Diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. Ideological confrontation in international relations. Soviet Union, United States of America
Diplomacy of Western countries in the struggle for the establishment of the Versailles-Washington system.
After the First World War, there was an urgent need to preserve peace, ensure security and prevent a repetition of the tragedy that had just been experienced. The convening of the Paris Peace Conference, which drew a line under the military cataclysm of 1914-1918, was the result of active diplomatic activity of Western countries. Even during the war, the leaders of the Western world (W. Wilson, L. George) came up with peace programs that could become the basis for resolving emerging contradictions. One of these programs - Wilson's 14 points - became the foundation of the future world, the contours of which were created at the Paris and then at the Washington Conference. To master the topic, students must
know:
1. peace programs of Western countries, tasks facing delegations at conferences in Paris and Washington, methods for solving them;
2. the general course of negotiations, the dynamics of changes in the positions of delegations on various issues;
be able to:
1. analyze the positions of the parties during the negotiation process;
2. establish cause-and-effect relationships between events, ideas, processes, etc.
The main criterion for mastering this topic will be fluency in and handling of facts relating to the formation of the Versailles-Washington system and the ability to evaluate the diplomatic activities of Western countries in the context of the development of international relations in the interwar period.
Diplomacy of the Third Reich (1933-1945)
The contradictory development of the Versailles-Washington system in the interwar period and the global economic crisis led to the emergence of revanchist sentiments in once-defeated Germany, which resulted in the rise to power of the Nazi Party and the triumph of the ideas of the Third Reich. To implement these ideas, originally formulated by A. Hitler in his book “My Struggle” (“Mein Kampf”), a lot of efforts were made by German diplomacy. One of the first steps on this path was Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations: in this way, the Nazis freed themselves from the obligations imposed by the Charter of the international organization and could, using all acceptable means, establish German dominance in the world. To master the proposed material, students must
1. actions of German diplomacy in ensuring the solution of the tasks of establishing world domination;
1. understand the fundamental determinants of the diplomacy of European and American countries;
2. analyze the actions of diplomats of Western countries in ensuring the interests of their states;
3. establish cause-and-effect relationships between various events;
The result of mastering the topic should be students’ understanding of the reasons for the success of German diplomacy on the eve of the war (the formation of a bloc of aggressive states, the inaction of Western democracies in curbing the aggressor, the contradictory position of the USSR), as well as the reasons for Germany’s defeat not only on the fronts of World War II, but also in diplomatic offices ( secret negotiations with Western allies).
Diplomacy of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War.
The end of the Second World War, unfortunately, did not mark the beginning of a period of universal peace and prosperity. Even in its final period, many contradictions arose between the allies, which could not but affect the post-war structure of the world. Already in 1946, in Fulton, Churchill delivered a landmark speech about the Iron Curtain that covered Europe. And, despite the fact that Churchill spoke as a private person and not as a head of state, the speech turned out to be the first act of the beginning of the Cold War. To master this topic, students must
1. interpretation of the term, historiography of the Cold War, options for periodization, stages of the Cold War;
2. key events, processes, ideas, doctrines related to the confrontation between the USSR and the USA;
3. key figures in the ideological and military confrontation.
1. analyze doctrines, processes, events and their determinants;
2. characterize the processes and phenomena of the Cold War from a scientific point of view;
3. understand the reasons for the development of events in various regions of the global confrontation between the USSR and the USA.
The main indicator of students’ mastery of the topic will be their free orientation in the material, understanding of the causes and consequences of the Cold War and the ability not only to discern echoes of the Cold War in current international relations, but to propose their own scenario for the further development of events.
XXXIII KHARAK FORUM “POLITICAL SPACE AND
SOCIAL TIME: DIALOGUE OF AGES AND VALUES OF GENERATIONS »
Dokuchaeva S.V.
Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Postgraduate Student, Faculty of History, South Ural State University
USING USSR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY DURING THE COLD WAR AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL MYTH DESIGN1
Abstract: the cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in Latin America during the Cold War can be viewed through the prism of the concept of political myth-design. Cultural and political propaganda serve to form the desired image of the state within one’s own country and in the international arena. This is a purposeful process that has common features with the process of constructing political myths. Cultural diplomacy, according to the author, is a set of political myths that form a special reality for those who are its recipients.
