corps caused confusion in the camp of the enemy. However, the actions of the Soviet mechanized corps were not coordinated. A single powerful blow to the enemy did not work. In addition, our tankers felt a great shortage of fuel and ammunition.

During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th motorized, 75th and 111th infantry divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the breakthrough, cutting off the Popel group. Attempts by units of the 8th mechanized corps to re-penetrate the enemy's defenses were not successful, and under the blows of aviation, artillery and superior German forces, he was forced to go on the defensive.

Destroyed T-34

The offensive of the 15th MK of the Red Army also turned out to be unsuccessful. Having suffered heavy losses from the fire of anti-tank guns, its units could not cross the Ostrovka River and were thrown back to their original positions along the Radostavka River.

June 29 The 15th mechanized corps was ordered to change units of the 37th rifle corps and withdraw to the Zolochiv heights in the area of Bialy Kamen - Sasuv - Zolochiv - Lyatsk. Contrary to the order, the withdrawal began without the change of units of the 37th sk and without notifying the commander of the 8th MK Ryabyshev, in connection with which the German troops freely bypassed the flank of the 8th mechanized corps. On June 29, the Germans occupied Busk and Brody. On the right flank of the 8th mechanized corps, without resisting the Germans, units of the 140th and 146th rifle divisions of the 36th rifle corps and the 14th cavalry division withdrew.

Surrounded by the enemy, the 8th MK of the Red Army managed to retreat in an organized manner to the line of the Zolochev Heights, breaking through the German barriers.

Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines, taking up all-round defense in the Dubno region. The defense continued until July 2, and only when ammunition and fuel came to an end, the detachment, having destroyed the remaining equipment, began to break through from the encirclement. After passing through the rear of the enemy for more than 200 km, the Popel group and the units of the 124th rifle division of the 5th army that joined it went to the location of the 15th rifle corps of the 5th army.

4th mechanized corps under the command of Andrey Vlasov ( being the most powerful unit in this sector of the front and having at its disposal 979 tanks, including 313 T-34 and 101 KV) reacted too slowly to orders and practically did not participate in active attacking actions. In fact, his main achievement was to provide cover for the retreat of the 15th mechanized corps from the advancing German forces. Despite a rather passive role in offensive operations, they managed to keep no more than 6 percent of their KV tanks, 12 percent of his T-34 tanks

The 9th and 22nd mechanized corps were able, moving away from Dubno, to take up defensive positions north and southeast of Lutsk. Thus, a "balcony" was created, which delayed the Army Group "South" on its way to Kiev. It is believed that as a result of this, Hitler decided to change his strategic decision and send additional forces to the south, removing them from the Moscow direction.

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The main reasons for the failure of the June counterattack by the Soviet mechanized corps were the strong dispersal of forces and the lack of coherence and coordination of mutual actions. The tanks of the mechanized corps entered the battle in most cases with insufficient infantry support, or in its complete absence. A huge role was played by the lack of aviation ( almost all aircraft were destroyed in the very first hours of the war on the airfields of the first line) and artillery support.

Soviet MiG-3 destroyed in the first days of Operation Barbarossa. Image from a collection of WWII prints. Scan by Jarekt from 5 × 8 cm print., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4011173

The German troops were much more active and intelligent than the Soviet ones, they used all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of the troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was generally the best in the world.

These factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: rifle units moved on their own two feet and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves at a level above the battalion acted without overall coordination, on their own. It often turned out that one mechanized corps was already rushing to the west, deep into the German defenses, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or withdraw from its positions ...

Another reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which must be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for an oncoming tank battle. Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks for infantry escort and raid war, created in the early to mid-1930s, there was a majority.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specifics of the tasks assigned to them, had anti-bullet or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuitable for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strengths and weaknesses of armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours both in quality and weapons, in defense, nullifying all the advantages of Soviet technology.

The German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if for the T-34 and KV, as a rule, it was not dangerous, then light tanks had a hard time. And against the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns of the Wehrmacht, which were rolled out for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KV and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26s and BTs, as the reports said, were “partially destroyed as a result of hitting anti-aircraft shells,” and not just stopped. But the Germans in this direction in anti-tank defense used far from only anti-aircraft guns.

