What do you know about the Tarutino maneuver. Tarutinsky march-maneuver and counteroffensive plan. Causes of military conflict

The Tarutino maneuver of the Russian army under the command of Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov is one of the outstanding achievements of military art. As a result of the maneuver, the strategic situation was finally changed in favor of the Russian army. Russian troops not only broke away from the enemy, but received time for the necessary rest, staffing and armament. Russian command secured a connection with the reserves and bases that were in Kaluga, Tula and Bryansk, covered them from the French. The Tarutino maneuver was highly appreciated by contemporaries, not only in the Russian army, but also by the enemy. Napoleon Bonaparte called the maneuver a move that put the French army in a difficult and even terrible position.

Even at the military council in Fili on September 1 (13), after the decision was made to leave Moscow, the question arose about the direction of the army's withdrawal. Bennigsen and Tol suggested that they immediately go to the Kaluga road without calling at Moscow. But to perform this maneuver in full view of the enemy was a wrong move. Barclay de Tolly proposed to retreat towards Vladimir or Nizhny Novgorod in order to move to Tver to cover Petersburg. However, in this case, Napoleon got the opportunity to go to Kaluga and Tula. Kutuzov did not express his opinion at the council, agreeing that it was necessary to retreat towards Ryazan. Therefore, the troops marched from Moscow through the Ryazan outpost and after it moved in two columns along the Ryazan road.

The first overnight stay was made in the village of Panki on September 3rd. At the same time, carts were sent along the Nizhny Novgorod road, it was supposed to be covered by a large cavalry detachment under the command of Winzingerode, which later headed to the Petersburg road. On the evening of September 3 (15), the troops received a disposition to march to the Borovskoye ferry across the Moscow River, where, while crossing, they were supposed to set up a camp. The convoy was heading to Bronnitsy under the cover of the Cossacks. After a day's work, the army suddenly turned west and moved towards Podolsk.

Only now Kutuzov revealed his plan. On September 3, he informed Ferdinand Wintzingerode that on the 4th he was going to make a crossing along the Ryazan road, the second transition to go to Tula, and from there to the Kaluga road to Podolsk. On September 4 (16), Kutuzov, in a report to Tsar Alexander, revealed the significance of his maneuver. He wanted to protect the military factories of Bryansk and Tula, food and other resources, maintain contact with the armies of Tormasov and Chichagov. On the same day, the commander-in-chief sent quartermasters to reconnoiter the position at Podolsk. Miloradovich was ordered to send a detachment of Cossacks to the Tula road.

As a result of the maneuver of the Russian army, the French lost contact with it. On September 11 (23), Kutuzov wrote to Emperor Alexander that the army, making a flanking movement on the Old Kaluga Road after crossing the Moscow River, made false cavalry movements to conceal its movement, making demonstrations to Kolomna, Serpukhov. The French command had no idea about the direction of the withdrawal of the Russian army. The French vanguard of Claperade mistook the withdrawal of two cavalry regiments along the Vladimir road for the movement of the main Russian forces and moved behind him. By September 5 (17), the French had almost reached Pokrov. Parts of Sebastiani were carried away by the Cossacks in the same way and followed them along the Ryazan road almost to Bronnitsy. Mikhail Kutuzov managed to completely disorient the French command with the cavalry forces, which were mistaken by the enemy for the Russian rearguard. The Russian cavalry then slipped away. Marshal Joachim Murat was forced on September 9 (21) to report to Napoleon that the Russian army was lost.

The French emperor had a suspicion that Kutuzov was preparing a surprise attack. Napoleon ordered to find the Russian army at all costs. Delzon's division was sent north, to Dmitrov, the 3rd Corps of Michel Ney - to the east, to Bogorodsk, the 1st Corps of Louis-Nicolas Davout - to the south, in the Moscow region. Murat, Poniatowski and Bessieres searched for Kutuzov's troops south of Moscow for five days. Only on September 14 (26) did the French stumble upon the Russians near Podolsk. “On this day, September 26, we again found the Russians,” says General Michel Marie Claparede, “who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment we saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk.”

The Russian army approached Podolsk on September 6 (18). The position was convenient for the battle. She allowed to break both the forces of Murat and the detachments of Poniatowski and Bessieres, if they dared to attack the Russian troops. However, in the event of a battle, Napoleon could quickly bring his troops to Podolsk. Therefore, Mikhail Illarionovich decided to withdraw troops to Krasnaya Pakhra. The rearguard of the army was located on the Borovsky ferry until September 7 (19), and on the night of that day, leaving the posts on the ferry itself, quickly retreated after the main forces of the army. The enemy could not detect this movement and pursued the cavalry cover, retreating along the Ryazan road to Bronnitsa itself.

Under the cover of part of the forces located on the Kolomenskaya road, the Russian army on September 8 (20) moved to a position to Krasnaya Pakhra, where it camped until September 15 (27). The main forces were located south of Krasnaya Pakhra, the vanguard detachments were posted in directions where the enemy could appear. The first avant-garde under the command of Miloradovich stood on the Desna River, he covered the army from Moscow. The second avant-garde under the command of Raevsky conducted observation from Podolsk. In addition, a sentinel detachment was sent west of Krasnaya Pakhra. The position at Krasnaya Pakhra was as convenient as at Podolsk, but had the same drawback - Napoleon, in the event of a collision between the Russian army and the advanced units of the French army, could quickly transfer reinforcements. Therefore, Kutuzov considered it appropriate to transfer troops to a new position - to Tarutin. The location of the troops at Tarutino increased their security and made it possible, if necessary, to quickly deploy the army in the right direction.

