Battle of Lutsk. The greatest tank battle under dubno, fords, exactly. An excerpt characterizing the Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody

In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, when the German tank wedges of the Army Groups Center and North closed the pincers near Minsk and rushed to Smolensk and Pskov (aiming at Moscow and Leningrad), a grandiose tank battle. The largest in the history of World War II and the first tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place on June 22 - July 10, 1941 and was a clear evidence of the high offensive activity of the Soviet troops, their desire to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, which he seized as a result of an unexpected attack.

This battle is little covered in memoirs, and in military history works it is usually referred to as “battles near Brody” or simply “border battles”. However, it was by no means an ordinary event and not a private operation. The battle unfolded in several western regions of Ukraine, in a huge pentagon between the cities of Lutsk, Rivne, Ostrog, Kamenetz, Brody, with the center in Dubno. In head-on battles, about 2,500 Soviet and German tanks. Its outcome had a significant impact on the disruption of the plans of the German command for the "lightning" crushing of the Red Army in the south. Breakthrough German troops on the move to Kiev was thwarted. The encirclement and destruction of the troops of the Southwestern Front and the capture of the industrial regions of Ukraine did not take place on schedule.

In this paper, the battle is considered from the point of view of the initial decisions of the Soviet and German high commands, which determined the course and results of the first tank battle. We want, as far as possible, to show the general course of the battle, the clash of ideas and plans, operational-tactical decisions and initiatives of the Soviet and German commanders of formations and units that took part in the battle.

German attack plan on the USSR and defense plan Soviet side were worked out and approved in the final versions almost simultaneously, and this is not accidental. The coincidence in time is explained by the ever-increasing tension in the world, caused by the successes of Germany at the beginning of the Second World War.

December 1940 - January 1941. in Moscow, the Soviet leadership held a meeting with military leaders and operational games, and a little earlier in Berlin, a similar meeting and games were held by the Nazi leadership of Germany. The aforementioned plans were the result of them.

The German plan "Barbarossa" (Directive No. 21) formulated the general goal: "The main forces of the Russians, located in Western Russia, must be destroyed in operations, by means of deep rapid advancement of tank wedges. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops to the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

German strategists, in accordance with the military doctrine of the "blitzkrieg", made the main bet on the use of tank and mechanized formations. Army Group South, operating south of the Pripyat Marshes, was tasked with: “... through concentric strikes, having the main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops stationed in Ukraine even before the latter reach the Dnieper. To this end, the main blow is delivered from the Lublin region in the general direction to Kyiv ... "

According to F. Paulus, one of the authors of the plan, a participant in the meeting and the head of the games, two amendments were included in the final version of actions in Ukraine. Hitler demanded that the Russians be surrounded by coverage from the north, and Halder ordered tank wedges to prevent the Russians from retreating and creating defenses west of the Dnieper.

Based on these instructions, the headquarters of Army Group South (commander Field Marshal von Rundstedt) developed an offensive plan (Scheme 1).

Scheme 1. Plan German offensive north (Army Group Center) and south (Army Group South) of the Pripyat swamps.

His plan: with an enveloping blow from the Pripyat swamps to Kyiv, and then turning south along the Dnieper, to surround the main forces of the Southwestern Front, cutting off the communications of the Southern Front, and with an auxiliary blow to Lvov (and further) to close the Soviet troops in a ring on the right bank Ukraine. The exit to Kiev was planned in 3–4 days, the encirclement in 7–8 days.

The offensive zone for tank and motorized divisions in the direction of the main attack was chosen with particular care. German generals attracted areas of Rivne - Lutsk - Dubno, where forests along the river. Goryn interspersed with flat fields, and the plain stretched to the southwest, from Rivne and Dubno, and to the northwest, to Lutsk. From the south, this area, quite open and quite suitable for tank operations, was protected by forests, and in the north - by the Polesskaya (or Pripyat) swampy lowland with almost complete impassability. It is not surprising that the main German attack, originally planned for Lvov, was moved to this zone. The main roads from the border to Novograd-Volynsky, Rovno and further to Zhytomyr and Kyiv passed along it.

