It is well known that the Battle of Prokhorovka was won by the Red Army, but few people know that it lasted not one, but six whole days, and the tank battle on July 12, 1943 was only its beginning. But who won it - Rotmistrov or Hausser? Soviet historiography declares an unconditional victory, while delicately keeping silent about the price that the tank crews of the 5th Guards Tank Army paid for it. German historians put forward their own arguments: by the evening of July 12, the battlefield remained with the Germans, and the ratio of losses was clearly not in favor of the Red Army. Modern Russian researchers also have their own vision of the events that took place in July 1943. Let's try to figure out who won this battle. As an evidence base, we will use the opinion of Candidate of Historical Sciences V.N. Zamulin, a former employee of the Prokhorov Field Museum and, perhaps, the most prominent specialist in the history of the Battle of Kursk.

First, you need to understand the main myth of the Soviet era - the number of tanks that directly took part in the battle. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, citing the works of Soviet military leaders, gives a figure of 1,500 tanks - 800 Soviet and 700 German. In fact, on the Soviet side, the strike group included only the 29th and 18th tank corps of the 5th Guards TA of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with a total of 348 vehicles (2).

It is more difficult to quantify the forces of the German side. The II SS Panzer Corps included three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the motorized division “Leibstandarte CC Adolf Hitler” had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Motorized SS division "Totenkopf" - 122 and motorized SS division "Das Reich" - 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars (1). The position in the center (in front of the Prokhorovka station) was occupied by the Leibstandarte, its right flank was covered by Das Reich, the left by the Totenkopf. The battle took place on a relatively small area of ​​terrain up to 8 kilometers wide, crossed by ravines and bounded on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is necessary to take into account that most of the tanks of the “Dead Head” division solved tactical tasks of capturing the bend of the Psel River, where the infantrymen and artillerymen of the 5th Guards Army held the defense, and the tanks of the “Das Reich” division were located behind the railroad tracks. Thus, the Soviet tankers were opposed by the Leibstandarte division and an unknown number of tanks from the Totenkopf division (in the area along the river), as well as the Das Reich division on the left flank of the attackers. Therefore, indicate the exact number of tanks that participated in repelling the attack of two tank corps of the 5th Guards. TA, it is not possible.

Before the attack, on the night of July 11-12. Due to the fact that the 5th Guards. The TA changed its initial positions for the attack twice; its command, concentrating forces in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka station, did not conduct reconnaissance - there was no time. Although the current situation urgently required it: on the eve of July 11, SS units ousted Soviet infantrymen and dug in half a kilometer from the southern outskirts of Prokhorovka. By bringing up artillery, they created a powerful line of defense overnight, strengthening themselves in all tank-dangerous directions. About three hundred guns were deployed in a 6-kilometer area, including rocket-propelled mortars and 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36 anti-aircraft guns. However, the main German “trump card” on this section of the front was the 60 tanks of the Leibstandarte division, most of which were in reserve by the morning (behind the anti-tank ditch at an altitude of 252.2).

Self-propelled guns of the SS division "Das Reich" fire at the positions of the 183rd SD in the Belenikhino area.
July 11, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/s05.gif

At 5 o'clock in the morning, before the offensive of the 5th Guards. TA, the Soviet infantry tried to dislodge the SS men from their positions, but, coming under heavy German artillery fire, retreated, suffering heavy losses. At 8.30 the command was sounded: “Steel, steel, steel,” and Soviet tanks began to advance. The Soviet tank crews did not succeed in a swift attack, as it seems to many to this day. First, the tanks had to make their way through the infantry battle formations, then carefully move forward along the passages in the minefields. And only then, in full view of the Germans, did they begin to deploy into battle formations. In total, the first echelon operated 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns of two corps - the 29th and 18th. The nature of the terrain forced the forces to be gradually introduced into battle - in some places battalion-by-battalion, with significant time intervals (from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, which, as it turned out later, allowed the Germans to destroy them one by one). The main task for the Soviet tank crews was to capture the powerful center of the German defense - the Oktyabrsky state farm, in order to gain further opportunity for maneuver.

From the very beginning the battle became extremely fierce. Four tank brigades, three batteries of self-propelled guns, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled into the German fortified area in waves, but, encountering powerful resistance, retreated back again. Almost immediately after the start of the attack, active bombing of Soviet troops by groups of German dive bombers began. Considering that the attackers did not have air cover, this sharply worsened their situation. Soviet fighters appeared in the sky very late - only after 13.00.

Attack of the brigades of the 18th TC in the area of ​​​​the village of Andreevka. July 12, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/36.jpg

The first, main attack of two Soviet corps, which looked like a single attack, lasted until approximately 11.00 and ended with the 29th Tank Corps moving to the defense, although units of the 18th Tank Corps continued to try to take the state farm, outflanking it. Another part of the tanks of the 18th Corps, supporting the infantry, advanced on the right flank and fought in the villages on the river bank. The goal of this tank group was to strike at the junction between the positions of the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf divisions. On the left flank of the troops, tankmen of the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps made their way along the railway track.

Soon the attacks of the main forces of the 29th Corps resumed and continued until approximately 13.30–14.00. The tankers nevertheless drove the SS men out of Oktyabrsky, suffering colossal losses - up to 70% of their equipment and personnel.

By this time, the battle had acquired the character of separate battles with enemy anti-tank defenses. The Soviet tank crews did not have a unified command; they attacked in the indicated directions and fired at enemy tanks and artillery positions that appeared in the firing sectors of their guns.

