Why did Stalin not sign the Geneva Convention. USSR and the Geneva Convention. "It is necessary to remove the moral oppression of mistrust from former prisoners of war"

Back in 1918 Soviet Russia joined the Hague conference. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the recognition of all international conventions on the Red Cross of June 4, 1918, it was announced that "the international conventions and agreements concerning the Red Cross, recognized by Russia before October 1915, are recognized and will be observed by the Russian Soviet Government, which retains all rights and prerogatives based on these conventions and agreements.”

More difficult with the Geneva Convention. Some sources, such as Yu. Veremeev's article, state that the USSR nevertheless signed the Geneva agreements. However, this is a mistake. A deliberate forgery was thrown into the Internet and the authors began to refer to each other without checking the source. In June 1929, two conventions were signed in Geneva, one of which was on the improvement of the condition of the wounded, the second on prisoners of war. The USSR signed only one of them, namely, on the situation of the wounded, and refrained from signing the convention on prisoners of war. In the list "on improving the fate of prisoners of war, the wounded and sick in active armies" in this document, the word "prisoners of war" is not. The USSR did not sign it because of disagreement on a number of points. March 19, 1931 The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the internal "Regulations on Prisoners of War", which generally repeats the Geneva Convention, but there are also discrepancies caused by the difference in Soviet law, therefore:

“In order to harmonize this Regulation with general principles Soviet law, the following differences from the Geneva Convention were introduced into the Regulation:
a) no benefits officers, indicating the possibility of keeping them separately from other prisoners of war (Art. 3);
b) the extension of civil rather than military regime to prisoners of war (Articles 8 and 9);
c) granting political rights to prisoners of war who belong to the working class or who do not exploit the labor of the peasantry, on a common basis with other “foreigners” who are on the territory of the USSR (Article 10);
d) providing [opportunities] for prisoners of war of the same nationality, if they wish, to be placed together;
e) the so-called camp committees acquire broader camp competence, having the right to freely communicate with all bodies to represent all the interests of prisoners of war in general, and not only limit themselves to receiving and distributing parcels, the functions of a mutual benefit fund, etc. (Art. 14);
f) prohibition to wear insignia and non-indication of the rules on saluting honor (Article 18);
g) prohibition of branching (art. 34);
h) the appointment of salaries not only for officers, but for all prisoners of war (Article 32);
i) the involvement of prisoners of war in work only with their consent (Article 34) and with the application to them of the general legislation on labor protection and working conditions (Article 36), as well as the distribution of wages to them in an amount not lower than that existing in the given locality for the relevant category of workers, etc.”

There was also an opinion that joining the Geneva Convention did little: “The Soviet government did not consider it necessary to do this, firstly because it joined the Hague Conference, which contains all the most important provisions that Geneva” Molotov. Indeed, Geneva didn't really add much. Simply observing the Hague Conference is already more than enough so that prisoners of war are not subjected to abuse and destruction.

Plus, they relied on case law that actually existed and worked throughout the 19th century. The principle of a similar attitude, as your prisoners are treated in enemy countries.

Therefore, in the conditions of the outbreak of war, relations with the ICRC had to be built almost from scratch. On July 8 and 23, the ICRC announced its readiness to exchange information between the two warring parties and created a branch in Ankara for this purpose.

In response to a request from the Swedish government, in the memorandum of the People's Commissar, Jin. Affairs of the USSR of July 17, circular note No. 3 of August 8, 1941, it was stated that "government USSR will respect the well-known international treaties concerning the law of war.”

“On June 27, 41 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, announced his agreement with the proposal "International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the submission of information about prisoners of war, if the same information is provided by countries at war with the Soviet state"

In August, the USSR hands over the first list of German prisoners. There was no response from Germany.

The ICRC is de facto doing nothing to mediate, putting the brakes on the July 5 protest about the bombing of hospitals… “The ICRC has evaded a public assessment and investigation of these cases, although this was a direct violation of the Geneva Conventions”. (On the 1st, July 6, 1906, which the USSR joined in 1926) The transfer of a simple text of protest to the German side, carried out by the ICRC, is taken in the USSR as a refined mockery. And when the ICRC takes a condemning position regarding the rejection of the Soviet proposal of the German side on the possibility of deploying German hospital ships in the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic Sea ... After that, the USSR not only freezes relations with the ICRC, but also does not initiate it. Those are satisfied with it.

Therefore, the USSR ceases to pin any hopes on the ICRC and moves on to a different strategy. Periodically publishing broadcast statements, such as the note of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of November 26, 41, which is guided by "... in relation to the detention of prisoners of war by international law and in particular by the Hague Conference of 1907, recognized by both the Soviet Union and Germany", the USSR makes the main emphasis on attempts to direct contacts between the KK parties. This is not possible with Germany, but huge progress is being made with Romania and Hungary.

So since January 1943, an attempt has been made to establish correspondence for prisoners of war. So far, I do not have reliable figures on how many letters came from Soviet prisoners of war. But from Hungarian and Romanian "from January 43 to December 44, 23534 letters were sent and 10914 received from abroad". Since the USSR conducted all negotiations from the standpoint of reciprocity, somewhere the same order of letters should be expected from Soviet prisoners. They also exchanged lists of prisoners with them, although these exchanges were very infrequent and did not reflect the completeness of the picture. Few? Maybe. But it was a breakthrough, and it was very, very difficult to achieve. Guarantees were also obtained from the Hungarian and Romanian sides regarding the maintenance of prisoners.