Army Group "South" deployed along the line Lublin - the mouth of the Danube (780 km). At the turn of Vlodava - Przemysl were the 6th and 17th field armies of Field Marshal Reichenau and General Stulpnagel, as well as the 1st Panzer Group (1st Tank Group) of General Kleist. The Hungarian corps advanced to the border with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Three more armies (11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian) occupied a line along the Prut and Danube rivers (Scheme 2).

The 6th Reichenau Army and Kleist's 1st Tgr were tasked with attacking the Russians from Vlodava to Krystynopol and breaking through to the Dnieper through Vladimir-Volynsky, Sokal, Dubno in cooperation with the 17th Army. Therefore, Rundstedt concentrated shock tank and motorized divisions in the Ustilug - Sokal - Krystyonopol section, creating here, at the junction of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies, three and even fivefold superiority in forces and means. The German 6th field army had 12 divisions, the Kleist tank group - 3 motorized corps (3rd, 14th and 48th), which included 5 tank divisions (9th, 11th, 13th, 14th th and 16th) and 4 motorized (16th, 25th, SS Viking and SS Life Standard Adolf Hitler). In total, there were 57 divisions in Army Group South, they were supported by the 4th Air Fleet of General Dör (1300 aircraft).

On the night of June 18, Rundstedt began to advance divisions to the waiting and starting areas, which were 7–20 km from the border for infantry divisions, and 20–30 km for tank divisions. The promotion ended on June 21st. The starting positions were located closer to the border and were occupied on the night of June 22. The Germans managed to reach them by 3 o'clock in the morning.

On the evening of June 21, the commanders of the prepared German formations received a conditional password: “The Legend of the Heroes. Wotan. Neckar 15 "- a signal for an attack, transmitted at 4 o'clock in the morning. On the night of June 21-22, the commander of the 48th motorized corps reported to Rundstedt:" Sokal is not darkened. The Russians equip their pillboxes in full light. They don't seem to be doing anything..."

On June 22, 1941, at 4:00 a.m., Rundstedt launched a simultaneous artillery and air attack and at 4:15 a.m. moved the infantry divisions. Around 9 o'clock, Kleist began to commit tank divisions to the battles. On June 22, Halder wrote in his diary: “The offensive of our troops was a complete surprise for the enemy ... units (Soviet. - Auth.) were taken by surprise in the barracks position, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulins; the advanced units, suddenly attacked, asked the command what to do ... After the initial "tetanus" ... the enemy proceeded to hostilities ... ”(F. Halder. Military diary. Vol. 3, book 1).

On the second day of the war, units of the 1st Panzer Group Kleist break through at the junctions of the Vladimir-Volynsky and Strumilovsky fortified areas, which contributed to their advance towards Kiev. The command of the Southwestern Front, realizing the danger, decided to launch a counterattack against the Nazis. The key to the success of the operation was to be the fourfold superiority of the Red Army in tanks, however, in reality, the counteroffensive turned into a tragedy.

For the attack, it was planned to involve the entire aviation of the front and, according to the plan of the command, a strike on the right flank of the German grouping should have collapsed the 4th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps with attached rifle units. The left wing of the advancing Nazis was attacked by the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, rifle formations and the 1st brigade with anti-tank guns.

Before entering the battle, most of the mechanized corps completed a difficult march without observing the prescribed technical standards. As a result, the units were greatly stretched, and the condition of many vehicles was unsatisfactory. Having not formed a single grouping, on the morning of June 24, the front command ordered the 15th Corps of General Carpezo to go on the offensive. Tankers occupied the city of Radekhov, after which the advance was stopped.

The Germans, noticing the accumulation of enemy forces, changed tactics. They abandoned oncoming battles and went on the defensive. The advance of the Red Army was accompanied by huge losses in manpower and equipment. A similar situation developed on the left flank.

