The wrong side of the first world. Describe the situation of people at the front and in the rear during the First World War. The situation of people at the front and in the rear

The situation on the fronts and in the rear

Structurally, the conversation was built from a consideration of the internal problems of the United States, and then from a consideration of the situation on the fronts.

A serious problem arose inside the country - the rise in food prices. It was 3 percent monthly, threatening to become uncontrollable. This could be followed by an increase in wages and, as a result, a round of inflation.

The reasons are obvious. The transfer of the economy to the expansion of military production actually eliminated unemployment. Not only qualified specialists came to the enterprises, but also women and youth. There was a migration of people from rural areas.

Factories switched to round-the-clock work, including weekends and holidays. Naturally, wages grew, and people tried to realize their income. Speculative tendencies also persisted in commercial and industrial circles and among those who produced food and civilian goods.

There was a real threat of a situation on the eve of the New Deal in the thirties.

The administration was forced to impose controls on prices, wages and incomes. That is why the President introduced the Life Stabilization Act to Congress on September 7, 1942. The question was posed point-blank: if the Congress does not accept the president's request, he will take responsibility and act independently.

The costs of the war are high and therefore it is impossible to risk weakening efforts to build up the US military potential.

At this time, the United States produced 25 thousand combat aircraft, 24 thousand tanks, more than 14 thousand anti-aircraft guns, 128 warships of various types. And more was needed.

In the war, by the end of 1942, there were trends for the better. Considering the situation on four fronts: the Russian front, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East, and Europe, the President stressed that at least one of them cannot be left without attention and help. Speaking about the situation on the Russian front, Roosevelt said: "Despite the fact that Germany captured an important part of the territory of Russia, Hitler could not destroy the unified Russian army."

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Inseparable unity with military organizational activities, the Communist Party intensified ideological work among the Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy. At the same time, as always, she was guided by Lenin's thesis that the state "is strong when the masses know everything, can judge everything and go for everything consciously."

The need to further strengthen the ideological influence on the masses in 1944 was caused by a number of circumstances. Over the past years of the war, the political activity of the masses has significantly increased, their interest in ideological, military-political and international issues has increased. Under these conditions, the Party faced new, more responsible tasks of educating the Soviet people and intensifying the struggle against the bourgeois ideology alien to the Soviet people.

The importance of strengthening ideological and mass-political work was also determined by the fact that the population of the regions liberated from fascist occupation was deprived of truthful information for a long time. Through false propaganda, the enemy tried to poison the consciousness of the Soviet people, to hide from them the truth about the course of the war, about the might of the Soviet Army and its victories. He tried in every possible way to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the union of workers and peasants, and slandered the collective farm system.

During the war, the composition of party, Soviet, trade union cadres was significantly updated. In place of those who left for the front, new workers came to the leadership, many of whom did not yet have sufficient experience in managerial work, the necessary ideological hardening and theoretical training.

The importance of ideological work at the front and in the rear also increased in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe and the fulfillment by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces of their great liberation mission. Under these conditions, military councils, commanders, political agencies and party organizations of the army in the field, ensuring the success of offensive operations, had to prepare personnel for operations abroad in moral, political and ideological terms, achieve increased vigilance and organization, and strengthen the education of soldiers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. . There was a problem of political work among the population of foreign countries, establishing the correct relationship between troops and local authorities. It was also necessary to intensify work among the enemy troops.

As before, the fight against the enemy on the ideological front was sharp and active. Organizing and directing it, the party proceeded from the premise that for complete victory over Nazi Germany it was necessary to achieve not only the military, but also the moral and political defeat of fascism.

The main content of the ideological work of the party in the second half of 1944 was the education of workers and soldiers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism and friendship of peoples, propaganda of the great advantages of the socialist system, explanation of Lenin's teaching on the defense of the socialist Fatherland, the just character of the war of the USSR and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition against fascist Germany and its satellites, the goals of the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, exposing the ideology of fascism and the anti-people essence of imperialism. It was aimed at achieving a clear understanding by all home front workers, soldiers of the active army of the exceptional importance of the successful solution of the tasks facing them, to mobilize the will and energy of all Soviet people to further strengthen the economic, moral, political and military power of the country, increase assistance to the front, increasing attacks on the enemy.

In the ideological-political, agitational and mass work of party organizations among the working class, carried out under the slogan "End 1944 - the year of decisive victories - with new production achievements!" improving their quality, mastering new types of weapons. The importance of maximizing the use of all reserves and opportunities for increasing the production of coal, oil, the production of electricity, metal, fuel, to meet all the needs of the front and rear was emphasized. In this work, the “Appeals of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution” were widely used. In those days, the illustrious teams of the two largest enterprises of the country's ferrous metallurgy - the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, which played a huge role in strengthening the military and economic power of the Soviet state, addressed all workers, employees, engineers and technicians of industry and transport of the Soviet Union in response to Appeals of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to end 1944 with new production achievements.

Agitation and propaganda work has intensified among collective farmers, workers of the MTS and state farms. It was aimed at a further increase in the political and labor activity of rural workers, at the development of socialist competition for the early fulfillment of the state plan for grain deliveries and the above-plan delivery of grain for the front. A vivid manifestation of its effectiveness was the wide scope of the mass movement unfolding in the country at the call of the collective farmers of Ukraine for the creation of a food fund for the Red Army. This movement resulted in a new demonstration of the patriotism of the Soviet people, their close unity around the party and the government.

Ideological work among the intelligentsia was aimed at mobilizing engineers and technicians, agronomists, teachers, doctors, workers in science, art and literature, as well as employees of enterprises and institutions to further strengthen the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, to expand assistance to the working class and collective farm peasantry in the future. the rise of the national economy, the fastest restoration of cities and villages destroyed by the fascist invaders, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, the development of science and culture, and the improvement of management.

In the second half of 1944 the Central Committee of the Party adopted a number of decisions on questions of ideological work. An important role in increasing its activity and effectiveness was played, in particular, by the decree of August 9 “On the state and measures to improve mass-political and ideological work in the Tatar party organization”. It noted that the Tatar Regional Committee, focusing its efforts on solving economic problems, paid little attention to the Marxist-Leninist studies of party, Soviet and Komsomol cadres, propaganda of the principles of collective farm construction, and the struggle against violations of labor discipline. The resolution emphasized the need to strengthen the ideological and political education of the intelligentsia, organize the scientific development of the history of Tataria, and eliminate the serious shortcomings and mistakes of a nationalist nature made by individual historians and writers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks paid special attention to the need to study and highlight the history of the joint struggle of the Russian, Tatar and other peoples of the USSR against foreign invaders, against tsarism and landowner-capitalist oppression, as well as the history of socialist transformations in Tataria during the years of Soviet power. Obliging the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the party organization of the republic to eliminate the identified shortcomings in the shortest possible time, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks determined specific measures to raise the level of all ideological and mass-political work among the working people of Tataria.

The requirements and recommendations set out in the resolution, especially on the education of workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, the propaganda of the heroic past of the peoples of the Soviet Union, their revolutionary traditions, contributed to raising the level and effectiveness of propaganda and agitation in all the republics of the Soviet Union, and the further development of Soviet historical science. The importance of the class approach to assessing the events of the past was also pointed out at a conference of historians convened by the Party Central Committee in May 1944.