On September 10 (22), Napoleon was informed of the appearance of the Cossacks on the Mozhaisk road. This extremely alarmed the French emperor, and he gave instructions to conduct more energetic reconnaissance, to strengthen the protection of communications. Napoleon entrusted the supervision of the Mozhaisk road to General Philippe Antoine d'Ornano, Jean-Baptiste Bessieres was sent to Kaluga, Józef Poniatowski and Murat to the Tula road to Podolsk. Thus, Napoleon assumed the possibility of Russian troops entering his communications and preparing for a new clash.

Fulfilling the order of Napoleon, Murat and Bessières began an active search. The French appeared in the Podolsk region and on the Desna River on September 10 and 11 (22 and 23). Having discovered Russian troops on September 14 (26), Murat began to press on Raevsky's flank vanguard, trying to outflank him from the south. The appearance of Murat's forces and the appearance of Bessieres' corps on the Desna hastened Kutuzov's decision to withdraw to Tarutino. Bennigsen and Barclay de Tolly opposed this decision. Barclay de Tolly believed that the position at Krasnaya Pakhra would allow them to take the fight. Bennigsen proposed to launch an offensive and defeat Murat's forces. However, Mikhail Kutuzov rejected these proposals and gave the order to withdraw. When discussing the choice of a new position, Bennigsen proposed to withdraw to Borovsk or Maloyaroslavets. But Kutuzov chose the position at Tarutin on the grounds that it was both close to Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets, and allowed him to control the Old Kaluga, Tula and Ryazan roads. On September 21 (October 3), the Russian army camped near the village of Tarutina, 80 km from Moscow.

A very convenient place south of the Nara River was chosen for the Tarutinsky camp. From the front, the position was protected by the river and seven batteries; the right flank was located on the heights and was fenced off by a ravine, besides it was reinforced by three batteries. The left flank adjoined a dense forest and was covered by the Istya River, and the rear of the army was a solid forest. Kutuzov ordered to cut through a number of clearings and arrange blockages to prevent possible detours from the left flank and rear. The position was somewhat cramped, but well fortified. The troops were positioned as follows. Between the villages of Gladovo and Dednya stood the vanguard - the 2nd and 4th cavalry corps and the first line troops - the 2nd and 6th infantry corps. Behind were the troops of the second line - the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th infantry corps. Behind the 4th Infantry Corps was the 1st Cavalry Corps. In the third line were the 8th Infantry Corps and most of the cavalry. There was also a fourth line - there were two cuirassier divisions and reserve artillery. The right flank of the Russian army was guarded by two regiments of chasseurs, the left - by five. In addition, several cavalry regiments were located in the nearest villages. The main apartment of the army was first located in Tarutino, and then moved to the village of Letashevka.

Tarutinsky maneuver of the Russian army had great importance for the outcome of the war. With this march, Mikhail Kutuzov thwarted a possible attack by the French army on Petersburg. With a 100,000 Russian army behind him, Napoleon was unable to make a dash to the north and capture the capital. Russian Empire. There was a possibility of a strike towards Petersburg: Napoleon sent his cavalry towards Tver, but then stopped it near the village of Black Dirt and returned to Moscow. Now the strategic initiative was in the hands of the Russian commander.

Counteroffensive plan

Having made the Tarutinsky maneuver, Mikhail Kutuzov conceived a grandiose plan to encircle and destroy Napoleon's army. Numerous " Grand Army» Napoleon was scattered over a vast area. On the main line of communication Warsaw - Moscow, the main forces were located: the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of Rainier - at Drogochin; 9th Corps of Victor and part of the 11th Corps of Augereau - in Smolensk; Junot's 8th corps is in Mozhaisk and Napoleon's main forces are in Moscow. The right flank at Bobruisk was covered by Dombrovsky's division. The Prussian corps of MacDonald was located near Riga. The 2nd and 6th corps of Oudinot and Saint-Cyr were stationed in Polotsk. At the end of August, under the command of Napoleon, there were approximately 350 thousand bayonets and cavalry.

Moving deep into Russia, Napoleon did a great job of creating a rear base. In addition to the main rear bases, which were located on the Vistula, the French created four lines of intermediate bases. The first line was located on the Neman River: in Kovno, Olit, Merech and Grodno. The second line had a powerful base in Vilna, the third line was located between the Berezina and Ulla - in Glubokoe, Borisov and Minsk. The fourth line consisted of bases in Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. In addition, a large transshipment point was located in Smolensk. The food and ammunition concentrated at these bases and warehouses allowed the French command, if necessary, to retreat to the area of ​​​​the Western Dvina, Dnieper and Berezina, spend the winter there and start a new campaign in 1813.

Napoleon had several escape routes, but each was fraught with a certain danger to the French army. Most radical decision there was a retreat along the Smolensk road. However, the area there was heavily devastated. The most tempting was the way through Kaluga to Volyn. The road went through an area not affected by the war and made it possible to connect with the Austrians of Schwarzenberg. But for this it was necessary to enter into a new battle with the army of Kutuzov. In addition, the troops of Tormasov and Chichagov could appear on the withdrawal route. Napoleon was also embarrassed by the behavior of the Austrians - Vienna was in no hurry to fulfill its obligations and increase its contingent for the war with Russia. The passivity of Schwarzenberg's corps allowed Napoleon to be wary of all sorts of surprises. The fact was also taken into account that there was not a single prepared food base in this direction and it was necessary to rely only on requisitions and the seizure of Russian stocks. It was possible to withdraw along the line running north of the Smolensk road. In this case, Napoleon could connect with the corps of Oudinot and Saint-Cyr and reach the Lower Neman, where large reserves were prepared. But the Russian troops could then preempt the enemy at Glubokoe or Vitebsk and strike at the flank.

Some commanders offered the French emperor not to take risks and stay for the winter in Moscow. But he turned down the offer. Napoleon understood the need to retreat, but the word "retreat" confused him, and he delayed this decision.

