Chechnya 1997 war there were fierce battles. Chechen War. Reasons for the start of the Chechen War

1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.

2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The head of the Chechen Republic, D. G. Zavgaev, spoke on this issue in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma."

Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, flooded this people with blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic. When Besliev, the vice-rector of a state university, was shot on the street. When Kancalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on.

8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation

9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.

10. Dudayev’s forces received a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat-ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.

12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994

18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament

22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)

At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance

In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.

According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.

One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded

32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation

37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War."

43. According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, 19,794 wounded

44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen).

45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

46. ​​On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the assault on Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

48. According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.” In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya”

49. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an extensive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.

51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war in modern Russian history is officially over. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime in Chechnya was introduced by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with repelling the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the gangs driven back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not help but begin. Events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements that ended the previous war in 1996 left no doubt that hostilities would break out again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars was very different. In 1994, the bet on the “Chechenization” of the conflict was lost - the opposition units were unable (and were unlikely to be able) to resist Dudayev’s formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not very well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops encountered fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

The assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994, was especially costly for the Russian army. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts place the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

As a result, the Russian army got involved in multi-week battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs, which lost about 7,000 people and a large amount of equipment and weapons. It should be noted that the Chechen separatists received the equipment in the early 90s, seizing the warehouses of military units located on the territory of Chechnya with the connivance of first the authorities of the USSR and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the gangs. On June 14, 1995, Basayev’s gang raided the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Territory, where they seized the city hospital, taking patients and staff hostage. The militants managed to get to Budennovsk by road. The guilt of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost universal.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and begin negotiations with the Dudayev regime. Russian special forces began an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by the order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to give the terrorists the opportunity to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was placed on the director of the Federal Grid Company, Sergei Stepashin, and the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Viktor Erin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. Federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the attacks by militants hiding in mountainous and wooded areas and enjoying the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar and took a group of hostages in a local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them hundreds of hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the Ministry of Internal Affairs checkpoint.

Soon, Raduev’s group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was stormed by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev's gang on Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye, 78 military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Some of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in the poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, gangs recaptured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, a ceasefire agreement was signed, after which negotiations between representatives of Russia and Chechnya began on the development of “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side by Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent “agreement on peace and principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Chechnya,” signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to the independence of Chechnya. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties on the basis of the principles of international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aircraft for political reasons. There was a severe lack of modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, were forgotten.

In addition, an information war was launched against the army - a number of media outlets and politicians carried out a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and background of the war were kept silent, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 90s. Many were killed, others were driven from their homes and were forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and imagined sins of the federal forces, but kept silent on the topic of the misfortunes of the Russian residents of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in Eastern European countries and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting the Chechen separatists. The intelligence services of Western countries also provided assistance to the gangs. A number of countries provided shelter, medical and financial assistance to the militants, and helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures were gross mistakes made by both the top leadership and the operational command, as well as the wave of army corruption, as a consequence of the deliberate and general disintegration of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number of successful operations by militants against Russian columns would have been impossible provided that Russian troops complied with the basic statutory requirements for organizing combat security, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not guarantee a peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. The authorities of Ichkeria even stole the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across Russian territory.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The bandits were counting on the weakness of the Russian government and the surrender of Dagestan. The attack was carried out on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

The fighting with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted more than a month. At this time, major terrorist attacks were carried out in several Russian cities - residential buildings were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and army did not come true. The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has taken overall leadership of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large forces of militants with few losses. The militants’ individual “successes” cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Height 776, when the bandits managed to escape from encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, without air and artillery support due to bad weather, held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants for 24 hours. The bandits broke through the company's positions only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people remained alive). The militants' losses amounted to about 500 people. After this, the main type of action by militants becomes terrorist attacks - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively exploited the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Within Russia itself, the new war also enjoyed significantly greater support than before. This time, in the highest echelons of power, there was no indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. The federal center has sent and continues to send large amounts of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. Units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are permanently stationed in Chechnya to maintain order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather restless region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion for Russia of another, very important stage in the struggle for its territorial integrity.

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. Following the results of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but no one still recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means has begun to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky’s unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.

Russia waged numerous wars against invaders, there were wars as obligations to its allies, but, unfortunately, there were wars, the causes of which were related to the illiterate activities of the country's leaders.

History of the conflict

It all started quite peacefully even under Mikhail Gorbachev, who, by announcing the beginning of perestroika, actually opened the way for the collapse of a huge country. It was at this time that the USSR, which was actively losing its foreign policy allies, began to have problems within the state. First of all, these problems were associated with the awakening of ethnic nationalism. They manifested themselves most clearly in the Baltic and Caucasus territories.

