The Ministry of Defense has declassified documents about the beginning of the Second World War. The Ministry of Defense has declassified unique archival documents about the beginning of the war. The enemy will be defeated

The Ministry of Defense on the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War publishedThere are more than 100 pages of declassified memoirs of Soviet military leaders on its website, the ministry said in a statement.Documents from the declassified funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense include the answers of the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders to five key questions prepared by the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff Soviet army.

"In the answers Soviet commanders contains comprehensive information on the course of deployment of troops of the Baltic, Kyiv and Belorussian special military districts according to the "Plan for Defense of the State Border of 1941" and the degree of readiness defensive line along the state border by the beginning of the war," the ministry said.

Pokrovsky group.

The survey of the high command was carried out by a group led by Colonel General Pokrovsky. It was created in 1952 to develop a description of the Great Patriotic War. The experts asked military leaders to answer whether the troops received a defense plan, how many units were deployed on the border, and whether they were put on alert on June 22. The commanders also spoke about the first battles with the German troops.

RIA Novosti / Ilya Pitalev
Among the respondents were Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, Lieutenant Generals Sobennikov and Derevyanko, and a number of other military leaders. Their answers later formed the basis of fundamental scientific works on the Great Patriotic War.

underestimation of the threat.

So, Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko, who in 1941 served as deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, noted that he had repeatedly reported to the command about the concentration German troops in border areas.

“However, I had a strong opinion that the district command underestimated the impending threat and treated many intelligence data with distrust,” he writes.

According to Derevianko, data on the time of the start of the war from Germany, obtained by intelligence, were received by the district headquarters from the first days of June. Moreover, three or four days before the start of the war, they indicated not only the exact date, but also the probable hour of the enemy attack.

Unexpected war.

"The personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving along railway On June 22, when I arrived at Siauliai station and saw the bombing of our airfields, I thought that maneuvers had begun," he recalls.

According to Sobennikov, even on the night of June 22, he personally received an order from the Chief of Staff of the Klenov Front in a very categorical form - to withdraw troops from the border by dawn on June 22. However, he categorically refused to fulfill it and the soldiers remained in their positions.

The general also spoke about the defeat of the 48th division. According to Sobennikov, she set out from Riga and "moved with music to the border", not knowing about the threat.

“This good division in the Raiseiniai area, not knowing that the war had begun, was attacked from the air, as well as by the German troops that had broken through, suffered heavy losses and was defeated before reaching the border,” he writes.

In 1952, in the Military History Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, a group was created under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, which began to develop a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

For a more complete and objective presentation of the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, questions were formulated relating to the period of deployment of the troops of the Baltic, Kyiv and Belorussian special military districts according to the "State Border Defense Plan of 1941" on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

Lieutenant General Pyotr Sobennikov, who led the troops of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District, writes that the war began unexpectedly for everyone.

“The personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving by rail on June 22, when they arrived at the Siauliai station and saw the bombing of our airfields, believed that maneuvers had begun,” he recalls.

The general also spoke about the defeat of the 48th division. According to Sobennikov, she set out from Riga and "moved with music to the border", not knowing about the threat.

At the same time, he continues, all aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields.

Five main questions were identified:

1. Was it brought to the attention of the troops in terms of their plan for the defense of the state border. If this plan was communicated to the troops, then when and what was done by the command and troops to ensure the implementation of this plan.

2. From what time and on the basis of what order, the covering troops began to reach the state border and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the start of hostilities.

3. When an order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22. What and when instructions were given to the troops in pursuance of this order and what was done.

4. Why most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was in training camps.

5. To what extent the headquarters of the unit was prepared for command and control and to what extent this affected the conduct of operations in the first days of the war

Assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, who exercised control in the first days of the war.

The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis of fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military specialists.

DEREVYANKO KUZMA NIKOLAEVICH
lieutenant general

In 1941 - Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front)

“The grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in large part and in detail.

The uncovered grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive grouping with a significant saturation with tanks and motorized units.
“The command and headquarters of the district had reliable data on the intensified and direct preparation of fascist Germany for the war against Soviet Union 2-3 months before the start of hostilities.

Starting from the second week of the war, much attention was paid to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of reconnaissance radio-equipped groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points on the territory occupied by our troops, in case of their forced withdrawal.

“In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value.