Kutuzov was thinking about the complete defeat of the enemy, while still on his way to the army, when he was appointed commander in chief. He instructed Chichagov and Tormasov to increase pressure on the right flank of the enemy. This pressure, combined with the general battle at Borodino, was supposed to force the enemy to retreat from Moscow. However, the lack of reliable communication, which could ensure proper coordination of actions in such a short time, and the lack of the necessary reserves, did not allow Kutuzov to implement his plan.

On September 6 (18), while in Podolsk, Kutuzov repeated his previous directive to Chichagov. Mikhail Illarionovich still did not leave the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bencirclement and a concentric strike against the enemy. He demanded that Chichagov join forces with Tormasov as soon as possible and go by the shortest routes to Mogilev on the Smolensk road in order to cut enemy communications and threaten his rear. On the same day, a directive was sent to Tormasov to ensure the flank of Chichagov's army from possible actions of the Schwarzenberg and Rainier corps. Kutuzov sent reinforcements to Wittgenstein and set the task of tying down the enemy forces on the line of the Western Dvina with his actions, and then being ready for the upcoming offensive operations. The enemy Kutuzov planned to inflict the “main defeat” in the area between the Dnieper, Berezina and Western Dvina. Chichagov and Wittgenstein were to launch an offensive as soon as the Main Army struck from the Tarutino position.

Thus, the commander-in-chief developed a plan to encircle and destroy the enemy army in the area between the rivers. Kutuzov was sure that the enemy would retreat in this direction. With his Tarutino maneuver, Mikhail Kutuzov anticipated the possible movement of French troops through Kaluga, or to the north. At the same time, Kutuzov did not forget to strengthen the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kiev, Chernigov and Kaluga provinces. The main role in this plan was to be played by the Main Army, and the forces of Chichagov and Wittgenstein would play a supporting role. However, Emperor Alexander intervened in Kutuzov's orders, in his opinion, leading role in the defeat of the French, Chichagov's army was supposed to play a flank attack. Admiral Chichagov was in no hurry to follow Kutuzov's instructions before, and after the intervention of the emperor, he began to behave even more independently. Mikhail Kutuzov, in a letter to Alexander, expressed dissatisfaction with Chichagov's actions and asked him to instruct him to transfer the army's efforts to Borisov.

At the same time, Kutuzov had to fight against "internal enemies", the court clique, which had its agents in the army and tried to slander the commander in chief. I had to fight against the intrigues of Bennigsen and others, to insist on their recall from the army. Subversive work against Kutuzov was also carried out by the English military representative in the Russian army, Robert Wilson. He carried on direct correspondence with the Russian emperor and tried in every possible way to discredit the Russian commander. British General Wilson pushed the Russian command to a decisive battle with the French. Not yielding to the pressure of the British, Kutuzov, in a conversation with Benningsen, said bluntly: “We will never, my dear, disagree with you. You think only of the benefit of England, but for me, if this island goes to the bottom of the sea today, I will not gasp. The actions of the emperor, Kutuzov's enemies took time and energy.

Among all the events of the war of 1812, the most significant for society was the Battle of Borodino, the abandonment and fire of Moscow, but for historians, tacticians and strategists of subsequent times, the main turning point Patriotic War was a brilliant march maneuver, which in late September - early October was made by the retreating Russian army. Napoleon himself was struck by its scale and correctness of organization, and most of M.I. Kutuzov believed that for one Tarutinsky transition one could rank the most illustrious prince among the greatest commanders of the New Age.

Course of events
On the evening of September 17 (5), Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov unexpectedly gives the order to turn off the Ryazan road, along which the army has so far retreated, and go to Podolsk. None of the corps commanders knew where and why the army was turning, and only by the evening of the next day did the Russians find themselves on the Tula road near Podolsk. Further, the Russian troops set off along the Old Kaluga road south to Krasnaya Pakhra, after which they stopped at the village of Tarutino.

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The military historian and adjutant of Kutuzov, who was present during the implementation of this flank maneuver, A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky describes the advantages that the Russian army received from these movements: “Becoming a firm foot on the Kaluga road, Prince Kutuzov had the opportunity: 1) to cover the midday provinces, which abounded in supplies; 2) to threaten the path of enemy actions from Moscow through Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk; 3) to cross detachments of French messages stretched over excessive space and 4) in the event of Napoleon's retreat to Smolensk, warn him along the shortest road. Indeed, the Tarutinsky maneuver allowed the Russian troops to cover from the enemy both food supplies in Kaluga, and weapons factories in Tula, and foundries in Bryansk, and also to prevent Napoleon from entering the fertile southern provinces. Moreover, such an arrangement of Russian troops deprived Napoleon of the opportunity to carry out the so-called "autumn plan" of the campaign against St. Petersburg.

In fact, for the first time in the campaign, Kutuzov outplayed Napoleon, putting him in check and forcing him to play according to his scheme. A. Jomini admitted that in the history of wars from ancient times "the retreat that the Russian army made in 1812 from the Neman to Moscow ... not allowing itself to be upset or partially defeated by such an enemy as Napoleon ... of course, should be placed above all others" not so much in terms of the "strategic talents" of the generals as " regarding the amazing confidence, steadfastness and firmness of the troops. The Grand Army became more and more entangled in a skillfully set trap, in which Moscow was the bait.