And yet, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march, without radio communications, at their own peril and risk, Soviet tankers went into battle - and often won it.

In the first two days of the counter-offensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other achieved success. On the fourth day, the Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to succeed, in some areas pushing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. On the evening of June 26, Soviet tankers even took the city of Dubno with battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat ... to the east!

And yet, the advantage of the Wehrmacht in the infantry units, without which in that war the tankers could fully operate except in the rear raids, soon began to affect. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And every hour the tankers lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel more and more.

But the battle near Dubno played its role in disrupting the Barbarossa plan fostered by Hitler. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the command of the Wehrmacht to commit reserves into battle, which were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And the very direction to Kyiv after this battle was considered as a priority.

And although there was a difficult autumn and winter of 1941 ahead, his word in the history of the Great Patriotic War the largest tank battle has already said. And this bitter experience was not forgotten by the Soviet command - the Germans still had to fully feel the power of the blows of the Soviet troops in the upcoming battles.

FROM BREST TO BERLIN

Poetic epic

Dubno, Lutsk and Brody remember, 1
Like a week in those places
The battle was fought by steel horses,
How they were pressed by a strong enemy.

Where are you tanks, our tanks?
Where are you, our corps?
You were torn like footcloths
Chopped down like forests

Eight hundred for those days
Out of two thousand eight hundred!
How many of you lay down, sons!
Who will present the mournful account?

How many dead
In the southwestern regions?
How many were burned alive
In those desperate battles?

"How many tanks have we knocked out?" -
"Up to two hundred, almost." - "Total?"
Or are we taught wrong?
Ile did not understand what?

Or Zhukov was not with us
And he was not in charge
Those first fights
Where did the enemy beat us like that?

Or there were not enough tanks,
Few tank brigades,
What did the Nazis give us?
Strongly many times in a row?

Yes, really like that
The world did not know until then:
Whatever the fight - we are beaten again,
Whatever the tank, the fire burns.

And although four times
There were more tanks, we
So many times and even more
They messed up in those days.

Member of the Military Council
He shot himself - burned shame. 4
Zhukov rushes to Moscow - sees the summer -
Stalin called on the carpet:

What is the tank drama! -
“Before Minsk at this hour
Surrounded like a hole
Our armies now."

There is another situation.
Here, to the south, everything is not so:
Enough strength, skill
Not enough to attack.

Failed with one hit 5
Eight of our buildings
Go to battle. As a result, a gift
We put the fighters.

Eight days - and counterattacks
Choked. Here's how.
Solace in this fight -
The enemy was detained for six days.

So we will this summer
Retreat until the enemy
We won't learn to hit hard
From the General Staff to the shooter.

Capturing millions,
Retreat endlessly
And under the Russian mat and groans
Water the earth with blood.

----------
1 The Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody is the largest tank battle in world history, including the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, which took place in June 1941 in the triangle of cities Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. About 3,200 tanks took part in the battle on both sides: 2,803 Soviet and 718 German. The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps, 27th, 31st, 36th, 37th rifle corps, 109th MD and 14th cd tried to flank strikes from the north and south to destroy von Kleist's tank wedge. During the period from June 23 to June 30, 1941, our losses amounted to about 800 tanks, German - 150 - 200.
2 By order of Stalin, the operation was led by the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the evening of June 22 and departed for Moscow on Stalin's call on the evening of June 26, 1941.
3 G.K. Zhukov in his book “Memoirs and Reflections” wrote about this battle: “Our historical literature somehow casually touches on this greatest frontier battle of the initial period of the war with Nazi Germany. It would be necessary to analyze in detail the expediency of using here counterattacks by mechanized corps against the enemy's main grouping that had broken through, and the organization of the counterattack itself. Indeed, as a result of precisely these actions of our troops in Ukraine, the enemy’s plan for a swift breakthrough to Kiev was thwarted at the very beginning. The enemy suffered heavy losses and was convinced of the stamina Soviet soldiers ready to fight to the last drop of blood." Zhukov did not write about our fourfold losses.
4 Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, Corps Commissar N.N., a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself. Vashugin.
5 The strike formations of the Southwestern Front could not carry out a single offensive. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a week delay in the offensive of the 1st German Panzer Group and the disruption of the enemy’s plans to break through to Kiev and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov ledge. The German command, through competent leadership, managed to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.

