Russian-Georgian War (2008). Russian-Georgian War (2008) Losses in Georgian armored vehicles

The tension grew gradually. Refugees have been leaving Tskhinvali all summer. Georgian and Russian troops demonstratively staged exercises in the area in front of each other. Politicians terminated some agreements and entered into others. And finally, the abscess burst.

Ossetian blitzkrieg

On the night of August 8, 2008, Georgian troops rained down shells from Grad rocket launchers on Tskhinvali. After artillery barrage, tanks moved towards the city at 03:30. The capital of South Ossetia was surrounded, and by the morning the Georgian army controlled the entire Zainur region.

Simultaneously with the start of the shelling, the commander of the Georgian Armed Forces announced to television that “a decision had been made to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone.”

By mid-day on August 8, most of South Ossetia was occupied by Georgian government troops.

In response to an appeal from South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, the first Russian combat unit, the 1st battalion of the 135th regiment, passed through the Roki tunnel. Three battalion tactical groups from the 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division and the 135th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District entered South Ossetia, which deployed into battle formations in the Java and Gufta regions.

At 15:30, clashes between Russian and Georgian units began. By the end of the day, Russian troops cleared the bypass road and heights in the area of ​​Kverneti, Tbeti, Dzari and reached the western outskirts of Tskhinvali.

On the evening of August 8, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that government troops completely control the entire territory of South Ossetia, except for the high-mountainous settlement of Java.

On August 9, the transfer of troops from Russian territory to South Ossetia and the creation of a strike force continued. The 76th Pskov Airborne Division was transferred to the combat area. Russian ships entered Georgian territorial waters and began combat patrols.

Units and subunits of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “begin preparations for an operation to enforce peace in the area of ​​responsibility of the peacekeepers,” artillery fires at firing points in the Tskhinvali area and conducts counter-battery combat.

Not everything went smoothly. When trying to release the Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali by the forces of the battalion group of the 135th motorized rifle regiment, the group encountered Georgian troops, who launched a new assault on the city. The convoy, which contained the car of the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General Anatoly Khrulev, was ambushed by Georgian special forces. The driver of the car was killed, the army commander himself fired back with his service weapon, but was seriously wounded. Having suffered losses in people and equipment, the group retreated from the city.

On August 10, Russia increased its force in South Ossetia to four regimental tactical groups (135th, 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments and a regiment of the 76th Pskov Air Assault Division) and attracted significant artillery forces. The total number of troops was increased to approximately 10 thousand people.

In response, Georgia began the urgent transfer of its infantry brigade from Iraq. In addition, the formation of volunteer detachments began in Kyiv, ready to go to the aid of Georgia. Ukrainian nationalists took the initiative. But the operation failed: air tickets to Tbilisi turned out to be too expensive.

Throughout the night from August 10 to 11, a battle raged in South Ossetia for the Prissky Heights dominating Tskhinvali. Georgian units continued shelling the city and a number of settlements in South Ossetia throughout the night, but by mid-day they were driven out of almost all areas of Tskhinvali. The Prissky Heights were also recaptured by Russian troops. During the fighting, Georgian enclaves north of the South Ossetian capital were blocked. The Georgian troops located in this area were cut off from the main group.

A group of ships of the Black Sea Fleet, led by the missile cruiser Moskva, arrived on the shores of Abkhazia. The group also includes the Smetlivy patrol ship and support vessels. Three large landing ships were already in the area. Russian Navy ships repulsed an attack by Georgian missile boats with missile strikes and artillery fire, one of them was sunk.

In the afternoon, representatives of the Georgian Foreign Ministry handed the Russian consul a note with a message that the Georgian side was stopping military operations in South Ossetia. However, firefights continued in the conflict zone.

The Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Tochka-U tactical rocket systems entered Georgia through the Roki tunnel from Russian territory.

In the area of ​​three Georgian cities - Gori, Zugdidi and Senaki - there were battles between Russian and Georgian troops. Georgian units retreated from positions in the Gori area, abandoning military equipment and property. Late in the evening, fighting between Russian and Georgian troops broke out 25 km from Tbilisi, Georgian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Nikolaz Natbiladze said.

On August 12, in South Ossetia, Russian troops reached the administrative border with Georgia along almost its entire length, continuing to push the few remaining combat-ready Georgian units to the south.

“I have decided to complete the operation to force the Georgian authorities to peace. The goal has been achieved,” Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said at a working meeting in the Kremlin.

Battle in the skies

On the morning of August 8, Russian aviation began bombing targets in Georgia. The planes attacked a military base in Gori, the airfields of Vaziani and Marneuli, where Su-25 and L-39 aircraft were based, as well as a radar station 40 kilometers from Tbilisi. According to the Gori city administration, more than 20 people were killed and more than 400 were injured as a result of the raid.

The Russian side lost the Su-25 attack aircraft and the Tu-22 long-range supersonic bomber - a very powerful and expensive combat vehicle. Three pilots who ejected from a downed bomber were detained by Georgian security forces.

Several air battles took place in the combat area; a Georgian Su-25 attacking the positions of the 58th Army was shot down. On August 9, Russian military aircraft attacked a military airfield in western Georgia and struck the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, which is controlled by Georgia.

The bombing of Georgian territory caused panic among the authorities and the population. Thus, a representative of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that on August 10, early in the morning, Russian aviation carried out a raid on Tbilisi International Airport. He later clarified that the airstrike fell on the neighboring territory where the Tbilaviastroi plant was located.

On the night of August 10, Tbilisi, Batumi, Poti and Zugdidi were bombed by the Russian Air Force. At least 50 Russian bombers were operating simultaneously. Two more Su-25 attack aircraft were shot down in the battle.

On August 12, the Russian Air Force bombed Gori. Georgian television showed that Russian planes struck the city television tower and the mountains.

Evil War

The fighting on the streets of Tskhinvali was carried out in the most brutal manner. There were no regular Ossetian troops in the city, and the militia had practically nothing to oppose the tanks. During the battle, the district hospital was almost completely destroyed. The university and parliament buildings were set on fire. Targeted fire from multiple launch rocket systems was opened on the headquarters and barracks of Russian peacekeepers.

The war was fought without rules. The confrontation between the two peoples was too strong.

The population was hiding in the basements. The Georgian infantry, having entered the city, carried out “cleansing operations”. The military knew that the Ossetians were hiding in the basements, and they threw grenades there or fired from machine guns.

“I saw how Ossetian women prayed for Russian tanks, I talked with my grandfather, whose Georgian tank ran over a car with his son, wife and child,” wrote Solidarity newspaper correspondent Yulia Korvin.

Eyewitnesses say: “The center was bombed the most. The air bombing continued for days. The house where the women and children were hiding caught fire. The fire reached the basement. But the floor was earthen, and they began to burrow into the ground. The city's defenders came to the rescue. They were 16-17 years old. Residents were pulled out of the burning basement and ran to the school basement.

Meanwhile, Georgian tanks and infantry entered the city. One of the tanks began firing directly at the school building. The militia fought with tanks. They took plastic soda bottles, drained gasoline from cars, and threw this Molotov cocktail into Georgian tanks. It’s impossible to count how many guys were killed there, but they knocked out a tank.

According to official data, at least 2,000 residents were killed in Tskhinvali. The losses of Russian military personnel amounted to 71 people killed and 340 wounded. Georgia lost 215 military personnel, 70 were missing and 1,469 citizens of the country were wounded.

2008 South Ossetia War, Five Day War
	South Ossetia, Georgia, Republic of Abkhazia
	According to the official position of South Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia: Response to Georgian aggression against civilians in South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers. "Forcing Georgia to Peace." According to the official position of Georgia: Conducting a military operation in the Tskhinvali region in response to provocations by South Ossetian armed forces; Russian aggression against Georgia, which began from the territory of Ukraine 6 days before the hostilities in South Ossetia.
	The defeat of the Georgian troops, the complete loss of Georgian control over the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 15,613 Georgian refugees and 34 thousand Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia. Russian recognition of the independence of the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Opponents
	Armed Forces of South Ossetia
	According to Azerbaijani media, a small number of its volunteer citizens are ethnic Georgians
According to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, at least 200 volunteers from UNA-UNSO	Volunteers from North Ossetia
MPRI, HALO Trust and other foreign mercenaries.
	76th "Pskov" Airborne Division
	Armed Forces of Abkhazia
Commanders
Mikheil Saakashvili	Eduard Kokoity
	Dmitry Medvedev
	Sergey Bagapsh
David Kezerashvili	Vasily Lunev
Zaza Gogava	Anatoly Barankevich
Mamuka Kurashvili	Marat Kulakhmetov
	Anatoly Khrulev
	Vladimir Shamanov
	Igor Miroshnichenko
	Valery Evtukhovich
	Sulim Yamadayev
	Alexander Kletskov
	Sergei Menyailo
	Merab Kishmaria
	Anatoly Zaitsev
Strengths of the parties
17 thousand people in South Ossetia The number of armed forces is 29 thousand people (of which 2000 were in Iraq at the beginning of the war), and an unknown number of internal troops.	3 thousand personnel, at least 20 tanks and 25 self-propelled guns 300 - 2 thousand volunteers from North Ossetia. 19 thousand personnel: 10 thousand in South Ossetia 9 thousand in Abkhazia Abkhazia: 5 thousand personnel
Military losses
According to Georgia: 412 dead (including 170 military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228 civilians), 1,747 wounded and 24 missing. According to Russia, the scale of losses is about 3,000 people among the army and security forces.	According to various estimates, from 162 to 1692 dead (see the section on losses in South Ossetia). According to official data, 67 dead and 283 wounded. According to other sources, from 71 killed and 340 wounded military personnel to 400 killed according to Georgia. Abkhazia: 1 dead and two wounded

Armed conflict in South Ossetia (2008)- military confrontation in August 2008 between Georgia on the one hand and Russia, along with the unrecognized republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.

Main events

Georgian and South Ossetian troops have been engaged in skirmishes and fire attacks of varying intensity since late July 2008. On the evening of August 7, the parties agreed on a ceasefire, which, however, was not actually done.

On the night of August 7-8, 2008 (at 0:06) Georgian troops began a massive artillery shelling of the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali (i) and surrounding areas. A few hours later, the city was stormed by Georgian armored vehicles and infantry. The official reason for the attack on Tskhinvali, according to the Georgian side, was a violation of the ceasefire by South Ossetia, which, in turn, claims that Georgia was the first to open fire.

On August 8, 2008 (at 14:59), Russia officially joined the conflict on the side of South Ossetia as part of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace, on August 9, 2008 - Abkhazia as part of an agreement on military assistance between members of the Commonwealth of Unrecognized States. On August 12, 2008, Russia officially announced the successful completion of the operation to force the Georgian authorities to peace; on August 13, 2008, Abkhazia officially announced the completion of the operation to oust Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge, after which active hostilities ended.

From August 14 to August 16, 2008, the leaders of the states involved in hostilities signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict (“Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan”).

Background to the conflict

The origins of the modern Georgian-Ossetian conflict lie in the events of the late 1980s, when the intensification of the Georgian national movement for independence from the union center (while simultaneously denying the small peoples of Georgia the right to autonomy) and the radical actions of its leaders (primarily Zviad Gamsakhurdia) The background of the weakness of the central leadership of the USSR led to a sharp aggravation of relations between Georgians and ethnic minorities (primarily the Abkhazians and Ossetians, who had their own autonomous entities and even then put forward demands to increase their status - and, ultimately, independence).

1989-1992

In 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region proclaimed an autonomous republic, and a year later it declared its sovereignty. In response, on December 10, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia abolished Ossetian autonomy altogether, dividing its territory into six administrative regions of Georgia.

In 1990, the USSR law “On the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of a union republic from the USSR” granted the right to autonomous entities “to independently decide the issue of secession from the USSR as part of the secession republic or of remaining within the USSR.” The Executive Committee of People's Deputies of South Ossetia took advantage of the granted right, and when Georgia seceded from the USSR on April 9, 1991, South Ossetia remained part of it.

The political struggle quickly escalated into armed clashes, and throughout 1991, South Ossetia was the scene of active military operations during which irretrievable losses (killed and missing) on ​​the Ossetian side amounted to 1 thousand people, over 2.5 thousand were wounded.

On January 19, 1992, a referendum was held in South Ossetia on the issue of “state independence and (or) reunification with North Ossetia.” The majority of those participating in the referendum supported this proposal.

In the spring of 1992, after some lull caused by the coup d'etat and civil war in Georgia, hostilities resumed in South Ossetia. Under pressure from Russia, Georgia began negotiations, which ended on June 24, 1992 with the signing of the Dagomys Agreement on the principles of conflict resolution. The Dagomys agreements provided for the creation of a special body to resolve the conflict - the Mixed Control Commission (JCC) from representatives of four parties - Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia and North Ossetia.

On July 14, 1992, a ceasefire was held, and the Mixed Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) consisting of three battalions - Russian, Georgian and Ossetian - were introduced into the conflict zone to separate the warring parties.

An OSCE Observer Mission was stationed in Tskhinvali.

1992-2007

After 1992, South Ossetia was a de facto independent state, with its own constitution (adopted in 1993) and state symbols. The Georgian authorities still considered it as an administrative unit of the Tskhinvali region, but no active steps were taken to establish control over it.

In the 1990s, the process of accepting Russian citizenship by the population of South Ossetia was actively underway. On July 1, 2002, a new citizenship law was introduced in Russia. This law closed the opportunity for former citizens of the USSR to obtain Russian citizenship in an extremely simplified manner. In this regard, the Congress of Russian Communities of Abkhazia in June 2002 initiated an action to massively obtain Russian passports for residents of the country. For this purpose, according to the Vremya Novostei publication, employees of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were specially sent to Sochi and a special headquarters was opened that dealt with the registration of Russian citizenship for residents of Abkhazia. This led to the fact that in June up to eight thousand Abkhazians received Russian citizenship per day. At the end of the action, approximately 220 out of 320 thousand residents of Abkhazia had Russian citizenship. By the end of July 2002, the number of Russian citizens in South Ossetia exceeded 60% of the population, by 2006 - 80% of the population. In 2006, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze stated that Russia intends to contribute to increased confrontation in South Ossetia. The deputy minister called the provision of Russian citizenship to the population of South Ossetia “annexation of Georgian territories.” A representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the adoption of Russian citizenship by the population of South Ossetia occurs within the framework of international law, and any claims on this issue from Georgia are inappropriate.

On December 5, 2000, at the initiative of the Russian side, a visa regime was introduced between Russia and Georgia, which created difficulties for Georgian citizens, 500 thousand of whom were working in Russia at that time. At the same time, a visa-free regime was maintained for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which caused protests from Georgia. On March 1, 2001, the benefits that provided for visa-free travel for Georgian diplomatic representatives and residents of the border zone were canceled.

Another increase in tension in the conflict zone coincides with the rise to power of Mikheil Saakashvili, who announced a course to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. In August 2004, things escalated into bloody clashes, during which Georgian troops unsuccessfully tried to establish control over the strategic heights around Tskhinvali, but, having lost several dozen people, were withdrawn.

In February 2006, the Georgian authorities announced the need for Russian peacekeepers to have visas in zones of interethnic conflicts; these statements were accompanied by frequent detentions of peacekeeping troops due to the lack of visas. The Russian side did not recognize the legality of Georgian demands. On February 15, 2006, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution in which the activities of the peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia were recognized as unsatisfactory and a desire was expressed to switch to a “new format of the peacekeeping mission.” In May of the same year, the Georgian authorities declared Russian peacekeepers who arrived in South Ossetia as part of the rotation as “criminals” due to violations of the visa and border regime, which took place from the point of view of the Georgian authorities. The South Ossetian authorities, in response to Georgian claims, threatened to introduce visas for Georgian citizens, including peacekeepers. The situation escalated on July 18, when the Georgian parliament demanded the withdrawal or “legalization” of the peacekeepers.

On July 20, 2006, the Russian Defense Minister promised to help Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression.

