The first Kuban ice campaign. First ice trek. The meeting participants decided
The first Kuban campaign lasted 80 days, from February 9 to April 30. Some people mistakenly call the first Kuban campaign the Ice Campaign.
The Ice Campaign occurred during the army's retreat in Siberia. The events of the Kuban campaign are connected with the Don.
At the end of 1917 on the Don, former tsarist generals and Kornilov created the Volunteer Army.
The goal of the Volunteer Army was to fight the Bolshevik regime. In January 1918, the Volunteer Army of General Alekseev found itself in a difficult situation.
The Red fighters successfully advanced towards the location of the volunteer army. Under certain circumstances, the Volunteer Army could be completely destroyed, because the number of Reds was many times greater than the number of Kornilov’s volunteers.
The leaders of the Volunteer Army hoped for broad support from the local population and the awakening of the Don Cossacks to fight Bolshevism. However, this did not happen.
In connection with the current difficult situation, Kornilov and Alekseev decided to withdraw their army from Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk to the glorious city of Ekaterinodar (today the city is called Krasnodar).
The retreat was due to the hope of raising an anti-Bolshevik uprising among the Cossacks, as well as the mountain peoples.
According to Alekseev’s plan, Kuban was to become a springboard for the fight against Bolshevism throughout Russia.
Initially, the volunteer army was supposed to get to Yekaterinodar by rail. However, the Reds captured Bataysk, and travel by train became impossible.
In mid-February, the Volunteer Army, while in Rostov, found itself under threat of encirclement. The generals decided to move out immediately. The first Kuban campaign began.
At the beginning of the first Kuban campaign, the Volunteer Army numbered 3,423 people, mostly former officers of the Russian army and ordinary volunteers. The Kuban campaign began with the army crossing the Don, to its left bank, and ending up in the village of Olginskaya.
In the village, the Volunteer Army was transformed into three infantry regiments. Then Kornilov’s army moved to Yekaterinodar, while bypassing the Kuban steppes. The journey was long, the volunteer army fought continuous battles with enemy detachments, paving the way to Ekaterinodar.
In addition to the Reds, the volunteer army had another enemy - the cold. Temperature changes, frosts, winds - everything was against the volunteers.
Bolshevik troops were the first to arrive in Yekaterinodar. Approaching the city, in front of Volunteer Army The task was set to take it by storm. Near the city, the Volunteer Army united with the detachments of the Kuban Regional Government, which fled from the city.
The size of Kornilov's army reached 6 thousand bayonets. Soon the assault on Ekaterinodar began. The volunteer army was opposed by 20 thousand Bolsheviks. The assault was repulsed. Inopportunely, a stray shell hit the house where Kornilov was located, and the general was killed. He became the new commander of the Volunteer Army.
Denikin decided to retreat; thanks to his skillful actions, the army avoided direct clashes with the enemy. The first Kuban campaign ended in the south of the Don region, near Mechetinskaya station. Denikin managed to preserve the Volunteer Army and its combat effectiveness.
The goal of the campaign - the uprising of the Cossacks and mountain peoples - was not achieved; the Don never became the center of the anti-Bolshevik movement on the intended scale. The first Kuban campaign lasted 80 days, during which soldiers and officers of the Volunteer Army covered 1,400 kilometers.
On the night of February 22 to 23 (from the 9th to the 10th, old style) 1918, the famous “Ice” (First Kuban) campaign of the Volunteer Army began.
Volunteer army, formed on the initiative of General M.V. Alekseev under the command of first L.G. Kornilov (and after his death - A.I. Denikin), retreated from Rostov-on-Don to Ekaterinodar with fierce battles. This extremely difficult campaign, at the limit of strength, became - contrary to the expectations of the triumphant Bolsheviks - the birth and baptism of fire White movement.
In essence, at first it was not an army, but a large partisan detachment of officers: officers, cadets, cadets, students, soldiers, fighters of former shock battalions - everyone who, since November 1917, wanted and was able to get to Novocherkassk. Maria Bochkareva herself arrived - a pretty and pretty girl, whose name was given to the women's shock battalion. First of all, children cadets and cadet boys with their officers rose to defend Russia. In all cities where there were military schools and cadet corps, the Bolsheviks were given worthy resistance. The Red Guards caught cadets in cities and at railway stations, in carriages, on ships, beat them, maimed them, and threw them out of windows on moving trains. Many cadets and officers did not have a better fate. The path to the Don was difficult; many came completely exhausted, hungry, in rags, having already drunk Soviet prisons and bullying, but not discouraged. They walked alone and in groups, breaking through the Bolshevik cordons... Everyone mixed here - monarchists, republicans, and yesterday's student revolutionaries, who, having seen the “work of their own hands,” literally became ardent counter-revolutionaries in one day. A small cadre of the Georgievsky regiment, the Kornilovsky shock regiment, cadets of the Mikhailovsky and Konstantinovsky artillery schools arrived from Kyiv, generals Denikin, Markov, Kornilov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky and many others arrived one by one. What did the Volunteer Army give them all? A rifle and five cartridges - that was the answer at the volunteer registration office. In the first month, volunteers received only meager rations; starting from the second, a small salary was paid.
The issue of money was very difficult to resolve. Apparently, the gentlemen entrepreneurs of those distant years were not much different from today... Monetary Moscow gave about 800 thousand rubles and expressed “warm” sympathy, as well as a promise to give “everything” to save the Motherland.
If cartridges were somehow still available, then the army’s artillery was formed by the most in original ways. So, one weapon was bought from Cossacks traveling from the front to their native lands, and the other was simply... stolen, having gotten the Cossack servants pretty drunk.