“...There was such a roar that blood flowed from my ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire: while you are alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a damaged German “Tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there...”(GSS G.I. Penezhko).

By noon, it became clear to the Soviet command that the counterattack plan had failed.

At this time, in the bend of the Psel River, the German division “Totenkopf”, having captured a section of the eastern bank of the river, pulled up artillery and opened fire on the strike wedge of the 18th Tank Corps, which was operating on the right flank of the advancing Soviet troops. Observing the advance of the corps and unraveling the plan of the Soviet command, the Germans launched a series of counterattacks, using compact tank groups supported by artillery, aviation and motorized infantry. Fierce oncoming battles began.

Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-44.html

It was units of the 18th Corps that made the deepest and most massive breakthrough in the German defense zone, going to the rear of the Leibstandarte positions. The headquarters of the 2nd SS TC reported on the situation: “Large enemy forces, 2 regiments with about 40 tanks, attacked our units east of Vasilyevka, through Prelestnoye, Mikhailovka, Andreevka, then, turning south, advanced to the area north of the Komsomolets state farm.” The situation has been restored. It is obvious that the enemy intends to attack from Storozhevoy in the direction of the bend of the railway line and from the north in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm to cut off our forces that have advanced to the northeast.”

Attack of Soviet tanks and infantry in the Prokhorovka area, July 1943
Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-49.html

Real maneuver battles of tank groups flared up after formations of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps pushed the SS men to the southwestern slopes of height 252.2. This happened around 14.00–14.30. Then groups of tanks from both Soviet corps began to break through to the west of Andreevka, to Vasilyevka, as well as to the area of ​​​​height 241.6, where fierce oncoming tank battles also took place at short distances. On the left flank, separate groups of Soviet tanks broke through along the railroad, also in a southwestern direction.

“...The situation has become extremely tense,– recalled the former commander of a tank platoon of the 170th Tank Brigade, at that time Lieutenant V.P. Bryukhov. – The battle formations of the troops were mixed up, it was not possible to accurately determine the front line. The situation changed hourly, even minutely. The brigades then advanced, then stopped, then retreated back. It seemed that the battlefield was crowded not only with tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns and people, but also with shells, bombs, mines and even bullets. Their soul-chilling paths flew, intersected and intertwined into a deadly ligature. The terrible blows of armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells shook, pierced and burned through the armor, broke out huge pieces of it, leaving gaping holes in the armor, maimed and destroyed people. Tanks were burning. The explosions caused five-ton towers to break off and fly off to the side 15–20 meters. Sometimes the upper armor plates of the tower were torn off, flying high into the air. Slamming their hatches, they somersaulted in the air and fell, instilling fear and horror in the surviving tankers. Often, strong explosions caused the entire tank to fall apart, instantly turning into a pile of metal. Most of the tanks stood motionless, their guns mournfully lowered, or were on fire. Greedy flames licked the red-hot armor, sending up clouds of black smoke. Tankers who were unable to get out of the tank were burning along with them. Their inhuman cries and pleas for help shocked and clouded the mind. The lucky ones who got out of the burning tanks rolled on the ground, trying to knock the flames off their overalls. Many of them were overtaken by an enemy bullet or shell fragment, taking away their hope for life... The opponents turned out to be worthy of each other. They fought desperately, harshly, with frantic detachment. The situation was constantly changing, it was confusing, unclear and uncertain. The headquarters of corps, brigades and even battalions often did not know the position and condition of their troops ... "

By 1500, the strength of both Soviet tank corps had exhausted itself. The brigades have 10-15 vehicles left in service, and some have even less. However, the counterattack continued, as the Soviet command at all levels received orders not to stop and to continue the offensive. It was at this time that the greatest danger arose of German tank units launching a counteroffensive, which jeopardized the entire outcome of the battle. From this point on, the attacks continued mainly by infantry, supported by small groups of tanks, which, naturally, could not change the course of the battle in favor of the attackers.

Judging by reports from the front line, the fighting ended between 20.00 and 21.00. However, on the Storozhevoy farm the fighting continued even after midnight, and the Soviet troops were unable to hold it.

Scheme of combat operations in the offensive zone of the main counterattack group of the front on July 12, 1943

Official Soviet historiography called the battle of Prokhorovka legendary. A battle broke out on the battlefield, which was recognized as the greatest oncoming tank battle in history, without, however, specifying the number of armored vehicles participating in it.

For a long time, the main story about this episode of the war was I. Markin’s book “The Battle of Kursk,” published in 1953. Then, already in the seventies, the epic film “Liberation” was shot, one of the episodes of which was dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. And its main part was. Without exaggeration, it can be said that Soviet people studied the history of the war from these works of art. For the first ten years there was no information at all about the world's greatest tank battle.

Legendary means mythical. These words are synonyms. Historians are forced to turn to myths when other sources are unavailable. The battle of Prokhorovka took place not in Old Testament times, but in 1943. The reluctance of honored military leaders to tell details about events so distant in time indicates that they made tactical, strategic or other miscalculations.

At the beginning of the summer of 1943, in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk, the front line was formed in such a way that an arc-shaped protrusion was formed deep into the German defense. The German General Staff reacted to this situation in a rather stereotypical manner. Their task was to cut off, encircle, and subsequently defeat the Soviet group, consisting of the Central and Voronezh fronts. According to the Citadel plan, the Germans were going to launch counter strikes in the direction from Orel and Belgorod.

The enemy's intentions were guessed. The Soviet command took measures to prevent a breakthrough of the defense and was preparing a retaliatory strike, which was supposed to follow after exhausting the advancing German troops. Both warring sides made movements of armored forces to implement their plans.

