The most important problems of German classical philosophy. German classical philosophy: main features, issues, representatives Representatives and founder of German philosophy

18 century. This is the age of empirical teachings. "Age of Enlightenment".

Centers for philosophical discoveries - France, England. Since the 17th century, questions have remained about the method of cognition, about the place of man in the world around him, about the goals of his activities.

The role of the individual is increasing. Orientation towards historicism, humanism. On the other hand, you cannot completely immerse yourself in sensuality. Leibniz's ideas appear that reason is a step to the Divine.

Locke (at the end of the 17th century) proposes a system where the human mind is educated through feelings. British empiricism appears: D. Berkeley, David Hume. Their main ideas are that feelings are supplied by the flesh, and thinking is based on sensory perception. Therefore, without feelings, thinking is not possible.

Problems of philosophy of the 18th century: Through reason, movement towards the Divine is possible. Thinking is brought up through feelings. Feelings are necessary to know God.

19th century. Idealism.

One of the features of intellectual life in the 19th century was the gap between artistic and scientific pursuits.

If earlier thinkers dealt with science and art from the standpoint of the general principle of harmony, then in the 19th century, under the influence of romanticism, a harsh reaction arose against the pressure of scientific progress on people. The scientific way of life with its experiments seemed to suppress the spirit of freedom and quest that is required of artists. The scientific approach will not allow one to discover the secrets of nature - this view was shared by Goethe, although he was not a romantic.

At the same time, a divergence appeared between science and philosophy.

The only requirement left is not to go beyond the scope of experience and its explanation. This was due to an appeal to Kant and his followers. Searching for the causes of the phenomenon and striving to explain the transition to the world of noumena, where categories and explanations do not apply, turned out to be unrealistic. This approach to scientific theory is characteristic of a whole generation of scientists who were interested in the philosophical content of research activities.

German classical philosophy from the point of view of modern philosophy is characterized as a certain general orientation, an ideological style of thinking.

The classics are interpreted as a cultural-philosophical-methodological standard for the application of a person’s subjective ability to posit his Being in the world.

It was in the second half of the 19th century that the so-called “irrationalist” philosophy appeared. These are the teachings of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard,

Nietzsche, Dilthey, intuitionist Bergson.

Heidegger declared Schelling to be the pinnacle of German classical philosophy. They turn to German classical philosophy, looking for the irrational or irrational in it.

German classical philosophy developed several general problems, which allows us to talk about it as a holistic phenomenon. She:

• - turned the attention of philosophy from traditional problems (being, thinking, cognition, etc.) to the study of human essence;
• - paid special attention to the problem of development;
• - significantly enriched the logical-theoretical apparatus of philosophy.

1. General characteristics of German classical philosophy.

2. Basic ideas of I. Kant’s philosophy.

3. Philosophy of J. Fichte, F. Schelling, G. Hegel, L. Feuerbach.

Key terms: antinomy, intelligent world, categorical imperative, noumenon.

German classical philosophy is associated with the emergence of a new stage, which is represented by the work of the classics of idealism of the late 18th – early 19th centuries: I. Kant, I. Fichte, F. Schelling, G. Hegel. The personal relationship between these philosophical figures was sometimes conflicting, which could not but affect its complex and internally contradictory nature. However, they have much in common - they all developed grandiose theoretical concepts that claimed absolute truth. German classical philosophy, first of all, turns to the study of the internal structure of the human mind, the problems of human activity as a cognizing subject, therefore, in its problems, the theory of knowledge has predominant importance. At the same time, the problems of ontology are not removed, but are rethought anew.

The philosophy of this period acted as the “conscience” of culture. It primarily examines:

1. The history of mankind and the essence of man himself: I. Kant’s question of philosophy is “What is man?” was decided in favor of man as a moral being. According to J. Fichte, man is an active, active being, endowed with consciousness and self-awareness. F. Schelling focuses on the problem of the relationship between object and subject. G. Hegel expands the boundaries of self-knowledge, and a person’s self-knowledge is connected not only with the outside world, but also with the self-awareness of other people, which gives rise to various forms of social consciousness. For L. Feuerbach, man is also the central problem of philosophy.

2. Philosophy as a system of philosophical disciplines, categories, ideas. Kant has epistemology and ethics. Schelling has natural philosophy and ontology. Fichte has ontology, epistemology, socio-political philosophy. Hegel has logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of history, history of philosophy, philosophy of law, morality, religion, state, etc. Feuerbach has ontology, epistemology, ethics, history, religion.

3. Problems of humanism, study of human life. For Kant, human life is the activity of the subject of moral consciousness, with his civil freedom. For Fichte, the people are above the state, the social world is the world of private property, the problems of the role of morality in human life. For Schelling, reason is a means of achieving goals. Hegel creates the doctrine of civil society, the rule of law, and private property. For Feuerbach, social progress is directly related to the religion of love. They were all unanimous in one thing: man is the master of nature and spirit.

4. Holistic concept of dialectics. For Kant, this is the dialectic of the limits and possibilities of human knowledge: the dialectic of sensory, rational and rational knowledge. Fichte explores the creative activity of the human “I”, the interaction of “I” and “not I” as opposites, as a result of the interaction of which self-development and human self-awareness occur. Schelling views the nature of the Spirit as an evolving process. Hegel presented the entire natural-historical and spiritual world as a process. Formulated the laws, categories and principles of dialectics as a science of development and interconnection.

Thus, it is obvious that representatives of German classical philosophy solved, first of all, the problem of the relationship between being and thinking. The movement of philosophical thought from substance to subject, from being to activity, from inert matter to an autonomous self-developing spirit is the main tendency of German idealism.

The outstanding thinker of German classical philosophy I. Kant (1724–1804) seemed to complete the era of Enlightenment and became its critic, especially those aspects that relate to rationalism and metaphysics of the New Age.

It is with I. Kant that the philosophy of modern times begins. The main motto of his work is “life is worth living in order to work.” In his famous “Critique of Practical Reason,” Kant wrote that two things always fill the soul with new and ever stronger wonder and awe: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. These words express two main directions, two main sources of his philosophy - Newtonian mechanics - the theoretical premise of “precritical” philosophy; and “the moral law in me” - as a stimulus for the development of ethical philosophy, the justification of human dignity, freedom and mutual equality.

His work is usually divided into two stages: "subcritical"(before writing " Critics of Pure Reason" in 1770) and "critical"(from about 1770).