The army grew, despite the disbelief in the success of many officers who remained on the sidelines, despite the angry hissing from around the corner: “...they decided to play toy soldiers!” On December 26, 1917, General Alekseev’s organization was officially renamed the Volunteer Army, distinctive sign which had a white-blue-red corner, worn on the left sleeve of the overcoat and tunic with the top down. The commander of the army is General Lavr Kornilov, the son of a Cossack, his deputy is General Anton Denikin, the son of a serf who became an officer. General Alekseev himself is the son of a long-term soldier.
The uprising in Rostov, the first battles with the Bolshevik Red Guards... Not a day passed without killing volunteers being buried in Novocherkassk. General Alekseev, standing at the open grave, said: “I see a monument that Russia will erect for these children, and this monument should depict an eagle’s nest and the eaglets killed in it...”
The army headquarters moved to Rostov, and the Bolsheviks were already pressing from all sides. It was impossible to stay on the Don.
 A.I. Denikin |
The night of February 9 to 10, 1918 - the beginning of the 1st Kuban campaign of the Volunteer Army, the beginning of the organized struggle against the enslavers of the Fatherland. Volunteers leave Rostov on a frosty and snowy night... The lines of General Alekseev, written by loved ones, served as an answer to the painful question of where we were going and what lay ahead: “... We are leaving for the steppes. We can return only if there is God's grace. But we need to light a torch so that there is at least one bright point among the darkness that has engulfed Russia...”
So, almost “following the blue bird” was the four-thousand-strong Volunteer Army, and this was the whole point of its first campaign, where everything was contrary to fate and common sense. Let us see this still dimly flickering candle of the sacred struggle of all Russia! There has never been such an army in the history of mankind. With rifles on their belts, with pitiful belongings in their duffel bags, two former commanders-in-chief of the Imperial Army, former front commanders, high staff ranks, corps commanders, colonels and officers, cadets and cadets, female shock workers and Rostov high school students walked in a column through the deep snow.
History has preserved for us the first composition of this small army: 36 generals, 242 staff officers (of which 190 are colonels), 2078 chief officers (captains - 215, staff captains - 251, lieutenants - 394, second lieutenants - 535, warrant officers - 668), 1067 privates (including cadets and senior cadets - 437), volunteers - 630 (364 non-commissioned officers and 235 soldiers, including 66 Czechs). The medical staff consisted of 148 people - 24 doctors and 122 nurses. A convoy of refugees followed with the army.
A short stop in the village of Olginskaya. General Kornilov is reorganizing the army and promoting cadets to warrant officers, and senior cadets to field cadets. Army composition:
- Combined officer regiment;
- Kornilovsky Shock Regiment;
- Partisan regiment;
- Special cadet battalion;
- Czechoslovakian engineer battalion;
- Technical Company;
- Two cavalry divisions;
- Artillery battalion (eight guns);
- General Kornilov's convoy
There are very few cartridges, a meager treasury, catastrophically few shells, a numerically superior enemy everywhere, but - forward!
 S.L. Markov |
Heavy, continuous battles and continuous march. Everything is taken in battle - shells, cartridges, food... The direction of the campaign is determined - to take the capital of Kuban, Ekaterinodar. From the village of Olginskaya to Yegorlytskaya, 88 versts, they walked in six days, and then the Stavropol province, engulfed by Bolshevism.
On March 15, the army approached the village of Novodmitrievskaya. It was here that the second name of the campaign was born - Ice, and the most vivid memories of every pioneer are associated with this battle. It rained all night the night before and the next morning. People were wet to the skin and were stirring up deep mud... By noon the wind blew and it began to snow. Ahead is a river, and behind it is a village. The officer regiment of General Markov began a long crossing on the croup of horses. And the weather changes again - the wind is stronger, frost and snowstorm hit. Everything was quickly covered with an icy crust, clothing, which became a shell, hindered any movement... The fallen people could no longer get up...
Markov found himself with his regiment alone in front of the village. The remaining units were just being transported. The question was stark: to freeze in the field or to take the village and save the army. Markov rushed to the attack. Frozen officers, clutching rifles in their numb hands, falling into a mess of mud and snow, rose again to meet the murderous fire of the Reds. The village was taken.
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In one of the battles, the Officer Company heard female voice: “Girls! Bring the machine gun here!” The company involuntarily laughed, but it was a short laugh, realizing the seriousness of this peculiar order. Yes, these were shock troops from women’s battalions, some with the rank of warrant officers with crosses on their chests. They continued to serve Russia and without hesitation went with the army on the 1st Kuban campaign.
The army receives its first reinforcements from the Kuban (including Kyiv cadets), its strength increases to six thousand people. On March 27, we approached Ekaterinodar.
March 31, 7.30 am. One of the red artillery shells flew into the headquarters room, where General Kornilov was sitting at the table... The news of his death spread very quickly. General Denikin receives the army. That same day, in the evening, the volunteers leave. Brilliantly maneuvering, Denikin leads the army out of the most difficult situations. On April 25, a detachment of Kiev officer Colonel Mikhail Drozdovsky, who fought 1,200 miles from the distant Romanian Front, joined.
On April 30, 1918, having covered 1050 versts in battle, the army returned to the Don and settled down to rest in the villages of Mechetinskaya and Yegorlytskaya. Of the 80 days of the campaign, 44 were in battle, up to 400 people were lost killed, 1,500 wounded were taken out, they left with four thousand and returned with five thousand.
By order of General Denikin, a special sign was installed for all participants in the campaign: a crown of thorns with a sword on St. George's ribbon and with a rosette of national colors on it. Nowadays, the Russian All-Military Union (formed by General Wrangel in 1924) has at its disposal a unique list of campaign participants awarded this badge.
The fates of the participants in the campaign turned out differently. Most died in the further struggle, some experienced the full hardship of emigrant life, some died in the army of General Franco, already fighting against the Spanish communists. Many became young and famous military leaders - generals Turkul, Manstein (from Kiev), Kharzhevsky, Kutepov. The pioneers have always remained a kind of “cementing” composition of all the white parts. Their motto until their death was: “Everything for Russia! Nothing for yourself!”