It is reliably known that on July 10, the Second SS under the command of Gruppenführer Paul Hausser collided with units of the Fifth Panzer of Pavel Rotmistrov, who was preparing for an offensive. The resulting confrontation lasted almost a week. It culminated on July 12th.

What is true in this information and what is fiction?

Apparently, the battle of Prokhorovka came as a surprise, both to the Soviet and German commands. Tanks are used for the offensive, their main function is to support infantry and overcome defense lines. The number of Soviet armored vehicles outnumbered the enemy, so at first glance, a counter battle was unprofitable for the Germans. However, the enemy skillfully took advantage of the favorable terrain, which made it possible to fire from long distances. Soviet T-34-75 tanks, which had an advantage in maneuver, were inferior to the Tigers in turret armament. In addition, every third person in this battle was a light reconnaissance T-70.

The factor of surprise was also important; the Germans discovered the enemy earlier and were the first to attack. Their best coordination of actions was due to well-organized radio communications.

In such difficult conditions the battle of Prokhorovka began. The losses were huge, and their ratio was not in favor of the Soviet troops.

According to the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin and member of the military council Khrushchev, the result of the counterattack should have been the defeat of the German group that was trying to make a breakthrough. This did not happen, and the operation was declared a failure. However, it later turned out that there was still a benefit from it, and a huge one. The Wehrmacht suffered catastrophic losses, the German command lost the initiative, and the offensive plan was thwarted, albeit at the cost of great blood. Then a fictitious plan for the battle of Prokhorovka appeared in hindsight, and the operation was declared a major military success.

So, the official description of these events near Kursk is based on three myths:

Myth one: a premeditated operation. Although this was not the case. The battle occurred due to lack of awareness of the enemy's plans.

Myth two: the main reason for the loss of tanks by both sides was the oncoming battle. That wasn't true either. Most of the armored vehicles, both German and Soviet, were hit by anti-tank artillery.

Myth three: the battle took place continuously and on one field - Prokhorovsky. And that was not the case. The battle consisted of many separate combat episodes, from July 10 to July 17, 1943.

The battle continued. The Oryol-Kursk section of the Central Front successfully resisted the Wehrmacht soldiers. In the Belgorod sector, on the contrary, the initiative was in the hands of the Germans: their offensive continued in a south-eastern direction, which posed a threat to two fronts at once. The site of the main battle was to be a small field near the village of Prokhorovka.

The choice of area for combat operations was carried out based on geographical features - the terrain made it possible to stop the German breakthrough and deliver a powerful counterattack by the forces of the Steppe Front. On July 9, by order of the command, the 5th Combined Arms and 5th Tank Guards Armies moved to the Prokhorovka area. The Germans advanced here, changing their attack direction.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Central battle

Both armies concentrated large tank forces in the village area. It became clear that an oncoming battle simply could not be avoided. On the evening of July 11, the German divisions began an attempt to attack the flanks, and our troops had to use significant forces and even bring in reserves to stop the breakthrough. On the morning of July 12, at 8:15, she launched a counteroffensive. This time was not chosen by chance - the Germans' aimed shooting was made difficult as a result of being blinded by the rising sun. Within an hour, the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka acquired a colossal scale. At the center of the fierce battle were approximately 1,000-1,200 German and Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

For many kilometers the grinding of colliding combat vehicles and the roar of engines could be heard. The planes flew in a whole “swarm”, resembling clouds. The field was burning, more and more explosions shook the ground. The sun was obscured by clouds of smoke, ash, and sand. The smell of hot metal, burning, and gunpowder hung in the air. Choking smoke spread across the field, stinging the soldiers’ eyes and preventing them from breathing. The tanks could only be distinguished by their silhouettes.

Battle of Prokhorovka. Tank battles

On this day, battles were fought not only in the main direction. South of the village, a German tank group attempted to penetrate our forces’ left flank. The enemy's advance was stopped. At the same time, the enemy sent about a hundred tanks to capture the heights near Prokhorovka. They were opposed by soldiers of the 95th Guards Division. The battle lasted three hours and the German attack ultimately failed.

How the Battle of Prokhorovka ended

At approximately 13:00, the Germans once again tried to turn the tide of the battle in the central direction and launched an attack on the right flank with two divisions. However, this attack was also neutralized. Our tanks began to push the enemy back and by evening they were able to push him back 10-15 km. The Battle of Prokhorovka was won and the enemy advance was stopped. Hitler's troops suffered heavy losses, their attacking potential on the Belgorod sector of the front was exhausted. After this battle, right up to the Victory, our army did not let go of the strategic initiative.

These three myths are some of the most painful in the mythology of war. They have existed for a long time, in fact since the war. In the post-war period, our military leaders, as well as party leaders, overdid it on these topics so seriously and on a large scale that God forbid! True, neither science nor public opinion have brought us one iota closer to the truth. Until now, despite the fact that there are already excellent fundamental works on these issues based 99% on archival documents, it is still impossible to completely dot all the i’s. These myths cause extremely heated debate on any aspect, especially on the issue of losses in tanks. As a matter of fact, this - the problem of losses in these battles - is the essence of the myths, disputes around which reach the point of insanity and even turn into legal proceedings. For example, the well-known Shakespearean scholar of the History of the Great Patriotic War, B. Sokolov, who became extremely “famous” for his, how can I put it mildly, archinnocent “calculations” of various losses of the Red Army and other “pseudo-scientific exploits,” has already been dragged to court for libel. Just on the issue of tank losses during the battle of Prokhorovka. So you can imagine the intensity of passions. And yet, as they say, I took up the tug, so don’t say that it’s not strong. And the only chance to prove this is to turn to the solid works of the most serious authors. Today there are two such authors - Lev Lopukhovsky and Valery Zamulin. Here's to their works - respectively “Prokhorovka. Nonclassified"(M., 2007), and also “Kursk break. Decisive battle of the Patriotic War"(M., 2007) and “The Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify"(M., 2007) - and let’s turn. As noted above, all these myths, not to mention their “creators,” are tightly fixated on the problem of losses. Well, the problem of losses is the problem of losses. In war, unfortunately, there are no losses.