The Party's theoretical activity in the field of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism expanded and rose to a higher level. Implementing the requirements of the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted in May 1944 in connection with the publication of the third volume of the History of Philosophy, the scientific cadres of the party increased their attention to the study of Lenin's philosophical heritage. The development and popularization of Lenin's theoretical propositions on questions of political economy and the defense of the socialist Fatherland also intensified. In scientific research and propaganda work, the two-volume collection of selected works of V.I. propaganda of the ideological and theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin was played by the printed and oral speeches of A. A. Zhdanov, M. I. Kalinin, I. V. Stalin, A. S. Shcherbakov, E. M. Yaroslavsky, as well as the works of M. B. Mitin, K. V. Ostrovityanova, B. N. Ponomarev, P. N. Pospelova, P. N. Fedoseeva and others.

The doctrine of the party, the alliance of workers and peasants, and the friendship of peoples received further development. Of great theoretical and practical importance were studies on the nature of Soviet patriotism, its sources, on the unprecedented feat of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the entire Soviet people in the fight against fascism.

On the basis of a generalization of the experience of the three years of the war, many provisions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, on the defense of the socialist Fatherland, were developed. In party documents, in the speeches of prominent figures of the party and the state, the most essential feature and feature of the Great Patriotic War - its consistently just, liberation character - was substantiated; functions to protect the gains of socialism, the interests of the international proletariat.

The documents of the party, the works of Soviet scientists, revealed the anti-people, reactionary essence of fascism, the further aggravation of the crisis of its ideology, domestic and foreign policy, military organization, emphasized the heroic past and present of the peoples of the USSR in the struggle against foreign invaders. Academicians B. D. Grekov, N. S. Derzhavin, E. V. Tarle, M. N. Tikhomirov, I. P. Trainin, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences I. I. Mints, A. M. Pankratova, Professor M. V. Nechkina and others.

The Party showed constant concern for raising the level of teaching of the social sciences in higher educational institutions. In August 1944, an all-Union conference of heads of the departments of Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, political economy and history of the USSR was held on this issue. The results of this meeting were discussed at the interregional and regional theoretical seminars held in September for teachers of socio-economic disciplines.

Many party organizations, concentrating their efforts on the material and technical provision of the front with everything necessary, somewhat weakened scientific and educational propaganda. This, in particular, led to some revival of religious survivals among part of the population. Therefore, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks carried out a number of measures to strengthen the propaganda of natural science knowledge among the working people. Ways to improve this work were outlined in a special resolution adopted by him on September 27, 1944 "On the organization of scientific and educational propaganda." “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers,” the resolution noted, “that the propaganda of natural science knowledge among the masses is acquiring special importance in the current conditions in further raising the cultural level of broad sections of the working people and overcoming the remnants of lack of culture, superstitions and prejudices.” The implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks contributed to the improvement of the propaganda of the achievements of science.

As an important means of political education of the masses, the Party made extensive use of lecture propaganda in combination with mass agitation work. A large amount of work was carried out by the lecture bureau established in July 1943 under the Committee for Higher School Affairs. Leading scientists, writers, cultural figures, prominent political and military workers were involved in reading public lectures. In December 1944, the Lecture Bureau of the Administration for Higher School Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR was also created. Under the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, the Central Lecture Bureau began to function. In 1944, the number of lectures, reports, and talks held around the country increased by more than 3 times compared to 1942.

Prominent party and state figures took an active part in the ideological and political education of the working people and soldiers. By decision of the Central Committee, many leading party, Soviet and military workers, scientists, writers and artists conducted this work as part of the propaganda groups of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as freelance lecturer groups and groups of speakers created under the Central Committee of the Allied Communist Parties. republics, regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the party. Local Party organizations have become more actively engaged in the selection and training of agitators, organizing their work at enterprises, construction sites, collective farms and state farms.

The Party attached great importance to the further improvement of Party education, to arming the Communists, and above all the cadres of Party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers, propagandists, as well as non-Party activists, with Marxist-Leninist theory. Thanks to the efforts of the Central Committee of the Party, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees, the system of party education has become more harmonious and efficient. An important role in the further improvement of the Marxist-Leninist training of party cadres was played by the one-year party schools created in the autumn of 1944 by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks under the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics. They trained and retrained employees of city committees, district party committees and secretaries of primary party organizations. In most republics and regions, these schools began their work on November 1, 1944.

Mass political training of party and non-party activists was carried out in the evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, as well as in district and city party schools and rural political schools. In 1944 there were 25,000 such schools in the country. More than 500 thousand communists, Komsomol members, party, Soviet and economic workers were engaged in them. By the end of the year, there were 22,270 political schools in the Soviet Army, in which 380,000 members and candidate members of the party were studying.

In addition to political schools for young communists, a network of divisional schools of party activists with day and evening departments with a six-month training period was deployed here. By the end of 1944, there were 900 such schools in the army.

The state of the Marxist-Leninist preparation of party activists was discussed at a conference convened in December 1944 by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional committees and regional committees, heads of organizational and instructor departments.

The educational network for the training and retraining of ideological cadres has been significantly expanded. In 1944 admission to the Correspondence Higher Party School was opened. Since December 1, more than 3,000 party workers have begun their studies there. The Lenin courses under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks resumed their work, at which the secretaries of city and district committees were trained. By decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Newspaper Courses were opened. At the Higher Party School, courses were organized for lecturers of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics. At many regional committees and regional committees, as well as at the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics, there were six-month courses for propagandists and journalists. In 1944, 8065 people graduated from such courses.

The scale and effectiveness of printed propaganda and agitation has been expanded. In 1944, 6,072 newspapers were published in the country with a total circulation of 20 million copies. As the occupied Soviet territory was liberated, the network of periodicals increased. The military press played an enormous role in the ideological, political and military education of Soviet soldiers. For them, the newspapers Krasnaya Zvezda and Krasny Fleet, the magazines Agitator and Propaganda of the Red Army, Notepad of an Agitator, Krasnoarmeyets, and nine special magazines were published. 821 newspapers were published at the fronts, fleets and districts. Their one-time circulation reached 3,195 thousand copies. 64 newspapers were published in national languages ​​(979). As emphasized in the directive of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army of July 19, 1944, one of the most important tasks of the front-line press was "educating personnel in the spirit of constant readiness for offensive battles and the desire to finish off the enemy on his territory." At the same time, the newspapers of the fronts, fleets, flotillas, armies and formations widely covered the situation in the country and abroad, on the Soviet-German front and other theaters of the Second World War, explained the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, showed the unity of the front and rear, the army and people, the further growth of the power of the Motherland.

The party also paid great attention to the development of such an important mass media and propaganda as radio. In December 1944, the 20th anniversary of Soviet radio broadcasting was celebrated, which was conducted daily in more than 70 languages ​​of the peoples of the country and in 28 foreign languages. Local radio broadcasting was also widely deployed, created in 126 republican, regional and regional centers, in more than 2000 districts.

In the ideological and cultural education of the people, the role of literature and art increased more and more. Books by Soviet writers published in 1944, as in previous war years, were devoted mainly to the heroic history of the country, the selfless struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. They mobilized the Soviet people to overcome the difficulties of wartime, strengthened their confidence in the final victory over the Nazi invaders.

One of the features of the works of literature and art created during this period was the comprehension of the major events of the past three years of the war. This, in particular, was characteristic of K. Simonov's story Days and Nights, dedicated to the heroic defense of Stalingrad, and A. Vek's story Volokolamsk Highway, which tells about the great battle near Moscow. Y. Chepurin's plays Stalingraders, Vs. Vishnevsky “At the walls of Leningrad”, L. Leonov “Invasion” and others. A huge role in the patriotic education of the people and their soldiers was also played by the new works of O. Bergholz “They lived in Leningrad”, L. Leonov “The Capture of Velikoshumsk”, S. Sergeev-Tsensky “The guns put forward”, L. Sobolev “ On the Roads of Victory”, A. Surkov “Punishing Russia”, A. Tvardovsky “A Book about a Fighter”, A. Tolstoy “Stories of Ivan Sudarev”, A. Fadeev “Leningrad during the Siege”, K. Fedina “Date with Leningrad”, M Sholokhov “They fought for the Motherland” (chapters from the novel), S. Shchipachev “The house in Shusheshzhy”, I. Ehrenburg “War”, journalistic articles by N. Tikhonov and other writers.

