History of philosophy. What skeptics dream about: what gave the world the current of skepticism. Greek skeptics called all other philosophers
philosophy skeptical knowledge
Ancient skepticism as a reaction to the metaphysical dogmatism of previous philosophical schools is represented, first of all, by the founder of the first skeptical school, Pyrrho of Elis (His student was the famous Timon Timon of Phlius, ancient Greek philosopher, orator, author of satirical poems, student of Pyrrho, died at the age of almost 90 years in 230 BC in Athens. Thanks to the works of Timon, we have information about the skepticism of Pyrrho, whose writings have not survived. from Phlius.). Then the second current in skepticism, the so-called Middle (Founded by Arcesilaus of Pitana. The main criterion of practical life, according to Arcesilaus, is probability.) and the New Academy (Its most prominent representative is Carneades of Cyrene. Arcesilaus’ thesis - “probability”, was developed by Carneades. ) And the so-called late skepticism is represented by the third school of ancient skepticism, which was founded by Aenesidemus (He joined the followers of Pyrrho. In ten so-called “Paths” (principles) he outlined the main theses of his teaching: the first six are the difference between living beings; people; sense organs; states of an individual; positions, distances, places; phenomena according to their connections; the last four principles are the mixed existence of a perceived object with other objects; relativity in general; dependence on the number of perceptions; dependence on the level of education, morals, laws, philosophical and religious views). Sextus Empiricus also belongs to this movement.
Ancient skepticism went through many changes and phases in its development. At first it was of a practical nature, that is, it acted not only as the most true, but also as the most useful and profitable life position, and then it turned into a theoretical doctrine; initially he questioned the possibility of any knowledge, then he criticized the knowledge, but only that obtained by previous philosophy.
Three periods can be distinguished in ancient skepticism:
The older Pyrrhonism, developed by Pyrrho himself (about 360-270 BC) and his student Timon of Phlius, dates back to the 3rd century BC. At that time, skepticism was of a purely practical nature: its core was ethics, and dialectics was only the outer shell; from many points of view, it was a doctrine similar to early Stoicism and Epicureanism.
Academicism. As a matter of fact, during the period when the series of Pyrrho’s students was interrupted, the skeptical trend dominated the Academy; this was in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC "in the Middle Academy", the most prominent representatives of which were Arcesilaus (315-240 BC) and Carneades (214-129 BC).
Younger Pyrrhonism found its supporters when skepticism left the walls of the Academy. Studying the works of representatives of the Academy of a later period, one can see that they systematized skeptical argumentation. The original ethical position faded into the background, and epistemological criticism came to the fore. The main representatives of this period were Aenesidemus and Agrippa. Skepticism gained many supporters in this last period among doctors of the “empirical” school, among whom was Sextus Empiricus.
A.F. Losev calls the earliest stage of skepticism, led by Pyrrho, intuitive-relativistic. Skepticism subsequently developed within Plato's Academy. For the first time we find skeptical teaching from the head of the Secondary Academy Arkesilaus. This is the direction of A.F. Losev calls it intuitive-probabilistic. It was further developed by the head of the New Academy, Carneades. This period is called reflective-probabilistic. This academic skepticism gradually weakened and turned into eclecticism, which is known from Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon (II-I centuries BC), who headed the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academy. A more solid and consistent position of skepticism is occupied by a distant follower and renewer of Pyrrhonism, the skeptic Aenesidemus (1st century BC), whose skepticism is called systematic, or reflective-relativistic.
It was followed by the logical-relativistic skepticism of Agrippa and Menodotus (1st century AD) and the final completion of ancient skepticism, or absolute skepticism, which borders on nihilism, although it is far from being reduced to it, is considered the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus and Saturninus (II-III century AD).
SKEPTICISM
SKEPTICISM
(from the Greek skeptikos - examining, exploring) - philosopher. a direction that questions the knowledge of reality or some fragment of it. S. can touch upon the boundaries of knowledge and assert that no absolute, undoubted, complete or perfect knowledge is available to man; that no knowledge, even if achieved, can be recognized as such; that no certain knowledge concerning certain objects (eg God, oneself, values, the world as a whole, causality, etc.) is achievable; that certain types of knowledge cannot be obtained by certain methods (for example, through reasoning, inference, direct observation, etc.). S. may refer to the method of obtaining knowledge and argue that each must be subject to never-ending tests; that all methods of obtaining knowledge do not give undoubted results; that knowledge in all or in certain areas is based on unprovable assumptions, etc.
The beginning of antiquity S. put Pyrrho from Elis in. 4th century BC. Based on the teaching of Democritus about the unreliability of sensory knowledge, skeptics denied the possibility of obtaining reliable knowledge. They also rejected the formation of the causes of phenomena, denied (“by nature”) the existence of good and evil, etc.
Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .
SKEPTICISM
(from Greek- examining, exploring) ancient, ancient Greek Philosopher direction founded by Pyrrho from Elis in con. 4 V. before n. e. Starting from the teaching of Democritus about the unreliability of knowledge based on evidence from the senses. Skeptics, according to Diogenes Laertius, did not admit the possibility of reliable knowledge and did not believe in the possibility of rational justification for norms of behavior. Skeptics rejected the existence of a cause of phenomena, repeating the arguments of the Eleatic school, rejected movement and emergence; denied the objective ("by nature") existence of good and evil (Diogenes Laertius IX 97-99; 90; 100-101). Declaring unity. the criterion of truth, skeptics considered all philosophers etc. directions as dogmatists and considered them fools. Pyrrho's student was Timon of Phlius. (OK. 325- 235 up to n. e.) , who caustically ridiculed in poetry philosophers who did not share the ideas of S. (Diogenes Laertius IX 109-115). S.'s ideas were adopted by Plato's Secondary Academy, represented by Arcesilaus, and the New Academy, represented by Carneades. Aenesidemus from Knossos (1V. BC eh.?) revived S. as independent. direction, put forward ten so-called skeptic tropes - arguments against the possibility of reliable knowledge (Diogenes Laertius IX 79-88), to which Agrippa added five more (Diogenes Laertius IX 88-99; Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonian principles I 164-177).
Teaching antique S. is known to us primarily from the later compendiums of Sextus Empiricus (2-3centuries) .
Richter R., S. in philosophy, lane With German, T. 1, St. Petersburg, 1910; Losev A.F., Cultural-historical. antique S. and Sextus Empiricus, in book: Sextus Empiricus, Op., T. 1, M., 1975, With. 5-58; Goedeckemeyer A., Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus, Lpz., 1905; Patrick M. M., The Greek skeptics, N.?., 1929; Weische A., Cicero und die Neue Akademie. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Geschichte des antiken Skeptizismus, Munster, 1961.
Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. editor: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. 1983 .
SKEPTICISM
(from the Greek skeptikos examining, examining)
philosophical direction that puts forward doubt as a principle of thought, especially in the reliability of truth. Moderate skepticism is limited to knowledge of facts, showing restraint in relation to all hypotheses and theories. Ancient skepticism as a metaphysical skepticism of previous philosophical schools is represented primarily by Pyrrho, then by the middle and new academies (Arkesilaus, Carneades) and the so-called late skepticism (Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, etc.). Aenesidemus points out ten principles (tropes) of skepticism: the first six are living beings; of people; sense organs; states of the individual; positions, distances, places; phenomena according to their connections; the last four principles are the mixture of the perceived object with other objects; relativity in general; on the number of perceptions; dependence on the level of education, morals, laws, philosophical and religious views. In the Newest, we again draw attention to the fact that in every “purely” scientific knowledge, faith plays a large role: for example, in the correspondence, even if not complete, of the categories of being and knowledge. In the ordinary sense, skepticism is psychological uncertainty, doubt about something, forcing one to refrain from making categorical judgments. see also Basic attitude, Speeches.
Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .
Emphasizing the relativity of man. knowledge, S. played positively. role in the fight against various forms of dogmatism and posing a number of problems of knowledge, although he was unable to resolve them. Revealing the incompleteness of our knowledge, their historical conditions of the process of cognition, S. absolutizes this relativity and ultimately comes to doubt the possibility of k.-l. objective knowledge in general. Proclaiming the rejection of judgments in principle, S. at the same time is constantly forced to accept a definition. factual judgments. The change of theories in science is interpreted by S. as evidence of the unreliability of all knowledge in general. Historical S.'s role in the ideological struggle and societies. life was different depending on what was the subject of his criticism and was questioned.
In ancient Greek. philosophy skeptic contained in the criticism of the Eleatic school, Heraclitus, the sophists - the Eleans, in the philosophy of the Megarian school, the Cynics, the Cyrenian school. In development, I am actually skeptical. schools distinguish three periods: 1) early S., the founder of which was Pyrrho; 2) S., developed at the Platonic Academy under its leaders Arcesilaus and Carneades; 3) late S., represented by Aenesidemus, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus and others. The futility of attempts to find truths as feelings. cognition and thinking (to select a criterion, a selection criterion is necessary, etc.), emphasizing the differences in moral norms among different peoples, the foundations of any religion, finding out how different theories refute each other, that each one is proven, and this leads either to a circle in the proof, or to an arbitrary choice of axioms, or to an infinite regress, arguments indicating that the existence of causality is unprovable - these are the most important arguments (" "), which the ancient. Skeptics argue for the equivalence of opposing statements and withholding judgment. But act, accepting the definition. decisions, forces the antique. C. admit that although there may be no criterion of truth, there is a criterion of practicality. behavior. This criterion must be based on “reasonable probability” (Arkesilaus). Ancient S. encourages us to follow what our sensations lead us to (eat when we feel hungry, etc.), follow the laws and customs of the country, and engage in certain activities. activities (including scientific), etc. Leaving a position that equally distrusts sensation and thinking, antiquity. S. gives preference to feelings. knowledge, closely approaching empiricism and experimental science. Experimental science—medicine—is practiced by the last representatives of antiquity. With: Menodotus, Theodos, Sextus and Saturninus. Ancient Greek skeptics are developing, compliance with which increases the knowledge gained by observation and experiment (“three degrees of probability” in the Academy, “reminiscent” of Sextus, three types of experience in Menodotus).
The Middle Ages played a progressive role as a form of criticism of the church. dogmatism [for example, in Abelard in op. “Yes and no” (“Sic et non”), etc.]. To an even greater extent this was characteristic of the Northern Renaissance. Throughout the 16th–18th centuries. both progressive and reactionary. thinkers called S. any criticism of religion and dogmatism. metaphysics in general. Skeptical. ideas were contained in the works of Nicholas of Cusa, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Agrippa of Nettesheim, but were most fully and vividly expressed in Montaigne. S.'s stamp also lies on the works of F. Sanchez, J. Vallee, O. Talon, Bodin, Charron.
S. of the ancients was a reaction to the theoretical. constructions created by thought that did not know the restrictions imposed on the factual. knowledge. In contrast, the S. Renaissance was preceded by enslavement to tradition and authority. Therefore, the starting point of the new S. is a rebellion against the power of authorities and the dogmatism of generally accepted opinions, a demand for freedom of thought, a call not to take anything for granted. His ch. enemy - . If antique skeptics questioned everything established by reason, asserting its powerlessness, then S. of the Renaissance questioned everything that had hitherto been taken on faith, and proclaimed it the supreme judge. Thus, he opposed fideism. At the same time, S. Renaissance demanded an experimental study of nature and societies. life, clearing the way for the science of modern times. Attacking the political and ethical the principles of feudalism, he defended the bourgeoisie. ideas of nature. equality of people and individualism.
S. Renaissance was eclectic and contradictory. Demanding that all questions be submitted to the judgment of reason, he repeated the arguments of the Pyrrhonists against reason; showing the limitlessness of the development of knowledge, he questioned the possibility of reliable knowledge and reached the point of being clearly agnostic. statements. In the 17th century skeptic the ideas of the Renaissance were developed by Bayle, Lamothe-Levier and others. These ideas were the starting point of philosophy. development of Gassendi, Descartes, Voltaire, Diderot.
Another form of S. was S. Yuma. Both the ancient skeptics and the skeptics of the Renaissance did not doubt the existence of an objective world. Questioning our knowledge, they understood it as the correspondence of knowledge to this reality. Hume questioned the very existence of the objective world. From this view. The question of whether our knowledge is reflected correctly (which, perhaps, is not true at all) became meaningless. All objects of knowledge perhaps arise and exist only in cognition - in thought (mathematics) or in sensations (other knowledge).
In the further development of the bourgeoisie. Agnosticism played a major role in philosophy (Kant, positivism, neopositivism), and S. is found only as a tendency (for example, in irrationalism). The views of the founders of positivism - Comte, Spencer, J. S. Mill - were directly related to Hume's and Kant's. In fact, the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) and the Baden school (Windelband, Rickert) take the same position on this issue. Elements of S. are also characteristic of the epistemology of pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey), as well as positivists such as Mach and Avenarius. In a certain sense, we can talk about the presence of elements of S. in the epistemology of neopositivism. This, in particular, concerns the attitude of neopositivists to the so-called. metaphysics, to philosophy. knowledge in general.
V. Boguslavsky. Moscow.
Lit.: General: Richter R., S. in philosophy, trans. from German, vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1910; Shpet G. G., Skeptic and him, M., 1919; Boguslavsky V.M., At the origins of the French. atheism and materialism, M., 1964; Hönigswald R., Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, Gött., 1914; Rodhe S. E., Zweifel und Erkenntnis. Über das Problem des Skeptizismus und den Begriff des Absoluten, Lund–Lpz., ; Ρreyre E. Α.. The freedom of doubt. Reflections of a natural sceptic, L., 1953; Topitsch E., Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, W., 1958.
A n t i c h n y S.: Maccoll N., The Greek skeptics, from Pyrrho to Sextus, L.–Camh., 1869; Brochard V., Les sceptiques grecs, P., 1887; Hartenstein K., Über die Lehren der antiken Skepsis..., Halle/Saale, 1888; Creadaro L., Lo scetticismo degli accademici, v. 1–2, Mil., 1889–93; Сaldi G., Lo scetticismo critico della scuola pirroniana, Üdine, 1896; Goedeckemeyer A., Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus, Lpz., 1905; Detmar V., Karneades und Hume, Lpz., 1910; Bevan E., Stoics and skeptics, Oxf., 1913; Patrick M. M., The Greek skeptics, N. Υ., 1929; Heintz W., Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Halle/Saale, 1932; Gomperz H., Problems and methods of early Greek science, "J. of the history of ideas", 1943, v. 4, fasc. 2; Robin L., Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec, P., 1944; Maréchal J., Le point de part de la métaphysique, 3 ed., Brux.–P., 1944; Dal Pra M., Lo scetticismo greco, Mil., 1950.