With Germany, due to its complete reluctance and the sabotaging role of the ICRC, this was not possible.

As a matter of fact, this whole story shows that the conventions themselves and their signing do not protect anything. Much more important is whether one of the parties is going to comply with them and negotiate. And this applies not only to Germany. The US signed everything possible. This did not save them from heavy losses among those captured by the Japanese. And what the Japanese were doing in China, which was also a signatory to a number of conventions, is better to be silent about this.

Therefore, all attempts to lay the blame for the dead Soviet prisoners on the USSR are simply shifting from a sick head to a healthy one.

The longer you defend the rights, the more unpleasant the sediment.

Since the USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention, he left his prisoners to the mercy of fate, and this is precisely what explains big number who died in captivity.

These theses were used by the Germans for self-justification at the beginning of the war: « Soviet Union did not join the agreement of July 27, 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. As a result, we are not obliged to provide Soviet prisoners of war with supplies that would comply with this agreement both in quantity and quality.. Nuremberg Proceedings Document D-225
These German "justifications", despite the fact that they not recognized as such The Nuremberg trials, the Russian emigration believed, supported them and began to distribute them. Our democratic society took over the myth from her.. Moreover, some authors began to argue that the USSR did not recognize the Hague Convention

A striking example:
“The situation of Soviet military personnel in Nazi captivity was largely determined by the fact that the USSR did not recognize the Hague Convention and the 1907 Declaration on the Laws and Customs of Land War and did not sign the 1929 Geneva Convention, which determined the legal status of prisoners of war”. (With.) Shneer A.I. "Roads to Hell"

“The prisoners ahead of time (back in 1929, when the USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention) were doomed by the Soviet government, that is, primarily by Stalin, to hunger and torment (the Red Cross helped the captured Europeans and Americans - ours chewed belts)”.(With.) Marietta Chudakova "Monument to our madness"

Germany position:
In any case, whether the USSR signed the Geneva Convention or not, Germany, as a signatory, was obliged to comply with it. The convention stated explicitly: “If, in case of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the convention, nevertheless, the provisions of such remain binding on all the belligerents who sign the convention”.

The position of the USSR:
Back in 1918, Soviet Russia joined the Hague Conference. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the recognition of all international conventions on the Red Cross of June 4, 1918, it was announced that "international conventions and agreements concerning the Red Cross recognized by Russia before October 1915 are recognized and will be observed by the Russian Soviet Government, which retains all rights and prerogatives based on these conventions and agreements".

More difficult with the Geneva Convention. Some sources, such as Yu. Veremeev's article, state that the USSR nevertheless signed the Geneva agreements. However, this is a mistake. A deliberate forgery was thrown into the Internet and the authors began to refer to each other without checking the source. In June 1929, two conventions were signed in Geneva, one of which was on the improvement of the condition of the wounded, the second on prisoners of war. The USSR signed only one of them, namely, on the situation of the wounded, and refrained from signing the convention on prisoners of war. In the list "on improving the fate of prisoners of war, wounded and sick in active armies" in this document the word "prisoners of war" is not. The USSR did not sign it because of disagreement on a number of points. March 19, 1931 The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the internal "Regulations on Prisoners of War", which generally repeats the Geneva Convention, but there are also discrepancies caused by the difference in Soviet law, that's why:

“In order to harmonize this Regulation with the general principles of Soviet law, the following differences from the Geneva Convention have been introduced into the Regulation:
a) there are no benefits for officers, indicating the possibility of keeping them separately from other prisoners of war (Article 3);
b) the extension of civil rather than military regime to prisoners of war (Articles 8 and 9);
c) granting political rights to prisoners of war who belong to the working class or who do not exploit the labor of the peasantry, on a common basis with other “foreigners” who are on the territory of the USSR (Article 10);
d) providing [opportunities] for prisoners of war of the same nationality, if they wish, to be placed together;
e) the so-called camp committees acquire broader camp competence, having the right to freely communicate with all bodies to represent all the interests of prisoners of war in general, and not only limit themselves to receiving and distributing parcels, the functions of a mutual benefit fund, etc. (Art. 14);
f) prohibition to wear insignia and non-indication of the rules on saluting honor (Article 18);
g) prohibition of branching (art. 34);
h) the appointment of salaries not only for officers, but for all prisoners of war (Article 32);
i) the involvement of prisoners of war in work only with their consent (Article 34) and with the application to them of the general legislation on labor protection and working conditions (Article 36), as well as the distribution of wages to them in an amount not lower than that existing in the given locality for the relevant category of workers, etc.” (from the conclusion of the consultant Malitsky on the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "Regulations on prisoners of war")

There was also an opinion that joining the Geneva Convention did little: “ The Soviet government did not consider it necessary to do this, firstly because it joined the Hague Conference, which contains all the most important provisions that the Geneva Conference did.(p.) Molotov.
Indeed, Geneva didn't really add much. Simply observing the Hague Conference is already more than enough so that prisoners of war are not subjected to abuse and destruction. Plus, they relied on case law that actually existed and worked throughout the 19th century. The principle of a similar attitude, as your prisoners are treated in enemy countries.