Keywords: cultural diplomacy, Cold War, Latin America, political myth, political myth design
The processes of communication and influence on people's consciousness are basic in the political sphere of society. At different periods of history, various techniques and techniques were used to achieve maximum effect in these areas, and the more knowledge about the nature and human psyche accumulated by science, the more serious and sophisticated these methods became.
Next, we will consider such a phenomenon as “cultural diplomacy” through the prism of influencing the mass consciousness of the population both within one’s country and abroad. The object of our research is the cultural diplomacy of the USSR in Latin American countries during the Cold War. The purpose of the work is to analyze this method of states expanding their spheres of influence as cultural diplomacy from the point of view of political myth-design.
The objectives of the study are as follows: to define the concept of “cultural diplomacy”, “political myth” and “political myth-design”, and to attempt to define the cultural diplomacy of the USSR in Latin American countries during the Cold War as an element of political myth-making.
Cultural diplomacy is one of the main ways for leading players in world politics to spread their influence on the international stage in the face of confrontation between cultures and ideologies.
To solve the research tasks, we use the following interpretation of the concept of “cultural diplomacy” - this is a way of representing a state in the international arena, a channel for forming its positive representative image, identification among other cultures. The tool for achieving this goal is propaganda of varying degrees of harshness and aggressiveness2.
During ideological wars, the efforts of all parties are aimed at devaluing the enemy’s culture and replacing it with their own cultural concepts.
1 The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 16-18-10213).
2 Dolinsky A.V. Discourse on public diplomacy // International processes, 2011. No. 25. pp. 63-73.
At the same time, spreading one’s own culture to other countries and peoples requires a clear, well-thought-out strategy, including a clear understanding of goals, objectives and methods for achieving them. The use of cultural and political propaganda involves the formation of the desired image of the bearer of a given culture in the eyes of the recipient of the communicative cultural message. And this, in turn, entails a partial or complete change in the recipient’s picture of the world.
The influence on human consciousness to solve political problems is in most cases carried out through political myth-making.
Myth, according to a number of researchers, is the source of ideology, its “primary building material,” and any ideology is mythological in nature, since it reflects the attitude of the political institutions of society to the political process1.
A socio-political myth can be defined as a form of political creative activity, the content of which is the construction of stereotypical ideas about the political realities of the past and present2.
Thus, cultural diplomacy as a means of ideological propaganda of the Soviet Union is a process of political myth-making, that is, the conscious and purposeful construction of political myths and their transmission to the population of one’s own state, as well as those countries that were in the sphere of ideological and geopolitical interests of the USSR.
In the process of implementing cultural diplomacy of the USSR in Latin American countries, the main emphasis was on contrasting the image of the Soviet state with the imperialist enemy - the United States. It was necessary to create an attractive image of a free country, with which the oppressed and poor mostly countries of Latin America would want to establish close cultural, economic, scientific, and then political contacts, but most importantly, would leave the influence of the United States, which, within the framework of The Cold War was one of the main goals.
At the same time, it is worth noting an important feature of the region that influences the Soviet Union's choice of pace and methods of using cultural diplomacy and the various propaganda tools on which it was based. This is the geopolitical situation of Latin America, and its dependence on the United States. The region was part of the zone of influence of the United States and the active intervention of the USSR in the affairs of its countries and the pursuit of an aggressive policy of “imposing” its culture as a counterbalance to the culture of the States could lead to serious international consequences and provoke America into retaliatory actions in countries that were historically part of the zone of influence of the USSR.
Therefore, the implementation of cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in Latin American countries was carried out carefully and depended on the internal political situation in the region. Key milestones in the activation of Soviet cultural diplomacy in Latin American countries were such events as the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963, as well as significant anniversary dates, for example, the anniversaries of the revolution or the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin.
It was after these events and on the eve of the anniversaries that the USSR began to actively spread its influence in the region using the tools of cultural diplomacy, which had several goals.
The most obvious goal was to strengthen the influence of the USSR in the international arena and confront the United States.
1 Tsvetkova N. US public diplomacy: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // International processes, Vol. 13, No. 3. P. 12 -133.