Already at the end of 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was convened. It was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a major general of the Soviet Army. The goal of the congress was secession from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen Republic. Gradually this decision began to come true.

Back in the summer of 1991, dual power was observed in Chechnya: the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria under Dzhokhar Dudayev continued to work there. But in September 1991, after the unsuccessful actions of the Emergency Committee, the Chechen separatists felt that a favorable moment had arrived, and Dudayev’s armed guards seized the television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. In fact, a coup d'état took place.

Power passed into the hands of the separatists, and on October 27 parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic. All power was concentrated in the hands of Dudayev.

Nevertheless, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin considered it necessary to introduce a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic and thereby created the reason for the start of a bloody war. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was a large amount of Soviet weapons in the republic, which they did not have time to remove.

For some time the situation in the republic was contained. An opposition was created against Dudayev, but the forces were unequal.

The Yeltsin government at that time had neither the strength nor the political will to take any effective measures, and, in fact, Chechnya became practically independent from Russia in the period from 1991 to 1994. It formed its own authorities, its own state symbols. However, in 1994, the Yeltsin administration decided to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. Russian troops were brought into its territory, which marked the beginning of a full-scale war.

Progress of hostilities

	Federal aviation attack on Chechen airfields. Destroying militant aircraft
	Entry of federal troops into the territory of Chechnya
	Federal troops approached Grozny
	The beginning of the assault on Grozny
	Capture of the Presidential Palace
	Creation of the "South" group and the complete blockade of Grozny
	Conclusion of a temporary truce
	Despite the truce, street fighting continues. Militant groups retreat from the city
	The last district of Grozny has been liberated. The pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by S. Khadzhiev and U. Avturkhanov
	Capture of Arghun
	Shali and Gudermes taken
	Fighting near the village of Semashki
April 1995	End of fighting in lowland Chechnya
	The beginning of hostilities in mountainous Chechnya
	Capture of Vedeno
	The regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken
	Terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk
	First round of negotiations. Moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period
	Second round of negotiations. Agreement on the exchange of prisoners “all for all”, disarmament of ChRI detachments, withdrawal of federal troops, holding free elections
	The militants capture Argun, but after the battle they are driven out by federal troops
	Gudermes was captured by militants and a week later cleared by federal troops
	Elections were held in Chechnya. Defeated Doku Zavgaev
	Terrorist attack in Kizlyar
	Militant attack on Grozny
	Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev
	Meeting in Moscow with Z. Yandarbiev. Armistice agreement and prisoner exchange
	After the federal ultimatum, attacks on militant bases resumed
	Operation Jihad. Separatist attack on Grozny, assault and capture of Gudermes
	Khasavyurt agreements. Federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the status of a republic was postponed until December 31, 2001

Results of the war

Chechen separatists perceived the Khasavyurt agreements as a victory. Federal troops were forced to leave Chechnya. All power remained in the hands of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria. Instead of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov took power, who was not much different from his predecessor, but had less authority and was forced to constantly make compromises with the militants.

The end of the war left behind a devastated economy. Cities and villages were not restored. As a result of the war and ethnic cleansing, all representatives of other nationalities left Chechnya.

The internal social situation has changed critically. Those who previously fought for independence have descended into criminal squabbles. The heroes of the republic turned into ordinary bandits. They hunted not only in Chechnya, but also throughout Russia. Kidnapping has become a particularly profitable business. Neighboring regions especially felt this.

Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen War.

The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.

Stage one. How it all began.

The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.

Just a few months after Yeltsin’s statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Even though in essence it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first signal had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who was never a Muslim and had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too fast. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that behind Dudayev there were serious people sitting in Moscow offices.

Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.

The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoy, it was he who tried to declare a State of Emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. During these days, Yeltsin was at his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR never accepted the document on the emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who literally stated the following during the discussion of the document: “these black-assed people must be crushed.” This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.

True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.

Stage two. War becomes inevitable.

After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.

In January 1992, there was practically not a single soldier left in the training center, and this entire mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50/50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to Dudayev’s extremely nationalistic policies in Chechnya, there is a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border every day.

But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.

It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that the Russian Army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.

Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, entirely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Egorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar reports. Egorov stated that the situation for sending troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic’s population will undoubtedly support this decision and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, emphasized in his report that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed postponing the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan for the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and stated that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin’s demand to prepare an operation plan for the deployment of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.

On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.

One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...