Before the war, contacts with the ICRC were episodic, which was largely due to the recognition of the Soviet Red Cross de facto in 1921 and only by 1928 de jure. The leadership of the USSR was extremely wary of the special actions of the ICRC to prevent the participation of the Soviet delegation in the discussions. Let's say at the moment there is a conflict with Switzerland, relations are suspended for six months. And of course, it is in Switzerland that the ICRC congress is convened. Calls to spend in another place or at least for a month to postpone or find some kind of compromise ... All this is valiantly ignored, even often without entering into correspondence.
Therefore, in the conditions of the outbreak of war, relations with the ICRC had to be built almost from scratch. On July 8 and 23, the ICRC announced its readiness to exchange information between the two warring parties and created a branch in Ankara for this purpose.
In response to a request from the Swedish government, in the memorandum of the People's Commissar, Jin. Affairs of the USSR of July 17, circular note No. 3 of August 8, 1941, it was stated that "the government of the USSR will observe the well-known international treaties concerning the law of war".
July 24, 41 USSR published "Regulations on the Central Information Bureau under the Executive Committee of the Union of Societies of the KK and the Red Crescent".
“On June 27, 41 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, announced his agreement with the proposal "International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the submission of information about prisoners of war, if the same information is provided by countries at war with the Soviet state".

In August, the USSR hands over the first list of German prisoners. There was no response from Germany.

ICRC de facto does nothing to mediate, puts a brake on the July 5 protest about the bombing of hospitals
… “The ICRC evaded public assessment and investigation of these cases, although this was in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions”. (on the 1st, July 6, 1906, which the USSR joined in 1926) The transfer of a simple text of protest to the German side, carried out by the ICRC, in the USSR taken for a sophisticated mockery. And when the ICRC takes condemning the position regarding the rejection of the USSR proposal of the German side on the possibility of deploying German hospital ships in the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic Sea... After that, the USSR not only freezes relations with the ICRC, but also does not initiate it. Those are satisfied with it.

Therefore, the USSR ceases to pin any hopes on the ICRC and moves on to a different strategy. Periodically publishing broadcast statements, such as the note of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of November 26, 41, which is guided by "... in relation to the detention of prisoners of war by international law and in particular by the Hague Conference of 1907, recognized by both the Soviet Union and Germany", the USSR makes the main emphasis on attempts to direct contacts between the KK parties. This is not possible with Germany, but huge progress is being made with Romania and Hungary.
So since January 1943, an attempt has been made to establish correspondence for prisoners of war. So far, I do not have reliable figures on how many letters came from Soviet prisoners of war. But from Hungarian and Romanian "from January 43 to December 44, 23534 letters were sent and 10914 received from abroad". Since the USSR conducted all negotiations from the standpoint of reciprocity, somewhere the same order of letters should be expected from Soviet prisoners. They also exchanged lists of prisoners with them, although these exchanges were very infrequent and did not reflect the completeness of the picture. Few? Maybe. But it was a breakthrough, and it was very, very difficult to achieve. Guarantees were also obtained from the Hungarian and Romanian sides regarding the maintenance of prisoners.

With Germany, due to its complete reluctance and the sabotaging role of the ICRC, this was not possible.
As a matter of fact, this whole story shows that the conventions themselves and their signing do not protect anything. Much more important is whether one of the parties is going to comply with them and negotiate. And this applies not only to Germany. The US signed everything possible. This did not save them from heavy losses among those captured by the Japanese.

Why did Stalin not sign the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War?

The Soviet Union ratified the terms of another document prescribing the humane treatment of the wounded and sick during the war. Even without the signing of the convention, the destruction of prisoners of war by the Nazis was an unthinkable and cruel act.

Questions about what would have been cannot justify the actions of the fascist regime. As history has shown, in war any means are good. The Germans used the fact that the USSR did not join the agreement of July 27, 1929, at the very beginning of the war to promote violence.

Stalin liked to repeat the idea that there should be no captured soldiers on the Soviet front and equated them with traitors. Surrender was unacceptable. Thanks to his conviction, Stalin did not sign the Geneva Convention.

I don't think it changed anything. On the Soviet-German front, war crimes were committed from the first hour of the war. So, for example, the captured Germans were killed on June 22 in the Brest Fortress. In the course of the movement of the columns of Soviet prisoners of war, the multi-membered corpses of those who were shot remained - about a million in 1941 while trying to escape ...

When leaving Rostov, the SS soldiers found a dozen of their soldiers tortured by the NKVD and did not take prisoners for two weeks ... - 7,000 prisoners were shot.

In Feodosia in 1942, Mekhlis ordered 160 wounded German prisoners to be thrown out into the cold ...

In 1942, the Germans strangled the defenders of the Adzhimushkaysky quarries with special smoke grenades ...

Everything is determined by moral standards, which were mostly observed on the western front.

Because, as Stalin put it: we have no prisoners, we have traitors.

A special order 227 was even issued On Measures to Strengthen Discipline and Order in the Red Army and Prohibition of Unauthorized Withdrawal from Combat Positions or, in common parlance, Not one step back! By this order, surrender, even subsequently wounded, was equated with treason. Accordingly, the Geneva Convention was not signed either. That is why there was such an inhumane, to put it mildly, attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war. The rest, too, the prisoner was not sugar. But according to the convention signed by Germany, they could receive parcels from their homeland. There were other concessions as well. But for the Red Army, captivity was tantamount to death. And shameful death. It was believed that it was better to be missing.