2 Tsvetkova N. US public diplomacy: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // International processes, Vol. 13, No. 3. pp. 12 -133.
Active work in the Latin American region through the Friendship Societies and the Department of Latin American Countries within the structure of the SSDS was aimed at ideological propaganda of Soviet culture and science, especially in the period from 1956 to 1970. The main interest was attracted by representatives of the creative, scientific, and cultural intelligentsia, whose representatives were invited to the Soviet Union as part of carefully selected delegations. And during the visit to the USSR, there was a complete immersion in the “constructed” reality. After returning to their homeland, the delegates broadcast the images created for them and carried out ideological work in favor of the inviting party. And this was the process of creating an external image1.
However, we came to the conclusion that the process of implementing cultural diplomacy of the USSR also had less obvious, but no less important goals - establishing friendly ties and assistance to Latin American countries worked not only for foreign, but also for domestic policy.
This was due to the fact that the internal image created using the techniques of cultural diplomacy was a means of achieving such goals as: managing one’s own population, sewerage and the accumulation of negative and positive emotions in relation to “their own” - Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and then Cuba, and the “strangers” - the USA, the imperialist countries.
In addition, opportunities were created for the population to participate in public and social life in a way that was safe for the state, a process of educating the population took place, introducing them to the life and culture of countries with lower standards of living, that is, the comparison in any case was in favor of the USSR. People’s negative emotions were also redirected to specific objects located outside the country, and at the same time citizens saw this image of their own state: selflessly helping, friendly to “its own”, fair, ready to protect the weak and poor, generous, strong.
As a result, the attitude “if one is like this to others, then to one’s own” was automatically formed in people’s minds, and the image of the state became infallible, and all problems and deviations from the model of behavior described above were attributed to individual performers, enemies of the people, who seek to deliberately harm to the Soviet people and state, to discredit its image.
Thus, we can conclude that cultural diplomacy was indeed a process of political myth-making. In the process of its implementation, a complex system of socio-political myths with a double vector of impact was created. One vector was aimed at the recipients (“receivers”) of the products of cultural diplomacy - in our case, these are residents of Latin American countries. The second vector was focused on the “carriers” of the broadcast culture themselves, that is, the population of the Soviet Union. We are convinced that the resources of cultural diplomacy as a means of creating and transmitting political myths are significant, but have been little studied from this point of view. However, their study makes it possible to expand the methodological tools through the methods of political psychology, in addition to studying the purely historical context, and to better understand the features of interaction between the USSR and this group of countries.
Literature
1. Dolinsky A.V. Discourse on public diplomacy // International processes, 2011. No. 25. pp. 63-73.
2. Klementieva N.M. Development of relations between the USSR and a number of Latin American countries in the field of culture, 1965-1975. M.: VGBIL, 1983. - 173 p.
1 Shestov N.I. Political myth now and before. M.: Olma-Press. 2005. P. 5.
3. Tsvetkova N. US public diplomacy: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // International processes, Vol. 13, No. 3. P. 12 -133.
4. Shestov N.I. Political myth now and before. M.: Olma-Press. 2005. - 416 p.
5. GARF, F. R-9576, op. 8, building 3
6. GARF, F. R-9576, op.8, no. 17
1. Dolinskiy A. (2011). Diskurs about public diplomatii. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Vol. 9. No. 25. R. 63-73.
2. Klementeva N.M. Razvitie svyazey megdy USSR i stranamy Latinskoy Ameriki v oblasty kultury, 1965-1975. M.: VGBIL, 1983. - 173 p.
3. Cvetkova N. Publichnaya diplomatiya USA: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // Megdunarodnye process, T. 13, N. 3. P. 12-133.
4. Shestov N.I. Politicheskiy mif teper I pregde. M. Olma-Press. 2005. - 416 p.
5. GARF, P-9576, Op.8, D.3.
6. GARF, P-9576, Op.8, D.17.
USSR"S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL MYTH"S IN
COLD WAR'S PERIOD
lecturer, postgraduate student of the History Department of South Ural State University [email protected]
Abstract: Cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in Latin America during the Cold War can be analyzed through the prism ofpolitical myths" concept. Cultural and political propaganda serve the formation of a desired image of a state within their own country and in the international arena. This is a deliberate process, that has common features with the process of construction of political myths. Cultural diplomacy, according to the author, is a set of political myths, which forms a distinct reality for its recipients.
