Kovalenko Central Committee of the CPSU Politburo Brezhnev. Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics

Let's look at the composition of the Politburo during Lenin's lifetime and the last composition of the Politburo during Stalin's lifetime, indicating how many years each Politburo member was in this body.

The first composition of the Politburo (1919).

It had 5 members.

(In 1917 there was also a Politburo, but, in fact, it was a provisional government, and since 1919 the Politburo has existed as the highest party body).

Members of the Politburo:

IN AND. Lenin - until 1924.

N.N. Krestinsky - until 1921.

L.B. Kamenev - until 1926.

I.V. Stalin - until 1953 (until his death).

L.D. Trotsky - until 1926.

In addition, there were three candidates at that time.

G.E. Zinoviev - was in the Politburo until 1926.

N.I. Bukharin - until 1929.

M.I. Kalinin - until 1946 (until his death).

This is the composition of the first Politburo. We see here two persons: Stalin and Kalinin, who were part of the Politburo for decades until their death.

Now the last composition of the Politburo during Stalin's lifetime.

It had 11 members. (It was transformed into the Presidium at the 19th Congress of the CPSU.).

I.V. Stalin - was in the Politburo since 1919, for more than 34 years without a change.

V. M. Molotov - from 1921 to 1957, 36 years continuously.

K.E. Voroshilov - from 1926 to 1960, 34 years without a break.

L.M. Kaganovich - from 1926 to 1957, 31 years old.

A.A. Andreev - since 1930 with one break, when he was not a member of the Politburo, and in total 22 years in the Politburo until 1956.

A.I. Mikoyan - from 1926 to 1960, continuously for 34 years.

N.S. Khrushchev - from 1938 to 1964, more than 26 years.

L.P. Beria - from 1939 to 1953, 14 years.

G.M. Malenkov - from 1941 to 1957, 16 years.

ON THE. Bulganin - from 1946 to 1958, 12 years.

A.N. Kosygin - from 1946 to 1979, 33 years old.

There was only one candidate to the Politburo at that time - Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, he was elected to the Politburo for the first time since 1939 and, with one break, served for 23 years.

Let's compare these lists. In fact, being in the Politburo became a lifelong commitment. That is, the movement was stopped. This, of course, greatly discouraged anything new. But it's not only that. The point is also that this was the established organizational regime for selecting leadership. The fact is that what Lenin so feared in his last works - the replacement of the system of democratic centralism with bureaucratic centralism - was largely realized in practice.

What did this mean?

The main characteristics of bureaucratic centralism were reduced to six phenomena.

First. This is a low level of development of mass culture and democracy.

The majority of grassroots cadres at the level of volost and even district organizations, not to mention the masses themselves, had an extremely low level of general, professional and political culture. And this level was in the 20-30s of the twentieth century an objective obstacle to these people making independent decisions. They needed a template, instructions, and appealed to the top. And this created a mass support for the phenomenon that was later called the cult of personality. Given the presence of a strong, high-quality composition of the Politburo, this shortcoming was tolerable. However, the old guard in the party leadership was quickly knocked out, and from top to bottom, a stereotype of a thoughtless performer, implanted from above, took shape.

In principle, with an increase in the cultural level of the masses, this deficiency could be corrected. However, the growth of democracy in parallel with the growth of culture, as Lenin planned in his last works (and this is the idea of ​​​​a cultural revolution) - the Stalinist apparatus did not allow this growth.

Democracy developed, but only its forms developed, while its essence changed little.

Second. The selection of middle and senior management personnel was carried out by Stalin himself.

The professional abilities of middle and senior management personnel were much higher than those at the bottom. But in this link (region, territory, republic) the selection was carried out personally and completely by Stalin himself. Moreover, it was carried out on the principle of personal devotion. (This layer was infinitely devoted to him and bears full responsibility for everything that happened under him).

Why did these people serve Stalin unquestioningly?

The fact is that in those days, people who reached this high level were compensated for their difficult working conditions in a certain way. They were compensated, firstly, by material support according to needs. And in this light, the nullification of the party maximum introduced under Lenin became inevitable. It was finally liquidated in 1934.

(However, it should be added that these people worked without regard for anything, worked beyond any standards. The nervous stress was colossal. And in this sense, their material support was labor support. But it should be noted that the difference in the level of support between them and the bulk of workers was so great that it gave rise to elements of social injustice).

In addition, the obedience of this link was compensated by a certain permissiveness in relation to those below. For those below him, the middle manager was as omnipotent as for him the superior leader, above all Stalin.

A kind of pyramid was built, tapering upward.

Third. Increasing role of the apparatus.

Not the elective apparatus, but the level with which the leaders worked at high levels. That apparatus in which each individual person in itself does not matter, but in the aggregate this apparatus (the apparatus is also largely irreplaceable, people in which have worked for decades) acquired enormous importance.

Fourth. Each lower level was just a general cog in the leadership.

Each worker from top to bottom was only a certain representative of the system, but not a competent leader in his area of ​​competence, even in his own area. All rights were practically delegated to the top. Each lower level was just a general cog in the leadership. This was due, first of all, to the lack of cost accounting.

Fifth. Fear.

Under such conditions, the functioning of the system could only be ensured through strict administration, in which one element had to be present - the element of fear. Fear, obedience. Hence the increasing role of punitive agencies, which were controlled personally by Stalin. To maintain fear, constant exposure of the enemies of the people, widespread repression, and spy mania became mandatory.

Let's give illustrative examples.

The first Soviet government, headed by Lenin, consisted of 15 people.

First on the list in the decree adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets was V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin), and the last (fifteenth) was I.V. Dzhugashvili (Stalin). Between them there were 13 more people: N.I. Rykov, V.P. Milyutin, A.G. Shlyapnikov, V.A. Ovseenko (Antonov). N.V. Krylenko, P.E. Dybenko, V.P. Nogin. A.V. Lunacharsky, I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, L.D. Trotsky (Bronstein), G.I. Oppkov (Lomov), I.A. Teodorovich, N.P. Avilov (Glebov).

What are the fates of these people?

Ten of them were declared spies and enemies of the people, with all the ensuing consequences. Only 3 people died of natural causes. Nogin - in 1924, shortly after Lenin's death, Skvortsov-Stepanov another 4 years later - in 1928 and Lunacharsky - in 1932.

History textbooks contain the composition of the members of Stalin's Politburo. In general, during all the years of existence of this body during Stalin’s life, 40 people were in its composition.

Their fates were different. Some died a natural death, others, judging by official documents, were helped in this, and the third group went partly through trials, and then without any trials (people were simply declared enemies of the people). In total, 22 people out of 40 experienced this fate. These people were either repressed or died, and official documents appeared that they were either poisoned or something else similar happened.

Frunze, Kuibyshev, Zhdanov died of illness, but under circumstances that gave rise to allegations of murder in the press. As for Frunze, the official message itself did not contain any such accusations, but soon a publication appeared, very transparently written, which said that Frunze’s illness was taken advantage of. For which the writer B. Pilnyak was repressed. This was directly stated in the charges against him.

As for Kuibyshev and Zhdanov, reports have emerged that their deaths were caused by non-violent means.

They were killed or committed suicide without subsequent defamation, but after certain clashes with Stalin, two people: S.M. Kirov and G.K. Ordzhonikidze. 17 people were repressed, killed, committed suicide and then were accused of treason. Everything under Stalin. This is: L.D. Trotsky, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev, N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, V.Ya. Chubar, S.I. Syrtsov, P.P. Postyshev.

Twenty-two people died under unnatural circumstances. Twenty-two out of forty people are more than half of the Politburo.

Two people were officially convicted of violating socialist legality: N.I. Ezhov and L.P. Beria. Yezhov was a candidate member of the Politburo. Beria was a member of the Politburo. Yezhov - under Stalin, Beria - in 1953.

These are the actions of this device.

Sixth. Actually a cult of personality.

The cult of personality is the deification of the leader, endowing him with supernatural qualities. A leader who knows everything, knows everything, can do everything. How was all this combined with the ideals of socialism? Very simply, by dissolving the ideal. Stalin came to personify socialism. Few people knew what the real person bearing the pseudonym Stalin was like. His biographies were published very short. In 1946, after the war, a book about Stalin was published, which was of an official political nature, but, strictly speaking, there was nothing in it about the man. There I.V. Stalin was presented as a symbol of socialism. And when a person disappears and a symbol remains, then a substitution of concepts occurs and certain slogans arise that remain in people’s minds. So the slogan, memorable to all Soviet people, “For the Motherland, for Stalin!”, in fact, meant “For socialism, for the revolution, for the people!”

History does not know the subjunctive mood; what happened cannot be changed. But she is also a good teacher. Let's study our history and not repeat the mistakes made by others.

WHAT FORMS STALIN’S STRUGGLE WITH THE INTRA-PARTY OPPOSITION TOOK IS CLEARLY SEEN IN THE FEBRUARY-MARCH PLENAUM OF THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937

“Transcript of the report of the People's Commissar of the NKVD N.I. Yezhova
at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937

Molotov. Comrades, allow me to declare the meeting of the plenum open. Do members of the plenum have any comments on the agenda?

Molotov. No objections?

Molotov. Approved. Let's start with the first question - “The case of Bukharin and Rykov.” Yezhov's report.

Yezhov. Comrades, at the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, based on the testimony of Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Sosnovsky, Uglanov and Kulikov, I reported on the existence of an anti-Soviet organization of the right, which was headed by the center consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. I then reported to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party that members of the center - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov: firstly, knew about the existence of an underground anti-Soviet Trotskyist-Zinoviev united bloc; secondly, they knew about the existence of an underground anti-Soviet Trotskyist parallel center; thirdly, they were aware that the Trotskyist-Zinovievite united bloc and the Trotskyist parallel center in their struggle against the party and the Soviet government switched to methods of terror, sabotage, and sabotage; fourthly, they were aware of the treacherous platform of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc, aimed at the restoration of capitalism in the USSR with the help of foreign fascist interventionists and, finally, fifthly, members of the center Bukharin, Uglanov and Rykov stood on the same platform, contacted the anti-Soviet activities of their right-wing organization with the Trotskyist organization.

