The first 4 hours of the Great Patriotic War.

For the first time, the events of the first day of the war are told directly at the sites of the main hostilities. There is a lot of new, unknown to the viewer information in the film. For example, about the fact that the first Soviet city was recaptured from the Germans on June 23, 1941! About the fierce battles in the Vladimir-Volynsky region, about the feat of the garrisons of the Soviet fortified areas, about the fact that the Soviet Air Force was not destroyed, as the almost official myth says, as well as about other little-known pages of the war.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War

Get up, great country,
Stand up for the death fight
With dark fascist power,
With the damned horde!

On the fifth day of the war, the whole country sang this song to the verses of Lebedev-Kumach and the music of Aleksandrov.

And the war began at dawn on June 22, 1941. Fascist Germany treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its aircraft delivered massive strikes against airfields, railway junctions, naval bases, quarterings for military units and many cities to a depth of 250-300 km from the border.

Here it is necessary to remember that the Soviet Union in 1941 was going to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

During these 24 years, our country has achieved a lot. Automobile plants were built in Moscow, Gorky, Yaroslavl. Tractor factories appeared in Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kharkov, Chelyabinsk. All of them could make tanks. Our aviation set world records for flight range. The Soviet state could resist any other state, but it was difficult for us to fight all of Europe.

Nazi Germany and its satellites concentrated large contingents of troops against the Soviet Union - 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and a large amount of military equipment: about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4980 combat aircraft and over 190 warships. And all this power was thrown at our country. From the ice of the Arctic to the Black Sea, the war scorched the fire of conflagrations, destroyed cities and burned villages, and civilians died.

According to the Barbarossa plan, Germany wanted to defeat the Soviet Union in six weeks. At the same time, the main forces of the Red Army were supposed to be destroyed, preventing them from retreating into the depths of the country. But the plans of the fascist command from the very beginning of the war were thwarted by the courage and heroism of our army and the whole people.

First hit

The frontier troops and divisions located near the border were the first to receive the enemy's blow. We had more than 500 frontier outposts along the western border. The Nazi command allotted no more than 30 minutes for the destruction of the outpost. But the outposts fought for days and weeks, and the Brest Fortress, located on the border at the confluence of the Mukhavets River with the Bug River, fought with enemies for more than a month. All this time, the defenders of the Brest Fortress fettered an entire Nazi division. Most of the defenders of the fortress fell in battle, some made their way to the partisans, some of the seriously wounded, exhausted, were captured. The defense of the Brest Fortress is a vivid example of patriotism and mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. Representatives of 30 nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union fought among the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

But, despite the heroic resistance, the covering troops could not detain the enemy in the border zone. In order to save forces, the Soviet troops were forced to retreat to new lines.

The Nazi troops in a short time advanced 400-450 km northwest, 450-600 km in the west, 300-350 km southwest, captured the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, part of Estonia, a significant part of Ukraine, almost all of Belarus, Moldova, invaded the western regions of the Russian Federation, reached the distant approaches to Leningrad, threatened Smolensk and Kiev. Mortal danger hung over the Soviet Union.

Based on the prevailing situation, the Soviet command at the end of June decided to switch to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front. The troops of the first strategic echelon were given the task of preparing a system of echeloned defensive lines and lines in the directions of the main attacks of the enemy, relying on which, by stubborn and active opposition, to undermine the offensive power of the enemy, stop him and buy time to prepare a counteroffensive.

The feat of the army and the people

The perfidious attack of Nazi Germany aroused the anger and indignation of the Soviet people. In a single impulse, he rose to the defense of his homeland. At rallies that swept across the country, the Soviet people stigmatized the fascist barbarians and swore to severely punish the invaders who broke in. Military registration and enlistment offices were stormed by thousands of young men and women, men and women - communists, Komsomol members and non-party people. They demanded immediate dispatch to the front, filed an application with a request to be sent behind enemy lines, to partisan detachments.

The misfortune that befell the Fatherland rallied the whole people as never before. The whole people, the whole vast country rose up to fight to the death for a holy and just cause. Every day that passed both at the front and in the rear was measured by the answer to the question: What did you do for the front, for victory? The efforts of the entire people - soldiers, workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia - were subordinated to one goal - to defend the Motherland from the fascist barbarians. And for this he spared neither his strength nor his life.

The word patriotism acquired a special meaning and meaning. It did not require any translations or explanations. Love for the Motherland beat in the heart of every Soviet person: whether he stood for the fifth day in the workshop at the machine tool or went to ram an enemy aircraft, whether he gave his personal savings to the defense fund or blood for wounded soldiers.

Already in the first days and weeks of the war, thousands of feats and boundless self-sacrifice of the bravest Soviet soldiers were inscribed in its annals. At that time, the names of most of these courageous people who fought to the last bullet, to the last drop of blood, were not yet known.

The results of these days and weeks, the most difficult for the Soviet people and their soldiers, already testified to the first failures in the implementation of Hitler's plans for a "blitzkrieg".

The enemy failed to destroy the main forces of the Soviet Army in the border battles, as he expected. The resistance of our troops grew every day. And in the deep rear, reserves for the front were being prepared at an accelerated pace. It was incredibly difficult to form, arm and train new regiments, divisions of the Soviet Army, but every day an increasingly powerful stream of fresh reserves went to the front. He significantly exceeded the reserves of the enemy, coming to the front to make up for the losses he had suffered.

Hundreds of industrial enterprises were at that time on wheels - they were relocated from threatened areas to the deep rear of the country. It took time to install the equipment and put it into operation in new places. The most active part of the working class and specialists of operating enterprises left for the ranks of the Soviet Army. Only a small part of skilled workers and specialists remained at the enterprises, without which it was impossible to start mass production of military products. Those leaving for the front were replaced by hundreds of thousands of women and teenagers.

But even these difficulties were overcome in the shortest possible time. The production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and various equipment for the defenders of the Motherland increased every day.

Mass labor heroism was also shown by the workers of socialist agriculture. Collective farms and state farms transferred a huge number of tractors and motor vehicles to equip the reserves of troops. There are even fewer men left in this sector of the economy than in industry and transport. And in the countryside, women and teenagers became the decisive force. It was they who had to harvest the vast sown areas. Remove mostly by hand. In front-line areas, harvesting was often carried out under enemy fire. And, nevertheless, with the help of hundreds of thousands of citizens, students and schoolchildren, agricultural workers also coped with the most important task for the front and the whole country - they laid in the state bins such an amount of food without which the war would have been successful.

In its entire course, the war showed that the courage and heroism of the Soviet people turned out to be an invincible force that managed to prevent the gravest crime against humanity.

In the direction of the main attacks of the Nazis, 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. The remaining frontier outposts held out from two days to two months. Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, not a single one withdrew without an order. The story of a day that forever changed the lives of tens of millions of people.