While the Germans defended on the flanks, Field Marshal Kleist developed the offensive at the tip of the wedge. On the morning of June 25, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps, after a 100-250 km march, reached the city of Rovno and struck at the left flank of the 1st Panzer Group in the direction of Lutsk - Dubno. Fighting vehicles of the 19th corps were opened defensive lines German 11th Panzer Division and by the end of the same day occupied the outskirts of Dubno, but was knocked out by a German counterattack.

When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?

both as a science and as a social tool, alas, it is subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are praised, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the vast majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up in the days of the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the battle of Prokhorovka, an integral part of the Battle of Kursk, to be the largest tank battle in history. But in fairness, it should be noted that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and five hundred kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas with a total number of about 4,500 armored vehicles converged in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody.

Counteroffensive on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the battle of Dubno, which is also called the battle of Brody or the battle for Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were still called mechanized out of habit - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev military district, launched the first serious counterattacks on the advancing German troops. The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Georgy Zhukov, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. First, the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon, struck at the flanks of Army Group South. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike at the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of the Army Group "South" and rushed to Kiev in order to surround and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this area had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kyiv Special Military District was considered the most powerful of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of the executor of the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first of all and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which had already become the Southwestern Front by this time, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And from the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision to offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which the Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight tanks for the first time

When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, it resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars in the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool to break through the enemy's defenses or create chaos in his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery was supposed to fight with tanks - well, and carefully dug in infantry. And the battle near Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on against German tanks. And they lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and sensible than the Soviet ones, they used all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of the troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was, unfortunately, a cut above than in the Red Army. In the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: rifle units moved on their own two feet and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves at a level above the battalion acted without overall coordination, on their own. It often turned out that one mechanized corps was already rushing to the west, deep into the German defenses, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or withdraw from its positions ...

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA

The second reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which must be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for a tank battle - a consequence of the same pre-war concepts "tanks do not fight tanks." Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks for infantry escort and raid war, created in the early to mid-1930s, there was a majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, medium tanks - 171 pieces (all - T-34), heavy tanks - 217 pieces (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th mechanized corps, which fought just west of Brody, had 892 more tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specifics of the tasks assigned to them, had anti-bullet or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuitable for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strengths and weaknesses of armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours both in quality and weapons, in defense, nullifying all the advantages of Soviet technology.

The German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if for the T-34 and KV, as a rule, it was not dangerous, then light tanks had a hard time. And against the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns of the Wehrmacht, which were rolled out for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KV and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26s and BTs, as the reports said, were “partially destroyed as a result of hitting anti-aircraft shells,” and not just stopped. But the Germans in this direction in anti-tank defense used far from only anti-aircraft guns.

The defeat that brought victory closer

And yet, Soviet tankers, even on such "inappropriate" vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes pierced even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they went.

They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counter-offensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other achieved success. On the fourth day, the Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to succeed, in some areas pushing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. On the evening of June 26, Soviet tankers even took the city of Dubno with battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat ... to the east!

Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru

And yet, the advantage of the Wehrmacht in the infantry units, without which in that war the tankers could fully operate except in the rear raids, soon began to affect. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And every hour the tankers lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel more and more. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy almost undamaged tanks: there was no time and opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.

Today one can meet the opinion that if the leadership of the front had not been given away, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, the command to switch from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned the Germans back near Dubno. Wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active interaction with other branches of the military. But the battle near Dubno played its role in disrupting the Barbarossa plan fostered by Hitler. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the command of the Wehrmacht to commit reserves into battle, which were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And the very direction to Kyiv after this battle was considered as a priority.

And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, broke them - and broke them so much that the pace of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although there was a difficult autumn and winter of 1941 ahead, the largest tank battle had already said its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This is his, the battles near Dubno, the echo thundered in the fields near Kursk and Orel two years later - and echoed in the first volleys of victorious salutes ...