It was reported on the personally observed concentration of fascist German troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on ongoing German officers reconnaissance along the border, the preparation of artillery positions by the Germans, the strengthening of the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia.

SOBENNIKOV PETER PETROVICH
lieutenant general

In 1941 - Commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District
(North-Western Front)
“How unexpectedly for the approaching troops the war began can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving by rail to dawn on June 22, arriving at st. Siauliai and seeing the bombing of our airfields, believed that "the maneuvers have begun."
And at this time, almost all aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15 hours on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.
“... at about 10-11 o'clock on June 18, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to their areas
defense by the morning of June 19, and Colonel General Kuznetsov [Commander of the PriOVO Troops]

On June 22, the Day of Memory and Sorrow, a unique electronic information resource dedicated to the events of the first days of the bloodiest war of the 20th century appeared on the official website of the Ministry of Defense. All documents have so far been classified and are being published for the first time. They contain a story about the first battles of the Great Patriotic War, about the directives of the NPO of the USSR, about the first award documents with descriptions of exploits.

We list the most relevant archive photographs due to numerous fake news and false fabrications about the beginning of the war. First of all, this is the copy of the Directive published for the first time on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense People's Commissar Defense of the USSR N1 dated June 22, 1941, signed by Zhukov and Timoshenko and handed over on the night of June 22 to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies.

Special attention also deserves the declassified copy of the handwritten Combat Order of the People's Commissar of Defense N2 of June 22, 1941, personally compiled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Georgy Zhukov three hours after the start of the war - at 7:15 in the morning. The order instructs the troops of the Red Army "by all means and means to fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border," and the bombing and attack aviation destroy enemy aircraft at airfields based and grouping ground forces "to a depth of German territory up to 100-150 kilometers." At the same time, it was indicated that "no raids should be made on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions." On the back of the last page of this document is Zhukov's postscript: "T[ov]. Vatutin. Bomb Romania."

What does it mean: first do not bomb Romania, then bomb it? Employees of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation explain that we have, in fact, the first combat order of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and between its lines, the attentive reader will see the colossal tension and tragedy of the first hours of the outbreak of war.

A trophy map of the initial stage of the "Plan Barbarossa", where, in addition to detailed deployment of Nazi troops near the borders of the USSR, the planned directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht troops in the first days of the war, is another exhibit of the virtual exhibition. As you know, the blitzkrieg failed.

And here is the story "from the trench". In one of the first battles, a battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Borisov destroyed 6 enemy tanks with direct fire. The platoon of junior lieutenant Brykl also set fire to 6 tanks, and when the platoon's guns were put out of action, the officer fired from a gun found nearby, left without calculation, and destroyed 4 more tanks. After the shells ran out, the junior lieutenant put the heavy machine gun on the tractor and, together with its driver, continued to fight until the last bullet.

The published reports of the heads of the political departments of the 42nd and 6th rifle divisions, which received the blow of the Nazi troops in the western direction, will tell about the course of the fighting in the Brest region and for the legendary Brest Fortress. The details of the military operations of these formations will be real revelations even for professional historians.

Wehrmacht officers were advised to avoid clashes with the 99th Infantry Division, which covered Przemysl, in the future. Selected and consisting of the most brave soldiers - this is exactly the assessment given to her by the German command following the results of the first days of fighting for the city. The combat orders and reports also presented on the website of the Ministry of Defense give an idea of the steadfastness and valor of these soldiers:

"On June 22, the division was in the city of Przemysl, where it received the first blow of the armored masses of the Nazi troops. As a result of a treacherous attack, the city was captured by the Nazis, but on June 23, parts of the division, together with other units, recaptured the right-bank Soviet part of the city and restored the border."

"On June 22, the Red Army soldier E.M. Balakar was on guard guarding the points of the city. At the time of the attack, he was not at a loss, occupied the pillbox, installed a heavy machine gun and for a day and a half repelled the enemy with machine gun fire and prevented him from crossing the San River."

"During the first few days of fighting, the city changed hands three times. All this time, the enemy brought reserves into battle, persistently trying to seize the initiative in his own hands ... The division command decided to prevent the enemy from breaking through (...), continuing to hold the state border. It was thanks to professionalism command and directly the commander of Colonel Dementyev N.I., parts of the division were able not only to resist the massive onslaught of the enemy, but also put him to flight.