The ghost of the Russian army roams the fields
But how did Kutuzov manage to hide the movement of more than 80,000 army from Murat's cavalry pursuing it? The point here was the old military trick with lighting fires: the French patrols, not being able to get further than the rearguard of Miloradovich, and then the Cossacks of Efremov, could be content only with the sight of lit fires, according to which they considered the approximate number of military groups in front of them. However, in this case they were deceived by the Cossacks in the same way that Khan Akhmat on the Ugra River was deceived by Ivan III in his time - there were several tens of times more fires than was necessary for two Cossack regiments that covered the retreat. In addition, the covering troops constantly made some kind of false maneuvers. Kutuzov wrote in a report to the emperor: “The army, making a flank movement, for the secrecy of this direction, introduced the enemy into bewilderment on every march. Heading towards myself famous point, she disguised herself between those fake movements of light troops, making demonstrations, now to Kolomna, now to Serpukhov, after which the enemy followed in large parties.

Map from the book of A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
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Here is how Murat G. von Roos describes this campaign in his memoirs: “We drove off, accompanied by smoke that was rushing towards us from the side of the city. The sun shone through the smoke, turning everything visible yellow. The Cossacks were very close in front of us, but on this day they did not even exchange pistol shots.<…>The next day, September 16, we continued along the road leading to Vladimir and Kazan.<…>We saw our opponents only in the evening, when we approached the wooden town of Bogorodsk, which stood to the right of the road. For another whole day, the French moved in the direction in which the Cossacks had disappeared. On the third day “In the early morning I paid a visit to my commander, Colonel von Milkau. He greeted me with the words: “We have lost the enemy and every trace of him; have to stay here and wait for new orders, Roos writes.

Indeed, continuing to follow the retreating ghost of the Russian army along the Ryazan road, Murat missed the flank movement of the Russians and on September 22 (10), when the Cossacks dispersed along with the fog, he found an empty road in front of him.

Marshal B. de Castellane describes a colorful picture, perhaps more than others, indicating the mood of the French troops at that moment: “Our vanguard is twelve miles away. The Neapolitan king, standing in the mud in his yellow boots, with his Gascon accent, spoke to the officer sent by the emperor in such expressions: “Tell the emperor that I honorably led the vanguard of the French army beyond Moscow, but I’m tired, tired of all this, you hear Do you? I want to go to Naples to attend to my subjects."

On the same days, Kutuzov sends a report to the emperor with the following content: “I still receive information about the success of my fake movement, because the enemy followed the Cossacks in parts (that is, the detachment left on the Ryazan road). This gives me the convenience that the army, having made a flank march of 18 versts tomorrow on the Kaluga road and sending strong parties to Mozhayskaya, should be very concerned about the enemy's rear. In this way, I hope that the enemy will seek to give me a battle, from which I expect equal success at a favorable location, as at Borodino.

Of course, after more than a week, as Roos writes, the French “They found the Russians again, who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when ... they saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk. The bloody military fun began again; all types of weapons were brought into action, daily, often from morning to evening, cannon fire took place ... ". But that was a completely different story.

Headquarters games: opponents and supporters of maneuver
Tarutino's maneuver caused fierce disputes at the headquarters and stirred up a new wave of intrigues around the field marshal. Chief of Staff L.L. openly opposed the maneuver. Bennigsen, F. Buxveden, M.I. Platov and their supporters. Historian E.V. Tarle writes that “At that time, in the headquarters, except for two or three people, no one understood the enormous and good significance of Kutuzov’s movements.”

Kutuzov's situation was worsened by the fact that Murat nevertheless opened the movement of Russian troops and began to push the Russian rearguard on the Kaluga road. Bennigsen and his comrades, foaming at the mouth, insisted on a battle with Murat at Krasnaya Pakhra, to which Kutuzov categorically disagreed, arguing that it was necessary to retreat even further south, to the village. Tarutino, because from there it will be easier to control the three roads leading from Moscow to Kaluga. Their dispute went so far that Kutuzov announced that he was resigning his power and giving Bennigsen the entire headquarters, all adjutants and the army: "You command the army, and I'm just a volunteer", he said to Bennigsen, giving him the opportunity to look for a place to fight. Bennigsen honestly searched all morning for a place to fight in the vicinity of Krasnaya Pakhra, found nothing and said that it was really impossible to fight here. After that, Kutuzov “returned” command to himself and ordered to retreat.

In the future, Kutuzov will deal more harshly with Bennigsen, in one of the disputes in which Bennigsen argued that Kutuzov's position was incorrect for attacking the French avant-garde (another maneuver that Kutuzov promised to do and did not), the commander-in-chief bluntly stated: “Your position near Friedland was good for you, but as for me, I am content with this position, and we will stay here, because I am the commander here, and I am responsible for everything.” Another reminder of the defeat near Friedland was a grave insult to Bennigsen. With caustic ridicule and the actual removal from business, Kutuzov destroyed the persistent critic of the Tarutino maneuver.

Be that as it may, but after all the advantages of the Tarutino maneuver became fully apparent, many of those generals who opposed it not only recognized this plan as brilliant, but even claimed its authorship. However, the most impartial and revealing evidence is the opinion of Kutuzov's rival and the author of the "retreat" concept: "This action- wrote M.B. Barclay de Tolly, - gave us the opportunity to complete the war by the complete extermination of the enemy.

By the beginning of October 1812, the Russian army was quite ready to launch a counteroffensive. The Russian command followed the actions of the enemy and waited for the right moment. Mikhail Kutuzov believed that the French army would soon leave Moscow. Intelligence data gave reason to assume that Napoleon would soon move on to active operations. However, the enemy tried to hide his intentions and for this purpose carried out false maneuvers.

The first signs of an unusual movement of the enemy appeared by the evening of 3 (15) October. General Ivan Dorokhov announced the possibility of the enemy moving towards Kaluga. True, on the same day, the heads of the partisan detachments Alexander Figner, who was operating near Mozhaisk, and Nikolai Kudashev from the Ryazan road reported that there was no reason for concern. However, Dorokhov's message alerted the commander in chief. He ordered the commanders of the army partisan detachments to increase surveillance in order to obtain more accurate information about the enemy and not miss his movements.