Above is the cover of Vladimir Tyaptin's new book. It includes 39 poems and 14 poems and songs dedicated to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, which reflect the main battles on all fronts of this great war, starting from the border battles of 1941 to the storming of Berlin and the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945. The book is full of large historical material included in 309 notes. In fact, these are two books - poetry and prose, united under one title. It features 156 specific personalities, including 96 war heroes, from ordinary soldiers to Marshal Zhukov and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. The design of the book was made by the winner of the State Prize of the Udmurt Republic Yuri Lobanov.

When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?

both as a science and as a social tool, alas, it is subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are praised, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the vast majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up in the days of the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the battle of Prokhorovka, an integral part of the Battle of Kursk, to be the largest tank battle in history. But in fairness, it should be noted that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and five hundred kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas with a total number of about 4,500 armored vehicles converged in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody.

Counteroffensive on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the battle of Dubno, which is also called the battle of Brody or the battle for Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were still called mechanized out of habit - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev military district, launched the first serious counterattacks on the advancing German troops. The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Georgy Zhukov, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. First, the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon, struck at the flanks of Army Group South. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike at the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of the Army Group "South" and rushed to Kiev in order to surround and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this area had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kyiv Special Military District was considered the most powerful of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of the executor of the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first of all and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which had already become the Southwestern Front by this time, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And from the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision to offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which the Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight tanks for the first time

When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, it resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars in the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool to break through the enemy's defenses or create chaos in his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery was supposed to fight with tanks - well, and carefully dug in infantry. And the battle near Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on against German tanks. And they lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and sensible than the Soviet ones, they used all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of the troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was, unfortunately, a cut above than in the Red Army. In the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: rifle units moved on their own two feet and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves at a level above the battalion acted without overall coordination, on their own. It often turned out that one mechanized corps was already rushing to the west, deep into the German defenses, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or withdraw from its positions ...

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA

Contrary to concepts and precepts

The second reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which must be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for a tank battle - a consequence of the same pre-war concepts "tanks do not fight tanks." Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks for infantry escort and raid war, created in the early to mid-1930s, there was a majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, medium tanks - 171 pieces (all - T-34), heavy tanks - 217 pieces (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th mechanized corps, which fought just west of Brody, had 892 more tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

And yet, Soviet tankers, even on such "inappropriate" vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes pierced even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they went.

They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counter-offensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other achieved success. On the fourth day, the Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to succeed, in some areas pushing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. On the evening of June 26, Soviet tankers even took the city of Dubno with battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat ... to the east!

Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru

Today one can come across the opinion that if the leadership of the front had not been given away, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, the command to switch from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned the Germans back near Dubno. Wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active interaction with other branches of the military. But the battle near Dubno played its role in disrupting the Barbarossa plan fostered by Hitler. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the command of the Wehrmacht to commit reserves into battle, which were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And the very direction to Kyiv after this battle was considered as a priority.

And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, broke them - and broke them so much that the pace of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although there was a difficult autumn and winter of 1941 ahead, the largest tank battle had already said its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This is his, the battles near Dubno, the echo thundered in the fields near Kursk and Orel two years later - and echoed in the first volleys of victorious salutes ...

If you gather at the round table Military historians from different countries and ask them a question about which tank battle was the greatest in the world, then the answers will be different ... The historian of the Soviet school, of course, will name KURSK DUGU , there the number of tanks and self-propelled guns, according to averaged data, was from the side of the Red Army - 3444 , from the Wehrmacht - 2733 combat vehicles. ( Although the figures from different researchers are given with such a scatter that it’s not even easy to average them out, we can only mention that even in our sources, our losses in tanks differ by 100% ).