S. in the philosophy of modern and contemporary times: Sartini V., Storia dello scetticismo moderno, Firenze, 1876; Owen J., The skeptics of Italian Renaissance) 3 ed., L., 1908; Charbonnel Roger J., La pensée italienne au 16 siècle et la courant libertin, P., 1919; Hoopes R., Fideism and skepticism during the Renaissance Three major witnesses, "Huntington Library Quarterly", 1951, v. 14, No. 4; Cornford F. M., sapientiae, Camb., 1952; Popkin R. H., The sceptical crisis and the rise of modern philosophy, "Review of Metaphysics", 1953, v. 7, p. 132–51, 306–22, 499–510.
Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by F. V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970 .
SKEPTICISM
SKEPTICISM (Greek σκεπτικός - seeking, considering, exploring) is a philosophical movement created in the 4th century. BC e. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 BC). Pyrrho practiced abstinence from judgment (), “he called nothing either beautiful or ugly, neither fair nor unjust, and in general believed that nothing truly exists..., is not one thing more than another”; “For everything there is an opposite” (Diogenes Laertius, K, 61, 74). Ancient skeptics argued that the claims of various philosophical schools to absolute truth were unjustified, and the truth of all knowledge was relative. A representative of the Second Academy - another line of skepticism - Arcesilaus (c. 315-240 BC) opposed the Stoic doctrine of “agreement,” which does not guarantee truth, and called for abstinence from judgment. In the Third (New) Academy, Carneades of Cyrene (c. 214-129 BC) considered all knowledge unreliable: the senses lead us into, we can perceive the non-existent - hallucinations, dreams, illusions; The mind, unable to resolve aporias, also deceives; it is necessary to refrain from claims to “absolute truth”, while statements of varying degrees of plausibility or “probabilistic” (έύλογον) exist. The later Pyrrhonism is represented by Aenesidemus (c. 1st century BC), who formulated ten skeptical “tropes” (“Pyrrhonian speeches” (c. 43 BC), Agrima and Sextus Empiricus (2nd - early 3rd century). AD), the author of the only works that have survived from ancient skepticism (“Three Books of Pyrrho’s Propositions” and “Against the Scientists”). Sextus also restores common sense in its rights, and equanimity (ataraxia) appears in him as abstinence from dogmatic judgments. Skepticism was revived in the 16th and 17th centuries as a result of the works of ancient philosophers, primarily Sextus Empiricus, and as a further development of their ideas (“new Pyrrhonism”).New European skepticism is associated primarily with criticism of scholastic methods, dogmatism, the so-called generally accepted opinions, focusing on authorities (Erasmus of Rotterdam), with a high appreciation of the experience of ancient skepticism. In the treatise “Nothing is Known” (1581) by the French philosopher and physician of Portuguese origin, Fr. Sanchez (1552-1632), scholastic methods are criticized, and criticism is recognized as the only criteria of science, the main obstacles to comprehending the truth are indicated - the imperfection of the senses, and the boundaries of human perception are noted. Of particular interest is M. Montaigne, for whom philosophizing means doubting. Montaigne's skeptical position was accepted by his friend P. Chardon, who had a great influence on J. Gassenda. J. Bayle highly appreciated the ideas of Sextus Empiricus, who combined the skeptical principle of abstaining from judgments and thesis of equivalent arguments for and against with the recognition of the “natural light” of universal reason and the absolute truth of the self-evident axioms of mathematics and logic. Bayle was critical of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Doubts about the reliability of human knowledge determined the epistemological concept of D. Hume, which became the starting point of modern European agnosticism (Kant, positivism).
L. A. Mikeshina
New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .
Synonyms:
The content of the article
SKEPTICISM(from the Greek “skepticism” - research, consideration) - in ancient philosophy, a movement whose representatives did not put forward any positive doctrine about the world and man and did not assert the possibility of true knowledge, but refrained from making a final judgment about all this. Along with Epicureanism and Stoicism, skepticism is one of the leading schools of ancient philosophy of the Hellenistic period. All non-skeptical philosophies within the school were called “dogmatic.” Traditionally, the history of ancient skepticism is considered in two school continuities: Pyrrho and his followers and the skepticism of the New Academy ().
Early Pyrrhonism.
The founder was Pyrrhon of Elis (365–275), his successor was Timon of Phlius, with the renewal of Pyrrhonian philosophy in the 1st century. BC. associated skeptics Aenesidemus and Agrippa.
The Skeptical Academy begins with the scholarchate (scholarch - head of the school) of Arcesilaus (c. 268) and continues until the time of Philo of Larissa (1st century BC).
Skeptics formulated three basic philosophical questions: What is the nature of things? How should we treat them? How do we benefit from this attitude? And they answered them: the nature of things cannot be known by us; therefore one should refrain from judgment on questions of truth; the consequence of such an attitude should be equanimity of spirit (“ataraxia”). The conclusion about the unknowability of the nature of things is made on the basis of the equiprovability of opposing judgments about this world and the impossibility of recognizing one judgment as more reliable than another. Suspension of judgment ("epoch") is a special state of mind that neither affirms anything nor denies anything. The state of "epoch" is the opposite of the state of doubt and the associated experience of confusion and uncertainty - the consequence of the era as paradise is calm and inner satisfaction. Thus, the consequence of theoretical skepticism about the structure of the world and its knowledge is a meaningful ethical conclusion about the ideal of practical behavior. Thus, although skeptics did not directly connect the achievement of happiness with the depth of theoretical knowledge, they still remained within the framework of traditional ancient rationalism: the achievement of an ethical ideal is directly correlated with an understanding of the boundaries of theoretical knowledge.
The most influential skeptical philosophers were representatives of the New Academy Arcesilaus and Carneades, who spent a lot of effort criticizing Stoic philosophy and epistemology. In general, post-Pyrrhonian skepticism is distinguished by a greater interest in logical-epistemological problems, in contrast to the moral and ethical overtones of Pyrrhon's teachings. The sources of skepticism are poorly preserved: insignificant fragments remain from the writings of academic skeptics; Pyrrho, the earliest of the supporters of skepticism, did not leave any written works. Important information about ancient skepticism is contained in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (late 2nd century AD), especially in Three books of Pyrrho's propositions.
Works: Sextus Empiricus. Works in 2 vols. M., 1975–1976
Maria Solopova
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHICAL SPECIFICITY OF ANCIENT SKEPTICISM
YES. GUSEV
Department of Philosophy Moscow Pedagogical State University 117571 Russia, Mosta Prospekt Vernadskogo, 88
Ancient skepticism as an independent philosophical trend has not been sufficiently studied both in domestic and foreign historical and philosophical science. The article is devoted to the main features of ancient skepticism. The author briefly characterizes its theoretical and methodological foundations, as well as its role and significance in the context of world philosophical thought.
Skepticism in philosophy is “scattered” across eras and countries, is characterized by many manifestations and has many representatives, from the Ancient World to modern philosophy. However, skepticism as such, as one of the trends in philosophy or a type of philosophical thinking, as a philosophical school, appeared (like philosophy itself) in Ancient Greece or, more broadly, in the ancient world, where it underwent a long ideological and historical evolution and reached its heyday; that is, skepticism in its most complete manifestation, complete form or authentic form is ancient skepticism, which, due to the above, can be called classical. Thus, the study of skepticism in philosophy involves, first of all, turning to its classical form. In addition, skepticism is not only one of the philosophical trends, but also represents something more.