At the first stage of his spiritual development, Kant adhered to naturalistic ideas that were new for that time. In the essay " General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens" He suggested cosmological hypothesis, which was later developed by Laplace and entered the history of science under the name of the Kant-Laplace hypothesis. Kant suggested that at first matter was in a state of gas-dust nebula, in which initially small asteroids were grouped around heavier particles under the influence of attractive and repulsive forces. The mechanical circulation of particles without any intervention from God led to the formation of the Sun and planets. At the same time, the internal movement of particles in the original cosmic bodies caused heat in them. According to the same scheme, according to I. Kant, the formation of stars and other celestial bodies occurred. Here he expressed the idea of ​​tidal friction slowing down the daily rotation of the Earth. But in Kant’s system there is a place for God: God created the Universe and then it develops according to its own laws, internal to nature itself.

Critical period his philosophy is outlined in such works as " Critique of Pure Reason" (1781), " Critique of Practical Reason" (1788), " Criticism of judgment"(1790), etc. In the first book, Kant sets out his theory of knowledge, in the second - the problems of ethics, in the third - the problems of aesthetics and expediency in nature and answers the question "How is beauty possible in nature and art?" The main goal of his philosophy is to analyze human cognitive abilities, determine the boundaries of knowledge, the subject of science and the possibilities of philosophy itself (metaphysics).

I. Kant critically reconsiders all previous philosophy, creates his own critical metaphysics and develops a critical method. He was convinced that the phenomena of things are separated from essence, form from content, reason from faith, rationalism from empiricism, theory from practice.

I. Kant believed that the whole world expresses itself through “appearance” and “things in themselves.” He believed that a person tries to penetrate into the essence of things, but cognizes it with distortions that are explained by the imperfection of the senses. Whenever a person comes into contact with a “thing in itself” (this is an objective reality that is the actual cause of our sensations), he distorts the knowledge of this thing with perceptions, i.e. nerve endings, the energy hidden in them. The “thing in itself,” according to philosophers, turns out to be elusive and unknowable. But how can a person in such a situation practically exist in the world for many hundreds of thousands of years? Kant gets out of this difficulty by assuming that pre-experimental, or a priori knowledge , not deduced from experience, is the free creativity of the mind, which is innate. The ability for supersensible knowledge, in which a person goes beyond the limits of experience, he called transcendental apperception.

« Thing in itself “There is also a limiting concept that limits the possibilities of human abilities to understand the world with the help of reason (God, the immortality of the soul, free will - this is not a subject of science, this is a subject of faith). Thus, “things in themselves are transcendental” - that is, they go beyond the limits of possible experience, are inaccessible to theoretical knowledge, and are outside of time and space. From this follows his idealism, which is called transcendental materialism.

Speaking about the unknowability of the “thing in itself,” Kant captures the essence of scientific research. Science begins with the formulation of a scientific problem, which limits the subject of its study and highlights what can be known and explained and what cannot. In mythology, the world is completely knowable and subject to explanation. Science destroys this “omniscience”; it produces only logically and empirically based knowledge.

IN theory of knowledge of I. Kant the main task is to explore the capabilities of the cognitive tools of human cognition themselves. Hence his famous questions: “What can I know?”, “What should I do?”, “What can I hope for?”, “What is a person and who can he be?”

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to the conclusion that knowledge is heterogeneous, there are different objects of knowledge and hence different types of cognitive activity. He is trying to find a “third way”, where knowledge cannot be reduced either to feelings or to reason.

Cognition begins with visual representations(sensuality), then moves on to reason(the area of ​​a priori concepts) and ends in mind(the area of ​​ideas) is the highest authority for processing visual representations. Thus, for him, cognition is a single process - the data of the senses is an object of activity for the intellect, and the intellect is for the activity of the mind. According to this scheme, the Critique of Pure Reason is divided into three parts: the doctrine of sensibility, the doctrine of understanding and the doctrine of reason. Knowledge is a synthesis of sensuality and reason. Thoughts without content are empty, and visual representations without concepts are blind.

Matter(flow of sensations) is the content of knowledge and is given pastoriori(experiential knowledge), and the form ( a priori) – a priori knowledge (concepts that are already in a formed form in the soul). Kant divides all knowledge into experimental and pre-experimental (apriori). A priori concepts are the tools of cognition, that is, a system of concepts that belongs to the subject. They determine the structure of his perceptions and rational thinking, but do not belong to the things themselves. “The Thing in Itself” evokes a feeling that is in no way similar to the originals. Kant divides all a priori concepts into a priori forms of sensibility and includes among them space, time and causality, which, in his opinion, are given to a person already at birth as the ability to navigate in space and time. Thanks to transcendental apperception In human consciousness, a gradual accumulation of knowledge is possible, a transition from innate ideas to ideas of rational knowledge. Next he highlights a priori forms of reason: quantity(unity, plurality, totality); quality: reality, denial, limitation; relationship: substances and accidents (properties), cause and effect, interaction; modality relation: possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-accident ( modality is an affirmation or denial of something by the speaker).

For Kant, the process of cognition is not the reproduction of a “thing in itself,” but the construction of a world of phenomena with the help of a priori concepts independent of experience. There is a world of phenomena that are comprehended by reason, and here knowledge is limitless. A priori knowledge does not exist in itself, but only “forms” sensuality.

According to Kant, the external world is a source of sensations, and a person, having a priori forms of sensibility, with the help of the categories of reason and ideas of reason, receives knowledge, locates it in space and time, and causally connects them with each other. A person, cognizing the world, constructs it, builds order out of chaos, creates his own picture of the world. Nature as an object of universal knowledge is constructed by consciousness itself. Reason dictates laws to nature, consciousness itself creates the subject of science ( subjective idealism).

Transcendental cognition– going beyond the limits of empirical experience and organizing this experience with the help of a priori forms. The synthesis of sensuality and reason is carried out with the help of the power of imagination. Here different ideas are combined and a single image is created - synthetic knowledge (incremental). The synthetic ability of imagination is manifested in apperception, recognition of human ideas as identical to the corresponding phenomena.

Except synthetic knowledge Kant highlights analytical knowledge(explanatory). All experimental judgments are always synthetic, and analytical ones are a priori, pre-experimental.

Next, Kant sets the task of identifying the characteristics of various types of knowledge that underlie various sciences. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he poses three questions about how mathematics, natural science and metaphysics (philosophy) are possible: mathematics relies on a priori forms of sensory knowledge. The ability to establish the position of various objects, changing places, the relationship of sequence is associated with the fact that he has a special prism through which he looks at the world - space and time. Theoretical natural science is based on reason. Reason is the ability to operate with concepts; they are independent of experience and any experienced content can be subsumed under the categories of quantity, quality, relationship, modality. As for philosophy, here Kant says that there is a third cognitive ability, which is the basis of philosophy as a special cognitive activity. This is the mind. Therefore, the third part of I. Kant’s teaching is the doctrine of the cognitive abilities of the human mind and its antinomies.