This battle in the West is called tank Tsushima. In our country it is known as a tank battle near Dubno, Lutsk, Brody.
The most, at that time, a major tank battle. In the battle, it took 3300 tanks. 2500 from our side and 800 from the German one.
The battle took place from June 23 to June 29, 1941. The course of the battle.
As a result of the offensive of the German Army Group South, by June 23, a fifty-kilometer-wide gap formed between the Soviet 5th and 6th armies in the Rovno direction. Formations of the first tank group under the command of Colonel General Kleist immediately rushed into the gap. There was a threat of a deep breakthrough of German troops and their coverage from the north of the main forces of the Southwestern Front.
In order to eliminate this threat and eliminate strike force of the enemy, the command of the South-Western Front organized a counterattack. Combined arms formations and also 6 mechanized corps were involved in the counterattack.
The 22.4 and 15 mechanized corps were the first to strike at the flanks of the enemy group. Then the 9.19 and 8 mechanized corps, advanced from the second echelon, were introduced into the battle.
The corps entered the battle after a 200,400-kilometer march in parts, without waiting for the concentration of forces and the approach of combined arms formations. Even on the march, the corps suffered heavy losses from the actions of enemy aviation. there was no air reconnaissance. The mechanized corps actually fought blindly.
June 26, 9th and 19th mech.corps from the Lutsk region, Rivne, and 8th and 15th mech. the corps from the Brody area struck at the flanks of the enemy tank grouping, which had broken through to Lutsk and Dubno by that time. The 9th and 19th mechanized corps were forced to retreat to Rovno by the end of June 27. Tank battles continued here until June 29.
The actions of the southern strike group of our troops were more successful. The 8 mechanized corps especially distinguished itself. On June 26, it moved 10-20 km, defeating German formations in the area north of Brody. new task. To strike from the Berestechko area in the direction of Dubno.
Having defeated parts of the 16th Panzer Division of the enemy, the corps moved 30-35 km, entered Dubno. Thus, it ended up in the rear of the enemy’s 3rd motorized corps. This ended the offensive capabilities of the corps. The Germans brought 7 fresh divisions into the battle in the Rovno direction.
The counterattack of the Soviet mechanized corps inflicted significant losses on the German troops. He thwarted the plan for the quick capture of Kiev. He removed the threat of encirclement of the main forces of the Southwestern Front.

Since the First World War, tanks have been one of the most effective weapons of war. Their first use by the British at the Battle of the Somme in 1916 ushered in a new era, with tank wedges and lightning-fast blitzkriegs.

Battle of Cambrai (1917)

After failures with the use of small tank formations, the British command decided to launch an offensive using a large number tanks. Since the tanks had not lived up to expectations before, many considered them useless. One British officer noted: "The infantry thinks that the tanks have not justified themselves. Even the tank crews are discouraged."

According to the plan of the British command, the forthcoming offensive was supposed to begin without traditional artillery preparation. For the first time in history, tanks themselves had to break through the enemy defenses.
The offensive at Cambrai was supposed to take the German command by surprise. The operation was prepared in strict secrecy. Tanks were brought to the front in the evening. The British were constantly firing machine guns and mortars to drown out the roar of tank engines.

In total, 476 tanks participated in the offensive. The German divisions were defeated and suffered heavy losses. The well-fortified "Hindenburg Line" was broken through to a great depth. However, during the German counter-offensive, the British troops were forced to retreat. Using the remaining 73 tanks, the British managed to prevent a more serious defeat.

Battle for Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (1941)

In the first days of the war, a large-scale tank battle took place in Western Ukraine. The most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht - "Center" - advanced to the north, to Minsk and further to Moscow. Not so strong army group "South" was advancing on Kyiv. But in this direction there was the most powerful grouping of the Red Army - the South-Western Front.

Already in the evening of June 22, the troops of this front received orders to encircle and destroy the advancing enemy grouping with powerful concentric strikes by mechanized corps, and by the end of June 24 to capture the Lublin region (Poland). It sounds fantastic, but this is if you do not know the strength of the parties: in a giant oncoming tank battle, 3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks met.