America, represented by Roosevelt, and England, represented by Churchill, have been putting pressure on the USSR since 1944, and after the signing of the convention, the people of the USSR would simply be in a deplorable state, and the whole country would be under economic slavery, so Stalin made a move and did not agree to sign. In fact, in the confrontation between the allies of the USA and England and the USSR, Stalin made many right decisions, which saved the country after the devastation caused by Germany ...

You can, of course, write that Stalin was such a proud horseman, they say he was not going to go into captivity, not at all. And a lot more about a short-sighted policy and a disregard for the Russian soldier, etc.

But from our time to judge this is simply architrudno. Even venerable historians wander in the dark and archives. What can we say about our ordinary contemporaries who have not been confused by history. Looked at the wiki, and everything is clear ...

I read a long time ago that the USSR, and even in 1929, when all this fuss with the Geneva Convention took place, was not at all going to fight in Europe. But on Far East and in China - very easily. It was in 1929 that the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek. After the provocations at the Chinese Eastern Railway. It is clear that the dictator was not very good with the convention.

And taking into account the fact that Japan did not ratify the Geneva Convention either, the USSR was not going to do this unilaterally. And this was the only obvious enemy for the USSR at that time. And the Geneva Convention came into force in 1931. At the same time, Japan refused the Soviet proposal to sign a non-aggression pact.

And at the expense of prisoners of war, there is an interesting decision of the Council of People's Commissars. What's wrong with conventions?

And further. The fact that the USSR did not sign the convention on prisoners of war in no way justifies the Nazi sadists who starved to death, killed, and burned hundreds of thousands of captured soldiers of the Red Army. As if some convention would soften the hearts of the executioners.

There is such a stable tradition in our post-Soviet history: everything that was bad and unpleasant in the Soviet past happens through the fault of Stalin, and everything that is good and heroic is contrary to him.

And in the great mythology patriotic war perhaps the most frequently repeated myth is the story that, they say, the German troops would like to treat Soviet prisoners of war well, they just dreamed, but the scoundrel Stalin did not sign the Geneva Convention. So the poor SS soldiers cried, but they tortured the captured soldiers of the USSR, starved, tortured, experimented, well, they were forced to do this, contrary to their soft nature! Because of Stalin, of course.

There is a second explanation: in nm, the Nazis did not feel remorse, simply because of the lack of the notorious signature, there was no one to intercede for Soviet prisoners of war. Who should have been blunted is not very clear: apparently, the world community and the civilized world (in the sense of Great Britain and the USA). And so without a signature, the world community did not see, hear or understand anything.

Alas, this is nothing more than a myth. Moreover, the myth is utterly foul.

To begin with, let's see if the lack of a signature really put Soviet prisoners of war outside the scope of international law?

Back in the 19th century, the same world civilized community developed rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. International rules, by the way, are common.

In 1929, these rules were slightly modified in the direction of giving prisoners of war greater rights and ensuring their protection. This is the same Geneva Convention. It was signed by all European countries, including Germany. The USSR did not sign the convention, but ratified the rules adopted simultaneously with it for the treatment of the wounded and sick in the war.

That is, the USSR did not actually sign the document as such, but made it clear that it agreed to comply with international rules and laws in fact.

So from the point of view of international law, Germany (as a signatory to the convention) was obliged to comply with its norms in full. The consent or refusal of the other party (USSR) to sign the same document does not matter.

By the way, these are not the conclusions of modern lawyers or communist-minded historians. These are the words of Admiral Canaris:

Even if we assume that the refusal of the USSR to sign made the Geneva Convention invalid, the rules of the Hague continued to apply. It was signed by both sides!

And one more thing: the Geneva Convention itself contained a provision that the signatory countries were obliged to comply with its rules, regardless of whether the opposing country signed the convention or not.

So the lack of a signature from the USSR should rather have strained the German side, because the Soviet Union did not take on obligations to maintain German prisoners of war.

However, the fear of the communists who mistreat our soldiers cannot be considered an excuse for Germany. Immediately after the start of the war, the Soviet Union turned to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and by July 1, adopted the Regulations on prisoners of war, fully consistent with the Hague and Geneva conventions.

So the USSR did everything to comply with international standards and guarantee the normal maintenance and treatment of German prisoners of war. And, of course, he counted on an adequate response from the German side.

Unfortunately, the answer turned out to be exactly what happened. And the reason here is not in the scoundrel Stalin, but in the fact that the very ideology of Nazism did not recognize Russians (Belarusians, Ukrainians and others like them) as people. These were sub-humans, subject to mass destruction, therefore, human rules did not apply to them. And this attitude began to change dramatically as soon as Germany began to understand that there would be no victorious war and that everything they had done would have to be held accountable.

Don't believe? Here is an extract from the German document:

German prisoners of war in the USSR felt more protected, more comfortable and more satisfying than an example. Moreover, during the entire period of hostilities, so it’s impossible to argue that such an attitude is a consequence of fear of defeat.

Why did the USSR, having actually acceded to the Geneva Convention, not sign it?

Now, after so many years, we can only guess about that. At least until we find Litvinov's memorandum somewhere in the archives, and on it Stalin's visa with a clearly stated position (which is unlikely).

Perhaps this decision was really influenced by the situation in the Far East.