Key words: cultural diplomacy, Cold War, Latin America, political myth, political mythology design
For citation: Dokuchaeva S.V. The use of cultural diplomacy of the USSR during the Cold War as a means of political myth-design // Archon, 2017. No. 3. P. 47-50.
Genesis of the Cold War
American diplomacy: directions and methods
The main features of Soviet diplomacy in the 1950s - 1980s.
Diplomacy of the allied countries of the USSR and the USA
The Third World and Superpower Diplomacy
Outstanding diplomats of the Cold War: A.A. Gromyko, G. Kissinger
Guidelines
The first question is about the origins of the Cold War. It is necessary to identify and assess the conflict potential between the USSR and the West, which accumulated in the 1920s and 1930s, at the final stage of the Second World War and in the second half of the 1940s.
In the second question, it is necessary to characterize the development of the American diplomatic school, the new role of the United States after World War II in international relations, and outline the main directions of US foreign policy activity in the world in the 1950s - 1980s. and the methods by which American diplomacy implemented its plans. It is expected to characterize the foreign policy positions of American presidents and Soviet leaders.
The third question is similar to the second, but the object of consideration, analysis and evaluation will be the diplomacy of the Soviet Union. As in the case of the United States, diplomacy should not be reduced only to the activities of diplomatic services, but attention should also be paid to other formats of international communication, as well as to the personalities of Soviet general secretaries.
The fourth question is intended to characterize the diplomacy of the allied states of the USSR and the USA, identifying common and specific features in comparison with the “senior” partners, as well as the peculiarities of their position in the international arena.
In answering the fifth question, one should explain the essence of the “Three Worlds” concept, highlight the different types among Third World states, and pay attention to the forms and methods by which the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and the United States achieved its goals in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. America.
The sixth question is devoted to the biographies of outstanding diplomats of the warring powers - A.A. Gromyko and G. Kissinger. In addition to highlighting the main milestones of the biography, it is necessary to pay attention to the following parameters of their diplomatic activities:
foreign policy guidelines;
interaction with management (president, first/general secretary);
personal style of negotiations.
Sources:
Gromyko A.A. Memorable. M.: State political publishing house. Literary, 1988. – 894 p.
Kissinger G. Diplomacy. M.: LODOMIR, 1997. – 579 p.
Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: In 2 volumes - 2nd ed. - M.: Politizdat, 1976. - 944 p.
Reader on the history of international relations. In 5 volumes / Comp. D.V. Kuznetsov. Blagoveshchensk, 2013. T. 4. Modern times. pp. 757 – 2149.
Literature:
“Ten years of negotiations are better than one day of war.” Memories of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. M.: Ves Mir, 2009. – 336 p.
Akhtamzyan A.A. The ABC of a diplomat / Answer. ed. A.V. Seryogin. M.: MGIMO-University, 2014. – 156 p.
Diplomatic Service / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, A.N. Panova. M.: Aspect Press, 2014. – 352 p.
Zonova T.V. Diplomacy: Models, forms, methods. – 2nd ed., rev. M.: Aspect Press, 2014. – 352 p.
History of diplomacy / Ed. V.A. Zorina, V.S. Semenova, S.D. Skazkina, V.M. Khvostova. – 2nd ed., revised. and additional M.: GIPL, 1959. T 1.– 896 p.
History of international relations: In 3 volumes / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, M.M. Narinsky. M.: Aspect Press, 2012. T. 2. Interwar period and the Second World War. – 496 p.
History of international relations: In 3 volumes / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, M.M. Narinsky. M.: Aspect Press, 2012. T. 3. Yalta-Potsda system. – 552 p.
Matveev V.M. US Foreign Service. M.: International relations, 1987. – 192 p.
Pechatnov V., Manykin A. History of US foreign policy. M.: International relations, 2012. – 688 p.
Systemic history of international relations. In 2 volumes / Ed. A.V. Bogaturova. M.: Cultural Revolution, 2009. T.1. Events of 1918-1945 – 480 s. T.2. Events 1945 – 2003. – 720 p.