Mikhail Kutuzov knew that Napoleon, having occupied Moscow, found himself in a difficult position. The French army could not fully provide itself with everything necessary in Moscow. The command of the Russian army launched a widespread guerrilla war, which prevented the normal supply of troops. To search for food and fodder, the French command had to send significant detachments that suffered losses. To protect communications and collect provisions, Napoleon was forced to keep large military formations far beyond the boundaries of the ancient Russian capital. Napoleon's attempts to start peace negotiations with Alexander and Kutuzov failed. The time for the decision to withdraw the army from Moscow was fast approaching.

The generals of the Russian army took the news of the possible movement of the enemy from Moscow as the beginning of the retreat of Napoleon's troops. Quartermaster General Karl Toll proposed his plan of attack on Murat's vanguard, which was to significantly weaken the French army. The realization of this goal, according to Tol, did not present any particular difficulties. Murat's vanguard could only receive reinforcements from Moscow, it became possible to defeat a significant part of the French army separately from the main forces. According to intelligence data on the Chernishna River (a tributary of the Nara), 90 km from Moscow, Murat's forces have been stationed there since September 24, watching the Russian army, there were no more than 45-50 thousand people. And, most importantly, the enemy settled freely, poorly organized the security system. In reality, under the command of Murat there were 20-26 thousand people: the 5th Polish corps of Poniatowski, 4 cavalry corps (or rather, all that was left of them, after the Battle of Borodino, the French command could not restore their cavalry). True, the French avant-garde had strong artillery - 197 guns. However, according to Clausewitz, they "burdened the avant-garde rather than could be useful to it." The front and right flank of the extended disposition of the forces of the Neapolitan king were protected by the rivers Nara and Chernishnia, the left wing went out into an open place where only the forest separated the French from the Russian positions. For about two weeks, the positions of the Russian and French armies were side by side.

It turned out that the left flank of the French, resting on the Dednevsky forest, was actually not guarded. The opinion of Tolya was joined by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army Leonty Bennigsen, the general on duty under the commander-in-chief Pyotr Konovnitsyn and Lieutenant General Karl Baggovut. Mikhail Kutuzov approved the idea and decided to attack the enemy. On the same evening, he approved the disposition, according to which the movement of troops was to begin the next day - October 4 (16), at 18 o'clock, and the attack itself - 6 o'clock in the morning on October 5 (17).

On the morning of October 4 (16), Konovnitsyn sent an order to the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 1st Western Army Yermolov, which confirmed that the performance would take place "today at 6 o'clock in the afternoon." However, the performance of the troops on this day did not take place, since the disposition was not delivered on time to the units. Mikhail Kutuzov was forced to cancel the order. Apparently, the responsibility for disrupting the timely delivery of the disposition to the troops lies both with Bennigsen, who was entrusted with the command of the troops of the right flank, he did not check the receipt of the order by the corps commanders, as well as Yermolov, who was hostile to Bennigsen, and did not check the execution of the instructions. In addition, there was another reason that forced the command to cancel the performance. On the night of October 5 (17), Kutuzov received information about the beginning of the movement of enemy forces along the Old and New Kaluga roads. The commander-in-chief suggested that the French army had left Moscow and might be at Tarutin at the time of the battle with Murat's vanguard. Not wanting to meet with the main enemy forces in unfavorable conditions, Kutuzov canceled the attack. Then it turned out that this information turned out to be false and the commander-in-chief appointed the offensive for October 6 (18).

Battle plan

The Russian headquarters assumed that the enemy forces were 45-50 thousand people and consisted of the cavalry corps of Murat, the corps of Davout and Poniatowski. The main forces of the Russian army were sent to attack the reinforced vanguard of Marshal Murat. The army was divided into two parts. The composition of the right wing under the command of Bennigsen included the 2nd, 3rd, 4th infantry corps, 10 Cossack regiments, parts of the 1st cavalry corps. The left wing and center under the command of the chief of the vanguard of the Main Army, Mikhail Miloradovich, included the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th infantry corps and two cuirassier divisions.

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th cavalry corps, the Cossack regiments under the leadership of Major General Fyodor Korf, were located in front of the left flank. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief was also to be located on the left flank. The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the right wing of Bennigsen on the left flank of the enemy. Bennigsen divided his forces into three columns and a reserve. The first column was made up of cavalry under the command of Vasily Orlov-Denisov: 10 Cossack regiments, one cavalry chasseur, two dragoons, one hussar, one lancer regiment. Orlov-Denisov was supposed to go around the left flank of the French troops through the Dednevsky forest and go to their rear near the village of Stremilova. The second column consisted of the infantry of Baggovut's 2nd Corps. She received an order to attack the left wing of the enemy from the front near the village of Teterino (Teterinka). The 4th Infantry Corps under the command of General Alexander Osterman-Tolstoy entered the third column. The third column was supposed to line up with the second column and attack the center of the French troops, also located near the village of Teterino. The reserve included the 3rd Infantry Corps of Pavel Stroganov, the 1st Cavalry Corps of Peter Meller-Zakomelsky. The reserve had the task of assisting Baggovut's 2nd Infantry Corps.

At the same time, the troops of M.A. were supposed to hit the enemy. Miloradovich with the support of part of the forces of the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov himself. Their task was to forge the right flank of the enemy. The troops were located in two lines. According to the disposition in the first line, near the village of Glyadovo (Glodovo), there were units of the 7th and 8th infantry corps. Behind in the second line is the reserve (5th corps). The 6th Infantry Corps and two cuirassier divisions were to leave Tarutino to the edge of the Dednevsky forest and act in the center, advancing in the direction of the village of Vinkov. Finally, the army partisan detachments of I.S. Dorokhov and Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Figner struck at the rear of the enemy, they received the task of cutting off the retreat of the enemy army. According to the plan of Mikhail Kutuzov, Russian troops were supposed to surround and destroy the enemy vanguard. The plan was good, but its implementation depended on the simultaneous actions of the Russian troops. In the conditions of that time, at night and in a wooded area, it was very difficult to achieve this plan.