On November 12, 2006, two parliamentary elections and a referendum on independence were held simultaneously in South Ossetia. One election and referendum were held in territory controlled by the authorities of South Ossetia (Eduard Kokoity won here, and the majority of referendum participants were in favor of independence). Other elections were held in territory controlled by the Georgian authorities, and among refugees from Ossetia located on the territory of Georgia proper (here Dmitry Sanakoev won). Both sides recognized the elections they held as democratic and reflecting the will of the people, while others recognized them as fraudulent. Both winners took an oath to the people of South Ossetia, claimed power over the entire territory of South Ossetia and accused each other of collaboration (with Russia and Georgia, respectively).

That same year, Georgia sent troops into the Kodori Gorge, despite protests from Abkhazia, after which the contingent of Russian peacekeepers in the lower part of the gorge was reinforced.

Tiger Throw Plan

According to some Russian sources, back in 2006, there was a plan in Georgia code-named “Throw the Tiger,” which envisaged, by May 1, 2006, with the support of the United States and the OSCE, forcing Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Following this, in order to destabilize the situation in the region, several high-profile provocations were to be organized within a week against the population of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia. At the same time, under the pretext of localizing the conflict area and ensuring the safety of the Georgian population living in close proximity to it, it was planned to create groups of Georgian troops on the border with South Ossetia. On May 6, formations, military units and units of Georgian law enforcement agencies from different directions were to capture all major settlements in South Ossetia while simultaneously completely blocking the border with the Russian Federation. Next, according to the plan, was the arrest of the actual leadership of South Ossetia and their bringing to trial. Then martial law was to be introduced in the republic, a provisional government was appointed and a curfew was established. In total, the Georgian military was given 7 days for this operation. In reality, these events did not happen.

The existence of such a plan was confirmed in an interview with Reuters by former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. According to him, " Abkhazia was our strategic priority, but in 2005 we developed military plans to take over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The plan initially provided for a double operation of invading South Ossetia, taking control of the Roki tunnel and Java" He stated that the United States warned even then that it would not provide assistance in the event of an invasion: “ When we met with George Bush in May 2005, we were told directly: do not try to enter into a military confrontation. We will not be able to provide you with military assistance.».

Withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia

In 2007, President Saakashvili demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The largest base was Akhalkalaki. The troops were withdrawn ahead of schedule - on November 15, 2007, although the withdrawal was planned during 2008. Only Russian peacekeepers remained, acting under the CIS mandate in Abkhazia and under the Dagomys agreements in South Ossetia.

Financial, political and military support for South Ossetia

After the military events of 1991-1992, the Russian Federation began to play an active political role in the territory of South Ossetia.

According to the Georgian side, Russia also supplied weapons to South Ossetia. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated in January 2006:

Russia, in turn, denied the accusations of the Georgian side. In January 2006, Ambassador at Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Valery Kenyaykin stated:

According to him, they were talking about four T-55 tanks, several howitzers and armored vehicles.

According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 2007), the strength of the armed forces of South Ossetia was 3 thousand people; There were 15 thousand people in reserve. South Ossetia had, according to some sources, 15, according to other sources - 87 T-72 and T-55 tanks (according to Novaya Gazeta, 80 of them “remained after the [Russian] Caucasus-2008 exercises”) , 95 guns and mortars, including 72 howitzers, 23 BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, 180 armored vehicles, including 80 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as three Mi-8 helicopters.

The magazine “Vlast” dated August 25, 2008 cited information with reference to the unnamed minister of North Ossetia that the budget of North Ossetia annually received 2.5 billion rubles from the Russian federal treasury for “international activities”, which were immediately transferred to the disposal of the government of South Ossetia ; no transparent reporting was provided on the expenditure of the transferred funds. This information was confirmed by former South Ossetian Prime Minister Oleg Teziev.

The bulk of the government of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia before the start of the armed conflict in 2008 consisted of former Russian officials, including military and intelligence officers.

Political and military support for Georgia. Military budget of Georgia

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia set a world record for military budget growth, increasing it more than 33 times from 2003 to 2008. The Georgian leadership sharply increased its military budget, trying to bring its armed forces to NATO standards. The Georgian budget for 2008 planned expenditures for the Ministry of Defense equivalent to US$0.99 billion, which is more than 4.5% of GDP (estimated at purchasing power parity) or about 9% of GDP (estimated at exchange rate ratios) and more than 25 % of all Georgian budget revenues for 2008.

As the BBC reported, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Georgia's arms suppliers included the USA, England, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others. In particular, Kalashnikov assault rifles were supplied from Serbia, which were used in the attack on South Ossetia and Russian troops. Russian diplomats pointed out to Serbia that Russian helicopters were shot down by bullets fired in Serbia (however, it should be noted that only one helicopter is known to have been lost by the Russian armed forces in South Ossetia, and this machine crashed for a non-combat reason after the end of the war; for more details, see. article Aviation losses during the war in South Ossetia (2008)). The Serbian manufacturing plant denies direct deliveries and suggests that the assault rifles reached Georgia through Croatia and Bosnia.

Ukraine confirms arms supplies to Georgia:

On August 12, from Ukraine’s report on the export of military equipment published by the UN, it became known what kind of weapons Ukraine supplied to Georgia. Some Ukrainian experts note that some of these weapons are obsolete, while at the same time, some equipment was removed from combat duty and delivered to Georgia, bypassing standard procedures, with the knowledge and instructions of Yushchenko. According to the report, Ukraine supplied the following types of weapons to Georgia: Osa and Buk air defense systems, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, L-39 training aircraft, self-propelled guns (including heavy 2S7 Pion) as well as tanks , infantry fighting vehicles and small arms. MLRS "Grad" is not on the list.

Later, the head of the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which deals with issues of the degree of legality of foreign arms trade, Valery Konovaluk said that the Commission found violations of Ukrainian legislation in the supply of weapons to Georgia, which caused enormous economic and political damage to Ukraine, and also weakened the country’s defense capability.

On this occasion, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said: “Official Kyiv did not even express regret over the deaths of civilians and Russian peacekeepers. At the same time, it is known that the Ukrainian leadership, through its supplies of heavy offensive weapons to the Georgian army, bears its share of responsibility for the tragedy that occurred in this region. Hundreds of people died, most of them civilians.”

In addition, according to the online publication Vesti.ru with reference to the British edition of the Financial Times, the Georgian armed forces and special forces were intensively trained by American instructors on orders from the Pentagon: “Georgian units were trained by the United States according to a program that was tested in Croatia in 1995 as part of the operation of the Croatian armed forces to capture the region of Krajna, the majority of the population of which were ethnic Serbs.”

Immediately after the entry of Russian troops into South Ossetia, on August 8, about a hundred American military specialists were evacuated from Tbilisi by a US Air Force plane. On August 28, a representative of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, told reporters that the Russian military found “a lot of interesting things” in the contents of captured American military Hummer jeeps in the city of Poti. Information has emerged that this has something to do with satellite reconnaissance. Nogovitsyn confirmed that jeeps with 20 military personnel were captured near the city of Gori with full weapons. According to the United States, the jeeps were in sealed warehouses at the port and were waiting to be sent to the American base in Germany after the completion of the Georgian-American exercises.

In August 2010, Russian Prime Minister V.V. Putin said that if there had not been the rearmament of Georgia, there would have been no aggression in 2008 and the blood that was shed then. According to Putin, the Russian leadership spoke about this to its partners in other countries, including European ones, but they remained silent.

Foreign policy context

On February 17, 2008, the autonomous region of Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija, declared its independence as the Republic of Kosovo; the next day it was recognized by a number of countries, including the United States. The recognition of Kosovo's independence caused an extremely negative reaction from the Russian leadership: President V. Putin on February 22 of the same year at the CIS summit said: “The Kosovo precedent is a terrible precedent. Those who do this, they do not calculate the results of what they do. Ultimately, this is a double-edged sword, and the second stick will crack them in the head someday."

The British magazine The Economist wrote on August 21, 2008: “ Russia's failed attempts to determine the outcome of Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, followed by the Orange Revolution there (following the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003), stung Mr. Putin. Discontent that had been simmering over continued NATO expansion and US plans to base elements of its missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland was ignited by the announcement at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April that both Georgia and Ukraine could eventually join the Union, although only then , when they'll be ready. Both Russia and Georgia were eager for a fight.»

On August 12, 2008, the influential American newspaper The New York Times, with reference to assistants to the US Secretary of State, wrote that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a private dinner with Georgian President M. Saakashvili on July 9, 2008 in Tbilisi, warned the latter against entering into a military conflict with Russia, in which he has no chance of winning.

Erosi Kitsmarishvili, who was Georgia's ambassador to Russia during the war, said on November 25, 2008, citing his sources in the Georgian government, that US President George W. Bush gave the green light to start the war in South Ossetia. US Vice President Dick Cheney considered the possibility of sending NATO and American troops to fight against Russia.

Rising tensions (early 2008)

At the beginning of 2008, there was an increase in tension in the conflict zone, as well as in relations between Russia and Georgia.

On March 6, 2008, it was announced that Russia had withdrawn from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia; Moscow's decision was regarded by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as "encouraging separatism in the Abkhaz region and an open attempt to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."

On April 16, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Russian President V. Putin gave the government instructions on the basis of which Moscow would build special relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On April 17, 2008, Kokoity said that Georgian military units were approaching the borders of his republic and called on “to refrain from rash steps that could lead to tragic consequences.”

On April 21, the Georgian side confirmed that the day before, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs produced by the Israeli company Elbit Systems was shot down. According to the Georgian authorities, he was shot down on Georgian territory by a Russian MiG-29 fighter. The incident was discussed in the UN Security Council.

On April 29, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced “On measures to strengthen the collective forces of the CIS to maintain peace in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict”; According to Novaya Gazeta on May 5, “a thousand (at least) contingent with armored vehicles crossed the border along the Psou River from the Sochi region.”

On May 6, 2008, the head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Troop Service of the Russian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, commenting on the situation in Abkhazia, said that the situation in the conflict zone is in the field of view of the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense and “all necessary measures are already being taken.” On the same day, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, who was visiting Brussels, said: “We, of course, are trying to avoid war. But we are very close to it. We know the Russians very well, we know the signals. We see that Russian troops are occupying territories based on false information, and this worries us.”

In the second half of July, simultaneously with the joint Georgian and US exercises “Immediate Response” (which, according to military observer Zaur Alborov, practiced an attack on South Ossetia), Russia conducted large-scale exercises “Caucasus-2008”, in which units of various security forces. At the same time, Russian railway troops repaired the tracks in Abkhazia.

Escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

At the end of July - beginning of August, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict escalated. Skirmishes and fire raids of varying degrees of intensity occurred regularly. Civilians of South Ossetia began to leave the conflict zone en masse.

Starting from August 1, on the initiative of the Prime Minister of South Ossetia, Yuri Morozov, the residents of Tskhinval were evacuated.

According to a correspondent of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (issue dated August 8, 2008), on August 6, Russian troops and armored vehicles were already moving towards South Ossetia: “Meanwhile, Russia is drawing serious military forces to the borders of Georgia. Military columns and individual vehicles with personnel and armored vehicles are moving along the Transkam from Alagir towards the Nizhny Zaramag border checkpoint. The NG columnist observed this with his own eyes on the way from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali. The military says the exercises are ongoing, but there is no doubt that Russia is demonstrating its determination to protect its citizens in South Ossetia. Up to carrying out an operation to enforce peace - if no other choice is left.”

On August 7, the Georgian army tried to occupy the Pris Heights around Tskhinvali, but this attack was repulsed. On the same day, the American Ambassador to Georgia, John Teft, reported to Washington that Georgian troops, including units with Grad-type launchers, were moving towards South Ossetia.

On the afternoon of August 7, 2008, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Anatoly Barankevich stated: “ Georgian troops are active along the entire border with South Ossetia. All this suggests that Georgia is beginning large-scale aggression against our republic" Barankevich also suggested that the Georgian military has plans to carry out an assault on Tskhinvali in the near future.

In an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, an officer of the 135th motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District said: “On August 7, the command came to advance to Tskhinvali. They alerted us and set us on the march. We arrived, settled in, and already on August 8 there was a fire there.” The newspaper later clarified that the date in question was August 8. Some Russian media also claimed that on August 7, the dispatch of a number of units of the 58th Army to South Ossetia began; a month later, the Georgian side began to announce this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008. The Georgian side published recordings of the conversation, which it claims belong to South Ossetian border guards. At the same time, as The New York Times notes, from the phrases (the question “Listen, did the armored vehicles come or what?” and the answer “Armored vehicles and people”) one cannot draw conclusions about the number of armored vehicles or indications that Russian forces were participating at that time in combat.

However, the representative of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Shota Utiashvili, said that in accordance with the agreements on the peacekeeping mission, which both sides signed in 2004, the rotation of the Russian peacekeeping battalion could only be carried out during the daytime and with advance notice of at least a month, but in this case no notifications did not have.

The materials presented by the Georgian side include telephone numbers of the Georgian cellular operator, however, as Kommersant writes, according to South Ossetia, “recently all officials and military personnel have used exclusively the services of the Russian operator MegaFon.”

Izvestia newspaper correspondent Yuri Snegirev stated that in June-July, military exercises of the 58th Army took place in North Ossetia, and after their completion, the equipment did not go into the pits, but remained in front of the entrance to the Roki tunnel (in Russia). Yuri Snegirev said: “After the tunnel there was no equipment. I saw this myself. This can be confirmed by my other colleagues, who, after the shelling of Tskhinvali on August 2, began to visit South Ossetia every day.""".

The Kozaev brothers (one of whom is an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia, the other is a hero of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) during and after the conflict claimed that the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity knew in advance about the upcoming military events and left Tskhinvali for Java in advance. However, according to Anatoly Barankevich, the President of South Ossetia left for Java only on August 8 at about 2 am.

Different interpretations of the cause of war

Georgia version

In the first hours of the war, the Georgian government motivated its actions by the fact that “the separatists carried out an attack on villages adjacent to Tskhinvali,” doing this in response to a unilateral ceasefire by Georgia. It was stated that there were massive bomb attacks on civilians and peacekeepers that occurred in the last hours of August 7, 2008, and it was also stated that “hundreds of armed people and military equipment crossed the Russian-Georgian border through the Roki tunnel.” In a corresponding statement published on August 8 at 2 a.m. by the Civil.ge website, there are calls for the Ossetian armed forces to stop hostilities, but there are no calls for Russia.

At 2 a.m., the Georgian government released a statement: “Over the past hours, the separatists carried out a military attack on the civilian population of the villages of the region and against the peacekeeping forces, which caused an extreme escalation of the situation. In response to a unilateral ceasefire and the proposal of the President of Georgia to hold peace negotiations, the separatists carried out an attack on the villages adjacent to Tskhinvali. First there was The village of Prisi was attacked at 22.30, and then at 23.00 the village of Tamarasheni was attacked. Hundreds of armed people and military equipment crossed the Georgian border. In order to ensure the safety of the civilian population and prevent armed attacks, the Georgian authorities were forced to take adequate measures. Despite the aggravated situation, the Georgian government again confirms its readiness for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and calls on the separatists to stop the armed conflict. action and sit down at the negotiating table."

On August 8, Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili called on Russia to intervene in the conflict as a “real peacemaker.”

On August 8, the commander of the Georgian peacekeepers, Mamuka Kurashvili, called Georgia’s actions in South Ossetia “an operation to restore constitutional order in the Tskhinvali region.” Later, in October 2008, during proceedings to study the August events in the Georgian parliament, Kurashvili stated that his statement was impulsive and was not sanctioned by the highest political leadership of Georgia. Georgian NSS Secretary Lomaia then stated that the essence of the statement “was not correct,” and Kurashvili himself received a reprimand.

Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili explained that “the goal of the Georgian leadership is not to take cities. “In Tbilisi they only want to put an end to the criminal regime so that no one threatens our cities, citizens and infrastructure.” The Georgian side stated that the actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia were a response to a violation of the ceasefire.

On August 9, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved the decree of President Mikheil Saakashvili declaring martial law and full mobilization for a period of 15 days. In the text of the decree, the introduction of martial law was justified by the need to “prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and acts of violence, in order to protect human rights and freedoms.”