Intelligence embodied in philosophical reflection. It acts as a regulator of cognition and a guiding authority for reason. The mind strives for “unconditional synthesis,” that is, for extremely general ideas.

Speaking about the unity of the phenomena of the world as an unconditional integrity, we come to the conclusion that the boundary that exists between the world of phenomena (phenomena) and the world of noumena (the essence of things) leads to a series antinomies(this word literally means “conflict of laws”) - to such judgments that come into irreconcilable contradiction with each other. I. Kant identifies four such antinomies:

1. The world has a beginning in time and is limited in space. – The world has no beginning in time and is infinite in space.

2. Only the simple exists, and that is made up of simple things. – There is nothing simple in the world.

3. There is not only causality according to the laws of nature, but also freedom. – There is no freedom, everything is done according to the laws of nature.

4. There is, of course, a necessary being (that is, God) as the cause of the world. – There is no absolute, necessary being as the cause of the world.

These antinomies are inexperienced and therefore insoluble. They are connected by the nature of human consciousness. Concepts equally do not allow one to assert either that the world is finite in space and time, or that it is infinite. Neither one nor the other is contained in experience, but depends on convictions and beliefs, and there is no other option for resolving the antinomies, according to Kant, how to transfer conviction and faith to the practical sphere.

Trying to give scientific knowledge about God, the world and the soul, the mind becomes entangled in contradictions. Reason, striving to cognize existing things, encounters antinomies, and these contradictions indicate that philosophy as thinking about the world, about “things in themselves” is impossible. It should only be a “criticism of reason”, establish the boundaries of knowledge, and demonstrate the heterogeneity of human cognitive activity. With the help of philosophy one can grasp the need for a transition from pure reason(theoretical) to practical reason(morality).

I. Kant formulates the theological idea of ​​“pure reason”. He critically analyzes all the proofs and refutations of God and constructs his own proof, transcendental - God really cannot be proven, but also cannot be refuted; this goes beyond the limits of reason and plunges it into an insoluble contradiction - man has only faith.

I. Kant talks about two dimensions of human life: man belongs to the world of appearances (phenomena) and the world of noumena (“thing in itself”). In the world of phenomena there is no freedom, everything is conditioned there. But when a person treats himself as the only basis for his own actions, then he acts freely. I. Kant comes to the conclusion that man as a free and responsible being cannot be known with the help of “pure reason”; man cannot be approached as a phenomenon, an object. A person can only be known “from the inside,” as a subject of free, self-determined action.

Basic provisions ethics of I. Kant set out in his work " Critique of Practical Reason”, this is where the question “What should I do?” comes up. He proceeds from the fact that the most important task of philosophy is to educate a person in the spirit of humanism. It should teach a person what it takes to be human.

Kant speaks of pure morality, which is based on what is due and necessary - these are, first of all, laws for oneself, they are found in the inner human impulse, this is the only source of morality. Kant calls the internal law " categorical imperative ", i.e. an unconditional command that reads:

1. Act in such a way that the maxim (impelling motive) of your will can be a principle of universal legislation. Otherwise, act as you would like them to act towards you. This is the golden rule of morality.

2. Don’t lie, don’t steal, don’t kill, because these actions cannot be universal human norms of behavior.

3. Particularly important is the problem of human duty, which is inseparable from the relationship between the individual and society.

Kant's moral ideal is the moral autonomy of the individual. Moral consciousness does not depend on sensory impulses and motives; they cannot be the basis of moral consciousness due to their individuality and selfishness.

I. Kant allows some exceptions to the law: if you are forced to lie, the lie should not be heard. Heroism should not be performed at any cost, without considering the consequences. In the works of the philosopher we also find justification for the need for religious faith. At the same time, Kant boldly swaps the places of the divine and the human: we are moral not because we believe in God, but because we believe in God because we are moral. But the idea of ​​God is only an idea, so it is absurd to talk about man’s duties before God, says the great thinker. In general, the philosophy of I. Kant is complex and contradictory and therefore has been criticized by various philosophical schools and movements.

The ideas of I. Kant continue to be developed I. Fichte
(1762–1814). His concept was called " Scientific teaching».

The main problems of I. Fichte’s philosophy: 1) the philosophy of the absolute “I” - the Absolute”; 2) philosophy of action (practical philosophy). His main philosophical works are “ The basis of general science" And " About the appointment of a scientist».

According to Fichte, the main task of philosophy is to determine the goals of practical action of people in the world and in society. It should become the foundation of all sciences - “ teaching about science».

Man in Fichte's philosophy initially appears as an active being. Developing the problems of the theory of knowledge, Fichte raises the question of whether an object exists without a subject. Here he seeks to eliminate Kant’s dualism (“thing in itself and appearance”, “nature and freedom”). He believes that Kant does not reveal a single basis for truth, and the task of philosophy is to build a single system of knowledge that has a single basis. This will be the philosophy of “Scientific Teaching”.

The initial basis of Fichte’s philosophical system is the consciousness of “I” - this is the consciousness of a person, divorced from him and transformed into an absolute. How is the essence of consciousness expressed? For Fichte, this is not a subjective image of the objective world. The essence of consciousness is self-consciousness, consciousness in itself. For Fichte, there is no subject without an object, but only subject-object relations. The subjective is what acts, and the objective is the product of action, they coincide and are fused together.

Science begins with the statement “I am” and there is no need for scientific proof. The first foundation of scientific teaching: The “I” is aware of itself and thus creates this “I” by the act of its awareness. Awareness of the alien world of “not-I” is second basis of scientific doctrine, where “I” presupposes “not-I”. But this is not an exit to the outside world - this is a different state of human consciousness, when it is not directed towards itself, but its activity is directed mainly towards the outside world. Material things are considered only in relation to man. Individual consciousness, according to Fichte, is able to contain the entire vast world. Thus, “I” turns into a World subject.

For Fichte, the entire world of our consciousness (and awareness of nature and self-awareness) is a product of the activity of the human spirit of our “I”. And therefore, “I” and “not-I” are different states of consciousness, internal opposites. These opposites are a single whole, the absolute “I”. The “I” posits itself and the “not-I.” That's what it is third basis of scientific doctrine.