The course of the battle

To carry out the maneuver, the commander-in-chief sent the author of the plan, Tolya, to help Bennigsen, who reconnoitered the routes. However, in practice, neither Bennigsen nor Toll succeeded in carrying out the maneuver according to the planned plan. Only the first column of Orlov-Denisov arrived at the appointed place to the village of Dmitrievsky on time. The other two columns got lost in the night forest and were late. As a result, the moment of surprise was lost.

As soon as dawn broke, Orlov-Denisov, fearing that his troops would be discovered by the enemy, decided to launch an offensive. He hoped that the other columns were already in position to support his attack. At 7 o'clock in the morning, the Cossack regiments attacked Sebastiani's cuirassier division. The Russian Cossacks took the enemy by surprise. Orlov-Denisov noted the feat of 42 officers of the Cossack regiments, who “being always in the hunters in front, were the first to cut into the enemy cavalry columns, overturned and drove to the infantry, covering their batteries; when the enemy formed up and prepared to attack, they, warning him, despising all the danger and horror of death, regardless of either shotgun or rifle volleys, rushed desperately at the enemy, cutting into the ranks, laying down many on the spot, and drove the rest in great disorder. several miles." The enemy threw 38 guns and fled in a panic. The Cossacks went to the Ryazanov ravine, along which the road to Spas-Kuplya went, but here they were met by the cavalry of Claparede and Nansouty and pushed back.

While the left flank of the enemy was crushed, in the center the French managed to prepare to repel the attack of the Russian troops. When units of the 4th corps of the third column entered the northwestern edge of the forest and began an attack on Teterinka, the French were ready for battle. In addition, at first only one Tobolsk regiment went on the offensive (the rest of the units had not yet left the forest), then the 20th Jaeger regiment from the Orlov-Denisov detachment joined it. Finally, parts of the second column of Baggovut began to appear, with which Bennigsen was also. Having deployed the rangers at the edge, Baggovut led them on the attack, without waiting for the rest of the troops of the column to approach.

Russian huntsmen pressed the enemy and captured the Ryazanov defile (a narrow passage between hills or water barriers), along which the French troops retreated. Marshal Murat, realizing the danger of the situation, gathered troops and drove the rangers out of the ravine. Karl Fedorovich Baggovut died during this fight. Bennigsen took command of the column. He did not dare to attack with the forces available to him, he began to wait for the approach of the third column and the reserve. Joachim Murat, took advantage of the respite and, under cover of artillery fire, withdrew the main forces, carts and part of the artillery to Spas-Kupl.

Karl Fedorovich Baggovut.

The reserve, the 3rd Infantry Corps, finally joined the second column. According to the original plan, he was supposed to advance in the direction of the Ryazanov ravine. However, Bennigsen ordered Strogonov's corps to go in support of the 2nd Corps and act in the direction of the village of Teterinka. Later, parts of the 4th Corps left the forest, and Bennigsen sent them to the central position of Murat. It was a gross mistake, since the enemy had already withdrawn troops.

Thus, only the forces of Orlov-Denisov and part of the troops of the third column of Osterman-Tolstoy struck at the original plan. Still, this attack brought some success. French batteries were suppressed by Russian artillery fire. The Russian infantry drove the enemy from their positions and forced them to hastily retreat. The enemy retreat soon turned into a rout. The Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov and Miloradovich's cavalry pursued the French to Voronovo. The success could have been more significant if the bulk of the troops of the right wing of the Russian army had acted in a more coordinated manner.

The troops of the right flank of the Russian army did not take part in the battle at all. They were stopped by order of the commander-in-chief. Kutuzov suspended the movement of troops for several reasons. He received a package from Kudashev, in which there was an order from Marshal Berthier to General Arzhan dated October 5 (17) to send them convoys and cargo to the Mozhaisk road and move his division to the New Kaluga road to Fominsky. This indicated that the French army was leaving Moscow and was going to move towards Kaluga and Tula along the New Kaluga road. Therefore, Mikhail Kutuzov decided not to lead his main forces into battle with Murat. On October 4 (16), Seslavin reported to the commander-in-chief that he had met significant enemy forces at Fominsky. After analyzing this information, Kutuzov began to suspect that Napoleon was starting the movement of his main forces. He orders Dorokhov's detachment, instead of moving to the rear of Murat's avant-garde, to return to the Borovskaya road. The detachment of Dorokhov, who arrived at Fominsky on October 6 (18). Dorokhov met a large French force and asked for reinforcements. The commander-in-chief sent two regiments to him and ordered the 6th Corps of Dokhturov, the guards cavalry division and Figner's army partisan detachment to also advance to this area. Thus, Mikhail Kutuzov created in advance on his left flank such a grouping that could withstand the battle until the main forces of the Russian army approached.

It was information about the movement of large enemy forces that forced the Russian commander to act so carefully in the Battle of Tarutino. Further active actions against the forces of Murat lost their former significance, a more serious "game" began. Therefore, the Russian commander-in-chief rejected the proposals of Miloradovich and Yermolov to pursue the forces of Marshal Murat.

The result of the battle

The defeat of Murat's troops did not work out due to the mistakes of the command, both in planning the offensive and in the fuzzy execution of the planned plans by the troops. According to the estimates of the historian M.I. Bogdanovich, 5,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry actually participated in the battle with the French.

However, despite the fact that Murat's forces were not destroyed, significant tactical success was achieved in the Tarutino battle. The battle ended with the victory and flight of the enemy, large trophies and a significant number of prisoners strengthened the morale of the army. This private victory was the beginning of active offensive operations of the army of Mikhail Kutuzov.