So, whose victory was the Ice Campaign of the White Army? Of course, the epic of the Ice March became a legend of the White Movement; of course, it was a feat on the part of the Kornilovites, who went almost into the unknown. The glory of this campaign undoubtedly belongs to Kornilov and his military comrades. But no less glorious were the two defenses of Sevastopol in 1854 - 1855 and 1941 - 1942. But both “Sevastopol sufferings” ended the same way - with the fall of the city. Undoubtedly, the heroic pages of our history are the defense Brest Fortress and the Battle of Smolensk - but our ancestors ultimately lost both battles. So who emerged victorious from the events of February - April 1918?
At first glance, it seems that luck favored the Reds. The Volunteer Army never took Ekaterinodar, the final goal of its campaign, and the city remained in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Kuban Cossacks never became its reliable rear for solving national problems. In addition, the army lost its beloved commander-in-chief, Lavr Kornilov, whose death morally crippled many white volunteers.
L.G. Kornilov
But this is only at first glance. It is no coincidence that Anton Ivanovich Denikin, who took command from the hands of the late Kornilov, pointed out in “Essays on the Russian Troubles” that the Ice Campaign cannot be approached with the yardstick of ordinary strategy or even politics. So let’s try to take a closer look at these events.
First of all, main goal the campaign, if you look at it, was not Ekaterinodar at all. Initially, white volunteers gathered for the Don; it was the Don region that became a kind of White Guard “mecca”. The cadets, cadets and officers who did not accept the October coup sought to move to the Don. On the Don there was an island of solid state power led by the conservative chieftain A.M. Kaledin, the former chief of staff of Emperor Nicholas II, General M.V., also went to the Don. Alekseev. Bykhov's prisoners also made their way to the Don - Kornilov, Denikin, Romanovsky, Markov and others, the future leaders of the White Movement in the South of Russia. In December 1917 - January 1918, the Volunteer Army created by Alekseev and Kornilov successfully resisted the onslaught of the Red Guards.
Lavr Kornilov and Mitrofan Nezhentsev in the hostel of white volunteers in Novocherkassk
What changed then? What has changed is that the Don Cossacks, tired of the First World War, never rose up in defense of their age-old rights and traditional foundations, as Kaledin and Kornilov had counted on. The Reds quickly realized the danger that the white army forming on the Don posed to them - and hastened to nip it in the bud. Rostov and Novocherkassk were attacked by many times superior forces of the Red Guards, which the Volunteer Army had no opportunity to resist alone. It became clear that without the help of the Don Cossacks, the Alekseevites and Kornilovites alone would not hold the front. “A handful of our people, not supported at all by the Cossacks,” Alekseev wrote bitterly to his wife, “abandoned by everyone, deprived of artillery shells and exhausted by long battles, have completely exhausted their strength and fighting capabilities. If today or tomorrow the Cossack conscience does not speak, then we will be crushed by the numbers of even an insignificant moral enemy. We will need to leave the Don under extremely difficult conditions." “Speaking about the departure of the Volunteer Army,” the same Alekseev explained to the Don Ataman Kaledin, “I had in mind that extreme case when further struggle would be meaningless and would only lead to complete destruction weak side what we are in in this case and we will appear."
M.V. Alekseev
A.M. Kaledin
The departure of the Volunteer Army from the Don was actually a retreat. The withdrawal of the army from its positions in order to save the troops from inevitable defeat. This was precisely the main motive for Alekseev and Kornilov when they made the corresponding decision. But - and this is the main strategic paradox of the Ice Campaign - Kornilov’s army, retreating,... advanced. There were enemies all around - Red Guard detachments and simply bandit gangs of deserter soldiers ruled everywhere in Russia (and it was not so easy to distinguish one from the other). The Volunteer Army was retreating from the Don, which had failed to become a reliable rear base for it, and at the same time was advancing on Kuban, where it hoped to find such a base. Kuban was not the final goal - it was only one of possible options. As alternatives, a withdrawal to the Volga region, to Astrakhan (Kornilov’s idea) or to the Salsky steppes, to the winter camp area (the idea of the Don marching ataman P.Kh. Popov) was considered. The main goal of both Alekseev and Kornilov was to preserve the army for subsequent battles with the Bolsheviks, not for a minute forgetting that the army was created not for narrow territorial, but for national tasks and that this army is, in fact, the legal successor Imperial Russia, which continued the war against the bloc of Central Powers.
And from this point of view, the Ice Campaign of the Volunteer Army turned out to be unexpectedly successful. Yes, Yekaterinodar was not taken, yes, the army lost its commander-in-chief - but at the same time, while the Kornilovites were fighting their way into the Kuban, the Reds were in charge of the Don - and in less than two months they managed to turn the local population against themselves so much that the Don flared up in uprisings . If you believe Sholokhov (and he is from those places and a direct participant in the events, and - which is extremely important for the question that interests us - a Bolshevik), the very same people who in February welcomed Soviet power and actively contributed to its establishment (I would like to direct those interested to the brilliant novel “Quiet Don”). The Volunteer Army failed to take the Kuban capital and secure a base in the North Caucasus - but the army was replenished with volunteers from among the Kuban Cossacks and Caucasian Muslim mountaineers, which sharply increased its maneuverability. An army, mostly on foot, stretched out from Rostov and Novocherkassk - now the new commander Denikin had cavalry divisions at his disposal. According to Denikin (see "Essays on the Russian Troubles"), the Volunteer Army returned to the Don, having grown in numbers - and this despite the fact that during the First Kuban Campaign it had to continuously fight and suffer losses. And on the Don, Drozdovsky’s detachment of almost three thousand people from three branches of arms, having arrived in the distant world, lit by Alekseev, with their armored cars and airplane, was already waiting for them.