On August 22, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili said in an interview with the Ukrainian agency UNIAN: “... the decision to attack Tskhinvali was made only when a column of Russian military equipment began to enter South Ossetia. The stories that we used Grad missile launchers to attack Tskhinvali are lies. Tskhinvali was bombed by the Russians after we took it for four and a half hours. We bombed the surrounding heights, including using aircraft and Grad missiles. I emphasize, not populated areas.”

On September 5, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Grigol Vashadze, in an interview with Interfax diplomatic correspondent Ksenia Baigarova, stated that “from August 1 to August 7, the heavy artillery of the so-called South Ossetian forces under the leadership of the Russian military razed all Georgian villages adjacent to the conflict zone.” The Georgian version is presented more fully in the application for consideration of the conflict in the Hague Court.

According to official statements by the Georgian side, the Russian peacekeeping forces that remained on Georgian territory after the signing of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan “really represented occupation forces, whose main goal was not the resolution of the conflict, but the appropriation of Georgian territories.”

On November 5, 2008, at an official press conference held under the auspices of NATO in Riga, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili presented his own version of the start of the war, according to which this war was Russian aggression against Georgia, which began from the territory of Ukraine. According to this version, the beginning of the conflict should be considered the exit of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet “with full armament” from Sevastopol to the coast of Georgia, which occurred at least 6 days before the first shots were fired on the administrative border with South Ossetia. According to Saakashvili, Ukrainian President Yushchenko tried to stop the Black Sea Fleet by decree, but Russia ignored him. This version is disputed by Ukrainian and Russian media, pointing out that Yushchenko’s decree appeared only on August 13, that is, 5 days after the start of the war, and after Russian President Medvedev officially announced the end of the military operation.

Also in November 2008, Saakashvili stated that Russia did not agree to conquer all of Georgia because it understood the readiness of the Georgian Armed Forces to resist it. “For the first time since World War II, the Georgian army forced Russian generals to flee from the battlefield,” noted the Georgian president. At the same time, he is convinced that 95% of the combat-ready part of the Russian Armed Forces fought against Georgia, “17-19 (Russian) aircraft were shot down. The 58th Russian Army was actually burned by the 4th (Georgian) Brigade.” In general, Saakashvili is very pleased with the actions of the Georgian Armed Forces. “The Georgian army offered exemplary resistance to the monster - the army of a large country,” noted the Georgian president. However, he said, “When the 58th Army was defeated, Russia deployed ground and air forces. They released more than half of their Iskanders.” The Georgian president believes that the decision to take military action in South Ossetia was inevitable:

This decision was inevitable due to two main circumstances: 1. we became aware that hundreds of Russian army tanks, heavy equipment, artillery installations, and thousands of military personnel were brought to the Georgian-Russian border, at the Roki tunnel, and we began to receive irrefutable, confirmed intelligence data, and you saw them, that they have started moving and are crossing the state border of Georgia. This fact was later confirmed by the world media, telephone interceptions were published, a lot of material was studied, obtained from the Internet, from open sources, and from intelligence sources, although it must be said that information from open sources is as convincing as intelligence information, maybe sometimes more convincing. And at this time, the Russian Federation itself could not refute the fact of the invasion of Georgia by military force.

On May 26, 2009, Saakashvili said that Russian troops planned to take control not only of Georgia, but also of the entire Black Sea-Caspian region, but thanks to the valor of Georgian military personnel, this did not happen.

Criticism

The European Union Commission of Inquiry into the War, in a report published on September 30, 2009, concludes that Georgia started the war, while Russia's actions leading up to it were limited to months of defiant actions.

The statement by Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili on August 22 is not confirmed by reports from world news agencies. The first reports of Russian military intervention appeared only around noon on August 8. It is also worth noting that no one from the Georgian leadership declared on August 8 that the start of the war was a consequence of the entry of Russian troops. On the contrary, statements were made about “establishing constitutional order” and the desire to “put an end to the criminal regime.”

According to the German magazine Spiegel, by the morning of August 7, the Georgian side concentrated about 12 thousand people and seventy-five tanks near Gori on the border with South Ossetia. The magazine wrote that according to Western intelligence services, “the Russian army began firing no earlier than 7:30 a.m. on August 8,” and “Russian troops began their march from North Ossetia through the Roki tunnel no earlier than 11 a.m. This sequence of events suggests that Moscow did not carry out aggression, but simply acted in response.” According to Colonel of the German General Staff Wolfgang Richter, who was in Tbilisi at that time, “the Georgians to a certain extent “lied” about the movements of troops.” Richter said he could not find evidence of Saakashvili’s claims that “the Russians moved into the Roki tunnel even before Tbilisi gave the order to advance.”

On October 12, the French Le Monde, commenting on the Georgian side’s claims that the shelling and attack on Tskhinvali occurred after “hundreds of Russian tanks had already passed through the Roki tunnel connecting South Ossetia with Russia to begin the invasion,” noted: “This point view is problematic because it contradicts all the statements that the Georgian side made during the events.” The newspaper wrote that until August 8, no one spoke publicly about Russian tanks and quoted the words of the French Ambassador to Georgia Eric Fournier: “The Georgians did not call their European allies with the words: the Russians are attacking us.”

Member of the European Parliament Julietto Chiesa said that Saakashvili does not make independent decisions, and Georgia, in fact, is a US protectorate. According to him, over the past 3-4 years an information war has been waged against Russia. J. Chiesa emphasized that in the conflict in South Ossetia, Russia is not the attacking party, it was only forced to come to the rescue and repel the blow. He also considers the recognition of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be completely legitimate, since “the recognition of the independence of these republics occurred only after the attack by the Georgian side.” “All this time, Moscow’s policy has been characterized by caution and restraint. For a long time, Russia did not recognize the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And she did not plan to blow up the situation,” added J. Chiesa. In his opinion, the United States played a significant role in this situation. “Little Georgia is essentially a US protectorate... it’s no secret that Georgian officials receive official salaries from the US State Department. It is quite obvious that no one will give money just like that. All this is payment for the services provided by President Saakashvili and his administration... American advisers in the Georgian army are by no means an improvisation. Taking into account the diverse political issues, we can say with confidence that systematic, purposeful work is being carried out. Both in civil and military directions. Saakashvili does not make independent decisions. Georgia alone would not have lasted even 10 minutes - without the support of American dollars. The states are making huge investments in the country’s economy,” explained J. Chiesa.

The South Ossetian side calls all statements by the Georgian side “cynical lies” and accuses high-ranking Georgian officials, including the president, of organizing war crimes. South Ossetian officials hope to see the Georgian leadership in the dock.

The President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, said on November 10, 2008: “Today, from the point of view of the information that is received by the Western media, and through them is already conveyed to the international community, suggests that a turning point is already coming in this information confrontation, because that that lie, that dirt that they tried to pour on the Ossetian side at the very beginning, on the Russian side. Today, the West is increasingly coming to understand who and how unleashed this aggression, who imposed Nazism... Therefore, if you and I again consolidate all our efforts in order to break through and finally dispel all these Georgian myths about the supposed dangers and aggression from South Ossetia and from Russia, the more the people and the international community know the truth, the less mistakes they will make. There will no longer be such hot spots as South Ossetia...”

So far, no independent source has confirmed Saakashvili's statement that Russian troops first crossed the border on August 7, and only then Georgia launched an offensive. It is especially strange that during the conflict the Georgian authorities did not mention this at all, and called the goal of their actions “the restoration of constitutional order” in South Ossetia. In addition, Georgia stated that it had gone on the offensive in response to the shelling of four Georgian villages the previous evening. However, another independent source - this time The New York Times - provides evidence from independent Western observers who also refute the official Georgian version. Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission say they have not found any evidence that these villages actually survived the attack. On the contrary, they accused Georgia of a “totally indiscriminate and disproportionate attack” that included intensive shelling of civilian targets with artillery shells and unguided rockets.

The American newspaper The Boston Globe wrote in November 2008 about reports made by observers under the auspices of the OSCE: “ These observers, who were in the territory of self-proclaimed South Ossetia on the night of August 7-8, report that they saw Georgian artillery and rocket launchers massing towards the South Ossetian border at 3 pm on August 7, long before the first Russian column entered the enclave territory. They also witnessed an unprovoked shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali that evening. The shells fell on residents hiding in their homes. And observers heard nothing that would confirm Saakashvili's statement that the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali was a response to the shelling of Georgian villages. There is no reason to doubt the competence or integrity of OSCE observers. The inevitable conclusion is that Saakashvili started this war and lied about it».

On December 20, 2008, the British television company BBC cited the opinion of former Georgian Defense Minister Giorgi Karkarashvili: “According to the ex-minister, the assertions of the Georgian military that the Georgian army carried out only defensive actions on the territory of South Ossetia are clearly contradicted by the consolidation of the central group of troops in Tskhinvali, albeit short-term. And this at a time when, logically, it should have been concentrated in the direction of the Roki tunnel, from where, as the Georgian side claimed, the manpower and equipment of the Russian army continued to advance.”.

Position of the Government of South Ossetia

In the South Ossetian interpretation, the war was caused by Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia, which occurred on the eve of the Olympic Games. President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity stated:

The code name of the blitzkrieg - “Clean Field” - reveals the essence of Georgia’s plans - to carry out ethnic cleansing and turn the whole of South Ossetia into a “clean field”. The very first day of full-scale military aggression undertaken by Georgia against South Ossetia brought enormous sacrifices to our people. Only the peace enforcement operation put an end to the senseless and cruel war that brought so much suffering to our people. The decision of the President of Russia to conduct an operation to force the aggressor to peace was timely, courageous and the only correct one... South Ossetia will never forget or forgive the crimes of Georgian fascism. The Georgian authorities, with their senseless cruelty, dug a bottomless bloody abyss between Georgia and South Ossetia.

On August 8, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity reported numerous casualties among civilians in South Ossetia and accused Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili of genocide of the Ossetian people. In his interview with the Kommersant newspaper, Kokoity admitted cases of looting in Georgian villages. He also acknowledged the destruction of Georgian enclaves, using the expression “We have practically leveled everything there,” and noted the impossibility of Georgians returning there: “We do not intend to let anyone in there anymore.” Later, however, Kokoity stated that all refugees from South Ossetia of Georgian nationality would be able to return to the territory of South Ossetia. However, those who do not have South Ossetian citizenship will have to obtain it and renounce Georgian citizenship. We are talking about those who did not take any part in the hostilities against South Ossetia, did not participate in the genocide of the Ossetian people. Regarding the residents of some Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia that were destroyed during the conflict, the South Ossetian authorities intend to conduct a particularly thorough personal check before allowing them to return, since the South Ossetian prosecutor's office believes that the residents of these villages participated in armed groups and took participation in the genocide of the Ossetian people.

Russia version

The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, President Medvedev, spoke about the beginning of an armed clash with the Georgian army in his interview dedicated to the third anniversary of the start of the conflict:

On the night from the 7th to the 8th, the Minister of Defense called me (I was just moving along the Volga, was on vacation, and in general the whole planet was in anticipation of the Olympics, which was in China) and said that our Georgian neighbor had begun active fighting. I will honestly say, absolutely, extremely frankly, at first I was very doubtful and said: “You know, we need to check, is he completely crazy, has he gone crazy, or what? Maybe this is just some kind of provocation, he’s testing the Ossetians’ strength and trying to show us something?” An hour passes, he says: “No, they have already fired with all their guns, they are using Grad.” I say: “Okay, I’m waiting for new information.” Some more time passes, he says: “You know, I want to report to you, they just destroyed the tent with our peacekeepers, putting everyone to death. What I should do?" I said, “Return fire to kill.” No numbers appeared at this moment.

On August 9, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces I. Konashenkov said that units and subunits of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “began preparing an operation to enforce peace in the area of ​​responsibility of the peacekeepers.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the reasons for the entry of Russian troops into the conflict zone were Georgia’s aggression against the territories of South Ossetia not under its control and the consequences of this aggression: a humanitarian catastrophe, the exodus of 30 thousand refugees from the region, the death of Russian peacekeepers and many residents of South Ossetia. Lavrov qualified the actions of the Georgian army against civilians as genocide. He noted that the majority of the population of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia, and that “not a single country in the world would remain indifferent to the murder of its citizens and expulsion of them from their homes.” Lavrov said that Russia “did not prepare for this conflict” and came up with a proposal to adopt a UN Security Council resolution calling on Georgia and South Ossetia to renounce the use of force. According to Lavrov, “Russia’s military response to the Georgian attack on Russian citizens and peacekeeping troops was completely proportionate.” Lavrov explained the need to bomb military infrastructure outside the conflict zone by saying that it was used to support the Georgian offensive. Lavrov called accusations that Russia, using the South Ossetian conflict as cover, was trying to overthrow the Georgian government and establish control over that country as “utter nonsense.” He noted that as soon as security in the region was restored, the Russian President announced the end of the military operation.

On August 11, Deputy Director of the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry Boris Malakhov denied the version that Russia’s goal is to overthrow the regime of M. Saakashvili.

On August 15, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that “Mr. Saakashvili was tired of all this diplomacy, and he simply decided to slaughter the Ossetians who were interfering with him.”

According to Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation A. A. Nogovitsyn, the Georgian operation “Clean Field” against South Ossetia was developed by Georgia together with the United States.

Criticism

According to The Wall Street Journal, the prevailing point of view in the West is the view that the Russian reaction to the actions of Saakashvili, who initiated the war, is disproportionate. The Commission of Independent Military Experts, created under the leadership of the European Union to internationally study the causes of the conflict, explains in its report that Russia's initial response to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali was justified by defense purposes, but, according to the commission, the subsequent actions of Russian troops were excessive.

There is a version about the unofficial entry of Russian troops into South Ossetia on the eve of the war, which, according to Tbilisi, provoked retaliatory actions by Georgian troops.

In the first days of the conflict, as an argument about a “humanitarian catastrophe” and “genocide of the Ossetian people,” versions were called about the number of dead residents of South Ossetia exceeding a thousand people, voiced by the South Ossetian side.

Some have expressed the opinion that Russia’s point of view about Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia also contradicts the UN Charter, since the independence of South Ossetia on August 8, 2008 was not recognized by any UN member state in the world (unlike the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia).

Abkhazia version

On August 22, the Chief of the General Staff of the Abkhaz Armed Forces, Anatoly Zaitsev, said that the Georgian army, after the complete capture of South Ossetia, planned to launch an offensive military operation against Abkhazia in 3 hours. According to him, Georgia’s plans were as follows: “a powerful air strike was launched, the first echelon of troops was landed from the sea in the amount of 800 people on high-speed boats, then again 800 people were supposed to land in Sukhumi, and 6 thousand people were supposed to strike with artillery and rocket systems, with a firing range of 45 km, at our mountain rifle battalions in the Kodori Gorge and checkpoints of the Russian peacekeeping forces. (...) The Georgians assumed that our units and checkpoints of the “blue helmets” would be demolished by heavy fire in this narrow gorge, and after that the Georgian group began to advance in the direction of Sukhumi.”

Progress of hostilities

8 August

On the night of August 8 (approx. 00.15 Moscow time), Georgian troops subjected Tskhinvali to fire from Grad rocket launchers, and at approximately 03.30 Moscow time they began an assault on the city using tanks.

A few minutes before the start of the operation by Georgian forces, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), General Murat Kulakhmetov, was informed by telephone from Tbilisi that the truce had been canceled. At an urgently convened briefing in Tskhinvali, Kulakhmetov told reporters that “ the Georgian side actually declared war on South Ossetia».

The locations of Russian peacekeepers were also attacked. More than ten Russian servicemen were killed and several dozen were wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Timerman, who led the defense of the Russian peacekeeping battalion, was subsequently awarded the title “Hero of Russia.”

At 00.30 Moscow time on August 8, the commander of operations of the Georgian armed forces, General Mamuka Kurashvili, announced on the Rustavi-2 TV channel that, due to the Ossetian side’s refusal to engage in dialogue to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone, the Georgian side “ decided to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone" Mamuka Kurashvili called on Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone not to interfere in the situation.