Among the published documents are dozens of award sheets for Red Army soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in those first bloody battles. Among them are descriptions of the exploits of fighter pilots of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Leningrad Military District, junior lieutenants Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev, who on June 26, 1941 made the first rams of Nazi bombers in the sky over the city of Ostrov. For these air battles, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 8, 1941, they were awarded high rank Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The Federal Security Service of Russia has declassified a large number of documents from Soviet and Western intelligence, our army headquarters, control bodies of border formations and units of the NKVD, revealing many dramatic and heroic pages of the first months of fascist aggression in the USSR.

Stalin did not believe the "Corsican"

Recently, the West has been actively reviving the myth fabricated by Goebbels that, in fact, the Great Patriotic War was provoked by the leadership of the USSR. Hitler, they say, was forced to deliver only a preemptive strike. But this myth does not stand up to criticism, since there is a lot of evidence to the contrary. One of them is a letter from Hitler Mussolini dated June 21, 1941, which was handed over to the FSB by the Italian secret services.

"Duce!

I am writing this letter to you at a moment when nervous waiting has ended with the most difficult decision of my life...

England has hitherto waged her wars with the help of continental countries. With the destruction of France, the British warmongers are turning their eyes to where they were trying to start the war: the Soviet Union. Behind these states stands the North American Union in a pose of instigator and waiter.

Actually, all available Russian troops are on our borders. With the onset of warm weather, defensive work is being carried out in many places ... The situation in England is bad. The will to fight is fed only by hopes for Russia and America. We do not have the ability to eliminate America. But to exclude Russia is in our power. I hope that we will soon be able to secure a common food base in the Ukraine for a long time.

Cooperation with the USSR weighed heavily on me. I am happy to be freed from this moral burden."

From this letter, an unbiased reader will certainly understand that Hitler started the war for internal motivation and by no means as a result of a mythical external provocation.

The fact that the leadership of the USSR not only did not seek war, but dismissed as provocative any information about preparations for it from Germany, quite obviously follows from the inadequately complacent position of Stalin in 1940-1941.

It is known with what skepticism he reacted to the disturbing reports of Richard Sorge, other Soviet intelligence officers, who warned the Soviet leadership about the impending German attack on the Soviet Union. Here is another typical document.

“The NKVD of the USSR reports the following intelligence data received from Berlin.

1. Our agent "Corsican" in a conversation with an officer of the headquarters of the High Command learned that at the beginning of next year Germany would start a war against the Soviet Union. The preliminary step towards the start of military operations against the USSR will be the military occupation of Rumania by the Germans, preparations for which are now under way and supposedly should be carried out within the next few months.

The aim of the war is to seize from the Soviet Union a part of the European territory of the USSR from Leningrad to the Black Sea and to create on this territory a state entirely dependent on Germany. In the rest of the Soviet Union, according to these plans, a "German-friendly government" should be created.

2. An officer of the headquarters of the High Command (department of military attaches), the son of the former Minister of Colonies, told our source No. months, Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union.

(October 1940).

Stalin, having read this message, summoned Beria. He, knowing the mood of the “Master”, said: “I will drag this “Corsican” to Moscow for disinformation and put him in jail.” The secret pseudonym "Corsican" was an employee of the German Ministry of Economy, one of the leaders of the underground anti-fascist organization in Berlin "Red Chapel" Arvid Harnak. In 1942 he was arrested and executed by the Gestapo. Stalin posthumously awarded him the Order of the Red Banner. But then, in 1940, he did not believe the "Corsican".

Distrust of their own intelligence is one of the reasons for the notorious "surprise", which resulted in numerous casualties and confusion on the fronts at the beginning of the war. Here are some documents showing this.

"Top secret

Report of F. Ya. Tutushkin, Deputy Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, on the losses of the Air Force of the North-Western Front in the first days of the war.

State Defense Committee

Comrade Stalin

Due to the unpreparedness of the Air Force units of the PRIBVO for military operations, the indiscretion and inactivity of some commanders of air divisions and regiments bordering on criminal actions, about 50% of the aircraft were destroyed by the enemy during raids on airfields.

The withdrawal of units from under the blow of enemy aircraft was not organized. There were no anti-aircraft defenses for airfields, and there were no artillery shells at those airfields where there were funds.

The leadership of the combat operations of air units on the part of the commanders of the 57th, 7th and 8th air divisions, as well as the headquarters of the Air Force of the Front and the District, was extremely poorly delivered, communication with air units from the beginning of hostilities was almost absent.