History of diplomacy. T. 5. Book. 1. / Ed. A. A. Gromyko and others - 2nd ed., revised. and additional - M.: Politizdat, 1974., pp. 242-244
Chapter 8. Imperialist politics of the Cold War. Creation of the aggressive NATO military bloc (1946-1949) (pp. 242-273)
1. Imperialist “diplomacy of force”(pp. 242-252)
US proclamation of “power diplomacy.” The doctrine of "containment" of communism. Churchill's speech in Fulton on March 5, 1946. The Soviet program for peace and international cooperation. "Truman Doctrine".
2. Diplomatic struggle over the Marshall Plan(pp. 252-261)
3. Creation of the imperialist military bloc NATO(pp. 261-273)
US Proclamation of "Power Diplomacy" (pp. 242-244)
The international situation that emerged after the end of the Second World War was characterized by a sharp aggravation of the deepest social contradictions, primarily between two systems - socialism and capitalism. The uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries has increased. The political, economic and military position of the United States of America was strengthened. Changes in the balance of power of capitalist states also entailed significant changes in the forms, methods and specific directions of their foreign policy and diplomacy.
Having seized important commanding heights in the capitalist world, the US ruling circles hoped that this would give them the opportunity to achieve world domination. US President Henry Truman's message to Congress on December 19, 1945 spoke of the “burden of constant responsibility for the leadership of the world” that fell on the United States and the “need to prove that the United States is determined to maintain its role as the leader of all nations.” In his next message in January 1946, Truman already called for the use of force in the interests of the struggle for US world domination, so that it would be the basis of “relations with other countries.”
The military, foreign policy and diplomatic strategy of the United States was directed against the forces of socialism, the communist, labor, and national liberation movements.
American imperialism has become the main militaristic force among the capitalist states. He set himself the task of further expanding military production. This was also driven by the pursuit of profits. In 1943 and 1944 US corporate profits reached a huge size - over 24 billion dollars a year, but already in 1945 they decreased to 20 billion [p. 243]
"Labor Fact Book 9". Labor Research Association. New York, 1949, p. 18.
The influence of the US Department of Defense - the Pentagon - on the country's domestic and foreign policy has increased. The ruling circles sought to combine diplomacy with military policy and intelligence. Thus, one of the congressional commissions emphasized “that decisions in the field of diplomacy should be based on military policy and vice versa. This requires close communication between the military and diplomatic services."
Many traditional methods of diplomacy - negotiations, compromises, agreements, cooperation on an equal basis - faded into the background in the practice of the State Department and its bodies. The methods of “power politics”, dictatorship, blackmail, intimidation, “nuclear diplomacy” and “dollar diplomacy” came to the fore. It was assumed that the widespread use of such methods would ensure that the United States imperialist circles would impose their will on other countries and peoples.
Using the temporary advantage of the United States in mastering atomic weapons to intimidate other countries and peoples.
Speculation on the financial and economic power of the United States, providing dollar handouts to “submissive countries” and refusing loans to all those who did not recognize the hegemonic claims of the US monopolists.
As a cover and justification for “power diplomacy,” the US ruling circles decided to use the myth of the “Soviet threat.” From the end of 1945, the anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the United States on an even greater scale. According to the famous American historian Fleming, “in the last weeks of 1945, speeches began to be made in the United States Senate that testified to the deepest hostility towards the Soviet Union and the intention to show determination against it.” Fleming notes that many of them ended with completely open calls for war against the Soviet Union, for the use of atomic weapons as the new “big stick.”
D. Fleming. The Cold War and its Origins. 1917-1960, vol. 1-2. London, 1961, p. 334.
Senator Edwin Jones of Colorado, who chaired the Military Affairs Committee, stated in a speech on November 28, 1945: “With strategic airfields located throughout the territory from the Philippines to Alaska on the shores of Asia, from Alaska to the Azores Islands in the South Atlantic, we can at the first order, drop atomic bombs on any place on the surface of the earth and return to our bases... An atomic bomb in the hands of the United States will be a great cudgel for American diplomacy.” [page 244]
Quote no: D. Fleming. The Cold War and its Origins. 1917-19G0, vol. 1-2. London, 1961, p. 336.