White Volunteer Army
The main thing is certain: contrary to the statements of Lenin, who already announced his victory in the Civil War in February 1918, the Volunteer Army survived. And therefore, victory is on her side.
There were a little more than four thousand people. But all of them are ideological, responsible people, for whom the concept of “Fatherland” was not just a pretentious figure of speech. By the way, by the time they left Rostov, there were sixteen thousand officers in the city who did not want to take part in the resistance to the Reds, who were waiting for “who will take it.” After the Bolshevik army entered there under the command of Sivers, some of them were demonstratively shot. Simply because the officers.... Yes, and the Rostov man in the street, who did not want to sacrifice even a handful of his personal reserves for the sake of providing for the Volunteer Army, was subsequently forced to give the Red “liberators of the working people” everything that they demanded for their own needs.
Went out to wake up
Unlike those who remained, those who went out into the chilly southern steppes on a frosty February night clearly knew what kind of destruction was taking over the country. And they had a clear plan, uniting with the units of the separatist Kuban Regional Rada that ingloriously fled from Ekaterinodar, essentially resubordinating them and the region to the interests of a united and indivisible Russia, to recapture the city, making it the center of anti-Bolshevik resistance.
It is interesting that almost simultaneously with this, other serious formations of anti-Bolshevik resistance began similar movements. So to save personnel, at the initial stage, infected with Cossack separatism, the army of Don Cossacks set out on the Steppe March from Novocherkassk - the Don Army, partially demoralized after the suicide of Ataman Kaledin. At the same time, from the Romanian front in early March they began to break through the chaos-ridden civil war the territory of historical Russia to the Don, Russian volunteers under the command of Mikhail Gordeevich Drozdovsky, along the Yassy-Don route that later became legendary. Subsequently, it will be the “blackbirds” who will recapture Rostov from the Reds.
General Mikhail Alekseev. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
In the meantime, it was in the upcoming campaign that the backbone of the Volunteer Army was formed, its units, which subsequently went through the entire civil war. So, at that time it consisted of an officer regiment under the command of the valiant General Sergei Leonidovich Markov, his fighters, recognizable a mile away by their black uniforms and white cap caps, and so they would later be called “Markovites”. And also the Kornilov shock regiment, brought together from patriotic veterans of the First World War (Great) and soldiers of the sovereign Tekin (Turkmen) convoy - the same black uniforms, but also a symbol of the Christian army on the banner, cockades and stripes - the head of Adam in the form of a skull and bones, as well as red crowns of caps, after the death of the commander they will also be called by his name - “Kornilovites”. Plus the Partisan Regiment of the Don Cossacks of General Bogaevsky, the Junker Battalion, consisting mainly of hot-blooded but very young cadets and students, the Czechoslovak Engineer Battalion and three cavalry divisions: officer, Don and partisan. And also ten guns. That's all. At the same time, the volunteers at that time were opposed by the Red Army, albeit hastily mobilized, but quite large and, unlike them, well-armed. In each battle, the “whites” had to come into contact with enemy units five and six times larger than them. But they responded with courage, determination and loyalty to their cause - in all eighty days the volunteers retreated only once, but more on that later.
“As long as there is life, while there is strength, not everything is lost, they will see a “light” flickering faintly, they will hear a voice calling to fight - those who have not yet woken up,” wrote a participant in the “Ice March”, later the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Army of the South Russia, General Anton Ivanovich Denikin. - This was the whole deep meaning of the First Kuban Campaign. You should not approach with cold argumentation of politics and strategy the phenomenon in which everything was in the realm of spirit and feat of achievement. the army—small in number, tattered, hunted, surrounded—as a symbol of persecuted Russia and Russian statehood, in the entire vast expanse of the country there was only one place left where the tricolor national flag openly fluttered—this was Kornilov’s headquarters.”
General Mikhail Vasilyevich Alekseev, who was at the origins of the movement, spoke no less clearly and tragically about the mission of volunteers:
“We are leaving for the steppes, we can return only if there is God’s mercy. But we need to light a torch so that there is at least one bright point among the darkness that has engulfed Russia...”
When snow and ice are no better than buckshot
Yes, it was Alekseev himself, who stood at the source of the conspiracy against the holy sovereign Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov. Did he understand then that he was going out and leading people into a desperate rush for historical Russia, ascends the Ice Golgotha to atone for his own sin? Judging by his memoirs, we can conclude that this once favorite of the royal couple nevertheless realized the entire crime of that fatal participation in the removal of the sovereign.
“The leading figures in the army are aware that, in the normal course of events, Russia must approach the restoration of the monarchy, of course, with those amendments that are necessary to facilitate the gigantic work of management for one person,” Alekseev wrote. “As the long experience of the events has shown, no other form government cannot ensure the integrity, unity, greatness of the state and unite into one the various peoples inhabiting its territory. This is the opinion of almost all the officer elements that make up the Volunteer Army, jealously ensuring that the leaders do not deviate from this fundamental principle in their activities. principle".
But Pandora's box was already open, blood was flowing like a river, and a small handful of brave men fought despite the weather and heavy enemy fire - of the eighty days of the campaign, forty of the eighty days of the campaign included fierce clashes with the “reds.”
“The army walked through continuous expanses of water and liquid mud...” Denikin recalled. “People walked slowly, shivering from the cold and dragging their feet heavily in swollen, water-filled boots. By noon, thick flakes of sticky snow began to fall, and the wind blew...”