“They don’t suspect anything about our intentions”

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

The commander of the 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Center, Heinz Guderian, writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which was visible from our observation posts, to the sounds of an orchestra, they were holding guards. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops.

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier who had crossed the border river Bug by swimming. The defector was sent to the headquarters of the detachment in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers, who were in Finnish ports, began to mine the way out of the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier identified himself as Alfred Liskov, a serviceman of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht infantry division. He reported that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information has been passed on to the higher command.

At the same time, the transfer of directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts begins from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. - "The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications."

The units were ordered to be put on alert, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and aviation was dispersed over field airfields.

It is not possible to bring the directive to the military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures indicated in it are not carried out.

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: "nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm."

3:05. A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt raid.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communications] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of ​​a large number of unknown aircraft; The fleet is on full alert.

3:10. The UNKGB in the Lvov region transmits by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

From the memoirs of the head of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Without finishing the interrogation of a soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken ... "

3:30. The chief of staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reports on an enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kiev district, General Purkaev, reports on air raids on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. The commander of the Baltic Military District, General Kuznetsov, reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

German soldiers cross the state border of the USSR.

"Enemy raid repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov calls Stalin and reports the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Timoshenko and Zhukov to arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is being convened.

3:45. The 1st frontier post of the 86th Augustow border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. The personnel of the outpost under the command of Alexander Sivachev, having entered the battle, destroy the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Frontier Detachment, including the 1st Frontier Post of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, are subjected to heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. The border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic Special Military Districts report the start of hostilities by German troops on land.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, and there were a large number of dead and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

"Defending not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe"

4:30. A meeting of members of the Politburo begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of the war and does not exclude the version of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. The German Ambassador to the USSR, Count von Schulenburg, presents the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov with a "Note of the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government", which says: "The German government cannot be indifferent to a serious threat on the eastern border, so the Fuhrer gave the order to the German armed forces by all means ward off this threat. An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

5:30. On the German radio, Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels read out Adolf Hitler's appeal to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow ... At the moment the greatest in terms of its length and volume of the performance of troops, which the world has ever seen ... The task of this front is no longer the defense of individual countries, but the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all.

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the start of hostilities against the USSR: "The German army has invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!"

“The city is on fire, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves the directive on repulsing the attack of Nazi Germany: "The troops will attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border." The transfer of "Directive No. 2" due to the violation by saboteurs of the communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the war zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.

10:00. From the memoirs of announcer Yuri Levitan: “They call from Minsk: “Enemy planes over the city”, they call from Kaunas: “The city is on fire, why are you not transmitting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” Women's crying, excitement: "Is it really a war? .." However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From the report of the headquarters of the 45th German division on the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are fiercely resisting, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized defense with infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. The fire of enemy snipers led to heavy losses among officers and non-commissioned officers.

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kyiv special military districts were transformed into the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: "Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed from our cities - Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others - with their own planes, more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory ... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the piratical attack and drive the German troops from the territory of our homeland ... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally their ranks still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree "On the mobilization of those liable for military service ..."

“On the basis of Article 49 of paragraph “o” of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North - Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization. Consider June 23, 1941 as the first day of mobilization. Despite the fact that June 23 is named the first day of mobilization, recruiting offices at the military registration and enlistment offices begin to work by the middle of the day on June 22.

13:30. The Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the High Command on the Southwestern Front.

"Italy also declares war on the Soviet Union"

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blockaded in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano states: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany has declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops enter Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st frontier post of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded head of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a planned withdrawal is still open. There is now ample evidence both for and against this.

It is surprising that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Strong artillery fire is conducted only in the north-west of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation.

Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, none retreated without an order.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis occupy the positions of the 1st frontier post. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev became one of the hundreds accomplished by the border guards in the first hours and days of the war. The state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea on June 22, 1941 was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of them were attacked on the very first day of the war. None of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

The Nazi command took 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outposts. Up to two months, 45 outposts fought.

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for another week.

"The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland"

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the faithful with a message: “Fascist robbers have attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land ... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now… The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox to defend the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All the armies, except for the 11th Army of the Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy on the entire front. The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command what to do ... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken to the air without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering the Soviet troops to go on the counteroffensive with the task of defeating the Nazi troops on the territory of the USSR with further advance into the territory of the enemy. The directive prescribed by the end of June 24 to capture the Polish city of Lublin.

"We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can"

21:00. Summary of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, the German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of Kalvaria, Stoyanuv and Tsekhanovets (the first two at 15 km and the last at 10 km from the border).

Enemy aviation attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met with a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes."

23:00. Appeal of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o'clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision ... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before generously lavished his assurances to the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were in a state of war ...

No one has been a more staunch opponent of communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and guarding the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray - oh yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, their protectors ...

We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.

June 22 has come to an end. Ahead were another 1417 days of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, I.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany - the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially fixed. And the name - "Great Patriotic" war appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
Until now, the question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at its beginning and the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad is being discussed. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not fulfill what he was obliged to do, because he took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of the war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation, the townsfolk were alarmed by rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world”, which was constantly repeated in the newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, moreover, on his own territory, encroaching on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev by the decisions of the XX Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who was “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “trusted” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on alert before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the soldiers of the Red Army met the war sleeping in their barracks »;
- “The main thing, of course, that dominated him, over all his activities, which also responded to us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces ”(From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military History Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the magazine Ogonyok No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities .....” (G.K. Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections”. M. Olma -Press.2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and significance of the General Staff .... he was little interested in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to fully report to I. Stalin on the state of the country's defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy ..». (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

Until now, in different interpretations, it sounds that the “main culprit”, of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot”, “everyone was afraid of him” and “nothing happened without his will”, “did not allow the troops to be brought into combat readiness in advance", and "forced" the generals to leave soldiers in the "sleeping" barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I am gone, more than one tub of dirt will be poured on my head, a pile of rubbish will be put on my grave. But I am sure that the wind of history will dispel all this!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, recorded in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this testimony, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall upon him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed in his time, is typical, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to digress from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is unacceptable to try to put all the blame for the surprise attack of fascist Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless lamentations of our military leaders about the "surprise" one can see an attempt to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the mistakes in the combat training of the troops, in their command and control in the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all units - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the non-fulfillment of it with references to I.V. Stalin is not to the face of the soldiers.
Stalin, by the way, just like them, gave a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, what the former People's Commissar of the USSR aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister should also be responsible for something ... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I will definitely bear responsibility for this. And then everything is on Stalin ... ".
The great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov were the same.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and appointed him to the 2nd Belorussian.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Pole to take Berlin, and G.K. became the Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov almost all of his officers of the Front Headquarters, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky have always been distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
Troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. Ye Golovanov was proud that he had the honor to serve the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but he did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military figures and historians speak about the same.