The word “skeptic” (“stkettkos”) translated from ancient Greek means “prone to examining, pondering, weighing, focusing on something,” and in this regard, a skeptic is just an examining, pondering, reflecting, searching (the last representative of ancient skepticism, Sextus Empiricus called skeptics searching philosophers). We say that a skeptic is just (emphasizing the expression “merely”) considering or seeking, since quite often the concept of “skeptic” is interpreted in a more radical way: a skeptic often means someone who decisively denies everything (ideas, teachings, theories -as insolvent), does not agree with one thesis, does not believe anything or anyone, tries to object to any statement; There is a widespread view of the skeptic as a destroyer and subversive. This understanding of the basic characteristics of a skeptic and skepticism is, by and large, erroneous. Considering, pondering, reflecting is not yet denying and subverting.
A skeptic is just a reflector, neither definitely affirming nor denying anything, doubting everything and seeking the truth, and skepticism is just doubt in the process of such a search, designed to keep the thinker from hasty conclusions, unfounded preferences, unconditional acceptance of theses that may be false.
Skepticism is doubt, and if philosophy is the love of wisdom, that is, not the possession of truth, but only the desire for it, then skepticism (and in this case one can also say criticism) is not only and not even so much a direction in philosophy, as one of its essential features, one of its important characteristics, because without doubt, or a critical attitude towards ideas, the desire for truth (or love for wisdom) is most likely impossible. If doubt, or skepticism, represents a kind of gradient of philosophy, then the study of skepticism is closely either directly related to the study of the very nature and specificity of philosophical knowledge, or is a study of one of its fundamental aspects, which determines the relevance of the topic under consideration.
However, skepticism in philosophy rarely became a separate object of study; research thought rarely paid attention to it, which is why, in general, it remained a poorly studied philosophical phenomenon. But little-studied things are, as a rule, either poorly understood or misunderstood. The latter gives rise to largely incorrect assessments and erroneous conclusions.
Skepticism is often considered as negative dogmatism, as a philosophical trend, in many ways related to agnosticism and relativism, or even, by and large, identical to them. Of course, skepticism is to some extent involved in agnosticism and relativism, but one cannot draw a conclusion from this fact about their identity. A certain type of thinking is called skepticism because it differs significantly from both agnosticism and relativism, has qualitative certainty or such specific features that make it skepticism, and not agnosticism or relativism.
Often, complete and partial skepticism are not differentiated and, instead of seeing their significant differences, the signs of the latter are extrapolated to the former, thereby significantly distorting its content. As a rule, they often try to accuse skepticism of inconsistency, to find contradictions in it, usually not noticing that skepticism is well aware of these kinds of objections against itself and easily copes with them. Moreover, sometimes positions are attributed to skepticism that it never asserted at all. There are many misinterpretations and negatively evaluative references to skepticism. Thus, unfounded conclusions are often made about the futility and failure of skepticism.
It is not surprising, therefore, that ancient, or classical, skepticism represents a kind of “blank spot” both in domestic and foreign studies of antiquity: ancient skepticism became a special subject of study in domestic and foreign scientific literature quite rarely. For example, works published over the last hundred years and devoted to
directions historically parallel to ancient skepticism - Stoicism, Cynicism and Epicureanism - are many times more numerous than the number of studies devoted to skepticism.
If we talk about historical and philosophical literature in Russian, excluding references to ancient skepticism (from several paragraphs to several pages) in general monographs on the history of ancient philosophy and the history of philosophy in general, the picture will look like this. There is only one historical and philosophical work of a monographic nature, entirely devoted to ancient skepticism - this is the monograph of the German scientist Raoul Richter, translated and published in 1910 in St. Petersburg, “Skepticism in Philosophy.” (The output data of all mentioned works of both domestic and foreign literature are indicated in the bibliographic list that concludes the article.) Next, we should mention another well-known work, but no longer of a monographic nature - this is the section on ancient skepticism in the multi-volume “History of Ancient Aesthetics” A F. Losev, which is duplicated by his article “The cultural and historical significance of ancient skepticism and the activities of Sextus Empiricus,” which precedes the two-volume work of Sextus Empiricus in the “Philosophical Heritage” series, published by the publishing house “Mysl” in 1976. The first chapter is also devoted to ancient skepticism books by V. M. Boguslavsky “Skepticism in Philosophy” (1990). In the collections of articles there are three works on ancient skepticism - this is the article by D. B. Dzhokhadze “The Theory of Knowledge of Ancient Skepticism and Its Modern Significance” (1986), the article by M. N. Gutlin “Views of the School of Skeptics on Ancient Religion” (1989 .) and the article by G. K. Taurin “Understanding the specifics of philosophical knowledge of the world in the development of skepticism” (1988). In periodicals there are only two historical and philosophical works on ancient skepticism - these are detailed articles by Professor A.B. Semushkina “Ancient skepticism. Lecture 1. Pyrrhonism” and “Ancient skepticism. Lecture 2. The evolution of Pyrrhonism. Neopyrrhonism” in the journal “Bulletin of the Russian Peoples’ Friendship University” for 1997 and 1998.
Such a strange, in its quantitative insignificance, list of Russian-language literature on ancient skepticism is provided by the catalogs of the collections of the Russian State Library and the results of an electronic search in the collections of INION RAS. (The author omits mention of his own publications on ancient skepticism.)
Things are a little better with foreign (English-language) historical and philosophical literature. There are several monographic works entirely devoted to ancient skepticism - this is N. McCall’s book “Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho to Sextus” (1869), M. Patrick’s monograph “Greek Skeptics” (1929), S. Stog’s work “Greek skepticism” (1969), the works of K. Janchek “Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus” (1951) and “The Skeptical Method of Sextus Empiricus” (1972), the study of J. Annas and J. Barnes “Paths of Skepticism. Ancient texts and modern interpretations”, G. Tarrant’s book “Skepticism or Platonism? Philosophy of the Fourth Academy.” The following works are partially devoted to ancient skepticism - E. Beaven’s monograph “Stoics and Skeptics” (1913), A. Long’s work “Hellenistic
skaya philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics” (1974), the work of E. Zeller “Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics” (1962), the book of C. Landesman “Skepticism” (2002) and the works of the same name by K. Hookway (1992 .), K. Nielsen (1973), A. Ness (1968), N. Richer (1980). Further noteworthy are collections of articles, most of which are devoted to ancient skepticism - these are “The Skeptical Tradition” edited by M. Burnet (1983), “Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy” (1980) and the collection G. Stricker “Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics” (1996) In addition, there are not much more than a dozen English-language articles in periodicals, which we will not list here - they are listed (along with other titles of literature) in the bibliographic list at the end of the article. Such a quantitative set of English-language historical and philosophical literature on ancient skepticism is provided by the catalogs of the collections of the RPB, the M. I. Rudomino VGBIL and the INION RAS.
As we see, ancient, or classical, skepticism is in many ways a historical and philosophical “virgin land,” especially regarding its representation in Russian scientific literature. In this article, the author makes a modest attempt to fill, as far as possible, this gap and presents to the indulgent reader several conclusions formulated by him as a result of many years of studying ancient skepticism, in the form of a short essay devoted to a brief description of the main features of ancient, or classical, skepticism as a unique type of philosophical thinking, as well as the role and significance of skepticism in general in the history of philosophical thought.