"AND. V. Stalin, when he learned about our losses,- noted the Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, who in 1943 commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, - became furious: after all, the tank army, according to the Headquarters plan, was intended to participate in the counter-offensive and was aimed at Kharkov. And here again we need to significantly replenish it. The Supreme Commander decided to remove me from my post and almost put me on trial. A. M. Vasilevsky told me this. He reported in detail to I.V. Stalin the situation and conclusions about the failure of the entire summer German offensive operation. J.V. Stalin calmed down somewhat and did not return to this issue again.” And now, as befits the history of Russia, there are only two questions: 1. Why was Stalin so indignant? 2. Why did Stalin then calm down and not bring Rotmistrov to trial?!

1. Few people know that with the results of the Battle of Kursk, especially the military activities of the Voronezh Front, as well as the 5th Guards headed by Rotmistrov. The TA and the tank battle near Prokhorovka were examined by a special commission chaired by a member of the State Defense Committee and the Politburo, Malenkov. The result of her work was hundreds of pages of various materials, which are still stored in the top secret Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and have not been declassified, because it contains such a detailed analysis of the failed tactics and strategy that our generals demonstrated during the Battle of Kursk, especially near Prokhorovka, that , obviously, it is believed that it is better for these documents to lie in the archives for half a century. However, the general conclusion of that commission is nevertheless known: the military operations of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka were characterized as "an example of a failed operation" . Not in the eyebrow, but straight in the eye!

Is this assessment objective?! Did the commission go too far in its party zeal?! Not at all. Only on July 12, 1943, that is, on the main day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, which, in fact, appears most of all in historical research, according to the highly professional calculations of L. Lopukhovsky, the irretrievable losses of the parties in armored vehicles on this day correlate approximately as follows: 6: 1 not in favor of the 5th Guards. TA under the command of Rotmistrov. The ratio of irretrievable losses during the seven-day Prokhorovsky battle is 5: 1 . To put it simply, these numbers can make you stunned...

According to even more unprecedentedly rigid data from our respected colleague V. Zamulin, who relied solely and exclusively on archival data, from 642 units of armored vehicles of the 5th Guards. Rotmistrov's TA (the total number in service on the indicated day in this army was 808 units armored vehicles) that took part in the fighting near Prokhorovka July 12, 1943, 340 fell into the loss column. Of them 194 burned, 146 hit. Losses - 53% of those who took part in the battle in just one day !

Now take a look at the table compiled by L. Lopukhovsky, mainly based on archival information, “Losses of the Voronezh Front in manpower, weapons and military equipment in the period from 5 to 22.07.43 according to various data”:

Name	According to the report of the front commander	According to the report of the front chief of staff	According to Manstein (from 5 to 23.7.43)	According to Krivosheev (“The classification has been removed”)
People (killed, wounded, missing)	74 500	100,932, including 24,880 missing	85 thousand, including 34 thousand prisoners.	73 892
horses	3110	2285	-	-
tanks (irrevocably)	1387	1571 (shot down - 834	1800	For three fronts, tanks and self-propelled guns 1614
self-propelled guns	33	57	-	-
aircraft (shot down and damaged)	387	387 (44 %)	524	For three fronts a total of 459
guns of all calibers	639	1713	1347	For three fronts a total of 3929
mortars of all calibers	622	1896	-	-
Art. machine guns	588	1795 (41 %)	-	small arms for three fronts, total (thousands) 70.8
light machine guns	2152	4780 (33 %)	-	-
PTR	911	3459 (27 %)	-	-
ppsh	12 434	36 898 (34 %)	-	-
rifles	27 800	42 132 (17 %)	-	-
cars	145	178	-	-

Despite the more than strange, unimaginable discrepancies even between the data of the front commander and his own chief of staff, the numbers indicate terrible losses. The fighting was extremely brutal. If, for example, we derive the arithmetic average for tank losses based on the data of the front commander, his chief of staff and Manstein, it turns out that for the period indicated in the title of the table, Soviet troops lost on average only 1586 tanks!

By the way, even before the official reports of the commanders, Stalin was already aware of the huge losses in tanks. On July 13, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin that he himself was personally convinced that the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrov lost “irretrievable and temporarily out of order up to 60% of tanks”. By the way, it is curious that Vasilevsky was very close to the truth in this assessment, although it is inaccurate. According to respected colleague V. Zamulin, from 215 available to July, 12 in this corps of tanks in battle July, 12 199 tanks took part, and losses amounted to 153 tanks, of which 103 were burned, 50 were knocked out, the total percentage of losses from those who took part in the battle was 77%.

So it should be quite clear that Stalin had reason to be indignant at Rotmistrov. Naturally, the main conclusion of the Malenkov commission was all the more justified against this background. However, not only against this background, but in principle it was more than justified. And here the author is literally physically forced to repeat what he already wrote when analyzing the myth about who is the best ace - German or Soviet tank crews.