Here is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia”, Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s wording was invented at one time in order to shift the blame for the defeat at the beginning of the war onto Stalin and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period ... ".

According to the long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, “Neither strategically nor tactically, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was not sudden” (VIZH 1990 No. 5).

The Red Army in the prewar years was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of mobilization and training.
Hitler declared universal military service from March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only from September 1, 1939.
As you can see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to wear and how to equip the conscripts, and only then, if the calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as much as, according to the calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the "Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940", developed by the head since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army - only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and re-equip it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

I. V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that she would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than mid-1942-43. That is why he sought to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to play for time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and was afraid of Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, an entry appeared that recorded the following words of Stalin personally heard by her during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for a rebuff, for a war with Hitler.

As to whether Stalin "trusted" Hitler, his speech at a meeting of the Politburo on November 18, 1940, when summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, testifies very well:

“... As we know, immediately after the departure of our delegation from Berlin, Hitler loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we well know the price of these statements! For us, even before meeting with Hitler, it was clear that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the requirements of the security of our country ....
We considered the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to probe the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his stubborn refusal to reckon with the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to stop the de facto occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about not infringing on the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to buy time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ....
It was at this time that we managed to prevent the attack of fascist Germany. And in this case, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role ...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite, the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but not completely eliminated.

But having concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot regard the Soviet-German pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
State security issues are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been moved to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops put on alert in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear.
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops on the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink for the war, for the offensive in the war, for our victory in this war .... "

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshal S.K. Timoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting about.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the troops of the districts:

“The war creeps up imperceptibly and will begin with a surprise attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. Molotov in the mid-1970s recalled the beginning of the war:

“We knew that war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war .... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months .... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, by the hour of the attack, no one could be ready, even the Lord God!
We were waiting for the attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would say: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!
The TASS report of June 14, 1941 was sent to give the Germans no reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort.... It turned out that on June 22, Hitler became the aggressor in front of the whole world. And we have allies .... Already in 1939 he was determined to unleash a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or a few months. Of course, we knew that we had to be ready for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It is very difficult ... "(F. Chuev. "One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov."

Much is said and written about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the leaders of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials (why, it will be shown below-sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was instructed to bring it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia, emphasizing that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.

So, for example, I. Stalin ordered to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
In early April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attache in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate potential aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on Stalin's instructions, specifically provided the Harbin residency of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to "intercept and decipher" a certain "circular from Moscow," which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union was preparing to defend its interests." (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

The most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR was obtained by foreign intelligence through its agents ("the magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, MacLean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations that British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax conducted with Hitler in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed to Hitler's demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany's expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of the highest representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were obtained on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion ("Sect's testament") that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for a period of time. more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.
The conclusion, as we see, was fully justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction of intelligence, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact in 1939.
In 1935, information was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged characterization of Germany's intentions towards the USSR, the specific goals, the timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained not yet clarified.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We should also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not bypass intelligence either. Our residency in Germany and other countries was severely weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov declared that he "cleaned 14,000 Chekists"

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to start aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to start hostilities no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - very happy for himself and then appointed June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed directive No. 21 - Plan "Barbarossa".

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa".

In January 1941, Sam Edison Woods, the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, obtained it through his connections in the German government and military circles.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington K. Umansky be acquainted with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Samner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, moreover, with an indication of the source.

The information of the Americans was very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information of the NKGB intelligence department and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it. (Sudoplatov P.A. "Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941". M., 2001).

But the date - June 22, is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh), General of the Army Ivashutin, said:
"The texts of almost all documents and radiograms relating to the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff."

Therefore, the statement of G.K. looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data ”(G.K. Zhukov“ Memories and Reflections ”M. APN 1975. p. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask, what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (since February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - "Variants of military operations of the German army against the USSR", compiled on the basis of all intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country's leadership.

This document outlined the options for the possible directions of attacks by the German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the "Barbarossa plan" and the direction of the main attacks of the German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question posed to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(Moreover, it is characteristic that in his most "truthful book about the war" G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov assured that he knew nothing on the eve of the war about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. Zhukov copies of these German documents, which were signed by Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the March 20, 1941 report and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing to attack the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 Head of the General Staff Directorate F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, the head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, received a report “On the plans for a German attack on the USSR”, which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and gave the number of concentrated German divisions;
- May 15, 1941, the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on the military preparations of Romania. Until June 22, a number of messages were submitted.

As mentioned above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the potential capabilities of the enemy.
What capabilities of a potential adversary could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity for a detailed report to I. Stalin - also a complete lie in "the most truthful book about the war."
For example, only in June 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office.
This is evidenced by entries in the journal of visits to I. Stalin's office.
("At a reception at Stalin's. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)" Moscow. New Chronograph, 2008. Records of reception secretaries on duty I.V. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day, to the nearest minute, the time spent in Stalin's Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded).

In the same period, Stalin's office was repeatedly visited, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, General of the Army Meretskov, Lieutenant Generals of Aviation Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement the Barbarossa plan.

The directive determined "Day B" - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Halder “On setting the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"one. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22, 1941.
2. In case of postponement of this period, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main strike will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned, and that you can proceed to the open execution of the order.
b) Alton's signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, then the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.

Unfortunately, our external, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht's bet on blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.

Foreign intelligence reports about German military preparations came from various residencies: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. He began to cooperate with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 he was arrested and executed) transmitted information that "at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin residency that on December 18, Hitler, speaking about the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, spoke out sharply against “injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice".

“In those pre-war years, there was an order to report to the leadership of the country each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without its analytical evaluation. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose certain measures were being taken, whether a political decision had been made on the attack, etc.
Generalizing materials were not prepared, with a deep analysis of all the information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country's leadership.” ("Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table" ed. Mosgorarkhiv 1995).

In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “filled up” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory, and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, which were developed by the highest ranks of the Third Reich.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, signed by Keitel, document No. 44142/41 “Guiding instructions of the Supreme High Command for masking the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, which provided for hiding from the enemy preparations for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed at the first stage, “until April, to maintain the uncertainty of information about their intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 "Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union."
This document provided:

“... from May 22, with the introduction of the maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all the efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue with particular energy the preparations for an attack on England ...
Among the formations stationed in the East, a rumor must circulate about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the East", and the troops stationed in the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ...
Spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England ... ".
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted over 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to Crete by air. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin residency was framed by an agent provocateur "Lyceum student" (O. Berlinks. 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940.).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, during interrogation in May 1947 testified that in August 1940 Amayak Kobulov (a resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was substituted by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceum student”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting of the Lyceum student with Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from the "Lyceum student" about the low probability of Germany's war with the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of Soviet troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of the “Lyceum student”. The foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that it was not difficult to quickly determine the true face of the "Lyceum student".
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin, Kobulov, provided the “Lyceum student” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation actions, information began to appear that German preparations near our borders were aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept economic and territorial demands, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin supposedly intends to put forward.