Aircraft losses on the ground in the 7th and 8th air divisions alone amount to 303 aircraft.

The situation is similar for the 6th and 57th air divisions.

Such losses of our aircraft are explained by the fact that within a few hours after the attack by enemy aircraft, the command of the District forbade flying out and destroying the enemy. The Air Force units of the District entered the battle late, when a significant part of the aircraft had already been destroyed by the enemy on the ground.

The relocation to other airfields took place in a disorganized manner, each division commander acted independently, without instructions from the Air Force of the District, they landed wherever they wanted, as a result of which 150 vehicles accumulated at some airfields.

So, at the Pilzino airfield, the enemy, having discovered such a cluster of aircraft, attacked by one bomber on June 25 of this year. destroyed 30 aircraft.

The camouflage of airfields has not yet received attention. The order of the NPO on this issue is not being carried out (especially with regard to the 57th Air Division - division commander Colonel Katichev and the 7th Air Division - division commander Colonel Petrov), the Front and District Air Force headquarters do not take any measures.

AT given time air units of the Air Force of the North-Western Front are incapable of active combat operations, since they include units of combat vehicles: the 7th air division - 21 aircraft, the 8th air division - 20, the 57th air division -12.

The crews, left without materiel, were idle and are only now heading for materiel, which arrives extremely slowly ...

In the warehouses of the Okrug, there is a shortage of spare parts for aircraft and aircraft engines (planes of MiG aircraft, VISH-22E and VISH-2 propellers, 3 MGA spark plugs, BS cartridges, and other parts)

Deputy Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR Tutushkin.

By June 22, 1941, the enemy had concentrated 4,980 combat aircraft along the western borders of the Soviet Union in three strategic directions. In the very first hours of the war, he launched a series of massive attacks on the airfields of the western border districts.

26 airfields of the Kyiv, 11 airfields of the Baltic special districts and 6 airfields of the Odessa military district were subjected to air raids. As a result, these districts suffered heavy losses in aircraft. The greatest damage was inflicted on the Western Special District, on which the Germans dealt the main blow. If on the first day of the war the entire Red Army lost about 1,200 aircraft, then this district alone lost 738 aircraft.

The main reason for this situation was that the Soviet military leadership failed to fully comply with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of February 25, 1941 "On the reorganization aviation forces Red Army". According to this decree, it was planned to form 25 directorates of aviation divisions and more than 100 new aviation regiments during the year, and equip half of them with new types of aircraft. At the same time, the aviation rear was restructured according to the territorial principle.

However, by the beginning of the war, the deployment of aviation and the restructuring of rear aviation on a territorial basis had not been completed. By June 22, 1941, only 19 new aviation regiments were formed, 25 air divisions did not complete the formation, the flight personnel were retrained. There was a lack of new equipment, maintenance and repair facilities. The development of the airfield network lagged behind the deployment of aviation. The Air Force was armed with aircraft of various designs, most of them had low speed and weak armament. The new aircraft (MiG-3, Yak-1, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2, etc.) were not inferior to the aircraft of the Nazi army in terms of combat capabilities, and surpassed them in a number of indicators. However, their entry into the Air Force began shortly before the war, and by June 22, 1941, there were only 2,739 of them. The incoming aircraft were, as a rule, crowded and did not disperse over field and other airfields, being a target for enemy aircraft.

In the Red Army at the beginning of the war, there was an acute shortage of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. As a result, our troops and airfields turned out to be defenseless against both tank attacks and enemy air strikes.

The state of affairs in the Red Army Air Force was significantly affected by the belated communication of the directive to bring the troops to full combat readiness to the command of the military districts. Some military units and divisions learned about the content of the directive after the start of hostilities.

The opinion prevailing at that time that there would be no war, “that Hitler is provoking us” and we “should not succumb to provocations” also had a negative effect. Even when the war had already begun, some commanders believed that this was not a war, but an incident.

But despite the heavy losses, Soviet pilots showed great courage, bravery and mass heroism. On the first day of the war, they made 6,000 sorties, inflicted significant damage on advancing enemy tank formations and aircraft, and shot down over 200 enemy aircraft in air battles.

Order No. 270: "Not a step back!"

The beginning of the war for our aviation turned out to be catastrophic. Things were no better in the infantry units.