The main reason for the origin of the ratio indicated by our respected colleague L. Lopukhovsky is that the Wehrmacht tank forces had significantly greater anti-tank artillery power, which our generals did not want to see, notice, and even less take into account. And therefore, in the literal sense of the word, pearls on the unsuppressed or at least insufficiently suppressed enemy defense, not so much even saturated, but - there is every reason for using such an expression - oversaturated anti-tank weapons. Moreover. If necessary, during battles, the Germans very competently and quickly switched to temporary defense, in which they effectively used the full power of both the anti-tank artillery of tank units and the power of the tank artillery itself, which in this case acted as anti-tank artillery. Even during the brutal tank battles on the Kursk Bulge, for some reason our generals did not want to accept this circumstance. And only after the fact of huge losses in tank units were they forced to admit this. The fact is that after the Battle of Kursk, the engineering services of the Red Army carefully examined all the damaged Soviet tanks and measured the diameter of the holes on them. It must be assumed that they took up this with the direct suggestion of Stalin and the Malenkov commission - they obtained painfully thorough results. As a result, it was found that:

33.5% of the holes were left by a 50-mm shell from German anti-tank guns (possibly also from guns of T-III tanks), 40.5% of holes were left by a 75-mm shell from German anti-tank guns (possibly also from guns from T-IV and T-V tanks) and 26% of the holes were left by an 88-mm shell from German anti-aircraft guns, which the Wehrmacht successfully used as anti-tank guns (possibly also as guns on T-VI tanks).

There is nothing surprising in these numbers. Dear colleague L. Lopukhovsky, in one of the notes in his wonderful book, indicated that:

“...the maximum armor thickness of the T-34 tank produced in 1942, the main type of tank of the 5th Guards. TA was 65 mm. All four main samples of 75-mm and 88-mm anti-tank and tank guns of the German army with barrel lengths of 48, 50, 70 and 71 calibers at a distance of 2 km with an anti-tank projectile at an impact angle of 60 degrees pierced armor plate from 63 to 148 mm!

Considering the terrible losses in tanks, there was nowhere to go, and the generals recognized this fact. Moreover, and you can’t deny them this, they did this unpleasant thing for themselves quite objectively. While apologizing for the forced but extremely necessary re-quoting, I ask you to once again carefully read the excerpt from a letter dated August 20, 1943 from Rotmistrov himself addressed to Marshal Zhukov:

“...When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuver advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the sighting range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our targeted tank fire... Thus, when confronted with German tank units that have gone on the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.”

Everything is accurate - that’s exactly how it happened!

But it would be better if he did not write such things. To put it mildly, this should not have been trusted on paper at all. At least for reasons of his own authority. Especially when you yourself actually become the founding father of the entire myth. After all, whatever one may say, it was Rotmistrov who inflated the analyzed myths, especially about the tank battle near Prokhorovka (this will be discussed separately below). Meanwhile, manuscripts, as we know, not only do not burn, but also have an ability, unpleasant for many, but programmed by History itself, to autonomously “surface” to the surface with all the ensuing consequences for their authors! This is what happened in this case.

For what Rotmistrov wrote is, in essence, his voluntary written recognition (luckily for him, not in Smersh) of the fact that the previous two-plus years of fierce battles with the Wehrmacht, including its tank units, did not became a serious lesson for our command. Including for him personally! Simply put, it (including Rotmistrov himself) did not learn any lessons, although, at the direction of Stalin and the Supreme Command Headquarters, both the GRU and the analytical division of the General Staff continuously carried out an in-depth analysis of past battles and battles, constantly generalized the experience of battles with German troops and constantly sent their recommendations to the active army. And the effect is zero point ten! And every time, as soon as the Germans went over to at least a temporary defense, they simply began to shoot our tanks from distant positions! And during those battles, for the results of which Stalin almost put Rotmistrov on trial, attacks on the enemy were simply suicidal only because proper measures were not taken to maximally suppress the enemy’s defense, which was oversaturated with anti-tank weapons. Naturally, the Germans simply shot at Soviet tanks from a long distance - as in a training exercise! Moreover, they then also had “tigers”, “panthers”, as well as “Ferdinands”.

2. Why did Stalin then calm down and not bring Rotmistrov to trial?!

Let us turn to the purely professional opinion of our respected colleague L. Lopukhovsky. And let's start with his global assessment of the results of the Battle of Kursk, primarily its first, defensive, stage. It is in the depths of these results that the roots of not only the reassurance of Stalin are hidden, but also the fair recognition of the Battle of Kursk as the one that finally broke the back of the Nazi beast, thereby symbolizing the final radical turning point in the war.

So, “why, despite all the mistakes and mistakes, did our troops manage to achieve ultimate success in the defensive operation? First of all, because the strategic leadership of the armed forces and the country was at its best. The balanced and well-thought-out decision to switch to deliberate defense fully justified itself. Having inflicted losses on the enemy, largely knocked out his tanks and brought reserves into the battle, our troops launched a strategic counter-offensive, which developed into a general offensive on a front of up to 2 thousand kilometers.”