Information was circulating that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, she would not be able to defeat England.
All this misinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin residency, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence service also received them through its agents in these countries.
Thus, it turned out to be a multiple overlap of the information obtained, which, as it were, confirmed their “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials.
On May 5, the same "Corsican" gives information that the concentration of German troops is a "war of nerves" in order for the USSR to accept Germany's conditions: the USSR must give guarantees for entering the war on the side of the "Axis" powers.
Similar information comes from the British residency.
On May 8, 1941, in a message from the "Sergeant" (Harro Schulze-Boysen), it was said that the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum, demanding to increase exports to Germany.

And all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting its generalized analysis and conclusions on the table to Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions ..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation with intelligence materials, but by no means with all materials.
Here is what V.M. Molotov:
“When I was the Presovnarkom, it took me half a day every day to read intelligence reports. What was not there, no matter what terms were called! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The task of the scout is not to be late, to have time to report ... ".

Many researchers, speaking of I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar for State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Foreman” (Schulze-Boysen) and "The Corsican" (Arvid Harnak):
"Tov. Merkulov. Can send your source from the headquarters of the German. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a source, but a misinformer. I.St.”

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin's distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only on the basis of I. Stalin's resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates for a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported only through military intelligence, Stalin apparently developed.

Hitler, for example, issued an offensive order during the war on the Western Front, and canceled it on the planned day of the offensive. On the offensive on the Western Front, Hitler issued an order 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the very message of the "Foreman", then the irritation and resolution of I. Stalin will become clear.
Here is the text of the Master's message:
"one. All military measures for the preparation of an armed uprising against the SSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any meaning.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops ... ".
(Following the text is the report of the "Corsican" on economic and industrial issues in Germany).
.
"Foreman" (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. He studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. He was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Imperial Ministry of Aviation, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack (The Corsican) before the start of World War II. Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed on August 31, 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks rather frivolous just because it confuses the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that I. Stalin's resolution applies only to the "Foreman" - an agent working in the headquarters of the German aviation, but not to the "Corsican".
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why the intelligence service trusted Starshina, Stalin said: "Go check everything and report back to me."

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by the military attaché, Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1638 sheets of telegraph reports were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR.
The telegram of Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, Krasnaya Zvezda published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The same fake and "resolution" L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
"Many workers are sowing panic ... The secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Almaz, Verny should be wiped into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany."
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

Indeed, since February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence became completely subordinate to Merkulov.

And here are some actual reports by R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2:“ I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German uprising against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."
- June 1: “The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left - on May 6 to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.
- June 20 "The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable."

Only according to military intelligence reports on the date of the start of the war with Germany, since 1940, more than 10 have come.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin next spring;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will perform in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack is scheduled for 3 - 4 am on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source in the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Directorate - "HVTs" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who, early in the morning of June 21. "KhVTs" himself called for an urgent meeting of his curator Colonel of the Republic of Uzbekistan K.B.Leontva.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again met with an agent of the HVC.
Information "KhVTs" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive was the agent network of Soviet intelligence is also evidenced by the fact that the agents of our military intelligence were such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk.

The illegal intelligence officer, acting under the pseudonym "Merlin", she is Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, the volume, and especially the level and quality of the information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that communication between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow, three radio operators in Berlin and its environs supported at once.
Hitler conferred on Olga Chekhova the title of State Artist of the Third Reich, specially established for her, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he defiantly showed her signs of the highest attention, invariably seated her in rows with him. (A.B. Martirosyan “The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to the undercover group of the Soviet military intelligence, which bore the code name "Krona". Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Yan Chernyak.
The group was founded in the mid 1920s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but none of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important officers of the Wehrmacht, major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers by captured German
film "The Girl of My Dreams"

But G.K. Nevertheless, Zhukov did not miss the opportunity to cheat our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Directorate of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our undercover intelligence, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Nazi high command. Our undercover intelligence failed to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union.

Hitler, on the other hand, continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay J. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft (the Junkers-52 aircraft was used by Hitler as a personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynka field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very "serious troubles."
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to J. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion forces far from the eyes and aviation of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about 88 divisions, accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to the rumors circulating now about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you on the honor of the head of state that this is not the case.
For my part, I am also sympathetic to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all rule out the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large dimensions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans.
It's only about one month. Around June 15 - 20, I plan to start a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I most convincingly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, needless to say, try not to give them any reason.
If a provocation by one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report the incident through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, we have clearly agreed with you. I thank you for meeting me halfway in a matter known to you, and I ask you to excuse me for the way I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941".

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself "calls" the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But I. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler's intentions and confidence in him.
The question of whether he believed or did not believe - simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler's "sincerity" and continued to take measures to "bring operational groupings of troops into combat readiness in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear," which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo, so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, directives of the General Staff No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) were sent on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline for submitting plans indicated in them by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, neither the General Staff nor the People's Commissar of Defense had time to approve these plans.
This is the direct fault of the commanders of the districts, as well as the General Staff, which did not demand the submission of plans by the specified date.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers answered with their lives with the beginning of the war;

- “... In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border was outlined, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the forms of their use .. ”(Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”. M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally call up about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the admission to the cadres of the reserve command staff, called up for mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who was detained in the army after the end of this war until a special order;