“It rained all night the day before, and it didn’t stop in the morning,” wrote another participant in the campaign. “The army walked through continuous expanses of water and liquid mud - along roads and without roads - that swam and disappeared in thick fog, hanging over the ground. Cold water soaked through the entire dress, flowing in sharp, piercing streams down the collar. People walked slowly, shivering from the cold and dragging their feet heavily in their swollen, water-filled boots. By noon thick flakes of sticky snow began to fall and the wind began to blow. It covers your eyes, nose, ears, takes your breath away, and stings your face as if with sharp needles... Meanwhile, the weather changed again: unexpectedly frost struck, the wind grew stronger, and a snowstorm began. People and horses quickly became covered with ice; it seemed that everything was frozen to the very bones; warped, as if wooden clothing had shackled the body; It’s hard to turn your head, it’s hard to lift your foot in the stirrup.”
There is a legend that the name “Ice March” also appeared by chance. After the capture of the village of Novo-Dmitrievskaya young sister mercy of no less than the young Junker battalion, chilled to the bone during the transition, but managed to warm up during the battle, told General Markov: “It was a real ice trek!".
"Yes, you're right!" - the general answered the girl.
When there is no death
Why did they win? Why did they never falter under the pressure of the elements and an armed enemy? Why were there no desertions or surrenders?
“Small numbers and the impossibility of retreat, which would be tantamount to death, the volunteers developed their own tactics,” Kornilov resident Alexander Trushnovich wrote in emigration. “It was based on the conviction that, given the numerical superiority of the enemy and the scarcity of one’s own ammunition, it is necessary to attack and only advance. This , undeniable in maneuver warfare, the truth entered into the flesh and blood of the White Army volunteers. In addition, their tactics always included an attack on the enemy’s flanks. The infantry advanced in a sparse chain. laying down for a while to give the machine guns the opportunity to work. It was impossible to cover the entire front of the enemy, because then the intervals between the fighters would reach fifty, or even a hundred steps. In one or two places, the volunteer artillery would only hit the front. on important targets, spending several shells on infantry support in exceptional cases. When the infantry rose to knock out the enemy, there could be no stopping. No matter how numerically superior the enemy was, he could never withstand the onslaught of the pioneers."
Yes, later their comrades in the White movement called them that - “pioneers.” For which these several thousand brave and desperate people enjoyed well-deserved honor and respect among Russian patriots. Their courage was legendary, their fearlessness was true. Moreover, both ordinary soldiers and their commanders were distinguished by their courage. This is what the emigrant magazine “Bulletin of the First Marcher” wrote about the battle near the village of Medvedovskaya:
“About 4 o’clock in the morning, Markov’s units began to cross the railway track. Markov, having captured the railway guardhouse at the crossing, positioned infantry units, sent scouts to the village to attack the enemy, hastily began crossing the wounded, convoys and artillery. Suddenly, a Red armored train separated from the station and set off to the crossing, where the headquarters was already located along with generals Alekseev and Denikin. There were a few meters left before the crossing - and then Markov, showering the armored train with merciless words, remaining true to himself: “Stop, you’ll crush your own!” When he actually stopped, Markov jumped back (according to other sources, he immediately threw a grenade), and immediately two three-inch cannons fired grenades at point-blank range into the cylinders and wheels of the locomotive. A hot battle ensued with the crew of the armored train, which was eventually killed, and the armored train itself was killed. burned."
And such a brave act by the general came in handy; the Reds’ armored trains inflicted serious damage on the Whites, who desperately lacked artillery. Therefore, every disabling of such a monster was worth a lot.
Those who fought through the frozen Kuban steppes failed to take Ekaterinodar. More precisely, they almost failed; individual white units were even able to gain a foothold in the city center, but without receiving reinforcements, they retreated. The fatal turning point in the offensive was the death of the commander of the Volunteer Army, General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov. By the way, another participant in the conspiracy against the sovereign... After which the more cautious Denikin, who replaced him, decides to retreat from the city. And this decision had its reasons; during the battles for Yekaterinodar with a 26,000-strong Red army under the command of Avtonomov and Sorokin, the volunteers lost four hundred killed, which was a serious loss for their small army, whose number had grown to five thousand people.
Those who retreated managed to get out of all the Bolshevik traps and did not allow themselves to be lured into a tactical encirclement; by May 13, the Volunteer Army reached the Mechetinskaya-Egorlykskaya-Gulyai-Borisovk area, where it gained a foothold. The ice campaign was completed. But the end of the civil war and the victory of anti-Russian forces in it was still far away.
Interestingly, the beginning of the first organized speech of the “whites” coincided with the week of the Publican and the Pharisee preparing the Orthodox for Great Lent, and ended after St. Thomas Sunday or Antipascha. It is unlikely that such a providential coincidence can, in principle, be considered a coincidence. It was during this campaign that the sacrificial Christian symbolism of the White movement was formed. Firstly, the symbol of the Ice Campaign itself is the sword in the Savior’s crown of thorns on the St. George’s ribbon. Secondly, in the uniform of the “colored” volunteer regiments, the colors predominated: black - a symbol of mourning and repentance, red - martyrdom and self-sacrifice, and white - the Resurrection and the Lord. And also the symbol of the Orthodox army, which was practically absent in the imperial army, which, over the years of godlessness in our fatherland, became associated exclusively with pirates from translated English-language novels. But no, the “Head of Adam” - a skull with crossbones, according to legend, was on the tunic of Alexander Peresvet, who went out to battle with the Horde occultist warrior Chelubey, and on the banner of Ataman Baklanov, who conquered the Caucasus. And on the uniforms of “white” volunteers, as a symbol of immortality, liberation from death through the Atonement of the Savior.
You can talk a lot about why the White movement lost. Was his initial sacrifice a prepared atonement for the tsar's betrayal? But it is precisely on Defender of the Fatherland Day that I want to understand one thing - by God’s Providence it was given to our people holiday date, which, in principle, does not need to be abandoned. It just needs to be rethought. Because, unlike the drunken and cocaine-sniffed Red sailors, who were scared off only by the sight of Germans, on the other end of Russian soil their compatriots showed a feat of courage and self-sacrifice. And, therefore, this holiday still has a correct historical basis. Therefore, to all the true defenders of the Fatherland of all times - happy holiday!