BSSR-USA: Cold War diplomacy
Anatoly the Great,
Contemporary Issues 1999
*****@***
Art. teacher of BSPU named after. M. Tanka;
Art. scientific co-workers National Archives of the Republic of Belarus
The article is devoted to one of the unknown pages of Belarus-US relationship during the Cold War, when at the beginning of the 50th the Congress has raised a question of establishing diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In fact neither government of the BSSR nor its Supreme Soviet have even discussed that proposal. Now with the opened access to the previously classified archival records the historians got an opportunity to investigate the unknown pages of history of Belarus.
A notable innovation in the post-war life of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was its entry into the international arena and participation in the work of a number of international organizations, which was facilitated by the fact that in February 1944 the BSSR was granted the right to carry out independent foreign policy activities. The Constitution of the Republic enshrined the right to enter into direct diplomatic relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties and agreements with them and to exchange diplomatic and consular representations. All this created favorable conditions for expanding the republic’s international activities.
However, while verbally declaring a commitment to expanding the framework of international cooperation, the BSSR in its foreign policy activities followed the grain of Moscow's foreign policy. This was clearly demonstrated, for example, in December 1948, when the UN General Assembly decided to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms. The BSSR was among those delegations that abstained from voting. And this is not surprising - for a totalitarian regime in which massive violations of human rights became a practice, this international act was alien and unnecessary.
An indicator of the fictitious independence of the BSSR in the international arena was the absence of authorized representatives of Belarus in foreign countries. However, there is an episode in the history of Soviet Belarus when it could truly become a full-fledged subject of the international community. Paradoxically, the United States of America has taken certain steps in this direction.
The beginning of the 50s was characterized by one of the most tense periods in relations between the USSR and the USA - the Cold War, for the outbreak of which both states were equally responsible. However, it was in the early 50s that the US House of Representatives made attempts to establish diplomatic relations with two Soviet republics - Ukraine and Belarus. In February 1953, the House of Representatives approved and submitted to Congress and the US State Department Resolution No. 58, proposed by Senator Smith of Wisconsin. The resolution asked the US leadership to take practical steps to establish diplomatic relations with the BSSR.
It should be noted that before this resolution was introduced in Congress and the State Department, it received a special hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. How did the initiators of the hearings justify the need and validity of such actions on the part of the United States? At the hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee, it was noted that, according to the Constitution, Belarus is a sovereign republic and, based on this, has every right to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them, exchange official representatives, etc. Based on Therefore, and wishing to establish friendly relations between the two peoples, the House of Representatives appealed to the US government so that the latter would begin to establish direct diplomatic relations with Minsk in accordance with the diplomatic procedure adopted in such cases.
However, the State Department was clearly aware of the real sovereignty of Belarus. And the Americans would not be Americans if they had not calculated all possible scenarios when initiating this issue not so much in front of Minsk as in front of Moscow. After a thorough analysis of the proposal submitted by the House of Representatives, the State Department came to the well-founded conclusion that it was inappropriate to establish diplomatic relations with the BSSR.
In a letter addressed to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the State Department, in support of its decision on the inappropriateness of establishing diplomatic relations with the BSSR, gave the following argument: “This proposal will never be published by the press and announced on the radio ... if radio, or any or other media will draw the attention of the Soviet people to this proposal, then the Soviet government will undoubtedly use all means to disseminate through its propaganda organs a distorted version of the act of the American government.”
Essentially, that's what happened. Officials in diplomatic tailcoats, together with the same officials in party suits, deceived their people, not only by not publishing the resolution of the House of Representatives in the press, but even by hiding the very fact of discussing this issue.
Indirect confirmation of the correctness of the conclusion of the American side that the discussion in the House of Representatives of this issue will not become public in Belarus is the fact that in April 1953, students of Georgetown University sent a letter to the head of the Belarusian delegation at the session of the UN General Assembly, K. Kiselev, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR. In particular, students asked K. Kiselev whether he, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a sovereign republic, knew about the resolution of the US House of Representatives calling for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the BSSR. Students were also interested in how K. Kiselev felt about this initiative, and whether it would serve mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the BSSR and the USA. Unfortunately, K. Kiselev’s reaction to this letter from American students is unknown, just as it is unknown whether there was one at all. However, as Foreign Minister, he certainly knew about it. Another question is whether the Belarusian people should have known about this.