Or maybe the reason lay in a purely ideological field. Please remember that this was in 1929. The world's first state of workers and peasants was not yet ten years old. The euphoria of the victory of communism is still strong, one still believes in a complete victory over world capital and the international Freedom, equality, fraternity! how else?

The Geneva Convention offered a different attitude towards the private and the officer, their content in captivity varied. For example, officers could not be involved in the work, they were entitled to special privileges and even salary payments.

The society of universal equality, which the Soviet Union considered itself to be, could not agree with such inequality. So that notorious signature did not appear on the document.

So the answers to your questions are simple:

No, it would not be easier for our prisoners of war. According to all international norms, Germany was obliged to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention (or at least the Hague Convention), regardless of the actions of the USSR.

It's not about Stalin and not about his signature (but should he have put it in 1929?). The signature is a formality. The cruel treatment of Soviet prisoners of war is a consequence of the ideology of Germany in those years, and not international law. We were going to be exterminated.

Would another reason for the inhuman attitude be found? But how! These reasons were voiced during the Nuremberg trials. Transfer?

Firstly, it turns out that the German command did not expect that there would be so many prisoners, so there was not enough content for everyone!

Secondly, thousands of Soviet soldiers died in captivity, because they were already exhausted and sick (well, there, famine, overwork on collective farms, etc.). The German doctors so wanted to help them, but alas, the Soviet goners, due to chronic malnutrition (there was a famine in the USSR for decades, understand?) Could not withstand forty-kilometer marches, gruel and work in quarries, which were easily tolerated by well-fed and healthy English and French prisoners of war.

And finally, thirdly (German historians voiced this reason already strongly after the war): the German guards of concentration camps and the SD teams massively shot Soviet prisoners of war, because they were pushed to do so by Soviet agents! Apparently, as part of the destruction of traitors, as Stalin wanted.

From my point of view, pure nonsense.

As a result, the blame for the death of millions of prisoners of war was shifted from the Nazis to the "bloody dictator", who hated his people so much that he went to destroy the captured Soviet soldiers. They like to supplement this myth with another one: allegedly those who miraculously survived and returned from German captivity were immediately sent straight to Stalinist camps. These "black myths" during the time of the USSR and then the Russian Federation were repeated so many times in various popular science, in fact, near-scientific works, expressed in magazines, newspapers, shown in the images of feature films, which became almost the truth. However, a lie, even repeated hundreds of thousands of times, does not cease to be a lie.

Soviet prisoners of war and international law

International rules for the treatment of prisoners were enshrined at the Hague Conference in 1899 (convened at the initiative of Russia, which at that time was the most peaceful of the great powers). In this regard, the German General Staff developed an instruction that retained the basic rights of the prisoner. Even if a prisoner of war tried to escape, he could only be subjected to disciplinary punishment. It is clear that during the First World War the rules were violated, but no one questioned their essence. In German captivity during the entire period of the First World War, 3.5% of prisoners of war died of starvation and disease.
In 1929, a new Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War was concluded, it provided prisoners with an even greater degree of protection than previous agreements. Germany, like most European countries, signed this document. Moscow did not sign the convention*, but ratified the convention concluded at the same time on the treatment of the wounded and sick in war. The USSR has demonstrated that it is going to act within the framework of international law. Thus, this meant that the USSR and Germany were bound by common international legal norms for the conduct of war, which were binding on all states, regardless of whether they acceded to the relevant agreements or not. Even without any conventions, it was unacceptable to destroy prisoners of war, as the Nazis did. The consent and refusal of the USSR to ratify the Geneva Convention did not change the situation. That is why the head of military intelligence and counterintelligence of Germany, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, drew attention to this fact. He sent a protest to the head of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), in which he said that although the Geneva Convention does not apply in relations between Germany and the USSR, the basic provisions of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. They have developed since the 18th century, and captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but only a precautionary measure that prevents a prisoner of war from participating in the war again. According to the head of the Abwehr, "... from a military point of view, it is unacceptable to kill or maim the defenseless." In addition, each commander has an interest in the fact that his own soldiers, being captured, will be protected from ill-treatment.

It should also be noted that the rights of Soviet soldiers were guaranteed not only by general international legal norms, but also fell under the Hague Convention, which Russia signed. The provisions of this convention remained in force even after the signing of the Geneva Convention, which was known to all parties, including German lawyers. In the German collection of international legal acts of 1940, it was indicated that the Hague Agreement on the Laws and Rules of War is valid even without the Geneva Convention. In addition, it should be noted that the states that signed the Geneva Convention assumed the obligation to treat prisoners normally, regardless of whether their countries signed the convention or not. In the event of a German-Soviet war, the situation of German prisoners of war should have caused concern - the USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention.

Thus, from the point of view of law, the Soviet prisoners were fully protected. They were not placed outside the framework of international law, as haters of the USSR like to claim. The prisoners were protected by general international norms, the Hague Convention and Germany's obligation under the Geneva Convention. Moscow also tried to provide its prisoners with maximum legal protection. As early as June 27, 1941, the USSR expressed its readiness to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. On July 1, the "Regulations on Prisoners of War" were approved, which strictly corresponded to the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. German prisoners of war were guaranteed decent treatment, personal security and medical care. This "Regulation" was in effect throughout the war, its violators were prosecuted in a disciplinary and criminal order. Moscow, recognizing the Geneva Convention, apparently hoped for an adequate reaction from Berlin. However, the military-political leadership of the Third Reich had already crossed the line between good and evil and was not going to apply either the Hague or the Geneva Conventions or the generally recognized norms and customs of war to the Soviet "subhumans". Soviet "subhumans" were going to be massively destroyed.