By the morning, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs disseminated information that “ The villages of Mugut, Didmukha and Dmenisi, as well as the outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali, were taken under the control of government forces».

On the morning of August 8, Russian aviation began bombing targets in Georgia. According to Russian military statements, “ the planes covered only military targets: the military base in Gori, the airfields of Vaziani and Marneuli, where Su-25 and L-39 aircraft are based, as well as a radar station 40 kilometers from Tbilisi».

August 9

The transfer of troops from Russian territory to South Ossetia and the creation of a strike force continued. In the morning, Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation I. Konashenkov stated that units and units of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “ began preparations for a peace enforcement operation in the peacekeepers' area of ​​responsibility».

It was reported that a unit of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division had been transferred to Tskhinvali with standard military equipment and weapons; units of the 98th Ivanovo Airborne Division and an airborne special forces regiment from Moscow were also expected.

In the afternoon there was an unsuccessful attempt to release the Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali by the battalion group of the 135th motorized rifle regiment. The group entered the city and met with Georgian troops, who began a new assault on Tskhinvali. After the battle, having suffered losses in people and equipment, the group retreated from the city. In this battle, several Russian media correspondents and the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General Khrulev, were wounded. Having received no reinforcements, the Russian peacekeepers were forced to retreat from the Southern camp.

Throughout the day, the exchange of artillery fire and Russian air strikes on Georgian territory continued.

Russian ships entered Georgian territorial waters and began combat patrols. In Abkhazia at this time, an amphibious landing began in the Ochamchira area and the transfer of airborne units to the Sukhumi airfield.

10th of August

A Russian-Georgian naval clash occurred;.

11th August

According to an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia, a Georgian Su-25 was shot down, attacking the positions of the 58th Army. Earlier that day, a Russian military spokesman said that the Russian Air Force had firmly gained dominance in the skies and Georgian military aircraft were not flying. Russian peacekeepers occupied the Georgian village of Khurcha in the Zugdidi region. Russian troops approached the town of Senaki and retreated after eliminating the possibility of shelling from a military base.

Truce

A number of media outlets disseminated information that the purpose of the Russian military operation was to seize Tbilisi and overthrow the Georgian leadership; political pressure from the United States and its allies, as well as the military’s unpreparedness for such an operation, thwarted such a scenario. For example, according to information published on November 13, 2008 by the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, Putin allegedly threatened during a meeting on August 12 with French President N. Sarkozy to “hang Saakashvili by the balls”; Moreover, Sarkozy allegedly had data intercepted by French intelligence services indicating that a significant part of the Russian army intended to go all the way and overthrow Saakashvili (at the same time, Medvedev announced the cessation of the military operation before the meeting with Sarkozy).

However, all this information is refuted by official representatives of Russia. Putin’s press service called the article in Le Nouvel Observateur “an insinuation of a provocative nature.” Answering the question “why did the Russian military not reach Tbilisi,” Russia’s permanent representative to NATO D. O. Rogozin said on August 22, 2008 that the Russian leadership did not have a goal to reach Tbilisi, since Russia’s only goal was “ save Ossetians from physical destruction.” The French side did not refute the article in Le Nouvel Observateur.

12th of August

On August 12, at a working meeting in the Kremlin with Defense Minister A. E. Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff N. E. Makarov, Russian President D. A. Medvedev said that “based on the report, he decided to complete the operation to force Georgia to peace”: “ The safety of our peacekeeping forces and civilians has been restored. The aggressor was punished and suffered significant losses. His armed forces are disorganized. If pockets of resistance and other aggressive attacks arise, make decisions about destruction.”

After this, during the visit to Moscow of the EU Chairman, French President N. Sarkozy, during a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, six principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon (Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan):

1. Refusal to use force.
2. The final cessation of all hostilities.
3. Free access to humanitarian aid.
4. Return of the Georgian Armed Forces to their places of permanent deployment.
5. The withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the line preceding the start of hostilities.
6. The beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security.

After this, President N. Sarkozy visited Tbilisi, where he held a meeting with the President of Georgia M. Saakashvili.

On August 12, Chechen President R. A. Kadyrov announced his readiness to send 10 thousand people to support Russian peacekeepers. Kadyrov called the actions of the Georgian authorities a crime, noting that the Georgian side committed murders of civilians.

August 13

Georgia said Russian troops in armored vehicles entered the city of Gori.

According to an AFP correspondent, a column of Russian military equipment left the Georgian city of Gori and headed towards Tbilisi. A dozen and a half tanks, which CNN showed the day before, claiming that they were heading towards Tbilisi, were discovered by the Russian military near Gori and removed from this region in order to ensure the safety of the civilian population, as stated by Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. A. Nogovitsyn: “There are no Russian tanks in Gori, and there could not be.” Russian General Staff: “Near Gori there were not tanks, but armored personnel carriers.”

Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov confirmed the presence of the Russian army near the Georgian cities of Gori and Senaki, but denied information about their presence in Poti.

A representative of the peacekeeping forces categorically denied the statements of the Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, Alexander Lomai, about the bombing of the Georgian city of Gori by the Russian military and the introduction of Cossacks there.

Radio “Echo of Moscow” claimed that the “Vostok” battalion of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the Russian Ministry of Defense was present in the area of ​​the Georgian city of Gori.

On August 13, Georgia accepted a conflict resolution plan, but with reservations. Thus, at the request of the Georgian president, the point about starting a discussion of the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was removed. French President N. Sarkozy confirmed M. Saakashvili's statement, adding that the point about starting a discussion of the future status of the two unrecognized republics was removed with the consent of Russian President D. A. Medvedev. This paragraph was reformulated as it allowed for an ambiguous interpretation. After the changes were made, Saakashvili announced that he was signing the settlement plan and accepting the terms of the ceasefire in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

According to N. Sarkozy, “a six-point text cannot answer all questions. It doesn’t completely solve the problem.”

August 14

There was an attack by unknown persons on UN employees in Gori, Ekho Moskvy reported with reference to France Presse.

According to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, at 14:00 Russian troops completely occupied the territory of the city of Gori. The Russian side denied this. The head of the information and analytical department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs said that Russian troops are mining Gori and Poti.

Russian troops handed over control of Gori to Georgian police. Major General Alexander Borisov officially confirmed that Georgian police can safely enter Gori for joint patrols. Several groups of journalists entered Gori along with the Georgian police. Some of them had their cars taken away (journalists blamed Ossetian militias for this). Georgian special forces were spotted in the vicinity of Gori. The situation in the city and its environs has deteriorated again. Shelling and constant looting continued.

The Russian military must leave the city in two to three days, which will be needed to repair armored vehicles.

August 15

“The peacekeeping force in South Ossetia will be increased, it will be given armored vehicles,” said Lieutenant General Nikolai Uvarov, an official representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, in an interview with RIA Novosti on August 15.

“We will definitely draw lessons from the events in South Ossetia. The group of peacekeepers that will remain here on a permanent basis will be increased. Peacekeepers will be armed not only with small arms, but also with heavy military equipment, including tanks,” said a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Georgian police, to whom General Vyacheslav Borisov had transferred control over the city of Gori the day before, were, by his order, withdrawn from there again and located a kilometer away.

August 16

On August 16, Russian President D. A. Medvedev signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Prior to this, the document was signed by the leaders of the unrecognized states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the President of Georgia M. Saakashvili. The signing of this document by the parties to the conflict finally marked the end of hostilities.

Terrorist attacks, shelling and assassination attempts after the ceasefire

• On October 3, 2008, a Georgian car brought for inspection was blown up near the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali. Seven Russian servicemen were killed, including the chief of the Joint Headquarters of the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, Ivan Petrik. The power of the explosive device is estimated at 20 kg of TNT.
• On October 3, an attempt was made on the life of the head of the administration, Anatoly Margiev, in the Leningorsky district.
• On October 5, in Tskhinvali, an employee of a Russian construction company rebuilding South Ossetia was killed as a result of shelling from the Georgian side. The shelling was carried out by people in the uniform of Georgian special forces.
• On October 6, an explosive device was detonated in front of the lead vehicle of a column of Russian peacekeepers being withdrawn from Georgian territory, northeast of Zugdidi.
• In November 2008, the situation in the conflict zone remained tense. There were reports of explosions and shelling with casualties in the area of ​​the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Similar information came from the Georgian-Abkhaz border.

Losses of the parties and casualties of the war

Military and civilian casualties

South Ossetia: Official data

Official data

By the evening of August 8, preliminary data on casualties appeared: as the president of the unrecognized republic, Eduard Kokoity, said in an interview with the Interfax news agency, over 1,400 people became victims of the attack by Georgian troops on South Ossetia. On the morning of August 9, the official representative of the South Ossetian government, Irina Gagloeva, reported 1,600 dead. On the evening of August 9, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko said that at least 2,000 residents of Tskhinvali (about 3% of the population of South Ossetia) had died.

On August 11, official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Boris Malakhov said that, according to updated data, approximately 1,600 civilians were killed in the conflict zone.

Data on a limited number of wounded were confirmed by the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The information department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations reported on August 12 that there are 178 people affected by Georgian military operations in South Ossetia, including 13 children, in medical institutions in North Ossetia. According to the head of the Federal Medical and Biological Agency Vladimir Uiba, among children “ no seriously wounded", there are " tangential wounds, as well as shrapnel wounds, but somatic diseases and psychological trauma predominate».

On August 16, South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev said that the final death toll was still unclear, but it was already clear that more than 2,100 people had died.

Final official data were reported on August 20; According to Irina Gagloeva, in total, South Ossetia lost 1,492 people killed during the conflict.

At the same time, the South Ossetian prosecutor’s office reported on August 20 that “as a result of the armed aggression of the Georgian army,” the deaths of 69 residents of South Ossetia, including three children, were “established and documented.” According to prosecutors, this list will grow because it does not include those killed in rural areas.

On August 20, the deputy head of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Prosecutor's Office (SKP), Boris Salmaksov, said that it is not yet possible to accurately establish the number of deaths in Tskhinvali as a result of Georgian aggression. According to B. Salmaksov, the opportunity to determine the number of deaths will appear “only when all the refugees who, except for Vladikavkaz, are in various regions of the Southern Federal District, have dispersed throughout the country, and gone abroad have been questioned.” B. Salmaksov said that the UPC has information about 133 dead. He emphasized that many of the graves remaining in South Ossetia after the Georgian attack have not been opened.

On August 22, Deputy Speaker of the South Ossetian Parliament Torzan Kokoiti said that the number of deaths in South Ossetia as a result of Georgian aggression, according to preliminary data from the South Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs, amounted to 2,100 people.

On August 28, the Prosecutor General of South Ossetia, Teimuraz Khugaev, stated: “ As of August 28, we have data on 1,692 people killed and 1,500 wounded as a result of Georgian aggression».

On September 5, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office (SKP), Alexander Bastrykin, said that the committee's investigators had documented the deaths of 134 civilians.

On September 17, the Prosecutor General of South Ossetia, Taimuraz Khugaev, said in an interview that 1,694 died in the war, including 32 military personnel and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic.

On July 3, 2009, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office (SKP), A. I. Bastrykin, stated that 162 civilians became victims of genocide and 255 were injured. However, according to him, this is not final data.

Other data

Representatives of the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch in Vladikavkaz questioned the statements of the Ossetian authorities about the number of deaths. According to Tatyana Lokshina, a representative of the organization, the data on the huge number of killed is not confirmed by the recorded number of wounded. Lokshina notes that “ From the morning of August 9 to the evening of August 10, a total of 52 wounded were admitted [to the hospital]. Moreover, 90% of these wounded are military personnel, 10% are civilians. We are not trying to claim that these statistics are representative, but hospital management reports that the wounded pass through them" According to her, official data on the number of killed is not confirmed by the testimony of refugees from Tskhinvali who arrived in North Ossetia after the end of the fighting in this city. As an employee of the organization told the Ekho Moskvy radio station, as of August 14, less than 50 dead and 273 wounded were registered in the central hospital of Tskhinvali (among the wounded, the majority were military). Human Rights Watch emphasized that these data do not include the number of deaths in various villages near Tskhinvali. At the same time, a representative of the organization said in an interview with REGNUM on August 14: “But we also talked with residents who buried the dead in their courtyards and gardens... Taking this into account, the figures given to us by the doctors - 273 wounded and 44 killed - are not exhaustive.”. Also, in this regard, it should be noted that the only hospital in Tskhinvali was destroyed on August 8 by Georgian troops. Heavy fire from Georgian troops at the hospital greatly limited the ability to transport the wounded there.

According to Human Rights Watch, a significant portion of the dead in South Ossetia were armed militias, who cannot be counted as civilian casualties.

However, according to human rights activist, director of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights Alexander Brod, Human Rights Watch significantly underestimates the death toll. According to him, some foreign organizations are silent about the victims and destruction in South Ossetia: “ Either this is silence, or, as on the part of Human Rice Watch, the death toll is clearly underestimated (they say that 44 people died). In Tskhinvali we were shown a whole street where the rubble had not yet been cleared, under which were the bodies of civilians who were sleeping, calmed down by Saakashvili’s promises not to start military operations».

A journalist from the Ukrainian news agency Donbass Internet Newspaper expressed the opinion that allegedly some of the photographs presented at the photo exhibition “South Ossetia: Chronicle of Genocide” were taken in the Georgian city of Gori.

On August 29, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg also suggested that Human Rights Watch's figures were underestimated: “I don’t want to politicize the debate around the victims of the conflict, but, in any case, the death toll appears to be higher than the number of clearly identified victims that was given by some organizations, for example, Human Rights Watch.”. Hammarberg noted: “many reports say that people buried the dead in their homes, in their cities due to problems with decomposing bodies”.

On September 4, the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” published a list of 310 people killed, indicating their full name, age, cause of death and place of burial. As of September 26, the death toll increased to 364 people. This list is not final and is updated as accurate information is established about persons whose fate has not been reliably established, or there is hope that the people are alive. On October 28, this list consisted of 365 people.

At the same time, the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” was unavailable to HRW and Memorial workers who tried to contact them to clarify details.

The Regnum agency also published a list of those killed during the fighting. Referring to information from its own audit, the agency questioned 8 items on this list. According to the agency, 5 people from the list died before the August events. For another 3 people, the agency was confused by the absence of their names in the list of victims for this locality (Khetagurovo). As of September 4, 2008, the Regnum agency list contained 311 names of the dead.

However, a list of the dead by name remains the only way to calculate the real number of dead, based on verifiable data. On this occasion, a member of the Memorial Human Rights Center A. Cherkasov said: “It is possible to compile lists of names, and only name lists can give us this figure.”

On November 10, the American magazine Business Week reported that, according to estimates by the human rights organization Human Rights Watch (HRW), between 300 and 400 civilians in South Ossetia were killed as a result of the Georgian attack. Business Week also reported that HRW “denied claims, widely circulated in Western media and the Internet during the conflict, that it initially counted only 44 dead in South Ossetia”.

Official Russian data

According to preliminary information from Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces A. A. Nogovitsyn, as of August 13, the losses of Russian military personnel numbered 74 dead, 19 missing, and 171 wounded.

On August 12, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that conscripts are not participating in hostilities in South Ossetia; only contract soldiers are performing combat missions. A representative of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces said that a small number of conscripts took part in the hostilities.

New data was released on September 3 by the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Russian Federation S. N. Fridinsky; According to them, the losses of Russian military personnel amounted to 71 people killed and 340 wounded. The list of killed Russian military personnel of the Russian agency Regnum has one more name than in the official figures.

As of mid-2009, official information about the losses of the Russian armed forces during the conflict remains contradictory. In February, Deputy Defense Minister Army General Nikolai Pankov said that 64 servicemen were killed (according to the list of surnames), 3 were missing and 283 were injured. However, in August, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reported 48 dead and 162 wounded. The reasons for this discrepancy in numbers are unknown.

Other data

According to Georgian data, Russia significantly underestimated its losses. So on August 12, Georgian President Saakashvili announced that the Georgian Armed Forces had killed 400 Russian soldiers.