First Kuban campaign |
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Kuban and Don |
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The main goals of the campaign were achieved |
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Opponents |
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Volunteer Army |
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Commanders |
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L. G. Kornilov † |
I. L. Sorokin |
A. I. Denikin |
A. I. Avtonomov |
R. F. Sievers |
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Strengths of the parties |
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4000 people |
24000-60000 people |
Military losses |
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About 400 killed |
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First Kuban campaign (“Ice” campaign)(February 9 (22) - April 30 (May 13), 1918) - the first campaign of the Volunteer Army to the Kuban - its movement with battles from Rostov-on-Don to Ekaterinodar and back to the Don (to the villages of Egorlytskaya and Mechetinskaya) during the Civil War war.
This campaign became the first army maneuver of the Volunteer Army, which was in the process of formation, under the command of generals L. G. Kornilov, M. V. Alekseev, and after the death of the first, A. I. Denikin.
The main goal of the campaign was to unite the Volunteer Army with the Kuban white detachments, which, as it turned out after the start of the campaign, had left Yekaterinodar.
"Ice March"
In March 1918, the weather suddenly deteriorated sharply: rain, followed by frost, caused the overcoats to freeze. Weakened in numerous battles and exhausted by daily marches through the softened Kuban black soil, the army began to exhaust itself under the blows of the elements. Then it got sharply cold, deep snow fell in the mountains, and the temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero. According to contemporaries, it got to the point that the wounded, lying on carts, had to be freed from the ice crust in the evening with bayonets (!)
At this time, a brutal clash occurred, known as battle at the station Novo-Dmitrievskaya March 15 (28), 1918. The soldiers of the Officer Regiment, which distinguished itself here, called the battle at Novodmitrovskaya “Markovsky”. General Denikin would later write: “March 15 - Ice March - the glory of Markov and the Officer Regiment, the pride of the Volunteer Army and one of the most vivid memories of every pioneer about the days gone by - they were either fairy tales.”
This battle at Novo-Dmitrievskaya, and the series of marches that preceded and followed it across the ice-crusted steppe, the Army began to call the “Ice March”:
Regarding the “etymology” of the “Ice March”, there is another story, set out in the book “Markov and the Markovians”.
The name “Ice”, “given by the sister” and “approved” by General Markov, subsequently began to be used in relation to the entire First Kuban campaign of the Good Army.
Background of events
The events of February 1917-October 1917 led to the virtual collapse of the country and the start of the civil war. Under these conditions, part of the demobilized army, according to the articles of the Brest Peace Treaty signed by the Bolsheviks on behalf of Russia, decided to unite to restore order (however, it soon became clear that many understand very different things by this word). The unification took place on the basis of the Alekseevskaya Organization, which began on the day of General Alekseev’s arrival in Novocherkassk - November 2 (15), 1917. The situation on the Don during this period was tense. Ataman Kaledin, with whom General Alekseev discussed his plans for his organization, having listened to the request to “give shelter to the Russian officers,” responded with agreement in principle, however, taking into account local sentiments, he recommended Alekseev not to stay in Novocherkassk for more than a week...
At a specially convened meeting of Moscow delegates and generals on December 18 (31), 1917, which resolved issues of management of the “Alekseev organization” (essentially the issue of distribution of roles in management between generals Alekseev and Kornilov, who arrived on the Don on December 6 (19), 1917), it was decided that all military power would pass to General Kornilov.
The responsibility for urgently completing the formation of units and bringing them to combat readiness on December 24, 1917 (January 6, 1918) was assigned to the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L. Markov.
At Christmas, a “secret” order was announced for General Kornilov to take command Army, which from that day on became officially known as Volunteer.
After the Don Cossacks refused to support the Volunteer Army and the start of the offensive Soviet troops to the Caucasus, General L.G. Kornilov, the commander-in-chief of the army, decided to leave the Don.
In Rostov there were shells, cartridges, uniforms, medical warehouses and medical personnel - everything that the small army guarding the approaches to the city so urgently needed. Up to 16,000 (!) officers were on vacation in the city and did not want to participate in its defense. Generals Kornilov and Alekseev did not resort to requisitions or mobilization at this stage. The Bolsheviks of Sivers, having occupied the city after their departure, “took everything they needed and intimidated the population by shooting several officers.”
General Denikin later wrote in “Essays on Russian Troubles”:
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By the beginning of February, the army, which was in the process of formation, included: |
On February 1 (14), 1918, the Volunteer Army lost the opportunity to retreat to Kuban by rail: the volunteers were forced to leave the station and the village of Bataysk - detachments of Avtonomov’s army arrived at the station in trains and were supported in their attack on the small volunteers by local railway workers. However, they managed to hold the left bank of the Don, and all attempts by Avtonomov to break into Rostov were also repulsed, which therefore limited itself to shelling the city from heavy guns.
At the same time, another one was approaching Rostov from the other side - from Matveev Kurgan and Taganrog. Soviet army: under pressure from the superior forces of the Red commander R. F. Sievers, who managed to organize a performance against the volunteers, the garrison of Stavropol with the 39th division that joined it, who fought directly to Rostov on February 9 (22), it was decided to retreat from the city beyond the Don - to the village of Olginskaya. The question of the further direction had not yet been finally decided: to the Kuban or to the Don winter camps.
The meaning of the campaign that began under such difficult circumstances was subsequently expressed by its participant and one of the army commanders, General Denikin, as follows:
Squad composition
The detachment that set out on the night of 9 to 10 (from 22 to 23) February 1918 from Rostov-on-Don included:
- 242 staff officers (190 colonels)
- 2078 chief officers (captains - 215, staff captains - 251, lieutenants - 394, second lieutenants - 535, warrant officers - 668)
- 1067 privates (including cadets and senior cadets - 437)
- volunteers - 630 (364 non-commissioned officers and 235 soldiers, including 66 Czechs)
- Medical staff: 148 people - 24 doctors and 122 nurses)
A significant convoy of civilians who had fled from the Bolsheviks also retreated with the detachment.