The Israeli will say that it was Doomsday War in October 1973. Then on the northern front 1200 Syrian tanks attacked 180 Israeli, and lost at the same time 800 . And on the southern front 500 The Egyptians fought against 240 IDF tanks. (The Egyptians were more fortunate than the Syrians, they lost only 200 tanks). Then hundreds of Iraqi cars arrived in time (according to some sources - up to 1500 ) and everything went into full swing. In total, during this conflict, the Israelis lost 810 armored vehicles, and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria and Cuba - 1775 machines. But, as I said above, the data in different sources are very different.

Well, in real life, such a battle took place on June 23-27, 1941 - in the region of Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne, the largest tank battle in the history of wars took place. In this battle, six Soviet mechanized corps faced the German Panzer Group.

It really was the largest tank battle in world history , lasting a week. More than four thousand tanks mixed up in a fiery whirlwind ... On the Brody-Rivne-Lutsk sector, the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd and 4th mechanized corps and the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th and 9th Panzer Divisions.

According to the average data from different sources, the balance of power was as follows ...

Red Army:

The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd corps included 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2.415 T-26, OT -26, T-27, T-36, T-37, BT-5, BT-7. In total - 2.803 combat vehicles. [Military History Journal, N11, 1993]. West of Brody, their flank was covered by the 4th mechanized corps, which was the most powerful of the then mechanized corps of the Red Army and the whole world. It contained 892 tanks, of which 89 were KV-1s and 327 were T-34s. On June 24, the 8th Panzer Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s - on June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th mechanized corps.

TOTAL: 3.695 tanks

WEHRMAHT:

In the 4 German tank divisions that make up the backbone of the Wehrmacht tank group, there were 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. (commander), and on June 28 in the 9th German Panzer Division entered the battle, this is also 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz-I, 12 Bef-Pz).

TOTAL: 628 tanks

By the way, Soviet tanks were mostly either no worse than German tanks, or superior to them in armor and caliber. In other words, see the comparison table below. The figures are given according to the caliber of the guns and frontal armor.

This battle was preceded by the appointment June 23, 1941 ., Georgy Zhukov , a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was as a representative of the Headquarters on the Southwestern Front that General of the Army G.K. Zhukov organized this counterattack. Moreover, his position was very convenient. On the one hand, he was a representative of the Headquarters and could give any order, and on the other hand, M.P. Kirponos, I.N. Muzychenko and M.I. Potapov were responsible for everything.

Experienced war wolves confronted our generals Gerd von Rundstedt And Ewald von Kleist . The first to strike at the flanks of the enemy grouping were the 22nd, 4th and 15th mechanized corps. Then the 9th, 19th and 8th mechanized corps, advanced from the 2nd echelon of the front, were brought into battle. By the way, the future marshal K.K. commanded the 9th mechanized corps. Rokossovsky, who was released from prison a year ago. He immediately showed himself to be a knowledgeable and proactive commander. When he realized that the motorized division under his command could only follow ... on foot, Rokossovsky, at his own peril and risk, took all the vehicles from the district reserve in Shepetovka, and there were almost two hundred of them, put infantry on them and, like motorized infantry, moved them in front of the body. The approach of its units to the Lutsk region saved the situation that had worsened there. They stopped the enemy tanks that had broken through there.

The tankers fought like heroes, sparing neither strength nor life, but the poor organization of the High Command nullified everything. Units and formations entered the battle after a 300-400 km march in parts, unable to wait for the full concentration of forces and the approach of combined arms support formations. Equipment on the march broke down, and there was no normal communication. And orders from the headquarters of the front drove them forward. And all the time German aircraft hung over them. Here, the consequences of stupidity or betrayal of those responsible for aviation in this theater affected. Before the war itself, most of the front-line airfields began to be modernized, and numerous aircraft were assembled at the few remaining suitable sites, and there was an order to put the planes wing to wing, supposedly for better protection from saboteurs. At dawn on June 22, 1941, such an oil painting "Junkers" I really liked it, but our aviation has greatly decreased in number.