An important achievement here is the dialectical way of thinking. Fichte writes about the contradictory nature of all things, about the unity of opposites - contradiction is the source of development. The category “non-a priori forms of reason” is a system of concepts that absorb knowledge that develops in the course of the activity of the “I”.

Fichte, without realizing it, moves from the position of subjective idealism to the position of objective idealism. In work " Instructions for a Blissful Life“I” as an absolute merges with God, and philosophy turns into theosophy.

In practical philosophy, Fichte examines the problems of morality in law and state (under the influence of the French bourgeois revolution). The main problem here is the problem of freedom. Human freedom consists in obedience to laws and awareness of their necessity. Law is the voluntary submission of each person to the law established in society.

The state must provide everyone with property, because the social world is the world of bourgeois private property, where the state is the organization of owners (this, in fact, is a guess about the economic and social nature of the state).

Fichte views the concept of nationality as a collective personality that has its own calling and purpose. He substantiates the sovereignty and dignity of the individual, speaks of his active side as the creator of social reality and himself.

« Thoughts of myself», « be yourself», « be free, intelligent, infinite in your possibilities“- these are the calls of the thinker.

Thus, the main achievements of Fichte's philosophy are as follows: 1) the conscious use of dialectics as a method of constructing a philosophical system; 2) overcoming Kantian dualism through the principle of monism in the theory of knowledge; 3) assertion of the right of reason to theoretical knowledge.

F. Schelling(1775–1854) known as an idealist and dialectician, creator of " Systems of transcendental idealism"(his main philosophical work). The core of Schelling's philosophy is the category Absolute. This is not something independent, independent of individual “I”. The Absolute, in his opinion, is the complete identity of spirit and nature.

The main idea of ​​his philosophy is to cognize the absolute unconditional beginning of all being and thinking. He criticizes Fichte and believes that nature is not “not-I,” but it is not the only substance, as Spinoza wrote. Nature is absolute, and not the individual “I”. This is the eternal mind, the absolute identity of the objective and the subjective, since human cognition is not just a subjective ability, it is initially embedded in the structure of the universe, as an objective component of this world.

The material and ideal principles are identical and coincide, therefore they cannot be opposed. These are just different states of the same thing absolute reason. The single basis of the essence of nature is ideal spiritual activity.

Schelling's natural philosophy sought, first of all, to substantiate the discoveries in natural science (Coulomb, Golvani, Volta and others), to comprehend them, to bring them into a single worldview. The thinker is trying to protect philosophy from the disdainful attitude of natural scientists (thus, I. Newton believed that philosophy is like a litigious lady, and getting involved with her is like being subjected to prosecution).

Schelling's philosophical system is dialectical: he proves the unity of nature as such, as well as the idea that the essence of every thing is the unity of opposites, “polarities” (magnet, positive and negative charges of electricity, subjective and objective consciousness, etc.). This is the main source of activity of things - the “world soul” of nature. Living and inanimate nature is a single organism, even its dead nature is “immature intelligence.” Nature is always life (idea panpsychism), all nature has animation. This was the transition to objective idealism and dialectics in German classical philosophy.

The main problem is Schelling's practical philosophy - this is freedom, since the creation of a “second nature” - the legal system of society - depends on it. States with a legal system must unite into a federation to end wars and establish peace among nations.

The problem of alienation in history is especially acute for Schelling. As a result of human activity, unexpected, undesirable consequences often arise that lead to the suppression of freedom. The desire to realize freedom turns into enslavement. History is dominated by arbitrariness: theory and history are opposite to each other. Society is dominated by blind necessity and man is powerless before it.

Schelling understands that historical necessity makes its way through the mass of individual goals and subjective interests that determine human activity.

But all this is the continuous implementation of the “revelation of the Absolute”, where the Absolute is God, and the philosophy of the identity of being and thinking is filled with theosophical meaning. Over time, Schelling's philosophical system acquires an irrationalistic and mystical character.

Philosophy G. Hegel(1770–1831) is the culmination of idealism in classical German philosophy. Its main ideas are set out in such works as “ Phenomenology of spirit», « The Science of Logic», « Philosophy of nature», « Philosophy of Spirit" and etc.

Hegel considered his main task to be the creation of dialectics as a science, as a system and as Logic. To do this, Hegel needed to embrace all knowledge and all human culture in their development, critically rework them and create a complex philosophical system in which the development of the world is presented as the development of an absolute idea (spirit).

Hegel's philosophical system begins with the doctrine of logic. He solves the question of logic from the position of idealism. Logic as a whole includes objective logic (the doctrine of being and essence) and subjective logic (the doctrine of the concept).

Objective logic is the logic of the pre-natural world, which is in the state before the creation of the world by God. It's there absolute idea. God and the absolute idea are identical as primary causes, but at the same time they are different in their state. God is always equal to himself, while the absolute idea continuously develops from abstract and poor in content definitions to more complete and concrete definitions.

After the “work” of objective logic, subjective logic (the doctrine of the concept) comes into play. It follows the same path with the help of concepts, judgments and conclusions and at the same time reflects the history of the practical movement of culture, in the process of which a person masters (cognizes) the world.

Self-development of the idea leads logic to the final point of movement - nature arises. Hegel's concept of nature is unusual. Nature is another being, that is, another form of being of an idea. The meaning and significance of nature is to mediate the divine and human spirit in their development - deployment.

The goal of the dialectical development of the absolute idea is awareness and absolute knowledge of one’s own path. This awareness must occur in a form that corresponds to the content of the idea. Moving towards absolute self-knowledge, the spirit itself finds the necessary forms for itself - these are contemplation, representation and conceptual thinking, which at the same time are the stages of self-knowledge of the spirit.

At the level of contemplation, the spirit appears in the form of art, at the stage of representation - in the form of religion, and at the highest level - in the form of philosophy. Philosophy is the pinnacle of world history and culture, and the final stage of self-knowledge is the absolute truth.

The grandiose philosophical work done by Hegel led him to the conclusion about the rationality of the world, which he expressed in the aphorism: “Everything that is real is reasonable, everything that is reasonable is real.” At the same time, in the process reasonable development of the idea overcomes the evil and imperfection of the world. Hegel's philosophy was of great importance for the subsequent development of the entire spiritual culture of Europe. But philosophical comprehension of the world has no limit. And Hegel's philosophy was not only further developed, but also criticized.

L. Feuerbach(1804–1872) directed his work towards criticism of the Christian religion, Hegel's idealism and the establishment of anthropological materialism. He believed that the common basis for religion and idealism is the absolutization of human thinking, its opposition to man and its transformation into an independently existing entity.