On May 24, 1941, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, I. Stalin openly warned all the top Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of "hidden mobilization" about a million "accomplices" from the inner districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions up to the regular strength of wartime (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and resupplying of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This covert mobilization could not be carried out without I. Stalin's instructions, but it was carried out covertly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859 / ss / s was sent to the ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the troops of the district, all deep rifle divisions ... withdraw to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual putting troops on high combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent on the immediate bringing into proper condition and full combat readiness of the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO, primarily strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report on the execution by June 15, 1941. But the report on the implementation of this directive has not been received.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg”. M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question was, where was the General Staff and its chief, who were supposed to demand its execution, or were I. Stalin supposed to control these questions for them ?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent to put into effect Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a directive of the General Staff was issued on the advancement of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”).
In three of the four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (commander of the district, General of the Army D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kiev OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sc (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sc (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sc (141.80.139 sd); 55 sc (169,130,189 sd); 49 sc (190.197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (sk), having 14 rifle divisions (sd), which is about 200 thousand people "
In total, 28 divisions were advanced closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko already in June 1941 recommended that the district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was put into practice by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
... The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kyiv OVO-Kirponos), without agreement with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if, without their knowledge, the commanders of the districts are taking such measures when a war with Germany is on the verge?
As a result, some corps and divisions of the covering forces during the attack of fascist Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order followed from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the strike force of the troops, was practically absent in combat formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover the units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command rendered this "invaluable service" to the invading German troops.
Here is what the German General Blumentritt, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd tank group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest region against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - the commander of the army, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all our artillery opened fire ... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer ... A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were being crossed, pontoon bridges were being built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy ... There was no doubt that they had caught the Russians by surprise ... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground ”(“ Fatal Decisions ” Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this it must be added that the bridges in the Brest region were not blown up, along which the German tanks moved. Even Guderian was surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in a 500-km strip from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has been done so far to mask airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft, in the “complete absence of their masking”, are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military installations...”.
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, especially the Western OVO, showed on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 were lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, which failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of its orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, having learned about these losses, on the same day, June 22, shot himself.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was ... He believed that at any moment, on a combat alert, they could give a reliable rebuff to the enemy ... Knowing exactly the number of aircraft deployed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.
Naturally, I. Stalin's idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly heard in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, Northwest, North.
By this time, the command posts of the fronts were already equipped, because. As early as June 13, a decision was made to separate the command and control structures in the military districts and to transform the departments of the military districts into front-line departments.
The command post of the Western Front (Front Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war).
In the city of Ternopil, there was a front-line command post of the South-Western Front (Front Commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos died on 09/20/1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, "the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it turned out to be in reality ...".
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the impending war from Merkulov’s foreign intelligence residencies from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the RU General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also reconnaissance of the border troops, subordinated to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by constant monitoring of the border guards, a large number of informers of the border regions who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these are residents of the border regions, train drivers , switchmen, greasers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot but be reliable. This information, summarized and put together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B dated April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko are given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, the reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868 / B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from the intelligence of the border troops were presented.

But this is what Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk in Minsk to be presented to the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I'll check again, but I think it's just a provocation ... "
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Not in the spirit of the Boss. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...”. Apparently, by this "bastard" he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to repeat that Stalin allegedly did not believe "Pavlov's warnings" about the concentration of German troops ....
The situation heated up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS report, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany."
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It became apparently clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany's military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no "withdrawal" and "transfer" of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter of May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, "toward England" did not happen.
On the contrary, an intensified accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the naval attache of the USSR, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that the German attack on the USSR would take place on June 22 at 3.30 in the morning. (Captain 1st rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on June 21 in the evening he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with the "inspection" of German units near our border.
Here is what he writes in his book - “I am a fighter” - Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov. Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting on it ... and ready to overflow over it.
We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information -sad39 would land soon) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok
After landing, the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took me after the report to the commander of the district.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either ....

June 22, 1941. 1st day of the war

The day before, June 21, at 13:00. German troops received the prearranged signal "Dortmund". It meant that the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan should begin the next day at 3 hours 30 minutes.

On June 21, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held, after which an order (directive No. 1) of the NPO of the USSR was issued and transmitted to the western military districts on the night of June 22: “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts is possible LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO ... The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions ... At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.

On the night of June 21-22, German saboteurs began to operate on the territory of the USSR in the border zone, violating communication lines.

At 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. along the entire length of the Western border of the USSR, the Germans began artillery and aviation training, after which the German ground forces invaded the territory of the USSR. 15 minutes before, at 3 o'clock. 15 minutes, the Romanian Air Force launched air strikes on the border regions of the USSR.

At 4 o'clock. 10 min. The Western and Baltic Special Districts reported on the start of hostilities by German troops in the land areas of the districts.

At 5:30 a.m. German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg handed over to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov a declaration of war. The same statement was made in Berlin to the USSR Ambassador to Germany Dekanozov.

At 7 o'clock. 15 minutes. Directive No. 2 was issued signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov and Zhukov: “On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them.
At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border ... The troops should use all their forces and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

The western border military districts of the USSR were transformed into fronts: the Baltic Special - into the North-Western Front, the Western Special - into the Western, the Kyiv Special - into the South-Western.

The beginning of the defense of the Liepaja naval base.

In the evening, Directive No. 3 of the NPO of the USSR signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov was issued, ordering the fronts to destroy the enemy with powerful counterattacks, "regardless of the state border."

The offensive of the German troops took the enemy by surprise ... everywhere we easily managed to capture bridges over water barriers and break through the border fortifications to the full depth ... After the initial “tetanus” caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy proceeded to active operations ... Our advancing divisions everywhere where the enemy tried to resistance, threw it back and advanced with the battle an average of 10-12 km! Thus, the way to mobile connections is open.

June 23, 1941. 2nd day of the war

• 2nd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 2nd day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 2nd day of border battles.

June 24, 1941. 3rd day of the war

• 3rd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 3rd day of Liepaja naval base defense.
• 3rd day of border battles.
• 2nd day of counterattacks by the Red Army in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 2nd day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

The Leningrad Military District was reorganized into the Northern Front.

June 25, 1941. 4th day of the war

• 4th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 4th day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 4th day of border battles.
• 3rd, last, day of counterattacks by the Red Army in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 3rd day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

The air forces of the Northern Front and the aviation units of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets simultaneously attacked 19 airfields in Finland, on which formations of Nazi and Finnish aviation were concentrated for operations against our targets. Having made about 250 sorties, the Soviet pilots destroyed many aircraft and other enemy military equipment on the airfields that day.

The Odessa Military District was reorganized into the Southern Front.

On June 25, enemy mobile units developed an offensive in the Vilna and Baranovichi directions ...

Enemy attempts to break through on the Brodsky and Lvov directions are met with strong opposition ...

On the Bessarabian sector of the front, the troops of the Red Army firmly hold their positions ...

The assessment of the situation in the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians decided to wage decisive battles in the border zone and retreat only in certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.

June 26, 1941. 5th day of the war

• 5th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 5th day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 5th day of border battles.
• 4th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

During June 26, in the Minsk direction, our troops fought with infiltrated enemy tank units.

The fights continue.

In the Lutsk direction, large and fierce tank battles are going on throughout the day with a clear advantage on the side of our troops ...

Army Group South is slowly advancing, unfortunately suffering significant losses. The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has a firm and energetic leadership ...

On the front of Army Group Center, operations are developing successfully. In the Slonim area, enemy resistance is broken ...

Army Group North, surrounding individual enemy groups, continues to systematically move east.