Already after the war, when a noose for the deliberate destruction of prisoners of war loomed before the German generals, they began to come up with excuses and lie. Their lie was rather primitive, but it was it that became the basis for the fabrications of the haters of the USSR and Russophobes in general. First, the German generals argued, they were allegedly not ready for the fact that so many Soviet prisoners would be in their hands. As a result, they were unable to provide them with proper maintenance and support. It is clear that this is a blatant lie. The German command initially counted on a blitzkrieg and the completion of the main phase of the war in the fall of 1941. From this it inevitably follows that the Germans will end up with millions of people from the defeated Red Army, the mobilized population, the party and state apparatus of the country. The second justification of the Nazis is also false. They reported that the Soviet prisoners of war were already captured by the goners (from bad Soviet life) and hundreds of thousands died, unable to withstand the conditions of captivity. Another reason was invented by the German historian Joachim Hoffmann, who stated that the German guards of the camps and the SD teams had to mass shoot prisoners, because Soviet agents pushed them to this. It's pointless to even comment on this nonsense.

Unfortunately, the justifications of the Nazis and their defenders were happily picked up and are still being repeated in Russia. The enemies of the USSR are so eager to denounce the "bloody regime" that they even go to justify the Nazis. Although numerous documents and facts confirm that the destruction of Soviet prisoners of war was planned in advance. No action Soviet authorities could not stop this cannibalistic machine (other than complete victory).

Soviet prisoners of war were herded into Stalin's camps?

According to the anti-Soviet "black myth", soldiers and officers released from German captivity were immediately driven to Stalin's camps. This myth is very popular and adopted by the Soviet-Russian cinematography. It is believed that the Stalinist regime equated captivity with treason, with all the ensuing consequences. However, this is only a myth and another lie.

According to Soviet pre-war legislation, only surrender, not caused by a combat situation, was considered a crime. For example, if a soldier of the Red Army fled with his position to the enemy, he would be shot at capture with confiscation of property. Prisoners of war who were captured due to circumstances beyond their control, in conditions caused by a combat situation, were not subject to criminal prosecution. Captivity was not a crime against the Motherland, but a tragedy.

They somewhat toughened their attitude to the problem of captivity in August 1941. A streak of terrible defeats led to significant losses of the Red Army, including prisoners. On August 16, 1941, the famous order No. 270 “On the responsibility of military personnel for surrendering and leaving weapons to the enemy” appeared, which was signed by Joseph Stalin. The order was quite consistent with the time - the enemy was rushing to the main Soviet centers, the situation was critical and required emergency solutions. Surrender was equated with treason. We should give credit to the Kremlin: the highest authorities quickly realized that the order was unnecessarily cruel. Fortunately, in practice, the cruel measures prescribed by order No. 270 were used very rarely, since the account of those captured was not established. And already from the beginning of November 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs again began to take actions to alleviate the life of Soviet prisoners of war who were in German captivity.

One of the reasons that led to the emergence of the myth about sending prisoners to Soviet camps, was the check of prisoners of war in the special camps of the NKVD. When released from German captivity, prisoners of war were sent there. From October 1941 to March 1944, 320,000 former prisoners of war passed through checks in such special camps. Moreover, in these camps, people were not only checked, but former prisoners of war restored their strength. The vast majority have successfully passed the test and received at the disposal armed forces, NKVD troops or was sent to industrial and agricultural enterprises. Only 4% of the total number of those subjected to verification were arrested.

After the Red Army began to conduct large successful offensives, and there was a radical change in the war, the approach to checking former prisoners of war was even more liberalized. It was ordered to send only "persons who have serious data for suspicion of anti-Soviet activities" to the special camps. As a result, for the majority, a quick check could be completed in one day. In the conditions of the front, they often managed without verification at all. So, according to the memoirs of the commander of the 21st Army, M. I. Chistyakov, Gumrak turned out to be a camp for prisoners of war. Former prisoners were dressed, shod, fed, given 10-15 days to rest and treatment, then 8 thousand people were selected from them and formed 8 battalions, which were armed and sent to divisions. Since November 1944, the practice of sending released prisoners of war to military units, bypassing the special camps of the NKVD, was legalized by a decree of the State Defense Committee.

It should be noted that the attitude towards former prisoners of war at the front was completely normal. After the war, people used to be reproached with captivity, but only on a personal level. This was due to the severe psychological trauma of the survivors of terrible war people, they were suspicious of those who were "on the other side." The state did not pursue former prisoners. The Kremlin closed this topic as early as July 7, 1945, when a decree “On amnesty in connection with the victory over Nazi Germany". According to this decree, even a part of the collaborators was pardoned (the unfinished Nazi accomplices still remind of themselves in the Baltic States and Ukraine).

An interesting fact is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin, beloved by liberals and human rights activists, betrayed the former Soviet prisoners of war. After the war, Germany had to pay reparations to the USSR. The established volume of reparations was divided between the FRG and the GDR. The German Democratic Republic had already paid its share by the early 1960s. And the FRG, being in the camp of enemies of the USSR, paid extremely slowly and by the end of the 1980s had paid a little more than half of what was due. Gorbachev forgave the remaining half of the debt of the FRG, although they could have reimbursed part of the loans received for "perestroika".