The Georgian news agency Medianews disseminated information about losses among Russian military personnel and equipment, many times higher than the losses reported by both the Russian side and Georgian officials: “As a result of the fighting in the Tskhinvali region, the Russian 58th Army lost 1,789 soldiers, 105 tanks, 81 combat vehicles, 45 armored personnel carriers, 10 Grad devices and 5 Smerch devices.”. The Georgian website “Our Abkhazia” on August 12, citing unnamed Russian sources, pointed to a large number of people killed in Tskhinvali, from which some also unnamed newspaper commentators concluded that this indicates “about the huge losses of the Russian army, etc. "volunteers". The publication used a catchy headline for this article: “There are so many corpses of Russian soldiers in Georgia that they are not being taken to Russia”.

Official data of Georgia

On August 10, a source in the Georgian government reported that at this point, since the beginning of the conflict, 130 citizens of the country had been killed, and another 1,165 were injured. This number includes both military and civilians who died on Georgian territory as a result of Russian air raids.

On August 13, after the end of hostilities, Georgian Health Minister Sandro Kvitashvili announced that 175 citizens of the country had died during the conflict; these data are not final.

• Ministry of Defense - 133 dead, 70 missing, 1199 wounded
• Ministry of Internal Affairs - 13 dead, 209 injured
• Civilians - 69 dead, 61 injured

In total, 215 were killed, 70 were missing and 1,469 citizens of the country were injured.

On September 15, the data on losses was clarified: the deaths of 154 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 14 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 188 civilians were reported; In addition, the bodies of 14 dead servicemen have not been found. Taking into account new data, Georgia's losses amount to 356 people killed.

• List of killed civilians in Georgian. In Russian-language blogs there are amateur translations from Georgian into Russian, the list shows the name, surname, and locality. There are a total of 228 people on the list, opposite 62 names there is a sign “information is being verified.”
• List of dead military and police officers: the official list of names was published on September 25 in English.

As new information becomes available, the lists are updated. There are a total of 169 people on this list.

• This brings the total number of those killed according to official death tolls to 397, with 62 deaths not officially confirmed. Data on some of those killed cannot be double-checked due to the lack of opportunity for Georgian officials to work in the territory controlled by the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and the Russian military.

Other data

Journalists from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, who were in Tbilisi on August 11, quoted an unnamed Georgian army officer, according to whom his unit delivered almost 200 killed Georgian soldiers and officers from South Ossetia to the hospital in Gori alone.

Some Russian sources accused Georgia of significantly understating the losses suffered. Some Russian information portals published expert opinions about huge losses among Georgian military personnel. According to the assumptions of Russian military experts, expressed in the Vesti news program on the Rossiya TV channel on August 15, the losses of the Georgian army could amount to 1.5-2 thousand people killed and up to 4 thousand wounded. On September 15, an unnamed Russian intelligence source said that Georgia had lost about 3,000 security personnel during the war. Information also appeared in the media that the Georgian armed forces were not taking action to remove the corpses of dead Georgian soldiers from the Tskhinvali region, and also that some of the dead Georgian soldiers were buried without identification in mass graves. These circumstances also gave rise to speculation in some media that the Georgian side is somewhat underestimating its military losses. It should be noted that unconfirmed by data from independent sources, these reports remain only speculation.

Casualties among journalists

• Alexander Klimchuk (collaborated with ITAR-TASS, Russian Newsweek) and Grigol Chikhladze were killed by fire from Ossetian militias.
• In the same incident, journalists of the Georgian English-language newspaper “The Messenger” Teimuraz Kiguradze and Winston Featherly (US citizen) were injured.
• Special correspondent of Komsomolskaya Pravda Alexander Kots was wounded by Georgian troops.

• Pyotr Gassiev, producer of the NTV television company, was wounded.
• Military correspondent of the Vesti TV channel Alexander Sladkov, cameraman Leonid Losev and video engineer Igor Uklein were wounded.

• Two Turkish journalists were wounded.

• In the morning, on the main square of Gori, in front of the city administration building, Dutch journalist and documentary filmmaker, 39-year-old Stan Storimans (TV channel RTL-2), was killed and his colleague Jeroen Akkermans was wounded. According to statements by the human rights organization Human Rights Watch and the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this happened as a result of Russian aerial bombardment with RBK-250 cluster bombs.
• At the same time, Tzadok Yehezkeli, a correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronot, was seriously wounded.

• Georgian television correspondent Tamara Urushadze was slightly injured live on air. She was allegedly wounded by a sniper.

Refugees

On August 15, official representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ron Redmond said that more than 118 thousand people became refugees as a result of the conflict, including about 30 thousand South Ossetian refugees in Russia, another 15 thousand people (ethnic Georgians ) moved from South Ossetia to Georgia and another 73 thousand people left their homes in Georgia, including the majority of Gori residents.

The Guardian of 1 September 2008 reported what they claimed were eyewitness accounts of the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population on 12 August 2008 in the village of Karaleti and neighboring villages north of Gori.

Russian media and officials (including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin) have repeatedly stated ethnic cleansing of the Ossetian population. The wording “genocide” is predominantly used.

Russian citizens held by Georgia

According to news agencies (RIA Novosti, Interfax, Vesti.ru), according to eyewitnesses, tourists - Russian citizens, vacationing in Georgia, were detained by the Georgian authorities, who do not allow them to leave the country. Georgian police detain them at checkpoints at the exit from populated areas. Many Russian citizens are in Georgia with young children. Russian citizens are also blocked from traveling to Armenia, Turkey and Tbilisi. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on August 10 that Georgia’s detention of Russian citizens “will be the subject of discussion in international organizations.”

On August 11, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a note to Georgia that as of August 10, at least 356 Russian citizens (among those who applied to the embassy in Tbilisi) cannot leave Georgian territory. “We demand that the Georgian authorities stop violating international norms. All responsibility for the consequences of such a situation falls on the Georgian side.”

According to Novye Izvestia, the Russian Embassy in Georgia did not organize the evacuation. The press service of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that they had not received instructions from the Foreign Ministry to organize a centralized evacuation. Information about the detention of Russian citizens was denied by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Grigol Vashadze and the head of the press center of the Georgian border police Lela Mchedlidze. They claimed that “Russians who left Georgia and flew from Yerevan did not have any obstacles when leaving Georgia.”

Russian citizens held by South Ossetia

According to the Kommersant newspaper dated September 1, 2008, two residents of North Ossetia, Vadim and Vladislav Kozaev, who left for Tskhinvali on August 9, 2008 to take their mother to Russia, on the way to Tskhinvali, in Java, unexpectedly encountered the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity, whom they knew personally. The brothers accused Kokoity of “knowing in advance about the upcoming military events, he left Tskhinval without taking care of the evacuation of civilians, old people, women, and children.” Kokoity's guards beat and detained the brothers; they were charged with “splitting Ossetian society.” At a press conference, Kokoity said that Russian citizens were not going to be released. On September 10, 2008, the Kozaev brothers, having been in prison for exactly a month, crossed the Roki tunnel and found themselves on Russian territory.

Destruction and losses in technology

According to the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces, 10 border South Ossetian settlements have been “completely wiped off the face of the earth.”

The Memorial human rights center reported that the Georgian villages of South Ossetia Kekhvi, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Eredvi, Vanati, Avnevi were almost completely burned. The destruction of Georgian villages was confirmed in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper by Eduard Kokoity.

On August 17, Deputy Minister of Regional Development of the Russian Federation Vladimir Blank said that out of more than 7,000 buildings in Tskhinvali, every tenth cannot be restored, and 20% received varying degrees of damage. This damage estimate is much lower than previously reported. In the first days of the conflict, information appeared in the media that by August 9 the city of Tskhinvali was almost completely destroyed; According to the official representative of the South Ossetian government, Irina Gagloeva, about 70% of residential buildings in the city were destroyed. Subsequently, the Minister of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu clarified that more than 2,500 residential buildings were destroyed, of which 1,100 could not be restored.

According to Alexander Brod, “the Jewish quarter of Tskhinval, destroyed during the Georgian aggression, made a depressing impression on international representatives.” However, Andrei Illarionov, who, according to him, visited the ruins of the Jewish quarter in October 2008, said that this part of the city gave him the impression of a long-abandoned place. According to Illarionov’s observations, bushes and trees up to several meters high grow right in the middle of the ruins. The quarter was indeed destroyed back in 1991-1992 by missile and artillery attacks by Georgian troops and military operations and was abandoned by its residents.

On August 22, Vice Speaker of the South Ossetian Parliament Tarzan Kokoity said that the entire territory of South Ossetia, with the exception of the Leningorsky region, which Georgia considered its own, came under fire from heavy guns and multiple launch rocket systems. “In Tskhinvali itself, the Elektrovibromashina, Emalprovod, mechanical, and underwear knitwear factories were destroyed. Today, there is no point in talking about the fact that the republic has its own industry,” said T. Kokoity.

During the fighting, the buildings and barracks of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the so-called Southern (Upper) Gorodok, located on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali, were partially destroyed and damaged.

There have been numerous cases of arson and looting in Georgian villages bordering South Ossetia by South Ossetian formations.

The Georgian authorities accused the Russian armed forces of vandalism, including causing damage to unique historical monuments, and ecocide, namely setting fire to forests in the Borjomi National Park during a military operation in the country.

The destruction of a railway bridge in the Cape region of Georgia was reported.

Losses in Georgian equipment

Georgian aviation losses

In total, information was received from the South Ossetian and Russian sides at different times about four downed Georgian planes and one helicopter. The Georgian side stated that it had no losses in the air, but admitted the destruction of three An-2s at the Marneuli airfield as a result of Russian air strikes on August 8. In addition, at the captured Senaki airfield, Russian troops destroyed three helicopters (one Mi-14 and two Mi-24).

The Georgian magazine Arsenal reported that one Georgian helicopter (most likely an Mi-24) crashed during the fighting. Perhaps we are talking about a helicopter shot down on August 9th from a ZU-23-2 launcher.

Losses in Georgian armored vehicles

On the first day of the war, South Ossetian representatives reported that by a certain point, 3 Georgian tanks had been knocked out in Tskhinvali, and one T-72 was personally knocked out by the former Minister of Defense of the unrecognized republic, Anatoly Barankevich.

By the end of the first day of hostilities, a source in Russian security forces reported that Russian troops had destroyed a large number of Georgian armored vehicles. During the evening assault on Tskhinvali on August 9, according to the South Ossetian side, 12 Georgian tanks were knocked out.

On the Internet there are photographs of 9 Georgian tanks destroyed in Tskhinvali and the surrounding area (all T-72), as well as photographs of about 20 tanks abandoned by Georgian soldiers and blown up by advancing soldiers of the 42nd motorized rifle division.

Georgian fleet losses

Russian ships sunk two Georgian boats that tried to attack them. Allegedly, these are boats of projects 205 and 1400M “Grif”.

According to the Kommersant-Vlast magazine, the Georgian fleet was destroyed “almost completely”: two boats were lost in naval battles, several more (up to 10) were destroyed from the air and scuttled by Russian paratroopers at the piers in Poti.

Captured equipment

On August 19, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Anatoly Nogovitsyn said that part of the weapons and military equipment left by the Georgian army in the fighting in South Ossetia will be transferred to the Russian army, and the other part will be destroyed. According to Rosbalt, Russian peacekeepers and units captured more than 100 armored vehicles in the conflict zone, including 65 tanks. On August 19, US White House press secretary Gordon Johndroe called on Russia to return American military equipment captured during the conflict, if any. On August 22, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Anatoly Nogovitsyn said that the request of the US authorities to return the American equipment seized from the Georgian military was incorrect.

Losses in Russian technology

Russian aviation losses

Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia Alexander Lomaya and Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili announced on August 8 that 4 Russian aircraft were shot down in the conflict zone; A search is underway for the wreckage and the ejected pilot, but the Russian Foreign Ministry called this information “nonsense.” Subsequently, the number of declared downed aircraft constantly grew; By the end of the conflict, the Georgian side reported 21 planes and 3 helicopters shot down.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has officially acknowledged the loss of four of its aircraft - three Su-25 attack aircraft and one Tu-22M3 bomber (or reconnaissance aircraft). In addition, it is known that after the end of hostilities, on the night of August 16-17, as a result of an accident during landing, the Mi-8 helicopter of the border service of the FSB of the Russian Federation burned down.

Some experts have expressed the opinion that the real losses of the Russian Air Force are somewhat higher than those recognized. Thus, the head of the Center for Military Forecasting, Anatoly Tsyganok, immediately after the end of hostilities, estimated the losses of Russian aviation at seven aircraft (six Su-25 and one Tu-22M). According to another expert, Said Aminov, Russian aviation losses amounted to seven aircraft (four Su-25, two Su-24 and one Tu-22M) and possibly one helicopter (Mi-24). In July 2009, an article was published in the Moscow Defense Brief magazine, which talks about the downing of six Russian Air Force aircraft and provides the circumstances of the loss of each of them; the author of the article, Anton Lavrov, also claims that three of the six downed planes could have been hit by “friendly fire.” On August 4, 2010, a report by independent experts was published, which said that 6 planes were shot down: three Su-25s, two Su-24s and one Tu-22M3.

Losses in Russian armored vehicles

Alexander Lomaia said on August 9 that Georgian forces in South Ossetia had knocked out 10 units of Russian armored vehicles. At the end of the day, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia Eka Zguladze announced the destruction of 40 Russian tanks on the approaches to Tskhinvali.

Detailed information is available about the loss of only 3 Russian tanks - T-72B(M) (141st separate tank battalion of the 19th motorized rifle division), T-62M (presumably No. 232u) of the 70th motorized rifle regiment of the 42nd motorized rifle division) and T-72 (No. 321 of the 1st company of the tank battalion of the 693rd motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division). For the rest of the allegedly destroyed Russian tanks, the evidence is only oral assurances from the Georgian military and politicians about generalized losses.

According to Gazeta.ru correspondent Ilya Azar, who visited Tskhinvali, Russian peacekeeping troops lost a large number of infantry fighting vehicles at the beginning of hostilities. However, neither the total number of lost infantry fighting vehicles nor their type is specified. On August 4, 2010, a report by independent experts was published - which stated the following losses: three tanks - T-72B(M), T-72B and T-62M, nine BMP-1, three BMP-2, two BTR-80, one BMD -2, three BRDM-2 and one MT-LB destroyed by enemy fire. Of the destroyed vehicles, these are: 20 units on the territory of the Russian peacekeeping battalion, ten more GAZ-66 trucks, which were part of the mortar batteries of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, and two Urals cargo trucks.

There were no statements from Russian officials about the total number of lost armored vehicles.

Legal assessments of the parties' actions

Statements by Russian officials have repeatedly referred to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia as aggression. From the point of view of international law, aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, while by the time the war began, the independence of South Ossetia was not recognized by any state in the world. At the same time, Russia’s entry into the war may formally fall under the definition of aggression, since such an invasion “cannot be justified by any considerations of any nature, be it political, economic, military or other nature.” However, according to the report of the European commission of inquiry into the circumstances of the war, Russia's protection of its peacekeepers served as a sufficient basis for intervention in the conflict, but not enough for the introduction of troops into actually Georgia.

At the same time, from the conclusions of the report it follows that Georgia (the first) violated international law by using armed force against Russian military personnel (peacekeepers) without justification, and the use of armed force against South Ossetia was unjustified and disproportionate, since, according to the authors of the report, many hours shelling of Tskhinvali using heavy artillery and MLRS cannot be interpreted as self-defense.

War crimes in the conflict zone

Russia and South Ossetia on the one hand, and Georgia on the other hand, accuse each other of crimes and ethnic cleansing. Journalists, human rights activists and others have also alleged war crimes during the conflict.

The Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation expressed its intention to bring charges against the Georgian side under the articles “planning, preparing, unleashing or waging an aggressive war”, “use of prohibited means and types of weapons”, “mercenarism”, “attack on persons or institutions that enjoy international protection” , “genocide”, “murder of two or more persons, committed in a generally dangerous manner, motivated by racial and national hatred.”