This march, associated with huge losses, became the birth of the White resistance in the South of Russia.
Despite difficulties and losses, a real army of five thousand, seasoned in battles, emerged from the crucible of the Ice Campaign. Only this number of Russian soldiers Imperial Army, after the October events, they firmly decided that they would fight. A convoy with women and children followed with the army detachment. Participants in the campaign received the honorary title “Pioneer.”
2350 rank command staff according to their origin, according to the calculations of the Soviet historian Kavtaradze, they were divided as follows:
- hereditary nobles - 21%;
- people from families of low-ranking officers - 39%;
- from townspeople, Cossacks, peasants - 40%.
Hike
Generals M.V. Alekseev and L.G. Kornilov decided to retreat south, in the direction of Ekaterinodar, hoping to raise the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Kuban Cossacks and the peoples of the North Caucasus and make the region of the Kuban army the base of further military operations. Their entire army, in terms of the number of fighters, was equal to a three-battalion regiment. It was called an army, firstly because a force equal to the size of the army fought against it, and secondly, because it was the heir of the old former Russian army, “its conciliar representative.”
On February 9 (22), 1918, the Volunteer Army crossed to the left bank of the Don and stopped in the village of Olginskaya. Here it was reorganized into three infantry regiments (Consolidated Officer, Kornilovsky Shock and Partisan); it also included a cadet battalion, one artillery (10 guns) and two cavalry divisions. On February 25, volunteers moved to Ekaterinodar, bypassing the Kuban steppe. The troops passed through the villages of Khomutovskaya, Kagalnitskaya, and Yegorlykskaya, entered the Stavropol province (Lezhanka) and again entered Kuban region, crossed the Rostov-Tikhoretskaya railway line, went down to the village of Ust-Labinskaya, where they crossed the Kuban.
The troops were constantly in combat contact with the superior red units, whose numbers were constantly growing, while the number of pioneers was becoming smaller every day. However, victories invariably remained with them:
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Small numbers and the impossibility of retreat, which would be tantamount to death, the volunteers developed their own tactics. It was based on the belief that, given the numerical superiority of the enemy and the scarcity of one’s own ammunition, it was necessary to attack and only attack. This truth, undeniable in a war of maneuver, entered the flesh and blood of the White Army volunteers. They were always advancing. In addition, their tactics always included striking the enemy’s flanks. The battle began with a frontal attack by one or two infantry units. The infantry advanced in a thin line, lying down from time to time to give the machine guns a chance to work. It was impossible to cover the entire enemy front, because then the intervals between the fighters would reach fifty, or even a hundred steps. In one or two places a “fist” gathered to ram the front. Volunteer artillery hit only important targets, spending a few shells to support the infantry in exceptional cases. When the infantry rose to knock out the enemy, there could be no stopping. No matter how numerically superior the enemy was, he could never withstand the onslaught of the pioneers. |
On March 1 (14), 1918, the Reds occupied Yekaterinodar, abandoned without a fight the day before by a detachment of the Kuban Rada who had left the Kuban capital in the direction of Maykop and was promoted to colonel by the Kuban ataman V.L. Pokrovsky on January 26, which significantly complicated the situation for the volunteers. The first rumors about the occupation of Yekaterinodar by the Reds were received by the Volunteer Army rushing towards the city on March 2 (15), 1918 at Vyselki station. Not many of the volunteers believed these rumors, but already 2 days later - on March 4 - in Korenovskaya, which was taken after a stubborn battle, confirmation of this was received from an issue of a Soviet newspaper found in the village. The news devalued and destroyed the very strategic idea of the entire campaign against Kuban, for which hundreds of lives of volunteers had already been paid. Commander General Kornilov, as a result of the news received, turned the army from Ekaterinodar to the south, with the goal of crossing the Kuban, giving rest to the troops in the mountain Cossack villages and Circassian villages and “waiting for more favorable circumstances.”
Despite the fact that General Alekseev was disappointed with the army’s turn in Transkuban, he did not insist on reviewing and changing Kornilov’s decision: the commander had serious reasons for such a decision. In addition, the relationship between the two army leaders became worse and worse, Alekseev withdrew from staff affairs. General Denikin considered the order to turn south a “fatal mistake” and was more determined: after talking and enlisting the support of Romanovsky, he went with him to the commander. Despite all the efforts of the generals to convince Kornilov, they failed: aware of all the losses and overwork of the troops, the Commander-in-Chief remained unconvinced: “If Ekaterinodar had held out, then there would have been no two decisions. But now we can’t take risks.”
The motives of Denikin and Romanovsky consisted in the fact that when before cherished goal campaign - Ekaterinodar - there were only a couple of transitions left and morally the entire army was aimed precisely at the Kuban capital as the end point of the entire campaign, any delay, and especially deviation from the movement towards the goal, threatens “a heavy blow to the morale and mental state of the army”, high morale , along with the organization and training of which alone could compensate for the small number of the army in comparison with the troops of Avtonomov and Sorokin, the lack of a base, rear and supplies.
Historian S.V. Karpenko believes that it was impossible to calculate in advance which of the parties was right - Kornilov, or Denikin and Romanovsky, who never agreed with him, and which of the two decisions was correct, and which was “deadly wrong” principle: the headquarters of the Volunteer Army had no idea what was happening outside the army’s location - outside the ring of the enemy’s dense encirclement; and each of the volunteer generals could be guided solely by personal “theoretical assumptions and intuitive feelings.”