In view of the seriousness of the charges brought against Bukharin and Rykov, the previous Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin, passed a resolution that the question of the specific guilt of candidates for members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Bukharin and Rykov, be postponed to this Plenum in order in order to carry out during this time the most careful and conscientious investigation of the anti-Soviet activities of the right, in particular the specific guilt of Bukharin and Rykov. Guided by this resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee, during this time the activities of the right-wing organization and the involvement of Bukharin and Rykov in it were investigated, which was expressed mainly in the following:

1. In Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov-on-Don, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Khabarovsk and some other cities, the Trotskyists Pyatakov, Radek, Yakovlev, Beloborodoye and many other active participants in the organization of the right, most of whom you know: Uglanov, Kotov, Yakovlev, Slepkov Alexander, Slepkov Vasily, Astrov, Tsetlin, Lugovoy, Rozit, Shoemaker[s]... (lists), Kozlov, Schmidt Vasily and many others. All of the listed participants in the organization of the right, as well as the Trotskyists, gave exhaustive testimony about all the anti-Soviet activities of the organization of the right and their personal participation in it. They fully confirmed the accusations that were previously brought against Bukharin and Rykov at the previous Plenum and supplemented them with a large number of new facts.

These facts leave no doubt that until recently there was a relatively branched organization of the right led by Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and Uglanov. The investigation into the activities of the right-wingers, in our opinion, was carried out with sufficient thoroughness and objectivity. The objectivity of this investigation is confirmed by the following facts: firstly, in completely different cities, by different investigators, at different times, dozens of the most active participants in the right-wing organization were interviewed, who at different times and in different places confirmed the same acts. Thus, the investigation had the opportunity to objectively compare the testimony of dozens of those arrested, which basically confirmed - with some minor deviations in relation to the individual anti-Soviet activities of each - all the testimony.

Secondly, comrades, many of the most active participants in the organization of the right, and in particular such close friends of Bukharin, his students as Efim Tsetlin, Astrov, themselves expressed their voluntary consent to tell the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the party body the whole truth about the anti-Soviet activities of the right throughout their existence and tell all the facts that they hid during the investigation in 1933. Thirdly, for the objectivity of checking the testimony, the Politburo of the Central Committee arranged a confrontation between Bukharin and Pyatakov, Radek, Sosnovsky, Kulikov, Astrov. The confrontation was attended by comrades. Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan and other members of the Politburo. All members of the Politburo of the Central Committee who were present at the confrontation repeatedly asked all the arrested Trotskyists and rightists whether they had slandered Bukharin and Rykov, or whether they had revealed too much about themselves. All of those arrested fully confirmed the testimony and insisted on it.

You yourself understand, comrades, that those arrested, who speak not only about the activities of others, not to a lesser extent, but more about their own anti-Soviet activities, were very tempted, when such a question was asked, to answer negatively, to refuse to testify. Despite this, everyone confirmed these testimony.

Rykov was given a confrontation with people with whom he himself wished to have a confrontation. The closest workers who were personally associated with him in the past - Nesterov, Ragin, Kotov, Vasily Schmidt - all of them confirmed the preliminary testimony in the confrontation, and despite the strictest warning that if they incriminate themselves and Rykov, they would punished, they nevertheless confirmed their preliminary testimony. Moreover, in these confrontations they gave a whole series of new facts, reminding Rykov of individual conversations, of individual directives that were received from him, and of individual facts that Rykov could not even deny.

Thus, comrades, we believe that the documentary and investigative material that we have leaves no doubt that until recently there existed and operated an anti-Soviet organization of the right, whose members, like the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, set as their task the overthrow of the Soviet government , changing the existing Soviet social and governmental structure in the USSR. Like the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, they took the path of direct betrayal of their homeland, the path of terror against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government, the path of sabotage and sabotage in the national economy. From these same investigation materials and documents, it follows that the guilt of Bukharin and Rykov has been fully proven, guilt of the gravest crimes against the party and the state, which were charged against them at the previous Plenum and which I am going to report on now.

Moving on to a specific presentation of the investigative and documentary materials that are at our disposal, I consider it necessary to make a reservation that I will not touch on the history of the issue, although there are many interesting facts from the historical point of view of the development of the organization of the right and its struggle against the party. I will touch on these facts only insofar as they are relevant to the discussion of today's issue.

If we dwell on the emergence and development of the anti-Soviet right-wing organization, then, based on the investigation and documentary materials, its activities can be divided into approximately three stages. The first stage was 1921–27, when the organization of the right was born in the form of Bukharin’s school, on the one hand, and in the form of the well-known trade unionist-minded cadres of trade unionists, led by Trotsky, on the other, which subsequently turned into one of the main and main parts of the right-wing organization. The second stage was 1927–30, when all right-wing opportunist groups, headed by Rykov in the Soviet apparatus, Tomsky in the trade union apparatus, and Uglanov in the Moscow party organization, gravitated toward Bukharin’s school and trade unionists. All together, by the June Plenum of the Central Committee of 1928, they had formed a completely cohesive faction with its own platform, internal faction discipline and its own centralized leadership. Finally, the third stage - 1930–37. (I am combining here) when the organization of the right goes underground, refuses to openly defend its views, double-dealingly disguises its attitude to the party line, to the party leadership and gradually slides into terror tactics, to organizing an insurrection in the countryside, to organizing strikes and, finally , to sabotage and sabotage activities in the national economy.

Let me not stop at the first two stages, taking only the two most important facts here. The first fact relevant to the first stage of development of the right-wing organization is the following. From all his many years of struggle against Lenin, Bukharin, unfortunately, learned one lesson: he directly told his school that Lenin beat me because I did not have an organized group of like-minded people. Therefore, after Lenin’s death, he immediately began to put together a group of like-minded people...

Mikoyan. He's a big hero.

Yezhov....which is subsequently registered in the well-known Bukharin school. Even then, this schoolgirl represented a completely complete faction group with its own program, with its own internal faction discipline. This whole school was brought up on the opposition of Bukharin to Lenin. The whole school believed that Bukharin was right in his struggle and in his views on issues of the Soviet economy, on the doctrine of the state, on imperialism, while Lenin was wrong. Every single participant in Bukharin’s school talks about this. Moreover, Bukharin did not hide this. He directly raised them in this school in such opposition to Lenin. Moreover, he educated himself not only in opposition to Lenin, but also in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party, believing that the Central Committee of the Party was also pursuing the wrong policy. There were literally no secrets from this school of young Bukharinites. All the secrets, all the issues of the Politburo that were discussed - and as you know, Bukharin was a member of the Politburo - were necessarily discussed in school.

The second fact, comrades, is related to the second stage. Everyone knows that the leaders of the right opposition in 1928 and later argued that they did not have any factions, much less that there was any illegal organization. They argued that the whole point boils down to the fact that the rightists, in their own honest way, each individually, not bound by factional discipline, defended and defended their wrong views. The facts say otherwise. Already by 1928, a complete faction of the right had fully formed, which contrasted its line with the line of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. It was formed, as I already said, on the one hand, from Bukharin’s school, from right-wing opportunist trade unionists, trade unionists, from some economic workers from the economic-Soviet apparatus and, finally, from some leading party workers of the Moscow party organization.

The third fact, related to the same period, is that already in 1928 the rightists, to lead all factional activities and their struggle against the party, created a leadership center, which included Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Schmidt, Uglanov and Ugarov. As has now been established by investigative materials and documents, this center led the entire factional struggle of the right. All speeches of the right at plenums, on the assets of the party organization during 1928–29. must have been previously discussed in this center. Moreover, the well-known anti-party attack by the right at the trade union congress, where they tried their hand, was led entirely by this factional center. During the meetings of the congress, the center met almost continuously in Tomsky’s apartment, setting up watches. Either Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, or others were on duty all the time. Such speeches, for example, as the speeches of Kotov and Rosit at the April Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, their theses were approved, first reviewed by the center, and only after that they spoke.

These are the main facts that I considered necessary to note from the activities of the right at the first stage of the development of this organization and at the second. As for the third, main and main stage, it is drawn approximately in the following form. After the defeat of the right at the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, the center of the right came to the conviction that an open attack against the party was hopeless and doomed to failure. Continuing to stand on its right-wing opportunist positions, the center of the right, in order to preserve its cadres from final defeat, took the path of double-dealing capitulation. In the hope that it will be possible to launch a new attack against the party in the near future, the center is discussing a whole plan, all the tactics of double-dealing. Here the mistakes of the Trotskyists, the mistakes of the Zinovievites are taken into account, and a plan for the double-dealing of filing applications is developed literally down to the details. This plan is as follows: first, all party members involved in the organization of the right, who are not yet known to the party organizations as actively connected with the right, are given a directive to keep their connections secret for the time being and not to go out anywhere, not to submit any statements. Special tactics are being developed for Muscovites, especially for members of the Central Committee from the Moscow organization.

During the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, the center meets, and the center invites Uglanov, Kotov and Kulikov to make repentant speeches and submit an application at the November Plenum of the Central Committee. What is the goal? The goal is the following: to preserve the Moscow group of workers at all costs, to preserve Uglanov, since a new fight, a new attack against the Central Committee of the Party was planned for the near future, when they recovered. As you know, Uglanov, Kotov and Kulikov, then members of the Central Committee, made such a statement and submitted a statement of repentance renouncing their right-wing opportunist views and breaking with the opposition. It is also known, comrades, that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky submitted these applications much later. Now Rykov and Bukharin are not averse to portraying this fact as follows: “Well, you attribute to us the existence of some kind of faction with its own discipline, etc., but I just found out about submitting an application for surrender, with renunciation of right-wing views only at the Plenum of the Central Committee. Even more than that, I was so outraged, considering it a stab in the back.” In fact, this “stab in the back” was quite mild, because it was discussed in advance, and there was no blow here. The whole plan was built only with the expectation of preserving at all costs the top of the Moscow organization of the right, strengthening their position in order to launch a new attack against the Central Committee of the Party at the first opportunity.