38 guns were captured. The French army lost about 4 thousand killed, wounded and captured (of which 1.5 thousand were prisoners). The Russian army lost about 1200 people killed and wounded.

Tarutinsky maneuver of 1812 - a march maneuver of the Russian army during the Patriotic War from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 kilometers southwest of Moscow, now the Kaluga Region), conducted under the leadership of Field Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov 5 - September 21 (September 17 - October 3, new style).

After the Battle of Borodino, when it became obvious that it was impossible to keep Moscow with the remaining forces, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov outlined a plan, which consisted in breaking away from the Napoleonic army and taking a flank position in relation to it, creating a threat to French communications, preventing the enemy from entering southern regions of Russia (not devastated by the war and rich in supplies) and prepare the Russian army for a counteroffensive.

Kutuzov kept his plan a great secret. On September 2 (14), leaving Moscow, the Russian army headed southeast along the Ryazan road.

On September 4 (16), after crossing the Moskva River at Borovsky Perevoz (not far from the current city of Zhukovsky), Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of General Nikolai Nikolayevich Raevsky, unexpectedly turned the main forces of the Russian army to the west.

The Cossacks of the rearguard succeeded in defiantly retreating to Ryazan to drag the vanguard of the French army behind them. I must say that covering the retreat, the Cossacks imitated a retreat 2 more times, and the French followed them along the Kashira and Tula roads.

The vanguard of General Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich and the detachment of Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky were advanced towards Moscow; detachments were assigned for partisan actions.

Having lost sight of the Russian army, Napoleon sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. For several days they searched for Kutuzov, and only on September 14 (26) the cavalry of Marshal Joachim Murat discovered Russian troops in the Podolsk region.

Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) retreated along the Old Kaluga road to the Nara River.

On September 21 (October 3, according to a new style), Russian troops stopped near the village of Tarutino, where they took up a new fortified position. The brilliantly organized and carried out Tarutinsky maneuver allowed the Russian army to break away from Napoleon's army and take an advantageous strategic position, which provided it with preparations for a counteroffensive.

As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, Kutuzov retained communication with the southern regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, and maintain contact with the armies of Alexander Petrovich Tormasov and Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov.

Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and eventually, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk road, that is, through the areas already devastated by the war. In the Tarutino maneuver, Kutuzov's outstanding military leadership talent was manifested, his ability to impose his will on the enemy, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war.

Tarutinsky camp

Tarutino camp - a fortified camp in the Tarutino region (a village on the Nara River, now the Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region, 80 kilometers southwest of Moscow), which was occupied by the Russian army from September 21 (October 3, new style) to October 11 (23) during the Patriotic War of 1812 after leaving Moscow.

The Tarutinsky camp was located on a terrain favorable for defense, relying on which it was possible to keep under the supervision of the road from Moscow - Old Kaluga, Tula and Ryazan.

The front and the left flank of the Tarutino camp were covered by rivers (Nara and others), earthen fortifications were built along the front in the form of flushes and lunettes (14 in total), the banks of the rivers were escarped.

In the forest that covered the rear of the Tarutinsky camp, notches and blockages were arranged. The army was located on both sides of the Old Kaluga road: in the 1st line - the 2nd and 6th infantry, in the 2nd - 4,5,3 and 7th infantry and 1st cavalry corps, in the 3rd - the 8th infantry corps and part of the cavalry, in the 4th - two cuirassier divisions and reserve artillery (about 400 guns).

Fleches are field (sometimes long-term) fortifications. They consist of two faces 20 - 30 meters long each at an obtuse angle. The apex angle is directed towards the enemy.

Lunette - an open field or long-term fortification, consisting of at least 3 faces. In the field lunette, usually, there were 1 - 4 companies.

To cover the flanks of the battle order, the following were advanced: the left - 5, the right - 2 jaeger regiments; the vanguard of the army (2nd and 4th cavalry corps) was located 3 kilometers north of Tarutino.

The apartment of Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov and his headquarters were located first in Tarutino, and then in the village of Letashevka (at the moment - the tract Maloye Litashovo, 3 km SW from Tarutino).

In the Tarutinsky camp, the Russian army was reorganized, understaffed, supplied with weapons, ammunition and food, and prepared for active offensive operations. Army partisan detachments were sent to the rear of the enemy.

In connection with the preparation of the counteroffensive, the number of cavalry in the army increased significantly. The troops were intensified combat training. Kutuzov used his stay in the Tarutinsky camp to prepare for the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive and already in the Tarutinsky battle on October 18 (October 6) defeated the vanguard of the French army.

In 1834, with the money of the peasants of the village of Tarutino and nearby villages, a monument was erected at the entrance to the village with the inscription: "In this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, having strengthened, saved Russia and Europe."

By the way, it was in the Tarutinsky camp that the great Russian poet, and then a lieutenant of the Moscow militia, Vasily Andreevich Zhukovsky, wrote the poem "A Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors", which glorified him throughout Russia.

The Nara River in the Tarutino region. The river served as a natural strategic barrier that protected the Russian army.

From the high slopes of the river valley, the surrounding area was visible many miles ahead.

The clear edges of the lunettes are still clearly visible on the ground.

Here and there in the vicinity of Tarutino you can find ditches and ramparts of ancient fortifications.

Monument in Tarutino.

Battle of Tarutino

Tarutino battle or Tarutinsky battle - a battle between Russian and French troops on October 6 (October 18, according to a new style) during the Patriotic War of 1812 near the Chernishnya River (a tributary of the Nara River), 8 kilometers north of the village of Tarutino. The participants themselves called the battle “The Battle of Chernishnia” (Kutuzov) or “The Battle of Vinkovo” (Kolenkur). Vinkovo ​​is the old name of the current village of Chernishnia.