The battle lasted a week: from 23 to 30 June. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The German command, through competent leadership, managed to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front. The rout was complete: the Soviet troops lost 2648 tanks (85%), the Germans - about 260 vehicles.

Battle of El Alamein (1942)

The Battle of El Alamein is a key episode in the Anglo-German confrontation in North Africa. The Germans sought to cut the most important strategic highway of the Allies - the Suez Canal, and rushed to the Middle Eastern oil, which the Axis needed. The pitched battle of the entire campaign took place at El Alamein. As part of this battle, one of the largest tank battles in World War II took place.

The Italo-German forces numbered about 500 tanks, half of which were rather weak Italian tanks. The British armored units had over 1000 tanks, among which were powerful American tanks - 170 "Grants" and 250 "Shermans".

The qualitative and quantitative superiority of the British was partly offset by the military genius of the commander of the Italo-German troops, the famous "desert fox" Rommel.

Despite the British numerical superiority in manpower, tanks and aircraft, the British were never able to break through Rommel's defenses. The Germans even managed to counterattack, but the superiority of the British in numbers was so impressive that the German shock group of 90 tanks was simply destroyed in the oncoming battle.

Rommel, inferior to the enemy in armored vehicles, made extensive use of anti-tank artillery, among which were captured Soviet 76-mm guns, which proved to be excellent. Only under the pressure of the huge numerical superiority of the enemy, having lost almost all the equipment, the German army began an organized retreat.

The Germans had just over 30 tanks left after El Alamein. The total losses of the Italo-German troops in equipment amounted to 320 tanks. The losses of the British armored forces amounted to approximately 500 vehicles, many of which were repaired and returned to service, since the battlefield was eventually left to them.

Battle of Prokhorovka (1943)

The tank battle near Prokhorovka took place on July 12, 1943 as part of the Battle of Kursk. According to official Soviet data, 800 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 German ones participated in it from both sides.

The Germans lost 350 armored vehicles, ours - 300. But the trick is that the Soviet tanks that participated in the battle were counted, and the German ones were those that were generally in the entire German group on the southern flank of the Kursk salient.

According to new, updated data, 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps took part in the tank battle near Prokhorovka against 597 Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rotmistrov). The SS men lost about 70 (22%), and the guards - 343 (57%) units of armored vehicles.

None of the parties managed to achieve their goals: the Germans failed to break through the Soviet defenses and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

A government commission was set up to investigate the causes of the heavy losses of Soviet tanks. In the commission's report fighting Soviet troops near Prokhorovka are called "a model of an unsuccessful operation." General Rotmistrov was going to be handed over to the tribunal, but by that time the general situation had developed favorably, and everything worked out.

Battle of the Golan Heights (1973)

The major tank battle after 1945 took place during the so-called Yom Kippur War. The war got its name because it began with a surprise attack by the Arabs during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (Judgment Day).

Egypt and Syria sought to regain territories lost after the crushing defeat in the Six Day War (1967). Egypt and Syria were helped (financially and sometimes with impressive troops) by many Islamic countries - from Morocco to Pakistan. And not only Islamic ones: distant Cuba sent 3,000 soldiers to Syria, including tank crews.

On the Golan Heights, 180 Israeli tanks opposed approximately 1,300 Syrian ones. The heights were the most important strategic position for Israel: if the Israeli defenses in the Golan had been broken through, the Syrian troops would have been in the very center of the country in a few hours.

For several days, two Israeli tank brigades, suffering heavy losses, defended the Golan Heights from superior enemy forces. The most fierce fighting took place in the Valley of Tears, the Israeli brigade lost from 73 to 98 tanks out of 105. The Syrians lost about 350 tanks and 200 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

The situation began to change radically after the reservists began to arrive. Syrian troops were stopped and then driven back to their original positions. Israeli troops launched an offensive against Damascus.