Further, comrades, after the application was submitted by Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsk, the center gives instructions to its supporters on the ground to immediately capitulate. By the way, at that time plenums of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties were held, activists gathered, where the issue related to the struggle of the right opposition against the party and the condemnation of this struggle was discussed. At most of these plenums and activists, active rightists, especially from among Bukharin’s students, most ardently spoke out in defense of their old right-wing positions, in defense of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. And for them, the “order,” as Slepkov calls it, the faction order regarding the immediate filing of an application with refusal was completely unexpected. There were some oddities, for example, this oddity: Slepkov, being at the plenum of the regional committee in Samara... in the morning gives a speech in defense of his positions, in defense of right-wing positions, in defense of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky; During the lunch break, he comes to his hotel, or to his apartment, receives a directive from Bukharin with the express order to slowly capitulate. At the evening meeting, he makes a repentant speech, renounces all his beliefs, and condemns the right. And as he says now: “It was so offensive that I cried all night because I was put in such an idiotic position.” So, comrades, thus, even at the time of submitting the repentant statements, there was no doubt that the centralized leadership of the right-wing faction was acting, which gave the order to capitulate, while at the same time developing a plan for this capitulation in all details.

This, comrades, is the situation with the supposedly sincere refusal of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky to defend their positions in the struggle against the Party. They take a position of double-dealing and go underground in order to intensify their anti-Soviet activities at the first opportunity.

By this time, comrades, i.e. by the beginning of 1930, or in 1930, taking into account all the maneuvers of the right, we had an established organization of the right in approximately the following form. The right had its center consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. Secondly, to unite the leadership of the underground activities of the right-wingers working in Moscow, the so-called Moscow center was formed, which includes: Uglanov, Kulikov, Kotov, Matveev, Zapolsky, Yakovlev. At the same time, on the ground, on the periphery, right-wing groups are emerging from among the most active participants in the organization and, mainly, participants in Bukharin’s school, who, by decision of the Central Committee, were sent to work in the field. Such groups are taking shape: in Samara - the Slepkov group, which includes Levin, Arefiev, Zhirov; in Saratov - Petrov’s [Petrovsky P.G.] group consisting of Zaitsev, Lapin [V.S. Lapkin]; in Kazan - Vasiliev’s group; in Ivanovo - Astrov's group; in Leningrad - Maretsky’s group consisting of Chernov and others; in Novosibirsk - the group of Yaglom and Kuzmin; in Voronezh - the group of Sapozhnikov and somewhat later Nesterov; in Sverdlovsk - Nesterov's group.

By 1930, these groups had more or less taken shape, organized themselves with their own factional discipline and made every effort to recruit supporters. They existed until 1932 with a slight change in their composition, when many of their participants were exposed for anti-Soviet activities, were subjected to repression, and a significant part were arrested after the well-known right-wing conference held in Moscow in August 1932. Some were arrested in connection with the exposure of Ryutin’s group, and after 1932–33. members of the organization go even deeper underground. Center members and their local supporters communicate with each other only through a chain. If in 1932–33. we had a large number of meetings, meetings and even a conference, then in subsequent years all meetings are prohibited and communication is established only at the beginning of personal meetings. This, comrades, is the situation with the emergence and development of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, as it is drawn from the materials of the investigation and the documents at our disposal.

What has been the political platform of the right-wing organization throughout its existence? I, comrades, here will not touch on the well-known individual documents that the right-wing parties submitted to the Central Committee of the Party at one time, but I will begin with a description of those documents that are, at least, at our disposal now.

In 1929, the thoughts were the same before 1929, the rightists considered it necessary to summarize their individual scattered notes, their disagreements with the party into some kind of single document. There was an attempt to draw up such a platform document in order to submit it to the Central Committee of the party. Such a document was drawn up. However, members of the Right Center Party did not dare to submit it to the Party Central Committee and hid it from the Party Central Committee. True, they did not hide it from the Trotskyists and Zinovievites. Bukharin, for example, showed this document to Pyatakov. Kamenev was also aware of this document. However, they did not present it to the Central Committee of the party. Members of their organization were also sufficiently aware of this generalizing document.

I will not go into detail about this document. I will only say that it is not relevant for the discussion of today's issue. I will only say one thing: the document more or less openly sets out proposals that, in essence, led to capitalist restoration in the USSR, accusing the Central Committee of the Party of all kinds of completely intolerant, vile attacks. Including sliding onto Trotskyist rails, the right expresses in it their disagreement on all the fundamental issues of our socialist construction and makes their proposals.

This document did not see the light of day. The rightists hid it. I repeat, it has no actual significance for the discussion of today’s issue. I touched on it only briefly and want to move on to later documents. First of all, it is necessary to focus on the so-called Ryutin platform. First of all, it also unites the mysterious Ryutin platform. The appearance of this platform was interpreted in different ways. The main thing that was revealed was that there was some kind of wild group associated with the right, which was more repressive. They decided to summarize all their moods and mindsets as a platform. So this wild group is spreading this platform. This platform was spread by the rightists, the Ryutinites themselves, the Zinovievites, and the Trotskyists. We were a little surprised, to say the least, that, for example, Rykov gave such instructions to his closest assistants to contact the right-wing organization. Bukharin says that this document does not exist, says that the GPU invented it.

But what is the picture of the appearance of this document, its nature, in fact, how it is drawn on the basis of the investigative materials that we have. Now, comrades, it has been absolutely indisputably proven that the Ryutin platform was drawn up on the initiative of the rightists in the persons of Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. Around this platform they intended to unite all elements that disagreed with the party: Trotskyists, Zinovievites, rightists. According to the testimony of the well-known V. Schmidt, the situation with its appearance is drawn approximately as follows.

In connection with the revival of anti-Soviet activities of various kinds of groups, the right in the spring of 1932 decided at all costs to draw up a political platform on the basis of which they could unite their entire organization and attract all groups to it.

For this purpose, in the spring of 1932, a right-wing center consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt was assembled at Tomsky’s dacha in Bolshevo. At this meeting, the members of the center agreed on all the main fundamental issues of the platform and outlined its plan. Schmidt showed that even something like theses had been sketched out. Then the center of the right instructed Uglanov to contact Ryutin, attract some literate people, formalize this platform, compile it and submit it for consideration by the center. The platform, based on these preliminary records, instructions from the center, was compiled in the fall of 1932. Uglanov receives this platform, the initial sketch of this very platform in finished form, and proposes that the center gather again. At Uglanov’s suggestion, they again gather in Bolshevo at Tomsky’s dacha under the guise of a party or some kind of drinking, and there they subject this document to the most thorough revision and reading. We read it point by point and made amendments. Present at this second meeting of the center were: Uglanov, Rykov, Schmidt, Tomsky. Bukharin was not there then; he was either on vacation or on a business trip. This is how Schmidt explains.

Vasily Schmidt paints a picture of the discussion of this platform as follows, since he took part in the approval and consideration of the platform. When considering this platform, Alexey Ivanovich Rykov opposed the first part, which provides an economic justification, and strongly rejected it. “It’s not good, she preaches too openly, it’s just a restoration of capitalism, she’s too uncovered. We need to smooth it out. As for the practical part, where it talks about active methods of struggle against the government, where it talks about the transition to effective measures against the party, here it is written well and one must agree with it.”

Tomsky spoke: “The economic part is nonsense, whether it will be corrected or not, then it can be corrected. The main thing is not in it (laughter), the main thing is this part, which speaks of active actions.” Moreover, as Schmidt said, he called this unit a terrorist unit. “This part is well written, and since it is well written, let’s agree with it and approve it.” Everyone agreed with Tomsky, the platform was approved and, judging by the approximate dates that we now have the opportunity to check from these investigations - Schmidt does not remember what day it was - but by comparing the investigation it can be established that this coincides exactly with the moment of discussing this platform at Tomsky’s dacha in Bolshevo.

Thus, comrades, the materials of the investigation, in our opinion, indisputably prove that in fact the authors of the actual Ryutin platform are not some wild group of Ryutin that accidentally fell from the sky, but the center of the right, including Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt, they are the actual authors and the fact that they entrusted their authorship to Ryutin does not change the matter. At the same meeting, it was decided that if this platform is discovered somewhere and they ask during the investigation, Ryutin must definitely hide it and pass it off as his own, declaring that it is a wild platform, etc. This, comrades, is the true origin of the Ryutin platform.

It goes without saying that Bukharin and Rykov deny this matter. Although yesterday, in a confrontation with Schmidt, Rykov was forced to admit that at Tomsky’s dacha he actually read Ryutin’s platform, however, he portrays it innocently and says that there were members of the Central Committee there, apparently, members of the Central Committee received Ryutin’s platform. I don’t know whether Ryutin’s platform was sent to members of the Central Committee?

Yezhov. He didn't say. He says that members of the Central Committee have the right to read any documents.

Yezhov. Yes, I told you yesterday. I, comrades, will remind you in order to link with what follows the main provisions of the Ryutin platform. The Ryutin platform denies the socialist character of the Soviet state, demands the dissolution of collective farms and the rejection of collectivization, the rejection of the line of liquidation of the kulaks, of Soviet industrialization, proposes to unite all opposition groups, including Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Shlyatnikovites, rightists, to fight against the party and the Soviet government. leftists, etc. and, as practical measures, openly formulates and proposes individual terror, demands, just like the Trotskyists in their famous letter, to remove Stalin, by this they mean to kill Stalin, invites all his like-minded people to issue leaflets, proclamations, organize strikes in factories and demands, finally, the overthrow of the Soviet government through an armed uprising.

If you carefully read the individual proposals of this platform, then in such a veiled, vague form there is a call for sabotage and sabotage of the activities of the party and government. This platform, comrades, was essentially a document expressing aspirations, moods, and views that directly demanded a capitalist restoration in the USSR. If you include the latest editions of Trotsky’s agreement with Hitler...

Yezhov. It is the same. This is the case with the Ryutin platform.