Among the prerequisites and reasons for the emergence of classical skepticism as an independent philosophical trend or school, both ideological and historical components can be distinguished: ideologically, skepticism was a definite result of individual, more or less pronounced, skeptical tendencies in the development of Greek philosophy from the pre-Socratic to the Hellenistic period; and historically, it represents a kind of intellectual reaction to the emergence of a philosophical priority for the unconditional eudaimonic orientation of Hellenism, which was largely due to the characteristic features of this era, expressed primarily in socio-economic and political instability and, as a consequence, emotional and psychological disorder.
The long ideological and historical evolution of classical skepticism can be traced from individual skeptical tendencies in various teachings, trends and directions of pre-Pyrrhonian philosophy to the formation of an independent skeptical school, which further evolved from the philosophical views of its founder Pyrrho and his student Timon (senior skeptics), through the skepticism of the Middle and New Academy (represented by its leaders - Arkesilaus and Carneades) to the philosophical teachings of Aenesidemus, Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus (younger skeptics). As a result of the long development of the skeptical school, the following main types of ancient Greek skepticism took shape, by which it is represented in the history of ancient philosophy: a) intuitive-relativistic skepticism of Pyrrho and Timon, b) intuitive-relativistic skepticism of Pyrrho and Timon, b) intuitive-relativistic skepticism
probabilistic - Arcesilaus and rational-probabilistic - Carnea, c) rational-relativistic skepticism of Aenesidemus, Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus.
The result, or result, of the ideological and historical evolution of classical skepticism was the philosophical work of Sextus Empiricus - the last skeptic in the history of the skeptical school and its only representative, whose main works have reached us in full. The skepticism of the predecessors of Sextus Empiricus is, ultimately, modified, but old in content, ideas, since the proclamation by the older skeptics of the unknowability of the world, the isosthenicity of opposing judgments and the need to refrain from them is a certain definite statement, a kind of postulate that comes into conflict with one of the main requirements of skepticism - not to postulate anything (not to affirm or deny). The philosophical innovation of Sextus Empiricus lies in the fact that he overcame this contradiction and, thereby, gave skepticism completeness and completeness by extending skeptical doubt to his own intellectual constructs, thanks to which Sextus Empiricus skepticism acquired its original, meaningfully authentic form. Therefore, it is possible to carry out a full-fledged reconstruction of classical skepticism based on the writings of Sextus Empiricus.
The anthropological aspect in skeptical philosophy takes precedence over the epistemological and ontological aspects. Largely prepared by certain historical and ideological conditions of the Hellenistic era, Greek skepticism, like Stoicism and Epicureanism, was one of the eudaimonistic philosophical models, considering as its main goal the philosophical justification of individual happiness. The starting position of skeptical philosophical constructions is to proclaim the ethical ideal of ataraxia (equanimity of the soul), for the search and justification of which certain epistemological and ontological ideas are built by skepticism, which thus become, to a certain extent, subordinate to the ethical issues of skeptical philosophy.
In order to substantiate ataraxia, skeptics need to overcome any positive orientation in the world and the very specific structure of the latter. Justified uncertainty of things, phenomena, events, actions could become a reliable and effective philosophical basis for the theoretical postulation and practical achievement of ataraxia. Therefore, the extensive epistemological section of Greek skepticism is a set of tropes (evidence) of the unreliability of sensory and rational knowledge, which finds its expression in the principle of isostenia (equilibrium) of opposing judgments and the requirement that inevitably follows from it to refrain from them, that is, not to assert anything in principle and don't deny.
However, such neutrality, or irrelevance, of thinking, quite acceptable as a theoretical model, turns out to be poorly compatible with real, actual, or practical life. Therefore, a mandatory addition and continuation of skeptical isosthenic epistemology is
There is a kind of ontological phenomenalism, which is devoted to the interpretation of the real life of the skeptical philosopher and is characterized primarily by the fact that it is focused not on the nature of things inaccessible to the skeptic, but on the only accessible phenomena, or the appearance of these things, which, although largely fragmentary and distorted , but still somehow reflect the forever hidden essence of objects. The problem of the skeptical ataraxia of the soul is also not without a significant contradiction, which lies in the fact that equanimity is postulated by skeptics as the main goal, and the basic principle or method of skepticism is incompatible with any postulation. The problem is solved in many ways paradoxically, and skeptics acquire their ataraxia not as their conscious and purposeful desire for it (since such a desire leads to the opposite effect), but involuntarily: ataraxia becomes the property of the skeptical philosopher as a result of his spontaneous abstinence from judgment or due to the neutrality of his thinking.
From the point of view of skepticism, a person’s undergoing various kinds of emotional states and the lack of mental equanimity is due to the close interrelation and interaction of the reflective-logical, real-practical and emotional-evaluative aspects of his life. World uncertainty and radical epistemological doubt are the basis for the important skeptical principle of isosthenia, by virtue of which there is an insurmountable boundary between the reflective and real-practical spheres, which necessarily separates, in turn, the factual-event sphere from the emotional-evaluative one. The inevitable absence of definite assessments of what is happening and any attitude towards it, the obvious meaninglessness and, consequently, the elimination of both positive and negative emotions forms the ataraxia of the soul sought by skepticism, which, thus, is a continuation and addition of isosthenia of the emotional-psychological level, so just like phenomenalism is its addition to the ontological level.
A possible misinterpretation of isosthenic skeptics as a dogmatic balance of opposites is prevented by skeptical phenomenalism, which is the basis for the practical life of a skeptic and, in contrast to isosthenic neutrality, is completely positive and active, representing an ascent from the general to the particular, from abstract positions and general conclusions to the rich and the complex specifics of real life. And such an ascent is the prerogative of dialectical thinking; Consequently, skeptical phenomenalism determines the understanding of isosthenia as a dialectical expression of perpetual motion and the struggle of the opposites balanced by it.
Skeptics who doubt everything, in order to remain consistent, must also doubt isosthenia itself, that is, equate it with the equality that it expresses. And in this case, the position, but for which “skeptics are only looking for” (i.e., they do not affirm or deny anything, but only doubt), will not, on the one hand, turn into dogmatism, and, on the other hand, will not carry self-internal contradiction, thereby
tralizing one of the common arguments against skepticism, according to which it is either a kind of negative dogmatism or an internally contradictory philosophical construct. And this is one of the significant differences between skepticism and traditional types and paradigms of philosophical thinking: the skeptical “picture of the world” is fundamentally mobile and plastic, and, as a consequence, skeptical philosophical constructions usually do not lead to any definite results, but at the same time they are open to different points of view, and therefore are alien to arbitrarily and unprovenly accepted positions; they do not “put anything out of the picture,” thanks to which they see the rightness (as well as the wrongness) of any philosophical idea. And, due to all this, skepticism is precisely the search for truth, and not the denial of the possibility of achieving it, as skeptical philosophy is often interpreted.
Classical skepticism can be characterized as a self-doubting doubt, which, being a completely unconventional philosophical solution, represents a dialectical interaction of isosthenia and phenomenalism, a paradoxical unification of, at first glance, incompatible, or eternally searching, never satisfied, never finally settling on anything and large-scale philosophical thinking. Skepticism, the importance of which in philosophy is quite difficult to overestimate, should be, in our opinion, one of the priority topics of historical and philosophical science, since it is not a fragment of philosophical thinking, but one of its most fundamental and characteristic parameters.