June 27, 1941. 6th day of the war

• 6th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 6th, last, day of defense of Liepaja naval base.
• 6th day of frontier battles.
• 5th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• Day 2 of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

During the day, our troops in the Shaulyai, Vilensky and Baranovichi directions continued to retreat to positions prepared for defense, lingering for battle at intermediate lines ...
On the entire sector of the front from Przemysl to the Black Sea, our troops firmly hold the state border.

June 28, 1941. 7th day of the war

• 7th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 7th day of border battles.
• 6th day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• 3rd day of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

... In the Lutsk direction, a large tank battle unfolded during the day, in which up to 4,000 tanks participate from both sides. The tank battle continues.
In the region of Lviv, stubborn intense battles with the enemy are going on, during which our troops inflict a significant defeat on him ...

June 29, 1941. 8th day of the war

• 8th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 8th, last, day of the Border Battles.
• 7th, last, day of the tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
• 4th day of defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

German and Finnish troops went on the offensive in the Murmansk direction.

A strategic defensive operation began in the Arctic and Karelia.

On June 29, Finnish-German troops went on the offensive along the entire front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland ...

In the Vilna-Dvina direction, attempts by the enemy’s mobile units to influence the flanks and rear of our troops, retreating as a result of the fighting in the Siauliai, Keidany, Panevezh, Kaunas regions to new positions, were not successful ...
In the Lutsk direction, the battle of large tank masses continues ...

The Germans pursued the goal of disrupting the deployment of our troops in a few days and capturing Kyiv and Smolensk with a lightning strike within a week. However ... our troops still managed to turn around, and the so-called lightning strike on Kyiv, Smolensk turned out to be thwarted ...

Heavy fighting is still going on at the front of Army Group South. On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Group, the 8th Russian Panzer Corps penetrated deep into our position ... This wedging of the enemy, obviously, caused a lot of confusion in our rear in the area between Brody and Dubno ... Separate groups are also operating in the rear of the 1st Panzer Group the enemy with tanks, which are even advancing for considerable distances... The situation in the Dubno region is very tense...

In the center of Army Group Center's zone, our completely mixed divisions are making every effort not to let the enemy out of the inner ring of encirclement, who is desperately making his way in all directions ...

On the front of the Army Group "North", our troops systematically continue the offensive in the planned directions to the Western Dvina. All available crossings were captured by our troops ... Only part of the enemy troops managed to get out of the threat of encirclement in the east across the lake region between Dvinsk and Minsk to Polotsk.

June 30, 1941. 9th day of the war

• 9th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 5th day of defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.
• 2nd day of the strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia.

The formation of the people's militia in Leningrad began.

All power in the USSR passes to the newly formed State Defense Committee (GKO) consisting of: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy chairman), Beria, Voroshilov, Malenkov.

In the Vilna-Dvina direction, our troops are fighting fierce battles with enemy motorized mechanized units ...
In the Minsk and Baranovichi directions, our troops are engaged in stubborn battles with the superior forces of the enemy’s mobile troops, delaying their advance at intermediate lines ...

In general, operations continue to develop successfully on the fronts of all army groups. Only on the front of the Army Group "Center" part of the encircled enemy grouping broke through between Minsk and Slonim through the front of the Guderian tank group ... On the front of the Army Group "North" the enemy launched a counterattack in the Riga region and wedged into our location ... An increase in enemy aviation activity in front of the front was noted army group "South" and in front of the Romanian front ... On the side of the enemy, already completely outdated types of four-engine aircraft are operating.

Sources

• 1941 - M.: MF "Democracy", 1998
• History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Volume 2. - M.: Military Publishing, 1961
• Franz Halder. War diary. 1941-1942. - M.: AST, 2003
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 1985. In 3 volumes.
• Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M.: AST; Transitbook, 2004

An air defense fighter conducts surveillance from the roof of a house on Gorky Street. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

75 years ago, on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began. In Russia and some countries of the former Soviet Union, June 22 is the Day of Memory and Sorrow.

June 22, 1941 for the USSR and its capital Moscow was determined in Berlin a week before this date - on Saturday, June 14, at a meeting of the Supreme High Command of the armed forces of Nazi Germany. On it, Adolf Hitler gave the last orders to attack the USSR from 04 am on June 22, 1941.

On the same day, a TASS report on Soviet-German relations was circulated, which stated:

"According to the USSR, Germany is just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground."

However, June 22, 1941 for the world's first state of workers and peasants could come a month or a week earlier. The leaders of the Third Reich originally planned to invade Russia at dawn on Thursday 15 May. But on April 6, together with the troops of the allies - Italy and Hungary - the Germans entered Yugoslavia. The Balkan campaign forced Hitler to postpone the time for the conquest of Moscow.

Until noon on June 22, 1941 (and there are hundreds of archival evidence for this), Moscow did not know about the German invasion.

04:30 . 48 watering machines rolled out onto the streets (according to documents).
05:30 . Nearly 900 janitors started work. The morning was serene, sunny, painting "the gentle light of the walls of the ancient Kremlin."
Approximately from 07:00. In parks, squares and other places of usual crowds of people, "exit" stall trade began to unfold, summer buffets, beer and billiard rooms opened - the coming Sunday promised to be very warm, if not hot. And in places of mass recreation, an influx of citizens was expected.
07:00 and 07:30 . (According to the Sunday schedule - on ordinary days, half an hour earlier). Dairy shops and bakeries have reopened.
08:30 and 09:00 . Grocery and gastronomes have begun work. Department stores, except for GUM and TSUM, did not work on Sundays. The assortment of goods, in essence, is usual for a peaceful capital. In "Dairy" on Rochdelskaya they offered cottage cheese, curd mass, sour cream, kefir, curdled milk, milk, cheese, feta cheese, butter and ice cream. All products - two or three varieties and names.

In Moscow it's a normal Sunday

Gorkogo Street. Photo: TASS / F. Kislov

Grocery store No. 1 "Eliseevsky", the main one in the country, put on the counters boiled, semi-smoked and raw smoked sausages, sausages, sausages from three to four names, ham, boiled pork of three names. The fish department offered fresh sterlet, light-salted Caspian herring (zal), hot-smoked sturgeon, pressed and red caviar. In excess there were Georgian wines, Crimean Madeira and sherry, ports, vodka and rum of one, cognac of four names. At that time, there were no time limits on the sale of alcohol.

GUM and TSUM exhibited the entire range of the domestic clothing and footwear industry, calicos, drapes, bostons and other fabrics, bijouterie, fiber suitcases of various sizes. And jewelry, the cost of individual samples of which exceeded 50 thousand rubles - a fifth of the price of the legendary T-34 tank, the IL-2 victory attack aircraft and three anti-tank guns - ZIS-3 guns of 76 mm caliber according to the "price list" of May 1941. No one could have imagined that day that the Moscow Central Department Store would turn into an army barracks in two weeks.