The roots and secret of religion and idealism are on earth. Man as a generic being in his activity is only indirectly connected with the idea, with the general, which prevails over the individual. People do not understand that these general ideas are their own creations, and they attribute supernatural properties to them, turning them into the absolute idea of ​​God.

To overcome this understanding of the idea, you need to understand man as an earthly being with his thinking. The subject of philosophy should not be spirit or nature, but man.

For Feuerbach, man is a spiritual-natural being, the most important characteristic of which is sensuality. People are connected by natural ties and, above all, by a feeling of love. At the same time, Feuerbach misses a very important feature of man - his social essence.

Only in the system of the German philosopher of the 18th century. I. Kant is the first to make such an attempt to build a theory of knowledge that would be completely independent of any assumptions about reality. In this regard, Kant puts forward the postulate that reality itself depends on the cognition of the subject: the object and subject of cognition do not exist as objective phenomena, but only as forms of the flow of cognitive activity. Kant argues that there is no subject outside of cognizable objects. The subject is understood by Kant not as a “thinking thing” of Descartes, but as an internal activity that reveals itself only when it shapes sensations through the creation of mental categories. Behind Kant's thesis about the creation of the world by the subject lies a deep dialectical idea of ​​the activity of the subject: the subject does not simply perceive a given world of sensations or rational concepts, but creatively processes them, builds knowledge that is new in content. In this regard, Kant sharply criticizes the method of the empiricists, rationalists and all old philosophy, which proceeded from the concept of pure real being, taken outside of relation to the subject.

In this regard, the theory of knowledge in Kant's philosophy takes on a new look. Criticizing the old philosophy, Kant believes that it cannot be a doctrine of being at all, but must explore the boundaries and possibilities of knowledge. The question of how the subject manages to find the “path” to the object seems false to Kant.

Kant's interest is aimed at clarifying the conditions for the fruitful use of the means of knowledge, that is, those conditions that allow us to draw the line between genuine scientific knowledge and false wisdom.

Kant failed to build a “pure” theory of knowledge, since he separated being and consciousness. Hegel was able to overcome the alienation of being and consciousness. He showed the relationship between these two categories, their transition into each other, revealing the inconsistency of the separation of being from consciousness.

Hegel's main premise is that subject and object are identical to each other, since the basis of reality is the self-development of the Absolute Spirit. He is both the subject of knowledge and reality. Therefore, the basis of cognition is, in essence, self-knowledge, that is, the basis for the opposition of subject and object, consciousness and being is lost.

If in ancient philosophy the theory of knowledge and being (ontology and epistemology) were not yet separated from each other, but in the philosophy of the 17th-18th centuries. are connected with each other as relatively independent parts of unified philosophical systems, then in the Hegelian concept they are consciously conceived as completely coinciding with each other.

Another feature of Hegel’s theory of knowledge is that he conceives of knowledge historically - it is steps in the development of the Absolute Spirit and, at the same time, steps in man’s knowledge of the external world and society itself.

Development of the theory of knowledge in Marxist and modern philosophy

In post-Hegelian philosophy, much attention was paid to the issues of the cognitive activity of the subject, especially in Marxist philosophy. On the basis of dialectics, Marxism links together dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge. Issues of cognitive activity are considered by Marx and Engels in inextricable connection with the objective and practical activities of people. She, according to Marx, is the true essence of social man. Based on the formula “being determines consciousness,” Marx is confident that the subject of knowledge is a derivative of the subject of practice, that knowledge is not the original and not the only relationship of man to the world.

A person, as an individual, becomes a person only in a joint social life with other individuals, using socially developed forms of cognitive activity, in particular language, categories of logic, etc. F. Engels considered contemplation, that is, the role of an observer, which the subject occupied, to be a disadvantage of the philosophy preceding Marxism in knowledge. Of course, this sharp statement cannot be taken as absolute, since the history of philosophy has shown examples of the activity of the subject, especially when it comes to self-knowledge. But the contribution of Marxism to the theory of knowledge lies in the fact that it showed that material existence, objective reality are realized by the knowing subject insofar as he assimilates them in the forms of his practical cognitive activity. The Marxist theory of knowledge proceeds from the fact that knowledge is not some independent object wedged between subject and object, but a form of crystallization of realized cognitive activity and a form of its possible future course.

Conclusion. The development of the theory of knowledge shows that this area of ​​philosophy, to a greater extent than its other areas, is trying to connect itself with science. In a number of cases, the theory of knowledge acts as a critical analysis and interpretation of scientific data, primarily the results of the natural sciences. Both in antiquity and in modern times, the study of problems of knowledge and cognition is directly related to the philosophical analysis of the nature of being, with the clarification of the primary foundations of reality. Moreover, in ancient philosophy the theory of knowledge is not clearly separated from cosmological views, but in the philosophy of the 17th-18th centuries. the theory of knowledge gains relative independence. But even during this period, knowledge is conceived as inextricably linked with being. Depending on the understanding of the nature of reality, the theory of knowledge develops in connection with an objective existence independent of consciousness (in the form of materialism or objective idealism) or in connection with a system of psychological experiences (feelings, sensations), etc.

However, the theory of knowledge is not identical to metascience (the science of science). It emerged as a field of knowledge long before science arose and interprets scientific results from the point of view of their foundations, truth or falsity. There is no direct and unambiguous connection between scientific data and the epistemological interpretation of these data. Epistemology only stimulates scientific research, forcing scientists to pay attention to the problems of the real validity of the conclusions obtained.

1.On the difference between pure and empirical knowledge

Without a doubt, all our knowledge begins with experience; in fact, how would the cognitive ability be awakened to activity, if not by objects that act on our senses and partly themselves produce ideas, partly prompt our mind to compare them, connect or separate them, and so how to process the rough material of sensory impressions into the knowledge of objects, called experience? Consequently, no knowledge precedes experience in time; it always begins with experience.

But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not at all follow that it comes entirely from experience. It is quite possible that even our experienced knowledge is composed of what we perceive by means of impressions, and of what our own cognitive faculty (only prompted by sense impressions) gives from itself, and we distinguish this addition from the main sensory material only when prolonged exercise draws our attention to it and makes us capable of isolating it.

Therefore, at least a question arises that requires more careful research and cannot be resolved immediately: does there exist such knowledge, independent of experience and even of all sensory impressions? Such knowledge is called a priori; it is distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has an a posteriori source, namely in experience.