Another example of concealing this fact is that in the annual report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR, sent to the Central Committee of the CP(b)B in 1953, there is not even a mention of this rather extraordinary event. At the same time, the report angrily denounces the Americans as the instigators of the Cold War and “the main enemies of all progressive humanity.”
Soviet diplomacy of that period was very colorfully described by the people's writer Shamyakin, who repeatedly participated in the sessions of the UN General Assembly. This is what he recalled: “About democracy in our delegations. To vote differently from the union delegation is a scandal, although at times it seemed to me that ordinary human logic and dignity required us to vote with the majority, with America. No, politics does not recognize logic.” And one more interesting observation by I. Shamyakin: “How to vote? I had to get up and run to the allied delegation, which was sitting at the other end of the hall, this, by the way, was the instruction - not to be shy, although the newspapers (of course, American - A.V.) ridiculed this. And our allied bosses laughed arrogantly. It was offensive to me." It is necessary, however, to agree with I. Shamyakin that during the Cold War, Soviet diplomacy did not recognize simple human logic.
The factor of Belarusian emigration in America brought originality to the relations between the BSSR and the USA. What made official Minsk especially nervous was not the very fact of the existence of emigration, but the way it was received and perceived in the United States.
The attitude of official Washington towards the Belarusian emigration was very loyal, moreover, friendly and emphatically attentive. An example of attentiveness and goodwill towards the Belarusian emigration was that US officials at the state level paid tribute to the emigration in its desire to preserve the ideals of the Belarusian People's Republic on American soil. For example, March 25, 1956, the day of celebration of the 38th anniversary of the proclamation of the BPR, New York Mayor Wagner officially declared Belarus Day in New York. In March 1957, the governors of the states of New Jersey and Michigan also officially declared March 25 as Belarus Day in their states, with corresponding state events held to mark this date.
In March 1958, on the occasion of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of the BPR, US President D. Eisenhower, through his assistant Adams, conveyed a personal message to the Chairman of the Belarusian-American Association K. Merlyak, in which he congratulated all Belarusians living in the United States on celebrating this day on American soil.
In addition, Vice President R. Nixon received the Belarusian delegation in the Capitol the day before and had a long conversation with it. Moreover, for the first time in the history of the US Senate, senators from the states of Minnesota, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois and others, more than 20 in total, spoke in Congress and congratulated the Belarusian emigration to the United States on the occasion of the Day of the Proclamation of the People's Republic of Belarus.
On March 30, 1958, in New York, at the Baltimore Hotel, a meeting of the Belarusian emigration was held, at which the President of the Hungarian People's Republic N. Abramchik made a report and read out a greeting from D. Eisenhower. 10 state governors and over 20 senators and members of the House of Representatives made welcoming speeches. The celebration of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China was also celebrated in other US cities - Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit. All these events were naturally reflected in the US media.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR, naturally, characterized the events as an anti-Soviet campaign organized by “American reactionaries”, which was directed against the “Belarusian SSR and the Belarusian people.” The Foreign Ministry also expressed regret that the US President, senators and members of the House of Representatives were involved in the campaign.
Of course, the Americans took advantage of such events and supported the Belarusian emigration to spite Moscow, since it was Moscow that completely determined the foreign policy of the BSSR. However, it is also necessary to take into account that the freedoms and values characteristic of an open society proclaimed in the US Declaration of Independence did not remain an empty phrase for the United States. The American government and people wanted to extend these values and freedoms to other states.
Let us note that the day of the proclamation of the Belarusian People's Republic was not celebrated so widely every year, and not every year the President of the United States sent welcoming telegrams to representatives of the Belarusian emigration. However, in the House of Representatives the so-called “Belarusian issue” was heard more than once.
In conclusion of this short excursion into the past, which, however, is inevitably projected onto the present and future, I would like to express the hope that diplomacy during the Cold War will become the property of history, just as the Cold War itself has already become the property of history and historians. The Republic of Belarus must rightfully take its place as a sovereign and independent state in the international community. However, this primarily depends on Belarus itself, its desire to get rid of the relapses of thinking and stereotypes of the Cold War.