And the saboteurs from the regiment "Brandenburg" these measures, by the way, did not interfere at all. Well, front-line air defense was then in the Red Army in general in its infancy. So even before entering the battle with the ground units of the Germans, our tanks suffered heavy losses from air raids. How many of our 7,500 aircraft died without taking off is still a mystery shrouded in darkness. And German air defense was just used very competently, although not quite standardly. Von Rundstedt and Von Kleist remembered how Guderian came up with the idea of deploying the FlaK 88 into battle formations. almost no one succeeded in the first projectile.

On June 26, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the Lutsk region, Rivne, and the 8th and 15th from the Brody region struck at the flanks of the German group that had broken through to Lutsk and Dubno. The formations of the 19th mechanized corps threw back the 11th panzer division of the Nazis by 25 km. However, as a result of the weak interaction between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps and the slow reaction to the rapidly changing combat situation of the front headquarters, our advancing tanks were forced to stop by the end of June 27 and retreat to Rovno, where tank battles continued until June 29. The actions of the 8th mechanized corps were more successful: on June 26, having defeated the enemy troops north of Brody, they advanced 20 km. But then the Headquarters woke up, and in connection with the aggravated situation near Dubno, on June 27, the 8th mechanized corps was given a new task - to strike from Berestechko in the direction of Dubno. And then the Soviet tankers behaved like heroes, completely defeating parts of the 16th panzerdivision, the corps fought 40 km, liberated Dubno and went to the rear of the 3rd German motorized corps. But the command was unable to provide the corps with fuel and ammunition, and on this their offensive capabilities were exhausted. By this time, the German command had introduced an additional 7 divisions into the battle in the Rivne direction.

And near Ostrog, units of the 5th mechanized corps and the 37th rifle corps were ordered to stop the advance of the 11th German tank division. But the Germans also threw the 9th panzer division onto the left flank of the Soviet defense (near Lvov). Given the complete superiority of the Luftwaffe in the air, this maneuver fatally destroyed the left flank of the defense of the Soviet units. And the most tragic thing is that by this time the Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.

27th of June consolidated squad from 34th Panzer Division under the command of Brigadier Commissar N.K. Popel, in the evening he hit Dubno, captured the rear supplies of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact German tanks, but the 8th mechanized corps could not come to the rescue and consolidate the success. The Popel detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines, at first the tankers took up all-round defense in the Dubno region and held out until July 2, and when the shells ran out, destroying the remaining equipment, the detachment began to break through from the encirclement. After passing through the rear more than 200 km, Popel's group went to his own. Nikolai Poppel, by the way, went through the entire war and retired with the rank of lieutenant general of tank troops.

The difficulties of the entire Soviet group turned into a catastrophe. On the morning of June 29 The 13th Panzer Division advanced east from Rovno, while the Soviet troops retreated north and south of the city, parallel to the German movement. Soviet tanks were increasingly left without fuel, and the German infantry destroyed the remnants of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions. On June 30, the 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the 3rd Cavalry Division. She then cut off the 8th and 10th Panzer divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the 6th the Soviet army ordered all his units to retreat to positions east of Lvov. And the Germans at that time were gathering parts of the 13th and 14th panzer divisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhytomyr and Berdichev.

By July 1, the Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. In the 22nd, about 10% of the tanks remained, in the 8th and 15th - 15%, in the 9th and 19th - about 30%. The 4th mechanized corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov (the same one) turned out to be in a slightly better position - he managed to withdraw with about 40% of the tanks.

Bertolt Brecht was right when he said that only bad generals need good soldiers to correct their mistakes with their blood. The total losses in tanks over these days amounted to about 2500 machines. This includes both combat and non-combat losses. Moreover, all the tanks - both wrecked, and stalled, and burned - went to the Germans. And for just Great Patriotic War from 131700 tanks and self-propelled guns, BTV Red Army lost 96500 combat units. The Germans, respectively, out of 49500 BT units lost 45000 combat units, 75% of them - on Eastern Front. The figures, of course, are taken from various sources and are accurate, taking into account deltas up to 15%.