From 07:00 to the big "mass event" began to prepare the stadium "Dynamo". A parade and competitions of athletes were to take place on it at 12 o'clock.
At about 08:00, 20,000 schoolchildren were brought to Moscow from cities and districts of the region for a children's holiday, which began at 11:00 in Sokolniki Park.

There were no "fermentations" of school graduates on Red Square and on the streets of Moscow on the morning of June 22, 1941. This is the "mythology" of Soviet cinema and literature. The last proms in the capital were held on Friday, June 20.

In a word, all 4 million 600 thousand "ordinary" residents and about one million guests of the capital of the USSR did not know until lunch on June 22, 1941 that the biggest and most bloody war in the history of the country against the invaders had begun that night.

01:21 . The border with Poland, absorbed by the Third Reich, was crossed by the last train loaded with wheat, which the USSR supplied under an agreement with Germany of September 28, 1939.
03:05 . 14 German bombers, having taken off from Koenigsberg at 01:10, dropped 28 magnetic bombs near the raid near Kronstadt, 20 km from Leningrad.
04:00 . Hitler's troops crossed the border near Brest. Half an hour later, a large-scale offensive began on all fronts - from the southern to the northern borders of the USSR.

And when at 11 o'clock in the Sokolniki park the pioneers of the capital greeted their guests with a solemn line - the pioneers of the Moscow region, the German advanced 15, and in some places even 20 km deep into the country.

Solutions at the highest level

Moscow. V.M. Molotov, I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov (left to right in the foreground), G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, A.S. Shcherbakov (left to right in the second row) and other members of the government are sent to Red Square. Newsreel TASS

The fact that the war was going on, in the rear in the morning of June 22, 1941, was known only to the top leadership of the country, the command of the military districts, the first leaders of Moscow, Leningrad and some other large cities - Kuibyshev (now Samara), Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Khabarovsk.

06:30 . Candidate member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov gathered an emergency meeting of the key leaders of the capital with the participation of senior officers of NGOs, the NKVD and directors of major enterprises. He and the chairman of the city executive committee Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin by that time had the rank of general. At the meeting, priority measures were developed to ensure the life of Moscow in wartime.

Directly from the city committee, orders were given over the phone to strengthen the protection of water supply systems, heat and electricity, transport, and, above all, the subway, food warehouses, refrigerators, the Moscow Canal, railway stations, defense enterprises and other important facilities. At the same meeting, the concept of Moscow's camouflage was formulated "roughly", including the construction of mock-ups and dummies, the protection of government and historical buildings.

At the suggestion of Shcherbakov, from June 23, a ban on entry into the capital was introduced for everyone who did not have a Moscow residence permit. Residents of the Moscow region also fell under it, including those who worked in Moscow. Special passes were introduced. Even Muscovites had to straighten them out, going to the forest for mushrooms or to a suburban dacha - they were not allowed back into the capital without a pass.

15:00. At the afternoon meeting, which took place after the speech on the radio by People's Commissar Molotov and after Shcherbakov and Pronin visited the Kremlin, the authorities of the capital, in agreement with the generals of the Moscow Military District, decided to install anti-aircraft batteries at all high-altitude points in the capital. Later, in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, created the next day, June 23, such a decision was called "exemplary." And they sent a directive to the Military Districts to ensure anti-aircraft protection of cities, following the example of the capital.

photography ban

One of the notable decisions of the second meeting of the leadership of Moscow on June 22, 1941: an appeal was formulated with an appeal to the population within three days to hand over cameras, other photographic equipment, film and reagents available for personal use. From now on, only accredited journalists and employees of special services could use photographic equipment.

This is partly why there are few photographs of Moscow in the first days of the war. Some of them are completely staged, as, for example, the famous photograph by Yevgeny Khaldei "Muscovites listen to Comrade Molotov's address on the radio about the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941." On the first war day in the capital of the Union at 12 noon (the time of the live broadcast of the speech of People's Commissar Molotov) it was +24 degrees C. And in the photo - people in coats, hats, in a word, dressed in autumn, as in the twentieth of September, when Presumably this picture was taken.

By the way, the attire of people in that staged photo is very different from the T-shirts, white canvas boots and trousers, in which, in another photo on June 22, 1941, Muscovites buy soda on Gorky Street (now Tverskaya).

At the same morning meeting on June 22, 1941, which was held by Alexander Shcherbakov, a special resolution was adopted - "to warn and suppress panic moods" in connection with the invasion of Hitler's troops in the USSR. The party secretary and de facto owner of the capital advised all leaders, and especially artists, writers, and newspapermen, to "adhere" to the position that the war would end in a month, a maximum of one and a half. And the enemy will be defeated on his territory. "And he paid special attention to the fact that in Molotov's speech the war was called "holy." Two days later, on June 24, 1941, having overcome a protracted depression, Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin), at the suggestion of Lavrenty Beria, appointed Shcherbakov (in addition to the existing positions and regalia) the head of the Sovinformburo - the main and, in fact, the only source of information for the masses during the Great Patriotic War.

Cleanups

Muscovites join the ranks of the people's militia. Photo: TASS

One of the results of the last meeting of the Moscow leadership, which took place after 21:00, was the decision to create fighter battalions. They, apparently, were initiated in the Kremlin, because a day later the overall leadership of the units was entrusted to the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the head of the NKVD, Lavrenty Beria. But the first fighter battalion in the country became under arms precisely in Moscow, on the third day of the war, on June 24, 1941. In the documents, the destruction battalions were designated as "volunteer formations of citizens capable of owning weapons." The prerogative of admission to them remained with party, Komsomol, trade union activists and other "verified" (so in the document) persons who were not subject to conscription for military service. The task of the extermination battalions was to fight saboteurs, spies, Hitler's accomplices, as well as bandits, deserters, looters and profiteers. In a word, everyone who threatened order in cities and other settlements in wartime.

On the fourth day of the war, the Moscow fighter made the first raids, choosing to begin with the workers' closets and doorways of Zamoskvorechye, the barracks of Maryina Roshcha. The purge was quite effective. 25 bandits with weapons were taken. Five especially dangerous criminals were eliminated in a shootout. Food products (stew, condensed milk, smoked meats, flour, cereals) and industrial goods stolen before the start of the war from one of the warehouses in the Filey region were confiscated.

Leader's reaction

General Secretary of the CPSU(b) Joseph Stalin. Photo: TASS

In Moscow - not only the city committee of the CPSU (b) and the city executive committee, but the entire supreme power of the USSR. According to the "reflected" documents, Stalin was informed about the invasion of the Nazi troops almost immediately - around 04:35-04:45. He, as usual, did not go to bed yet, and, according to one version, he was at the "near dacha".