Soon, European human rights activists ensured that Germany paid compensation to all those whom the Nazis drove to work and kept in concentration camps. Initially, it was about Europeans, but then the practice was extended to citizens of the former Soviet Union. It was logical to assume that Russian government will create a public commission that would ensure that all victims receive compensation. However, in Russia, it was the German prisoners themselves who had to prove that they were driven to work, starved and worked hard. Moreover, former prisoners of war were not included in the number of victims. Russian authorities agreed that prisoners of war were not entitled to compensation. Relevant intergovernmental agreement Russian Federation signed with Germany on March 20, 1993. And this betrayal was committed by the government, which regularly slandered the Soviet past and especially the era of Stalin.

*The refusal to join the Geneva Convention was ideological in nature. In particular, it provided that the officer corps was entitled to benefits (for example, salaries) and the opportunity to wear insignia in the camp. At the same time, the Geneva Convention provided for the possibility of mandatory involvement of prisoners of war in work, which the USSR leadership did not like. There were other points with which the USSR did not agree. As a result, the USSR adopted on March 19, 1931 its own “Regulations on prisoners of war”.
Since its adoption, a document has been prepared outlining the differences between this provision and the Geneva Convention. So that you can understand what the difference is, we will give it in full:

CONCLUSION OF THE CONSULTANT MALITSKY ON THE DRAFT DECISION OF THE CEC AND SNK OF THE USSR "REGULATION ON PRISONERS OF WAR"
Moscow, March 27, 1931

On July 27, 1929, the Geneva Conference worked out a convention on the maintenance of prisoners of war. The government of the USSR did not take part either in drawing up this convention or in its ratification. Instead of this convention, this Regulation has been developed, the draft of which was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on March 19 of this year.
This draft provision is based on three ideas:
1) create a regime for our prisoners of war that would not be worse than the regime of the Geneva Convention;
2) issue, if possible, a brief law that does not reproduce the details of all those guarantees that the Geneva Convention gives, so that these details form the subject of instructions executing the law;
3) to formulate the issue of prisoners of war in accordance with Soviet principles of law (inadmissibility of benefits for officers, optional involvement of prisoners of war in work, etc.)

Thus, this Regulation is based in general on the same principles as the Geneva Convention, such as: the prohibition of ill-treatment of prisoners of war, insults and threats, the prohibition of using coercive measures to obtain information of a military nature from them, granting them civil legal capacity and disseminating on them the general laws of the country, the prohibition to use them in a war zone, etc.
However, in order to harmonize this Regulation with the general principles of Soviet law, the Regulation introduces the following differences from the Geneva Convention:
a) there are no benefits for officers, indicating the possibility of keeping them separately from other prisoners of war (Article 3);
b) the extension of civil rather than military regime to prisoners of war (Articles 8 and 9);
c) granting political rights to prisoners of war who belong to the working class or who do not exploit other people's labor of the peasantry, on a common basis with other foreigners who are on the territory of the USSR (Article 10);
d) providing [opportunities] for prisoners of war of the same nationality, if they wish, to be placed together;

Mirror of history

) the so-called camp committees receive broader camp competence, having the right to freely communicate with all bodies to represent all the interests of prisoners of war in general, and not only limit themselves to receiving and distributing parcels, the functions of a mutual benefit fund (Article 14);
f) prohibition to wear insignia and non-indication of the rules of saluting (Article 18);
g) the prohibition of branching (art. 34);
h) the appointment of salaries not only for officers, but for all prisoners of war (Article 32);
i) involvement of prisoners of war in work only with their consent (Article 34) and with the application to them of the general legislation on labor protection and working conditions (Article 36), as well as the distribution of wages to them in an amount not lower than that existing in the given area for the relevant category of workers, etc.
Taking into account that this bill establishes a regime for the maintenance of prisoners of war no worse than the Geneva Convention, that therefore the principle of reciprocity can be extended without prejudice to both the USSR and individual prisoners of war, that the number of articles of the provision is reduced to 45 instead of 97 in the Geneva Convention that the principles of Soviet law are carried out in the Regulation, there are no objections to the adoption of this bill.
* * * * *
GA RF, f.3316, op.64, file 1049, l.1-1a. Typescript. Script

As you can see, the Soviet situation, firstly, was more democratic than the Geneva Convention, and secondly, it provided for better maintenance for prisoners of war, if only due to the fact that the salary was assigned not only to officers, but to all prisoners of war.

But let's not dissemble - this provision was valid only until July 1, 1941, when Soviet government a new regulation on prisoners of war was adopted, and the previous one became invalid. The new provision was close to Geneva in those paragraphs that stipulated special conditions for officers, the ability to wear insignia and provided for the payment of monetary allowances not to all prisoners, as was the case in 1931, but only to officers. It also became possible to involve prisoners of war in work without their consent. Prisoners of war lost the right to elect their own bodies to represent the interests of prisoners of war and for other purposes.
There were also some discrepancies with the Geneva Convention: it was not forbidden to use prisoners of war in work with unhealthy working conditions, the provision of protection to prisoners of war accused of committing crimes was not stipulated, the death sentence of a convict could be carried out without notifying the government of the country of which he was a citizen. is, and without reporting to the International Red Cross.