The main thing is that our tankers did not burn in tanks in vain and shed their blood. They delayed the advance of the Germans for at least a week, it was this week that the Germans then constantly lacked.

The headquarters of the Southwestern Front could not properly organize the management and supply of the most powerful tank grouping in the world at that time, and this is precisely the reason for the failure of this operation. And the inspirer and leader of the counteroffensive, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, after the tank corps were stuck, and it became clear that the counteroffensive was not successful, departed for Moscow.

A member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin, shot himself at the end of the battle. He did not prepare, did not plan and did not conduct this battle, he did not bear direct guilt for the failure, but his conscience did not allow him to do otherwise. After the Crimean disgrace, Comrade Mekhlis did not shoot himself, but blamed everything on Kozlov and Tolbukhin. After the bloody unsuccessful assault on Grozny, where thousands of boys died, Pasha Mercedes did not reach for his service pistol. Yes... Conscience is a piece goods.

And to our Heroes Eternal Glory and Eternal memory. Wars are won by Soldiers.

And now I apologize for the terrible photos, my heart ached when I looked at them, but this is the Truth of History. And let the critics not tell me that I smooth out sharp and unfortunate moments. Military History. True, I am sure that now they will accuse me of praising the Wehrmacht.

APPENDIX

Popel, Nikolai Kirillovich

Military commissar of the 11th mechanized (tank) brigade since 1938. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939. Until June 3, 1940, the military commissar of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, brigade commissar, political officer of the 8th mechanized corps. He led the mobile group of the 8th MK in the battles for Dubno. He fought in an encirclement near Dubno, left the encirclement with part of his troops.

From August 25, 1941 to December 8, 1941, he was a member of the military council of the 38th Army. Since September 1942, the military commissar of the 3rd mechanized corps. From January 30, 1943 until the end of the war, he was a member of the military council of the 1st Tank Army (transformed into the 1st Guards Tank Army). After the war, he wrote memoirs. Literary critic E. V. Kardin was engaged in recording and processing the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Nikolai Popel. These memoirs eventually grew into two books: "During hard times" And "Tanks turned west", which saw the light, respectively, in 1959 and 1960.

88 mm anti-aircraft gun FlaK-18/36/37/41

Of all the artillery systems of the Second World War, the German Flak 36/37 88 mm anti-aircraft gun was perhaps the most famous. However, this gun was best known as an anti-tank weapon. The project of a semi-automatic anti-aircraft gun of caliber 88 mm with a high initial speed The projectile was developed at the Krupp factories in 1928. In order to overcome the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, all work on the manufacture of samples was carried out at the Swedish factories of Bofors, with which Krupp had bilateral agreements. The gun was already launched into a series at the Krupp factories in 1933, after Hitler came to power, Germany openly spat on the Versailles Treaty.

The prototype Flak 36 was the Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun of the same caliber, developed back in the first world war and mounted on a four-wheel towed platform. Initially, it was designed exclusively as an anti-aircraft gun. However, the circumstances were such that several Flak 18 guns sent to Spain as part of the Legion "Condor", the Germans had to use to protect their own positions from the advancing tanks of the Republicans. This experience was subsequently taken into account when upgrading the new gun, which was produced in two versions Flak 36 and Flak 37. An important advantage of the guns was the presence of an automatic ejection mechanism for spent cartridges, which allowed trained personnel to provide a rate of fire up to 20 rounds per minute. But in order to load the gun with a 15-kilogram projectile every three seconds, 11 people were needed for each gun, of which four or five were exclusively engaged in the supply of shells. Putting together such a large team in the field was far from an easy task, and getting the position and mittens of the loader - the one who put the projectile into the gun lock, was a high honor and proof of qualification.

Basic tactical and technical data:

Gun weight - 7 tons, Caliber - 88 mm, Projectile weight - 9.5 kg,

Ground range. - 14500 m, / Range air. - 10700 m

Beginning projectile speed - 820 m / s, rate of fire - 15-20 rounds per minute.