“Special message of the NKVD of the USSR No. 41/303 to the GKO, the General Staff of the Red Army and the NKO of the USSR on the investigation of the reasons for the heavy losses of the 199th Infantry Division

On July 6, in the Novo-Miropol area, the 199th Infantry Division was defeated, suffering heavy losses in people and materiel.

In connection with this, the Special Department of the South-Western Front conducted an investigation, as a result of which it was established:

On July 3, the commander of the Southwestern Front ordered the 199th Infantry Division to occupy and firmly hold the southern front of the Novograd-Volyn fortified area by the morning of July 5. The command of the division complied with this order belatedly. Parts of the division took up defense later than the specified period, in addition, during the march, food was not organized for the fighters. People, especially the 617th Infantry Regiment, arrived at the defense area exhausted.

After occupying the defense area, the command of the division did not reconnoiter the enemy forces, did not take measures to blow up the bridge across the river. Sluch in the central sector of defense, which made it possible for the enemy to transfer tanks and motorized infantry. Due to the fact that the command did not establish a connection between the division headquarters and the regiments, on July 6, the 617th and 584th rifle regiments acted without any direction from the command of divisions.

During the panic created in the units during the enemy offensive, the command failed to prevent the flight that had begun. The divisional headquarters fled. Division commander Alekseev, deputy. political commander Korzhev and early. The headquarters of the German division left the regiments and fled to the rear with the remnants of the headquarters.

Through the fault of Korzhev and German, party documents, blank forms of party tickets, seals of the party and Komsomol organizations, and all staff documents were left to the enemy.

Division commander Colonel Alekseev, deputy. division commander for political affairs, regimental commissar Korzhev and early. division headquarters Lieutenant Colonel German arrested and tried by a military tribunal.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Abakumov.

The 199th division is not an isolated case. Many units in June-July 1941 randomly retreated. And only an imperious iron hand could stop them. So the first "draconian" order appeared.

“Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin to the military councils of the fronts, armies to bring to court a military tribunal of middle and senior command personnel who leave their positions without an order from the military command

In order to decisively fight alarmists, cowards, defeatists from the command staff, who arbitrarily leave their positions without an order from the high command,

I order:

allow the military councils of the active armies to bring to court-martial persons of middle and senior command personnel, up to and including the battalion commander, guilty of the above-mentioned crimes.

People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin".

After that, Stalin signed an even tougher order No. 270, popularly known as "Not a step back!" In accordance with it, even the families of those who went wrong at the front were subjected to repression.

And although the situation began to gradually stabilize, already in July the threat hung over the very capital of Russia.

“Message of the NKVD of the USSR No. 2210 / B to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov about the plans of the German command to capture Moscow and Leningrad on July 14, 1941

According to the head of the Leningrad Directorate of the NKGB, the following data was obtained from captured German pilots in prison by operational equipment measures:

2. At this time, enemy aircraft are carefully studying and photographing the approaches to Leningrad and mainly airfields.

3. German air raids on Leningrad will be carried out large quantity aircraft and should start on Tuesday, i.e. from 15 July.

The head of the UNKGB informed comrades. Voroshilov and Zhdanov.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria.

The enemy will be defeated!

And yet, even in those difficult days, the contours of future victories were already beginning to emerge. The bulk of the fighters and commanders showed the greatest courage and heroism, atoning for the mistakes of politicians with their blood.

From the journal of combat operations of the border troops of the Leningrad District (from June 22 to July 11, 1941):

“The head of the 5th outpost of the 5th KPO, junior lieutenant Khudyakov, a member of the CPSU (b), being surrounded by a several times superior enemy, being wounded, did not leave the battlefield, but, as befits the son of a socialist Motherland, continued to command the outpost . With a skillful organization of rifle and machine-gun fire, he managed to withdraw the outpost from the encirclement with an insignificant number of losses of his fighters, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Such behavior at this critical moment beginning. Khudyakov’s outpost says only one thing, that at that moment only one feeling led him - this is a feeling of love for the Motherland, for the party of Lenin-Stalin and a sense of responsibility for the work entrusted to him. The Red Army soldiers of the 8th outpost of the same detachment Kornyukhin, Vorontsov, Tolshshkur and Dergaputsky, pupils of the Leningrad Komsomol, brave and courageous border guards, honorably fulfilled their combat mission. Under heavy enemy fire, they crawled to the road along which 5 enemy tanks were supposed to move, skillfully disabled two tanks, thereby making it easier for their unit to complete the main task.