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLINES OF ANCIENT SKEPTICISM
Department of Philosophy,
Moscow Teachers Training State University
117571 Russia, Moscow,
Prospekt Vernadskogo, 88
The ancient Greek skepticism as an independent trend philosophical has been insufficiently studied both in the Russian and foreign research. The article is dedicated to the principal outlines of Greek skepticism. Its theoretical and methodological basis; its role and importance in the context of the world philosophy are briefly analyzed by the author.
The last great movement of Hellenistic philosophy was skepticism. It appeared almost simultaneously with Stoicism and Epicureanism at the turn of the 4th and 3rd centuries. BC e. The skeptics did not create a school as such, as the Stoics and Epicureans did, but the ideas of skepticism persisted and developed for about five centuries. Skepticism stood somewhat apart from other schools and contrasted all of them with its own philosophical doctrines; philosophers of other schools created theories, while skeptics only criticized and denied them. They called their opponents “dogmatists” or “affirmative philosophers”, and themselves - “withholding judgment” (effectiveists), only “seeking” (scientists) or “considering” (skeptics). The last name stuck, and skepticism began to be called a philosophical position that denies the possibility of knowing the truth. In antiquity, this position was more often called “Pyrrhonism” after its creator, and its less radical form, which developed in the Academy, was “academicism”.
Predecessors. The main predecessors of skepticism were the sophists, led by Protagoras. They prepared skepticism with their relativism and conventionalism. The Sophists, as well as the younger Eleatics, provided, according to skeptics, models of argumentation. But other philosophers also prepared skepticism as a critical part of their theories. Democritus, who presents sensory qualities as subjective, and even Plato, the severe critic of sensory knowledge, put weapons into the hands of skeptics. Latest; in an effort to spread their family tree even further, they considered Heraclitus and Xenophanes their ancestors.
Development. Ancient skepticism went through many changes and phases in its development. At first it was of a practical nature, that is, it acted not only as the most true, but also as the most useful and profitable life position, and then it turned into a theoretical doctrine; Initially, he questioned the possibility of any knowledge, then he criticized the knowledge, but only that obtained by previous philosophy. Practical and radical skepticism was proclaimed by the Pyrrhonists, and theoretical and critical skepticism by representatives of the Academy. Three periods can be distinguished in ancient skepticism:
1) Senior Pyrrhonism, developed by Pyrrho himself and his student Timon of Phlius, dates back to the 3rd century. BC e..At that time, skepticism was of a purely practical nature: its core was ethics, and dialectics was only the outer shell; from many points of view, it was a doctrine similar to primitive Stoicism and Epicureanism; however, Pyrrho, who was older than Zeno and Epicurus, came up with his teachings before them and, most likely, he influenced them, and not vice versa.
2) Academicism. As a matter of fact, during the period when the series of Pyrrho’s students was interrupted, the skeptical trend dominated the Academy; this was in the 3rd and 2nd centuries. BC e. “in the Middle Academy,” the most prominent representatives of which were Arcesilaus (315-240) and Carneades (214-129 BC).
3) Younger Pyrrhonism found its supporters when skepticism left the walls of the Academy. Studying the works of representatives of the Academy of a later period, one can see that they systematized skeptical argumentation. The original ethical position faded into the background, and epistemological criticism came to the fore. The main representatives of this period were Aenesidemus and Agrippa. Skepticism gained many supporters in this last period among doctors of the “empirical” school, among whom was Sextus Empiricus.
Skepticism, which, although it remained faithful to its original position, underwent significant changes in the course of development: the demanding, moralizing skepticism of Pyrrho found its application after many centuries in positivist empiricism.
Founders. Pyrrho lived approximately 376-286. BC e., was an artist and, already in adulthood, took up philosophy. The formation of his views was most influenced by the teaching Democritus(he was a student of Anaxarchus of Abdera, who in turn was a student of Metrodorus, a student of Democritus), then he was influenced by the Indian magicians and ascetics whom he met when he took part in Alexander’s campaign in Asia; in their indifference to life and suffering, Pyrrho saw the best means for achieving happiness. He developed this idea not only in theory, but was also guided by it in his own life. The attitude of indifference, the quintessence of the wisdom of the East, was that alien motive which, with the help of Pyrrho, was introduced into the philosophy of the Greeks.
Returning from Asia, he settled in Elis and founded a school there. With his life he earned universal respect, and thanks to him, the inhabitants of Elis freed philosophers from taxes, and he himself, a skeptic, was elected the highest clergyman. Pyrrho did not leave behind any works because he believed that knowledge could not be obtained. He became the patron of later skeptics, and they attributed their own ideas to him, just as the Pythagoreans attributed to Pythagoras. Pyrrho's students inherited rather his style of life; his theory was developed only by Timon from Phlius. He lived 90 years (325-235 BC), studied in Megara, but, having met Pyrrho, moved to Elis. Later he settled in Athens, where he lived until the end of his life. Timon earned his living by teaching rhetoric and philosophy. He was a man of a different kind than Pyrrho. His skepticism seemed to have a dual source: on the one hand, Pyrrhonian education, and on the other, his inherent sarcasm told him that one must suspect lies in everything. Unlike Pyrrho, he wrote a lot, not only philosophical treatises, but also tragedies, comedies and satirical poems.
Arcesilaus(315-241 BC), head of the Academy. which introduced skepticism into her. He was the younger age of Timon and a student of the peripatetic Theophrastus. The Academy and the Lyceum fought with each other for the talented philosopher. The Academy pulled him over to its side, but then Arcesilaus pulled the Academy over to Pyrrho's side. He represented a different type of personality than the respected Pyrrho and the sarcastic Timon; he was the type of skeptic - a secular man, and as such, grace must have been the dominant feature of his thinking. Arcesilaus was a man who knew how to organize his life, was a lover of beauty, art and poetry, and was known for his independent and chivalrous character.
Carneades was the head of the Academy about a hundred years later than Arcesilaus (214-129 BC). After Pyrrho, he did the most to develop skepticism. Many of the most powerful skeptical arguments go back to him, and in particular the criticism of religious dogmatism. He represented another type of personality: this skeptic was busy fighting dogmatism and, in accordance with ancient customs, did not have time to cut his beard and nails. Carneades, like Pyrrho and Arcesilaus, did not write. But just as Pyrrho had Timon, Arcesilaus had Lacidas, so he had his own Kleitomachus, who wrote for him. There is no personal information about later skeptics.
Works. Among the works of skeptics, the works of a late representative of the school have survived Sixth, by nickname Empiricist, who lived in the 3rd century. Two of his works, which have come down to us in full, give a clear and systematic overview of ancient skepticism. One of these works, Pyrrhon's Propositions, was written in three books in textbook form, where Sextus presented the views of the skeptics, first comparing their general arguments for the impossibility of knowledge in general, and then successively demonstrating the impossibility of logical, physical and ethical knowledge. The second work - “Against Mathematicians” - in eleven books has a similar content, but it is polemical in form and consists of two parts: five books are addressed against the dogmatism of philosophers and six books are against the dogmatism of scientific specialists both from the field of mathematics, astronomy, music , grammar and rhetoric.
Views. Initially, the foundations of skepticism were of a practical nature: Pyrrho took a skeptical position in philosophy, saying that only philosophy alone will ensure happiness, give peace, and happiness lies in peace. It is the skeptic, convinced that he is not capable of a satisfactory solution to any issue, who has no voice anywhere, and this restraint provides him with peace of mind. Pyrrho's teaching included two elements: the ethical doctrine of tranquility and the epistemological skeptical doctrine. The first testified to Pyrrho's fundamental position in philosophy, the second was its proof. The first became a general characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy, while the second became the specialty of Pyrrho and his students.