Soviet cinema has been enriched with new interesting works. The greatness of the feat of soldiers and home front workers was reflected in the films released in 1944: “Zoya”, “Man No. 217”, “Malakhov Kurgan”, “Great Land” and others. The Party continued to take measures to further improve the state of affairs in the field of cinematography. In August, the Artistic Council of the Committee for Cinematography under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was created. The measures envisaged by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the production of film magazines and documentaries” adopted in May were successfully carried out. Soyuzkinozhurnaly, the magazines News of the Day, and Frontline Film Release gained wide popularity among the Soviet people.

The Communist Party carried on a great deal of ideological and political work among the population of the liberated regions. Despite all sorts of tricks, the enemy failed to ideologically disarm and morally corrupt the Soviet people who temporarily found themselves under Nazi occupation. They remained faithful to the party and the Soviet Motherland, to the ideals of socialism. Extensive agitation and mass work was carried out among the population of the occupied territory. Radio programs were regularly broadcast for him, leaflets, newspapers, magazines and brochures were delivered. Behind enemy lines, underground fighters and partisans intensified verbal agitation.

However, it was impossible to ignore the fact that the population of the occupied regions for a long time was deprived of the opportunity to regularly receive truthful information, was under the influence of hostile propaganda that tried to poison it with the poison of anti-Sovietism, private property, bourgeois nationalism and religion. In the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, in Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the working people were subjected to bourgeois ideological indoctrination for decades, and during the war years they became the object of fascist and bourgeois-nationalist propaganda. Considering all these circumstances, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a number of special decisions on questions of ideological work in the liberated regions and republics. An important role in eliminating the consequences of enemy propaganda during the occupation of these areas was played by his decree “On the immediate tasks of the party organizations of the CP (b) of Belarus in the field of mass political and cultural and educational work among the population” dated August 9, 1944. In this document, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) drew special attention of the party organizations of Belarus to the education of the working people of a socialist attitude towards labor and public property, to strengthening state discipline, overcoming the private property, anti-collective farm and anti-state sentiments implanted by the occupiers, manifested in certain groups of the population. It was proposed in agitation and propaganda work to make wider use of the facts of the bloody crimes of the Nazi invaders against the Belarusian people, to expose Hitler's predatory policy of enslavement and extermination of peoples, to increase the vigilance of the masses, to timely uncover and stop the subversive activities of enemy agents. The resolution set out specific instructions on the organization and content of propaganda work, improving its means, forms and methods, on improving the Marxist-Leninist training of party, trade union, Komsomol cadres and the intelligentsia, and improving the activities of the editorial offices of regional and district newspapers.

Fulfilling the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the party organizations of Belarus took measures to strengthen propaganda and agitation among the population, attracted their best forces, as well as the most trained part of the intelligentsia, to this work. Under the Central Committee of the CP(b)B, regional committees, city committees and district committees, groups of speakers were created. Seminars of propagandists on the organization and ideological content of agitation and propaganda work were held in all regions. In addition, conferences of teachers with reports and lectures on theoretical topics were held in cities and district centers. By the end of the year, 2,830 people graduated from the existing courses under the Central Committee of the CP(b)B for the training of party, Soviet and propaganda workers.

In the autumn of 1944, a republican conference on issues of propaganda and agitation was held in Minsk. The secretaries of the regional committees of the CP(b) of Belarus for propaganda, heads of propaganda and agitation departments of city and district party committees, lecturers, heads of party offices and newspaper editors took part in its work. The meeting discussed the first results of the work of party organizations on the implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the immediate tasks of the party organizations of the Communist Party of Belarus (b) of Belarus in the field of mass political, cultural and educational work among the population.” The participants of the meeting exchanged experience in conducting advocacy work and outlined measures for its further strengthening. P. K. Ponomarenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus, spoke at the meeting.

On September 27, 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On shortcomings in political work among the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR”. It pointed out the slowness of the party organizations in these regions in developing mass political work among the population and its weak organization, especially in the countryside. There were shortcomings in the content and direction of ideological education. The resolution defined the tasks of the party organizations to increase assistance to the front, restore and develop the economy, further unite the Soviet people, and educate them in the socialist spirit. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ordered the communists "to explain to the population that only the Soviet state, based on the friendship of peoples, provides the working people of the western regions of Ukraine with true freedom, material well-being and a rapid cultural upsurge."

The implementation of these instructions, the elimination of revealed shortcomings raised mass political and cultural educational work in the liberated areas to a new level, contributed to the strengthening of the political and labor activity of the population in restoring the national economy, multiplying its contribution to the victory over the enemy. The party organizations of the western regions of Ukraine have widely launched political work among the masses, especially in the countryside, organized systematic information for the population about military-political and international events, explained to the working people the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, the foundations of the Soviet system, the rights and duties of citizens of the USSR, educated them in every possible way in the spirit of socialist attitude to social labor and public property, strict observance of state discipline. The activity of propaganda increased in exposing the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, their hostile activities aimed at disrupting the activities of the Soviet state. The Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the party took effective measures to increase the role of the press in the ideological and political education of the working people. Newspapers and magazines began to cover ideological issues more deeply and broadly, to show more vividly the life of the Soviet Ukraine and other republics of the USSR, the course of economic restoration and the development of culture in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

A wide range of party and Soviet workers were involved in mass political work among the population of the liberated regions. They delivered political reports and talks at enterprises, institutions, and villages. A daily issue of leaflets with summaries of the Sovinformburo was organized. Radio broadcasting and the work of cultural and educational institutions have improved.

Particular attention was paid to work among the urban and rural intelligentsia. After the occupiers were expelled, party and Soviet bodies involved her in active participation in state, economic and cultural construction. Lectures and consultations were organized for her on the history of the party, the history of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, literature and art.

The decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, held on November 22-24, 1944, which discussed the reports of the secretaries of the Volyn, Stanislav and Chernivtsi regional party committees on the implementation of the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 27, 1944, contributed to the strengthening of ideological work in the western regions.

Propaganda and agitation also gained wide scope in Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Karelian-Finnish SSR. They were built taking into account the specific conditions of these republics and the characteristics of various segments of the population.

Further improvement of the ideological education of the masses produced results. The Soviet people rallied even more closely around their native Communist Party and increased their efforts in the fight against the enemy. Workers, collective farmers, engineers and scientists, by selfless labor in the rear, provided the front with everything necessary for conducting large-scale offensive operations.

Ideological work in the Armed Forces, in accordance with the decisions and instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was subordinated to the mobilization of Soviet soldiers to complete the liberation of the areas of the country occupied by the Nazis, to deliver the peoples of Europe from fascism and to ensure the final defeat of the enemy.

In connection with the beginning of the liberation of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks drew the attention of the military councils, commanders and political agencies to the fact that the enemy would resist here with the despair of the doomed, and demanded in this regard to develop in every possible way the perseverance in the personnel in performing combat missions, fortitude, courage and courage, the desire to finish off the wounded fascist beast in its lair as quickly as possible.