After the Ryutin platform, approximately 5 years passed after its release. Over the years, comrades, the country has moved forward gigantically. For everyone, the victory of socialism became completely obvious. In the conditions of the final victory of socialism, continuing the active struggle against the Soviet government, hiding behind Soviet phraseology, will not work. The case is hopeless; anyone can expose it. Therefore, it was inevitable that there would be a feeling within a group of individual right-wingers to formulate their sentiments more openly. We have now discovered such an attempt to create a platform during the investigation. It dates back to 1936–37. This platform itself is extremely distinctive. This platform has an appeal to all the peoples of the Soviet Union and to all youth. The authors of the platform are Alexander Slepkov, a well-known student of Bukharin, Kuzmin, a student of Bukharin, and finally Khudyakov. Sitting in prison, in an isolation ward, they wrote this program, this platform, and upon Khudyakov’s release they offered him, since he had gone into exile in Western Siberia, in Biysk, they invited him to contact, gave him addresses, offered to contact the right-wing organization, discuss the platform and express your thoughts.

I, comrades, will read to you some of the provisions of the new platform. First of all, its philosophical part. It says the following: “Marxism, as an integral worldview [...] and, finally, the doctrine of class struggle.” All this, according to the authors of the platform, has been refuted by life; Marxism has completely outlived its usefulness. Then there are discussions about the statements of Spencer, Herzen and Bakunin, etc., which justified themselves and are covered by life. Criticizing the political part of our system, they say the following in the program:

“The socialist economic system turned out to be the most bureaucratic... in its coils the boa constrictor strangled all living things.” And further: “The dictatorship of the proletariat with its monopoly position...”

Yezhov.“The philosophy of Marxism has turned into the most reactionary ossified dogma... of defense and attack.” Based on this, the authors of the platform consider it a sacred and unwavering duty to overthrow such despotic power. And then they propose to form a new party called the People's Democratic Party of Russia. (Indignation in the hall.) This is how former cadet Slepkov formulates his views today, the dog has returned to its vomit.

Further, what are the main tasks for the coming period they propose. They consider the overthrow of the Stalinist regime to be their first and main duty. By what means? They propose the following: “This destruction can occur as a result of various reasons and methods, of which we consider the following to be the most successful and appropriate: 1) As a result of an external blow, i.e. as a result of the offensive war of Germany and Japan on the USSR.”

Antipov. A familiar matter to us.

Yezhov.“2) As a result of a palace coup or a military coup, which could be carried out by one of the Red generals.”

Mezhlauk. This is also a familiar thing.

Yezhov. The matter of palace coups, you know it well enough from the protocols that were handed over to you, and it must be said that Rykov, Bukharin and others fussed with this matter for a very long time. Thus, comrades, this program puts in the first place the military attack of Nazi Germany and Japan on the Soviet Union. They openly formulate their defeatist attitude towards this.

In addition, the program does not abandon individual terror. True, they call it, apparently based on the experience of the Kirov events, “terrorist partisanship” and propose moving to group terror.

Shkiryatov. This is also familiar to us.

Yezhov. This is also quite familiar from the discussions that Bukharin had with Radek and others. But, it is true, they do not reject individual murders. However, it is said that the most recent “modernity”, i.e. Kirov's murder does not testify in her favor. But, however, they argue, “the appearance of Caesar always inevitably entails the appearance of Brutus.” (Noise, movement in the hall.) They say: “We terrorists have a completely different attitude towards terror than so-called official Marxism.” This, comrades, is the last revelation of this group of rightists who have reached the end.

By the way, today we received a telegram from Novosibirsk, where the investigation is ongoing, and it turns out that the deputy. prev West Siberian State Planning Committee, what's it called?

Eiche. Edelman.

Yezhov. Deputy prev Gosplan Edelman accepted this platform and carried it out in his right-wing group.

Voroshilov. Where was this platform compiled?

Yezhov. In the isolation ward. (Laughter.)

Kosior. This is an interesting insulator. (Laughter.)

Lozovsky. This platform is from Bukharin’s school.

Yezhov. Yes, it was compiled by Slepkov, Kuzmin and Khudyakov you know. These are people very close to Slepkov, involved in the organization, his students. Here, comrades, these are the programmatic political guidelines of the right, which are drawn to us on the basis of the investigative and documentary materials that we now have at our disposal.

I turn to the actual side of the anti-Soviet activities of the right, which they were able to develop in our peculiar difficult conditions, to their work over these years. Having set as their goal the restoration of capitalism in the USSR and the seizure of power, with the success of our socialist construction, they fell lower and lower every day and moved on to the most intensified forms of struggle.

First of all, comrades, about the terrorist activities of the right. Based on all the investigative materials that we now have, there is no doubt that the right has long begun to recognize the possibility of terror against the leaders of the party and government. In conditions of complete political isolation and the impossibility of actively showing their true colors in any other way, the rightists, in the end, just like the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, switched to the position of individual terror. The comrades here know some facts from the protocols, but I want to say that terrorist sentiments on the right arose much earlier. The first terrorist statements and conversations of a rather frank nature, which were revealed in the organization of the right, we had already in 1928. The same Kuzmin, well known to you - the author of this platform - back in 1928 he directly expressed the idea of ​​​​the need to kill Comrade Stalin. He expressed out loud what the people around him, including Slepkov and others, were talking about then, without wanting to say it directly. Kuzmin directly posed the question back in 1928, he posed this question, and it was not generally the cry of an enraged young guy involved in an anti-Soviet organization, it was the conviction of a person. He said this already in 28; it is enough to read his diary to imagine all his moods in those years.

They may say: Kuzmin is a loner, according to the Russian proverb - “every family has its black sheep.” Unfortunately, there are too many freaks in the right-wing family...

Eiche. Absolutely nothing but freaks.

Yezhov. Slepkov and Sapozhnikov directly raised this question back in 1927–28, and then later they moved on to organizing terrorist acts. Well, comrades, the following question can be raised here: what do Bukharin and Rykov have to do with it?

Yezhov. Maybe this is the sentiment of some of their supporters? Unfortunately, I must say that terrorist groups were most actively organized where they were organized on the direct orders of either Bukharin, or Rykov, or Tomsky. You have all received investigative material on the right-wing case. Therefore, I will limit myself only to pointing out the most characteristic, from my point of view, facts.

What does Rosit say, the well-known Rosit, one of Bukharin’s closest students and friend? He shows: “Terrorism is not an accidental phenomenon in our country. Bukharin brought us up and cultivated an exceptional hatred of Stalin and his comrades. I don’t remember a single meeting, a single meeting with Bukharin, where he did not incite this hatred. In this regard, I remembered Slepkov’s expression that hatred of Stalin is sacred hatred.” By the way, it should be said that this hatred of Stalin was used to determine loyalty to Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky - this was the criterion.

In 1930, at Slepkov’s dacha in Pokrovsko-Streshnevo, Bukharin personally gave instructions for terror and motivated this by the fact that the right’s focus on winning a majority in the CPSU (b) was defeated. The same Rosit gives the following testimony: “Bukharin directly said that it was necessary to begin preparing a terrorist group against Stalin and his closest associates... (reads). That is, people didn’t even have any doubt about it because the ground had already been completely prepared. Why am I citing this testimony of Rosita? We have Slepkov, and Maretsky, and everyone else from Bukharin’s school. I cite Rosit’s testimony because he is one of those people who were closely associated with Bukharin until recently. This, comrades, is Bukharin.

As for Rykov, at first glance it seems like he has nothing to do with it. True, from the latest testimony that you read, it is known that he also has something to do with it, is directly involved in this case. True, Rykov, if we take the total members of this center, is much more cautious, much more conspiratorial, not a chatterbox, knows where to do what, and knows how to conspire, while Bukharin sometimes likes to chatter. Tomsky went so far as to write down incredible nonsense in his notes, which were quite frank. We can find in them anti-obscene expressions (as in the text - V.S.), terry expressions addressed not only to individual leaders of the party and government, but even to our country. A man who until recently had correspondence with the most terry White Guards, who scolded and cursed the Soviet regime in typically fascist expressions, this man considered it possible to receive this correspondence, read it and, moreover, store it in his apartment and file it.

So, about Rykov. Despite all his secrecy and caution, I want to cite the following testimony of the former head of Rykov’s secretariat in the Council of People’s Commissars, Nesterov, a man personally very close to Rykov. He gives the following testimony: “We, the rightists, tried to create such sentiments around Rykov”... (reads). In accordance with this, Rykov, despite his special position, does not hesitate to give direct instructions on the organization of terrorist groups. This same Nesterov tells how, before leaving for Sverdlovsk in May 1931...

Molotov. Which Nesterov is this?

Yezhov. Head of the Rykov Secretariat. Rykov was delighted at Nesterov’s arrival and said that from before. The Council of People's Commissars made him postmaster. Here, he says, you and the Politburo, here, he says, is the line for harmony, got into postmasters. He painted a rather gloomy picture of the situation in the country and suggested that he organize a group of like-minded people in Sverdlovsk, select terrorist fighters in order to send them to Moscow if necessary. Nesterov shows: “How the party learned to organize the armed forces in the era... (reads). We need to learn to shoot in a new way." And further, Rykov gave direct instructions to organize terrorist groups. And further: “in this conversation Rykov gave me a direct directive...” (reading). Another former “scientific” secretary of Rykov, Radin, also gives a lot of incriminating testimony. He shows that “in one of the conversations with me, Rykov told me...” (reading).

In the testimony of Radin, Kotov and others you will find enough incriminating material. I want to focus on just one fact. In a face-to-face confrontation, it is extremely difficult to deny all these facts that are directly presented to Rykov. By the way, he himself personally asked for confrontations with certain individuals. He previously described Radin to me as an extremely intelligent, calm and talented person and asked me to arrange a confrontation with him earlier. When they confronted him, after that or beforehand, he stated that indeed in 1932 Radin came to his apartment, and Radin had such anti-party, anti-Soviet sentiments. He allegedly demanded from Rykov: “Why are you sitting here in the center, doing nothing. Let’s fight, get active, etc.” In a word, Radin put pressure on Rykov. In general, Rykov complained that Radin provoked him into such harsh speeches. But I, he says, scolded him, scolded him, kicked him out, etc. In particular, when Radin wanted to leave the party, he cursed him. In a word, Rykov wants to portray the matter in such a way that it was not he who influenced Radin, but Radin who influenced Rykov. But at the same time he limited himself to such paternal suggestions. Did he tell the party about this? Didn't say. This, he says, is my mistake.