Pyrrho posed three fundamental questions: 1) What are the qualities of things? 2) How should we behave towards things? 3) What are the consequences of our behavior towards them? And he answered: 1) We do not know what the qualities of things are. 2) Because of this, we must refrain from making judgments about them. 3) This abstinence gives peace and happiness. For Pyrrho the last position was the most important, but his followers shifted the center of gravity to the first position. It presents the foundation of the whole doctrine, and it was in this that the originality of skepticism lay, and not in the eudaimonism which was in the spirit of the times and to which other schools, especially the Epicureans, tended. A separate problem that faced skeptics in that period was the criticism of human knowledge, the opinion that knowledge is impossible in any form and in any sphere. In accordance with this task, skeptics cultivated critical, negative, destructive qualities of the mind and tried to cultivate these “skeptical abilities” in themselves. From Pyrrho's restrained position, his followers moved to a defiant position.
They rejected scientific judgments, because they are all untrue. Only the skeptics did not try to question the judgments about the phenomena. For example, if I eat something sweet or hear some sound, then this is undeniable. But science and our ordinary judgments concern not phenomena, but their real basis, that is, what is their cause. Honey is not what my sense of sweetness is. Knowing only one’s own state, there is no need to assume anything regarding its similarity to anything, since, knowing only a portrait, there is no way to know whether it is similar or not similar to the original. The causes of phenomena - as opposed to the phenomena themselves - are unknown to us, and therefore judgments about them are always untrue.
The ancient skeptics substantiated their position not with the help of a psychological analysis of the human mind, since such an analysis would demonstrate the inability of the mind to know, but with the help of a logical analysis of statements. Their general attitude was the following: each judgment must be opposed to a judgment that has “not much” power, “not much” truth. The result of their criticism, in the most general terms, was isosthenia or “equivalence of judgments.” No proposition is logically stronger or more true than another. The method of their skeptical understanding is based on the fact that, wanting to question any statement, skeptics opposed it with another, contradictory, but “equivalent” judgment. In addition to this general method, later skeptics developed certain special stable arguments to refute judgments, which they called “tropes” or methods.
These arguments were once reduced to two (“two paths” were formulated, perhaps, by Menodotus); any judgment, if true, is so either directly or indirectly, but, firstly, direct truth does not exist due to the diversity and relativity of views, and secondly, indirect there cannot be truth, since there are no directly true judgments that could serve as prerequisites for proof.
Skeptics specifically developed each of these paths: 1) immediate truth cannot be sought: a) not through perceptions; b) neither through concepts and 2) indirectly: a) nor through deduction; b) not by induction; c) neither through the application of criteria.
I. A) Arguments against the possibility of knowing things through the senses were given Aenesidemus in their classic ten tropes:!) The same things will be perceived differently by different types of creatures. A person perceives differently than an animal, because he has different sense organs, a differently constructed eye, ear, tongue, skin. It is impossible to decide whose perception corresponds better to the thing perceived, since there is no reason to give preference to the person. 2) The same things are perceived differently by different people. There is also no reason to give preference to one over the other. 3) The same things are perceived differently by different senses. The same person perceives a thing completely differently depending on which sense organ is used; there is no reason to give preference to one sense over another. 4) The same things are perceived differently, depending on the subjective states of the perceiver. Therefore, even with the same feeling, one and the same thing can be perceived differently: to a person with jaundice, honey seems bitter, but when he is healthy, it seems sweet. 5) The same thing is perceived differently, depending on its position and distance from the perceiver. The oar is straight in the air, but half-submerged in the water has a kink; the tower appears round from afar, but multifaceted up close; We must consider each object from some distance, in some circumstances and in each position, and at a certain distance it will be perceived differently by us, and here there is also no reason to assume that this and not another position, that and not a different distance gives the true image of a thing. 6) Things are not perceived directly, but through a medium that is between them and the perceiver, and because of this, not a single thing can be perceived in its pure form. 7) The same things cause different impressions depending on how many they are and what their structure is: sand in small quantities is hard, but in large quantities it is soft. 8) Any perceptions are relative and depend on the nature of the perceiver and on the conditions in which the perceived thing is located. 9) Things are perceived differently depending on how often we previously perceived them. 10) A person’s judgments about things depend on his upbringing, customs, faith and beliefs.
These paths can be reduced, and by later skeptics they were reduced, to one thing - the relativity of perceptions. The meaning of understanding is the same everywhere: one cannot be satisfied with perception, since perceptions of the same thing differ from each other, and there is no meaning for the sake of which one can be satisfied with one perception and not another; perceptions are different from each other because they are relative and dependent on both subjective (paths 1-4) and objective (5-9) conditions.
B) Arguments against the possibility of knowing a thing through concepts. Another argument is being presented here. The object that we must cognize through concepts is the species. A type either includes all the units falling under it, or does not include them. The last assumption cannot be accepted, because if it did not include them, it would not be a species. But the first is also impossible, since, covering all units, the species would have to have the characteristics of all of them, for example, a tree would have to be both a plane tree and a chestnut, have both needles and leaves, leaves - both round and pointed. And since each tree belongs to a specific species of tree, each would have to have all the qualities of the species, but the qualities are not compatible and contradictory to each other. Consequently, the appearance is somewhat contradictory, and therefore unimportant. Consequently, not a single object corresponds to concepts, and we do not know anything with the help of concepts. Consequently, the method of knowledge through concepts, proclaimed by most philosophers, in particular Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, must be discarded.
II. No method of indirect substantiation of judgments is satisfactory - neither deductive nor inductive.
A) Deduction refutes some of Agrippa's tropes. There are five of these tropes: 1) contradictory views; 2) incompleteness of the evidence; 3) relativity of perception; 4) use of insufficient conditions; 5) the presence of a false circle in the proof.
These provisions were formulated later than those of Aenesidemus, and cover a larger amount of material in a smaller number of tropes. Here the first trope corresponds to the last one in Aenesidemus, and the third trope corresponds to the other nine. The three remaining ones, having no analogues in the provisions of Aenesidemus, are directed against the possibility of deduction and proof. The second and fourth pose a dilemma. Looking for reasons for the consequences of any judgment, we interrupt further proof and in this case we leave all the evidence on unfounded premises (4th trope), or we do not interrupt the proof, but then we are forced to go to infinity, but we cannot realize a single infinity (2nd trope) trope). But this is not enough: according to the fifth trope, in every proof we go in a false circle in the case where the conclusion is already contained in the premises. According to this statement, if all men are mortal, then we conclude that Dion is mortal, but in the statement that all men are mortal, there is already a proposition that Dion is mortal.
These questions did not call into question the relation of consequence between premises and conclusion, but they concerned the premises themselves, which are never them, so that they could be used as the basis of reasoning; they are specifically directed against the Aristotelian doctrine of directly true premises.
B) The skeptics’ argument against induction was as follows: induction is either complete or incomplete, but complete induction is impossible (since it does not have a final solution, so it is impossible), while incomplete induction is worthless (due to the fact that a case not envisaged by it may nullify the results obtained).