In general, the real military conditions have made their own harsh adjustments compared to the fine-hearted position of 1931, adopted in peacetime.
Author Samsonov Alexander

In Russian Imperial Army captivity was not considered a crime; prisoners were treated as sufferers. They retained ranks, awards, monetary allowance, captivity was counted in the length of service. With the active participation of Emperor Nicholas II and Russian diplomats, the famous Hague Convention of 1907 "On the laws and customs of war on land" appeared, which determined the rights of prisoners of war. In 1914-1917. 2.4 million officials of the Russian army were captured, of which no more than 5% died.

Fundamentals of criminal policy Soviet state in relation to their own citizens who were captured, they were laid down long before 1939. The still newborn RSFSR refused to recognize the 1907 convention. Lenin said: "The Hague decree creates a selfish psychology among soldiers." As a result, 16-18 thousand Red Army soldiers captured during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 died of starvation and typhus in Polish camps, abandoned by the Council of People's Commissars to their fate.

Stalin in 1925 called the work of the Hague Conference "an example of the unparalleled hypocrisy of bourgeois diplomacy." In 1927, the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recognized: "The non-working elements that make up the majority of our army - the peasants - will not voluntarily fight for socialism." The mass death of prisoners would reduce the likelihood of the formation of the Russian anti-communist army on the side of the enemy. On May 15, 1929, Stalin informed Voroshilov that the USSR would not participate in the Geneva Conference. On July 27, 1929, the heads of delegations of 47 states signed the Geneva Agreement on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Soviet Union refused to join the convention. Nazi Germany recognized the convention in 1934.

Hitler justified the sinister plans for Soviet prisoners of racial theory, the struggle of ideologies and the non-recognition of international conventions by the Bolsheviks. On March 30, 1941, speaking to the generals, the Fuhrer frankly declared: in the coming war, "a Red Army soldier will not be a comrade." Taking advantage of the refusal of the USSR government to protect the rights of its citizens in captivity, the Nazis doomed them to methodical extinction from hunger and disease, to bullying and repression. Political workers and Jews taken prisoner were subject to destruction. In turn, in order No. 270 of August 16, 1941, Stalin, Zhukov and other members of the Headquarters proposed to destroy the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army captured by the enemies "by all means, both ground and air, and to deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who had surrendered of state benefits and help." On September 28, 1841, in special directive No. 4976 on the troops of the Leningrad Front, Zhukov demanded that the families of Soviet prisoners of war be shot.

In 1941-1942. the prisoners were kept in inhuman conditions, dying in the hundreds of thousands, primarily from starvation and typhus. In the winter of 1941-1942, about 2.2 million prisoners of war died. The tragedy of these people, betrayed by their government and fallen victim to Nazi policy, is not inferior in scale to the Holocaust and the Holodomor. Many of the mass graves have remained unknown, and pilgrims are not taken to the places of the former "stallags". The German military sometimes claimed that they were unable to accommodate and feed such a large number of people. But then it is not clear why they forbade the population to feed the prisoners. From July 25 to November 13, 1941, the Germans released and sent home 318,775 people (personnel of three armies!) - mostly Ukrainians, whom they treated differently than Russians, but then the dissolution stopped. The bottom line is that the death of millions of prisoners fit into Hitler's idea of "depriving Russia of its vitality." Death threatened primarily ordinary Red Army soldiers: command staff were placed in separate camps where conditions were better.

In September 1941, the head of intelligence, Admiral Canaris, turned to Field Marshal Keitel with a request to show nobility towards Russian prisoners of war, but he replied that "soldiers' notions of a knightly war have nothing to do with it when it comes to" the destruction of the worldview ". Keitel, apparently , saw the prisoners as carriers of the "Bolshevik infection". However, for the magazine Der Untermensch ("Underman"), photographs of the emaciated faces of starving prisoners served as an illustration of the "degenerative appearance of the Eastern hordes"

Individual officers of the Wehrmacht (Admiral Canaris, Count GD von Moltke, Major K. von Stauffenberg and others) protested, considering such a practice incompatible with the code of honor and traditions of the German army. Some commandants, guided by Christian feelings, tried at their level to somehow alleviate the suffering of the unfortunate. But such cases were rare. Only in the autumn of 1942 did the situation begin to improve somewhat. In 1942, the Nazis became interested in the prisoners as a labor force, and in the spring of 1943, the development of the Vlasov movement began.

Soviet prisoners of war in 1941 - 1945

War years Number of prisoners of war Including defectors

1941 3.8 million 200 thousand

1942 1.65 million 79,769

1943 565 thousand 26 108

1944 147 thousand 9 207

1945 34 thousand?

Total 6.2 million 315 thousand

Of the 5.8 million prisoners (excluding defectors), approximately 3.3 million (60%) died. Mortality among captured Allied armies ranged from 0.3 to 1.6%. Of the surviving 2.4 million, approximately 950 thousand entered the service of the Wehrmacht and anti-Soviet formations (ROA, Cossack and other units). About 500 thousand fled or were liberated in 1943-1944. About 940,000 waited until the spring of 1945. The overwhelming majority of them returned to their homeland, where again camps, forced labor, humiliating special checks and the stigma of "traitors" were waiting for them. Restoration of the rights of former prisoners dragged on for the entire post-Stalin period.

(History of Russia, XX century, vol. 2, pp. 102-104)