Battle of Tarutino

In early October 1812, having completed the preparation of the Russian army for a counteroffensive, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov sent the first blow against the French avant-garde (28 thousand people, 187 guns, under the command of Marshal Joachim Murat), located on the banks of the Chernishnya River.

Kutuzov's idea was to strike the main blow with a group of General Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen (3 infantry and 1 cavalry corps, 10 Cossack regiments) against the left flank, and a group of General Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich (2 infantry corps, guards and reserve cavalry) together with the main forces of the Russian army - against the center of the French avant-garde, in cooperation with the partisan detachments of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Alexander Samoilovich Figner, advancing behind enemy lines, to surround and destroy him.

At 7 am on October 6 (18), the Cossack regiments of Vasily Vasilyevich Orlov-Denisov attacked the French in the village of Teterinka, threatening to cover their left flank. Behind them, the advanced units of the main forces of the Bennigsen group began to attack. The position of the French avant-garde became critical. Murat retreated. Russian troops (Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov and Miloradovich's cavalrymen) pursued them to Spas-Kupli.

The main forces of the Russian army, which advanced to the Chernishnia River, were not brought into battle: Kutuzov, having received a report about the withdrawal of Napoleon's troops from Moscow, stopped them and returned them to the Tarutino positions.

The result of the Tarutinsky battle was the partial defeat of the French avant-garde, which lost about 2,500 (according to other sources - 4,000) people killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, 38 guns and the entire convoy. Russian losses amounted to 300 people killed and 904 people wounded (according to Kutuzov's report). According to the inscription on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Russian army lost 1183 people killed and wounded.

The Tarutinsky battle was the first major tactical victory of the Russian army after the battle of Borodino, which strengthened the morale of its troops on the eve of the counteroffensive.

Bust of Ataman Platov on military memorial near the village of Kuzovlevo (not far from Chernishni).

The Cossacks of Ataman Platov accomplished many feats during the Battle of Tarutino. Near the village of Teterinki, the Cossacks captured a French battery of 18 guns. Captain Kostin, who was the first to capture a French gun, distinguished himself. The centurion of carps captured the golden standard of the 1st Cuirassier Regiment. Officer Filatov stabbed General Deri, the commander of Murat's guards. During the battle, more than 170 Cossacks were killed, but they themselves destroyed almost 2,000 French.

Although, there are other opinions about the Cossacks, such as the memoirs of General A.P. Yermolov: "... Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating".

A memorial sign near the village of Chernishnya.

Upon learning of the losses, Kutuzov did not resume the battle the next day. Even in the event of success and the advance of his army, the position of the Russians remained precarious. They did not have any stocks on the section from Moscow to Smolensk (all warehouses were made in Belarus, where at first it was supposed to wage war). Napoleon had large manpower reserves beyond Smolensk. Therefore, Kutuzov believed that the time had not yet come to go on the offensive, and ordered a retreat. True, he hoped to receive reinforcements and did not rule out the possibility of giving a new battle already at the walls of Moscow. But the hopes for reinforcements did not come true, and the position chosen for the battle near the city turned out to be unprofitable. Then Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility of surrendering Moscow. "With the loss of Moscow, Russia has not yet been lost ... But if the army is destroyed, they will die and Moscow, And Russia", - said Kutuzov at a military council in Fili to his generals. Indeed, another army capable of dealing with Napoleon, Russia did not have. So, the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years was in the hands of foreigners. Leaving Moscow Kutuzov began to withdraw in a southeasterly direction, along the Ryazan road. After two crossings, the Russian troops approached the Moscow River. Having crossed at the Borovsky ferry to the right bank, they turned west and moved in a forced march to the Old Kaluga road. At the same time, the Cossack detachment from the rearguard of General Raevsky continued to retreat to Ryazan. With this, the Cossacks misled the French vanguard of Marshal Murat, who followed on the heels of the retreating army. During departure Kutuzov introduced harsh measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and camped in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. cash composition (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army got out of the attack and took an advantageous position. Being in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten French communications on the Smolensk road. The French, on the other hand, could not advance unhindered from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Thus, Kutuzov actually imposed on Napoleon the further course of the campaign. In the Tarutinsky camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. In 1834, a monument was erected in Tarutino with the inscription: "At this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, saved Russia and Europe." The capture of Moscow did not lead Napoleon to a victorious end to the campaign. He was met by a city abandoned by the inhabitants, in which fires soon began. At this tragic moment in Russian history, Alexander I declared that he would fight with the people in Siberia, but would not make peace as long as at least one armed invader remained on Russian soil. The firmness of the emperor was important, since many influential people at the court (the mother of the king, his brother, the great Prince Konstantin, General Arakcheev and others) did not believe in the success of the fight against Napoleon and advocated peace with him. Kutuzov, at a meeting with the French envoy Lauriston, who arrived for peace negotiations, philosophically uttered that the real war was just beginning. "The enemy could destroy your walls, turn your property into ruins and ashes, impose heavy shackles on you, but he could not and cannot win and conquer your hearts. Such are the Russians!", These words of Kutuzov, addressed to the people, marked the beginning of the people's, Patriotic war. The entire population of the country, regardless of class or nationality, rises to fight the invaders. National unity became the decisive force that crushed the Napoleonic army. In less than two months, the peoples of Russia sent 300,000 new militias to help their army and collected more than 100 million rubles for it. In areas occupied by the enemy, unfolds guerrilla war, in which Denis Davydov, Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, Alexander Figner and many other heroes became famous. The year 1812 fully showed the talents of M.I. Kutuzov, the commander and wise national strategist, who managed to organically combine the actions of the army with the patriotic struggle of the nation.