Several facts show that this is not only about talk on issues of terror, we are talking about practical activities. Of the facts of this order I cite the following. In 1931, on the directive of Rykov, Nesterov organized a terrorist group in Sverdlovsk consisting of: Nesterov, Karbolit (Karmalitov A.I. - V.S.), Alexandrov. Nesterov, Karbolit, Aleksandrov - all admitted their participation in a terrorist organization, all showed that they gave their consent to join a terrorist organization, all admitted that upon the first call they undertook to come to any place in the Soviet Union in order to sacrifice their lives in the benefit of his right-wing organization.

Second fact. A member of the Moscow Center of the Right, Kulikov, as well as Kotov, on behalf of Uglanov, created a terrorist group in Moscow in 1931 consisting of Kotov, Afanasyev, Nosov. Kotov, Uglanov, Afanasyev and Nosov - all admitted to this. I will not give specific testimony; you know it from the protocols sent out. It was further established that at the beginning of 1933, Bukharin instructed the former Trotskyist and former Socialist Revolutionary Semenov to prepare a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. Tsetlin testifies about this - a person quite close to Bukharin, who knew all the ins and outs of what was going on with Bukharin, the most devoted person to him.

Finally, on Rykova’s personal instructions, a certain Artemenko, a close person to Rykov, the wife of this same Nesterov, conducted surveillance, establishing the easiest ways to commit a terrorist act. Further, on the personal instructions of Rykov, an active member of the right-wing organization Radin, together with Slepkov, also conducted preparations for recruiting members to commit a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin.

I, comrades, completely exclude here the four terrorist groups organized by Tomsky; for now I will limit myself to the testimony, the facts that I have presented here. This, comrades, is the documentary, factual side of the terrorist activities of the right-wing organization. It seems to me that based on the testimony of all participants, based on the documents that we have, this side of the vile anti-Soviet activity of the right and members of this center Bukharin, Rykov, and others is completely proven.

Next, comrades, I would like to dwell in a few words on the idea of ​​the so-called “palace coup”. Along with the ideas of individual terror of 1930–31, the rightists intensively talked about the possibility of actually implementing the idea of ​​the so-called “palace coup.” It was thought of in different versions, but at its core it was that it was necessary to arrest the government, introduce some kind of military unit, destroy the government and appoint one of our own. So, they assumed that with such a short blow to the leadership of the party and government they would be able to quickly get closer to power. This idea, quite common at one time, was widely discussed in right-wing circles. I think that, comrades, we have not yet fully gotten to the bottom of all the facts surrounding the discussion of these plans, but I do not exclude that some real prospects may have loomed before them at that time. Suffice it to say that we have now arrested one former employee of the Cheka in Leningrad, who worked in our apparatus, he was present at a meeting in a group of right-wingers and strongly supported this very idea of ​​a “palace coup” as the most easily feasible. Moreover, he offered them his services in establishing communication...

Yezhov. This is an ordinary worker, a former Belarusian worker, now working in the fire brigade in Leningrad.

What are the options for this “palace coup” idea? I will not dwell on Sapozhnikov’s testimony here, they are known to you, I will give only the most characteristic testimony of Tsetlin. He gives the following testimony: “The initiator of the idea of ​​a “palace coup” was Bukharin personally and put it forward with the full consent of Tomsky and Rykov”... (reads). “The second option was put forward for carrying out a “palace coup”: firstly, to extend our influence to the Kremlin security, put together shock cadres there who are loyal to our organization, and carry out a coup by arrest... (He reads, ending with the words: “Using his official position Rykov, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, to introduce this military unit by order into the Kremlin.") In the event of a successful coup, they distributed posts. Tomsky was proposed for the post of Secretary of the Central Committee; the remaining posts in the Central Committee would be occupied by Slepkov and, in general, all other members of the right. These are the facts. Among the ideas that were especially characteristic of Bukharin in 1930–31 was the idea of ​​a “palace coup.”

I, comrades, have drawn out the report somewhat; allow me to completely release this section, which talks about the bloc with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, because I cannot add anything new in comparison with those that were at the trial and which are known to everyone. It is only necessary to say about this very bloc with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, about its certain originality, how it is drawn from the materials of the investigation and how it appears to me.

You see, the fact that the right, after defeat in 1929, immediately embarked on the path of seeking connections with the Zinovievites and Trotskyists, is shown by the well-known meeting of Bukharin, his negotiations, etc. and so on. Now we have another new fact. The same Schmidt Vasily told us the following news that at the end of 1930, as far as I remember from his testimony, Tomsky called Schmidt to his place and told him: “I need your dacha for the evening alone.” He asked him: “Why?” “It’s none of your business,” he says. - “No, tell me.” - “It’s necessary for our meeting.” He was a member of the center and asks: “Can I?” “No,” he says, “you can’t. Give me the change." “At first I balked a little, I was offended,” he says. “Don’t you want to give it? We’ll find another one, we’ll find another apartment.” “Well, then,” he says, “I provided it and left on my own. Then on the second day I attacked Tomsky and threw him into hysterics. What happens? You guys there, the troika, are deciding something. I myself am a member of the party, what am I, an idiot, a fool, or something, I just have to obey you. What's the matter, tell me. He pressed Tomsky, and Tomsky spilled the beans, saying: “We had a date, there was Rykov, there was Bukharin and there was me, there was Kamenev at the dacha. To all my questions about what they were talking about, he said: I won’t say, I can’t say.”

Rykov, of course, and Bukharin deny this, but I have one extremely interesting objective fact. The other day, Tomsky’s wife, handing over some documents from her archive, said to me: “Here, Nikolai Ivanovich, I want to tell you one interesting fact, maybe it will be useful to you. At the end of 1930, Mishka - she calls her husband that way - was very worried. I know that something was wrong. I saw that such and such people came to Vasya Schmidt’s dacha, but he was not present there. I don’t know what they talked about, but they sat until late at night. I saw this case by accident. Why am I saying this? Now they can accuse Vasya Schmidt, but he doesn’t know anything.” I say: “Why do you think he doesn’t know anything?” - “Because on the second day I attacked Tomsky and said: what are you, such a bastard, you meet there again, you fall asleep, you get caught, what will happen to you? He says: shut up, it’s none of your business. I had a fight with him and said that I would tell the Central Control Commission. Then Vasya Schmidt came, I attacked him: why are you giving your apartment for such meetings? He was terribly embarrassed and said: “I don’t know about anything.” Here's a fact she told. Thus, this is not only the testimony of this same Schmidt, it also coincides with the conversation that I had with her when I met.

Thus, comrades, already at the end of 1930, as you see, they considered it possible to meet outside the city, in a secret atmosphere, to talk. I don’t think this was a heartfelt conversation and tea party. If this were so, then probably Vasily Schmidt would have been invited. Apparently, the conversation was serious, which they did not even consider possible to inform Schmidt about. Here Schmidt says: I told them - fools, Kamenev will betray you. They say: it won’t give anything away. Well, if he betrays us, we will physically destroy him. That's what Schmidt says. This is the first.

The connection between the right and the Trotskyists and Zinovievites was also noted in 1932. These facts are known. But wariness, what explains that well-known caution or wariness when people did not go for a direct merger? It seems to me that here, at the top, they did not go, they gave a direct directive to the bloc with the Trotskyists below, and in fact we had a direct union of them with the Trotskyists in Samara, Saratov and Sverdlovsk. They unite in a bloc, act and work together, it is difficult to tell them who is right, there is no difference between them, they work together. But here, at the top, they were cautious. Why were you careful? They proceeded from the following: they believed that Zinoviev, Kamenev and other Trotskyists and Zinovievites were so discredited that it was unsafe to connect their fate with them. Therefore, they established mutual information, mutual awareness, mutual contact. But they did not go further than this in order to block directly. As some rightists say, in particular from Bukharin’s school, there was a certain fear on the right that they would somehow be kicked out in the event of a seizure of power, that Trotskyists might not get too many seats, etc. Although this is secondary. It seems to me that the main thing is that they did not agree to an organizational merger with the Trotskyists - it was fear. There is one final moment when a direct connection is established. Although it can be considered that formally neither Bukharin, nor Rykov, nor others were part of the parallel or united Trotskyist-Zinovievist center, the fact that they were fully aware of all their activities, that they were fully informed and agreed, is I have no doubt.

I would like to dwell, comrades, on the position of the right, on the activities of the right in their relationship with the Socialist Revolutionaries and, in particular, I want to dwell on their attitude towards the kulak uprisings. Based on the investigative materials that we now have, I must say directly that the rightists gave direct instructions to their local supporters that in the event of village unrest, which they assumed would be widespread in 1930–31–32, so as not to stay away from these movements, we must lead these movements. Of the facts that you know, I will not repeat them, I just want to say the following: in 1930-31, according to the testimony of the now famous Yakovenko, a partisan who was arrested...

Molotov. Well, you all know.

Yezhov. Yes, that's absolutely right. So this same Yakovenko in his testimony says that in 1930–32 he had repeated conversations with Bukharin, expressed his disagreement with the party’s policy in the countryside, believed that the party was especially mistaken on the issue of collectivization, and considered kulak uprisings inevitable , considered it necessary to introduce these kulak and other uprisings into some organized channel. Bukharin strongly supported him. He told Bukharin that he had a connection, a very close connection, with the Siberian partisans. “People keep coming to see me, and that I have the opportunity to organize them.” A partisan center was formed.

Yakovenko himself more or less regularly informed Bukharin that he had the opportunity to organize an uprising in some areas of Western Siberia, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and Eastern Siberia. Bukharin then expressed the idea that if the uprising had been successfully organized, then the possibility cannot be ruled out that it would be possible to organize a certain autonomy there - a Siberian state that would put pressure on the Stalinist regime (laughter) and would help us in matters of collective farm policy .

Voroshilov. State within a state.

Kaganovich. Kind of like Kolchak's.

Yezhov. They raised the question of creating this state. Further, comrades, I will not read out to you the testimony that you have in your hands. I must say that the most ardent, active participation in all such events is the difficulty with grain procurements in the Kuban, in all the Siberian bagpipes. The right always took the most active participation, wherever possible, as a directive to get involved in this matter.