The education of soldiers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism was intensified on the basis of the requirements of the Decree of the State Defense Committee of April 10, 1944 and the instructions given at the meeting of members of the military councils of the fronts in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 4, 1944. All means of propaganda and agitation were used to reveal the anti-people essence of capitalism and its offspring - fascism, to bring to the consciousness of every fighter the inadmissibility of identifying the ruling exploiting classes and bourgeois governments with the working people of those countries into whose territory Soviet troops entered, the features and nature of the Armed Forces of the first socialist state, which considers it its sacred duty to provide assistance and support oppressed peoples in their struggle for social and national liberation.

Military councils and political agencies, guided by the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the regions of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe liberated by the Soviet Army, established relations with the local administration, assisted it in restoring the economy, transport, housing destroyed by the occupiers, organized reports for the population, lectures, rallies, conversations, published newspapers, distributed agitation and propaganda literature, which reflected the goals of the Soviet Armed Forces, their liberation mission and exposed the reactionary essence of fascism. In total, in 1944, the political organs of the Soviet Army published and distributed among the troops and the population of foreign countries almost 450 million copies of newspapers, leaflets, brochures, and posters.

Great importance was attached to familiarizing Soviet soldiers with the nature of the social and state system of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, with the traditions, culture and way of life of their peoples. So, for the soldiers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, certificates were issued about Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Conversations and press materials were devoted to these countries.

Documents such as the “Agreement on relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak Administration after the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Czechoslovakia” (dated May 8), “Statement of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the relations of the Soviet Union to Poland” (dated July 26) were widely used in mass propaganda work. ), “Note of the Soviet government to the government of Bulgaria” (dated September 5), as well as materials published in the newspaper Pravda and other central press organs.

The recommendations of the July 15 meeting of the Council of Military-Political Propaganda at the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army with the participation of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Shcherbakov contributed to the wide development of this work. At the meeting, the report of the head of the political department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant-General A. N. Tevchenkov, “On the state of party political work in the troops of the front outside the Soviet Union,” was heard and discussed. Following the discussion, the Main Political Directorate prepared a special directive, which was sent to the troops on July 19. It summarized the first experience of the work of political agencies and party organizations in the new conditions, revealed shortcomings and indicated ways to eliminate them, contained recommendations for further strengthening the political and moral state of the personnel, increasing the vigilance and organization of soldiers in every possible way, and the personal responsibility of each of them for the task assigned.

Of great importance in strengthening the ideological and political, including international, education of Soviet soldiers was the further improvement of work with the command and political staff of the army and navy. This was pointed out by the Main Political Directorates of the Red Army and the Navy in a number of their directives.

With an increase in the ideological level, an increase in the scope of propaganda and agitation, their effectiveness grew, their beneficial effect on personnel, on the state of combat readiness of troops and fleets.

Thus, the Communist Party, taking into account the new tasks that faced the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the second half of 1944, significantly intensified ideological work, aiming it at mobilizing the masses for the successful solution of political, economic and military tasks, for the victorious end of the struggle against fascist German invaders.

  • 12. Completion of the process of centralization of Russian lands at the end of the XV-beginning of the XvI centuries.
  • 13. The main stages of the domestic policy of Ivan IV the Terrible. Changes and repressions. The meaning of the oprichnina.
  • 14.Foreign policy of Russia during the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible.
  • 15. Russian culture XIV-XVI century.
  • 16. Russia in the period of troubled times at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries.
  • 17. Development of Russia in the xiI century. After the accession of the Romanov dynasty. New phenomena in the economy and political sphere.
  • 18. Popular movements in Russia in the xiI century. Peasant war led by Stepan Razin.
  • 19. Foreign policy of Russia in the XVII century. Relations with Poland, Sweden, Crimea. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.
  • 20. Culture of Russia in the XVII century.
  • 21. Economic and military reforms in Russia during the reign of Peter I.
  • 22. Reforms of Peter I in the socio-political sphere and in the field of the state structure of Russia
  • 23. Russia's foreign policy in the first quarter of the 17th century.
  • 24.Transformations in the field of culture and enlightenment in Russia in the first quarter of the 17th century.
  • 25. The era of palace coups in Russia (1725-1762)
  • 26. The policy of enlightened absolutism in Russia. Catherine II.
  • 27. Peasant war in Russia led by Emelyan Pugachev.
  • 31. Political development of Russia in the first quarter of the xiX century. conservative and liberal tendencies.
  • 32. Patriotic War of 1812 And the foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813-1814. The international status of Russia following the results of the Napoleonic wars.
  • 33. Formation of socio-political opposition in Russia in the first quarter of the xiX century. Decembrist revolt
  • 34. Domestic and foreign policy of the Russian government in the second quarter of the xiX century.
  • 35. The crisis of serfdom in Russia in the 30-50s. 19th century The beginning, features and consequences of the industrial revolution.
  • 36. Social movements in Russia 30-50s xiXv. Westernizers and Slavophiles. The ideology of utopian socialism.
  • 37. Culture of Russia in the first half of the xiX century.
  • 38. Crimean War 1853-1856 Causes, course and consequences.
  • 39. Economic, socio-political development of Russia at the turn of the 50-60s. 19th century Peasant reform of 1861, its content and significance.
  • 40. Reforms of the 60s - early 70s. 19th century In Russia (zemstvo, city, judicial, military, etc.)
  • 41. Russian foreign policy 1860 - 70s. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 Annexation of Central Asia and the Amur region.
  • 42. Socio-political movements in Russia in the 60s - 70s. 19th century
  • 43. Culture of Russia after the abolition of serfdom (60-80s of the XiX century)
  • 44. Policy of counter-reforms of Alexander III.
  • 45. Features of the development of Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries.
  • 46. ​​Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905
  • 47. Revolutionary events of 1905-1907 In Russia: causes, course, results.
  • 48. Political parties in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. : programs and tactics of struggle. Left Social Democrats (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party)
  • SRs (Party of Socialist Revolutionaries)
  • Anarchists
  • Black Hundreds ("Union of the Russian People", monarchists)
  • 50. Culture of Russia in the late XIX - early XX centuries.
  • 51. Participation of Russia in the World War 1914-1918.
  • 52. February revolutionary events of 1917
  • 53. Russia in the period of dual power (1917). Crises of the Provisional Government.
  • 54. Struggle for power in Russia in July-September 1917
  • 55. October 1917 In Russia.
  • 56. The policy of the Bolsheviks in late 1917 - early 1918.
  • 57. Civil war and intervention (October 1917 - autumn 1922) Main fronts. The alignment of the political forces of the revolution and counter-revolution. Results.
  • 58. War communism: ideology and practice.
  • 59. Soviet society in 1921-1927. New economic policy: its meaning, difficulties and contradictions.
  • 60. Nation-state construction in the 1920s. Formation of the USSR
  • 61. The international position of the Soviet country in the 20s of the XX century.
  • 62. Formation of a totalitarian system in the USSR.
  • 63. The policy of collectivization of agriculture in the USSR: goals, methods and consequences.
  • 64.Industrialization. USSR in the years of the first five-year plans.
  • 65. Strengthening the foreign policy positions of the USSR in 1931 - 1939
  • 66. Culture of Soviet Russia in the 20-30s. XX century
  • 67. Foreign policy of the Soviet government at the beginning of World War II (1939-1941)
  • 68. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Causes of the initial defeats of the Red Army. The transformation of the USSR into a single military camp.
  • 69. Moscow battle, its significance. The failures of the Red Army in the spring and summer of 1942. Defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.
  • 70. A radical change during the Great Patriotic War.
  • 71. Foreign policy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Anti-Hitler coalition.
  • 1. Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition
  • 2. The problem of the "second front"
  • 3. What will the world be like after the war?
  • 72. The final stage of the Great Patriotic War.
  • 73. The end of the Second World War. Military operations in the Far East. The role of the USSR in the defeat of imperialist Japan.
  • 74. Soviet rear during the war. partisan movement.
  • 76. Socio-political and cultural life of Soviet society in the post-war period (1946-1953)
  • 77. Restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR in the first post-war years (mid-1940s - early 1950s)
  • 78. Post-war world. Start of the Cold War (1946-1953)
  • 79. Internal political development of the USSR (1953-1964). The policy of de-Stalinization. Successes and difficulties of social and economic development.
  • 80. Foreign policy of the USSR during the thaw
  • 81. Foreign policy and international position of the USSR in the late 1960s - early 1980s.
  • 82. An attempt at economic reforms in the USSR in the mid-60s. XX century
  • 83. Socio-political development of the USSR and the internal policy of the Soviet leadership in 1964 - 1985.
  • 84. Features of the development of Soviet culture in 1950 - 1980. Achievements in science and technology.
  • 85. The policy of Perestroika in the USSR. Essence, goals, contradictions.
  • 86. International relations in 1985 - 1991 New political thinking and the end of the cold war.
  • 87. The collapse of the USSR. Formation of sovereign independent states.
  • 88. Economic and political reforms in Russia in the 1990s.
  • 89. Russia at the beginning of the 21st century. Successes and contradictions of socio-economic and political development.
  • 2. Russia - West
  • 2.1. political and military relations.
  • 2.2. Economic cooperation with foreign countries.
  • 3. Russia and neighboring countries
  • 4. Results
  • Soviet rear during the war