However, the term a priori is not yet sufficiently defined to properly indicate the whole meaning of the question posed. Indeed, it is usually said of certain knowledge derived from empirical sources that we are capable of or (268) involved in it a priori because we derive it not directly from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, is itself borrowed from experience. So they say about a person who dug the foundation of his house: he could know a priori that the house would collapse, in other dictionaries, he had no need to wait for experience, that is, when the house would actually collapse. However, he still could not know about this completely a priori. The fact that bodies have heaviness and therefore fall when they are deprived of support, he should have learned earlier from experience.

Therefore, in further research we will call knowledge that is unconditionally independent of any experience, and not independent of this or that experience, a priori. They are opposed to empirical knowledge, or knowledge that is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. In turn, among a priori knowledge, that knowledge is called pure, to which nothing empirical is mixed at all. So, for example, a position, any change that has its cause, is an a priori position, but not a pure one, since the concept of change can only be obtained from experience.

2. We have some a priori knowledge, and even ordinary reason can never do without it

We are talking about a sign by which we can confidently distinguish pure knowledge from empirical knowledge. Although we learn from experience that an object has certain properties, we do not learn that it cannot be otherwise. Therefore, firstly, if there is a position that is thought together with its necessity, then this is an a priori judgment; if, moreover, this proposition is derived exclusively from those which themselves, in turn, are necessary, then it is certainly an a priori proposition. Secondly, experience never gives its judgments true or strict universality, it gives them only conditional and comparative universality (through induction), so this should, in fact, mean the following; As far as we know so far, there are no exceptions to this or that rule.

Consequently, if any judgment is conceived as strictly universal, that is, in such a way that the possibility of exception is not allowed, then it is not derived from experience, but is an unconditionally a priori judgment. Therefore, empirical universality is only an arbitrary increase in the significance of a judgment from the degree when it is valid for the majority of cases, to the degree when it is valid for the majority of cases, as, for example, in a position, all bodies have heaviness. On the contrary, where strict universality belongs to a judgment on the merits, it points to a special cognitive source of judgment, namely the capacity for a priori knowledge. So, necessity and strict universality are true signs of a priori knowledge and are inextricably linked with each other. However, using these signs, it is sometimes easier to detect (269) the randomness of a judgment than its empirical limitation, and sometimes, on the contrary, the unlimited universality we attribute to a judgment is clearer than its necessity; Therefore, it is useful to apply these criteria separately from each other, each of which is infallible in itself.

It is not difficult to prove that human knowledge actually contains such necessary and, in the strictest sense, universal, and therefore pure a priori judgments. If you want to find an example from the field of science, then you just need to point out all the provisions of mathematics; If you want to find an example from the use of ordinary reason itself, then this can serve as the statement that every change must have a cause; in the last judgment, the very concept of cause so obviously contains the concept of the necessity of connection with action and the strict universality of the rule that it would be completely reduced to nothing if we decided, as Hume does, to deduce from his frequent addition of what happens to what happens. , what precedes it, and from the resulting habit (hence, purely subjective necessity) of connecting ideas. Even without citing such examples to prove the reality of pure a priori principles in our knowledge, we can prove their necessity for the possibility of experience itself, that is, prove it a priori. In fact, where could experience itself derive its reliability from if all the rules that it follows were in turn also empirical, therefore random, as a result of which they could hardly be considered the first principles. However, here we can be content with pointing out as a fact the pure use of our cognitive faculty together with its characteristics. However, not only in judgments, but even in concepts, the a priori origin of some of them is revealed. Gradually discard from your empirical concept of body everything that is empirical in it: color, hardness or softness, weight, impenetrability; then there will still remain the space which the body (now completely disappeared) occupied and which you cannot discard. In the same way, if you remove from your empirical concept of any corporeal or incorporeal object all the properties known to you from experience, then you still cannot take away from it that property due to which you think of it as a substance or as something attached to a substance (although This concept has greater certainty than the concept of an object in general). Therefore, under the pressure of necessity with which this concept is imposed on you, you must admit that it a priori resides in our cognitive faculty. (270)

Kant I. Criticism of pure reason // Works: in 6 volumes. T.Z. – M., 1964. – P. 105-111.

F. SCHELLING

Transcendental philosophy must explain how knowledge is possible at all, provided that the subjective is accepted in it as dominant or primary.

Consequently, it makes its object not a separate part of knowledge or its special subject, but knowledge itself, knowledge in general.

Meanwhile, all knowledge is reduced to known initial beliefs, or initial prejudices; their transcendental philosophy must be reduced to one original conviction; this belief, from which all others are derived, is expressed in the first principle of this philosophy, and the task of finding it means nothing more than finding the absolutely certain, by which all other certainty is mediated.

The division of transcendental philosophy itself is determined by those initial beliefs from the significance of which it proceeds. These beliefs must first be discovered in ordinary consciousness. If we return to the point of view of ordinary consciousness, it turns out that the following beliefs are deeply rooted in the minds of people.

That not only does the world of things exist independently of us, but, moreover, our ideas coincide so much with these things that there is nothing in things beyond what exists in our ideas about them. The compulsory nature of our objective ideas is explained by the fact that things have an invariable certainty and our ideas are indirectly determined by this certainty of things. This first primordial conviction defines the first task of philosophy: to explain how ideas can absolutely coincide with things that exist completely independently of them. Since on the assumption that things are exactly as we imagine them, and that we actually know things as they are in themselves, the possibility of any experience is grounded (for what would happen to experience and what would be, for example, the fate of physics without the premise of the absolute identity of being and appearance), then the solution to this problem belongs to the field of theoretical philosophy, which should explore the possibilities of experience.

Schelling F. System of transcendental idealism // Works. T.1. – pp. 238, 239.

Being (matter), considered as productivity, is knowledge; knowledge considered as a product is being. If knowledge is productive at all, it must be so entirely and not partially; nothing can come into knowledge from the outside, for everything that exists is identical to knowledge and there is nothing outside knowledge. If one factor of representation is in the I, then the other must also be in it, since in the object they are not separated. Suppose (271) for example, that only materiality belongs to things, then this materiality, until the moment when it reaches the I, or in any case at the stage of transition from thing to representation, must be formless, which, of course, is unthinkable.

But if limitation is initially posited by the I itself, then how does it feel it, i.e., does it see in it something opposite to itself? The entire reality of knowledge is connected with sensation, therefore a philosophy that is unable to explain sensation is thereby already untenable. For the truth of all knowledge is undoubtedly based on the feeling of compulsion that accompanies it. Being (objectivity) always expresses only the limitations of contemplating or producing activity. The statement “in this part of space there is a cube” means only that in that part of space the action of my contemplation can manifest itself in the form of a cube. Consequently, the basis of all reality of knowledge is the basis of limitation, independent of intuition. A system that eliminated this basis would be dogmatic transcendental idealism.