I will not list the facts with the Social Revolutionaries; there is nothing new here. We have nothing except Tsetlin's testimony. I will take into account only one preliminary testimony of Yakovenko. He shows: “I told Bukharin my negative point of view on the policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He informed me about his impressions of my arrival in Siberia, from where I recently returned”... (reads). Bukharin’s attitude, he says, completely coincided with my views, and I accepted them.

These are the facts that we have regarding the right in relation to the issues of the peasant uprisings that took place in 1930-31, in a number of which they participated. They also took part in organized bagpipe performances at industrial plants. We are now at the stage of investigating the extremely important Vychug events and the events in Ivanovo in general. They were essentially organized by the right.

The material was prepared by Vladimir KOMISSAROV, member of the Society for the Study of the History of Domestic Special Services

WHEN DID THE CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL REFORM ARISE?
An insidious plan... as some say.

In March 1985, M.S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

And, horror of horrors, he did not have a ready-made restructuring plan. He didn’t have any plan at all, written down to the smallest detail: item number, content of the event, deadlines, people responsible...

But he had a Politburo of the Central Committee in the composition elected in March 1981 at the Plenum of the Central Committee after the 21st Congress of the CPSU (the composition, however, had undergone some changes by March 1985):

Composition of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee after the XXVI Congress of the CPSU (March 1981)	Changes in composition for the March (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:
Members of the Politburo:
Yu. V. Andropov	died February 9, 1984
L. I. Brezhnev	died November 10, 1982
M. S. Gorbachev
V. V. Grishin
A. A. Gromyko
A. P. Kirilenko	withdrawn November 22, 1982
D. A. Kunaev
A. Ya. Pelshe	died May 29, 1983
G. V. Romanov
M. A. Suslov	died January 25, 1982
N. A. Tikhonov
D. F. Ustinov	died December 20, 1984
K. U. Chernenko	died March 10, 1985
V. V. Shcherbitsky
Candidates for membership Politburo:
G. A. Aliev	member of the PB since November 22, 1982
P. N. Demichev
T. Ya. Kiselev	died January 11, 1983
V. V. Kuznetsov
B. N. Ponomarev
Sh. R. Rashidov	died October 31, 1983
M. S. Solomentsev	member of the PB since December 26, 1983
E. A. Shevardnadze
Inducted into the Politburo after the congress:
V. I. Dolgikh	candidate since May 24, 1982
V. I. Vorotnikov	candidate since June 15, 1983 member of the PB since December 26, 1983
V.M. Chebrikov	Ph.D. since December 26, 1983

M.S. Gorbachev’s “legacy” was the Sixth Article of the USSR Constitution and “stagnation” in a variety of manifestations: shortages, corruption, outdated enterprise equipment, drunkenness, the war in Afghanistan, participation in the arms race, censorship, and public sentiment expressed with the words “they pretend that they pay us, and we pretend that we work.”

The first slogans were “acceleration”, “socialism with a human face”. The first actions are the fight against drunkenness, “détente” in international relations, the introduction of state acceptance, and the elimination of the consequences of Chernobyl.

And also easy frame cleaning. G.V. Romanov, V.V. Grishin, N.A. Tikhonov were removed from the Politburo, Politburo members E.K. Ligachev, N.I. Ryzhkov were introduced, candidates B.N. Yeltsin, N.V. Talyzin, S.L. Sokolov.

In fact, the task that M.S. Gorbachev wanted to solve is formulated simply and even banally: to make people’s lives better.

But no one knew how to do this.

Of course, it was possible to tighten the screws, but... this has already been tried, more than once, and it did not work. And in general - what kind of wildness is this - tightening the screws, putting things in order - this is completely different, but again, what kind of order and how...

Several years before perestroika, Yu.V. Andropov admitted that the country’s leadership did not know the country in which they lived. Gorbachev could say that he knew the situation was bad, but he had no idea to what extent.
In the book “Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World,” published in the spring of 1988, M.S. Gorbachev wrote:

“An unbiased, honest approach led us to an inexorable conclusion: the country found itself in a pre-crisis state. This conclusion was made at the Plenum of the Central Committee held in April 1985...”

What should be done with the system if it is about to enter a crisis? Where to start?

Improve the implementation of individual functions - planning, execution, control, strategy? Change the structure of governing bodies? Change personnel?

Of course, there is a wonderful joke about the need to change the system, but this is still about the plumbing.

One could also say that it is necessary to urgently, decisively, radically introduce a market economy. It would be a bright, bold proposal. But at the same time, we must also understand how to keep the masses of workers from bankrupt enterprises from revolutionary actions. Dictatorship?

“Acceleration” became a groping, a search for new methods of management, which showed that it was necessary to change the principles of planning, introduce self-sufficiency, self-financing with accompanying social consequences, which means it was necessary to change the system of management of the national economy.
After Chernobyl, the fall in world oil prices, and the decline in budget revenues from the sale of alcohol, the economic situation began to deteriorate even faster. What to do?

After October 1917, the Bolshevik policies were implemented by commissars. In China, the Cultural Revolution was carried out through the Red Guards under the slogan “Fire at the headquarters.”

There was no revolution or civil war in the USSR, and reforms had to be carried out by peaceful means by completely peaceful people, who at that time were sometimes called “foremen of perestroika.” These foremen would have to be, first of all, party workers - the vanguard of Soviet society. We should...

However, they were a vanguard, not democratically and freely elected as recognized, respected and authoritative leaders, but an appointed, nomenklatura vanguard.

And for a nomenklatura employee, the main qualities are diligence, discipline, energy in following instructions, devotion, careerism, of course.

It was necessary to change the system of nomenklatura, bureaucratic power in the USSR, and this meant political reform.

Gorbachev came to understand the need for changes in the political system... however, the exact date of this realization is unknown.

But the emergence of opportunities for the implementation of this understanding can be traced.

In the memoirs of A.N. Yakovlev (“Twilight”) it is mentioned that back in December 1985 he prepared a note for M.S. Gorbachev, in which, in particular, he mentioned the need to hold elections of deputies on an alternative basis, free and democratic, with the number of candidates at least two... And M.S. Gorbachev supposedly remarked on this occasion that it was still “premature”.

It can be assumed that M.S. I already thought about this, since I assessed that “it’s not the time.”
One can not assume, but confidently assert that in 1986 the CPSU Central Committee would not have supported its Secretary General with such an idea. This was the composition of the Central Committee, this was the Politburo.

1986

On February 18, 1986, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which the draft of the new CPSU Program was considered. It contained certain provisions related to both the electoral system and the general democratization of public life.

But how would you interpret, for example, the words about “increasingly full involvement of citizens in the management of state and public affairs” - as a stamp repeated from year to year or an application for something specific? Is there a difference for you between “development” and “improvement” of the electoral system?

Few knew about the meaning and upcoming specific content of these words. But what did they “know”, and few thought about it. And for ordinary voters it was not very clear what, how and whether it would happen at all. There was (or maybe only appeared) hope...

Much more interesting and understandable were the words that “The role of general meetings and councils of work collectives will be raised... a transition will be made to the election of foremen, site managers and heads of other production departments.”

At the XXVII Party Congress in February 1986, M.S. Gorbachev said:

“The Party will continue to ensure that the most worthy people who are capable of conducting state affairs at a high level are elected as deputies, so that the composition of the Soviets is systematically renewed...”

No wonder, the party has always taken care of this.

“Democracy is that healthy and clean air in which only a socialist society can reveal its potential”

But who would know what it really means...

By the way, after the XXII Congress of the CPSU (in March 1986), the composition of the Politburo was still not completely (as it seems to us now) “perestroika”:

Members of the Politburo: G. A. Aliev, V. I. Vorotnikov, M. S. Gorbachev, A. A. Gromyko, L. N. Zaikov, D. A. Kunaev, E. K. Ligachev, N. I. Ryzhkov, M. S. Solomentsev, V. M. Chebrikov, E. A. Shevardnadze, V. V. Shcherbitsky

Candidates for Politburo membership: P. N. Demichev, V. I. Dolgikh, B. N. Yeltsin, N. N. Slyunkov, S. L. Sokolov, Yu. F. Solovyov, N. V. Talyzin

This was the “avant-garde” of perestroika.

The year 1987 was a turning point.

At the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the draft Law on the State Enterprise was approved for public discussion, and in June at the Plenum of the Central Committee a comprehensive program of economic reforms was discussed.

Since the January Plenum of the Central Committee, the political reform of the country began. M.S. Gorbachev proposed making changes to the electoral legislation and at the same time submitting this draft law for public discussion.

Now that was already a sensation!

To submit a draft law for discussion by the citizens of the country - this seems to have never happened in seventy years of Soviet power?!

Although no, in 1936 the draft “Stalinist” constitution was published and it was widely discussed (but naturally from the point of view of complete support and admiration - judging by publications in the Soviet press), in the same year the law on abortion was discussed in the press, and in later years, as far as I remember, first the Central Committee of the CPSU (it seems, with the Council of Ministers) approved a document called the project “Main directions for the development of the national economy for the period ...”, it was published in newspapers, and then the Supreme Council approved it.

So strictly speaking, Gorbachev was not the first leader of the country who was interested in the opinion of the people.
But he was the first who was going to do this sincerely, since before him all projects submitted for public “discussion” assumed exclusively their approval, that is, all “discussions” had exclusively propaganda significance.

The main changes that were discussed at the January plenum of the Central Committee were to concern the fact that several candidates would be able to apply for one deputy mandate. At the same time, they also spoke about the need for alternatives in internal party life - about the election of party leaders from several candidates.

Now this is a sensation!

Of course, specialists in electoral legislation will say that Stalin also wanted to make the elections alternative, but let these specialists tell you what came of it. There is no alternative, but a continuous “great terror”.

In February 1987 The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopts the Decree "On elections to local Soviets of People's Deputies of the RSFSR" and issues a Resolution "On conducting experimental elections to local Soviets of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in multi-member electoral districts."