While in principle I completely agree with this conclusion, which is absolutely adequate to historical realities, I cannot help but draw attention to one circumstance. This balanced and well-thought-out decision to switch to deliberate defense was based on impeccable intelligence information, which was abundantly provided to the senior leadership by both Soviet foreign and Soviet military intelligence, as well as the partisans and the front-line intelligence of Smersh. Not mentioning their initial contribution to making such a decision is simply unacceptable. Because intelligence in this case once again demonstrated the highest class, because the information obtained showed the entire process of the genesis of the German strategic plan associated with the Battle of Kursk - from its inception, detailed formation and final development up to the setting of specific goals. After all, data was established not only about the date, forces and planned specific actions of the German command, but also further plans of the Reich High Command that were closely related to them. In particular, it was established that in case of success at Kursk, it was planned to launch a large offensive operation in the south in the general direction of Kupyansk (operations “Panther” and “Hawk”), as well as in other directions north of the Kursk salient. Moreover. It was established that the German command was planning, if successful, a new attack on Leningrad. In short, their plans included the defeat of more than a quarter of the Red Army divisions and in fact carried out the defeat of the entire southern strategic wing of the Soviet front. So the decision is a decision, but we should not forget that neither Stalin, nor the Headquarters, nor the General Staff could have made such a decision if they did not have such exclusive super-extra-class intelligence information.

It was intelligence that made it possible not only to make such a balanced and well-thought-out decision on deliberate defense, but also, more importantly, to organize this deliberate defense itself, which now appears in many studies almost as a standard. For example, when analyzing the tragedy of June 22, 1941, it is often mentioned that “ideally, the formation of a group of Soviet troops near the western borders should have been the same as it was two years later in the Battle of Kursk. Then they created a defense in depth (eight defensive lines to a depth of 300 km), which made it possible to repel the enemy’s offensive, bleed his troops, and then launch a decisive strategic offensive. But then, in 41st, it didn’t work out.”. We talked enough about the tragedy of 1941 in the second volume of this five-volume set. So we will only talk about defense on the Kursk Bulge.

On the Kursk Bulge the total front line was 550 km, therefore, with the then chosen depth of defense in 300 km, the area in 165 thousand sq. km! On the Kursk Bulge, only rifle trenches and trenches for anti-tank rifles were dug 167 824! The length of the trenches and communication passages alone on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 8480 km. Command and observation posts on the Kursk Bulge were created 10 644 . Shelters and dugouts, respectively - 35 010 And 385 110! Wire barriers were erected on the Kursk Bulge 1186 km. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were installed on the Kursk Bulge 1,275,000 pcs.. To carry out work on the Kursk Bulge, up to 300 thousand people workers and collective farmers. Not to mention the fact that 1 million 336 thousand the men in the troops not only cheered them on with cheers. Not to mention the fact that enormous forces of the Red Army are concentrated in advance on the Kursk Bulge. All this was ensured by intelligence - with its super-extra-class exclusive information obtained in advance.

As a result, in terms of its scope and intensity, the Kursk defensive operation, the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, was one of the largest battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War as a whole. During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts bled and then stopped the advance of the Wehrmacht strike forces. Moreover. We created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kursk directions. Not only did Hitler’s plan to defeat the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient suffer a complete collapse, but the entire plan of the Wehrmacht’s summer campaign suffered an unconditional collapse. As Army General SM recalled in the post-war period. Shtemenko, formulating certain provisions of the congratulatory order to the troops who defeated the enemy in the Battle of Kursk, Stalin specifically dictated the following insert: “This way, the legend is exposed that the Germans always succeed in the offensive in the summer, and the Soviet troops are supposedly forced to retreat.” And Stalin further explained: “We need to talk about this. The fascists, led by Goebbels, after the winter defeat near Moscow, are constantly running around with this legend.” And it’s right what they said. Because, firstly, as it turned out later, already on July 19, 1943, a forced confession appeared in the combat diary of the OKW command: “Due to the strong enemy offensive, the further conduct of the Citadel(code name of the Wehrmacht operation on the Kursk Bulge. - A.M.) does not seem possible". And Hitler was forced to stop Operation Citadel. Secondly, already in the post-war period, the same Manstein - the main opponent of our troops in the Battle of Kursk - admitted that “in the Battle of Kursk, where the troops advanced with desperate determination to win or die... the best parts of the German army died.” After the Battle of Kursk, the strategic initiative on the Soviet-German front forever passed into the hands of the Soviet command, and the Nazis were forced to switch to defensive strategy and tactics.

So, it was the global victorious outcome of the Battle of Kursk that calmed Stalin, sharply reducing the intensity of his indignation at the actions of Rotmistrov, who, by the way, managed to twice arouse the wrath of the Supreme Commander in less than a year. The first time was during the Battle of Stalingrad, where his actions were also examined by the Malenkov commission. However, this is beyond the scope of our study.

And when Oryol and Belgorod were liberated on August 5, the considerably cheerful Stalin fell into an extremely complacent mood and began developing a system of fireworks in honor of the victories of the Soviet troops on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. On the same day, the first of 363 fireworks during the war was fired.

However, it was precisely this same victorious global outcome of the Battle of Kursk that gave rise to the chance for our generals to so polish the course of this fierce battle, in which both sides suffered severe losses, that in the end, either consciously or unconsciously, they managed to conceive the main contours of the analyzed myths . As L. Lopukhovsky notes:

“... in the post-war period, especially with the publication of P. A. Rotmistrov’s book “The Tank Battle of Prokhorovka” in 1960, the flow of praise to the tank army and its command intensified (this began on July 25 and 29, 1943 with articles in the newspaper "Red Star". - A.M.) and continued to grow with each anniversary of the Battle of Kursk. The funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense were closed. And Pavel Alekseevich, relying on his authority as the chief marshal of the armored forces and assistant minister of defense (1964–1968), formed a point of view on the events of July 12 near Prokhorovka, which, given the lack of information and the strict requirements of military censorship, was not so easy to criticize. At the same time, he tried to forget about the proceedings of the Malenkov commission, and about his more sober and adequate assessment of the events in a letter addressed to G.K. Zhukov, written on August 20, 1943. This is how myths and legends were created."