    Soviet rear during the war. In the fight against the German invaders, not only military formations, but also all home front workers took an active part. They provided the front with everything necessary: ​​weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, as well as food, footwear, clothing, etc. Despite the difficulties, the Soviet people managed to create a powerful economic base that ensured victory. In a short time, the national economy of the USSR was reoriented to the needs of the front.

    The occupation of the most important economic regions of the USSR placed the country's national economy in extremely difficult conditions. Before the war, 40% of the country's population lived in the occupied territory, 33% of the gross output of the entire industry was produced, 38% of grain was grown, about 60% of pigs and 38% of cattle were kept.

    In order to urgently transfer the national economy to a military footing, the country introduced compulsory labor service, military norms for the issuance of industrial goods and food products to the population. Everywhere an emergency order of work was established for state institutions, industrial and commercial organizations. Working overtime has become common practice.

    On June 30, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, which provided for the mobilization of the country's material and labor resources to meet the needs of defense as soon as possible. The plan provided for the urgent evacuation of the population, institutions, industries and property from areas threatened by the German occupation.

    Through the efforts of the Soviet people, the Urals, Western Siberia and Central Asia were transformed into a powerful military-industrial base. By the beginning of 1942, most of the plants and factories evacuated here had launched the production of defense products.

    Military destruction, the loss of a significant part of the economic potential led to the fact that in the second half of 1941 in the USSR there was a critical decline in production volumes. The transfer of the Soviet economy to martial law, which was completed only in mid-1942, had a positive effect on increasing the output and expanding the range of military products.

    Compared with 1940, the gross industrial output in the Volga region increased 3.1 times, in Western Siberia - 2.4 times, in Eastern Siberia - 1.4 times, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan - 1.2 times. In the all-Union production of oil, coal, iron and steel, the share of the eastern regions of the USSR (including the Volga region) ranged from 50 to 100%.

    The growth of military production with a reduction in the number of workers and employees was achieved through the intensification of labor, an increase in the length of the working day, overtime work and the strengthening of labor discipline. In February 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued an Order "On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during the wartime period." Men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old were mobilized from among those not employed in state institutions and enterprises. The labor resources of the USSR in 1944 amounted to 23 million people, half of them were women. Despite this, in 1944 the Soviet Union produced 5.8 thousand tanks and 13.5 thousand aircraft per month, while Germany produced 2.3 and 3 thousand, respectively.

    The measures taken were supported and understood by the population. During the war, the citizens of the country forgot about sleep and rest, many of them overfulfilled labor standards by 10 or more times. The slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for the victory over the enemy!" became essentially universal. The desire to contribute to the victory over the enemy manifested itself in various forms of labor competition. It became an important moral stimulus for the growth of labor productivity in the Soviet rear.

    The achievements of the Soviet economy during the Great Patriotic War would have been impossible without the labor heroism of the Soviet people. Working in incredibly difficult conditions, not sparing their strength, health and time, they showed stamina and perseverance in completing tasks.

    Socialist competition for the production of above-plan products has acquired an unprecedented scope. A feat can be called the heroic work of young people and women who did everything necessary to defeat the enemy. In 1943, a movement of youth brigades unfolded for the improvement of production, the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan, for the achievement of high results with fewer workers. Thanks to this, the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition has significantly increased. There was a continuous improvement of tanks, guns, aircraft.

    During the war, aircraft designers A. S. Yakovlev, S. A. Lavochkin, A. I. Mikoyan, M. I. Gurevich, S. V. Ilyushin, V. M. Petlyakov, A. N. Tupolev created new types of aircraft, superior to the German ones. New models of tanks were developed. The best tank of the period of the Second World War - T-34 - was designed by M.I. Koshkin.

    The workers of the Soviet rear felt like participants in the great battle for the independence of the Fatherland. For the majority of workers and employees, the appeals became the law of life: “Everything for the front, everything for the victory over the enemy!”, “Work not only for yourself, but also for a comrade who has gone to the front!”, “In work - like in battle!” . Thanks to the dedication of the workers of the Soviet rear, in a short time the country's economy was transferred to martial law in order to provide the Red Army with everything necessary to achieve victory.

    partisan movement.

    The partisan movement in the rear of the Nazi troops in the temporarily occupied territory began literally from the first days of the war. It was an integral part of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist invaders and was an important factor in achieving victory over fascist Germany and its allies.

    The partisan movement had a high degree of organization. In accordance with the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 and the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops", the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (TSSHPD) headed by the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus P.K. .

    These documents gave instructions on the preparation of the party underground, on the organization, recruitment and arming of partisan detachments, and determined the tasks of the partisan movement.

    Already in 1941, 18 underground regional committees, more than 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other bodies, a large number of primary party organizations and groups, in which there were 65.5 thousand communists, were operating in the occupied territories.

    The struggle of Soviet patriots was led by 565 secretaries of regional, city and district committees of the party, 204 chairmen of regional, city and district executive committees of working people's deputies, 104 secretaries of regional committees, city committees and district committees of the Komsomol, as well as hundreds of other leaders. In the autumn of 1943, 24 regional committees, more than 370 district committees, city committees, district committees and other party bodies operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the organizational work of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the combat capability of the partisan detachments increased, their zones of action expanded and the effectiveness of the struggle increased, in which the broad masses of the population were involved, and close cooperation was established with the Soviet troops.

    By the end of 1941, over 2 thousand partisan detachments were operating in the occupied territory, in which up to 90 thousand people fought. In total, during the war years, there were more than 6 thousand partisan detachments behind enemy lines, in which more than 1 million 150 thousand partisans fought.

    In 1941 - 1944 in the ranks of Soviet partisans in the occupied territory of the USSR fought: RSFSR (occupied regions) - 250 thousand people. Lithuanian SSR -10 thousand people Ukrainian SSR - 501750 people. Byelorussian SSR - 373942 people. Latvian SSR - 12,000 people. Estonian SSR - 2000 people. Moldavian SSR - 3500 people. Karelian - Finnish SSR - 5500 people.