On August 11-12, 2008, the Georgian government filed lawsuits against Russia at the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Both claims were accepted for consideration. A lawsuit against Russia in 49 cases of injured 340 civilians was filed with the European Court of Human Rights by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association in connection with the violation of such rights as “the right to life, the right to property, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment.”

In November 2008, the human rights organization Amnesty International published a report according to which:

• During the assault on Tskhinvali, the Georgian army carried out indiscriminate attacks, as a result of which dozens of South Ossetian civilians were killed and many were injured, as well as significant damage to infrastructure (public buildings, hospitals, schools);
• The main destruction of Tskhinvali was caused by the Grad multiple launch rocket systems used by the Georgian army, the missiles of which have low accuracy.
• During the conflict, Russian aviation carried out more than 75 air raids, most of which targeted the positions of the Georgian army. Villages and towns were hit by airstrikes, with damage “limited to a few streets and individual houses in some villages.”
• There is evidence that some Russian attacks on Georgian towns and roads have resulted in civilian injuries and deaths, with "perhaps no distinction being made between legitimate military targets and civilians." As the report writes, “if this is indeed the case, then such attacks qualify as indiscriminate attacks and constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.”
• As the report states, “according to eyewitnesses, the disciplined behavior of Russian military personnel differed sharply from the actions of Ossetian fighters and militia groups, who were seen in looting and robberies.” Georgians interviewed by Amnesty International noted that Russian military personnel “generally behaved decently towards Georgian civilians and showed proper discipline.”
• South Ossetian units and paramilitary forces committed serious crimes against Georgians in South Ossetia and its surrounding territories. Eyewitnesses reported unlawful killings, beatings, threats, arson and robberies carried out by armed groups on the South Ossetian side.

January 23, 2009 international human rights organization Human Rights Watch released the “Up in Flames” report, several months in the making (over 460 eyewitnesses to the war were interviewed), which concluded that Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian armed forces committed numerous violations of humanitarian law, resulting in the death of civilians; the authors of the report call on Moscow and Tbilisi to investigate the crimes and punish the perpetrators. In the 147-page report, the Georgian side was accused of indiscriminate use of weapons during the shelling of Tskhinvali, neighboring villages and during the subsequent offensive, as well as beating detainees and robberies. The South Ossetian side was accused of torture, murder, rape, robbery and ethnic cleansing. The Russian side was accused of robbery. HRW also stated that numerous accusations by the Russian side of the Georgian army of genocide and massacres were not confirmed during verification, and HRW did not receive answers to a request to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office. According to HRW, individual facts of atrocities by the Georgian army, published in the Russian media, can be qualified as independent serious crimes, but not as an attempt at genocide.

Other legal aspects

International law expert at Birkbeck College, University of London, Bill Bowring, believes that Russia had grounds to send additional troops into South Ossetia. The head of the department at the University of Hamburg, Otto Luchterhandt, considers it legal to send Russian troops into South Ossetia and nearby territories, but not into western Georgia.

According to Article 102 of the Russian Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Federation Council includes “resolving the issue of the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation.” However, the Federation Council did not make such a decision regarding the dispatch of troops to the territory of Georgia before the start of the operation of Russian troops. Chairman of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov said on August 11 that the upper house of parliament would not hold an emergency meeting to agree to the entry of Russian troops into Georgia. “It is not a military contingent operating in South Ossetia. We are increasing the peacekeeping contingent, and this does not require the approval of the Federation Council.”

On August 18, 2008, the magazine “Vlast” expressed the opinion that, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the consent of the Federation Council to the entry of Russian troops into Georgia was required. The journalist recalled that earlier, in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation “On the procedure for providing the Russian Federation with military and civilian personnel to participate in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security,” the consent of the Federation Council was sought to increase the number of peacekeeping contingents abroad. The publication also recalled: “The same law says that “the decision to send individual military personnel outside the territory of the Russian Federation to participate in peacekeeping activities” is made by the president himself. If we recognize the thousands of troops sent into South Ossetia and Abkhazia as “individual military personnel,” then in this case the Federation Council really did not have to meet.”.

On August 25, 2008, Sergei Mironov said that the Federation Council will have to consider the issue of using “an additional contingent of peacekeeping forces represented by the Russian Armed Forces in the region of the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts from August 8,” saying that this issue was raised before the Federation Council by the President RF in accordance with the law and regulations of the chamber. On the same day, at a closed meeting, the Federation Council adopted resolutions “On the use of additional peacekeeping forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to maintain peace and security in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict” and “On the use of additional peacekeeping forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to maintain peace and security in zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict"

The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, approved on July 12, 2008 by Russian President D. Medvedev, states (paragraph III, 2): “Russia proceeds from the fact that only the UN Security Council has the authority to authorize the use of force to enforce peace.”

Information coverage of the conflict

Information coverage of the armed conflict in South Ossetia played a significant role, as it influenced public opinion regarding the actions of one side or another. Russian, Georgian, Western and other media sometimes provided conflicting information about the events of the conflict. Discussions about different interpretations also took place on the Internet, from harsh statements on blogs and forums to attacks on official government websites.

Geopolitical and economic consequences of the conflict

After the end of hostilities, the confrontation between the parties acquired a predominantly political and diplomatic character, largely moving into the sphere of international politics.

Economic consequences

The conflict had significant economic consequences.

In October 2008, Western countries announced the allocation of $4.55 billion in financial assistance to Georgia over 2008-2010 to overcome the results of the military conflict, of which 2.5 billion was a long-term low-interest loan, and 2 billion was a grant. According to a number of experts, this assistance played a major role in preventing the collapse of the Georgian economy.

The Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) has published new data on Russian losses during the five-day war in South Ossetia on August 8-12, 2008 - they amounted to three tanks, up to 20 armored vehicles and six aircraft.
These data are presented in the TsAST article “Losses of Russian military equipment” in the updated almanac “Tanks of August”.
The updated English version of the almanac was released last Friday.
“The Russian command never released official data on the losses of military equipment in the war. But the study of available photo and video materials, memories of war participants and media materials made it possible to make an independent calculation,” notes CAST.
So, during the fighting, the Russian side lost three tanks: one T-72B(M), one T-72B and one T-62. All of them were destroyed as a result of enemy fire. Light armored vehicles suffered significantly greater losses, at least 20 units. Russian forces are known to have lost at least nine BMP-1, three BMP-2, two BTR-80, one BMD-2, three BRDM-2 and one MT-LB in the conflict. (Most of the lost infantry fighting vehicles were in peacekeeping battalions: Russian and South Ossetian). No artillery installations, multiple launch rocket systems, or air defense systems were lost, the article notes.
Vehicle losses were also high. In the Southern peacekeepers camp, as a result of artillery and tank shelling of the Russian peacekeeping battalion on August 8, almost all the vehicles parked there were destroyed in the parking lot - and this is at least 20 units. During the fighting on August 9, Georgian artillery fire destroyed ten GAZ-66 trucks of mortar batteries of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments. Two Ural trucks were destroyed on the afternoon of August 11 as a result of an attack by Georgian Mi-24 helicopters. Several more trucks were involved in serious accidents.
During the fighting, six Russian aircraft were shot down: three Su-25, two Su-24 and one Tu-22M3. After the end of hostilities in South Ossetia, a plane crash occurred in which two Russian helicopters were lost - Mi-8MTKO and Mi-24.
The Russian Navy did not experience any loss of personnel or damage to equipment from enemy fire during combat operations.
Official personnel losses amounted to 67 military personnel. Sergeant Lejiev and the commander of the downed Tu-22M3, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Koventsov, are still listed as missing.
At the same time, the losses of the Georgian army were officially announced in 2008 and amounted to 170 military personnel and 14 police officers, up to 2 thousand people were injured, CAST notes.
During the hostilities, the Georgian military fleet was completely destroyed - two missile boats and five patrol boats. Aviation losses amounted to three An-2s, three Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14.
During the fighting, 15 tanks were destroyed, up to 20 tanks were burned on the spot (Gori region) after the fighting, 30 were taken by the Russian army as war trophies.
The Georgian army lost four BMP-2, three BTR-80, and four Cobra armored vehicles (Turkey) during the fighting. 15 BMP-1U (modernized in Ukraine) and two BMP-2 were taken as war trophies.
The Georgian artillery suffered losses in the form of four self-propelled guns of 203 mm caliber "Pion" and two "Dana" (Czech Republic) destroyed during the battles. As war trophies, the Russian army took one "Pion", two "Dana" and 20 non-self-propelled guns of various calibers.
In addition, the Georgian army lost a large amount of military transport equipment (at least 30-40 units).

LOSSES IN GEORGIA'S EQUIPMENT

Who: T-72AV tank (tactical number 109). Behind the exploded tank there is an abandoned whole tank (tactical number 111) which was taken as trophies. Tank unit not identified
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, Isak Kharebov street, entrance to Tskhinvali from the Zarskaya road, near the Oak Grove.
Shot down on August 8 by South Ossetian militias, or destroyed by Russian aircraft.

Who: T-72AV tank (tactical number 110). The tank's division has not been identified.
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali-Khetagurovo road, near the village of Tbet
Abandoned on the road on August 8th, blown up by passing Russian troops on August 9th.

Who: T-72AV tank (tactical number 125). The tank's division has not been identified.
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali-Khetagurovo road
Abandoned by Georgian troops on August 8. On August 9, while passing a column of the 1st battalion of the 135th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, it was blown up by Major Denis Vetchinov.

Who: 2 T-72B tanks (tactical numbers could not be determined) from the Gori separate tank battalion.
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali

Destroyed on the afternoon of August 8, between 13:00 and 14:00, by a group of militia of General Barankevich. Both crews were killed.

Who: T-72AV tank (unit and tactical number not established)
Where: Irrigation canal between Zemo-Nikozi and Tskhinvali, 400 meters southeast of the Southern Peacekeepers Camp.
The tank fired at the peacekeeping base and was hit on the morning of August 8 by return grenade fire from the peacekeepers' base.

Who: T-72B tank (unit and tactical number not established)
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, Heroes Street
It was hit and completely burned on August 8th. First, the tank's transmission was disabled, and then an RPG was fired at the rear of the turret, where there was no remote sensing.
The crew managed to get out of the tank, but were killed in a firefight.

Who: T-72AV tank (tactical number 425) from the Gori separate tank battalion.
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, territory of kindergarten No. 14
Was hit and abandoned by the crew on August 8 or 9.

Who: overturned T-72AV tank. Possibly from the mixed mechanized battalion of the 2nd Infantry Brigade
Where: Georgia, Surami settlement
Details unknown, possible non-combat loss.

Who: T-72B tank (tactical number 406) from the Gori separate tank battalion
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali
intersection of Moskovskaya and Privokzalnaya streets (Myrotvortsev)
Destroyed on the afternoon of August 8, between 13:00 and 14:00 by General Barankevich. An RPG-7 grenade launcher hit the rear of the turret and, as a result of the detonation of the ammunition, the tank was torn into pieces. The tower flew several tens of meters and broke through the reinforced concrete canopy of the Sovprof building.
The entire crew of tank No. 406
Lieutenant Romelashvili Georgiy Murazovich
Corporal Birtvelishvili Zaza Tamazovich
Corporal Sukhitashvili Otar Dimitrievich
officially listed as missing.

Who: T-72AV tank (tactical number not established) from the 4th Infantry Brigade
Where: Georgia, gardens near the village of Pkhvenisi
Destroyed on August 10 at approximately 23:00 by a Russian combat helicopter
In the conclusion of former Georgian Defense Minister Gia Karkarashvili, the loss of the tank is mentioned as follows:
“At approximately 23:00 on August 10, during the first flight, an enemy helicopter discovered and blew up a tank and a Hilux of the IV Brigade that had been placed without camouflage.
Two "Strelas", which were in service with the 43rd battalion, did not work (they turned out to be unusable). This was not the first time.
Since only a few dug trenches, and the helicopter was supposedly flying at an altitude of 100 meters, on the orders of the company commander
The train either simply did not dare to return machine-gun fire, or the commander forbade them to do so."

Who: T-72B tank (tactical number 209) from the 2nd Infantry Brigade
Where: Georgia, Senaki

Who: T-72B tank (tactical number 207) from the 2nd Infantry Brigade
Where: Georgia, Senaki
Discovered by Russian troops at a captured military base in Senaki and burned.

Who: Tank T-72B (tactical number 208) from the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces.
Where: Western Georgia
Captured by Russian troops at a military base in Senaki. During the transfer to Abkhazia, it broke down under its own power and was burned on the road from the inside.

Who: destroyed Georgian T-72 tanks of various modifications
Where: Georgia, near the city of Gori
In addition to combat losses, after the end of hostilities, 15-20 Georgian T-72 tanks were captured by Russian troops at a military base in Gori and destroyed by explosion in the vicinity of the city by units of the 42nd motorized rifle division
In total, taking into account captured and destroyed vehicles, Georgian tank losses can be estimated at 55-60 vehicles (all T-72), which is almost half of all T-72 tanks that the Georgian army had at the beginning of the war (about 120 units).

Abandoned Georgian T-72B No. 329.

Park of captured equipment in Tskhinvali

2. ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES

The Georgian BMP-2 was abandoned in Tskhinvali by the crew...

A Georgian infantry fighting vehicle was blown up on the Gori-Tbilisi highway during the retreat of the Georgian army.

A Georgian BMP-2 was burned by a Russian SU-25 attack aircraft near the village of Kvemo-Rene.

Georgian BMP-2 - blown up by Russian units near Gori after the end of hostilities.

A damaged Georgian armored car OTOKAR "Cobra" on Stalin Street in Tskhinvali No. 307.

Ossetians on the captured Georgian armored car OTOKAR "Cobra" No. 09...

Burnt BTR-80 near Gori.

Transfer of captured Georgian Shkval infantry fighting vehicles to Russia. Ukrainian-made Shkval infantry fighting vehicles were abandoned by Georgian troops at the military base in Gori in full force (15 vehicles).

Captured Georgian Hummer armored vehicles in Poti...

3. ARTILLERY, self-propelled guns and MLRS

Georgian D-30s, abandoned and destroyed at firing positions near Gori...

Georgian D-30s abandoned in Kodori (Abkhazia); in total, in the Kodori Gorge, Abkhaz formations captured 6 Georgian D-30s and about 2,000 shells for them.

The damaged Georgian howitzer "Msta-B" was hit by counter-battery fire from Russian artillery: the shell fuse was set to high-explosive and went off underground.
The gun suffered mechanical damage and could not be repaired (data from the militarykavkaz.net forum)

An abandoned Georgian MTLB with an MT-12 "Rapier" cannon near the village of Akhalsheni...

Captured Georgian guns in Tskhinvali...

Burnt Georgian self-propelled guns VZ.77 ZTS "DANA" in the Gori area
Burned by Russian aircraft. According to other sources, they were burned by the Georgians during their retreat...

Abandoned and captured VZ.77 ZTS "DANA"

Captured Georgian self-propelled gun 2S7 "PION"

Launch container from the Georgian MLRS LAR-160 in Kodori. According to some reports, 1 Georgian MLRS LAR-160 was destroyed in Kodori (Abkhazia).

4. AVIATION

Georgian MI-24 - destroyed by a group of Russian paratroopers at the captured Georgian airbase in Senaki...

Georgian MI-24 - destroyed by a Russian MI-24 combat helicopter during a raid on the Georgian airbase in Senaki...

Destroyed Georgian MI-14BT helicopter - destroyed by a Russian MI-24 combat helicopter during a raid on the Georgian airbase in Senaki...

Destroyed Georgian AN-2 military transport aircraft in Marneuli - destroyed by missile and bomb attacks by Russian aviation on the Georgian air base in Marneuli:
In total, 3 aircraft and all transport vehicles parked there were destroyed...

Missile boat of the Georgian Navy "Tbilisi"
Airborne number 302. Project 206MR, built in 1981, displacement 268 tons.
Armament: 2 P-15M anti-ship missiles, one 76-mm AU-176 gun mount, one 30-mm six-barreled AK-630M gun mount.
It was blown up at the pier on August 13, 2008 by a reconnaissance group of the Russian army that entered the Georgian Navy base in Poti. Completely burned out, after which it sank at the pier.
Restoration is not possible.