The subsequent (second) report on the advance of the Germans along the entire front made a strong impression on the leader. He locked himself in one of the rooms and did not leave it for about two hours, after which he allegedly went to the Kremlin. The text of Vyacheslav Molotov's speech did not read. And he demanded to report to him about the situation on the fronts every half an hour.

According to the testimonies of a number of military leaders, it was just this that was the most difficult to do - communication with the active units, leading fierce battles with the German troops, was weak, if not completely absent. In addition, by 18-19 hours on June 22, 1941, according to various sources, a total of 500 thousand to 700 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were surrounded by the Nazis, who, with incredible efforts, with a terrible shortage of ammunition, equipment and weapons, tried to break through the "rings" of the Nazis.

However, according to other, also "reflected" documents, on June 22, 1941, the leader was on the Black Sea, at a dacha in Gagra. And, according to the USSR ambassador to the United States, Ivan Maisky, "after the first report on the German attack, he fell into prostration, completely cut himself off from Moscow, remained out of touch for four days, drinking to a stupor."

So is it? Or not? It's hard to believe. It is no longer possible to check - the documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU since then have been massively burned and destroyed at least 4 times. For the first time in October 1941, when panic began in Moscow after the Nazis entered the outskirts of Khimki and the passage of a column of Nazi motorcyclists along Leningradsky Prospekt in the Sokol area. Then at the end of February 1956 and the end of October 1961, after Stalin's personality cult was exposed at the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU. And, finally, in August 1991, after the defeat of the State Emergency Committee.

And do you need to check everything? It remains a fact that in the first 10 days of the war, the most difficult time for the country, Stalin was neither heard nor seen. And all orders, orders and directives of the first week of the war were signed by marshals and generals, people's commissars and deputies of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Lavrenty Beria, Georgy Zhukov, Semyon Timoshenko, Georgy Malenkov, Dmitry Pavlov, Vyacheslav Molotov and even the "party mayor" of the capital Alexander Shcherbakov.

Appeal of Nakrom Molotov

12:15. From the studio of the Central Telegraph, one of the leaders of the Soviet state, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, spoke on the radio with an appeal.

It began with the words: "Citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement. Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country ... "The performance ended with famous words that turned into an idiom throughout the Great Patriotic War: "Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours!".

12.25. Judging by the "log of visits", Molotov returned from the Central Telegraph Office to Stalin's office.

Muscovites listened to the speech of the People's Commissar, mainly through loudspeakers installed on all streets of the city, as well as in parks, stadiums and other crowded places. In the performance of the announcer Yuri Levitan, the text of Molotov's speech was repeated 4 times at different times.

Muscovites listen to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland. Photo: TASS / Evgeny Khaldei

At the same time from about 09:30. until 11:00 there was supposedly a serious discussion in the Kremlin about who should make such an appeal? According to one version, all, as one, members of the Politburo believed that Stalin himself should do this. But he actively denied it, repeating the same thing: the political situation and the situation on the fronts "are not yet clear," and therefore he will speak later.

As time went. And delaying information about the beginning of the war became dangerous. At the suggestion of the leader, Molotov became the one who would inform the people about the beginning of the holy war. According to another version, there was no discussion, because Stalin himself was not in the Kremlin. They wanted to instruct the “all-Union headman” Mikhail Kalinin to tell the people about the war, but he even read from a piece of paper, stumbling, syllable by syllable.

Life after the start of the war

The news of the invasion of Hitler's troops on June 22, 1941, judging by the documents of the archives (reports of employees and freelance agents of the NKVD, police reports), as well as the recollections of eyewitnesses, did not plunge the residents and guests of the capital into despondency and did not change their plans too much.

Already after the announcement of the beginning of the war, passenger trains Moscow-Adler departed exactly on schedule from the Kursk railway station. And on the night of June 23 - to Sevastopol, which the Nazi aircraft heavily bombed as early as 05:00 on June 22. True, passengers who had tickets exactly to the Crimea were dropped off in Tula. And the train itself was allowed only to Kharkov.

Brass bands played in the parks during the day, performances were staged in theaters to full houses. Barber shops were open until evening. Beer houses and billiard rooms were practically filled with visitors. In the evening, the dance floors were not empty either. The famous foxtrot melody "Rio Rita" was heard in many parts of the capital.

A distinctive feature of the first war day in Moscow: mass optimism. In conversations, in addition to strong words of hatred for Germany and Hitler, it sounded: "Nothing. A month. Well, one and a half. We will break, crush the reptile!" Another metropolitan sign on June 22, 1941: after the news of the attack of the Nazis, people in military uniform everywhere, even in pubs, began to skip the line.

Anti-aircraft artillery on guard of the city. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

An impressive example of the efficiency of the Moscow authorities. By their order, at screenings in cinemas after 2 pm on the same June 22, 1941, before feature films (and these were "Shchors", "If Tomorrow is War", "Professor Malok", "The Oppenheim Family", "Boxers"), they began to show educational short films like "Blackout an apartment building", "Take care of the gas mask", "The simplest shelters from bombs."

In the evening, Vadim Kozin sang in the Hermitage Garden. In the restaurants "Metropol" and "Aragvi", judging by the "expenditure sheets" of the kitchen and buffet, sandwiches with pressed (black) caviar, herring with onions, fried pork loin in wine sauce, kharcho soup, chanakhi (lamb stew ), lamb cutlet on the bone with a complex garnish, vodka, KV cognac and sherry wine.

Moscow has not yet fully realized that a big war is already underway. And on the fields of its battles, thousands of soldiers of the Red Army have already fallen, hundreds of civilians from Soviet cities and villages have died. Within a day, the registry offices of the city will note the influx of fathers and mothers with a request to replace the name Adolf in the birth certificates of their sons with Anatoly, Alexander, Andrey. Being Adolfs (in common parlance - Adiks), who were massively born in the second half of 1933 and at the end of 1939, in June 1941, became not only disgusting, but also not safe.

A week later . In the capital of the USSR, cards for food, household essentials, shoes and fabrics will gradually begin to be introduced.
In two weeks. Muscovites will see newsreel footage showing Soviet villages, villages and towns on fire and women and young children lying near their huts shot by the Nazis.
Exactly one month later. Moscow will survive the first raid of the Nazi aviation, and with its own eyes, not in the cinema, will see the mutilated bodies of fellow citizens who died under the rubble, destroyed and burning houses.

In the meantime, on the first day of the war, in Moscow, everything is approximately the same as in the textbook poem by Gennady Shpalikov "On the dance floor of the Forty-First Year": "It's nothing that there is no Poland. But the country is strong. In a month - and no more - the war will end ... "

Evgeny Kuznetsov