    By the beginning of 1944, they were: workers - 30.1%, peasants - 40.5%, employees - 29.4%. 90.7% of the partisans were men, 9.3% were women. In many detachments, communists made up up to 20%, about 30% of all partisans were Komsomol members. Representatives of most nationalities of the USSR fought in the ranks of the Soviet partisans.

    The partisans destroyed, wounded and captured over a million fascists and their accomplices, destroyed more than 4,000 tanks and armored vehicles, 65,000 vehicles, 1,100 aircraft, destroyed and damaged 1,600 railway bridges, derailed over 20,000 railway echelons.

    Partisan detachments or groups were organized not only in the occupied territory. Their formation in the unoccupied territory was combined with the training of personnel in special partisan schools. The detachments that were trained and trained either remained in the designated areas before their occupation, or were transferred to the rear of the enemy. In some cases, formations were created from military personnel. During the war, it was practiced to send organizing groups behind enemy lines, on the basis of which partisan detachments and even formations were created. Such groups played a particularly important role in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, in the Baltic states, where, due to the rapid advance of the Nazi troops, many regional committees and district committees of the party did not have time to organize work on the deployment of the partisan movement. For the eastern regions of Ukraine and Belarus, for the western regions of the RSFSR, advance preparation for a guerrilla war was characteristic. In the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol, Moscow and Tula regions, in the Crimea, fighter battalions, which included about 25,500 fighters, became the base for formation. Base areas for partisan detachments and warehouses for materiel were created in advance. A characteristic feature of the partisan movement in the Smolensk, Oryol regions and in the Crimea was the participation in it of a significant number of Red Army soldiers who were surrounded or escaped from captivity, which significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the partisan forces.

    The main tactical unit of the partisan movement was a detachment - at the beginning of the war, usually several dozen people, later - up to 200 or more fighters. During the course of the war, many detachments united into formations (brigades) numbering from several hundred to several thousand people. Light weapons (assault rifles, light machine guns, rifles, carbines, grenades) predominated in armament, but many detachments and formations had mortars and heavy machine guns, and some had artillery. People who joined partisan formations took the partisan oath. A firm military discipline was established in the detachments.

    Depending on the specific conditions, small and large formations, regional (local) and non-regional, were organized. Regional detachments and formations were constantly based in one area and were responsible for protecting its population and fighting the invaders in this area. Non-regional formations and detachments carried out tasks in various areas, making long raids, maneuvering which, the leading bodies of the partisan movement concentrated their efforts on the main directions to deliver powerful blows to the rear of the enemy.

    Physical and geographical conditions influenced the forms of organization of partisan forces and the methods of their action. Vast forests, swamps, mountains were the main bases for partisan forces. Partisan territories and zones arose here, where various methods of struggle could be widely used, including open battles with enemy punitive expeditions. In the steppe regions, however, large formations operated successfully only during partisan raids. The small detachments and groups that were constantly here usually avoided open clashes with the enemy and inflicted damage on him mainly by sabotage.

    In a number of regions of the Baltic states, Moldavia, and the southern part of Western Ukraine, which became part of the USSR only in 1939-40, the Nazis managed to spread their influence through bourgeois nationalists to certain sections of the population. The small partisan detachments and underground organizations that existed in these areas were mainly engaged in sabotage and reconnaissance operations and political work.

    The general strategy, the leadership of the partisan movement was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The direct strategic leadership was carried out by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters, created on May 30, 1942. He was operationally subordinate to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement (ShPD), which were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, regional committees and regional committees of the CPSU (b) (since 1943, the Ukrainian SPD was directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command). The broadbands were also subordinate to the Military Councils of the respective fronts.

    In cases where several fronts operated on the territory of a republic or region, representative offices or operational groups of republican and regional broadband operations were created under their Military Councils, which, while directing the combat activities of partisans in the zone of a given front, were subordinate to the corresponding broadband and the Military Council of the front.

    The strengthening of the leadership of the partisan movement proceeded along the lines of improving the connection of the partisans with the mainland, improving the forms of operational and strategic leadership, and improving the planning of combat activities. If in the summer of 1942 only about 30% of the partisan detachments registered with broadband access had radio communication with the mainland, then in November 1943 almost 94% of the detachments maintained radio contact with the leadership of the partisan movement through the walkie-talkies of the partisan brigades.

    A large role in the development of partisan struggle behind enemy lines was played by a meeting of senior officials of NGOs, TsSHPD with representatives of underground party bodies, commanders and commissars of large partisan formations in Ukraine, Belarus, Oryol and Smolensk regions, held by TsSHPD on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the end of August - early September 1942. The results of the meeting and the most important issues of the struggle behind enemy lines were formulated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement".

    Much attention was paid to the uninterrupted supply of partisans with weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive equipment, medicines, and the evacuation of the seriously wounded and sick to the mainland by aircraft. During its existence, the TsSHPD sent 59,960 rifles and carbines, 34,320 machine guns, 4,210 light machine guns, 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 2,184 mortars of 50 mm and 82 mm calibers, 539,570 hand-held anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades to the headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1943, more than 12,000 sorties behind enemy lines were made by ADD and GVF aircraft alone (half of them landed on partisan airfields and sites).

    The expansion of the partisan movement was facilitated by the enormous political work of partisans and underground fighters among the population of the occupied regions. The population provided assistance to the partisans with food, clothing and footwear, sheltered them and warned them of danger, and sabotaged all enemy measures. The disruption of the fascist plans to use the human and material resources of the occupied regions is one of the most important merits of the partisans.

    Much attention in party-political work among the partisans was given to the education and combat training of personnel. During the war years, the central and republican schools of the partisan movement trained and sent to the rear of the enemy about 30 thousand various specialists, among them were demolition workers, organizers of the underground and partisan movement, radio operators, intelligence officers, etc. Thousands of specialists were trained behind enemy lines at "forest courses".

    Communications, especially railways, became the main object of the partisans' combat activity, which, in its scope, acquired strategic importance.

    For the first time in the history of wars, the partisans carried out, according to a single plan, a number of large-scale operations to disable enemy railway communications over a large area, which were closely connected in time and objects with the actions of the Red Army and reduced the capacity of railways by 35-40%.

    In the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army smashed the Nazi troops on the Volga, the Caucasus, the Middle and Upper Don, they launched their attacks on the railways, along which the enemy threw up reserves to the front. In February 1943, in the sections Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Gomel, they undermined several railway bridges, including the bridge over the Desna, along which from 25 to 40 echelons passed daily to the front and the same number of trains back - with broken military units, equipment and stolen property.

    In Belarus, only from November 1, 1942 to April 1, 1943, 65 railway bridges were blown up. Ukrainian partisans blew up the railway bridge across the Teterev River in the Kyiv-Korosten section and several bridges in other areas. Under the blows of the partisans almost all the time were such large railway junctions as Smolensk. Orsha, Bryansk, Gomel, Sarny, Kovel, Shepetovka. Only from November 1942 to April 1943, in the midst of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad and the general offensive, they derailed about 1500 enemy echelons.

    Strong blows were dealt to enemy communications during the summer-autumn campaign. This made it difficult for the enemy to regroup, transport reserves and military equipment, which was a huge help to the Red Army.

    Grandiose in scale, in terms of the number of forces involved and the results achieved, was a partisan operation that went down in history under the name "Rail War". It was planned by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement and prepared for a long time and comprehensively. The main goal of the operation was to paralyze the transportation of the Nazis by railroads by simultaneous massive undermining of the rails. Partisans from Leningrad and Kalinin were involved in this operation. Smolensk, Oryol regions. Belarus and partly Ukraine.