Schelling F. System of transcendental idealism // Works. T. 1. – P. 291.

We accept as a hypothesis that our knowledge is generally characterized by reality, and we ask the question: what are the conditions of this reality? Whether reality is truly inherent in our knowledge will be established depending on whether those conditions that are at first only deduced will actually be revealed in the future.

If all knowledge is based on the correspondence of the objective and the subjective, then all our knowledge consists of propositions that are not directly true and borrow their reality from something else.

A simple comparison of the subjective with the objective does not yet determine true knowledge. Conversely, true knowledge presupposes a combination of opposites, which can only be indirect.

Consequently, in our knowledge, as its only basis, there must be something universal mediating.

2. We accept as a hypothesis that there is a system in our knowledge, that is, that it is a self-sufficient and internally consistent whole. The skeptic will reject this premise as well as the first; and both can be proven only through the action itself. For what would it lead to if even our knowledge, nay, our entire nature turned out to be internally contradictory? Consequently, if we assume that our knowledge is the original integrity, then the question of its conditions again arises. (272)

Since every true system (for example, the system of the universe) must have the basis of its existence in itself, then the principle of the knowledge system, if one really exists, must be located within knowledge itself.

This principle can only be one. For every truth is absolutely identical to itself. In probability there may be degrees, in truth there are no degrees; that which is true is equally true. However, the truth of all positions of knowledge cannot be absolutely the same if they borrow their truth from different principles (mediating links); therefore, all knowledge must be based on a single (mediating) principle.

4. Indirectly or indirectly, this principle is the principle of every science, but directly and directly - only the principle of the science of knowledge in general, or transcendental philosophy.

Consequently, the task of creating a science of knowledge, that is, a science for which the subjective is primary and highest, directly leads us to the highest principle of knowledge in general.

All expressions against such an absolutely highest principle of knowledge are suppressed by the very concept of transcendental philosophy. These objections arise only because the limitations of the first task of this science are not taken into account, which from the very beginning is completely abstracted from everything objective and proceeds only from the subjective.

We are talking here generally not about the absolute principle of being - otherwise all the objections raised would be fair - but about the absolute principle of knowledge.

Meanwhile, if there were no absolute boundary of knowledge - something that, even without being consciously realized by us, absolutely fetters and binds us in knowledge and in knowledge does not even become an object for us - precisely because it is the principle of all knowledge , - then it would be impossible to acquire any knowledge, even on the most private issues.

The transcendental philosopher does not ask the question, what is the final basis of our knowledge that lies outside of it? He asks what is the last thing in our knowledge itself, beyond which we cannot go? He seeks the principle of knowledge within knowledge (hence this principle itself is something that can be known).

The statement “is there a supreme principle of knowledge” is, in contrast to the statement “there is an absolute principle of being,” not a positive, but a negative, restrictive statement, which contains only the following: there is something final, from which all knowledge begins and beyond which there is no knowledge . (273)

Since the transcendental philosopher always makes only the subjective his object, his statement is reduced only to the fact that subjectively, that is, for us, there is a certain initial knowledge; whether there is anything at all abstracted from us beyond this initial knowledge is of no interest to him at first; that must be decided later.

Such initial knowledge for us is, without a doubt, knowledge about ourselves, or self-awareness. If an idealist turns this knowledge into a principle of philosophy, then this is fully consistent with the limitations of his entire task, the only object of which is the subjective side of knowledge. That self-consciousness is the reference point with which everything is connected for us does not need proof. But that this self-consciousness can only be a modification of some higher being (perhaps a higher consciousness, or even higher, and so on ad infinitum), in a word, that self-consciousness can be something generally capable of explanation, can be explained something about which we cannot know anything, precisely because self-consciousness alone creates the entire synthesis of our knowledge, does not concern us as transcendental philosophers; for for us self-consciousness is not a kind of being, but a kind of knowledge, and the highest and most complete of all that are given to us.

Schelling F. System of transcendental idealism // Works. T.1. – P. 243, 244.

Irritability is like a center around which all organic forces are concentrated; to discover its causes meant revealing the secret of life and stripping nature of its veil.

If nature contrasted the animal process with irritability, then it, in turn, contrasted irritability with sensitivity. Sensitivity is not an absolute property of living nature; it can only be imagined as the opposite of irritability. Therefore, just as irritability cannot exist without sensitivity, sensitivity cannot exist without irritability.

We generally infer the presence of sensitivity only from the peculiar and voluntary movements that external irritation causes in a living being. The external environment acts differently on a living being than on a dead one; light is only light for the eye; but this uniqueness of the effect that external stimulation has on a living thing can only be inferred from the uniqueness of the movements that follow it. Thus, for an animal, the sphere of possible movements also determines the sphere of possible sensations. The number of voluntary movements an animal can make, the same number of sensory impressions it can perceive, and vice versa. Consequently, the sphere of his (274) irritability to an animal determines the sphere of his sensitivity and, conversely, the sphere of his sensitivity determines the sphere of his irritability.

What is interesting about classical German philosophy? It’s difficult to talk about it briefly, but we’ll try. It is a very significant and significant contribution to the history and development of world thought. This is how it is customary to talk about a whole set of different theoretical concepts that appeared in Germany over the course of more than a hundred years. If we are talking about a comprehensive and original system of thinking, then this is, of course, German classical philosophy. Briefly about its representatives the following can be said. First of all, this is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach. The leading number of thinkers in this direction also includes several other famous people. These are Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Schelling. Each of them is very original and is the creator of their own system. Can we then even talk about such a holistic phenomenon as classical German philosophy? It is briefly described as a collection of diverse ideas and concepts. But they all have some common essential features and principles.

German classical philosophy. General characteristics (briefly)

This is an entire era in the history of German thought. This country, as Marx aptly put it, in those days existed more theoretically than practically. However, after the crisis of the Enlightenment, the center of philosophy moved here. Its birth was influenced by various factors - the revolution and the attempt at Restoration in France, the popularity of the ideology of natural law and property, the concept of a reasonable social system. If we really want to understand what classical German philosophy is, we can briefly say that it accumulated the previous ideas of different countries, especially in the field of knowledge, ontology and social progress. In addition, all these thinkers tried to understand what culture and consciousness are. They were also interested in what place philosophy occupied in all this. German thinkers of this period tried to characterize. They developed systematic philosophy as a “science of the spirit,” defined its main categories and identified branches. And most of them recognized dialectics as the main method of thinking.