On the night of March 5-6, General Kornilov’s army moved towards Ust-Labinskaya, turning south, repelling an attack from the rear by Sorokin’s large detachment. Having fought across the Laba on the morning of March 8, the army went in the Maikop direction. Finding himself in the Trans-Kuban region in a “complete Bolshevik encirclement”, where every farm had to be taken in battle, General Kornilov decided to turn sharply in a western direction after crossing Belaya - in the direction of the Circassian villages. The general believed that in friendly villages he could give the army a rest and preserve the chances of uniting with the Kuban Pokrovsky.
However, by an evil irony of fate, on March 7, the Kuban command, based on outdated information about Kornilov’s movement towards Yekaterinodar, decided to stop trying to break through to Maykop and turn back to the Kuban River - to join with Kornilov’s army that had left there. Only the Kuban people could then hope to unite with volunteers, whose troops, at the very first clash with the enemy, revealed their extremely low combat effectiveness. Only 4 days after the hardest battles and grueling marches in a continuous ring of encirclement by the Reds, trying to find each other at random - to the sound of a distant battle it was still unclear who and with whom - the Volunteer Army and the troops of the Kuban Territory found each other. On March 11, when the exhausted Kuban people going to Kaluzhskaya ran into a large group of Reds in the area of the Shendzhiy village and even civilians from the Kuban convoy went into battle, a Kornilov patrol came across them.
On March 3 (17), at Novodmitrievskaya, after stubborn resistance from the Kuban people, who wanted to maintain an independent fighting force, and the eventual signing of an official “union agreement,” the military formations of the Kuban regional government were included in Kornilov’s army, while the Kuban government pledged to facilitate the replenishment and supply of the Volunteer Army . As a result, the strength of the army increased to 6,000 bayonets and sabers, of which three brigades were formed; the number of guns increased to 20.
The Volunteers were faced with a new task - to take Ekaterinodar. The army stood in Novo-Dmitrievskaya until March 22 - the headquarters was developing an operation to capture the capital of Kuban. The troops rested and reorganized, simultaneously repelling Avtonomov’s constant attacks from Grigor’vskaya.
Having crossed the Kuban River at the village of Elizavetinskaya, the troops began an assault on Yekaterinodar, which was defended by the twenty-thousand-strong South-Eastern Red Army under the command of Avtonomov and Sorokin.
March 27-31 (April 9-13), 1918, the Volunteer Army undertook unsuccessful attempt take the capital of Kuban - Ekaterinodar, during which General Kornilov was killed by an accidental grenade on March 31 (April 13), and command of army units in the most difficult conditions of complete encirclement by many times superior enemy forces was taken by General Denikin, who succeeds in the conditions of incessant battles on all sides, retreating through Medvedovskaya, Dyadkovskaya, to withdraw the army from under flank attacks and safely escape from encirclement beyond the Don, largely thanks to the energetic actions of someone who distinguished himself in battle on the night of April 2 (15) to April 3 (16), 1918, when crossing the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya railway commander of the Officer Regiment of the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L. Markov.
According to the memoirs of contemporaries, events developed as follows:
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At about 4 o'clock in the morning, parts of Markov began to cross the railway track. Markov, having captured the railway guardhouse at the crossing, positioned infantry units, sent scouts to the village to attack the enemy, hastily began crossing the wounded, convoys and artillery. Suddenly, a Red armored train separated from the station and went to the crossing, where the headquarters was already located along with generals Alekseev and Denikin. There were a few meters left before the crossing - and then Markov, showering the armored train with merciless words, remaining true to himself: “Stop! So-so-grand! Bastard! You’ll crush your own!”, he rushed into the path. When he actually stopped, Markov jumped back (according to other sources, he immediately threw a grenade), and immediately two three-inch cannons fired grenades at point-blank range into the cylinders and wheels of the locomotive. A hot battle ensued with the crew of the armored train, which was eventually killed, and the armored train itself was burned. |
Losses during the failed assault amounted to about four hundred killed and one and a half thousand wounded. General Kornilov was killed during artillery shelling. Denikin, who replaced him, decided to withdraw the army from the Kuban capital. Retreating through Medvedovskaya and Dyadkovskaya, he managed to withdraw the army from under flank attacks. Having passed Beysugskaya and turning to the east, the troops crossed railway Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya and by April 29 (May 12) reached the south of the Don region in the Mechetinskaya - Egorlytskaya - Gulyai-Borisovka area. The next day the campaign, which soon became a legend of the White movement, was over.
Results
The “Ice Campaign”, along with the other two white “first campaigns” that took place simultaneously with it - the Drozdov Campaign of Yassy-Don and the Steppe Campaign of the Don Cossacks, created a fighting image, a fighting tradition and an internal unity of volunteers.
All three campaigns showed the participants of the White movement that it was possible to fight and win in the face of inequality of forces, in difficult, sometimes seemingly hopeless, situations. The campaigns raised the spirits of the Cossack lands and attracted more and more new additions to the ranks of the White resistance.
At the end of the “eight” described by the Volunteer Army, its chief of staff, Lieutenant General I. P. Romanovsky said:
Alexander Trushnovich would later write that the history of the Ice March
and justifies this by the fact that
It is impossible to say unequivocally that the campaign was a failure (in military terms, a defeat), as some historians do. One thing is certain: it was this campaign that made it possible, in the conditions of the heaviest battles and hardships, to form the backbone of future Armed Forces South of Russia - White Army.
In addition, as a result of this maneuver, it was possible to return to the lands of the Don Cossacks, who, by that time, had already, in many ways, changed their initial views regarding non-resistance to Bolshevism.
The pioneers were proud and remembered their past. Once, responding to “Ivan the Nepomniachtchi,” General Denikin said:
In exile, the participants of the campaign founded the Union of Participants of the 1st Kuban (Ice) Campaign of General Kornilov, which became part of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS).