... The deputy head of the outpost for political affairs, Konkov V.I., at the time of the attack by superior enemy forces on the defense area of the outpost, being seriously wounded in the leg and arm, refused to leave the battlefield.

Unable to move, he ordered the Red Army soldiers to bring him a light machine gun.

Courageously overcoming the pain from his wounds, he accurately shot at the pressing enemy. At the time of the critical situation of the outpost, the slogans “For the Motherland!”, “For Stalin!” managed to inspire the fighters, raise their faith in victory over the enemy ... "

Such heroic examples then became a symbolic guarantee that, despite the tangible losses of the first weeks of the war, the Soviet soldier, after four difficult years of fighting, would nevertheless reach the citadel of fascism and hoist the Banner of Victory over its ruins.

Yuri Rubtsov - colonel, member of the Russian Association of Historians of the Second World War

On the occasion of the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow, the Ministry of Defense launched a unique historical project. The department published copies of declassified documents about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Declassified archival documents, directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, orders, reports, award documents with descriptions of the first exploits of Soviet soldiers. Unique facts that clearly show what happened in the first hours and days of the Great Patriotic War. The secret cipher, dated June 22, was compiled at 01:45. Dispatched at half past two. According to which, all units of the Red Army were ordered to be in full combat readiness. A sudden attack by the Germans was expected, including after provocative actions. The task was set for our troops: not to succumb to provocations, but to be ready. From the combat order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 2 of June 22, 1941:

"On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them. In connection with the unheard-of arrogance attacks from Germany on the Soviet Union, I order: the troops should collapse with all their might and means on enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border. From now on, until further notice to ground forces, do not cross the border."

And signatures: Tymoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov. The declassified archives contain dozens of memoirs of eyewitnesses and direct participants in the first days of the war. Of course, they are not without subjectivity, but nevertheless they show that the high command knew about the impending attack and realistically assessed the situation. But the enemy, who had two years of combat experience, and due to the resources of the already captured countries, was much stronger.

A trophy map captured during the fighting on June 22, which shows the main lines of attack by the troops of Nazi Germany. The German command counted on a quick victory, but, according to an analysis of declassified documents, having recovered from the first swift blow of the Nazis, despite the existing difficulties of a peaceful, rather than military, principle of supplying troops, the headquarters were still able to properly manage the fighting.

And without a doubt - a feat of ordinary soldiers. On June 25, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Borisov met enemy tanks moving along the road. With direct fire from three guns, the battery destroyed 6 enemy tanks. Comrade Borisov is worthy of the Order of the Red Banner. A Red Army soldier, comrade Yefim Balakar, was on guard guarding the points of the city. At the time of the attack, he was not at a loss, occupied the pillbox, installed a heavy machine gun and for a day and a half repelled enemy attacks with machine gun fire and prevented him from crossing the San River. When the danger had passed, he took the heavy machine gun and joined his regiment. Worthy of the Order of the Red Star.

Sunday 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany and its allies attacked our country with an invasion army unprecedented in history: 190 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks, 47,000 guns and mortars, about 4,500 aircraft, up to 200 ships, a total of 5 million people.

The first blows were delivered by German aircraft at dawn. Hundreds of German bombers invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. They bombarded airfields, areas where troops were stationed in the western border districts, railway junctions, communication lines and other important objects, as well as large cities in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.

At the same time, Wehrmacht troops concentrated along the entire length of the State Border of the USSR opened heavy artillery fire on border outposts, fortified areas, formations and units of the Red Army stationed in its immediate vicinity. After artillery and aviation preparation, they crossed the State border of the USSR along its entire length - from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The Great Patriotic War- the most difficult of all the wars ever experienced by the country.

It is these events of the first day of the war that are illuminated by the documents presented at the exhibition "The Beginning of the Great Patriotic War".

Among them are orders, directives, operational reports, intelligence reports for June 22, 1941 of the top military leadership of the Soviet Union and the command of the fronts.

It is no less interesting to get acquainted with intelligence reports, reports and other documents of the German troops, reflecting the events of the first day of the war. Such two-sided coverage of the military situation at the beginning of the war will allow us to see the true picture, to feel its scale and tragedy.