Founder

Most historians consider Immanuel Kant to be the founder of that most significant phenomenon in the history of the development of the human mind, which is classical German philosophy. Briefly, his activities are divided into two periods. The first of them is traditionally considered subcritical. Here Kant showed himself as a natural scientist and even put forward a hypothesis about how our solar system arose. The second, critical period in the philosopher’s work is devoted to the problems of epistemology, dialectics, morality and aesthetics. First of all, he tried to solve the dilemma that arose between what is the source of knowledge - reason or experience? He considered this discussion to be largely artificial. Sensations give us material for research, and reason gives it form. Experience allows us to balance and verify all this. If sensations are ephemeral and impermanent, then the forms of the mind are innate and a priori. They arose even before experience. Thanks to them, we can express the facts and phenomena of the environment in concepts. But we are not given the opportunity to comprehend the essence of the world and the Universe in this way. These are “things in themselves”, the understanding of which lies beyond the limits of experience, it is transcendental.

Critique of Theoretical and Practical Reason

This philosopher posed the main problems, which were then solved by all subsequent German classical philosophy. Briefly (Kant is a very complex philosopher, but let’s try to simplify his schemes) it sounds like this. What and how can a person know, how to act, what to expect, and in general, what is he himself? To answer the first question, the philosopher considers the stages of thinking and their functions. Feelings operate with a priori forms (for example, space and time), reason - with categories (quantity, quality). Facts taken from experience are transformed into ideas with their help. And with their help the mind builds a priori synthetic judgments. This is how the process of cognition occurs. But the mind also contains unconditional ideas - about the unity of the world, about the soul, about God. They represent an ideal, a model, but it is impossible to rationally derive them from experience or prove them. Any attempt to do this gives rise to insoluble contradictions - antinomies. They point out that here reason must stop and give way to faith. Having criticized theoretical thinking, Kant moves on to practical thinking, that is, to morality. Its basis, as the philosopher believed, is the a priori categorical imperative - the fulfillment of moral duty, and not personal desires and inclinations. Kant anticipated many features of German classical philosophy. Let's briefly look at its other representatives.

Fichte

This philosopher, unlike Kant, denied that the environment does not depend on our consciousness. He believed that subject and object are just different manifestations of the divine Self. In the process of activity and cognition, positing actually occurs. This means that first the “I” realizes (creates) itself, and then objects. They begin to influence the subject and become obstacles for him. To overcome them, the “I” develops. The highest stage of this process is the awareness of the identity of subject and object. Then the opposites are destroyed and the absolute Self arises. In addition, the subject in Fichte's understanding is theoretical and practical. The first defines, and the second implements. The Absolute "I", from Fichte's point of view, exists only in potency. Its prototype is the collective “We” or God.

Schelling

Taking up Fichte's ideas about the unity of subject and object, the thinker believed both of these categories to be real. Nature is not the material for the realization of the “I”. This is an independent unconscious whole with the potential for the appearance of a subject. The movement in it comes from opposites and at the same time represents the development of the world Soul. The subject is born from nature, but he himself creates his own world, separate from the “I” - science, art, religion. Logic is present not only in the mind, but also in nature. But the most important thing is the will, which makes both us and the world around us develop. To discern the unity of man and nature, reason is not enough; intellectual intuition is needed. Philosophy and art have it. Therefore, according to Schelling, the system of thinking should consist of three parts. This is the philosophy of nature, then epistemology (where a priori forms of reason are studied). But the crown of it all is the comprehension of the unity of subject and object. Schelling called it the philosophy of identity. She believes the existence of an Absolute mind, in which spirit and nature and other polarities coincide.

System and method

The most famous thinker with whom German classical philosophy is associated is Hegel. Let us briefly outline its system and basic principles. Hegel accepts Schelling's doctrine of identity and Kant's conclusion that matter cannot be derived from consciousness, and vice versa. But he believed that the main philosophical principle was the unity and struggle of opposites. The world is based on the identity of being and thinking, but contradictions are hidden in it. When this unity begins to realize itself, it alienates and creates a world of objects (matter, nature). But this other being still develops according to the laws of thinking. In The Science of Logic, Hegel examines these rules. He finds out what concepts are, how they are formed and how they are characteristic, how formal and dialectical logic differ, what are the laws of development of the latter. These processes are the same for thinking and for nature, because the world is logical and reasonable. The main method for Hegel was dialectics, the main categories and laws of which he derived and consolidated.

Triads

Two more significant works of the German thinker are “Philosophy of Nature” and “Phenomenology of Spirit”. In them he explores the development of the otherness of the Absolute Idea and its return to itself, but at a different stage of development. The lowest form of its existence in the world is mechanics, then comes physics and, finally, organics. After the completion of this triad, the spirit leaves nature and develops in man and society. First he becomes aware of himself. At this stage it represents the subjective spirit. Then it manifests itself in social forms - morality, law and the state. Human history ends with the emergence of the Absolute Spirit. It also has three forms of development - art, religion and philosophy.

Materialism

But the German classical system does not end with Hegel’s system (we will briefly describe his teaching below); it is considered its last representative. He was also Hegel's most vocal critic. From the latter he borrowed the idea of ​​alienation. He devoted almost his entire life to finding out what forms and types it has. He tried to create a theory about overcoming alienation, and also criticized religion from the standpoint of materialism. In his work on the history of the Christian religion, he stated that it was man who created God. At the same time, there was an alienation of the ideal from people. And this led to the fact that man made his creation an object of cult. People's aspirations should be directed to what truly deserves them - to themselves. Therefore, the most reliable means of overcoming alienation is love, which can create new relationships between people.

German classical philosophy. Summary of main ideas

We see that all these different philosophers tried to explore man, his essence and purpose. Kant believed that the main thing in people is morality, Fichte - that activity and rationality, Schelling - that the identity of subject and object, Hegel - logic, and Feuerbach - love. In determining the meaning of philosophy, they also occupied different, although often similar, positions. Kant gives primary importance to ethics, Schelling to natural philosophy, Fichte to political disciplines, Hegel to panlogism. Feuerbach considers all these problems in a complex manner. As for dialectics, everyone recognized its importance, but each of them put forward his own version of this theory of universal connection. These are the main problems that German classical philosophy considered. The general characteristic (briefly described above) of this phenomenon in the history of human thought, according to established opinion, is that it is one of the most significant achievements of the culture of Western Europe.