    Operation "Rail War" began on the night of August 3, 1943. On the very first night, more than 42 thousand rails were blown up. Mass explosions continued throughout August and the first half of September. By the end of August, more than 171,000 rails had been put out of action, which is 1,000 km of a single-track railway track. By mid-September, the number of undermined rails reached almost 215,000. “In just one month, the number of explosions increased thirty times,” the command of the security forces corps of the Army Group Center reported in its report on August 31.

    On September 19, a new such operation began, which received the code name "Concert". This time, the rail war also spread to other areas. It included the partisans of Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Crimea. Even stronger blows followed. So, if 170 partisan brigades, detachments and groups, numbering about 100 thousand people, took part in Operation Rail War, then 193 brigades and detachments numbering more than 120 thousand people took part in Operation Concert.

    Attacks on railways were combined with attacks on individual garrisons and enemy units, with ambushes on highways and dirt roads, as well as with disruption of the Nazis' river traffic. During 1943, about 11,000 enemy trains were blown up, 6,000 steam locomotives, about 40,000 wagons and platforms were disabled and damaged, more than 22,000 cars were destroyed, about 5,500 bridges on highways and dirt roads were destroyed or burned. and over 900 railway bridges.

    Powerful partisan blows behind the entire line of the Soviet-German front shocked the enemy. Soviet patriots not only inflicted great damage on the enemy, disorganized and paralyzed railway traffic, but also demoralized the occupation apparatus.

    The enemy was forced to divert large forces to the protection of railway communications, the length of which in the occupied territory of the USSR was 37 thousand kilometers. As the experience of the war showed, to organize even a weak protection of the railway for every 100 km, 1 battalion is needed, for a strong protection - 1 regiment, and sometimes, for example, in the summer of 1943 in the Leningrad region, the Nazis were forced, due to the active actions of the partisans, to allocate up to 2 regiments.

    An important role was played by the reconnaissance activities of partisans and underground fighters, who kept a vast territory under surveillance. Only from April to December 1943, they established the areas of concentration of 165 divisions, 177 regiments and 135 divisions. enemy battalions, while in 66 cases they disclosed their organization, staffing, names of command personnel. On the eve of the Belarusian operation in 1944, the partisans reported the location of 33 headquarters, 30 airfields, 70 large warehouses, the composition of 900 enemy garrisons and about 240 units, the direction of movement and the nature of the transported goods of 1642 enemy echelons, etc.

    During the defensive battles of 1941, the interaction of the partisans with the troops of the Red Army was carried out mainly in the tactical and operational-tactical framework and was expressed mainly in reconnaissance in the interests of the Soviet troops and minor sabotage behind enemy lines.

    During the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1941-42. interaction between partisans and troops expanded. The partisans attacked communications, headquarters and warehouses, participated in the liberation of settlements, directed Soviet aircraft at enemy targets, and assisted airborne assaults.

    In the summer campaign of 1942, in the interests of the defensive operations of the Red Army, partisans solved the following tasks: making it difficult to regroup enemy troops, destroying enemy manpower, military equipment and disrupting its supply, diverting forces to guard the rear, reconnaissance, aiming Soviet aircraft at targets, freeing prisoners of war .

    The actions of the partisans diverted 24 enemy divisions, including 15-16 were constantly used to guard communications. In August 1942, 148 train wrecks were made, in September - 152, in October - 210, in November - 238. However, in general, the interaction of partisans with the Red Army was still episodic.

    Since the spring of 1943, plans for the operational use of partisan forces have been systematically developed. During the winter offensive of 1942-43, during the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the battle for the Dnieper and in operations to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, the partisans stepped up their actions in the interests of the advancing Soviet troops. The offensive of the Red Army in 1944 was carried out in close cooperation with the partisans, who actively participated in almost all strategic operations.

    The importance of tactical interaction increased, since the offensive of the Soviet troops passed through areas where geographical conditions contributed to the creation of a strong defense by the enemy (wooded and swampy areas of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions, Belarus, the Baltic states, and northwestern regions of Ukraine). It was here that large groups of partisans operated, which significantly helped the troops overcome enemy resistance. With the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army, they disrupted the enemy transfer of troops, disrupted their organized withdrawal and control, etc. As the Soviet troops approached, the partisans delivered blows to the enemy from the rear and contributed to breaking through his defenses, repelling his counterattacks, and encircling the Nazi groups. The guerrillas assisted the Soviet troops in capturing settlements, provided open flanks for the advancing troops. The guerrillas, assisting the offensive of the Red Army, in addition to disrupting enemy communications, seized river crossings, liberated individual settlements, road junctions and held them until the advanced units approached. So, in Ukraine, during the offensive of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, they captured 3 crossings through the Desna, 10 through the Pripyat and 12 through the Dnieper.

    The most striking example of such effective interaction is the Belarusian operation of 1944, in which a powerful group of Belarusian partisans was, in essence, a fifth front, coordinating its operations with four advancing fronts.

    In 1944, in order to assist the fraternal peoples in the struggle against the Nazi invaders, partisan detachments and formations carried out raids outside Soviet territory. In the occupied territory of Poland, there were 7 formations and 26 divisions. large detachments of Soviet partisans, in Czechoslovakia - more than 40 formations and detachments, of which about 20 came here in raids, the rest were formed on the basis of landing organizing groups.

    The struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was a vivid manifestation of Soviet patriotism. The significance of the partisan movement in the war was determined by the great assistance it provided to the Soviet troops in order to achieve victory over the enemy.

    In this war, the concept of "partisan movement" as spontaneous and independent actions of individual detachments and groups disappeared. The leadership of the partisan movement was centralized to a strategic extent.

    Unified management of the combat activities of partisans with stable communication between broadband and partisan formations, interaction of partisans with the Red Army on a tactical, operational and strategic scale, large-scale operations by partisan groups, widespread use of modern mine-explosive equipment, systematic training of partisan personnel, supply of partisans from the rear of the country, the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the enemy rear to the mainland, the actions of Soviet partisans outside the USSR - these and other features of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War greatly enriched the theory and practice of partisan struggle as a form of armed struggle.

    To fight against the Soviet population, which offered fierce resistance to the Nazis, the invaders abandoned a total of 50 divisions, which amounted to 20% of all German troops stationed on the Soviet-German front, moreover, until the summer of 1944 on all other fronts (against the allies) , taken together, there were only 6% of the troops of the Nazi Wehrmacht.

    The German General Guderian wrote that "partisan warfare has become a real scourge, strongly influencing the morale of front-line soldiers."

    The partisan movement and the Bolshevik underground behind enemy lines had a truly broad popular-patriotic character. They fully met the requirements that were presented to them in the speech of I.V. Stalin on July 3, 1941: "In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every turn, disrupting all their activities."

    By the beginning of 1915, it became obvious that in reality the war was noticeably different from what it was seen by the staff of the General Staffs of the great powers in the pre-war period. Due to the fact that the war had become protracted, it was important for its main actors to enlist the support of new allies in order to break the existing balance of power in this way.

    In 1915, the scope of hostilities expanded due to the entry into the war of two new countries - Bulgaria on the side of Germany and Italy on the side of the Entente. But the fate of the war was still decided on the Eastern and Western fronts.