At meetings to nominate candidates for deputies, several candidates could be considered; the right to nominate was given to primary public organizations - rural, street, house committees, councils of women, war and labor veterans, district consumer societies, the Knowledge Society, etc.

Changes were made to the content of information about the candidate on the ballot, and the rights of election commissions were expanded.

The experimental elections were held in multi-member districts and it is worth paying attention to two more features of this experiment.

Firstly, a district meeting was held, which considered the nominated candidates and could make changes to the list of candidates, and then the list of candidates approved by this meeting was submitted for final approval to the district election commission for registration of candidates for deputies.

Secondly (since the districts were multi-member), the candidate who received the largest number of votes was considered elected (if the required minimum of 50% + 1 vote was exceeded), and other candidates who received more than half the votes became so-called “reserve deputies” who could participate in the work of the council with the right of an advisory vote, and in the event of the withdrawal of the “main” candidate, they became deputies without any elections.

The experiment concerned elections only to local councils - district, city (cities of district subordination), town and village councils and covered about 4-5% of the country's districts; in total, over 120 thousand candidates were nominated for 94 thousand mandates

The experiment was original (especially in terms of “reserve” deputies), controversial, of course, but it slightly accustomed both candidates and voters to the fact that there can be competition in elections.

This mechanism - the selection of candidates nominated at meetings of labor collectives before their registration - was also used in the preparation of the law on the elections of people's deputies of the USSR and caused discontent among both unregistered candidates and voters.

1988 - XIX All-Union Party Conference

One of M.S. Gorbachev’s associates - V.A. Medvedev in his memoirs (“On Gorbachev’s team: a view from the inside”) says:

“We were all unanimous that the political system needed fundamental changes in the direction of the rule of law. The existing order lacked the main thing - control from below over the bodies of state power and administration, and their leaders.

The lack of control of power corrupts those who are at its helm, not to mention the fact that it is unable to provide high quality management. The role of the Soviets turned out to be diminished. The composition of the deputies seemed to be sufficiently representative, but it was not the result of a democratic expression of will, but was simply adjusted in advance to the given parameters through “elections without choice.” The work of the Soviets is formal in nature and comes down to rubber-stamping laws and regulations prepared by the apparatus, without deep penetration into their content. Under these conditions, there could be no talk of any effective control over the executive power by the Soviets.

We were fully aware that the root of the matter lay in the relationship between the state and the party. Power and governance in the country essentially belong to the party, are carried out by party bodies, in the election of which 4/5 of the country's population does not participate. The decisions of party bodies give direct instructions on certain issues of state, economic and cultural life.

The departments of the central government administration - foreign affairs, defense, state security, internal affairs, culture, television and radio broadcasting, publishing houses - and many others are only nominally part of the government, but actually work under the leadership of the Central Committee. Within the Central Committee, an economic management apparatus was formed in the form of sectoral departments.

The picture is similar locally. In contradiction even with the current Constitution, primary party organizations are endowed by the CPSU Charter with the right to control the activities of the administration of all enterprises and organizations.

Gorbachev’s plan turned out to be different: to transform the Councils into permanent bodies, to establish the posts of chairmen of Councils at all levels, as senior officials, bearing in mind that the head of the party organization at the appropriate level, and in the country - the leader of the party, is elected chairman of the corresponding Council. All this is now well known and has largely become history.

As far as I could discern, Gorbachev’s version was dictated by the desire to elevate the role of the Soviets, to turn them into truly working bodies of people’s power.”

At the XIX All-Union Conference of the CPSU(June 28 - July 1, 1988) a resolution was adopted "On the democratization of Soviet society and the reform of the political system", which, in particular, stated that the right to unlimited nomination of candidates, wide and free discussion of them, inclusion in ballot papers for more candidates than there are mandates, strict adherence to the election procedure, regular reporting of deputies and the possibility of their recall.

This was already specific.

It must be said that in Soviet times, at all enterprises, organizations and institutions, a system of political education was developed, holding lectures, political information, meetings to explain the decisions of the party and government, and the international situation. Almost all party organizations, without fail, held party meetings following the results of plenums and party congresses, trained party propagandists for explanations, etc. There was also the Knowledge Society, whose lecturers gave lectures on a variety of topics.

During the perestroika years (especially after 1987) clarification decisions of the party began to turn into their discussions– increasingly lively, spontaneous and debatable. How else? After all, the party launched a policy of openness and democratization!

In 1987, the first socio-political discussion clubs began to emerge, and in 1988, popular fronts appeared, and some groups even began to call themselves parties (“Democratic Union”). However, more about all this in the section Popular Front.

At the end of September 1988 At the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, proposals for changes and additions to the Constitution, as well as for the election of people's deputies of the USSR, were discussed. After consideration by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they were published for public discussion.

It was truly a discussion - with meeting resolutions, with letters to newspapers and magazines. And there was no complete “approval” - more than 120 thousand proposals and comments were received from citizens, labor collectives, public organizations, scientific and educational institutions, and the media.

December 1, 1988 The extraordinary 12th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Laws “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR” and “On the Election of People’s Deputies of the USSR”, as well as the resolution “On further steps to implement political reform in the field of state building”.

Not only did the electoral legislation change, the system of government bodies in the country changed.

A new highest legislative body was established - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which was supposed to meet once a year. The Congress elected from among its members the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Chairman and the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council. The Congress of People's Deputies was empowered to resolve any issue within the jurisdiction of the USSR. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress included: the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR and the introduction of amendments to it; making decisions on issues of national government; establishment of the state border of the USSR, approval of changes in borders between union republics; determining the main directions of domestic and foreign policy; approval of long-term state plans; election of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Chairman and First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The congress consisted of 2,250 deputies and was formed from three main parts: 750 deputies were elected in territorial constituencies on the basis of equal suffrage (the number of voters in districts was comparable), 750 reflected the representation of administrative-territorial units and were elected in national-territorial constituencies (the number of voters in districts differed more significantly), 750 were elected at plenums and congresses of public organizations according to different representation quotas: for example, 100 deputies from the CPSU, 1 from the philatelist society.

Were these changes revolutionary or half-hearted, preserving the stability of power, compromising, provoking, stimulating activity, thoughtful? The approaches may vary. You can evaluate them from the point of view of formal, substantive, personally selfish (as I or you would like), state (as it would be useful for the fatherland), etc.

Formally, the amended Constitution of the USSR and the new electoral law became less democratic:

Elections of people's deputies became not entirely equal and direct; only two thirds of the deputies were elected directly by citizens, and a third were elected as “electors” in “public organizations” (why in these and why such quotas?), and not by members of these organizations, and their “delegates”. As a result, in the districts there were 230.4 thousand voters for each deputy mandate, and in “public organizations” - 21.6 voters (more than ten thousand times less!).
The principle of “one person, one vote” was not observed during the elections. The same voter could vote both in his district and in those public organizations whose governing bodies he was a member of. And it was theoretically possible to participate in the nomination of candidates many times.

However election practice compared to previous decades was revolutionary.

SOME INNOVATIONS:

The number of candidates for people's deputies was not limited; each participant in the meeting to nominate candidates for deputies could propose any candidates for discussion, including his own. It was also guaranteed that an unlimited number of candidates could be included on the ballot.

The right to nominate candidates for deputies by meetings of voters at the place of residence was established, and the meeting was considered valid if it was attended by 500 voters living in the territory of the electoral district.

The right of voters to campaign both “for” and “against” candidates for deputies was secured at meetings, in the press, on television, and radio.

A candidate for deputy could present a program for his future activities.

There were provisions in the law on observers - representatives of labor collectives, public organizations, meetings of voters, proxies, as well as representatives of the press, television, radio, who could be present at meetings of election commissions, including during the registration of candidates for deputies, the counting of votes at a polling station , determining the election results for the district and summing up the overall election results.

It was established that the decisions of the precinct commission could be appealed in court, and not in the local Council that formed the election commission, as was the case before.

Of course, there were also “anti-democratic” norms about district assemblies, which finally form the list of candidates for the district, that is, they serve as a kind of “sieve”, and of course, these elections were from public organizations...

True, there was another and, perhaps, the most “undemocratic decision” that the combination of the posts of the head of the party organization and the chairman of the relevant Council at all levels should be ensured. That is, (for example) the chairman of the Moscow Council could only be a deputy of the Moscow City Council who is the head of the Moscow party organization, or the chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine could only be a deputy of the Congress of the National Assembly of Ukraine, who is the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

And the flip side of this “anti-democratic” norm was that if the first secretary, Comrade Pupkin, did not become a deputy, then he could not become the chairman of the Council. But then some comrade Tyapkin should have become the chairman of the Council, and he should also become the leader of the party organization. After all, combining posts is mandatory. And Comrade Pupkin should resign... To put it simply, if the secretary of the city committee found himself without a deputy mandate, then only one of the deputies could and should have become the secretary of the city party committee.

And it was a trap for party workers, which worked.

POLITIBURO of the CPSU Central Committee - the highest organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1917 and 1919-1991, acting as such the same role as the highest organ of state power in the USSR.

For the first time it was formed on October 10 (23), 1917 as the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) for the political leadership of the armed forces. station in Petro-gra-de for the purpose of overthrowing the Provisional Government. Its composition included V.I. Lenin, A.S. Bub-nov, G.E. Zi-nov-ev, L.B. Ka-me-nev, G.Ya. So-kol-ni-kov, I.V. Stalin, L.D. Trotsky. After the October Revolution of 1917, it was re-established as a permanently functioning body, me-named -nie: Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (1919-1925); Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1925-1952), Prezi-di-um of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1952-1966), Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1966-1991). He was formed from the bi-ral at the meeting of the Central Committee. In 1919-1921, the Politburo included 5 people (Ka-menev, N.N. Krestinsky, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky; c 1921, instead of Krestinsky Zi-nov-ev; in 1922, A. I. Rykov and M. P. Tomsky also entered; in 1924, after death of Le-ni-na, - N.I. Bu-kha-rin), then the number of members increased (maximum up to 16 people in 1976).