Flagship of the Georgian Navy, missile boat "Dioscuria"
tail number 303. Type "La Combattante II", built in 1971, displacement 255 tons (full).
Armament: 4 Exocet MM38 anti-ship missiles, two 35-mm twin Oerlikon gun mounts, two 533-mm torpedo tubes.
On August 13, 2008, at about 17:00, a reconnaissance group of the Russian army, which entered the Georgian Navy base in Poti, blew up the engine room of the boat, but it remained afloat.
On August 19, it was blown up again by Russian troops, after which it quickly sank off the pier. Completely disabled, restoration impossible.

Georgian Coast Guard patrol boat "R-204"
Airborne number R-204. Project 1400M patrol boat "Grif".
Armament: one 23-mm twin ZU-23-2
Sunk at the pier on August 13, 2008 by a reconnaissance group of the Russian army that entered the Georgian Navy base in Poti.
Subsequently, it was lifted from the water and placed on slips, then it was sold for scrap.

Georgian Navy patrol boat "Tskhaltubo"
Airborne number 101. Converted communications boat of Project 1387, built in 1964.
Armament: one 37-mm 70-K machine gun.
It was blown up at the pier on August 13, 2008 by a reconnaissance group of the Russian army that entered the Georgian Navy base in Poti.
It was subsequently raised from the water and sold for scrap.

In addition, in a naval clash off the coast of Abkhazia, Russian ships destroyed one of the Georgian patrol boats...

6. MILITARY TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT

Burnt Georgian KRAZ trucks from a column of the headquarters company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces near the Shindisi railway station.
The column was completely destroyed by Russian units - up to 15 Georgian soldiers were killed...

Destroyed Georgian KRAZ on the road near the village of Mereti. Destroyed by a Russian SU-25 attack aircraft during a raid on a Georgian convoy...

Burnt Georgian KRAZ near the village of Ergneti...

An abandoned Georgian KAMAZ (identified by black Georgian license plates) with broken tires near the village of Eredvi...

Military trucks "Dodge" and MAN

Georgian "Dodge" is a water carrier (or fuel tanker). Captured at a military base in Gori...

Non-combat loss - an accident on the Gori-Tbilisi highway during the retreat of Georgian troops...

Toyota Hilux and other passenger cars

A broken Georgian military Hilux pickup truck on the road between Tskhinvali and Variani.
Presumably came under attack from Russian aircraft...

Burnt Georgian military Toyota Hilux pickup trucks in the “oak grove” in the south of Tskhinvali...

A pile of burnt Georgian equipment from a column of the headquarters company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces near the Shindisi railway station...

A group of 10 Georgian Toyotas was destroyed by a Russian SU-25 attack aircraft in the gardens near the village of Mereti...

Destroyed headquarters "LAND ROVER" from the column of the headquarters company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces near the Shindisi railway station...

Abandoned Georgian military tractor/transporter MAZ-537 (partially burnt out)...

7.) Air defense and air defense systems

Abandoned S-60 anti-aircraft gun (with MTLB)...

Captured air defense system "BUK-M" and TZM (transport-loading vehicle). Captured at a military base in Senaki: a total of 2 air defense systems and 2 TZMs were captured...

Captured Georgian "BUKI" and TZM - are prepared for transportation to Russian territory on Georgian MAZ-537 transporters (also captured in the same area)...

Captured air defense system "OSA-AK" (captured in the Gori area)...

8). OTHER

Broken (or abandoned) mobile Georgian radar P-18

Destroyed civilian Georgian radar station in the area of ​​Tbilisi airport (was integrated into the Georgian air defense system)

Burning and abandoned IMR-2

Trophy BTS-2

In addition to military equipment, such interesting vehicles were captured at Georgian bases...

Mountains of Georgian weapons and ammunition...

Among domestic weapons, AK-47 and RPG-7 - in various conditions and from a variety of manufacturers - from the Czech Republic to Ukraine...

From foreign weapons - M4 "Bushmaster" rifles (USA) and "Negev" machine guns (Israel)

LOSSES OF RUSSIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Who: T-72BM/BU tank from the 141st separate tank battalion
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, Southern peacekeeping base.
Burned on 08/09/2008, at approximately 18-19 hours of the day on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali, at the location of the Russian peacekeepers’ base.
One of two tanks of the 141st brigade that broke through to the peacekeepers during an unsuccessful attempt to release them on the day of August 9 by the forces of the first battalion of the 135th motorized rifle regiment and the tank company of the 141st brigade.
The tank supported the peacekeepers with fire for several hours, ran out of ammunition and was damaged. The crew left it and joined the peacekeepers, after which on the evening of August 9 it departed with them.
The tank commander, Lieutenant Alexander Popov, was wounded in the leg.

Who: T-62M tank (tactical number 232) from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
Where: South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, Moskovskaya street
Shot down around noon on August 10 in Tskhinvali, on Moskovskaya Street. Two crew members were killed - the commander of the guard tank platoon, junior lieutenant Vitaly Neff, and the guard tank loader, private Serik Kumarov.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia took part in a number of wars. These military actions influenced the subsequent development of the Russian army, military equipment and military doctrine. One of the most striking examples of this is the reflection of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia by Russia and its allies, on the one hand, back in August 2008. Another name for this conflict is the “five-day war.”

Historical background

The border that arbitrarily divided the Ossetians between the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR was established back in Soviet times. Back then they could not even imagine that it would become the border between two unfriendly blocs.

While Georgia was part of the USSR, things were peaceful here, and there was no talk of a possible ethnic conflict. But everything changed after perestroika, when the Georgian authorities began to slowly but surely move towards gaining independence. It was when it became clear that the exit of the Georgian SSR from the Union was quite real that the South Ossetian leadership, mostly gravitating toward Russia, began to think about its own sovereignty. And as a result, already in 1989, the autonomy of South Ossetia was declared, and in 1990 - its full sovereignty.

However, the Georgian government was against it. At the same time, in 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the decree granting autonomy to South Ossetia invalid.

War 1991-1992

On January 5, 1991, Georgia sent a three-thousand-strong police force into the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali. However, just a few hours later, street fighting broke out in the city, often with the use of grenade launchers. During these battles, the futility of the decision of the Supreme Council of Georgia became obvious, and the Georgian detachment itself was gradually pushed back to the city center. As a result, the Georgian contingent was withdrawn to positions in the center of Tskhinvali, where they began to prepare for long-term defense.

On January 25, 1991, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Georgian contingent from Tskhinvali and their abandonment of the city, thanks to which the fire ceased for several days. However, new provocations from the Georgian side made the truce short-lived.

What also added fuel to the fire was the fact that, according to the Soviet constitution, autonomous entities within the Soviet socialist republics leaving the Union could independently make decisions about their stay within the USSR. Therefore, when Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1991, the South Ossetian leadership hastened to announce its continued stay in the USSR.

However, the conflict flared up. The Georgian police and army controlled the territory and heights near Tskhinvali, thanks to which they could launch artillery strikes on the city. The situation there became truly catastrophic: destruction, loss of life and appalling conditions did not add sympathy to the Georgian side.

On December 21, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of independence of the republic, and a month later a corresponding referendum was held. It should be noted that this referendum was mainly boycotted by the Georgian population of the republic, so the absolute majority of votes (about 99%) were cast for independence. Naturally, the Georgian government did not recognize either the independence of the region or the referendum.

The conflict ended quite quickly, and the cause was political instability in Georgia. At the end of 1991, a civil war broke out in this country, which significantly weakened Georgia’s position in the region. In addition, Russia, which was not happy with the smoldering hotbed of tension on the southern border, also intervened in the situation. Pressure was put on the Georgian government (even to the point of the possibility of an airstrike against Georgian forces in the Tskhinvali area), and in mid-July 1992 the shelling of the city stopped.

The result of this war was that the people and government of South Ossetia finally turned away from Georgia and continued to strive with all their might for recognition of their independence in the international arena. Total casualties during the conflict were approximately 1,000 killed and 2,500 wounded.

Period 1992-2008 Rising tensions

The period after the Georgian-South Ossetian war became a time of undulating tension in the region.

As a result of the conflict of 1991-1992. An agreement was reached between the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides on the deployment of a joint peacekeeping contingent to the territory of South Ossetia. This contingent consisted of three battalions (one from each side).

The first half of the nineties was characterized by a big diplomatic game played by all parties. On the one hand, South Ossetia sought to finally separate from Georgia in the eyes of the international community and become part of the Russian Federation. Georgia, in turn, methodically “squeezed out” South Ossetian independence and autonomy. The Russian side was interested in peace in South Ossetia, but soon focused its attention on Chechnya, another far from peaceful region.

However, negotiations continued throughout the first half of the nineties, and in October 1995, the first meeting between the Georgian and Ossetian sides took place in Tskhinvali. Representatives of Russia and the OSCE were present at the meeting. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to cancel the decree of the Georgian Supreme Council on the liquidation of the autonomy of South Ossetia, as well as the republic’s non-secession from Georgia. It is worth noting that, perhaps, the Russian leadership took such a step in exchange for Georgian President E. Shevardnadze’s non-recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and his support for the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya.

In the spring of 1996, a memorandum on the non-use of force in South Ossetia was signed in Moscow. It became a real step forward in Georgian-Ossetian relations. And on August 27 of the same year, the first meeting between Georgian President E. Shevardnadze and the Chairman of the Parliament (and in fact the head of state) of South Ossetia L. Chibirov took place. During this meeting, the parties outlined further ways to normalize the situation, however, after the meeting, E. Shevardnadze said that “it is too early to talk about the autonomy of South Ossetia.”

However, the situation by 2000 contributed to further peace in the region, the return of refugees and economic recovery. However, all the cards were confused by the coming to power in Georgia in January 2004 as a result of the “Rose Revolution” by M. Saakashvili. It was he who represented the young, nationalist-minded generation of Georgia, which, in pursuit of immediate success, did not disdain populist ideas, even if at times very absurd.

Even before his official election as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili visited South Ossetia, and this visit was not coordinated with the South Ossetian authorities. At the same time, he allowed himself the remark that “2004 will be the last year when South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not participate in elections in Georgia.” This statement contributed to the destabilization of the situation.

In 2004-2008 The situation around South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion on its territory continued to heat up. In the spring of 2006, the Georgian leadership declared Russian military personnel of the peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia to be criminals. The reason for such a loud statement was that the servicemen from Russia did not have visas issued by the Georgian side and were allegedly staying on Georgian territory illegally. At the same time, the Georgian side demanded either the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers or their “legalization.”

Meanwhile, fighting flared up in a number of regions of South Ossetia. Skirmishes, provocations and shelling, including mortar attacks, are no longer rare. At the same time, the overwhelming number of provocations were carried out by the Georgian side. It is also worth mentioning the May 2006 statement by then Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who stated that by May 1, 2007, South Ossetia would become part of Georgia. In response to this clearly provocative statement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov guaranteed assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression against them.

It was in 2006 that the process of confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia took final shape. The Georgian leadership, in its nationalist hysteria, continued to declare that Georgian territory must be inviolable and restored by any means, even military means. It is in this regard that Georgia has set a course for rapprochement with the United States and NATO. American military equipment and instructors arrived in the Georgian army and became frequent guests.

At the same time, South Ossetia from the very beginning of its existence adhered to an exclusively pro-Russian course, so its “peaceful” unification with Georgia after Saakashvili came to power could not happen in principle. In November 2006, a referendum on support for independence was held in South Ossetia. As a result, approximately 99% of the residents of South Ossetia who voted were in favor of maintaining the independence of the republic and continuing its foreign policy course.

Thus, by August 2008, the situation in the region had deteriorated to the limit and a peaceful resolution of the issue was practically impossible. The Georgian “hawks” led by Saakashvili could no longer retreat - otherwise they would have lost their prestige and weight in the eyes of the United States.

Start of hostilities on August 8

On August 8, 2008, approximately 15 minutes after midnight, the Georgian army suddenly opened fire on Tskhinvali with Grad multiple rocket launchers. Three hours later, Georgian troops moved forward.

Thus, the truce was violated by the Georgian side, and the Georgian army, already in the first hours of the offensive, managed to capture a number of settlements on the territory of South Ossetia (Mugut, Didmukha), and also break into the outskirts of Tskhinvali. However, the South Ossetian militia units were able to inflict significant losses on the aggressor at the very beginning of the conflict and slow down the pace of the Georgian “blitzkrieg” with stubborn defense.

At this time, in Tskhinvali itself, as a result of the Georgian artillery attack, casualties appeared among the civilian population. The city was taken by surprise, but the residents bravely greeted the news of the Georgian invasion. Another tragic episode of the initial period of the war was the death of Russian peacekeepers from the fire of Georgian salvo launchers. This fact finally convinced the Russian leadership that there was no prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev announced the start of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace.

In the morning, Russian aircraft began carrying out air strikes on Georgian troops, thereby sharply reducing the pace of their advance. Russian columns of the 58th Army, which formed the main reserve and main defense forces in the South Ossetian direction, moved through the Roki tunnel to help the peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia units.

During the day, Georgian troops managed to significantly push back the Russian-South Ossetian troops and surround the barracks of the Russian peacekeepers, but they failed to decisively turn the situation in their favor. In fact, by the evening of August 8, it became clear that the Georgian “blitzkrieg” had failed and it would not be possible to immediately capture Tskhinvali. However, a victorious mood reigned in the Georgian media; It was announced that the assault on Tskhinvali was successful.

Further development of the conflict (August 9-11)

By the morning of August 9, fighting in Tskhinvali continued, but the Georgian troops no longer had significant superiority. Having gotten bogged down in street fighting, they now sought to seize as much territory as possible so that during subsequent peace negotiations (which no one doubted on August 9) they would have at least some trump cards in their hands. However, militia units and Russian peacekeepers continued to stubbornly defend the city's neighborhoods.

At the same time, a group consisting of units of the 58th Russian Army arrived in Tskhinvali; in addition, the 76th Airborne Division was transferred to the scene of events. A battalion group was also created, separated from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The task of the group was to release Russian peacekeepers and establish contact with them.

However, due to the fact that the offensive impulse of the Georgian troops had not yet been exhausted, and the troops themselves had a sufficient amount of manpower and equipment, as a result of the oncoming battle, the Russian battalion group suffered significant losses and was withdrawn from the city by the end of the day. However, this counter-strike contributed to the speedy stop of the Georgian offensive and the transition of Georgian forces to defense.

Throughout the day on August 9, there were Russian airstrikes against Georgian troops, as well as mutual artillery shelling. A group of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the territorial waters of Georgia in order to carry out patrols and prevent aggressive actions by Georgia at sea. Moreover, the very next day, August 10, 2008, an attempt by the Georgian naval forces to penetrate the conflict zone was repelled.

On August 10, Russian troops launched a counter-offensive and began to oust Georgian forces from Tskhinvali, and Russian-Abkhaz forces began moving out of the regions bordering Georgia. Thus, on the third day of the conflict, the Georgian offensive completely fizzled out, and the front line began to move in the opposite direction. The result of the defensive battles was, first of all, a complete stop of the Georgian troops, their losses and complete disorganization. It was at this point that the Georgian leadership began to panic, caused by the threat of complete military defeat. Saakashvili asked NATO countries to intervene in the conflict and “save Georgia from the clutches of the Russian aggressor.”

On August 11, Russian troops completed the liberation of the territories of South Ossetia seized by the aggressor and entered the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, this event was covered in every possible way as the need to “force Georgia to peace.” On the same day, Russian troops occupied the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia without a fight, and the city of Gori was abandoned by Georgian troops.

Truce and end of the conflict

On August 12, Russian President D. Medvedev announced that there was no longer a danger to the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian military personnel, which is why it makes sense to stop the operation to force the aggressor to peace. After this, through the mediation of the President of France and the President of the European Union, Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiations began between Russia and Georgia. The general meaning of the future peace agreement was based on the non-use of force to resolve controversial issues, the end of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the conflict, access for humanitarian aid to the region, as well as the beginning of an international discussion on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership agreed with all points of the agreement, except for the point on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paragraph has been reformulated.