By the way, L. Lopukhovsky gives a very interesting expose of the myth about the tank battle near Prokhorovka:

“Here it is impossible not to cite the opinion of a person who devoted a lot of effort to studying the Prokhorov battle. Retired Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Lebedev, a researcher at the Belgorod Museum of Local Lore, writes: “...by July 12, 1943, near Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army destroyed 150 enemy tanks in three days, and not 400, as the army commander proclaimed. 1st Guards TA. And these battles were called a counterattack at that time, and then they began to be called an oncoming tank battle. But until July 12, every day of battle was fiercer than Prokhorovka. How can it be relegated to the backyard? the events that took place in the Oboyan direction north of Belgorod, where the plan for a fascist breakthrough on the southern flank of the arc was thwarted? After all, the fighters and commanders of the 6th Guards Army of General Chistyakov and the 1st Tank Army of General Katukov, together with other branches of the military, in the fiercest battles, suffering huge losses and showing unprecedented heroism, blocked the Nazis’ path to Kursk! The press, radio and television reduced the success of the Soviet troops to the success of the 5th Guards. tank army."

And, finally, about empty allegations about some kind of mistake, that is, about an alleged ignorance of the need to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Kursk Bulge, which would have helped to avoid huge losses. Let me again turn to the purely professional opinion of my respected colleague Lopukhovsky:

“...In connection with large losses in a defensive operation, the idea is sometimes expressed that it would have been better, using our superiority in forces, to forestall the enemy in going over to a strategic offensive and that the transition to a deliberate defense is a mistake. The easiest time to make assessments is now, when the consequences of a particular decision are known.

Supporters of preemptive strikes can only be advised to once again comprehensively analyze the situation that developed in the spring of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. We must not forget that the Kursk ledge was formed not only as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops, but also as a result of the failures of the Central Front and the defeat of the Voronezh troops. The Soviet military and political leadership had to take into account the enemy's capabilities to conduct successful large-scale operations. Just three weeks after the crushing defeat at Stalingrad, the Germans were able to launch a counteroffensive in the Donbass and in the Kharkov direction. Having thrown back the troops of the Southwestern Front and the Left Wing of the Voronezh Front by 150–200 km, they again seized the strategic initiative, imposing their will on the Soviet command.

Our troops went on the defensive not due to a lack of forces and means, as envisaged by existing theoretical views regarding strategic defense, but deliberately, having superiority over the enemy...

...The matter cannot be reduced only to the quantitative ratio of forces and means. Yes, the fronts received a large number of tanks and aircraft, but they, as it turned out, were inferior in quality to the German (“alaverdy” generals - what were they thinking about, because intelligence, including military intelligence, continuously reported that the Germans were systematically modernizing their weapons and military equipment, developing new types, etc.? - A.M.). Judging by the reports of numerous commissions that checked the tactical and special training of personnel and equipment of formations for combat operations, not all was well in this regard. All this had to be taken into account by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Proponents of a pre-emptive strike usually limit themselves to general arguments about the advantage of the offensive over the defensive. Indeed, only an offensive can achieve the final defeat of the enemy. But it was necessary to carefully weigh what a transition to the offensive could bring in these specific conditions. And first of all, give answers to the questions - when, where and with what forces to attack? In April, the troops of the Voronezh Front had not yet had time to recover from the defeat. In May? But by this time they had not yet managed to accumulate reserves of material resources due to the same mud. Strategic reserves were not created either. And Manstein was already ready for the offensive. He, like other German generals, subsequently explained his defeat by the fact that Hitler, contrary to their proposals, postponed the offensive from May to July.

If in June, then where? In which strategic direction or in two at once? Is there enough strength? It may be enough to break through the tactical zone. Although the tenacity of German troops in defense is known. After July 17, our troops, having a huge superiority in strength, experienced the resistance of the enemy’s pretty battered troops in defense. What about the mobility and striking power of tank divisions already ready for an offensive? How a collision with them in the operational depth would have ended can be judged by the events near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka. On August 18, the enemy launched a counterattack on the 27th Army, throwing it back 24 km, and again captured Akhtyrka. On August 24, an entry appeared in the OKH headquarters diary: “In the area south of Akhtyrka, the remnants of the encircled enemy group were destroyed. At the same time, 299 tanks and 188 guns were captured, as well as 1,800 prisoners."

* * *

A short comment by A. B. Martirosyan.In his new book “Battles on the Military-Historical Front,” Army General M. A. Gareev, with reference to the German historian W. Adam, indicates that “seventeen German tank divisions, reinforced with 60-ton Tiger tanks and 70-ton self-propelled artillery installations "Ferdinand", launched an offensive on a front section of 70 kilometers. This means that there was one tank division per four kilometers of front! “Nowhere else has the Wehrmacht concentrated so much offensive power in a limited space.” .

Pay special attention to this fact. The fact is that, according to the regulations of the Wehrmacht tank forces, they were supposed to make a breakthrough on a front that was twice or two and a half times wider. If we proceed from the average strength of a Wehrmacht tank division before the start of such an important, in the opinion of the Nazi command, operation of 172 tanks, then there are 43 tanks per kilometer of the offensive front. And then there are reinforced tanks. Well, what would happen to our troops if they foolishly tried to use such force? But do not forget that the Wehrmacht tank division was strong not only and not even so much in tanks, but in the exceptionally competent and skillful use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and the latter in defense knocked out tanks no worse than purely anti-tank artillery.