    In 1915, the Russian army began to experience difficulties caused by the fact that the military industry could not provide it with the proper amount of ammunition, weapons and ammunition. Germany decided in 1915 to strike the main blow on the Eastern Front. In the winter and spring of this year, fighting unfolded along the entire length of this front. In Galicia, things went well for the Russian troops. The Austrian troops suffered defeat after defeat, and the threat of complete defeat hung over them. In May, the Germans came to the aid of their ally, whose unexpected strike between Gorlice and Tarnow led to a breakthrough in the front and the forced withdrawal of Russian troops from Galicia, Poland and Lithuania. Throughout the summer, our troops had to fight heavy defensive battles, and only in the autumn did they manage to stop the German offensive.

    In 1916, hostilities on the Western Front intensified. In February 1916, the German command launched its largest-scale operation, trying to capture the strategically important French fortress of Verdun. However, despite colossal efforts and huge losses, the German troops were never able to take it.

    To weaken the onslaught of the Germans on Verdun, the Anglo-French army, in turn, tried to break through the German defense line near the Somme River. In this battle, which lasted from July to the end of November 1916, the British and French used tanks for the first time. Nevertheless, the battle on the Somme did not bring tangible operational results.

    The situation on the Eastern Front was more successful for the Entente. In the midst of the fighting near Verdun, the French command again turned to Russia for help. The call for support also came from the Italian army, which was defeated by the Austro-Hungarian troops. In the summer of 1916, the Russian command launched a series of offensive operations. The army under the leadership of General A. Brusilov broke through the Austrian front on the line Lutsk - Chernivtsi. Russian troops again occupied most of Galicia and Bukovina, putting Austria-Hungary on the brink of military defeat. The Brusilovsky breakthrough stopped the activity of the Austrians on the Italian front and greatly facilitated the position of the Anglo-French troops near Verdun and on the Somme. The dispersion of combat forces in many directions weakened Germany.

    The huge scale of hostilities led to the depletion of material and food resources in all the warring powers. In all the warring countries, military fatigue was felt, and anti-war protests grew. The situation in the countries of the German bloc was especially difficult. In Germany, the number of workers on strike was steadily growing. On May 1, 1916, on the initiative of K. Liebknecht, a left-wing Social Democrat from the Spartak group, a mass demonstration took place along the streets of Berlin under the slogans “Down with the war!”, “Down with the government!”.

    In Austria-Hungary, the anti-war sentiments of the working masses were closely intertwined with the national liberation movement.

    Turkey is in a deep economic crisis. Discontent grew in Bulgaria. Even in Great Britain and France, where the crisis was not so deep, there were large strikes and demonstrations.

    However, the most acute was the situation in tsarist Russia. The futility of 30 months of almost uninterrupted battles, the death of millions of soldiers, the collapse of the national economy, devastation, famine, the disintegration of the government apparatus - all this restored broad sections of the population against tsarism. Autocracy in Russia was in deep crisis. As a result, in February 1917, a revolution took place in the country, which led to the overthrow of the tsarist regime.

    The main events of 1915 unfolded on the Eastern Front. At the suggestion of the commander of the Eastern Front, General von Hindenburg, the German command decided in 1915 to defeat Russia in joint actions with the Austro-Hungarian army.

    Von Givdenburg, Paul (1847-1934). Military, political and statesman of Germany, field marshal. Participated in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). He retired in 1911, but with the outbreak of the First World War he returned to the army. He commanded the German troops that defeated the Russian armies in East Prussia (1914). Since 1916 - Chief of the General Staff. He had a serious influence on the actions of the German Emperor Wilhelm II. In 1925 he was elected president of the Weimar Republic. Re-elected in 1932. By appointing A. Hitler Chancellor of Germany, he contributed to the elimination of democracy in Germany.

    In the spring of 1915, the offensive began in Galicia, in August - in the north of the Eastern Front. Almost its entire length was hacked. The Russian army suffered catastrophic losses - 850 thousand killed and wounded, 900 thousand prisoners. Previously captured Galicia, as well as Poland and Lithuania, were left. But the main objective of the campaign was not achieved: Russia did not withdraw from the war.

    Defeat of Serbia

    The relative success of the Triple Alliance on the Eastern Front pushed Bulgaria to join it. Together, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary defeated the Serbian army, which retreated to the Adriatic Sea and was evacuated by the British. The only consolation for the Entente was that two French divisions that landed in the Greek city of Thessaloniki and tried to hit the flank of the Bulgarian army formed the Salonica front instead of the Serbian one.

    Positional warfare on the Western Front

    There were no active hostilities on the Western Front throughout the year. Both sides understood that breaking through the enemy's defenses - multi-layered, saturated with artillery and machine guns - would require colossal sacrifices. On April 22, 1915, the German command for the first time in history used a gas attack, releasing poisonous gas - chlorine - on the positions of the British near Ypres. 15 thousand people were poisoned, of which 5 thousand died. Since that time, a gas mask has become an obligatory accessory of soldier's equipment. Both sides actively used chemical weapons throughout the war, thus violating the pre-war convention on the non-use of asphyxiating gases in hostilities.

    The war here, earlier than on other fronts, acquired a classic positional character. Opponents covered themselves with minefields, slingshots with barbed wire. The life of soldiers was more and more reduced to digging trenches and communications, arranging dugouts, firing points and machine-gun nests. The war has lost its romantic appearance, it has become a monotonous, but dangerous work of a huge mass of men. It ceased to be a personal duel of soldiers: they died from shells, bullets, gas attacks, without even seeing the face of their opponent.

    In this "factory of death" luxurious uniforms, shakos and plumes seemed ridiculous: they were replaced by a protective, predominantly gray-green color uniform for all uniforms. A steel helmet began to come into use, protecting the head from splinters.

    The army demanded more and more specialization from the soldiers. Machine gunners stood out in the infantry. The proportion of artillerymen grew rapidly. More and more car drivers were needed. There was an air force and air defense. The rear service became even more complicated, because it had to provide everything necessary for a huge mass of troops. The French army produced 8.1 million shells per month, the German - 9 million. The monthly requirement for cartridges for the German army was determined at 250 million pieces. To provide the Russian army with food, 3 thousand wagons per day were required.

    Italy's entry into the war

    If Germany and its allies managed to win the support of Bulgaria, then the Entente managed to win over Italy. She, although she was a member of the Triple Alliance, was in no hurry to enter the war, bargaining for more favorable conditions for herself. Austria-Hungary could offer Italy the French Mediterranean coast, Corsica and Tunisia. But she demanded South Tyrol with a predominantly Austrian population, to which Austria-Hungary did not agree. The Entente also promised Italy and Tyrol, and Trieste, and the eastern coast of the Adriatic. On April 26, 1915, an appropriate treaty was signed, and a month later Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente. The offensive of the Italian troops was not particularly successful, and already in July the war also here - on the Italian front - acquired a positional character. But this was practically the only help to the Russian troops: the Austrians transferred 10-12 divisions from the Eastern Front to the Italian.

    In connection with the transition of Italy to the side of the Entente, the Triple Alliance ceased to exist. It was replaced by the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire - an alliance called the Quadruple.

    submarine war

    In 1915, the German command made an attempt to turn the tide of the war at sea in its favor. Since by 1914 Germany had not managed to achieve a decisive advantage over the British surface fleet, it was decided to start a submarine war against England. On February 4, Germany announced that, in response to the British naval blockade, it was declaring all the waters surrounding Great Britain a war zone and that all ships in that zone would be the targets of U-boat attacks. On May 7, the large English passenger liner Lusitania was sunk with 1,196 passengers on board, of which 128 were Americans. The United States protested strongly, and the German command, fearing that the United States would join the Entente, was forced to temporarily curtail the scale of the submarine war.

    Kreder A.A. Recent history of foreign countries. 1914-1997

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