Over the next days, the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgian territory continued. On August 16, the peace agreement was signed by the heads of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. Thus, although this conflict is called a five-day war (due to the fact that the phase of active hostilities lasted from August 8 to 12, 2008), it actually ended on August 16.

Results and consequences of the five-day war

The results of the August conflict in South Ossetia are interpreted differently by each side of the conflict. The Russian leadership announced the victory of Russian and South Ossetian troops, curbing the aggressor, inflicting a serious defeat on him and excluding new large-scale military conflicts in the near future. However, isolated battles and artillery attacks, ambushes and firefights continued until the end of 2008.

The Georgian leadership announced the victory of the Georgian troops, and Georgian President M. Saakashvili stated that one Georgian brigade, equipped with the latest American weapons, managed to defeat the entire 58th Army. However, if we objectively evaluate the results of the conflict, it should be noted: the statement of the Georgian leadership was made solely for propaganda purposes and had nothing to do with reality.

As for the losses suffered by the parties to the conflict, their estimates also differ. According to Russian data, the losses of the troops of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in total amount to about 510 people killed and wounded, while the losses of Georgia are approximately 3000. The Georgian side claims that the losses of Georgian troops during the conflict amounted to about 410 killed and 1750 wounded, and the losses of Russian troops and their allies were approximately 1,500 killed and wounded. Thus, there was no such thing as “the defeat of an entire Russian army by a Georgian brigade.”

The objectively recognized result of the war in South Ossetia was the victory of Russia and its allies, as well as the heavy defeat of the Georgian army. At the same time, as a result of investigations conducted by the International Commission of the European Union, it was proved that it was Georgia that was the aggressor in the conflict, but at the same time it was pointed out that “Russia’s provocative behavior prompted Georgia to resolve the issue by force.” However, how this “provocative behavior” was linked to Russia’s refusal to accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the non-recognition of the independence of the republics, the Commission was unable to give an answer.

The consequences of the five-day war were Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the beginning of confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia (diplomatic relations were severed between the states in September 2008). The United States, despite the Commission's conclusions about Georgia's responsibility for starting the war, accused Russia of aggressively seeking to expand its borders. Thus, the conflict in South Ossetia can be called a new era in relations between Russia and the Western world.

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The Russian military operation, taking place from 08/08/2008 to 08/12/2008, was called the “Five-Day War”. This operation was of a peacekeeping nature and was a response to Georgian aggression towards South Ossetia. This military operation was the first in the history of the Russian Federation to take place outside its territory.

The war in South Ossetia began on the night of August 7–8. That night, Georgian artillery struck Tskhinvali with a powerful blow, marking the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict. Immediately after the unprovoked artillery strike by Georgia, Russian troops located on the border and territory of South Ossetia began active operations that lasted for 5 days.

Increasing conflict in early 2008

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia has been escalating since the late 1980s. The first bloody battles between Georgia and the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia took place back in 1991-1992. Then Georgia imposed a complete economic blockade of South Ossetia, which led to the mass death of children and elderly people in the winter months. As a result of this conflict, a huge number of refugees tried to get into Russian territory, often being attacked by the Georgian military along the way.

In 2004, the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again. The Georgian side began a large-scale campaign to restore the integrity of the country, considering the territory of South Ossetia to be its original territory. In 2004, Georgian troops were introduced into the territory of South Ossetia, and subsequently the systematic bombing of Ossetian cities and villages began. Only Russian intervention saved the young republic from the seizure of its territory by Georgia. At the same time, this strained Russian-Georgian relations.

In 2008, when tensions in the South Ossetian region reached the limit, Russia lifted the flank quota restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the North Caucasus. Already in April 2008, some units of the 7th Airborne Division were introduced into the territory of Abkhazia and located near the Georgian border.

At the end of May 2008, Russian railway troops, totaling about 400 people, entered Abkhaz territory. This deployment of troops caused real hysteria among the Georgian authorities, who declared to the whole world that Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion of Georgian territory, under the guise of providing assistance to South Ossetia.

The second half of July was marked by joint exercises between the United States and Georgia, at which, according to military experts, the attack and seizure of the territory of South Ossetia was practiced. At the same time, Russia conducted the Caucasus-2008 exercises, in which units of various military and security forces took part. In addition to the exercises, Russian railway troops completely restored the railway tracks on the territory of Abkhazia.

Exacerbation of the military conflict in the Georgian-Ossetian region at the end of the summer of 2008

Starting from the end of July, various shootouts and raids began to systematically occur on the territory of South Ossetia, which the Georgian government diligently denied. As a result of instability, civilians quickly began to leave the region. Since the final target of all the raids was the city of Tskhinvali, the Prime Minister of South Ossetia Yuri Morozov signed documents on the mass evacuation of residents of this city.

In early August 2008, the concentration of military forces of the Georgian army on the border with South Ossetia reached a critical limit. Although both Georgia and Russia deny the presence of their regular troops on the territory of South Ossetia before the conflict began, some events indicate that both Georgian and Russian special forces military units were already in South Ossetia. The death of some contract soldiers from both sides on the first day of the conflict (August 8) indirectly testifies to this.

Who started this conflict, the opinions of the warring parties

To this day, the conflicting parties blame each other for starting this conflict. To figure out who is really to blame, you need to hear all sides of the conflict and draw conclusions from this:

• The opinion of the Georgian government is unequivocal and unshakable. They claim that this conflict was started by the South Ossetian side, which entered into a conspiracy with Russia and carried out a series of provocations. According to Georgia, their invasion of the territory of South Ossetia was due to the fact that the Georgian military managed to intercept a secret telephone conversation in which information “came up” that Russian troops had already invaded the territory of South Ossetia on August 7;
• Russia's position on this issue was clearly voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He stated that the only reason for the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia was Georgia's military aggression against South Ossetia. The consequences of Georgian aggression were 30 thousand refugees, the death of civilians in South Ossetia, and the death of Russian peacekeepers. All actions of the Georgian army on the territory of South Ossetia were qualified by the Russian side as full-scale genocide. According to Russia, not a single country in the world will remain indifferent after an attack on its peacekeepers and civilians who find themselves on the territory of South Ossetia, therefore the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia is natural and justified;
• Since Europe was also interested in finding out who is to blame for the Russian-Georgian conflict, an International Independent Commission was created, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. This commission found Georgia guilty of starting the conflict in South Ossetia, since it was Georgia that began the bombing of Tskhinvali. It was noted that the Georgian attack was launched after multiple acts of provocation by South Ossetia. The Russian side has also been accused of numerous violations of international rights.

Progress of hostilities from August 7 to 10, 2008

In order to trace the entire chronology of the military conflict, called the “five-day war,” it must be studied starting one day before the official start and ending a day later, after the end of the conflict.

On August 7, all Georgian media published information that the leader of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity had prepared to conduct massive military operations to seize Georgian territories. Since the attack of a small South Ossetian army on Georgia sounded absurd, the media reported that, together with the South Ossetian army, numerous detachments of Russian volunteers, who are in fact regular units of the Russian army, would march against Georgia. The leader of South Ossetia himself is in Java, from where he will lead the military operation.

The afternoon of August 7 was devoted to a televised address by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who called on the Georgian military to cease fire unilaterally, and called on Russia to become a guarantor of negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia, in which he guaranteed to give South Ossetia the widest possible autonomy within Georgia.

At the same time, Saakashvili guaranteed a complete amnesty to all armed formations of South Ossetia, to which he included the army. As a result of these negotiations, both sides agreed to cease fire until negotiations were scheduled for August 8.

At 23.30 Georgia opened massive fire on Tskhinvali. The Georgian government stated that it was forced to open fire because South Ossetia did not stop shelling Georgian villages during the truce.

On the night of August 8, Tskhinvali was subjected to massive shelling from Grad multiple launch rocket launchers. At 3.30 am, Georgian troops began to storm Tskhinvali with the help of tanks. As a result of this assault, the capital of South Ossetia was surrounded, and 6 South Ossetian villages were captured by Georgian troops.

On the same day, a meeting of the UN Security Council was held in New York at the request of Russia. The representative of Georgia said that the blame for the shelling lies entirely with South Ossetia. Although the UN Security Council expressed extreme concern about the situation in South Ossetia, it was not satisfied with the solution proposed by Russia.

By 21.00, according to official information from the Georgian media, the entire territory of South Ossetia, except for the settlement of Java, was under the control of Georgian troops. By this time, 7 thousand volunteers from North Ossetia were sent to help South Ossetia. Another 3 thousand volunteers, gathered at the headquarters of Vladikavkaz, were awaiting dispatch. By the end of the day, Russian troops reached the western outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali.

On the night of August 9, the UN Security Council did not make any decisions regarding the situation in South Ossetia. While the UN was trying to come up with a solution to this conflict, Russian troops took active action. While the Georgian army was bombing and shelling Russian and Ossetian positions, Russian aircraft carried out targeted bombing of various military and strategic targets in Georgia. Russian artillery fired at Georgian firing points in the Tskhinvali area.

At the same time, Russian ships began patrolling Georgian territorial waters.

On August 10, the fighting in South Ossetia was in full swing. The Georgian army systematically bombed the populated areas of South Ossetia and the positions of Russian and Ossetian troops. Russian aviation, in turn, continued air strikes on the following targets in Georgia:

• All known locations of Georgian anti-aircraft missile systems;
• Military radars;
• Various military bases throughout Georgia;
• Seaports;
• Aerodromes;
• Bridges throughout the country, in order to limit the mobility of military units of the Georgian army.

Although the Georgian side still insists that Russia carried out numerous attacks on populated areas of Georgia. In fact, all the losses that occurred among the civilian population of Georgia were accidental, since such losses are always inevitable during military operations. The Russian side completely refutes all talk that its air strikes were directed against the civilian population of Georgia.

In the evening of that day, Russian aviation launched a powerful air strike on a military airport, which was located on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

The Russian side increased the number of its troops in South Ossetia to 4 regiments, in addition, significant aviation and artillery forces were involved. The total number of Russian troops officially participating in this conflict has approached the 10 thousand mark. In response to this, the Georgian side urgently began transferring its infantry brigade, which was in Iraq.

On the same day, Abkhazian troops decided to take advantage of this situation and moved into the Kodori Gorge. By mid-day, Abkhaz troops took up positions on the Ingur River. Concerned by the latest events, the Georgian government handed the Russian consul a note informing the Georgian side that all military operations in South Ossetia had ceased. Despite this, firefights from the Georgian side continued throughout the next night.

Progress of hostilities from August 11 to 13

On the night of August 11, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful air strike on a military base that was located near Tbilisi. This was reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. In addition, according to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the same night the Russian Air Force carried out a massive raid on a number of Georgian cities:

• Batumi;
• Tbilisi;
• Poti;
• Zugdidi.

According to the Georgian Foreign Ministry, Russia carried out a massive attack on peaceful Georgian cities on the night of August 11, using at least 50 bombers in this operation. Russia, in turn, denies the fact of air strikes on civilians, stating that all attacks were aimed at destroying Georgian military facilities.

The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that as a result of ongoing military operations, the number of Russian military deaths continues to increase, reaching 18 people. In addition, Russia officially stated that it lost 4 combat aircraft. According to the Georgian side, their military shot down 19 military aircraft belonging to Russia. Given the tendency towards exaggeration that characterizes official sources, it can be assumed that in reality Russia lost 8-10 aircraft, although this information cannot be verified.

On the same day, Georgian President Saakashvili signed an official ceasefire document. However, throughout South Ossetia, fighting continued with detachments of the Georgian military, who were cut off from the main forces of Georgia and did not hear anything (or did not want to hear) about the signing of such an important document.

On August 11, the capital of South Ossetia was completely cleared of the presence of Georgian military forces. Fighting continued with the use of heavy artillery and aircraft by both sides. Georgian troops continued to fire at Tskhinvali from a distance with long-range artillery and mortars.

During these same days, Ukrainian nationalists became seriously active and announced a gathering of volunteers in support of the Georgian army. Official authorities in Kyiv stated that they do not support this movement. In addition, the nationalists do not even have enough funds to buy tickets to Georgia for those who want to fight there.

All communications between Russia and Georgia were interrupted. In the evening, fighting between the Russian and Georgian sides took place within a radius of 25 km from Tbilisi. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the main part of the operation to force Georgia to a peaceful settlement of the South Ossetian conflict has been completed.

On the morning of August 12, the armed forces of Abkhazia went on the offensive. Their goal was to completely oust the Georgian armed forces from the Condor Gorge. Prior to this, for 2 days, Abkhaz artillery and the Air Force attacked Georgian military installations located in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. This offensive involved not only Abkhaz regular troops, but also reservists of the Abkhaz Armed Forces.

At the same time, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful bomb attack on Gori. Georgian television managed to film this blow and show it on television.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced on the afternoon of August 12 that he had decided to complete the military operation to force Georgia to peace. On the same day, a rally was held in Tbilisi, at which President Saakashvili announced that Georgia was leaving the CIS, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia were being declared occupied territories.

On August 13, Russian ships that were in the Poti area were suddenly attacked by boats belonging to Georgia. This act provoked the entry of Russian warships into the port, which destroyed 3 Georgian coast guard ships. At the same time, no one offered any resistance to the Russian military.

On the same day, Russia and Georgia declared mourning for those killed during this military operation.

Throughout the day, Georgian media and officials repeatedly reported that the Russian army continued to bomb Georgian populated areas, captured Gori, and Russian tanks were moving at an accelerated pace towards Tbilisi. In response to these statements, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated that all movements of Russian troops across the territory of Georgia are connected only with the withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In addition, the head of the Foreign Ministry said that a number of Russian army troops remain on Georgian territory in the Gori and Senaki regions. This is due to the fact that the Georgian military abandoned warehouses of military equipment and ammunition to the mercy of fate, which could be plundered by looters or various gangs of separatists. In addition, Russian troops are providing all possible humanitarian assistance to the local population.

War crimes committed during the conflict in South Ossetia

Since the Russian and Georgian authorities accuse each other of various crimes and ethnic cleansing, one should listen to the opinions of independent experts, since each side will protect itself while denigrating the actions of the enemy.

The human rights organization Amnesty International became seriously interested in this conflict; in 2008, while all the consequences of the military conflict were still visible and fresh in the memory of the local population. Already in November 2008, this association published an official report, which detailed a large part of the war crimes. Here are the main findings from this report:

• When the Georgian army stormed Tskhinvali, its soldiers carried out numerous attacks on civilians, leaving dozens of them dead and hundreds seriously injured. In addition, the city's infrastructure was significantly damaged, which was not a military facility (schools, hospitals, etc.);
• Tskhinvali suffered the most extensive destruction from the use of Georgian Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which have an extremely low accuracy parameter;
• During the military conflict, Russian aviation carried out about 75 combat missions. It is these sorties that the Georgian side accuses of causing enormous harm to the civilian population. According to the results of the inspection, villages and towns suffered little damage as a result of air strikes; several streets and some individual houses were destroyed. Naturally, the people who were in them also suffered;
• Sometimes the Russian military, attacking Georgian settlements, caused harm to civilians. To this, the Russian side responds that all attacks on civilians are provoked by their aggressive behavior;
• The report noted that the discipline of Russian military personnel differed significantly from the behavior of Ossetian fighters and militias, who often behaved like looters. Georgian civilians interviewed confirm that the Russian military rarely behaved undisciplinedly;
• South Ossetian soldiers were seen committing serious war crimes on Georgian territory. These are illegal killings, arson, beatings, threats, rape and robberies that were committed by units and militias of South Ossetia.

Amnesty International calls on parties to investigate every war crime and punish those responsible.

The military campaign in Georgia in 2008 showed that the Russian army is in urgent need of reform, since many branches of the military were unable to act coherently within the framework of a separate combat operation. Russia's combat losses were incomparable with the scale of this military conflict.