If we take all this into account, it turns out that the supporters of a preemptive strike, either consciously or unconsciously, are most likely passionately trying to retrospectively impose on the Red Army a terrible pogrom, like those that happened in June 1941?! What for?! Why is it so voluptuous to desire the defeat of one’s own troops, especially in retrospect?! Well, isn't it time to calm down?! If only because History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood...

* * *

In this regard, it is worth returning to Vatutin’s thoughts on the preparation of an offensive operation, expressed by him in a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on June 21, 1943 - two weeks before the start of Operation Citadel:

“According to all available data, the enemy is apparently improving its defenses, preparing a second defensive line and staffing its infantry and tank divisions. The enemy's intentions have not been revealed. I assume that the enemy is currently biding his time and is afraid of our attack.”

At the end of the report, Vatutin outlines the front’s needs for material resources in the interests of carrying out an offensive operation (very impressive figures) and asks:

“...give additionally to the front: two combined arms armies, two tank armies, two separate tank corps, seven breakthrough tank regiments, two artillery corps, three 152-mm self-propelled artillery regiments, two anti-aircraft divisions, 1000 aircraft, of which 600 fighters and 400 attack aircraft and bombers, 1500 cars, 300 Studebakers and 300 "Willis"".

According to Vatutin’s plan, the Southwestern Front was to participate in the operation, which also had to be strengthened. He spent 15 days preparing the operation. It was supposed to lead to the encirclement and defeat of 30 enemy divisions, including 10 tank divisions. But where to get so much strength and resources? Be left completely without strategic resources? The Headquarters could not agree to this.

The option proposed by Vatutin of pre-empting the enemy in going on the offensive with delivering the main attack bypassing the area of ​​Sumy, Mirgorod, Poltava (having a powerful group of Manstein’s troops on the flank, already ready for the offensive) would only play into the hands of the enemy. We already attacked this rake in May 1942 in the area of ​​the Barvenskovsky ledge.

The entire experience of war shows that the combination of offensive and defense is an objective law of military art, which cannot be ignored. In our opinion, The mistake was not that they switched to deliberate defense, but that they failed to take full advantage of its advantages.

This is, in brief, the more than difficult True Truth about the Battle of Kursk and the tank battle near Prokhorovka. However, under no circumstances will it be able to diminish the historically unprecedented greatness of the feat of our soldiers and officers, who, despite the losses they suffered, managed to break the back of the Nazi beast. And at least for the sake of basic respect for the memory of those who accomplished this feat, it’s time for the myth-makers to shut up, and the existing negativity in the history of not only this battle, but in the history of the war in general, should be sorted out calmly and in the professional circles of military historians, without staging a PR show in the media with “ sensational revelations of Stalinism." After all, you, not gentlemen, live only thanks to the feat of our ancestors, including those who fought and won on the Kursk Bulge!

Notes:

RGVA. F. 4. Op. 11. D. 74. L. 200–201.

Simonov K. M. Collected works: In 10 volumes, M., 1981, vol. 5, p. 48–49.

Note by I. Pykhalov and A. Dyukov: Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2–2): Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, June 22, 1941 - 1942. M., TERRA, 19917, p. 156.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 11, p. 11.

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 540–541. RGASPI. F. 83. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 61–65. Zamulin V.N. Battle of Prokhorov. Essay for the book “PROKHOROVKA - a look through the decades. Book of memory of those killed in the Battle of Prokhorov in 1943.” M., 2002, p. 320.

Zamulin V. Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify. M., 2007, p. 770–771, table No. 8. I cannot help but draw the attention of readers to the fact that literally every figure, every line in this table is strictly documented by archival data. Just a fantastic confirmation of literally everything.

Mellentin F. Armored fist of the Wehrmacht. M., 1999, p. 202.

Hardly any of his contemporaries know that the system of those fireworks was actually developed personally by Stalin. Moreover, despite the fact that it was very different from the established international rules, due to its exceptional harmony, clarity and logic, it was recognized throughout the world without any reservations. The marshals and generals of Victory knew about this, but not one of them even hinted at it in their memoirs! Everyone only mentions the fact that Stalin made the decision to hold fireworks. Strange “vow of silence”...

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 567.

There, p. 566, as well as: Samsonov A. M. Know and remember. Let's face it. Letter from V.N. Lebedev. M., 1989, p. 170.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 562.

Gareev M. A. Battles on the military-historical front. M., 2008, p. 322. Gareev refers to: Adam Wilhelm. Difficult decision, M., 1967, p. 398.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 562, as well as TSAMORF.F. 16. Op. 1720. D. 14, L. 7–22.

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 560–563.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of World War II took place.

Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as one that was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War.

The events of those days unfolded as follows. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943.
Having information about the preparation of fascist German troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thereby it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 near the railway station Prokhorovka(56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards). Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River . The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Destroyed German tank

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks conducted active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank The SS Totenkopf expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile). By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction. On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy group (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender in this direction of the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Destroyed German tank

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.
To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which tried to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

This day was the coldest in the history of weather observations. July, 12 was in 1887 year, when the average daily temperature in Moscow was +4.7 degrees Celsius, and the warmest was in 1903 year. That day the temperature rose to +34.5 degrees.

See also:

Battle on the Ice
battle of Borodino
German attack on the USSR