Member of the Political Bureau was the General (1922-1934 and 1966-1991) or 1st (1953-1966) Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party tii (in 1934-1953, the post of ru-ko-vo-di-te-la of the party from-s-t-t-val), chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (CM) of the USSR, chairman-s-e-tel Pre-zi-diu -MA of the USSR Armed Forces, a number of secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)-CPSU, the first secretaries of the Communist Party of Ukraine (since 1930; since 1961 and some other republican committees of the party; since 1990 all), se-re-ta-ri of the Moscow and/or Leningrad city-co-mov couples -tii, since 1973, also before the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry. Replenishment of the main composition of the Po-lit-bu-ro pro-is-ho-di-lo mainly through the in-sti-tut kan-di-da-tov as members Po-lit-bu-ro.

Formally, according to the Us-ta-vu of the party, the Political Bureau was under-chi-not and under-account-but of the Central Committee, and its main the function is the leadership of the political work of the Central Committee of the party between the ple-nu-ma-mi. In fact, it decided all the most important political, ideological, economic, internal and external -non-possible questions. Under-go-com-ku for-se-da-niy Po-lit-bu-ro (pro-in-di-were mainly weekly, in certain periods more often or re-same) implemented the Sec-re-ta-ri-at of the Central Committee. For every issue, at the end of the day (usually over 10), a document was indicated in advance, something there were pro-ek-you decisions (ras-sy-la-li-li-for-preliminary oz-on-to-whom-member-of-us and can-di-da-there in the member- we Po-lit-bu-ro together with co-pro-vo-dative ma-te-ria-la-mi, under-prepared-len-us with-from-vet-st-vu- cabbage soup by state ve-dom-st-va-mi). At the meeting, members of the Central Committee of the party could be present with the right of co-vesting voice. With pro-ko-la-mi for-se-da-niy Po-lit-bu-ro could-o-z-na-ko-m-sya members and can-di-da-you as a member we are the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)-CPSU, the ru-co-di-te-li of the control bodies of the party. The decisions of many for-se-da-fiction-si-ro-va-were under the stamp of the highest secret-no-sti (“Special dad”). For the development of individual issues, the Political Bureau has created a commission. Only after the confirmation of the Politburo the most important changes of all bodies of legislative power and the right-of-power. The Lit-Bu-ro also ut-ver-expected kan-di-da-tu-ry to positions from the highest no-menk la-tu-re par-tiy-no-go-su-dar-st-ven-noy.

Initially, the members of the Politburo had different views on the tactics of the arrival of pain. She-vi-kov to power and the ability to build a social-tsia-liz-ma, although in 1917 and 1919-1923 there were no conditions -la-da-la po-zi-tion V.I. Le-ni-na. During his severe illness and after his death, open dis-cussions opened up in the Politburo and ideological struggle between bli-zhai-shi-mi so-rat-ni-ka-mi Le-ni-na according to the party. In 1924, L.D. was finally appointed as the head of May. Trotskym “left-wing op-position”, in 1925 - “new op-position” led by G.E. Zi-nov-e-vym and L.B. Ka-me-ne-vym, in 1927 - “general op-position”, in 1929 - “right op-position” (N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky). The fight went on "chi-st-ka-mi" in the party and ended with the victory of I.V. Sta-li-na (general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1922-1934) and his united mouse-len-nikov. In 1926-1937, they were op-nen-would you be from the Politburo. Stalin's influence both in the Political Bureau and in the Central Committee became op-re-de-lying. By the end of 1930, the Politburo included K.E. Vo-ro-shi-lov, L.M. Ka-ga-no-vich, M.I. Ka-li-nin, S.M. Kirov, S.V. Ko-si-or, V.V. Kui-byshev, V.M. Mo-lo-tov, Ya.E. Rud-zu-tak, G.K. Or-d-jo-ni-kid-ze, Sta-lin. In 1936-1939, former members of the Politburo - A.S. Bub-nov, Bu-kha-rin, Zi-nov-ev, Ka-me-nev, N.N. Kre-stin-sky, Ko-si-or, Rud-zu-tak, Ry-kov ras-str-lya-ny (G.Ya. So-kol-ni-kov in 1939 killed in prison, Trots was expelled from the USSR in 1929).

Hello dears.
Today we will finish a series of posts about the Politburo of the Brezhnev era, but perhaps we will not finish the topic in principle :-) Probably few people are interested in it, but I like it myself :-))
So, last time we stopped here:

The next XXV Congress of the CPSU, held in March 1976, elected a new Politburo.
Now it looked like this: “old members” Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Podgorny, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Pelshe, Kulakov, Andropov, Grishin, Grechko, Gromyko, Kunaev, Shcherbitsky. In place of the secretary instead Kulakova have taken Ustinova. They also introduced a new member of the Politburo - the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU Romanov. The Politburo existed in this composition for less than a month - because in April 1976 the Marshal died Grechko. The new Minister of Defense is Ustinov.
As a matter of fact, we have 2 newcomers.
Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov unique in that he is one of two people who have 11 (!!!) Orders of Lenin. The second is the Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev.
Lavrentiy Beria's protégé Dmitry Ustinov was People's Commissar of Armaments during the Great Patriotic War, remained in this position throughout the war, renamed Minister of Armaments, and then Minister of Defense Industry of the USSR.

During the speech of the Anti-Party Group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them, Ustinov took the side of Khrushchev, for which he was noticed and promoted along the party line, becoming not only a technocrat, but also an apparatchik. Ustinov would remain in the Politburo until his death in 1984, and even the city of Izhevsk would be renamed in his honor for a short time.

An even more interesting figure is Grigory Vasilievich Romanov. A front-line soldier who worked his way up from the very bottom in 1970 became the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU and remained so for 13 years. And let's be objective - he has done a lot for the city. Now that the dust of the frenzy of the 90s has already cleared, it is possible to objectively evaluate this or that personality. And the fact is that Romanov, despite all his shortcomings, was useful for the city. Although not everyone in the city loved him and rumors were constantly being spread. Just the feature about my daughter’s wedding in and in the Hermitage was worth it :-)

By the way, I vaguely remember him. My kindergarten, which I went to for a short time, was in Osinovaya Roshcha, almost opposite his dacha, where he loved to relax. I remember the car and the man in it smiling and waving at me too :-))
Romanov was Andropov's man, and was supposed to become his successor. But everything turned out difficult there. In fact, he was technically pushed aside, choosing the sick Chernenko. And under Gorbachev, he completely disappeared from all posts. Until his death in 2008, he lived as a modest pensioner.

The final consolidation of power in the hands of Leonid Ilyich occurred at the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1977. Bored Brezhnev Podgorny was dismissed, and Leonid Ilyich himself became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, concentrating in his own hands all the power both de facto and de jure.
Over the next 5 years before Brezhnev's death in November 1982, 3 more people were added to the Politburo, and two died. The clever girl has passed away Alexey Kosygin, and the main ideologist of the country Mikhail Suslov.
Future General Secretaries were introduced Konstantin Chernenko(1979) and Mikhail Gorbachev(1980), and Nikolay Tikhonov(1979).
It is with this interesting technocrat that we will end our story. An old friend of Brezhnev, Tikhonov made a career on the path of ferrous metallurgy. Taking power into his own hands, Brezhnev actively moved Tikhonov - in 1965 he was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and after Kosygin’s death he became the Soviet Prime Minister. Well, then he entered the Politburo

September 27, 1985 Nikolai Alexandrovich Tikhonov was officially relieved of his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “for health reasons” (cerebral atherosclerosis); The much younger Ryzhkov was appointed the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. On October 15, 1985, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee removed him from the membership of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1986-88 - State Advisor to the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces. Since 1988, he has been a personal pensioner of union significance. Died in 1997. There was no money for the funeral and he was buried at public expense. But because he donated all his money and pension to orphanages and for the construction of pioneer camps. Which, you see, characterizes this person very positively.


The last Politburet of the “Brezhnev era” looked like this: Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Suslov, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Pelshe, Chernenko, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kunaev, Shcherbitsky, Romanov, Gorbachev

That's probably all.
I hope you found it interesting :-)
Have a nice time of day.

RSDLP RSDLP(b) RCP(b) All-Union Communist Party (b) CPSU History of the party October Revolution War communism New economic policy Lenin's call Stalinism Khrushchev thaw Period of stagnation Perestroika Party organization Politburo ... Wikipedia

Politburo- , uncl., cf. 1. The leading party body. ◘ The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) was approved in May 1917. ITU, vol. 2, 688. Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria. Politburo of the MPRP Central Committee. Rosenthal, 1985, 220. 2. District or county body of the Cheka in ... Explanatory dictionary of the language of the Council of Deputies

POLITBURO, unwritten, cf. (neol.). Political Bureau, the governing body of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; see watered…. The Central Committee organizes: for political work the Political Bureau... Charter of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Ushakov's explanatory dictionary. D.N. Ushakov. 1935 1940 ... Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

Politburo- uncl., politique + bureau m. Wed 1. Political Bureau, the governing body of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Ush. 1939. 2. In a report to the head of the provincial department of the GPU, a 20-year-old security officer complained: .. working in the Tobolsk Politburo (that was the name of the county emergency commissions. A. P ... Historical Dictionary of Gallicisms of the Russian Language

Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CRSU, leading party. body elected by the plenum of the Central Committee of the party to lead the political. the work of the Central Committee between plenums; existed in 1917 52; By decision of the 19th Congress of the CPSU (1952), it was transformed into the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Politburo... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leader: Gennady Zyuganov Date of foundation: 1912 (RSDLP (b)) 1918 (RCP (b)) 1925 (VKP (b) ... Wikipedia

RSDLP RSDLP(b) RCP(b) All-Union Communist Party (b) CPSU History of the Party October Revolution War Communism New Economic Policy Stalinism Khrushchev Thaw Era of Stagnation Perestroika Party organization Politburo Secretariat Organizing Bureau Central Committee... ... Wikipedia

Books

• Politburo and saboteurs Campaign to combat sabotage at military industry facilities, O. Mozokhin (responsible author). Starting from the second half of the 1920s, the Stalinist leadership placed the main responsibility for the economic difficulties in the country on “class enemies”, “saboteurs”, “saboteurs”...
• Politburo and the peasantry. Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940. In 2 books. Book 1, . Two books of the publication include documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Economics, the Russian...