C) Consequently, we cannot obtain knowledge either directly or indirectly, neither through feelings, nor through concepts, nor through deduction, nor through induction. We are doomed only to list the many existing judgments that contradict each other, and are not able to choose among them those that are true. No proposition is true in itself; Not There are external differences which would separate a true judgment from a false one. (This statement was directed against the Stoics and their cataleptic ideas.) Also there are no external criteria, which would be a measure of the truth of judgments. The doctrine of criteria, which was developed by the Hellenistic theory of knowledge, according to skeptics, leads to extraordinary difficulties,
1. The criterion must be supplemented by evidence that it is true. However, in proving its truth, we either use it itself and then find ourselves in a false circle of proof; or we apply another criterion, which in turn we derived, and so on ad infinitum, until we fall into an error in the proof, into infinity.
2. There are various views on the criterion, and each school offers its own, but there is no criterion for choosing between them. A choice must be made, but who can be the judge, what power of reason should judge and according to what standard? And at the same time, there is no way to solve these problems.
III. Not content with a general denial of the possibilities of knowledge, skeptics tried to refute particular theories and judgments in both theology and natural science, both in mathematics and ethics.
l.All theological problems are very controversial, since they usually contain contradictory statements. Some theologian-dogmatists consider the deity to be corporeal, others - incorporeal; Some consider it immanent to the world, others - transcendental. Neither of these views can be preferred.
Therefore, the concept of deity is full of contradictions. If the deity is perfect, then it is unlimited; if unlimited, then it is motionless; if motionless, then it is soulless; and if it is soulless, then it is imperfect. If it is perfect, then it must have all the virtues. And some virtues (for example, patience in suffering are a manifestation of imperfection, since only imperfection can be subject to suffering). The concept of divine providence poses particular difficulties. If providence applied only to some people, it would be unjust, since it is possible only for everyone. Universal divine providence is revealed as follows: God is either willing and able, or able but not willing, or willing but unable. The three indicated possibilities do not correspond to the divine nature, and the first does not correspond to the facts, namely: the fact of the existence of evil in the world.. Any evidence of the existence of God (through universal consent, harmony of the world, statements of clearly absurd consequences, for example, that there would be belief in God without the existence God) are insufficient. However, skeptics did not claim that there is no God: because the evidence for the absence of God is as insufficient as the evidence for his existence.
There remains only one existence in things, the same as in the characteristics of the deity: to admit that we know nothing about them, and to refrain from conclusions and judgments.
2. The basic concepts of natural science are no less controversial than theological ones. As regards matter, there is a great variety of views regarding its nature; recognition of all these views as sufficient leads to absurdity, and recognition of only some leads to the need to highlight a criterion and, consequently, to an erroneous circle or to infinity in the proof.
The concept of cause, which is most used by natural scientists, is also controversial. It can be interpreted in one of three ways: either as simultaneous with the effect, or taking place before it, or after it. It (the cause) cannot be simultaneous, since something cannot be created if it already exists; it cannot manifest itself earlier, because in this case there would be no connection between cause and effect: there is no effect while the cause exists, and there would be no cause while the effect exists; especially since the cause cannot manifest itself later than the effect, this would be even greater nonsense. If none of these three cases is possible, then the existence of causes is impossible. In a similar way, skeptics sought to show that neither a corporeal nor an extracorporeal cause, neither a movable nor an immovable cause, nor a cause acting independently or in conjunction with others, is possible. Therefore, a cause is something that we think and talk about, but about which we actually know nothing. On the other hand, denying that causes operate in nature also leads to absurd consequences. Nothing can be affirmed or denied.
Skeptics found similar difficulties both in the recognition and in the denial of other initial concepts of natural science that relate to movement, time and space.
3. The reasoning of mathematicians is also untrue, their concepts are also full of contradictions. A point is contradictory, a line as a set of points is contradictory, a line as a quantity devoid of width, a plane devoid of depth.
4. In ethics, skepticism was based on the same arguments. First of all, to the diversity that occurs both in moral customs and in ethical theories; there is nothing that could be recognized by everyone as good. Therefore, no one knows what good is, since no one can define it; the definitions that are given either have nothing to do with the good, or relate only to things that are connected with it (for example, when it is defined as benefit), or are so abstract (when they define it as happiness) that everyone manages to interpret it according to at your own discretion. Finally, there is nothing that is by its nature a good, so definite, as, for example, things that by nature are either hot or cold, since, for example, fire always warms everyone, and snow always cools everyone, and none of the so-called goods always and everywhere gives a feeling of good.
Ultimately, good as well as evil are unknowable, like God, nature or a mathematical figure; everyone has a different idea about them. The only acceptable position towards him is to withhold judgment. This concerns, ultimately, theoretical knowledge, a thing, not a phenomenon: there is doubt that a given thing is good, but there is no doubt that we accept it as good.
In any case, it is necessary to somehow live and coexist with other people; skeptics did not recognize any principles of knowledge, but should have and did have certain principles of life, namely: they were content with what natural inclinations and customs lead each of them to. In practical life, certainty is not required, a reasonably understood plausibility is sufficient.
It was in this probabilistic spirit that academic skepticism developed, as well as later Pyrrhonism; probability later permeated the theory. Carneades argued that in fact no proposition is true, but it is equally untrue. There are levels of truth: 1) only true judgments; 2) true and consistent; 3) true, consistent and confirmed. Carneades believed that it is not necessary to refrain from judgments; one can express them if they are true. Because of this, the nature of the skeptics' teaching underwent changes: it lost its radicalism and approached common sense.
The meaning of skepticism. Despite this, the tasks that the skeptics set for themselves were negative. Their works were not about establishing the truth, but about revealing lies and demonstrating the untruth of human judgments; their role in philosophy was rather positive and even significant. They discovered many errors and errors in the accepted philosophical views; used and systematized everything that was in the critical thought of Greece, increasing their fame. They were the “theoretical conscience” of their era and raised the level of evidence in science as a whole. Developing their views over several centuries with scrupulous systematicity, they collected a veritable treasury of skeptical ideas and arguments, from which later eras learned much.
Opposition, directed against skepticism, due to the difficulty of a direct attack, it fought against it, as a rule, in roundabout ways: 1) sought to demonstrate the lack of consistency in the skeptical position; to show that the life of a skeptic cannot develop in accordance with his theory; 2) accused skeptics of using hidden, dogmatic principles, without which their argumentation lost its strength; 3) revealed the clearly harmful moral consequences of skepticism.
The influence of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism emerged from antiquity and, in addition to its own school, influenced others. In addition to the Academy in its “middle period” (III and II centuries BC), under his influence was the “empirical school” of doctors who applied the fundamental idea of skeptics in medicine: they recognized that the causes of diseases are unknowable, and therefore limited themselves to recording painful symptoms.
Ancient skepticism was the highest point in the development of skepticism; in later times it was supplemented only in particulars, and never developed further. He was not that influential, but consistent skepticism found its supporters. In the Middle Ages, skepticism acted as an auxiliary doctrine serving dogmatic thought: in order to strengthen faith, some scholastics disparaged knowledge skeptically. In its pure form, skepticism manifested itself in modern times during the Renaissance directly in France in the 16th century. in Montaigne's views. As a matter of fact, from this time on, skepticism had supporters in all centuries (Bayle - at the beginning of the 18th century, Schulze - at the end of the 18th century), in all cases these were individual thinkers who did not have a large number of supporters and influential skepticism. schools. The ideas of ancient skepticism were used not only by supporters of skepticism, but also of criticism: Descartes, Hume And Mill updated the skeptics' interpretation and argumentation, but did not draw such extreme conclusions as they did.
